DIGITAL HEALTH DATA AND INFORMATION
SHARING: A NEW FRONTIER FOR HEALTH CARE COMPETITION?

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It has long been the case that information can confer competitive advantage. This has come to be increasingly important, and perhaps central, in many industries as digital interfaces and data storage and processing capacities have grown dramatically. In all sectors of the economy, companies are applying data science to their digital assets to gain insights into the people and behaviors represented in the data. While in many ways health care has lagged in the adoption and effective utilization of information technology, the ability to access and analyze data has become increasingly important in health care, as it has in other sectors of the economy.

Analyzing health data can yield important insights for health care organizations. For example, through data they possess, health care businesses can learn more about the people they are caring for, the practice patterns of their

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2 We refer to digital health data via custody rather than ownership because whether anyone besides an individual owns data about them is beyond the scope of this paper. We focus on digital data within the traditional health care system in this paper (also known as digital Protected Health Information under HIPAA). Health data collected in other settings, such as retail or direct-to-consumer services, is outside our scope.
doctors, and the capacity utilization of their facilities. This rich information can be used to assess and improve performance. It has the potential to improve the quality of care and lower costs, benefiting both patients, health care organizations, and the health care system overall. It can be used by individuals to create their own longitudinal health record and monitor their health.\(^3\) In fact, the promise of digital data exchange to improve health underlay Congress’ enactment of the Health Information Technology for Clinical Health (HITECH) Act in 2009 as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act,\(^4\) and most recently, the health information technology (IT) provisions of the 21st Century Cures Act in 2016\(^5\) (Cures). Both of these federal laws actively promoted a higher rate of exchange\(^6\) of identifiable health information for all the above reasons.

Yet, even with widespread digitization of health information and a $36 billion-dollar taxpayer investment to make that happen,\(^7\) that information seems to be flowing at a sluggish pace, and the exchange of digital health information among competitors is the exception, not the norm.\(^8\) This is distinct from some other industries where sharing data is more common and firms compete on the basis of using that data to create value.\(^9\)

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\(^6\) As used in this article, “exchange” will have two meanings, understood from the context. It means (1) a provider sharing of identifiable health data with another provider for a common patient and (2) the ease with which EHRs enable that sharing.

\(^7\) HITECH & ARRA, *supra* note 4, Title V (money for incentive payments to physicians and hospitals who “meaningfully used” certified electronic health records).


\(^9\) Extensive information exchange between rivals occurs in some other industries (but not all). Financial institutions fiercely compete for customer business and regularly exchange information from their customers’ accounts. Cellular phone customers can change carriers and equipment without the carrier refusing to exchange or transfer the data (although a federal law was required to make this easier for the consumer). In on-line search, customers can easily transfer their bookmarks, settings, and search histories across browsers, although search engines retain proprietary custody of the search histories they collect. Online shopping sites typically retain their custom-
In this article, we argue that the sluggish pace of information exchange results from firms’ incentives and abilities to maintain or enhance their competitive advantage. Health care organizations and their software vendors control the data collected or generated in the course of patients’ encounters with them. These organizations decide if, when, and how they will share that information with others, including other health care organizations, other software vendors, and, in some cases, even the patients themselves.¹⁰

Not surprisingly, if retaining data is profitable while sharing it is not, there will not be a large amount of data sharing. In particular, if firms perceive that control of these data confer competitive advantage, they will be reluctant to share the data with rivals, even if sharing the data likely enables better care to be delivered to patients. Holding on to data may allow market participants to maintain, and in some cases enhance, their market position.¹¹ We believe this “data blocking” is already a barrier to choice and competition and can make it difficult for new innovative organizations to successfully enter health care markets and compete. Furthermore, we anticipate that these issues will become even more pressing as data become an ever more important asset in health care, as it is in the rest of the economy.

The Executive and Legislative branches have recognized the apparent lack of data sharing by health care organizations may be attributable to data blocking (also called “information blocking”). In 2014, Congress requested that the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT (ONC) publish a report on information blocking.¹² Information blocking occurs when an entity that controls health data—such as a

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¹⁰ While HIPAA, supra note 4, requires that providers give patients their Protected Health Information (PHI) when it is requested, patient complaints about inability to get their own data remains the number one type of complaint to OCR. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Top Five Issues Investigated (Jan. 31, 2018), www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-enforcement/data/top-five-issues-investigated-cases-closed-corrective-action-calendar-year/index.html.

¹¹ Joy Grossman, Kathryn Kushner & Elizabeth November, Creating Sustainable Local Health Information Exchanges: Can Barriers to Stakeholder Participation Be Overcome? Research Brief, Center for Studying Health System Change (2008), www.hschange.org/CONTENT/970/970.pdf. This study conducted interviews with health care stakeholders in four communities regarding the sharing of health data and found that hospitals “viewed clinical data as a key strategic asset, tying physicians and patients to their organization.” Id. at 5.

health care organization or an electronic health record (EHR)\textsuperscript{13} software vendor—refuses to share the data or engages in practices that impede efficient access and use of the data by competitors or other individuals or entities.

In April 2015, ONC published the report requested by Congress on the nature and extent of information blocking.\textsuperscript{14} In late 2016, Congress passed the 21st Century Cures Act (Cures).\textsuperscript{15} Cures defines information blocking, and requires ONC in conjunction with the HHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to define business practices that do not constitute information blocking.\textsuperscript{16} It also authorizes OIG to root out information blocking, including authorizing levying fines of up to $1 million per violation.\textsuperscript{17} On February 11, 2019, ONC released an “HHS approved” draft of its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to Improve the Interoperability of Health Information, which will be published shortly in the Federal Register.\textsuperscript{18}

Whether these provisions will be sufficiently strong to overcome firms’ incentives to engage in information blocking remains an open question. In what follows, we trace the background and public policy behind the federal government’s drive to dramatically increase the availability of clinical digital health data and its expectation that those data would be exchanged widely and appropriately.\textsuperscript{19} We focus on how the sharing (and lack of sharing) of clinical

\textsuperscript{13} HITECH subtitle A, part I, § 13001(1), defines Electronic Health Records statutorily. CMS (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services) offers a layperson’s definition as an electronic version of a patient’s medical history, that is maintained by the provider over time, and may include all of the key administrative clinical data relevant to that person’s care under a particular provider, including demographics, progress notes, problems, medications, vital signs, past medical history, immunizations, laboratory data and radiology reports. U.S. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Electronic Health Records (Mar. 26, 2012), www.cms.gov/Medicare/E-Health/EHealthRecords/index.html. Regulations promulgated by the Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT (ONC) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 170.300 et seq.) specify the functions an EHR must meet to be “certified.” As is discussed, infra note 33, to be eligible to receive financial incentives from CMS, physicians and hospitals must use EHRs that are certified.


\textsuperscript{15} Cures, supra note 5, Title IV, §§ 4001–4006.

\textsuperscript{16} Id. 130 Stat. 1177 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 300jj–52(a)(2)(C)).

\textsuperscript{17} Id. § 4004 (creating § 3022(b) of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-52(b)).


\textsuperscript{19} We focus on clinical digital health data from a care setting, as opposed to administrative digital health data, because the former has been the focus of HITECH and subsequent federal
digital health data affects competition. We analyze the problem from the perspectives of the health care providers and EHR vendors, the most important participants in the flow of patient medical data from an antitrust and policy perspective. We conclude with a look forward and suggestions of policy efforts that could shift firms’ incentives from not sharing data to sharing it.

