Chapter Two

Reforming Justice for Alaska Natives: The Time is Now

Section 205 of the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 (TLOA) states, “Nothing in this Act limits, alters, expands, or diminishes the civil or criminal jurisdiction of the State of Alaska, any subdivision of the State of Alaska, or any Indian tribe in that State.” Yet, the Indian Law and Order Commission’s opinion is that problems in Alaska are so severe and the number of Alaska Native communities affected so large, that continuing to exempt the State from national policy change is wrong. It sets Alaska apart from the progress that has become possible in the rest of Indian country. The public safety issues in Alaska—and the law and policy at the root of those problems—beg to be addressed. These are no longer just Alaska’s issues. They are national issues.

The most recent example of harmful Alaska exceptions in Federal law and policy came with the March 7, 2013 enactment of the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 (VAWA Amendments). Title IX (“Safety for Indian Women”), Section 910, contains a rule that limits the Act’s “Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction” to just 1 of the 229 federally recognized tribes in Alaska. Given that domestic violence and sexual assault may be a more severe public safety problem in Alaska Native communities than in any other Tribal communities in the United States, this provision adds insult to injury. In the view of the Commission, it is unconscionable.
Every woman you’ve met today has been raped. All of us. I know they won’t believe that in the lower 48, and the State will deny it, but it’s true. We all know each other and we live here. We know what’s happened. Please tell Congress and President Obama before it’s too late.

Tribal citizen (name withheld)

Statement provided during an Indian Law and Order Commission site visit to Galena, AK

October 18, 2012
The strongly centralized law enforcement and justice systems of the State of Alaska are of critical concern to the Indian Law and Order Commission. They do not serve local and Native communities adequately, if at all. The Commission believes that devolving authority to Alaska Native communities is essential for addressing local crime. Their governments are best positioned to effectively arrest, prosecute, and punish, and they should have the authority to do so—or to work out voluntary agreements with each other, and with local governments and the State on mutually beneficial terms.

While it is not within the scope of the Commission’s work to address needed reforms within Alaska's State government, matters relating to the public safety of the Alaska Native communities are. The Commission’s study of Alaska and its recommendations to Congress and the President are focused on what can and should be done to restore and enhance authority to local Native communities.

**Findings and Conclusions**

*Centralized administration falls short of local needs.* Forty percent (229 of 566) of the federally recognized Tribes in the United States are in Alaska, and Alaska Natives represent one-fifth of the total State population. Yet, these simple statements cannot capture the vastness or the Nativeness of Alaska. The State covers 586,412 square miles, an area greater than the next three largest states combined (Texas, California, and Montana). There are only 1.26 inhabitants per square mile—as compared to 5.85 for Wyoming, which is the next least populous state. (See map.)

Many of the 229 federally recognized tribes are villages located off the road system and “more closely resemble villages in developing countries” than small towns in the lower 48. Frequently, Native villages are accessible only by plane, or during the winter when rivers are frozen, by snow-machine. Food, gasoline, and other necessities are expensive and often in short supply. Subsistence hunting, fishing, and gathering (caribou, moose, reindeer, beluga whale, seal, salmon, halibut, berries, greens, etc.) are a part of everyday life. While Alaska Natives constitute a majority of the rural population, each community is nonetheless quite small; typical populations are in the range of 250-300 residents, many of whom share family or clan affiliations. Villages are politically independent from one another and have institutions that support that local autonomy—village councils and village Corporations. Historically, each village has managed its own local affairs, including issues of justice, and many are seeking ways to do so again. These conditions pose significant challenges to the effective provision of public safety for Alaska Natives.

*Justice efforts, however, are often hampered.* Problems with safety in Tribal communities are severe across the United States—but they are systematically the worst in Alaska. This is evident in an array of data concerning available services, crime, and community distress.
Alaska’s True Proportion to the Continental United States
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duties</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Funded Force* (2011-12)</th>
<th>Gun?</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>State Troopers</strong></td>
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<td>Enforce all criminal laws</td>
<td>15 weeks</td>
<td>Urban and rural posts across the state</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investigate crimes</td>
<td>Accredited</td>
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<td>Assist other LE agencies</td>
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<td>Transport offenders</td>
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<td>Provide court security</td>
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<td><strong>Village Public Safety Officers (VPSOs)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Search and rescue</td>
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<td>Rural villages</td>
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*Some positions may not be filled

Our Tribe needs the State to recognize and respect our Tribal courts. We don’t get much justice in Fairbanks.

*Curtis Summer, Vice Chairman, Tanana Village*

*Testimony before the Indian Law and Order Commission, Meeting in Tanana Village, AK*  
*October 29, 2012*

Alcohol is probably 95 percent of our problem, but the State says we have no Tribal authority to fight bootlegging locally when they’re hundreds of miles away—and only by airplane much of the year. The State and the Feds won’t step up to prevent alcohol and drugs from flowing in here from Anchorage and Fairbanks. We’re on our own, except they [the State] won’t respect or enforce what we do.

*Dave Richards, City Manager, Fort Yukon, AK*

*Testimony before the Indian Law and Order Commission, Meeting in Fort Yukon, AK*  
*October 30, 2012*
Most Alaska Native communities lack regular access to police, courts, and related services:

- Alaska Department of Public Safety (ADPS) officers have primary responsibility for law enforcement in rural Alaska, but ADPS provides for only 1.0–1.4 field officers per million acres. Since ADPS's 370 officers cannot serve on a 24/7 basis, the actual ratio of officers to territory is much lower. According to ADPS, troopers’ efforts “are often hampered by delayed notification, long response distance, and the uncertainties of weather and transportation.”

