



HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
NATURAL RESOURCES
CHAIRMAN BRUCE WESTERMAN

To: Subcommittee on Indian and Insular Affairs Republican Members
From: Subcommittee on Indian and Insular Affairs Staff: Kirstin Liddell
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Date: Monday, January 12, 2026
Subject: Oversight hearing titled “*Implementation of the Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2024*”

The Subcommittee on Indian and Insular Affairs will hold an oversight hearing titled “*Implementation of the Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2024*” on **Wednesday, January 14, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. in room 1324 Longworth House Office Building.**

Member offices are requested to notify Seneca Feys (seneca.feys@mail.house.gov) by 4:30 p.m. on Tuesday, January 13, 2026, if their Member intends to participate in the hearing.

I. KEY MESSAGES

- In March 2024, the United States (U.S.) renewed its Compacts of Free Association (COFA) with the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau, collectively known as the Freely Associated States (FAS). The COFA reaffirms a long-standing and strategic partnership with the FAS in the Indo-Pacific
- Regrettably, the Biden administration significantly delayed COFA implementation, leaving several required actions, such as interagency coordination, follow-through, and veterans’ service delivery, unfinished.
- Implementation has resumed and progress is being made under the Trump administration, but there is still more to do.
- For their part, the FAS are required to submit annual financial audits detailing their use of COFA funds. Many of these audits, however, are still outstanding, a problem that began under the Biden administration and continues to impair accountability today.
- The House Committee on Natural Resources (Committee) is providing continual oversight to ensure that the 2024 Compacts of Free Association are implemented as Congress intended, demonstrating that the U.S. is a reliable partner in the region.

II. WITNESSES

Panel I (Administration Witnesses):

- **Mr. Angel Demapan**, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Insular and International Affairs, U.S. Department of the Interior, Washington, D.C.
- **Mr. Antone “Tony” Greubel**, Director, Office of Australia, New Zealand, and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C.

Panel II (Outside Experts):

- **His Excellency Hersey Kyota**, Ambassador to the United States, Republic of Palau, Washington, D.C.
- **His Excellency Jackson Soram**, Ambassador to the United States, Federated States of Micronesia, Washington, D.C.
- **His Excellency Charles Paul**, Ambassador to the United States, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Washington, D.C.

III. BACKGROUND

Overview

The Freely Associated States (FAS) are three sovereign nations in the Indo-Pacific—the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), and the Republic of Palau (Palau). The FAS are independent countries with full United Nations and Pacific Islands Forum membership.¹ Yet, their economies face structural challenges similar to those afflicting other Pacific island countries, including small land areas and populations, limited natural resources, geographic isolation, and underdeveloped infrastructure.²

The FAS maintain a treaty-based relationship with the U.S. under COFA.³ COFA’s defense and political provisions continue indefinitely unless terminated, while its economic assistance provisions require periodic renewal by Congress.⁴ The U.S.-FAS relationships are long-standing⁵ and foundational to America’s commitment to a free and democratic Indo-Pacific.⁶

The COFA bind the FAS and the U.S. together through a mutually beneficial partnership, under which the U.S. holds defense and security rights in the FAS, while the FAS receive economic

¹ “The Pacific Islands Forum,” Pacific Islands Forum, 2024, <https://www.forumsec.org/who-we-arepacific-islands-forum/>; “Member States,” United Nations, <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/member-states#gotoF>.

² For more information on the FAS, see Thomas Lum, “The Freely Associated States and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, October 7, 2020, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46573/2>.

³ “What are the Freely Associated States of the Pacific?” Institute of Education Sciences, February 2021, <https://ies.ed.gov/use-work/resource-library/resource/fact-sheetinfographicfaq/what-are-freely-associated-states-pacific>.

⁴ P.L. 99-239, 48 U.S.C. 1681 note, 59 Stat.1031, Section 211, and H.J. Res. 626, Nov. 14, 1986, P.L. 99-658, 61 Stat. 3301, Section 432.