I. FEDERAL POLICY TO DIGITIZE HEALTH INFORMATION AND PROMOTE INFORMATION SHARING

In this Part, we first briefly describe the federal legal landscape that permits physicians and hospitals to exchange identifiable health information about patients they have in common. Next, we summarize how Congress built on that foundation in 2009 by enacting HITECH, creating significant financial incentives for physicians and hospitals to digitize their record keeping and to share the resulting digital data.

A. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Supports Information Sharing

In 1996, Congress passed the Health Information Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). Although this act is now synonymous with the health information privacy regulation it spawned, HIPAA actually focused on two other features. “Portability” refers to insurance coverage portability, not data portability. (Twenty years ago policy makers believed insurance coverage portability would help alleviate the worse health effects of pre-existing condition exclusions to insurance coverage.) “Accountability” referred to the federal legal requirement that, in order to be paid by CMS (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services), providers would have to bill CMS digitally and therefore digitize claims information. Thus, through HIPAA, Congress made its first attempt to bring the power of computing to health care, specifically in the context of data transmissions. To avoid unintended consequences deriving from the electronic billing requirement, Congress delegated to HHS the development of regulations that specified how digital health data can be accessed, used and disclosed. As a result, we have the HIPAA Privacy, Security and Breach Notification federal regulations still in use today. In general, unless

20 HIPAA, supra note 4.
22 Although 45 C.F.R. §§ 160–164 state all of the Privacy, Security and Breach Notification Rules, most of the Privacy Rule is found at 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500–164.536, most of the Security Rule is found at 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.300–164.318, and most of the Breach Notification Rule, not relevant for the present discussion, is found at 45 C.F.R. §§ 400–414.
the context requires more specificity, we will simply refer to HIPAA for the totality of the Privacy, Security, and Breach Notification rules.

What HIPAA permits and requires by way of information sharing is important, because if HIPAA does not permit sharing, holders of data protected by HIPAA should not be accused of “information blocking.” But, where HIPAA permits or even requires data sharing, a failure to do so should be examined to make sure that HIPAA is not being employed as a pretext to justify data “hoarding,” as has been alleged by ONC, or to prevent patients from being “poached.” Therefore, we will briefly summarize what HIPAA permits and requires relative to information sharing.

The basic regulations governing when health information protected by HIPAA can be exchanged were written in 2000 and 2002, and are unchanged since then. HIPAA applies to the holders of identifiable health information, called “protected health information” or PHI, when those holders (called “covered entities”) are physicians, hospitals, health plans (including self-funded employer medical benefits plans), and certain businesses that process digital health information for billing. We are focused on health information in the custody of physicians and hospitals. HIPAA further recognizes that covered entities will need to hire various “business associates” to serve special purposes. The Privacy and Security Rules apply to both covered entities and business associates either by regulation or contract. For hospitals and physicians, EHR vendors are their business associates under HIPAA.

HIPAA requires that when requested to do so, covered entities provide an individual with copies of that individual’s PHI. The individual can then do whatever he or she wants with it, including giving it to another covered en-


25 Office of the Nat’l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech. & HHS Office for Civil Rights Fact Sheets on exchange for treatment and exchange for health care operations of the recipient, published in 2016, describe and illustrate 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.501, 164.506, and some provisions of § 164.512. Office of the Nat’l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., Fact Sheets [hereinafter HIPAA Fact Sheets], www.healthit.gov/topic/fact-sheets. In essence, as between two traditional health care organizations, like hospitals and physicians, the fact sheets show that exchange for treatment is permitted without first obtaining an individual’s written permission, but not required. In contrast, when an individual asks for a copy of his or her own health information, including electronically via a download or transmit function on an EHR, release of the data is required. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.524. Thus, no federal regulations require physicians or hospitals to exchange health information with each other.

In HITECH, Congress interpreted this regulation, and required that where a person sought his or her PHI from a health care organization that used a certified EHR, the person must be able to view, download, or transmit their PHI to a recipient of his or her’s own choosing, including a competing provider. HIPAA also permits two covered entities to share PHI, without the person’s written consent, about a person to whom they are both delivering care. In 2015, the HHS Office for Civil Rights clarified that this permission includes sharing health information using ONC certified EHRs. That guidance also specified that the disclosing covered entity was legally not responsible for the security conditions at the recipient covered entity. As a result, it is well documented that while other privacy rules may place additional restrictions on when and how sharing occurs, lack of health information sharing is not due to HIPAA specifically prohibiting it.

B. HITECH INCENTIVIZES INFORMATION SHARING

HITECH, passed in 2009, provided over $36 billion in incentive payments for physicians and hospitals to adopt and meaningfully use (as specified by CMS “Meaningful Use” criteria) software (with functions prescribed by ONC) to keep track of their patients’ medical care through EHRs. HITECH provided further incentives for digitizing health records, this time clinical, not claims, data. Under HITECH, a physician or hospital that adopted a certified electronic health record that met minimum software specifications, and which used that software as specified by CMS Meaningful Use criteria, was eligible for significant payments—$44,000 per physician for full Stage 1 compliance. The incentive payments were intended to compensate providers for the acquisition costs of the EHRs.

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28 HITECH, supra note 4, § 13405(c).
29 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c)(2) & (c)(4).
30 HIPAA Fact Sheets, supra note 25.
31 Michelle Mello, Julia Adler-Milstein, Lucia Savage & Karen Ding, Legal Barriers to the Growth of Health Information Exchange—Boulders or Pebbles?, 96 MILBANK Q. 110 (Mar. 2018) [hereinafter Mello et al., Boulders or Pebbles].
33 See HITECH, supra note 4, §§ 4101–4102; 42 C.F.R. §§ 412, 413, 422 & 495. This method—payment incentives for new behaviors it wants—now infuses many other CMS payment rules, such as the Medicare Inpatient Prospective Payment Rule for Hospitals and the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule for physicians. For example, see generally 2019 Medicare Inpatient Prospective Payment, 83 Fed. Reg. 41,144, 41,634–88 (Aug. 17, 2018).
34 HITECH, supra note 4, § 3001; 42 C.F.R. § 170.300 et seq. (regulations).
36 HITECH, supra note 4, §§ 4101–4102.
This whole scheme was called “Meaningful Use” or “the Meaningful Use Program,” after language in HITECH. Meaningful Use had three stages.\(^{38}\) The criteria required to qualify for meaningful use payments became more demanding at each successive stage. For example, in Stage I physicians and hospitals had to attest to a criterion that required having received health information from someone else.\(^{39}\) In Stage II, they had to attest to a criterion that required having sent it somewhere else, and to having allowed patients who wanted it the ability to download or transmit their own health information directly from the relevant EHR.\(^{40}\)

ARRA also made $300 million available for seed money grants (to be awarded by ONC) to states or organizations designated by states, to build technical and governance infrastructure to enable physicians and hospitals to share information with each other.\(^{41}\) There were also funds available to Medicaid agencies within states to build connectivity and ensure that Medicaid beneficiaries also got the clinical and efficiency benefits of health information exchange.\(^{42}\) Even after the official “Meaningful Use” program began to end, CMS continues to use this method to change provider behaviors in general, and in particular about information sharing.\(^{43}\)

By the end of 2016, most of the $36 billion had flowed to EHR vendors.\(^{44}\) According to ONC, more than 95 percent of acute care hospitals and 78 percent of physicians were “meaningfully using” electronic health records, as a

\(^{37}\) Id.

