Testimony of Peyton McCrary
Professorial Lecturer in Law
George Washington University Law School

Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Of the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary

Oversight of the Voting Rights Act: Potential Legislative Reforms

August 16, 2021

Chair Cohen, Vice Chair Ross, Ranking Member Johnson, and distinguished Members, thank you for inviting me to testify before you today.

My name is Peyton McCrary. Although I have retired from 20 years of full-time university teaching and 26 years of government service in the U.S. Department of Justice, I still co-teach a course on voting rights law each fall at the George Washington University Law School, where adjunct faculty bear the title Professorial Lecturer in Law. My testimony today is offered in my personal capacity as a historian, not as a representative of any organization.

The focus of my testimony is evidence regarding the jurisdictions that would be covered by a new form of federal preclearance of voting changes, which I understand is being contemplated by this chamber. Representatives of the Brennan Center for Justice and the Leadership Conference Education Fund asked me some months ago to investigate the preclearance coverage formula that is being considered for inclusion in the John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act (VRAA). An earlier version of the VRAA passed the House of Representatives December 6, 2019, as HR 4 and is now under consideration in a new Congress.¹

The VRAA is designed to restore the preclearance provisions of the 1965 Voting Rights Act by

¹ For the record, I have performed the analysis as a consultant for these organizations, not as a staff member for either organization.
revising the coverage formula invalidated by the Supreme Court in its 2013 decision in *Shelby County v. Holder*. Preclearance refers to the process of receiving prior federal approval from the Department of Justice or the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia before implementing any change affecting voting. My task was to identify the jurisdictions that would be subject to preclearance should the VRAA become law. This task required the use of research methods I have employed – both in my scholarly publications and in expert witness testimony – over the last four decades. For example, it calls among other things for methodology I applied in my sworn Declaration filed by the United States in *Shelby County v. Holder* in 2010.²

The new formula for determining the jurisdictions that would be subject to preclearance under the VRAA would be triggered by the record of voting rights enforcement. My analysis generally focuses on the last 25 years, currently from 1996 through 2020, although the conclusions would change if the review period changed. Under some circumstances entire states would be covered; even if the entire state is not subject to preclearance, any individual political subdivision within a state could be covered if the record of voting rights violations in that subdivision fits meets the criteria of the VRAA.

My understanding of the current version of the bill’s coverage formula is that an entire state would be subject to preclearance if either of two patterns of violations applied: a) if 15 or more voting rights violations occurred within the state during the previous 25 years; or b) if 10 or more violations occurred in the state, at least one of which was committed by the state itself, rather than by local subdivisions within the state. I also understand that even if an entire state were not subject to preclearance, any political subdivision would be covered if it had three or

more violations during the previous 25 years. My count of violations includes: a) final judgments of a voting rights violation by the federal courts; b) objections to voting changes by the Attorney General; and c) a consent decree or other settlement causing a change favorable to minority voting rights.

I understand that Congress may consider other specifics for the coverage formula. While I am not testifying as to any approach Congress should take, I note that changes to the formula could lead to different conclusions than those I have reached.

**Qualifications**

I am an historian by training and taught history at the university level from 1969 until 1990. During the 1980s I served as an expert witness in numerous voting rights cases in the South. I was employed as a social science analyst by the Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, of the U.S. Department of Justice, from 1990 until my retirement in December 2016. My responsibilities in the Civil Rights Division included the planning, direction, coordination, and performance of historical research and empirical analysis for voting rights litigation, including the identification of appropriate expert witnesses to appear for the government at trial. In some instances, I was asked to provide written or courtroom testimony on behalf of the United States. Since retiring from government service, I have served as an expert in several voting rights cases brought by private plaintiffs.

I received B.A. and M.A. degrees from the University of Virginia in 1965 and 1966, respectively, and obtained my Ph.D. from Princeton University in 1972. My primary training was in the history of the United States, with a specialization in the history of the South during the 19th and 20th centuries. For 20 years I taught courses in my specialization at the University of Minnesota, Vanderbilt University, and the University of South Alabama. In 1998-99 I took
leave from the Department of Justice to serve as the Eugene Lang Professor of Social Change in the Department of Political Science at Swarthmore College. For the last fourteen years, both during government service and since retiring from the Department of Justice, I have co-taught a course on voting rights law as an adjunct professor at the George Washington University Law School.