⁵ Jacob Young & Dr. Mikulas Fabry, “The Compact of Free Association and Development in the Freely Associated States,” Georgia Institute of Technology, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, May 2023, https://inta.gatech.edu/sites/default/files/2023-06/youngiacobeli_100449_41468357_Jacob%20Young%20INTA%204500%20Paper.pdf.

⁶ Derek Grossman, et al., “America’s Pacific Island Allies: The Freely Associated States and Chinese Influence,” National Defense Research Institute, RAND Corporation, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/trecms/pdf/AD1097652.pdf>.

assistance and defense guarantees from the U.S.⁷ They are central to American efforts to counter the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) influence operations in the Pacific.⁸

The PRC seeks to undermine democratic governance in the region through economic coercion, increased intelligence gathering, visible demonstrations of military power, and efforts to build political alignment among Pacific Island states.⁹ Under the COFA, the U.S. holds the right to establish permanent military bases in the FAS and to deny third-country military access.¹⁰ But America’s COFA obligations extend beyond providing military protections. U.S.-supported judicial and governance trainings, for example, provide FAS officials with the tools to recognize and respond to encroaching PRC influence in local government, helping safeguard democratic processes in the Pacific.¹¹

The COFA’s economic assistance provisions require periodic renewal.¹² Recognizing this, the Committee worked to reauthorize the COFA in the 118th Congress, convening a bipartisan Indo-Pacific Task Force, conducting multiple hearings on the COFA and their role in supporting U.S. interests, and led a historic, bipartisan Congressional Member Delegation to the FAS. The Committee passed a reauthorization of the COFA on November 8, 2023, and the legislation was ultimately signed into law on March 9, 2024. These actions secured bipartisan support for reauthorization of the FSM and RMI Compacts, as well as the Palau Compact Review Agreement (CRA), through 2043.^{13 14}

⁷ Jared G. Tupuola , “The Compacts of Free Association” Congressional Research Service, December 3, 2025, <https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12194>.

⁸ “China’s Influence on the Freely Associated States of the Northern Pacific,” United States Institute of Peace, September 20, 2022, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2022-09/ssg-china-influence-on-freely-associated-states-of-northern_pacific.pdf.

⁹ *Id.*

¹⁰ Jared G. Tupuola , “The Compacts of Free Association” Congressional Research Service, December 3, 2025, <https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12194>.

¹¹ David Shullman, ed., “Chinese Malign Influence and the Corrosion of Democracy: An Assessment of Chinese Interference in Thirteen Key Countries,” International Republican Institute, 2019, https://www.iri.org/wp-content/uploads/legacy/iri.org/china_malign_influence_executive_summary_booklet.pdf.

¹² P.L. 99-239, 48 U.S.C. 1681 note, 59 Stat.1031, Section 211, and H.J. Res. 626, Nov. 14, 1986, P.L. 99-658, 61 Stat. 3301, Section 432. For further information on the legislative history of COFA renewal, refer to Subcommittee on Indian and Insular Affairs legislative hearing on October 19, 2023, titled “*Discussion Draft on H.J. Res. ___ (Rep. Westerman), “Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2023,”*” <https://naturalresources.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=414959>.

¹³ See Subcommittee on Indian and Insular Affairs oversight hearing on May 16, 2023, titled “*Preserving U.S. Interests in the Indo-Pacific: Examining How U.S. Engagement Counters Chinese Influence in the Region.*” <https://naturalresources.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=413218>; House Committee on Natural Resources Indo-Pacific Task Force oversight hearing on June 14, 2023, titled “*How the Compacts of Free Association Support U.S. Interests and Counter the PRC’s Influence*” <https://naturalresources.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=413428>; House Committee on Natural Resources Indo-Pacific Task Force oversight hearing on July 18, 2023, titled “*The Biden’s Administration’s Proposed Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2023*”

<https://naturalresources.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=414550>; House Committee on Natural Resources oversight field hearing on August 24, 2023, titled “*Peace Through Strength: The Strategic Importance of the Pacific Islands to U.S.-led Global Security*” <https://naturalresources.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=414736>; “Westerman Returns from Historic CODEL Demonstrating U.S. Strength in the Indo-Pacific and Countering CCP Influence,” House Committee on Natural Resources, September 5, 2023, <https://naturalresources.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=414776>.