\(^{38}\) Medicare & Medicaid Programs; Electronic Health Record Incentive Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 44,313 (July 28, 2010).

\(^{39}\) Final Stage 1 regulations were effective in 2011 and superseded by subsequent regulations, all of which updated 42 C.F.R. § 170.300 et seq.

\(^{40}\) 42 C.F.R. § 412 (for hospitals); 42 C.F.R. § 495 (for physicians). We note that with each year’s new measurement and incentive payment regulations, the regulatory nomenclature and incentive requirements change. For example, for calendar year 2019, what used to be called meaningful use for hospital is now called “promoting interoperability,” 2019 Medicare Inpatient Prospective Payment Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 41,144, 41,635 (Aug. 17, 2018).

\(^{41}\) ARRA, supra note 4, Sec. 5, Div. A, Title I, ONC Appropriation, 123 Stat. 179 (2009).


\(^{43}\) For example, the 2019 Medicare Inpatient Prospective Payment Rule still financially rewards hospitals which can attest to exchange for a single patient. 83 Fed. Reg. 41,144 (Aug. 7, 2018). As for financial penalties, the proposed 2019 Inpatient Payment Rule requested information on whether a failure to meet certain health sharing behaviors could lead to a hospital not being allowed to participate in the Medicare program at all. 83 Fed. Reg. 20,164, 20,550 (May 7, 2018). However, in the 2019 Medicare Inpatient Prospective Payment Rule, Medicare did not impose this type of penalty. 83 Fed. Reg. 41,144, 41,688 (Aug. 17, 2018).

\(^{44}\) Joseph Conn, Epic, Cerner EHRs Top the List for Hospital Meaningful-Use Payments, MODERN HEALTHCARE (May 12, 2014), www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20140502/NEWS/305029944.
result of HITECH and its incentives.\textsuperscript{45} This means that the vast majority of Americans have some, and possibly a lot, of their health data stored in digital form.

Although the volume of digital clinical health data grew substantially, data were not being exchanged. Many hospitals and providers met the Meaningful Use criterion that required electronic transmission of a summary of care record for at least 10 percent of transitions from provider to provider or one care setting to another (as part of meeting the second stage of Meaningful Use requirements).\textsuperscript{46} Few of them, however, did so for the majority of care transitions.\textsuperscript{47} National hospital data from 2014 reveal that only 25 percent of hospitals routinely engaged in four dimensions of interoperability—finding, sending, receiving, and integrating data from outside providers.\textsuperscript{48} One year later, this had only increased to 30 percent, suggesting a slow transition to nationwide interoperability.\textsuperscript{49}

In parallel with national data revealing slow progress on interoperability, anecdotal reports of information blocking emerged.\textsuperscript{50} Lawmakers and other stakeholders became concerned that the slow progress on interoperability was, at least in part, driven by information blocking behaviors. In response, Congress requested that ONC investigate.\textsuperscript{51}

The resulting report\textsuperscript{52} summarized available evidence of information blocking and included examples of these practices, including unreasonably high fees for technical connections, pretextual use of privacy laws as a justification for not sharing information, and various contractual and other business practices that limit the exchange of information with competitors. The agency con-

\textsuperscript{45} Office of the Nat’l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., Office of the Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 2016 Report to Congress on Health IT Progress: Examining the HITECH Era and the Future of Health IT Submitted Pursuant to Section 3001(c)(6) of the Public Health Service Act and Section 13113(A) of the HITECH Act (2016) at 5.
\textsuperscript{46} CMS Electronic Health Record Stage 2 Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 52,909 (Sept. 4, 2014).
\textsuperscript{49} Id. at 1825
\textsuperscript{50} This is summarized in Nick Terry, Information Blocking and Interoperability, Bill of Health (Dec. 19, 2014), blogs.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2014/12/19/information-blocking-and-interoperability/.
\textsuperscript{52} ONC Information Blocking Report, supra note 14, at 17.
cluded both that information blocking was occurring and that it was a serious impediment to the appropriate flow of health information.\textsuperscript{53}

Further, the ONC Information Blocking Report expressed concern that one aspect of information blocking represented potentially anticompetitive conduct. EHR developers and health care providers were not exchanging health information outside their closed systems. ONC’s concern was that this failure to exchange information sometimes reflected deliberate attempts to disadvantage rivals by withholding information.\textsuperscript{54}

From a legal perspective, providers and hospitals received substantial financial payments for legally attesting to having undertaken certain activities, including a specific, albeit minimal level of exchange.\textsuperscript{55} If the attestations were proved false, they would be subject to the same rules as any other false or fraudulent claim to CMS.\textsuperscript{56} However, the second, and more likely, scenario was a set of activities that were not false attestations. For example, the amount of activity required to meet the incentive milestone was sometimes quite low, such as a single occurrence of information exchange with an unaffiliated provider in a 12-month period. In practice, providers and hospitals could both legally attest to the minimal quantity amounts of exchange and still engage in information blocking beyond those minimums.

We do not know whether CMS and ONC were “naïve”\textsuperscript{57} regarding the prospect that organizations would meet the requirements while still engaging in information blocking, or realized the possibility but did not think it would be widespread. By the time it wrote the Information Blocking Report, however, ONC clarified that HITECH was enacted with the goal of spurring data-driven competition among health care delivery organizations.\textsuperscript{58}

As mentioned earlier, following ONC’s February 2015 report, Congress responded in 2016 by enacting the 21st Century Cures Act,\textsuperscript{59} outlawing information blocking, except as required by law or specified in future

\textsuperscript{53} See, e.g., id. at 16.
\textsuperscript{54} Id. at 15.
\textsuperscript{55} See, e.g., id. at 4, 17.
\textsuperscript{58} Promoting “a more effective marketplace, greater competition . . . increased consumer choice, and improved outcomes in health care services” is one of the express purposes of a nationwide health IT infrastructure for health information exchange. ONC INFORMATION BLOCKING REPORT, supra note 14, at 10. See also Public Health Service Act § 3001(b)(10), 42 U.S.C. § 300jj–11(b)(10).
\textsuperscript{59} Cures, supra note 5, §§ 4001–4006 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
rulemaking.\textsuperscript{60} It also directed the HHS Office of the Inspector General and ONC to collectively develop standards via rulemaking for recognizing unlawful information blocking.\textsuperscript{61}

Meanwhile, there was an effort to examine the extent of information blocking by surveying leaders of digital health data exchange efforts across the country. The survey revealed that 60 percent of respondents reported that hospitals and health systems routinely or occasionally engage in information blocking, while 85 percent of respondents reported that EHR vendors do so.\textsuperscript{62} The survey also identified common forms of information blocking pursued by providers (e.g., controlling patient flow by selectively sharing data) and by EHR vendors (e.g., charging fees for sharing that were unrelated to actual cost to provide sharing capabilities).\textsuperscript{63} While not all health care stakeholders are convinced that information blocking is real,\textsuperscript{64} prominent stakeholders, including the American Medical Association, American Academy of Family Practitioners, and Health IT Now continue to advocate to ONC and OIG on whether information blocking is a significant problem and, if so, how it should be defined.\textsuperscript{65} Recently, Principal Deputy National Coordinator Genevieve Morris declared, “We have to stop competing on hoarding data”\textsuperscript{66} And Medicare Administrator Seema Verma stated that hospital “[s]ystems too often refuse to share data because they fear their patients will be poached. This mentality has to be changed because it endangers the health of millions of Americans.”\textsuperscript{67}

