AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H.R. 8512
OFFERED BY MR. TURNER OF OHIO

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) Short Title.—This Act may be cited as the “Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025”.

(b) Table of Contents.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

1. Short title; table of contents.
2. Definitions.

TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Intelligence Community Management Account.

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

TITLE III—GENERAL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Sec. 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law.
Sec. 303. Statute of limitation for espionage offenses.
Sec. 304. Secure communication between Congress and intelligence community.
Sec. 305. Commission to examine the national security and defense risks to the United States posed by anomalous health incidents.

TITLE IV—MATTERS RELATING TO NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE

Subtitle A—Miscellaneous Authorities and Limitations

Sec. 401. Congressional notifications and summaries of misconduct regarding employees within the intelligence community.
Sec. 402. Improvements to urgent concerns submitted to Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 403. Protection for individuals making authorized disclosures to Inspectors General of elements of the intelligence community.
Sec. 404. Clarification of authority of certain Inspectors General to receive protected disclosures.
Sec. 405. Codification of the National Intelligence Management Council.
Sec. 406. Analyses and impact statements regarding proposed investment into the United States.
Sec. 407. Responsibilities and authorities of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 408. Enabling intelligence community integration.
Sec. 409. Protection of intelligence sources and methods.
Sec. 411. Authorization relating to certain intelligence and counterintelligence activities of Coast Guard.
Sec. 412. Requirements with respect to access of foreign nationals to Department of Energy National Laboratories.
Sec. 413. Formalized counterintelligence training for Department of Energy personnel.
Sec. 414. Federal Bureau of Investigation proactive cyber support.
Sec. 415. Requirements relating to confidential human source program of Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Sec. 416. Congressional notice of FBI counterintelligence investigations into individuals who hold or are candidates for Federal elected office.
Sec. 417. Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office at the Department of Transportation.
Sec. 418. Ukraine lessons learned Working Group.
Sec. 419. Modification to waiver for post-service employment restrictions.
Sec. 420. Prohibition of funds for Intelligence Experts Group.
Sec. 421. Prohibition on availability of funds for certain activities of the Overt Human Intelligence and Open Source Intelligence Collection Programs of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security.
Sec. 422. Limitation on availability of funds for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence pending submission of information regarding improvements relating to intelligence community staffing, details, and assignments.

Subtitle B—Reports and Other Matters
Sec. 431. Foreign malign influence interagency guidance.
Sec. 432. Foreign malign influence standard operating procedures.
Sec. 433. Intelligence support for certain executive branch departments and agencies.
Sec. 434. Intelligence community recruitment for certain security-cleared separating Military Members.
Sec. 435. Strategy to strengthen intelligence community recruitment efforts in the United States territories.
Sec. 436. Extension of requirement for annual report on strikes undertaken by the United States against terrorist targets outside areas of active hostilities.
Sec. 437. Advisability and feasibility study on updating intelligence sharing regulations.
Sec. 438. Budget transparency for open-source intelligence activities.
Sec. 439. Enhancing public-private sharing on manipulative adversary practices in critical mineral projects.
Sec. 440. Briefing on policies and procedures for addressing threats from known or suspected terrorists.
Sec. 441. Assessment on intelligence relationship between Egypt and Israel.
Sec. 442. Intelligence assessment of economic coercion by the People’s Republic of China in the Indo-Pacific region and strategies to enhance the economic resilience of countries in the Indo-Pacific region.
Sec. 444. Report on the economic outlook of China.
Sec. 445. Repeal of requirement with respect to assessments regarding the Northern Triangle and Mexico.

TITLE V—MATTERS RELATING TO DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AND OVERHEAD ARCHITECTURE

Sec. 501. Sense of Congress on the need for increased effort and resources in the field of geomatics.
Sec. 502. Department of Defense Senior Intelligence Oversight Official.
Sec. 503. Extension and modification of Department of Defense intelligence and counterintelligence expense authority.
Sec. 504. Authority of Army counterintelligence agents.
Sec. 505. Modifications to notification on the provision of Defense sensitive support.
Sec. 506. Revision of Secretary of Defense authority to engage in commercial activities as security for intelligence collection activities.
Sec. 507. Promulgating guidance related to certain Department of Defense contracts.
Sec. 508. Sense of Congress on Space Force acquisition workforce.

TITLE VI—MATTERS RELATING TO CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Sec. 601. Requirements for the Special Victim Investigator.
Sec. 602. Reserve for Contingencies notification requirement.
Sec. 603. Government Accountability Office study and report on modernization initiative of the Central Intelligence Agency.

TITLE VII—MATTERS RELATING TO TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION

Sec. 701. Sensitive compartmented information facility accreditation.
Sec. 702. Study of intelligence community research security.
Sec. 703. Report on biotechnology.
Sec. 704. Data with respect to timeliness of security clearance determinations.
Sec. 705. Data with respect to timeliness of polygraph examinations.

1 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.—The term “congressional intelligence com-
mittees” has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

(2) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term “intelligence community” has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2025 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the Federal Government.