- Funding is available for just over 100 Village Public Safety Officers (VPSOs), although only 88 positions serving 74 communities were filled in 2011. Local Alaska Native Corporations hire VPSOs and villages have input into their selection; but, the officers actually work under Alaska State Trooper oversight. VPSO presence helps improve the coverage ratio, but technically their role is restricted to basic law enforcement and emergency first response. They do not carry firearms, although most offenders in rural villages do, a fact tragically emphasized through the death of VPSO Thomas Madole in March 2013.

- 104 more officers serve 52 communities as Village or Tribal Police Officers, and both the Bristol Bay and North Slope Boroughs have borough-wide police departments. These officers do carry firearms, but the positions exist only in those communities with the economic resources to support them.

- At least 75 communities in Alaska lack any law enforcement presence at all.

- Each of the four judicial districts in the Alaska court system serves rural Alaska, but the district courts frequently delegate responsibility to magistrates to serve low population, remote communities. Magistrates serving rural circuits visit individual communities regularly, but infrequently. Yet, often they are the sole face of the State court in Native villages.

- By Federal law, Alaska Native Tribes may establish Tribal courts. As of 2012, 78 Tribes in Alaska had done so; 17 more Tribes were in the process of court development. However, funding constraints and narrow jurisdiction limit Alaska Tribal courts’ efforts. Not all Alaska Tribal courts are fulltime or even operated with paid staff. These courts typically address only child welfare cases, customary adoptions, public drunkenness, disorderly conduct, and minor juvenile offenses.
Alaska Natives experience the highest rates of family violence, the highest rates of suicide, and the highest rates of alcohol abuse anywhere in the nation and, unfortunately, at the top of the list in Indian country in the United States. And those challenges...are exacerbated, in part, because of the enormous geographical size of Alaska, the remoteness of these communities, the skyrocketing costs of transportation, the lack of any economic opportunity, and the enormous gaps in the delivery of any form of government service, particularly from the State of Alaska.

Mayor Bruce Botelho, Commissioner, Alaska Rural Justice and Law Enforcement Commission
Testimony before the Indian Law and Order Commission, Hearing at Tulalip Indian Reservation
September 7, 2011
➢ The Emmonak Women’s Shelter, which closed for several weeks in 2012 for lack of resources, is “one of two facilities dedicated to domestic violence protection in the State. It is also the only facility located in a Native American community.”\(^{16}\) It is located “in a region in which there are few police officers, no transitional housing for women, and limited options for women seeking to escape.”\(^{17}\)

➢ Alaska funds only 16 juvenile probation offices across all of Alaska; on average, each office’s service area is the size of Tennessee.\(^{18}\)

➢ Of the 76 substance abuse treatment and/or mental health treatment centers in the State, most are in southern and southeastern Alaska, with approximately one-third in Anchorage alone; for residents of southwestern, central, and northern Alaska, help is typically provided a very long way from home.\(^{19}\)

Alaska Natives are disproportionately affected by crime, and these effects are felt most strongly in Native communities:

➢ Based on their proportion of the overall State population, Alaska Native women are over-represented in the domestic violence victim population by 250 percent; they comprise 19 percent of the population, but 47 percent of reported rape victims.\(^{20}\)

➢ On average, in 2005-2004 an Alaska Native female became a victim of reported sexual assault or of child sexual abuse every 29.8 hours, as compared to once every 46.6 hours for non-Native females. Victimization rates, which take account of underlying population proportions, are even more dissimilar: the rate of sexual violence victimization among Alaska Native women was at least seven times the non-Native rate.\(^{21}\)

➢ In Tribal villages and Native communities (excluding the urban Native population), problems are even more severe. Women have reported rates of domestic violence up to 10 times higher than in the rest of the United States and physical assault victimization rates up to 12 times higher.\(^{22}\)

➢ During the period 2004-2007, Alaska Natives were 2.5 times more likely to die by homicide than Alaskans who reported “White” as their race and 2.9 times more likely to die by homicide than all Whites in the United States.\(^{23}\)

➢ Alaska Natives’ representation in the Alaska prison and jail population is twice their representation in the general population (36 percent versus 19 percent).\(^{24}\) Nearly 20 percent of the Alaska Natives under supervision by the Alaska State Department of Corrections are housed out of State, nearly all at Hudson Correctional Facility in New York State—4,419 road miles from Anchorage.\(^{25}\)
“It nonetheless bears repeating that the Commission’s findings and conclusions represent the unanimous view of nine independent citizens, Republicans and Democrats alike: It is the Commission’s considered finding that Alaska’s approach to criminal justice issues is fundamentally on the wrong track.”
➢ In Fairbanks, the city that serves a large rural and Tribal village population, Alaska Native youth who come into contact with the juvenile justice system are four times more likely than non-Natives to be referred to juvenile court and three times more likely to be sentenced to confinement.26

Social distress, which can be a cause of crime or other threats to public safety, is also high among Alaska Natives and in Alaska’s Tribal communities:

➢ The suicide rate among Alaska Natives is almost four times the U.S. general population rate, and is at least six times the national average in some parts of the State.27

➢ In 2011, over 50 percent of the 4,499 reports of maltreatment substantiated by Alaska’s child protective services and over 60 percent of the 769 children removed from their homes were Alaska Native children.28

➢ More than 95 percent of all crimes committed in rural Alaska can be attributed to alcohol.29

➢ The alcohol abuse-related mortality rate was 58.7 per 100,000 for Alaska Natives over the period 2004-2008, 16.1 times higher than rate for the U.S. White population over the same period.30

Origins and further impacts. Why do these grave crime and safety issues persist in Alaska’s tribal communities? Responsibility, it appears, lies primarily with the State’s justice system.