As the preceding demonstrates, federal law requires or permits information sharing, and Congress has gone to great and repeated lengths to promote shar-

\textsuperscript{60} Id. § 4004 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300-jj-52(a)(1)).
\textsuperscript{61} Id. § 4006(a)(3), 130 Stat. 1177 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-52(a)(3)) (“The Secretary, through rulemaking, shall identify reasonable and necessary activities that do not information blocking for purposes of paragraph.”).
\textsuperscript{63} ONC INFORMATION BLOCKING REPORT, supra note 14, at 15.
\textsuperscript{64} Dr. John Halamka: 4 Thoughts on MU, Information Blocking and Interoperability, BUCKER’S HOSP. REV. (June 02, 2015), https://www.healthleadersmedia.com/innovation/countdown-information-blocking-rule-progress (quoting John Halamka, MD, CIO of Harvard-affiliated Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center in Boston, “I’ve never seen it. Find me one example”); Mandy Roth, Countdown to Information Blocking Rule in Progress, HEALTH LEADERS MEDIA (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.healthleadersmedia.com/innovation/countdown-information-blocking-rule-progress (quoting Marc Probst, CIO of Intermountain Health Care in Utah, “Data blocking is a bit like a mythical creature. . . . I think they [HHS] are stretching it a bit when they talk about some of the things that have happened around data blocking.”).
\textsuperscript{66} Morris, supra note 23, at 27:16.
\textsuperscript{67} Verma, supra note 24.
ing. Yet, exchange is not occurring at the rates hoped for, or even anticipated. Therefore, this prompts us to consider what else may be driving or contributing to the low rates of exchange. Below, we examine all the justifications that have been reasonably asserted and conclude that anticompetitive motivations may be suppressing the rate of health information exchange, despite a clear public policy favoring it. In Part IV, we suggest additional actions that could be undertaken to better understand why rates of health information exchange remain so low and potentially to help remedy the problem.

II. FACTORS AFFECTING INFORMATION SHARING

In what follows we consider legal or technical factors that may impede data sharing among health care organizations, then explain how these factors (privacy, security, technical challenges, etc.) relate to different health care organizations’ financial incentives. We conclude that these firms too often make it harder than it needs to be (legally or technically) for patients to take their data to other firms because this can inhibit patients or customers from moving their business to competing providers. This conduct thwarts federal policy goals of increasing consumer choice and competition in health care.

A. Justifications for Not Sharing Health Information

Health care systems and providers, as well as EHR vendors, have offered various justifications for not exchanging health information. These include patient privacy, ensuring proper security of health information, intellectual property, and the costs and complexity of software interfaces. While some of these are legitimate (at least in certain circumstances), some do not hold up legally or factually. We discuss each of these below. For example, health care providers have claimed that HIPAA regulations are a reason why information cannot be shared. However, as we demonstrated above, this nationwide health privacy law actually has more than a dozen reasons why sharing health information among providers is permitted or even required.68 In addition, while there are some technical challenges associated with sharing digital health data, experts believe these technical barriers can be overcome, as they have been in other industries.69

68 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c) (listing some reasons why disclosure is permitted); C.F.R. § 164.524 (stating disclosures required to an individual of their own health information).
In what follows, we first discuss factors affecting information sharing by EHR developers, then health care providers. We analyze their financial incentives regarding information sharing, and legal or technical barriers to doing so.

B. Financial Incentives Affecting EHR Developers’ Information Sharing

As discussed above, Congress provided significant financial incentives through the Meaningful Use program to make health information exchange more widespread, and the basic federal health information law permits the contemplated exchange without the written permission of the individual. Despite this, there is still little exchange of data. In order to understand this, one must examine how firms’ overall economic interests are affected by data exchange. At present no business model exists for EHR companies to profit from data sharing. In fact, holders of PHI are not allowed to sell it, and for permitted disclosures (discussed in Part I.A above), PHI holders are allowed to recover only their “reasonable” costs for preparing and transmitting data. On the other hand, EHR companies may have substantial financial incentives to retain data and avoid facilitating their physician and hospital customers from sharing the health information outside of business relationships the EHR company controls.

While the financial incentives at play for any given vendor depend on its business model, and precise information on the business models used is not publicly available, there is a common understanding of how different business models create competitive benefit from not sharing data. The first and most direct incentive is the way vendors are paid. An EHR company that is paid based on the number of individuals whose records they process has strong incentives to retain the data and strong disincentives to make it easy for an individual to move their data to a competing provider. When patient data migrate from one vendor to another, the source vendor directly loses revenue, which is gained by competitors.

A second financial incentive to retain data is that the data held by an EHR company can be exploited for analytics. The greater the volume of data a firm

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70 45 C.F.R. 164.506(c).
73 Jordan Everson & Julia Adler-Milstein, Engagement in Hospital Health Information Exchange Is Associated with Vendor Marketplace Dominance, 35 HEALTH AFF. 1286 (2016) (finding that there is more information exchange in markets where the dominant EHR vendor has a smaller market share, suggesting that competition and information exchange may be positively related).
holds, the more informative, and hence valuable, the analytics it can produce are for customers, who may use them for research, clinical decision support, business decision support, etc.\textsuperscript{74} An NIH blog suggests that EHR data may be “the most high-value data set to come.”\textsuperscript{75} For example, this year, Flatiron Health, a privately held oncology EHR company, sold for $1.9 billion because of the value of its data.\textsuperscript{76}

A third financial incentive affecting information sharing is that lack of interoperability between EHRs can financially benefit the EHR companies. If an EHR is more valuable to any user the more it is adopted by other users, then EHR companies have a strong incentive to build and retain market share to become the dominant EHR.\textsuperscript{77} This is because if an EHR has more patients, it has more data for analysis, an attractive feature for prospective providers.\textsuperscript{78} The EHR vendor is thus likely to become a “must have” data destination. Interoperability undermines that value, enabling providers to acquire patient records outside that particular vendor and its closed environment.

In its Information Blocking Report, ONC discussed the rise of these “walled gardens,” technical environments in which every provider who contracts with that EHR developer may be able to exchange with other customers of that vendor, but not outside the “garden walls.”\textsuperscript{79} A dominant vendor has the most data on the most patients within the referral market, and on the most physicians in the referral market. This dominant position creates pressure for providers not using the dominant vendor to switch because that is where the patient data are. While, of course, there may be interoperability within one EHR developer’s data system used by many providers, effective competition among EHR developers and the innovation and downward price pressure it brings, languishes.

\textsuperscript{74} An example is Flatiron Health, which developed and hosts data for an oncology-only EHR, with the express business model of aggregating data sets to improve cancer research, better clinical decision support, etc. Christina Farr, At Flatiron Health, Keeping the Doctor Close, FAST COMPANY (Apr. 19, 2017), www.fastcompany.com/3067893/at-flatiron-health-keeping-the-doctor-close.

\textsuperscript{75} Patti Brennan, \textit{Is the EHR the New Big Data?}, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, DataScience@NIH, (Mar. 24, 2017), datascience.nih.gov/BlogIsTheEHR.

\textsuperscript{76} Sy Mukherjee, Why Drug Giant Roche’s $1.9 Billion Deal to Buy Data Startup Flatiron Health Matters, FORTUNE (Feb. 16, 2018), fortune.com/2018/02/16/roche-flatiron-health-deal-why-it-matters/.