I have published a prize-winning book, *Abraham Lincoln and Reconstruction: The Louisiana Experiment* (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1978), six law review articles, seven articles in refereed journals, and seven chapters in refereed books. Over the last three and a half decades my published work has focused on the history of discriminatory election laws in the South, evidence concerning discriminatory intent or racially polarized voting presented in the context of voting rights litigation, and the impact of the Voting Rights Act in the South. One of these studies was made part of the record before Congress regarding the adoption of the 2006 Voting Rights Reauthorization Act.\(^3\) I continued to publish scholarly work in my areas of expertise while employed by the Department of Justice and expect to continue my scholarly writing now that I have retired from government service. A detailed record of my professional qualifications is set forth in the attached curriculum vitae (Attachment 1), which I prepared and know to be accurate.

Although I write about the history of voting rights law in my scholarly publications and teach in a law school, I am not an attorney. However, the findings reflected in court opinions

often provide valuable evidence for investigations by experts. I routinely utilize the factual
evidence provided by court decisions in my scholarly writing. As I observed in a recent journal
article: “The factual evidence presented in court proceedings – in voting rights cases key
evidence often comes in through expert witness testimony by political scientists or historians – is
an invaluable resource for historical and social science research.”

The Methodology I Have Employed in This Investigation

Identifying final judgments in reported cases – and Section 5 objections interposed by the
Attorney General – was my first task. In my files I already had both hard copies and electronic
copies of many of the Section 2 cases from 1982 to the present, and of the voting rights cases
decided under the 14th Amendment before the amendment of Section 2 in 1982. I utilized the
detailed study by Professor Ellen Katz and her students at the University of Michigan Law
School, which became part of the record before Congress for the 2006 Reauthorization Act (and
subsequently published as a law review article). The website of the Civil Rights Division’s
Voting Section – where I worked for 26 years – gave ready access to the large number of final
judgments and settlement documents in cases involving the United States (under Section 2,
Section 4(e), Section 5, Section 11(b), and Section 203). Access to Westlaw through GW Law
School facilitated identification of other reported decisions brought on behalf of private plaintiffs
that I counted as violations. The Voting Section’s website also included links to all the Attorney
General’s Section 5 objections from the 1960s through the Shelby County decision in 2013.

---

4 Peyton McCrary, “The Interaction of Policy and Law: How the Courts Came to Treat
Annexations under the Voting Rights Act,” Journal of Policy History, 26 (No. 4, 2014), 429-58
(quoted sentence at p. 431).
Identifying consent decrees and other settlements in voting rights cases was perhaps the most time-consuming part of the investigation. The library resources of GW Law School gave me access to LexisNexis Court Link, a database with a comprehensive collection of dockets from voting rights litigation. This was the same database I had used to identify settlement documents in my 2010 declaration in *Shelby County v. Holder* (cited in Note 1 above). Many Court Link dockets included links to electronic copies of consent decrees, consent orders, and other settlement documents. Where no links were available through Court Link, I had to pursue further research to locate the needed evidence of violations (for which the internet proved invaluable). Numerous publicly available reports and scholarly publications also helped document court-ordered settlements of voting rights lawsuits.

I expect to finalize a more detailed report to the Brennan Center and the Leadership Conference soon. In my testimony today, however, I will summarize my findings and attach a listing of the key facts regarding each violation. I hope the subcommittee finds this testimony useful in considering how to proceed with the VRAA.

**Findings**

Let me begin by focusing on the eight states that – according to my analysis – are most likely to be subject to preclearance of voting changes. Recall that under my working understanding of the coverage formula, an entire state would be subject to preclearance if either of two patterns of violations applied: a) if 15 or more voting rights violations occurred within the state during the previous 25 years; or b) if 10 or more violations occurred in the state, at least one of which was committed by the state itself, rather than by local political subdivisions

---

6 Brennan Center staff have also been helpful in locating documentary evidence of settlements, but the assessment of whether any document demonstrated evidence of a violation was entirely my own.
within the state. I consider as a violation: a) a final judgment that a jurisdiction has violated the 14th or 15th Amendments, violated a provision of the Voting Rights Act, or been denied preclearance by a three-judge federal district court in the District of Columbia; b) an objection to voting changes by the Attorney General; or c) a consent decree or other settlement in a lawsuit where the defendants agreed to change the challenged election practice at issue in a manner that was favorable to minority plaintiffs. The following exhibit summarizes the number and type of violations that in my analysis would require federal preclearance of states if the current version of the coverage formula were enacted into law. Those states are Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas. Exhibit 1 identifies the violations in each of these states that I counted.