In Alaska’s criminal justice system, State authority is privileged: the State has asserted exclusive criminal jurisdiction over all lands once controlled by Tribes, and it exercises this jurisdiction through the provision of law enforcement and judicial services from a set of regional locations, under the direction and control of the relevant State commissioners. This approach has led to a dramatic under-provision of criminal justice services in rural and Native regions of the State. It also has limited collaboration with local governments (Alaska Native or not), which could be the State's most valuable partners in crime prevention and the restoration of public safety.

It is not the Commission’s intent in any way to criticize the many dedicated and accomplished State officials who serve Native communities day in and day out. They deserve the nation’s respect, and they have the Commission’s.

Yet, control and accountability directed by local Tribes is critical for improving public safety. It brings to the table place-specific knowledge of what may work best to prevent crime and social disorder. It prioritizes the
use of scarce criminal justice resources according to community needs. It creates possibilities for intervention before disagreements or stressful situations become violent. It makes it easier for law enforcement officials to respond to crime, creates better access to the institutions of justice for victims and witnesses, and allows for trials by jury of a defendant’s peers.

Through these improved means of responding to problems, de-escalating conflict, and providing justice, local control may even decrease demand for certain criminal justice services and related social services. 

By contrast, Alaska’s criminal justice system can only weakly respond to crime, do little to prevent it, and ultimately, perpetuates public safety concerns.

The Commission appreciates the State of Alaska’s support of the Commission’s visits to the State during the course of performing its statutory duties, including, but not limited to the cooperation that Attorney General Michael Geraghty and the Alaska State Troopers repeatedly extended. Similarly, we are grateful for the senior Federal leaders who did not hesitate to enable the Commission’s work or engage individual Commissioners on these important matters. Where this report differs on interpretation of law, legal issues, and policies, we want to make clear that it is not for a lack of dialogue or a willingness to engage in robust discussion and debates. (See Appendix F for letters from Attorney General Geraghty and Donald Mitchell, Esq.)

It nonetheless bears repeating that the Commission’s findings and conclusions represent the unanimous view of nine independent citizens, Republicans and Democrats alike: It is the Commission’s considered finding that Alaska’s approach to criminal justice issues is fundamentally on the wrong track. The status quo in Alaska tends to marginalize and frequently ignores the potential of tribally based justice systems, intertribal institutions, and organizations to provide more cost-effective and responsive alternatives to prevent crime and keep all Alaskans safer. If given an opportunity to work, Tribal approaches can be reasonably expected to make all Alaskans safer—and at less cost.

The Alaska State Attorney General has reviewed the distinct history of Tribal-territorial and Tribal-State relationships regarding land occupancy, ownership, and jurisdiction for the benefit of the Indian Law and Order Commission (Appendix F). The Commission understands that from the State’s perspective, Alaska’s criminal justice system is rooted in U.S. statutory and case law. The Attorney General’s review notes that given the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 (ANCSA) in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, there is very little Indian country in Alaska (as defined by the Indian Country Act, 18 U.S. C. § 1151).

The Alaska Attorney General’s review also emphasizes that Alaska is subject to P.L. 83-280, which assigns certain aspects of Federal jurisdiction
over Indian country to the State government. The Attorney General takes the position that its law enforcement authority is exclusive throughout the State, maintaining that Tribes do not have a land base on which to exercise any inherent criminal jurisdiction.

In the Commission’s view, each of the Attorney General’s arguments is incomplete and unconvincing.

- The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government addressed fee land, not Alaska Native town site land or Alaska Native allotments, and a number of strong arguments can be made that this land may be taken into trust and treated as Indian country. Recently, for example, after exhaustively reviewing all the statutory authorities, a Federal court has decided that the Secretary of Interior does have authority to take land into trust in Alaska for Alaska Native communities.

- The State of Alaska rests its argument for exclusive criminal law jurisdiction on P.L. 83-280. Yet, courts within and outside Alaska have unanimously affirmed that P.L. 83-280 left concurrent State and inherent Tribal jurisdiction intact within Indian country. The State cannot simultaneously assert that, outside the Metlakatla Reservation, there is no Indian country in Alaska and that P.L. 83-280 prevails.

- Evidence in Alaska suggests that Tribes do have a land base on which to exercise criminal jurisdiction. At least some Alaska municipalities already are entering into agreements with Native villages that acknowledge the exclusive operation of Native law and law enforcement within overlapping municipal and village boundaries. One such example is the agreement between Alaskan city of Quinhagak and the Native Village of Kwinhagak.

Without doubt, the Commission understands that the structure of Alaska’s criminal justice system is consistent with the overall organization of Alaska State government, which is more centralized than any other U.S. state’s. In Alaska, most State programs and functions operate from a designated hub or hubs, and less attention is paid in Alaska than in other States to developing local capacity. Given this orientation, when Federal policy augmented State authority to include authority over Alaska Native lands, the State reflexively absorbed and centralized that authority.