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

(a) SPECIFICATIONS OF AMOUNTS.—The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the Federal Government are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this Act.

(b) AVAILABILITY OF CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.—

(1) AVAILABILITY.—The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations
of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of
the House of Representatives, and to the President.

(2) Distribution by the President.—Subject to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, within the executive branch of the Federal Government.

(3) Limits on disclosure.—The President shall not publicly disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any portion of such Schedule except—

(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3306(a));

(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or

(C) as otherwise required by law.

SEC. 103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

(a) Authorization of Appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2025 the sum of $650,000,000.
(b) **Classified Authorization of Appropriations.**—In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2025 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).

**TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM**

**SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund $514,000,000 for fiscal year 2025.

**TITLE III—GENERAL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS**

**SEC. 301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.**

The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
SEC. 302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

SEC. 303. STATUTE OF LIMITATION FOR ESPIONAGE OFFENSES.

(a) In general.—Chapter 213 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

“§ 3302. Espionage offenses

“An indictment may be found or an information may be instituted at any time without limitation for—

“(1) a violation of section 951, or a conspiracy to violate such section;

“(2) a violation of section 794, or a conspiracy to violate such section; or

“(3) a violation of section 1425, if the offense was committed to facilitate a violation of section 951.”.

(b) Clerical Amendment.—The table of sections for chapter 213 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

“3302. Espionage offenses.”.
(c) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 19 of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (18 U.S.C. 792 note) is amended by striking “, 793, or 794” and inserting “or 793”.

SEC. 304. SECURE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN CONGRESS AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(aa) REQUIREMENTS WITH RESPECT TO SECURE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN CONGRESS AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of National Intelligence shall, upon the approval of specified congressional leaders—

“(A) provide secure communications to support the oversight functions of the congressional intelligence committees, including through the procurement, installation, configuration, and maintenance of sufficient software, connectivity, information technology equipment, computers, printers, and related peripheral equipment to ensure that such committees are able to communicate with the intelligence com-
munity through secure data, voice, and video communications;

“(B) ensure that such communications enabled under subparagraph (A) facilitate communication at all classification levels;

“(C) ensure that the requirements specified in subparagraph (A) are met in conformity with applicable standards for the protection of national security information; and

“(D) ensure that any security limitations or controls associated with use of capabilities pursuant to subparagraph (A) are consistent with such limitations or controls imposed within the executive branch and do not impede effective and efficient oversight of the intelligence community by Congress.

“(2) GOVERNANCE.—The Director, in coordination with specified congressional leaders, shall establish governance and security policies applicable to the connectivity, equipment, and software provided under this subsection and shall review and update such policies periodically, as appropriate, to address counterintelligence threats and technological changes.
(3) Treatment as Congressional Records.—Any data created, stored, or transmitted by the congressional intelligence committees through networks, equipment, or software provided under paragraph (1) is a congressional record and shall not be treated as an agency record for purposes of section 552 of title 5, United States Code, (commonly known as the ‘the Freedom of Information Act’) or any other law.

(4) Documentation of Cost.—The Director shall document the funding required to satisfy this subsection within each annual budget submission to Congress, including any anticipated upgrades or recapitalization expenditures over the 5-year period that begins on October 1 of the fiscal year for which year-by-year proposed funding is included.

(5) Specified Congressional Leaders Defined.—In this subsection, the term ‘specified congressional leaders’ means—

(A) the Speaker and the minority leader of the House of Representatives;

(B) the majority leader and the minority leader of the Senate; and

(C) the Chair and Ranking Member of the congressional intelligence committees.”.
SEC. 305. COMMISSION TO EXAMINE THE NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE RISKS TO THE UNITED STATES POSED BY ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established, not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, an independent commission to be known as the National Security Commission on Anomalous Health Incidents (referred to in this section as the “Commission”) to review anomalous health incidents affecting United States Government personnel and their dependents for the purpose of comprehensively addressing the national security and defense risks to the United States posed by anomalous health incidents.

(b) MEMBERSHIP.—

(1) COMPOSITION.—The Commission shall be composed of 9 members appointed as follows:

(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall appoint 1 member.

(B) The Chair of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives shall appoint 1 member.

(C) The Ranking Member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives shall appoint 1 member.
(D) The Chair of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives shall appoint 1 member.

(E) The Ranking Member of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives shall appoint 1 member.

(F) The Chair of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate shall appoint 1 member.

(G) The Vice Chair of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate shall appoint 1 member.

(H) The Chair of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate shall appoint 1 member.

(I) The Ranking Member of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate shall appoint 1 member.

(2) INITIAL APPOINTMENTS.—Members shall be appointed to the Commission under paragraph (1) not later than 30 days after the establishment of the Commission under subsection (a).

(3) EFFECT OF LACK OF APPOINTMENT BY DEADLINE.—If one or more appointments under paragraph (1) is not made by the appointment date specified in paragraph (2), the authority to make
such appointment or appointments shall expire, and
the number of members of the Commission shall be
reduced by the number equal to the number of ap-
pointments so not made.