¹⁴ P.L. 118-42. For more information on the background of the 2024 Compacts, see House Committee on Natural Resources markup on November 8, 2023, <https://naturalresources.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=415101>; Karen Goldmeier Green, et al., “Compacts Renewal Ushers in New Era of Relations Between the U.S. and Freely Associated States.” Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, March 21, 2024, <https://www.akingump.com/en/insights/alerts/compacts-renewal-ushers-in-new-era-of-relations-between-the-us-and-freely-associated-states>.

Congress must now ensure that the COFA are implemented as legislatively intended. To this end, on September 10, 2024, the Subcommittee on Indian and Insular Affairs (Subcommittee) held its first oversight hearing on the implementation of the COFA.¹⁵ Federal agencies responsible for implementing the Compacts, along with leaders from each FAS, testified on the status of implementation approximately half a year after its passage.¹⁶

Building on this work, the Subcommittee will continue to investigate COFA's implementation progress to ensure that America's unique relationship with the FAS is maintained and strengthened.¹⁷

Countering the PRC's Influence in the FAS

The Compacts are essential to countering the PRC's malign influence in the Indo-Pacific region. In its bid for increased global power, the PRC has mistreated Pacific island nations, including the FAS. Due in part to their geographic proximity to the PRC, the FAS face a heightened risk of PRC pressure and interference. Overall, the PRC is the second-largest external source of development financing and investment in the FAS, after the U.S.¹⁸ All three FAS nations have businesses owned and operated by Chinese nationals, including in the restaurant, retail, and fish-processing sectors, which represent a considerable portion of foreign investment across the FAS economies.¹⁹

Palau has experienced some of the most direct effects of PRC influence in the FAS. During the late 2010s, Palau saw a sharp increase in tourism from the PRC, which contributed to a roughly 66-percent increase in visitor arrivals.²⁰ As the number of PRC tourists grew, they became the dominant share of Palau's tourism market, creating an unhealthy economic reliance on PRC-based tourism operators. Following Palau's continued diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, PRC authorities and state-affiliated travel agencies halted group tourism to Palau, contributing to a collapse in Palau's tourism sector.²¹ This sharp decline, compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic, led to an estimated 30-percent contraction in Palau's gross domestic product over five years.²² While tourism has begun to recover with visitors from other countries, levels remain below those seen before PRC-imposed travel restrictions.²³

Under the Compacts, the U.S. retains the right to establish permanent military installations in the FAS. When the U.S. proposed installing a high-frequency radar system in Palau, a PRC-linked group submitted a competing proposal to develop a hotel on the same land area, directly competing for the land in an apparent attempt to obstruct U.S. military activities.²⁴ Despite PRC-

¹⁵ Subcommittee on Indian and Insular Affairs oversight hearing on September 10, 2024, titled, "*Examining the Implementation of the Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2024*," <https://naturalresources.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=416436>.

¹⁶ *Id.*

¹⁷ More information on the hearings, including memos and video recordings, are available on the House Natural Resources Committee's website: <https://naturalresources.house.gov/issues/issue/?IssueID=5066>.

¹⁸ *Id.*

¹⁹ *Id.*

²⁰ Subcommittee on Indian and Insular Affairs staff correspondence with Jeffery Farrow.

²¹ *Id.*

²² *Id.*

²³ *Id.*

²⁴ *Id.*

linked entities' attempts to confound U.S. plans, ultimately, the construction of the U.S. radar system was approved. The expected completion date for the radar system is June 2026.²⁵ Additionally, during consideration of U.S. rocket testing in Palau, a PRC agent was apprehended attempting to smuggle in cash for a Palau Senate leader ahead of the Senate vote on the rocket tests.²⁶ The rocket tests were allowed to proceed, and the PRC's attempts to bribe the Palau politicians failed.