\textsuperscript{77} This phenomenon is referred to as a “network externality.” A product or service is more valuable the more other people adopt or use it. This phenomenon is familiar from computer operating systems and software, microprocessors, telecommunications, and electronic marketplaces.

\textsuperscript{78} Depending on the EHR developer’s business model, greater numbers of patient records may also mean greater revenue.

\textsuperscript{79} ONC INFORMATION BLOCKING REPORT, supra note 14, at 17–18.
A fourth form of financial incentive is that EHR developers can and do charge providers high fees for connectivity to other vendor systems or with third parties, such as fees that a developer charges to engineer software to connect securely to another vendor’s software. These make interoperability, and thus data sharing, expensive, but improve the developer’s bottom line. Of course, fees at some level may be reasonable, but providers (especially small practices, which constitute the majority of providers outside of hospitals)\(^80\) argue that the fees are disproportionately high compared to the technological challenge, do not account for economies of scale, and in fact are priced high to discourage connectivity and exchange.\(^81\) Thus, the fees can serve as financial barriers for physicians who want to exchange data with providers who use competing EHR systems, and confine those physicians to the aforementioned “walled gardens.” Thus, charging high fees can be a strategy for data holders to impede data transfer and thwart competition. This may be a version of the strategy of raising rivals’ costs to thwart competition.\(^82\)

Developers, however, argue that they need to restrict information sharing to protect the intellectual property underlying their systems. In particular, there is concern that making information available for sharing could reveal two business sensitive sources of IP: (1) their underlying data model (i.e., how information is stored and organized), and (2) how the data are presented (i.e., aspects of their user interface). For example, Cerner’s terms of use prohibit the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services from disclosing “source code, prices, trade secrets, mask works, databases, designs and techniques, models, displays and manuals.”\(^83\)

When source code cannot be disclosed, competing EHR developers, or physicians who hire their own software engineers, cannot develop the tools to

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engineer appropriate data connections between two vendors’ systems, even if this is what the providers want for patient care. The legitimacy of intellectual property must be recognized and protected, but as in other areas of IT, developers need to make key information available to others who are engineering connections or applications to the platform.\footnote{In its rule on Certified EHRs, ONC required for the first time that developers add to the next version an “open specification, read-only” application programming interface, such as is commonly used for financial data already. See 45 C.F.R. § 170.315(g)(7), (8) & (9); 2015 Ed. Health Information Technology (Health IT) Certification Criteria, 80 Fed. Reg. 62,602 (Oct. 16, 2015) [hereinafter 2015 Health IT Cert Criteria]. CMS then required in its payment rules under the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114–10, 129 Stat. 87 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), that physicians seeking incentive payments allow developers to use those open specifications to develop third-party apps, which individuals would use to get copies of their own health information, called “consumer mediated exchange,” or a B2C transaction. Medicare 2018 Updates to the Quality Payment Program, 82 Fed. Reg. 77,008 (Nov. 1, 2016). CMS repeated this requirement for hospitals in its 2018 Medicare Inpatient Prospective Payment Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 53,568 (Nov. 16, 2017), and reiterated that effective date in the 2019 Medicare Inpatient Prospective Payment Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 41,144, 41,635–36 (Aug. 17, 2018). It remains to be seen if requiring this change in the software functionality will facilitate greater amounts of business-to-business/provider-to-provider exchange.}

In fact, creating open specifications, available to third-party developers, was a key goal of the API provisions of ONCs 2015 rule.\footnote{2015 Health IT Cert Criteria, supra note 85, 80 Fed. Reg. 62,602, 62,675–76 (Oct. 16, 2015) (noting that how organizations implement the required API should not “block” information sharing by API).} How EHR developers are responding is mixed. On the one hand, they seem to be listening: as of June 2018, 159 developers of certified EHRs have proven to ONC that they have shipped this update to their customers, even if their customers, the providers and hospitals,\footnote{ONC CERTIFIED HEALTH IT PRODUCTS LIST, CHPL.HEALTHEIT.GOV (June 12, 2018), chpl.healthit.gov/#/collections/apiDocumentation (public dataset).} are not required to make it available until January 2019.\footnote{82 Fed. Reg. 53,568 (Nov. 16, 2017); Seema Verma, Admin’r of Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Remarks at the HIMSS18 Conference (Mar. 26, 2018), www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Press-releases/2018-Press-releases-items/2018-03-06-2.html.} But according to Aneesh Chopra, former Chief Technology Officer for the United States, only a handful of hospitals have actually turned on this functionality.\footnote{Aneesh Chopra, Pres., CareJourney, Unleashing Data to Transform Health Care Panel, 2018 EHR National Symposium at Stanford Medicine, at 12:20 (June 4, 2018), youtu.be/qgLlLiabDFU.} There is also public concern that despite including the API technology, the two largest EHR developers are charging high fees for third-
party apps to connect,\textsuperscript{90} and as a result, may be inappropriately raising their rivals’ costs.\textsuperscript{91}

An EHR developer’s intellectual property is worthy of protection. That protection does not extend, however to the health facts that comprise PHI.\textsuperscript{92} Those property rights have limits. For example, a patient’s blood sugar test result describes what is occurring in his or her blood. The health fact—blood sugar—may be displayed in a certain manner, with the display potentially being a developer’s intellectual property. But the existence of the display does not convert the naturally occurring health fact into the developer’s intellectual property.

Furthermore, HIPAA makes it clear that people have a right to obtain form their physicians and hospitals their own PHI, even when extracted from an EHR, and notwithstanding any intellectual property that might exist in the display the developer developed. The patient’s right, in existence at least since HIPAA was passed, pre-dates the development of any EHR software IP.\textsuperscript{93} Moreover, under HIPAA the developer has no rights to use the PHI for its own business purposes, because under HIPAA, it is merely a business associate.\textsuperscript{94}

Data security is another factor that is cited as a barrier to information sharing. HIPAA requires that data must be kept secure. Health care providers are right to want to be confident that health information exchange does not introduce unexpected security risks into their environment, and to look to some extent to their EHR developers to provide a secure environment.\textsuperscript{95} But often security and exchange can both be achieved, and providing a secure environment should not be an impediment to exchange.

\textsuperscript{90}Arthur Allen, \textit{Developers Complain of High EHR Fees for SMART Apps}, \textit{POLITICO} (Aug. 6, 2018), www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-ehealth/2018/08/06/onc-interop-forum-kicks-off-306709 (note: a longer version of this publication is available behind Politico’s paywall).

\textsuperscript{91}Salop & Scheffman, \textit{supra} note 82.

\textsuperscript{92}\textit{Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.}, 569 U.S. 576 (2013). There, the Supreme Court reversed an appellate court ruling that a DNA sequence found in nature could be patented. the Court wrote: "It is undisputed that Myriad did not create or alter any of the genetic information encoded in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. The location and order of the nucleotides existed in nature before Myriad found them. . . . To be sure, it found an important and useful gene, but separating that gene from its surrounding genetic material is not an act of invention.”\textit{Id.} at 590–91.


\textsuperscript{94}45 C.F.R. § 164.504.