But understanding the history of Alaska’s system does not imply that it should continue, especially as its population keeps growing. The serious and ongoing crime and disorder problems in rural and Native regions of the State are evidence that the system is deeply flawed and that it has failed. From the standpoint of public safety, to leave the system unchanged makes the State of Alaska’s continued assertion of exclusive jurisdiction seem not only unwise, but also incautious. It also is indefensibly expensive.
to all Alaskans in terms of the human and economic toll it is taking on this and future generations of Alaskans.

The VPSO and VAWA Amendment exclusions are two specific examples of way the organization and orientation of the State’s criminal justice system fail to prevent crime and imperil public safety

➢ **The Village Public Safety Officer position.** The VPSO position is emblematic of the deficiencies in Alaska’s criminal justice system for Tribal communities. These quasi-law enforcement field officers are paid by Alaska Native Corporations, but report to the Alaska State Patrol, and are not accountable directly to Alaska Native communities. They perform numerous nonpolicing functions, have limited training, and cannot carry firearms—despite the great volatility of many situations they encounter. There is no reason for Alaska to use this model other than cost savings. VPSOs themselves can be exceptional officers, but the plans to expand the VPSO system do not translate into the scale of public safety enhancements that are necessary.

➢ **The harms in the VAWA Amendments exclusion.** Title IX, Section 901 of the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 includes a special rule limiting the Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction in the Act to the Metlakatla Indian Community, leaving 228 other Tribes in Alaska without its benefit. The VAWA Amendments provisions allow Tribal courts to exercise this jurisdiction even against non-Natives under certain circumstances, and in several respects may apply in the absence of Indian country (for example, when the victim is a spouse, intimate partner, or dating partner of a member of the participating Tribe). The civil provisions allowing for protective orders also are not tied to the requirement of “Indian country.” Exempting all but one of Alaska’s Tribes from this legislation deprives them—and the State overall—of an essential tool in the fight against domestic violence and sexual assault.

Furthermore, crime and safety problems are only one the system’s many negative consequences:

➢ Alaska’s approach to providing criminal justice services is unfair. Alaska Natives, especially those living in rural areas of the State, have not had access to the level and quality of public safety services available to other State residents or that they should rightly expect as U.S. citizens. Given the higher rates of crime that prevail in Alaska Native communities, the inequities are even greater in relative terms. The State of Alaska’s overarching lack of respect for Tribal authority further magnifies fairness concerns.
➢ Alaska’s approach creates and reinforces discriminatory attitudes about Alaska Natives and the governing capacities of Alaska Native Tribes. As long as the system that helped create the problems is allowed to persist, the general public will be tempted to assume that the fault lies with the victims—when instead, Alaska Natives and Alaska Native Tribal governments have had relatively little say in the way crime and justice are addressed in their communities.

➢ Alaska’s approach puts the State out of step with the rest of the United States and with international norms. As the State Attorney General's letter demonstrates, Alaska steadfastly relies on ANCSA as the basis of its interactions with Tribes. But placed in context, ANCSA was the last gasp of Federal “Termination Policy,” which focused on ending government-to-government relationships with Native nations. A mere 4 years later, Congress passed the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 (P.L. 93-638), and Federal policy moved strongly in the direction of Tribal empowerment. Since then, evidence has accumulated that Tribal self-government is the best means of improving outcomes for American Indians living in Tribal communities, and international law has affirmed the importance of self-determination for Indigenous peoples.

➢ Alaska’s approach will lead to significant criminal justice and litigation costs. A variety of legal rulings and court decisions underscore the strong differences of opinion about State and Tribal government powers in Alaska. These decisions include: the 133-page opinion of the Department of the Interior Solicitor in 1993 that ANCSA had not terminated villages' status as Tribes, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Venetie, and the Alaska Supreme Court’s 1999 decision in John v. Baker that Alaska Native Tribal courts can regulate internal domestic affairs even if Tribes do not have federally recognized Indian country. Without policy change, the future will look much like the contested past, only with much bigger and costlier problems compounded over time. As one expert has observed, “the extent of Tribal jurisdiction in Alaska is not yet clear, and will likely be the subject of State and Federal court cases for years to come.” Even if Alaska wins cases, the financial and social costs of litigation will be considerable and could be avoided altogether if State-Tribal relations instead were characterized by respect, mutual recognition, and partnership.

➢ Alaska’s approach may result in irrevocable harm. The 75 Alaska Native villages that lack any law enforcement presence must contend with the prevailing sentiment in the State, which the Commissioners frequently heard from State and Federal leaders, that they should “just move.” The Commission was told repeatedly, in other words, that many Alaska Natives should relocate to larger, semi-urban centers, where there are law enforcement,
Circle Peacemaking in the Organized Village of Kake is a community-based restorative justice process for both adults and juveniles. State judges can defer to it for sentencing decisions and community members can turn there before problems deteriorate into official concerns. Kake circle peacemaking focuses on restoring balance to offenders’ lives and to healing ruptures in their family, clan, Tribe, and community relationships. While literally sitting in a circle, justice system personnel, village elders, service providers, and any interested or affected community members meet with the offender and victim(s) to “speak from the heart in a shared search for understanding of the event” and to “together identify the steps necessary to assist in healing all affected parties and prevent future crimes.” Kake Circle Peacemaking has led to decreased substance abuse, decreased offending, which is reflected in recidivism rates as much as 40 percentage points lower than the comparable State of Alaska figure, and greater Tribal self-determination.35

One of the vehicles of change which I view as a hopeful, empowering mechanism is catching on in some villages in this region. The Western way of locking people up to sit in a jail cell and receive three meals a day and not really have to do anything meaningful to make things right is not too effective….Some of our State Magistrates and some State Judges are offering the option of the offender who has been charged and pled guilty to a misdemeanor or lower offence, to go before their home communities and be in a circle and to take ownership of their mistake in a meaningful way which can only happen in the safety and caring of a circle by the people who helped raise you. This is an example of a positive solution.