The Compacts remain vital to upholding the continued health of the U.S.-FAS relationship and bolstering America's strategic posture in the Indo-Pacific. Fully implementing the COFA Amendments Act as Congress intended reaffirms America's commitment to its allies and demonstrates its reliability as a partner. This commitment is essential to countering the PRC's aggression and maintaining the U.S.'s capacity to secure its interests in the region. Although the Compacts have recently been renewed, Congress must continue to provide oversight to ensure that these partnerships remain long-lasting and mutually beneficial.

Implementation Status of Key COFA Provisions

Under COFA, the Joint Economic Management Committee (JEMCO) oversees the administration of economic assistance to FSM.²⁷ JEMCO is composed of government-appointed representatives from FSM, the U.S. Department of State (State), the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI), and the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury). JEMCO's oversight efforts include annual meetings,²⁸ the most recent of which took place in late August 2025.²⁹ There, representatives adopted a resolution approving \$140 million in annual COFA assistance for FSM beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2026.³⁰

Under the 2024 Compacts, JEMCO must examine the resolutions that were passed in the previous iteration of COFA and seek to reintroduce or revise any resolutions that would be beneficial to implement.³¹ Although the deadline for completion of the review was July 2024, FSM officials have reported that U.S. agencies have undertaken no action to complete the required review of previous resolutions.³² On the other hand, the U.S. has raised concerns that FSM has withheld its most recent census data from government personnel and external partners.³³ Without accurate census data, it is difficult to evaluate whether COFA funds are producing intended improvements in FSM.³⁴

²⁵ "The Compacts of Free Association", Congressional Research Service, December 3, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12194/IF12194.46.pdf

²⁶ Subcommittee on Indian and Insular Affairs staff correspondence with Jeffery Farrow.

²⁷ "Joint Economic Management Committee (JEMCO)", U.S. Embassy in the Federated States of Micronesia, January 1, 2020, <https://fm.usembassy.gov/joint-economic-management-committee-jemco/>.

²⁸ *Id.*

²⁹ House Committee on Natural Resources Meeting with Federated States of Micronesia Ambassador Jackson Soram on October 22, 2025.

³⁰ "U.S. Strengthens Compact Partnerships with FSM and RMI at Annual Economic Meetings", U.S. Department of the Interior, September 4, 2025, <https://www.doi.gov/oiapress/us-strengthens-compact-partnerships-fsm-and-rmi-annual-economic-meetings>.

³¹ House Committee on Natural Resources Meeting with Federated States of Micronesia Ambassador Jackson Soram on October 22, 2025.

³² *Id.*

³³ Briefing with U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of the Interior, and various House of Representatives and Senate offices on September 29, 2025.

³⁴ *Id.*

The Joint Economic Management and Financial Accountability Committee (JEMFAC) oversees the administration of COFA funding to RMI.³⁵ JEMFAC is composed of government-appointed representatives from RMI, State, DOI, and Treasury. The most recent JEMFAC meeting took place in August 2025, and featured a strong emphasis on auditing issues in RMI.

The 2024 Compacts require the U.S. President to establish an Interagency Group (IAG) on the FAS to improve coordination across federal agencies during implementation.³⁶ The IAG consists of the Secretaries of the Interior, State, and War, along with the heads of other relevant federal agencies such as the Department of the Treasury, Department of Health and Human Services, and the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs.³⁷ The IAG is co-chaired by the Secretaries of State and Interior. The IAG advises the U.S. President on the implementation and coordination of policies related to COFA and must provide an annual report to Congress on its activities and recommendations.³⁸ In late August 2025, the IAG met to confirm representatives to serve on JEMCO and had plans to meet at the end of October 2025.³⁹ However, the government shutdown of October and November 2025 interrupted scheduled interagency coordination. Upon the federal government's reopening, the IAG met on December 19, 2025. Representatives from multiple agencies, including DOI, State, Treasury, the U.S. Department of War (DOW), the U.S. Department of Education, and the United States Postal Service, met to discuss outstanding issues.⁴⁰ Topics of discussion ranged from anti-money laundering efforts in the FAS, Head Start in FSM and RMI, and evolving concerns with PRC's influence in the FAS.⁴¹ The agencies have action items, including investigating mail delivery delays, next steps to bring Peace Corps back to the FSM, outstanding questions regarding tuition, and issues to address related to REAL ID and CDL licenses for FAS citizens.⁴²