Although I believe they are likely to be covered, there are several states that could drop out of coverage depending on how Congress drafts the bill. Those states are Florida, North Carolina, and South Carolina. Each is close to the minimum threshold, so minor changes in what counts as a violation could make a difference.

On the other hand, barring wholesale changes to the coverage formula as I applied it, I have concluded that Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas are highly likely to be covered. There are also several states that I do not think will be covered but may be depending on drafting choices or the occurrence of a small number of additional violations. Virginia could meet the threshold of 10 violations with at least one by the state if what counts as a violation is altered, although I currently have it at 8 violations. New York and California are each between 10-15 violations, but none were committed by the State. If either State were to commit one violation, it would likely bring the State into coverage.

---

7 Exhibit 2 provides a breakdown of violations in states that I concluded would not be covered.
As I understand the current formula, even if an entire state would not be subject to preclearance, any political subdivision of that state in which three or more violations occurred in the preceding 25 years would be covered. The relevant political subdivision under this provision is the governmental unit responsible for voter registration – in most instances a county.\(^8\) Five political subdivisions in non-covered states which have three or more violations – which would therefore need to preclear voting changes – are itemized in Exhibit 3. The five counties are: Los Angeles County, California; Cook County, Illinois; Westchester County, New York; Cuyahoga County, Ohio; and Northampton County, Virginia.

**Conclusion**

I hope my analysis of the proposed coverage formula is helpful to the subcommittee’s current deliberations. My testimony today has focused on empirical analysis of court decisions, Section 5 objections, and consent decrees favorable to minority voters. For a moment, however, I want to emphasize the importance of the challenge Congress currently faces. When the Section 5 preclearance process was still functional – before June 2013 – it was a powerful tool for protecting minority voting rights. The bill you are considering can play a key role in confronting current efforts to limit voter registration and voting by minority citizens, as well as diluting minority voting strength. Based on my 41 years of experience in voting rights litigation, I believe firmly that strengthening enforcement of the Voting Rights Act is a critical need for our democracy.

---

\(^8\) In Louisiana the equivalent of a county is called a parish. In the state of Virginia independent cities – in addition to counties – conduct voter registration. Virginia’s independent cities are geographically separate from counties. All other municipalities are, as in the rest of the country, located within a county.
Exhibit 1: States Covered Under the Preclearance Formula in HR 4 If Enacted into Law

Alabama: 14 violations – 3 violations by the state

Court Decisions: (4)


Section 5 Objections: (3)

02-06-1998: Tallapoosa County (Redistricting Plan), 97-1021.

08-16-2000: Shelby County (City of Alabaster), Annexations, 2000-2230.

08-25-2009: Shelby County (City of Calera), Annexations and redistricting plan, 2008-1621.

Consent Decrees/Settlements: (7)


Jenkins v. City of Ozark, Alabama, No. 1:97cv1450 (M.D. Ala.), Consent Judgment and Decree, December 10, 1997 (Section 5 enforcement action).


Dillard v. Chilton County Commission, 495 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2007) (consent decree).


Florida: 10 violations - 3 violations by the state

Court Decisions: (3)

Stovall v. City of Cocoa, Fla., 117 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 1997).


Section 5 Objections/Settlements: (2)


Consent Decrees/Settlements: (5)


Georgia: 25 violations - 4 violations by the state

Court Decisions: (4)


Section 5 Objections: (13)


01-11-2000: Webster County (Redistricting plan, county school district), 98-1663.

03-17-2000: Wilkes County (MOE Tignall city council members), 99-2122.

10-01-2001: Turner County (MOE change, Ashburn), 94-4606.


09-12-2006: Randolph County (Change in voter registration & candidate eligibility), 2006-3856.

05-29-2009: State of Georgia (Voter verification program), 2008-5243.


Consent Decrees/Settlements: (8)

McIntosh County NAACP v. McIntosh County, Ga., No. 2:77CV70 (S.D. Ga. 1977) (consent decree).


State of Georgia.


---

**Louisiana: 16 – 1 violation by the state**

**Court Decisions: (2)**


**Section 5 Objections: (13)**


08-10-2009: **State of Louisiana** (designating length of time when parish precinct boundaries are frozen during the preparation of the U.S. decennial census), 2008-3512.