Mishal Tootyak Gaede, Tribal Court Facilitator, Tanana Chiefs Conference Letter to the Commission, October 31, 2012

One of the concluding observations I would make is that as a result of our activities within the State we become painfully aware that there was a tendency to be a wide gap between State governments and Tribal governments with regard to the roles in rural Alaska.

Mayor Bruce Botelho, Commissioner, Alaska Rural Justice and Law Enforcement Commission Testimony before the Indian Law and Order Commission, Hearing at Tulalip Indian Reservation September 7, 2011
court services, and support for victims and offenders. For communities that already are under great stress from natural resource development, environmental degradation, climate change, competition over subsistence resources, complex restrictions on subsistence activities, high prices for food and fuel, and substandard housing and sanitation conditions, this relatively callous attitude toward village public safety may be the final straw, leading to the dissolution of villages and the abandonment of life ways forged in the crucible of the Arctic thousands of years ago. While cultural change is to be expected, it should be guided by community choices—not forced by colonial policy.

Making change. Some important initial reforms have gained toeholds within the current system, particularly within the Alaska State judiciary. In her 2013 “State of the Judiciary Address,” Chief Justice Dana Fabe of the Alaska Supreme Court praised both the State-deputized circle sentencing program, a traditional Native practice for restoring breaches in the community caused by wrongdoing, which the State has piloted as a sentencing practice in a limited number of State court proceedings, and Tribal courts, which are fully independent of State control:

Tribal courts bring not only local knowledge, cultural sensitivity, and expertise to the table, but also are a valuable resource, experience, and a have a high level of local trust. They exist in at least half the villages of our State and stand ready, willing, and able to take part in local justice delivery. Just as the three branches of State government must work together closely to ensure effective delivery of justice throughout the State court system, State and Tribal courts must work together closely to ensure a system of rural justice delivery that responds to the needs of every village in a manner that is timely, effective, and fair.

Backing up words with action, Justice Fabe and her colleagues have been instrumental in improving the enforceability of Tribal court orders concerning domestic violence and engaging State and Tribal courts in shared training meetings.

This outreach and innovation by the Alaska judiciary is impressive and welcome, but it falls far short of what is truly needed. More Tribal villages need Tribal courts and sentencing circles, and where such institutions already exist, greater Tribal jurisdiction could make them even more effective.

Native villages without reasonable access to law enforcement should have that access, and all of their law enforcement officers should have the training and approval to carry firearms subject to standards that accord with all State peace officers. Native village residents should be able to participate locally in substance abuse treatment, technology-assisted alternatives to detention, and anger management programs. Not only the
State’s judicial branch, but also all of State government should be working in greater collaboration with Alaska Native Tribes. The immediate and overriding need is for a criminal justice system that fully recognizes, respects, and empowers their governments.

What policy adjustments the State of Alaska should make in support of greater Tribal authority over criminal justice is something the State and its citizens should decide, not the Indian Law and Order Commission. The Commission notes only that a variety of organizational models support greater empowerment and that the shift must include the financial means for Tribal governments to do their share. Among others, options include:

- collaborating with Tribes on other criminal justice issues
- deputizing Tribes to provide a wide array of criminal justice services
- delegating or deputizing Tribal judges, including the expanded use of circle sentencing and traditional dispute resolution
- leveraging the State and Tribal governments’ concurrent criminal jurisdiction to develop specific, locally optimal criminal justice approaches
- adopting a policy of State deference to Tribal authority in Tribal communities

Questions about how Tribal government services will be paid for immediately draw attention to an important difference between village and urban Alaska communities. Village subsistence economies do not lend themselves to many traditional means of government revenue generation, such as imposing a sales tax. Instead, other forms of finance must be found. Tribal governments may have access to certain Federal income streams (especially if the Commission’s recommendations concerning base funding are implemented), and some may have site-specific revenue opportunities, such as in wildlife management, extractable resources, and government contracts.

The State government can also generate funds for Tribal criminal justice programming by rooting out inefficiencies and wasteful spending in its current organization, taking advantage of cost-savings from the increased use of alternatives to detention and other innovations in service provision, and moving money out of regional centers when increases in Tribal capacity make the current extent of service provision unnecessary.⁴⁴

Regional Alaska Native Corporations, the largest beneficiaries from Tribal resources over the last four decades, also should increase their contributions to the governments that justify their existence. The bottom line is that as Alaska Native Tribal governments must have adequate finances to carry out the functions of government, meet their
responsibilities to citizens, and work to improve their citizens’ lives. As a legal matter, such changes may require statutory and constitutional change in Alaska, as well as corresponding reforms to ANSCA and other laws.\(^{45}\)

While acknowledging that change in the criminal justice system that serves Native Alaska is primarily a State and Tribal responsibility, the Indian Law and Order Commission observes that there also is a role for Congress. By making relatively modest changes to law and policy, Congress can help create a jurisdictional framework that supports Tribal sovereignty, provides a clearer role for the State, and lays groundwork for the resolution of resourcing issues.