Under the 2024 Compacts, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) must provide certain VA programs and services in the FAS. These services included telehealth, postal delivery of prescriptions, and travel reimbursement.⁴³ However, the Biden administration slow-walked the implementation of these provisions, as noted in the Subcommittee's September 2024 oversight hearing.⁴⁴ The Secretary of Veterans Affairs is required to negotiate with the FAS governments on the terms and conditions of these services.⁴⁵ To date, discussions have remained stalled. In April 2025, an internal VA memorandum that directed VA officials to "sustain the status quo" regarding services.⁴⁶ This leaked memorandum was received poorly by the FAS broadly—the

³⁵ "U.S. Strengthens Compact Partnerships with FSM and RMI at Annual Economic Meetings", U.S. Department of the Interior, September 4, 2025, <https://www.doi.gov/oiapress/us-strengthens-compact-partnerships-fsm-and-rmi-annual-economic-meetings>.

³⁶ P.L. 118-42.

³⁷ *Id.*

³⁸ *Id.*

³⁹ Briefing with U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of the Interior, and various House of Representatives and Senate offices on September 29, 2025.

⁴⁰ Subcommittee on Indian and Insular Affairs conversations with Office of Insular Affairs, January 7, 2025.

⁴¹ *Id.*

⁴² *Id.*

⁴³ P.L. 118-42.

⁴⁴ Subcommittee on Indian and Insular Affairs oversight hearing on September 10, 2024, titled, "*Examining the Implementation of the Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2024*,"

<https://naturalresources.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=416436>.

⁴⁵ "At a Glance: H.J. Res 96, Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2023," Congressional Budget Office, December 6, 2023, <https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2023-12/hjres96.pdf>.

⁴⁶ U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Internal Memo, April 11, 2025. On file.

President of FSM sent Secretary Doug Collins a letter on April 25, 2025, expressing “serious concerns” with the “decision to decline expanding access to healthcare benefits.”⁴⁷

The VA maintains the position that it holds “discretionary authority” in the implementation of COFA programs and has raised concerns regarding the cost of providing these services to FAS veterans of the U.S. military. VA maintains that FAS veterans “are entitled to equitable earned benefits through the existing Foreign Medical Program (FMP).” The FMP provides care for veterans who live outside the U.S. It is the VA’s position that posture “ensures equity with all U.S. veterans.”⁴⁸

Congress maintains that the VA must carry out the 2024 Compacts pursuant to legislative intent. To reinforce this posture, Congress included in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2026 a provision requiring the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to provide a briefing to the U.S. House and Senate Committees on Veterans’ Affairs no later than 30 days after enactment, and then monthly thereafter.⁴⁹ These briefings will include updates on the implementation status of the 2024 Compacts in relation to VA equities.⁵⁰

Delegate King-Hinds [R-CNMI-At Large] introduced H.R. 6652, the *U.S. Vets of the FAS Act* on December 11, 2025. This legislation would require the Secretary of the VA and the FAS to enter into agreements on providing telehealth and mail-order pharmacy services to FAS veterans. Additionally, payments for beneficiary travel would be authorized quarterly. The House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs has scheduled a hearing on the bill for January 13, 2026.⁵¹

Additional Oversight Needs

Each FAS member is required to submit a single audit per year, as they are non-federal entities that expend over \$1 million annually in federal awards.⁵² Each single audit must contain the FAS member’s financial statements and federal awards for the fiscal year.⁵³ The audits provided in 2025 showed that the FAS collectively received a total of \$217,208,851.⁵⁴ A September 2025 Office of the Inspector General (IG) report found that the Office of Insular Affairs (OIA) did not adhere to federal regulations to ensure that the FAS submitted their single audits on time and did not take the steps necessary to implement corrective action among the FAS.⁵⁵ From FY 2019-

⁴⁷ Letter from President Simina Letter to Secretary Collins. April 25, 2025. On file with IIA Staff.