In particular, “fake security” concerns should not undermine interoperability or be an excuse for not allowing sharing of information through competing EHR vendors. For example, an open-specification API, such as ONC prescribed in its 2015 edition rule, could be both secure and enable low cost exchange. Indeed, as was clear from evidence presented in public hearings convened by ONC, in most other internet-enabled industries (finance is often the example), businesses and their software engineers and security professionals have adopted methods to keep information flowing while maintaining security. Certainly important regulators, like the CMS Administrator, think EHR developers may have strategically inflated security concerns as a way of impeding exchange.

Last, developers understand there have yet to emerge policies that could counter-balance any urge to hoard data. They may rightly calculate that, without the probability of significant consequences, making exchange hard makes business sense. As we discuss below, there are some steps that can be taken to better understand the impact on health care competition of low levels of information sharing.

C. Factors Affecting Health Care Providers’ Information Sharing

No one doubts that physicians, nurses, and the health systems and hospitals in which the majority of health care is delivered want to help their patients. But health care providers and health care systems are businesses, and therefore operate within the realities of the marketplace. We note that while in general federal law does not require providers to exchange data with each other, it does give them quite a bit of flexibility to exchange when they choose to do so. Thus, we explore whether there are incentives on the provider side that explain the low levels of exchange, despite liberal permissions to exchange.

To understand how providers view the competitive implications of information exchange, we turn first to the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) payment system—that is, where the supplier is paid for each service. Doctors and hospitals are sales revenue driven organizations. The overwhelming majority of their revenues come from payments from private insurers and Medicare and

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97 42 C.F.R. § 170.315(g) (7), (8) & (9).
98 See, e.g., ONC API Task Force, supra note 69, at 27; ESAC Inc. & SRS, Inc., supra note 69.
99 Slavitt, supra note 96.
100 Grossman et al., supra note 11, at 1.
Medicaid. As a consequence, providers make money by attracting and retaining (profitable) patients. Making information readily available and transportable helps patients seek out new, and potentially competing, providers. This may make it harder to retain patients and the health insurance fees their care generates. Patients who are mobile may lead to tougher competition among providers. Patients benefit substantially from tougher competition that leads to lower prices and higher quality, but providers are typically worse off.

Furthermore, even as the fee-for-service system evolves to payment for value or population health outcomes, providers who are responsible for a patient’s overall care may lose control if a patient receives care outside their system. Thus, even in this type of system, providers may want to keep their patients in the system, even if it is not where the individuals would receive the best or most appropriate care. In principle, it is possible for providers paid on a value basis to contract in a mutually advantageous way for patient care, so that patients are appropriately referred and incentives are maintained. In this situation information sharing is critical—indeed, appropriate and efficient referrals for care cannot take place without it.

As a specific example, Aledade is a start-up seeking to help independent (non-hospital owned) ambulatory practices deliver high-value care using a built-in infrastructure Aledade supplies to enable information exchange. Because Aledade’s business model focuses on independent practices collaborating with each other and sharing financial risk for keeping their collective patients out of hospitals, it may prove a counterweight to any tendency of hospital-owned practices to exchange only with other doctors sharing a single information technology system or an integrated ownership structure.

Yet, even information exchange patterns among independent practices can create incentives for a different kind of walled garden, one bounded by referral patterns (instead of proprietary technology), where the institutions choose to allow (or prioritize) disclosure only to specific established electronic ad-

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101 Evidence shows that physician referral patterns are substantially altered when a practice is owned by a hospital, in particular that physician practices owned by a hospital refer substantially more to that hospital than to other hospitals, even if the care at that hospital is of lower quality than elsewhere. Laurence C. Baker, M. Kate Bundorf & Daniel P. Kessler, The Effect of Hospital/Physician Integration on Hospital Choice, 50 J. Health Econ. 1 (Dec. 2016) This illustrates that providers respond to incentives (in this example, hospital ownership) by altering their behavior to keep patients in the system.


dresses, or make it difficult for patients to identify secure electronic delivery locations for data they want sent to their other doctors.\textsuperscript{104}

As has been made clear, there are strong financial incentives to retain data and not to share it. In contrast, it is hard to identify a profitable business model that involves information sharing. These concerns about information blocking and provider competition are not merely theoretical. FTC officials blogged in October 2014 about their interest in the implications of provider competition on EHRs and the data they create.\textsuperscript{105}

III. CURRENT POLICIES TO ADDRESS DATA BLOCKING

Congress has noticed that health information is not flowing freely among health care providers and has some evidence to suggest that anticompetitive motivations are partly to blame.\textsuperscript{106} However, the extent to which anticompetitive conduct is responsible remains unclear, as well as whether such conduct is due to the vendors, the providers, or both. Nor do we know if the incentives hindering exchange of information are symbiotic or merely happen to be contemporaneous. For example, is EHR connectivity costly and difficult because vendors are responding to their provider customers’ desires to avoid exchanging data, or would providers be willing to exchange data, but lose interest because of the costs and difficulties with EHR connectivity and compatibility? Are the costs and complexity associated with connectivity legitimate, or are they driven by strategic motives on the part of EHR vendors? What role, if any, do developers’ concerns about IP and their security obligations play?

On the provider side, the Meaningful Use regulations continue to require attestation to higher levels of electronic transmission of summary of care records during patient transitions. Specifically, Stage 3 criteria raise the bar from 10 percent to 50 percent, and impose penalties on eligible providers and hospitals that do not meet these thresholds. Nonetheless, thus far Meaningful Use has not been a sufficiently strong driver to result in widespread exchange. Therefore, in January 2015, Congress attempted to further increase incentives when it passed the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015


\textsuperscript{106} Senate Information Blocking Hearings, supra note 81.
This Act replaced the old Medicare payment formula with a sweeping new payment method that requires payments for Medicare physician services be based on value and measured outcomes. These measures and outcomes, in turn, were to be specified in regulations. The resulting regulations for payment years 2017 and 2018 increase the amount of care that is paid based on measured outcomes, and those outcomes are calculated in part using the digital health data HITECH made widely available. Among the new measures is an attempt to measure exchange as part of the “advancing care information” domain. To achieve top marks in this domain for calendar 2017, however, a physician needed only exchange a summary of care record with a single other physician. For calendar 2019, CMS proposes only that hospitals need prove information exchange on behalf of only one individual.

Despite enacting MACRA in late 2015 (with more incentives payable for exchange but no explicit provisions on information blocking), it appears that Congress remained concerned that information was still being blocked. After holding three hearings on the subject of information blocking, in December 2016, it enacted Cures, which contains elements designed to address this issue directly. Cures itself defines “information blocking,” and charged HHS with identifying conduct that is not “information blocking” and rooting out and punishing information blocking when it occurs.

Specifically, 21st Century Cures says that a practice is information blocking: “(ii) if conducted by a health care provider, such provider knows that such practice is unreasonable and is likely to interfere with, prevent, or mater-
rially discourage access, exchange, or use of electronic health information.” And it defines information blocking by developers as behavior that “if conducted by a health information technology developer, exchange, or network, such developer, exchange, or network knows, or should know, that such practice is likely to interfere with, prevent, or materially discourage the access, exchange, or use of electronic health information[].” Providers will be permitted to attest that they have not blocked information; EHR vendors, however, will have to demonstrate that they have not information blocked in response to standards developed by the Secretary. Cures also authorizes fines against EHR developers of up to $1 million.