Because the vast majority of public safety concerns in rural and Native Alaska relate to substance abuse, minimizing harms from alcohol and drug use will be key to addressing public safety issues in Native villages. There must be creative thinking about substance abuse problems and other local public safety concerns, by a broader set of individuals, (especially Tribal governments, but others as well), who can leverage a wider set of resources.

When Tribal governments have a larger decision-making role, it is likely that even more locally based, therapeutic sentencing models will emerge; that treatment resources in Native villages will be more integrated with law enforcement; that criminal justice and social services will be deployed more often for prevention and harm reduction than for intervention and punishment; and that new players, such as nonprofit organizations or Tribal collaboratives, will join in. This is not to minimize the difficulty in solving problems related to transportation, access, and infrastructure, but to suggest that even for very entrenched problems like substance abuse reduction, expanding local Tribal governments’ authority offers more hope than does the status quo.

**Recommendations**

**2.1: Congress should overturn the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government,\(^{46}\) by amending ANCSA\(^ {47}\) to provide that former reservation lands acquired in fee by Alaska Native villages and other lands transferred in fee to Native villages pursuant to ANCSA are Indian country.**

The *Venetie* decision was based on an outdated and static understanding of ANCSA. Although that statute was first enacted under the influence of Termination Policy, it has been amended and reinterpreted many times since then, moving gradually but unmistakably toward a Tribal self-determination model. Thus, although the original language of ANCSA disavowed “lengthy wardship or trusteeship”\(^ {48}\) for Alaska Natives, later amendments deliberately extended restrictions on transfer of shares in Alaska Native Corporations out of Native ownership, and included other measures to ensure continued Native control of Alaska Native Corporations and the lands they own.\(^ {49}\)
Further, as noted above, in 1993 the executive branch confirmed recognition of Alaska Native villages as federally recognized Indian nations with a government-to-government relationship with the United States. Since then Federal agencies have been providing services to Alaska Native villages that clearly qualify as Indian country much as they do for Tribes on reservation lands. Nothing in ANCSA expressly barred the treatment of these former reservation and other Tribal fee lands as Indian country. As a consequence, the Venetie decision has been widely criticized for failing “to honor longstanding principles of Indian law favoring the preservation of Tribal rights and powers until Congress clearly expresses its intent to terminate those rights and powers.”

Congress should step forward and correct the Supreme Court’s misguided interpretation of ANCSA.

2.2: Congress and the President should amend the definitions of Indian country to clarify (or affirm) that Native allotments and Native-owned town sites in Alaska are Indian country.

There is an archipelago of lands—individual Indian allotments and commonly held lands within Alaska Native town sites—that ANCSA did not affect. These are geographies over which the Federal government retains a trust responsibility, and they should be fully recognized as Indian country.

These parcels are not insignificant—conservative estimates place their total area somewhere between 4 and 6 million acres. If a land base is what is needed to exercise criminal jurisdiction (and other kinds of land-based jurisdiction), the change would clarify that at least some Alaska Native Tribes do have one. Furthermore, these lands are foothold from which Indian country in Alaska can be expanded.

2.3: Congress should amend the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act to allow a transfer of lands from Regional Corporations to Tribal governments; to allow transferred lands to be put into trust and included within the definition of Indian country in the Federal criminal code; to allow Alaska Native Tribes to put tribally owned fee simple land similarly into trust; and to channel more resources directly to Alaska Native Tribal governments for the provision of governmental services in those communities.

To assert substantial land-based jurisdiction, Alaska Native Tribes need more land, with a focus on restoring and consolidating Tribal authority within Native villages and town sites. Transfers of Regional Corporation land back to Tribes and conversion of this land to trust status makes that possible. Tribes also should have the option of converting any land held in fee simple to trust status to further enlarge the reach of territorial jurisdiction.

Where Tribes in Alaska pursue such land consolidation and create larger swaths of Indian country in Alaska, the argument for them to opt out of P.L. 83-280 jurisdiction (as provided for in Commission recommendation...
1.1) is at least as strong as it is for P.L. 85-280 Tribes in the lower 48. Indeed, Alaska Native Tribes may have a stronger case for exiting State jurisdiction under P.L. 85-280 because the State of Alaska centralizes its jurisdiction much more than other States, allowing even less local control.

Significantly, there are benefits of larger Tribal land bases that extend beyond improved criminal justice. For one, larger land bases help secure economic opportunity, that is, market opportunities that could help fund Tribal government and subsistence activities that provide Tribal citizens with greater food and financial security.

In fact, a larger tribally controlled land base for subsistence may have a variety of positive consequences. It can be protective of the environment, as Alaska Native communities have a vested interest in sustaining ecological health. It can decrease the criminalization of subsistence harvesting by expanding the geography in which community members can harvest without facing a choice between breaking the law and feeding their families. And, it may decrease social distress (which ultimately relates to public safety concerns) by providing productive, self-esteem enhancing “employment” for community members.

Some lawmakers have considered ANCSA sacrosanct, and may object to its amendment. But the Commission notes that ANCSA has been amended many times before with the intention of protecting Alaska Native resources, and the Commission’s proposals share that commitment. Indeed, from its passage in 1971, ANCSA was amended by nearly every Congress for the next 55 years, so it is hardly set in stone.