**Consent Decrees/Settlements: (1)**

Mississippi: 18 – 2 violations by the state

Court Decisions: (7)

Teague v. Attala County, MS, 92 F.3d 283 I5th Cir. 1996).
Clark v. Calhoun County, MS, 88 F.3d 1393 (5th Cir. 1996).
Gunn v. Chickasaw County, 1997 WL 1:02CV33426761 (N.D. Miss. 1997).
Citizens for Good Govt. v. Quitman, Ms., 148 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 1998).

Section 5 Objections: (8)

09-22-1997: State of Mississippi (NVRA implementation plan), 95-0418.
06-28-1999: Pike County (McComb, changing polling place to American Legion), 97-3795.
03-24-2010: State of Mississippi (majority vote requirement for county school boards, etc.), 2009-2022.
12-03-2012: Hinds County (Redistricting plan, city of Clinton), 2012-3120.

Consent Decrees/Settlements: (3)

Tryman v. City of Starkville, No. 1:02-cv-111 (N.D. Miss. 2003) (consent decree).
North Carolina: 11 – 4 violations by the state

Court Decisions: (3)


Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017), State of North Carolina.


Section 5 Objections: (6)

02-13-1996: State of North Carolina prohibits state legislative & congressional districts from crossing precinct lines, absent Section 5 objections, 95-2922.


06-25-2007: Cumberland County (Change in MOE for Fayetteville city council), 2007-2233.

08-17-2009: Lenoir County (Change to non-partisan election, City of Kinston), 2009-0216.

04-30-2012: Pitt County (Change in MOE, county school district), 2011-2474.

Consent Decrees/Settlements (2)


South Carolina: 15 – 1 violation by the state

Court Decisions: (1)


Section 5 Objections: (13)

03-05-1996: Cherokee County (Change in method of electing Gaffney Bd. Of Public Works), 95-2790.


12-09-2002: Laurens County (Annexations & district assignment, Clinton), 2002-1512, 2002-2706.

06-16-2003: Cherokee County (Reduction in size of school board), 2002-3457.

09-16-2003: Orangeburg County (Annexations by town of North), 2002-5306.

02-26-2004: Charleston County (From nonpartisan to partisan school board elections), 2003-2066.


08-16-2010: Fairfield County (MOE & number of members, county school board), 2010-0970.

**Consent Decrees/Settlements:** (1)


---

**Texas: 34 – 3 violations by the state**

**Court Decisions:** (5)


Fabela v. City of Farmers’ Branch, 2012 WL 3135545 (N.D. Texas).

**Section 5 Objections: (18) – 3 violations by the state**


03-17-1997: Harris County (Annexations, town of Webster), 95-2017.

12-04-1998: Galveston County (Adding numbered posts to at-large seats, Galveston), 98-2149.

07-16-1999: Dawson County (De-annexation, city of Lamesa), 99-0270.

06-05-2000: Austin County (Adding numbered posts, Sealy ISD), 99-3828.


06-21-2002: Waller County (Redistricting plans, commissioners court, constable districts), 2001-2430.

08-12-2002: Brazoria County (MOE, Freeport city council), 2002-1725.


03-24-2009: Gonzales County (Bi-lingual election procedures), 2008-3588.

03-12-2010: Gonzales County (Bi-lingual election procedures), 2009-3078.

06-28-2010: Runnels County (Bilingual election procedures), 2009-3672.

02-07-2012: Nueces County (Redistricting, county commissioners court), 2011-3992.

03-05-2012: Galveston County (Redistricting, county commissioners court), 2011-4317.

03-12-2012: **State of Texas** (Voter registration & photo id procedures, SB 14), 2011-2775.

12-21-2012: Jefferson County (Beaumont ISD, reduction in single member districts), 2012-4278.

04-08-2013: Jefferson County (Beaumont ISD, change in term of office, qualification procedures), 2013-0895.
Consent Decrees/Settlements: (11)

U.S. v. City of Earth, TX, 5:07-CV-144 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (consent decree).
U.S. v. Littlefield ISD, TX, No. 5:07-cv-145 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (consent decree).
U.S. v. Post ISD, TX, No. 5:07-CV-146-C (N.D. Tex. 2007) (consent decree).
U.S. v. Seagraves ISD, TX, No. 5:07-CV-147 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (consent decree).
U.S. v. Waller County, TX, No. 4:08-cv-3022 (S.D. Texas 2008) (consent decree).
U.S. v. Fort Bend County, TX, No. 4:09-cv-1058 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (consent decree).
Exhibit 2: States Not Covered Under the Current Preclearance Formula in HR 4

Alaska: 2 violations

Consent Decrees/Settlements: (2)


Arkansas: 2 violations

Court Decisions: (0)

Consent Decrees/Settlements: (2)

Cox v. Donaldson, No. 5:02CV319 (E.D. Ark. 2003) (consent decree)


Arizona: 4 violations

Section 5 Objections: (2)


02-04-2003: Coconino County (MOE, Coconino Association for Vocations, Industry, and Technology), 2002-3844.