In addition, the HHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) is using existing regulations to target data blocking by vendors. On May 31, 2017, the OIG and the DOJ’s fraud unit settled for $155 million a case against eClinicalWorks, an EHR developer, under the False Claims Act. The government alleged in part that the developer’s “software failed to satisfy data portability requirements intended to permit health care providers to transfer patient data from eClinicalWorks’ software to the software of other vendors.” eClinicalWorks is one of the top 10 EHR developers in the United States by size.\textsuperscript{120} The next day, OIG issued a report estimating that over $700 million in Meaningful Use incentives had been paid based on meaningful use stage 1 and 2 attestations that OIG could not verify based on a random sample. Those attestations, including attestations that exchange occurred with unaffiliated organizations.\textsuperscript{121}

States have concurrent jurisdiction over, and their own interest in, a competitive health care landscape. States are empowered to take action, and one has. Following the publication of ONC’s Information Blocking Report, Connecticut enacted a law that includes specific requirements for easily moving

\textsuperscript{116} Id. § 4004(a)(1)(B) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 300jj–52(a)(1)(B)).
\textsuperscript{117} Id. § 4004(a)(3) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 300jj–52(a)(3)).
\textsuperscript{118} Id. § 4004(b)(2)(A) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 300jj–52(b)(2)).
\textsuperscript{121} DANIEL R. LEVINSON, INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, MEDICARE PAID HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS IN ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD INCENTIVE PAYMENTS THAT DID NOT COMPLY WITH FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS (June 2017), oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region5/51400047.pdf. One finding was that 12% of stage 1 Meaningful Users inaccurately attested. Stage 1 included the requirement of at least one instance of exchange. Id. at 16.
health information from one provider to another.\textsuperscript{122} According to state Senator Martin Looney, one of the bill’s sponsors:

[H]ospital systems in Connecticut have been pressuring independent physician practices to join their network by denying them electronic access to a patient’s full medical records unless they join. [Looney] said these hospital systems, namely Yale New Haven Health and Hartford Health, have used their Epic Systems-made EHRs to create a private health information exchange accessible only to affiliated providers or those providers willing to pay thousands of dollars to connect to the hospitals’ IT systems. “Epic has become a monopolistic practice,” Looney said. “If you’re not part of Epic through the hospitals you’re left out and your practice is at a great disadvantage.”\textsuperscript{123}

In other words, State Senator Looney was concerned that the “walled gardens” described in ONC’s report were simply becoming bigger on the inside, and that dominant hospital systems were intent on creating technology captives among their physicians with admitting privileges and those physicians’ patients. Whether the Connecticut law will be successful at breaking down the walls remains to be seen.

**IV. NEW POLICIES TO PROMOTE DATA SHARING**

There is a strong public policy rationale for more freely flowing information. Freely flowing information between providers will make patients more mobile and promote competition between providers. Further, improved provider data sharing will improve care coordination, which should enhance quality of care and could reduce costs. Greater EHR interoperability will also promote the flow of information and the benefits that accrue from it. Finally, enhanced interoperability should increase competition between EHR vendors.

As indicated above, policymakers have taken some important initial steps, but there are some additional things that can be done to help improve matters.

First, we suggest that the FTC conduct a study of the exchange of health data and whether health information exchange is being impeded because of attempts to avoid competition. We know that less health data are being exchanged than expected or desired, but we need to know more about what is happening, what actions specifically are being taken by organizations that affect data sharing, and how these affect competition. Specific information could be collected such as (but not limited to the following):


\textsuperscript{123} Alex Ruoff, *In Connecticut, Debate Starts over Information Blocking*, HEALTH IT LAW & INDUSTRY REPORT (BLOOMBERG/BNA) (Nov. 9, 2015) (on file with authors).
(1) How many health information exchange transactions occur between unaffiliated EHRs or among providers who are not in the same medical group or corporate family in a wide variety of markets?

(2) When information sharing occurs, what are the costs and the benefits the EHR vendors or providers experience? What is it that makes it beneficial for the various parties to the exchange? What are the key factors that support exchange?

(3) When information sharing does not occur, what are the costs and benefits? What is it that does not make it beneficial for parties to the potential exchange? What are the key factors that prevent exchange?

(4) How frequently is HIPAA used as a justification for not exchanging when, under the HIPAA regulations, exchange would be permitted and no other privacy laws apply?

(5) What are the costs incurred in engineering connectivity between two different EHR systems for two providers who want to exchange data?

(6) How frequently are developers of third-party apps authorized to connect to the open-specification API that ONC included in its 2015 regulation and, if the developer has to pay for that privilege, what are the prices the developer pays?

(7) What are the fees data holders charge for transmitting data? How do those fees correspond to the costs of transmitting data? Does it appear that data holders are setting fees at high levels in order to deter demand for data or to raise the costs of rivals to put them at a competitive disadvantage?

(8) What action are private payers taking to ensure their enrollees have their data available for all clinicians, particularly across institutions or EHR systems?

Further, in the period since the passage of HITECH, some health care mergers have been defended in part by citing the need for integrated, uniform health IT systems to improve efficiency and quality. We need to know more

about the existence and magnitude of such efficiencies, the extent to which they are merger specific, as well as any impacts they have on competition.

If the information to answer these questions is readily publicly available, then the FTC can conduct a study using those sources. If the information is not readily publicly available, the FTC can use its powers in Section 6(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act\(^\text{125}\) to obtain the relevant information from those possessing it.\(^\text{126}\)

Second, while the FTC’s role is significant, it is important to remember that only the DOJ has federal enforcement jurisdiction over anticompetitive practices by non-profit corporations,\(^\text{127}\) including the 58 percent of hospitals that are non-profits.\(^\text{128}\) These non-profit hospitals are custodians of significant quantities of clinical digital health information. Therefore, through its long collaboration with FTC,\(^\text{129}\) the DOJ can use the results from any FTC study or FTC enforcement actions to evaluate whether there is information blocking that rises to the level of an actionable enforcement issue for non-profit health care actors.

Third, ONC and CMS can take actions to promote the adoption of the information technology that is used throughout the rest of the economy for internet-enabled transactions. For example, while ONC cannot require the

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\(^{126}\) Section 6(b) of the FTC Act “empowers the Commission to require the filing of ‘annual or special reports or answers in writing to specific questions’ for the purpose of obtaining information about ‘the organization, business, conduct, practices, management, and relation to other corporations, partnerships, and individuals’ of the entities to whom the inquiry is addressed.” Fed. Trade Comm’n, A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority (July 2008), www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 46).

\(^{127}\) The FTC’s jurisdiction over non-profits is limited by the definition of corporation in Section 4 of the FTC Act, which includes those entities “organized to carry on business for [their] own profit or that of [their] members.” 15 U.S.C. § 44. Thus, while FTC has authority under the Clayton Act to challenge mergers of non-profit corporations, it cannot assert jurisdiction over non-profits in other types of antitrust cases.


adoption of any particular technology, it can continue to champion technologies that facilitate low-cost interoperability, such as open-specification (non-proprietary) Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). If used, this could drastically reduce the technical friction of secure, auditable information sharing. CMS’s role is to financially incentivize use of the technology ONC requires of certified EHR systems. Starting in January 2019, CMS will require physician practices (as a condition of payment for services delivered to Medicare beneficiaries) to use the open API. Specifically, the open API will enable, from a technical perspective, authentic and secure apps from unaffiliated businesses to access EHR data for legitimate purposes, as already occurs in finance and retail. Since adoption of the open API will drastically reduce technical barriers to exchange, if information flow is not substantially increased thereafter, persistent low levels of exchange will make a strong case that information hoarding is occurring, impeding competition. Such evidence may warrant investigation by federal or state antitrust authorities.