⁴⁸ U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Internal Memo, April 11, 2025. On file.

⁴⁹ P.L. 119-60.

⁵⁰ *Id.*

⁵¹ H.R. 6652. U.S. Vets of the FAS Act. <https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/6652/text?s=1&r=2>. And IIA Conversations with House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs. 01.09.26

⁵² 2 C.F.R. Part 200 Subpart F.

⁵³ 31 U.S.C. 7501.

⁵⁴ “The Office of Insular Affairs Needs To Ensure Insular Areas’ Compliance With Federal Regulations Related to Single Audit Submissions,” Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of the Interior, September 15, 2025, <https://www.doioig.gov/sites/default/files/2021-migration/The%20Office%20of%20Insular%20Affairs%20Needs%20To%20Ensure%20Insular%20Areas%20Compliance%20With%20Federal%20Regulations%20Related%20to%20Single%20Audit%20Submissions.pdf>.

⁵⁵ “The Office of Insular Affairs Needs To Ensure Insular Areas’ Compliance With Federal Regulations Related to Single Audit Submissions,” Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of the Interior, September 15, 2025, <https://www.doioig.gov/sites/default/files/2021-migration/The%20Office%20of%20Insular%20Affairs%20Needs%20To%20Ensure%20Insular%20Areas%20Compliance%20With%20Federal%20Regulations%20Related%20to%20Single%20Audit%20Submissions.pdf>.

2023, the FAS failed to meet audit submission deadlines (see Figure 1, below). Palau and RMI have yet to submit their FY 2022 single audits, and all three FAS nations have not submitted their FY 2023 single audits.⁵⁶ The FAS cites the COVID-19 pandemic and the departure of the main certified public accounting firm (Deloitte) from the region as the main reasons for these delays.

**Figure 1: FY 2019-2023 Single Audit Reports:
Number of days late or not submitted by the FAS as of March 2025.⁵⁷**

Insular Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Palau	230	665	889	Not Submitted	Not Submitted
FSM	183	184	302	472	Not Submitted
RMI	183	341	307	Not Submitted	Not Submitted

Timely submission of single audits is critical to ensuring that federal awards are used as intended and to identify discrepancies, inefficiencies, or possible instances of noncompliance.⁵⁸ Continued delays allow unresolved issues to persist without appropriate corrective action.⁵⁹ The IG report recommended that the OIA develop and implement a process to enforce the FAS to conduct and submit the audits in accordance with the Federal grant regulations.⁶⁰ Under the Trump administration, there is an increased emphasis on accountability and performance metrics, intended to help ensure that outstanding audits are submitted and that future audit submissions occur on schedule.⁶¹ The OIA awarded \$250,000 in FY25 Technical Assistance Program funding to each FAS in an effort to improve the audit timeliness. These funds were to be used for the hiring of additional staff with relevant experience.⁶²

⁵⁶ *Id.*

⁵⁷ *Id.*

⁵⁸ *Id.*

⁵⁹ *Id.*

⁶⁰ *Id.*

⁶¹ House Committee on Natural Resources meeting with the U.S. Government Accountability Office on October 15, 2025.

⁶² “Interior’s Office of Insular Affairs Awards \$250,000 Each to Boost Audit Preparation.” Department of the Interior. Office of Insular Affairs. September 2025. <https://www.doi.gov/oia/press/Interiors-Office-of-Insular-Affairs-Awards-%24250%2C000-Each-to-Boost-Audit-Preparation>.