Moreover, while the Commission’s proposals for amendment are relatively modest, its members also observe that ANCSA got Indian policy in Alaska wrong. ANCSA has strong similarities to the General Allotment Act of 1887, which by converting communal land into individual land assets was intended to assist American Indians in adapting to Western life ways. The legislation’s implicit assumption was that after a generation or two, Indigenous peoples would no longer desire Tribal settlement arrangements. But, by the early 1950s, the empirical evidence generated by five decades of allotment invalidated the idea that American Indians would assimilate or that land allotment was the best way forward.

The U.S. government acknowledged its error and repudiated its policy with the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA). While the IRA has been problematic in some ways, it firmly recognized Tribal sovereignty and Tribes’ right to hold lands in common. It also led to reinvestment in American Indian communities with the understanding clarified in P.L. 93-638 that local Tribal governments are best positioned to address the social and economic needs of their citizens. Forty years after the passage of ANCSA, the Commission finds that the United States again has empirical evidence that allotment—albeit in a newer form—does not work. As Congress did with passage of the IRA, it is time to respond to the evidence
As the Federal government feverishly works to ward off a looming cash crunch, Alaska needs to work with Tribes creatively to conserve dwindling resources. The models are already there. The proverbial wheel need not be re-invented. Isn’t the goal to solve the problems associated with jurisdiction, not perpetuate them? States like Wisconsin, Maine, and Arizona are to be applauded in their efforts to push through outdated prejudices and fears to create cooperative, problem-solving protocols. In some States, a simple cup of coffee between historic adversaries grew into powerful partnerships. We stand on fertile ground to develop both responsible and effective tools to reduce the domestic violence epidemic in Alaska and enter a new age of mutual understanding and cooperation.

Myron Naneng, Sr., President of the Association of Village Council Presidents
Alaska Dispatch
March 17, 2013

Overarching Themes of the 2006 Alaska Rural Justice and Law Enforcement Commission Report

1. Engage in more partnering and collaboration, especially through cross-jurisdictional agreements
2. Make systemic changes to improve rural law enforcement, especially changes that would support the training and certification of more Tribal officers
3. Enlarge the use of community-based solutions, especially through the delegation of authority to Tribes to address juvenile matters
4. Broaden the use of prevention approaches, with a special concentration on cultural relevance
5. Broaden the use of therapeutic approaches, including linking these approaches to culturally appropriate child welfare services
6. Increase employment of rural residents in law enforcement and judicial services by recruiting rural and Alaska Natives, creating opportunities for in-community probation supervision, and contracting with tribes for community service
7. Build additional capacity through infrastructure investments in housing for public safety officers, holding facilities in rural Alaska, and improve equipment
8. Increase access to judicial services, especially through increased jurisdiction and funding for Tribal courts
9. Expand the use of new technologies, especially by learning from the implementation of tele-medicine
that Alaska Native nations are not going away and reaffirm the status of Alaska Native Tribal governments as the key players in improving the lives of Alaska Natives. The recommended amendments to ANCSA for the return of land assets and for financial support of Tribal governments are based on this understanding.

2.4: Congress should repeal Section 910 of Title IX of the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 (VAWA Amendments), and thereby permit Alaska Native communities and their courts to address domestic violence and sexual assault, committed by Tribal members and non-Natives, the same as now will be done in the lower 48.

The special rule applying Title IX of the VWA Amendments to only one Native community in Alaska is inimical to providing effective public safety in Alaska. A simple fix is the removal of the one section relating to Alaska, which puts Alaska Native communities on par with Native communities throughout the nation. Allowing Tribal courts to issue protective orders, to enforce them, and provide the local, immediate deterrence effect of these judicial actions may be the single-most effective tool in fighting domestic violence and sexual assault in Native communities in Alaska. Significantly, many of the VWA Amendments provisions apply even in the absence of Indian country and clearly should be in the purview of Tribal courts in Alaska.55

2.5: Congress should affirm the inherent criminal jurisdiction of Alaska Native Tribal governments over their members within the external boundaries of their villages.

P.L. 83-280 does not fit well in Alaska, predicated as it was on the presence of Indian country as defined by the Federal criminal code. The changes wrought by ANCSA effectively diminished any real meaning for P.L. 83-280 in Alaska, yet it is the law that the State relies on to hold that Alaska Native Tribes cannot exercise concurrent criminal law jurisdiction over their own members, frustrating the development of local-level criminal justice institutions. Regardless of what lands Tribes own or whether they are considered Indian country, this recommendation offers an opportunity to use new tools to respond to the public safety crisis in Alaska Native communities.

