EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A responsive intelligence apparatus with the agility and focus to combat modern capabilities on the physical, cyber, and influence battlefields is needed to enable our nation to face its current and future national security challenges. Intelligence support for military operations, both current intelligence and the estimative analysis that underpins it, is largely reactive and tactical, and operational commanders require real-time intelligence for battlefield decision advantage. As our government increasingly turns towards security partnerships with governments with complex interests, low-footprint approaches to power projection, and smaller-scale man hunting, effective intelligence will be increasingly important for coping with the frictions of a constrained force but persistently complex battlefield.

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), created in 1961, was directed to serve the Secretary of Defense; Staff Assistants to the Secretaries; Military Departments; Joint Chiefs of Staff; specialized Department of Defense (DOD) agencies; Unified and Specified Commands; and other organizations in the national intelligence Community requiring military intelligence.1 In subsequent iterations of the charter, the provision of military intelligence to the combatant commands (CCMDs) became an increased focus for DIA. DIA’s functions and its relationships to the other defense intelligence components puts the agency at the epicenter of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE).2 As a Combat Support Agency (CSA),3 DOD's only all-source intelligence agency,4 and an Intelligence Community (IC) element,5 DIA is charged with many functions. The number and range of these functions have challenged DIA’s ability to perform its core defense intelligence mission over time. Further, DIA’s multiple roles, to include serving concurrently as the lead DOD component conducting a core defense intelligence mission, DOD Functional Manager, IC Functional Manager, and IC Executive Agent bolstered the need to review the agency.

Key Findings

Overall the Committee found that DIA produces excellent intelligence on foreign-military capabilities and operating environments and boasts several unique capabilities in support of DOD and the IC. However, DIA is not fully satisfying critical DOD intelligence requirements in several key areas, to include indications & warning intelligence,6 and target intelligence.7

DIA provides and enables unique defense intelligence in several areas:

- Scientific and Technical Intelligence;
- Overt Human Intelligence;
- Foundational Intelligence Analysis;
- Defense Cover;
- DIE Training;
- Document and Media Exploitation, and
- Partner Nation Intelligence Sharing.

The Committee also found that there are several areas in which DIA is struggling to fully meet its requirements. These specific areas are:

- Analysis;
- Intelligence Mission Data Enterprise Management;
- Intelligence Support to Planning;
- Intelligence Support to Targeting;
- Collection and Processing;
- Understanding and Awareness of User Requirements;
- Defense Collection Management;
- Knowledge Management, Systems, and Tools;
- Serving as the IC Executive Agent for non-DOD Functions;
- Execution of DOD Enterprise Management/Functional Management Responsibilities; and
- Warning/Watch Functions.

The Committee found that common root causes underlie most of the challenges outlined above, many of which date back to DIA’s creation and most of which are externally driven.

- A Long History of Ambiguous Responsibilities and Authorities;
- Untenable Scope of Roles and Functions;
- Lack of Involved Executive Branch Oversight;
- Complicated DIE Command and Control Structure;
- Competing Customers and Requirements;
- Internal Information-Sharing Challenges;
- IT Resource/Responsibility Misalignment;
- Informal Deployment Requirements;
- Lack of Interagency/DOD Awareness of Capabilities;
- Inconsistent Approaches to Talent Management; and
- Failures to “Think Forward.”

Recommendations

As a result of the findings of this review, the Committee has seven recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and Secretary of Defense should assess specific roles and functions for transfer, elimination, or consolidation. There are a number of roles and functions for which DIA is currently responsible that the Committee believes may not need to be resident within DIA or are ancillary to the defense intelligence mission. Each of these roles and functions currently benefits from the broad infrastructure that DIA offers given the diversity and breadth of its responsibilities, but the Committee will be looking to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and DOD, in concert with DIA, to reassess these roles and functions.

Recommendation 2: The Secretary of Defense should administratively separate the Joint Staff J2 from DIA to clarify the relationships, responsibilities, and command and control for the Defense Intelligence Enterprise’s functional management. DIA’s relationship to the Joint Staff J2 should be one of resource sponsorship, akin to its relationship with the CCMD and Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs). All relevant policies, memoranda, and guidance documents should be updated to reflect this change.

Recommendation 3: The Secretary of Defense should transfer all of DIA’s DOD Enterprise management responsibilities to the Joint Staff Director for Intelligence. The DIA Director has responsibilities as an executor of defense intelligence functions and concurrently as the enterprise manager for many of the same functions (e.g., analysis, counterintelligence (CI), collection management, human intelligence (HUMINT), open-source intelligence (OSINT), etc.), which creates confusion and real and perceived conflicts of interest, given the sheer number of functions in which DIA is acting in both capacities.

Recommendation 4: The Secretary of Defense should elevate the position of Joint Staff Director for Intelligence to a 3-star position. The Joint Staff Director for Intelligence will have additional responsibilities and authorities for the DIE based on the Committee’s recommendations above. As a result, the position of Joint Staff Director for Intelligence should be elevated to a 3-star position on par with each of the other Joint Staff J-Code positions and reflecting its increased enterprise responsibilities and authorities.

Recommendation 5: The Secretary of Defense should implement a “Follow the Sun” model for the Defense Intelligence Enterprise’s Watch Floor/Operations Centers. The Secretary of Defense should identify each Watch Floor/Operations Center operating throughout the DIE and select those 8-10 that are geographically located so that they, in aggregate, cover the globe and each of the time zones. Within each of those, there should reside a distributed representation of the DIE so that all DIE element commanders and directors have representatives of their organizations on the Watch at all times in support of their mission, but not necessarily in 24-hour shifts in their theater of operations.
Recommendation 6: DIA should create an Entrepreneur-In-Residence program to tap into external expertise, energize workforce innovation, and institutionalize a culture of strategic planning and thinking about the most critical challenges DIA may face in the future. The commercial sector has experienced a lot of success over the past several years with Entrepreneur-In-Residence (EIR) Programs and, increasingly, government entities are institutionalizing modified versions to tap into external talent pools to help solve complex Agency challenges. DIA should create an EIR program to tap into external expertise, energize workforce innovation, and institutionalize a cultural of strategic planning and thinking about the most critical challenges DIA may face in the future.

Recommendation 7: DIA should move towards developing two cadres of personnel—one focused on steady-state operations and one that is more expeditionary in nature. The DIA workforce should comprise two cadres of personnel—one focused on steady-state operations, amassing technical expertise and depth to provide robust foundational defense intelligence support to the DOD and the IC, and one that is more expeditionary in nature, composed of modular teams, tailored to fit current problem sets or emergent mission needs.