Consent Decrees/Settlements: (2)


California: 12 violations

Court Decisions: (1)

Section 5 Objections: (1)


Consent Decrees/Settlements: (10)

U.S. v. City of Walnut, CA, No: CV 07-2437 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (consent decree).

Colorado: 2 violations

Court Decisions: (2)
Sanchez v. State of Colorado, 97 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir. 1996).

Hawaii: 1

Court Decisions: (1)
Arakaki v. Hawaii, 314 F. 3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002).
Illinois: 4

Court Decisions: (3)


Harper v. Chicago Heights, IL, 223 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2000).

Consent Decrees/Settlements: (1)

U.S. v. Kane County, IL, No. 07-v-5451 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (memorandum of agreement).

Massachusetts: 5

Court Decisions: (1)


Consent Decrees/Settlements: (4)


City of Lawrence, No. 98cv12256 (D. Mass. 1998) (settlement agreement).

Michigan: 3

Section 5 Objections: (1)

12-26-2007: Saginaw County (Buena Vista Township, closure of voter registration branch office), 2007-3837.

Consent Decrees/Settlements: (2)


Missouri: 1

Court Decisions: (1)


Montana: 5

Court Decisions: (1)

U.S. v. Blaine County, MT, 363 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2004).

Consent Decrees/Settlements: (4)


Nebraska: 2

Court Decisions: (1)

Stable v. Thurston County, NE, 129 F. 3d 1015 (8th Cir. 1997).

Consent Decrees/Settlements: (1)


Nevada: 1

Court Decisions:

New Jersey: 2

Consent Decrees/Settlements: (2)


New Mexico: 3

Consent Decrees/Settlements: (3)


New York: 12

Court Decisions: (5)

Goosby v. Town of Hempstead, NY, 180 F.3d 476 (2nd Cir. 1999).


Objections: (2)


02-04-1999: Change in method of election from single transferable vote to limited voting with four votes per voter for community school boards in Bronx, Kings, and New York Counties: 98-3193.
Consent Decrees/Settlements: (5)


North Dakota: 2

Court Decisions: (1)


Consent Decrees/Settlements: (1)


Ohio: 4

Court Decisions: (1)


Consent Decrees/Settlements: (3)


Pennsylvania: 2

Court Decisions: (1)

Consent Decrees/Settlements: (1)

South Dakota: 2
Court Decisions: (1)
Section 5 Objections: (1)
02-11-2008: Charles Mix County (Increase in size & redistricting of county commission), 2007-6012.

Tennessee: 2
Court Decisions: (1)
Consent Decrees/Settlements: (1)

Virginia: 8 – 2 by State
Section 5 Objections: (6)
10-27-1999: Dinwiddie County (Polling place change), 99-2229.
04-29-2002: Pittsylvania County (Redistricting, county supervisors & school board), 2001-2026, 2501.
07-09-2002: Cumberland County (Redistricting plan, county supervisors), 2001-2374.


**Consent Decrees/Settlements: (0)**

---

**Washington: 3**

**Court Decisions: (1)**


**Consent Decrees/Settlements:**


---

**Wisconsin:1**

**Court Decisions:**


---

**Wyoming: 1**

**Court Decisions:**

Large v. Fremont County, Wy., 709 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (D. Wyo. 2010).
Exhibit 3: Political Subdivisions Covered Under the Preclearance Formula in HR 4

**California:**

**Los Angeles County: 5 violations**


U.S. v. City of Walnut, No. CV 07-2437 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (consent decree).


---

**Illinois:**

**Cook County: 3 violations**


Harper v. Chicago Heights, 223 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2000).


---

**New York:**

**Westchester County: 3 violations**


U.S. v. Westchester County, No. 05 CIV. 0650 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (consent decree).
Ohio:

Cuyahoga County: 3 violations


Virginia:

Northampton County: 3 violations