Fourth, ONC and CMS could more aggressively create financial incentives for providers to engage in exchange by tying provider payments to process and outcome measures that are directly affected by the level of information exchange. ONC has taken an initial step in this direction by funding the National Quality Forum to begin to develop such measures, and the resulting set of measure concepts span both exchange activity (e.g., percentage of available structured elements that were electronically exchanged per patient) and outcomes that are likely to be improved by exchange (e.g., percentage reduction in duplicate labs and imaging over time). These were only concepts, however.

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130 Consistent with its mission to facilitate nationwide health information exchange, ONC in 2015 updated its software rule to require that to be certified by ONC, a developer had to include an open-specification, i.e., read-only “Application Programming Interface,” which would enable unaffiliated application developers to write apps to extract (read-only) data from one system and transport it elsewhere. 42 C.F.R. § 170.315(g)(7) (2015). Unfortunately, in its most recent proposed rules on expected behavior by hospital and providers to earn incentive payments or to avoid penalties, CMS did not require that hospitals or providers allow this API to be used, whether by individuals to get their own health data (as is required by law, 82 Fed. Reg. 30,010, 30,015 (June 30, 2017)), or by allowing an app to work to exchange with an unaffiliated physician for a shared patient, both of which HIPAA has always allowed. See HIPAA Fact Sheets, supra note 25.


132 ONC API TASK FORCE, supra note 69.


134 NAT’L QUALITY FORUM, A MEASUREMENT FRAMEWORK TO ASSESS NATIONWIDE PROGRESS RELATED TO INTEROPERABLE HEALTH INFORMATION EXCHANGE TO SUPPORT THE NATIONAL QUALITY STRATEGY (Sept. 1 2017), www.qualityforum.org/Publications/2017/09/Interoperability
ever, and no such measure specifications presently exist. Moreover, it is not clear who will take up the work to develop the measures and shepherd them through the endorsement process so that they can be used in practice. Typically, development of measure specifications is undertaken in response to a robust evidence base by government agencies or private nonprofits, and resulting measures are then endorsed by professional societies and/or consumer groups.135 While the evidence base for the benefits of exchange is expanding, it is still fairly limited and, because information exchange cuts across so many contexts and clinical conditions, it does not have an obvious set of stakeholders to take on the development or pursue subsequent endorsement. Of course, the benefits and costs of such enhanced financial incentives should be evaluated carefully before adopting such a policy.

Making funding available to entice measure developers to speed the creation of promising measures may also be worthwhile. In the interim, a practical option, but one with potential unintended consequences, could involve tying stronger financial incentives to existing measures of performance that are likely to reflect high levels of information exchange. For example, there is a measure in the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems “Clinician & Group” survey that asks patients about whether their provider had access to all prior information about their care.136 Tying CMS provider payment to high performance on this measure, or a close derivative of it that asks about prior information from “external” providers, could be a powerful driver of greater information exchange (as well as ensuring that information is not only exchanged, but is also made easily available to frontline providers at the point of clinical decision making).

While such incentives would serve as a powerful counterbalance to current incentives not to share data, it is important to recognize that this approach could also be gamed or have unintended negative consequences. For example, if only some providers are subject to these payment incentives, it could create a scenario in which the providers that need to engage in exchange to meet the measure are beholden to another set of providers who do not need to meet the measure but care for the same patient population. In this scenario, the latter group, which hold the patient data needed for high measurement achievement would have leverage over the former group. That leverage might even inten-

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sify any existing market consolidation pressures (i.e., formally aligning with or acquiring a provider group in order to achieve the measure through exchange).

Fifth, there is a role for payers in promoting information exchange. For example, Intel Corporation in 2013–2015 experimented with creating a narrow network for its employees (in certain locations where it was a dominant employer), where participation in the network required providers to exchange data with each other.\footnote{Prashant Shah, Angela Mitchell & Brian DeVore, Intel Corp., Advancing Interoperability in Health Care: Employer Led, Standards-Based Collaboration to Advance the Triple Aim (2015), www-ssl.intel.com/content/www/us/en/healthcare-it/solutions/documents/advancing-interoperability-healthcare-paper.html.} While Intel apparently had good results on quality improvement and cost savings, its approach has not been widely duplicated. It is not clear why private payers generally have not been more aggressive in pursuing such strategies.

There are some counterexamples. Interestingly, Blue Shield of California recently announced that in order to contract with it in-network, providers had to also exchange data through the California state HIE, at no cost to the providers.\footnote{Press Release, Blue Shield of Cal., Blue Shield of California Commits to Work with Providers to Bring Health Care into the Digital Age (Mar. 6, 2018), www.businesswire.com/news/home/20180306006518/en/Blue-Shield-California-Commits-Work-Providers-Bring.} Furthermore, for accountable care organizations (ACOs) and other value-based payment models to take root in the private sector, health information must be exchanged. Organizations like the public-private “learning and action network” and commercial payers are working towards wider adoption of alternative payment models, and recognize that data sharing is “foundational for operationalizing” such models.\footnote{HEALTH CARE PAYER LEARNING & ACTION NETWORK, ACCELERATING AND ALIGNING POPULATION-BASED PAYMENT MODELS: DATA SHARING (Aug. 8, 2016), hcp-lan.org/groups/pbp/ds-final-whitepaper/.} To date, however, their work is still in an early stage. Finally, although some state Medicaid agencies and commercial payers have used their oversight and market powers to accelerate the rate of health information exchange,\footnote{See Governor of Ohio, Office of Health Transformation, Ohio Medicaid Reform (Aug. 2015), healthtransformation.ohio.gov/Portals/0/OhioMedicaidReforms8-11-2015.pdf?v=2015-08-17-142316-027; Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 2017 PGIP Fact Sheet: Health Information Exchange Initiative, VALUEPARTNERSHIPS.COM (Mar. 2017), www.valuepartnerships.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/2017-HIE-Initiative-Fact-Sheet.pdf. Medicaid is a complex system in its own right, given federal funding and state eligibility rules, and a deeper discussion of Medicaid and information exchange or information blocking is beyond the scope of this article.} this approach is not widespread.\footnote{Dori A. Cross, Sunny C. Lin & Julia Adler-Milstein, Assessing Payer Perspectives on Health Information Exchange, 23 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS‘N 297 (2016).}

In spite of these examples, for the most part payers have not taken an active role in promoting information exchange. The role of payers is not well understood.

\footnote{FORTHCOMING, 82 ANTI TRUST LAW JOURNAL NO. 2 (2019). COPYRIGHT 2019 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
stood, and as indicated above, could be a valuable subject for investigation by an FTC study.

V. CONCLUSION

While there is widespread agreement on the benefits from routine sharing of digital health data, and specific federal goals that seek to achieve it, data sharing is still the exception rather than the rule. As we have indicated, EHR vendors and providers likely find it to their advantage to refuse to share data with rivals. While this is understandable, it can harm competition and consumers.

Furthermore, while these issues are important now, we expect them to only grow in importance. Our world is being transformed to one in which data are central to individuals and businesses. This digital transformation is coming to health care the same way it has come to much of the rest of the economy. In this state of the world, the portability of data, or lack thereof, may become a major driver of competition, costs, and outcomes. We need to better understand the factors driving the current lack of health data exchange and formulate policies that facilitate its use and transmission to benefit society.