These changes authorize Tribes to locally and immediately attend to violence and criminal activity. They make it easier to create State-Tribal MOUs for law enforcement deputization and cross-deputization, cooperate in prosecution and sentencing, and apply criminal justice resources for optimal, mutual benefit. Such reforms also facilitate the ability of Alaska Native Tribes and nations to work together for mutual benefit, such as creating intertribal courts and institutions. Of course, to make the most of this Federal affirmation, Tribes should take action to clarify and, as necessary, formalize Tribal law for governing their recognized territories, especially law that relates to public safety.
CONCLUSION

In the words of Chief Justice Fabe:

Every study or survey of rural justice over the past two decades has acknowledged the unique and compelling justice needs of Alaska’s small and isolated villages. The Alaska Sentencing Commission, the Alaska Natives Commission, the Alaska Judicial Council, the Alaska Supreme Court’s Advisory Committee on Fairness and Access, the Alaska Commission on Rural Governance and Empowerment, and the Alaska Rural Justice and Law Enforcement Commission, have each studied the issues thoroughly. Consistent among their recommendations is a theme heard with increasing urgency: the need for greater opportunities for local community leaders and organizations to engage in justice delivery at the local level. Quite simply, for courts to effectively serve the needs of rural residents, justice cannot be something delivered in a far-off court by strangers, but something in which local people—those most intimately affected—can be directly and meaningfully involved.

The Chief Justice’s framing of the systemic dysfunction that flows from the State’s existing justice system may give reason for hope. Yet hope is not a strategy.

The Indian Law and Order Commission is not the first advisory board to recognize the lack of access to safety and public safety services in Alaska Native communities. But it should be the last. The situation in Alaska is urgent and of national, and not just State or regional, importance. Only the combined efforts of Federal, State, and Tribal leaders will be sufficient to change course and put all Alaskans on a better path.


9 *About VPSO Program*, supra note 7.


15 “Alaska Natives and the Courts (gateway page and publication list), Justice Center, University of Alaska at Anchorage, http://justice.aaa.alaska.edu/directory/a/alaska_natives_courts.


18 The State’s eight juvenile facilities are located in Anchorage, Bethel, Fairbanks, Juneau, Kenai, Ketchikan, Nome, and Palmer; the eight probation-only offices are in Barrow, Craig, Dillingham, Homer, Kodiak, Kotzebue, Sitka, and Valdez; see Juvenile Detention in Alaska, 25 ALASKA JUSTICE FORUM at 1 (2006), http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/forum/25/2summer2006/c_juvdetention.html.


25 STATE OF ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 2011 id. at 52.


27 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Injury Prevention and


30 Gretchen Day, Peter Holck, & Ellen Provost, supra note 27 at 15, 265.

31 For example, in dry villages with law enforcement, there is a 40 percent lower rate of serious injury caused by an assault as compared to dry villages without a law enforcement presence. Darryl S. Wood & Paul J. Gruenewald, Local Alcohol Prohibition, Police Presence and Serious Injury in Isolated Alaska Native Villages, 101 ADDICTION 393 (2006).


33 While these statements are true, the Commission finds the Alaska Attorney General’s argument to be inconsistent. The assertion of P.L. 83-280 jurisdiction is unnecessary if there is no Indian country in Alaska.


35 See M.J. ex rel. Beebe v. United States, 721 F.5d 1079 (9th Cir. 2015).


39 Governmental Jurisdiction of Alaska Native Villages Over Land and Non-Members, Memorandum to the Secretary from the Solicitor, Department of the Interior (Thomas Sansonetti) (1995), http://www.doi.gov/solicitor/opinions/M-56975.pdf on February 28, 2015. The Opinion concluded that there were tribes in Alaska, but that their territorial jurisdiction had been limited by the by passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act.

40 982 P.2d 758 (Alaska 1999)


A complete analysis of these options is essential to lay the groundwork for a more cost-effective, tribally based criminal justice system that places greater emphasis on the power of local control and accountability. This includes such basic issues as ensuring that Tribal villages can swiftly enforce their own laws related to alcohol, domestic violence, and other pervasive challenges whose implications are predominately local in nature, as is common place in the lower 48. A worthwhile place to begin would be to extend the very general framework from enhanced Alaska Native tribal sovereignty articulated in David S. Case & David A. Voluck, Alaska Natives and American Laws (2012), especially Chapter 10 (“Sovereignty). While Case and Voluck do not examine criminal justice issues per se, their insights on the interplay among State, tribal, and Federal laws are instructive.


Id. at 355.


Case and Voluck, supra note 46 at 165.

48 Stat. 984 (1954), also known as the Wheeler-Howard Act or “Indian New Deal.”

Sen. Mark Begich (D-AK) introduced a bill entitled “Alaska Safe Families and Villages Act of 2013” (S. 1474) on August 1, 2013, which was intended as a “fix” to the special Alaska exclusion in the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization of 2013. However, the version Begich introduced fell far short of the version that many Alaska Native advocates had been expecting. Earlier draft language had proposed to supplement State jurisdiction in Alaska Native villages with enhanced Tribal and local authority to address domestic violence and reduce alcohol and drug abuse. The final bill was about the Tribes entering into agreements to implement State law, which advocates claim they do not need Federal legislation to do. Native Sun News reported that “Begich’s aide Andrea Sanders said the changes came about through consultations between both Alaska senators and the state’s Attorney General Michael C. Geraghty on July 51.” At the time of writing (fall 2013), S. 1474 had stalled in committee, but this outcome further underscores the importance of finally standing up for Alaska Natives’ rights, as implementation of the Commission’s recommendations would do. See Talli Nauman, Violence Against Women Act Amendment Falls Short of Protecting Women, Native Sun News, August 12, 2013, http://www.indianz.com/News/2013/010769.asp (reprint), and “S.1474: Alaska Safe Families and Villages Act of 2013,” http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s1474/text.

Fabe, supra note 42 at 8. These are the citations for the reports mentioned in the address: (1) Alaska Sentencing Commission, 1992 Annual Report to the Governor and the Alaska...