(4) QUALIFICATIONS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that each member of the Commission ap-
pointed under paragraph (1) should—

(A) have significant professional experience
in national security, such as a position in—

(i) the intelligence community;

(ii) the Department of Defense;

(iii) the scientific community;

(iv) a medical institution; or

(v) an academic or scholarly institu-
tion; and

(B) be eligible to receive the appropriate
security clearance to effectively evaluate their
duties.

(5) PROHIBITIONS.—A member of the Commiss-
ion appointed under paragraph (1) may not—

(A) be a current member of Congress;

(B) be a former member of Congress who
served in Congress after January 1, 2017;
(C) be a current or former registrant under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611 et seq.);

(D) have previously received medical treatment for symptoms related to a suspected anomalous health incident, or have a dependent who previously received medical treatment for symptoms related to a suspected anomalous health incident; or

(E) have served, with direct involvement, in actions by or sponsored by the executive branch of the United States Government to investigate or respond to reports of anomalous health incidents.

(6) CHAIR AND VICE CHAIR.—The Commission shall select a Chair and a Vice Chair from among the members of the Commission.

(7) TERMS.—Members shall be appointed for the life of the Commission. A vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its powers and shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment was made. The Chair and Vice Chair shall report any vacancy in the Commission to the appropriate congressional committees immediately upon learning that there will be a vacancy in the Commission.
(8) MEETINGS.—

(A) INITIAL MEETING.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which all members of the Commission have been appointed, the Commission shall hold the first meeting of the Commission.

(B) FREQUENCY.—The Commission shall meet at the call of the Chair and Vice Chair.

(C) QUORUM.—A majority of the members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum, but a lesser number of members may hold meetings.

(e) DUTIES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Commission shall carry out the review described in paragraph (2). In carrying out such review, the Commission shall consider both the events known as anomalous health incidents themselves, and the response to such incidents by the United States Government and other nations’ governments for the purpose of comprehensively addressing the national security and defense risks to the United States posed by the causes of, and responses to, anomalous health incidents.
(2) Scope of the Review.—In conducting the review under paragraph (1), the Commission shall consider the following:

(A) A historical review of the United States Government’s response to anomalous health incidents to identify a more effective, standardized model that can be applied to complex challenges to ensure all perspectives are fully and fairly presented to policy makers, mitigate real or perceived undue influence on analytical judgments, and effectively gather and act on intelligence and information to address complex national security challenges.

(B) A historical review of the United States Government’s provision of support and medical care to United States personnel and their dependents impacted by anomalous health incidents.

(C) Whether a review of all information on collected reports of anomalous health incidents can inform the development of a categorization mechanism which can inform appropriate steps to be taken following future reports.
(D) Whether available data points to the involvement of an external actor in some or all reported anomalous health incidents.

(E) Whether known or novel mechanisms an adversary might use against United States personnel or their dependents might explain some or all reported anomalous health incidents.

(F) Whether comparable information, data, and reports on other intelligence questions led to similar analytic judgments.

(G) Any other matters the Commission deems relevant to the common defense of the Nation.

(d) Reports.—

(1) Initial briefing.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall brief the President, or the President’s designee, and the appropriate congressional committees on the progress of the activities of the Commission as of the date of such briefing.

(2) Annual report.—

(A) In general.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the initial meeting of the Commission, and annually thereafter, the Commis-
sion shall submit to the President and the appropriate congressional committees a report describing the progress of the activities of the Commission as of the date of such report, including any findings, recommendations, or lessons learned endorsed by the Commission.

(B) BRIEFING.—On the date of the submission of each annual report required under this paragraph, the Commission shall brief the President, or the President’s designee, and the appropriate congressional committees.

(3) FINAL REPORT.—

(A) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 3 years after the date of the establishment of the Commission under subsection (a), the Commission shall submit to the President and the appropriate congressional committees a final report on the findings of the Commission and such recommendations that the Commission may have for action by Congress and the Federal Government, which shall address the following:

(i) Whether known or novel mechanisms an adversary might use against United States personnel or their depend-
ents might explain some or all reported anomalous health incidents.

(ii) Whether available data points to the involvement of an external actor in some or all reported anomalous health incidents.

(iii) Whether the United States Government’s provision of support and medical care is sufficient to appropriately address the impacts of anomalous health incidents on affected personnel.

(iv) Effectively structuring United States Government responses to distinct, complex national security issues such as reports of anomalous health incidents.

(v) Research and development to improve the medical response and potential harm mitigation techniques for anomalous health incidents.

(vi) How analytic integrity and structured analytical techniques impacted the United States Government’s response to anomalous health incidents.

(vii) What the anomalous health incidents situation says about the counterintel-
ligence posture of the United States Gov-
ernment.

(viii) Future policy recommendations
for anomalous health incidents or other
health incidents with a potential counter-
intelligence nexus.

(B) ADDENDA.—Any member of the Com-
mmission may submit an addendum to the report
required under subparagraph (A) setting forth
the separate views of such member with respect
to any matter considered by the Commission.

(C) BRIEFING.—On the date of the sub-
mission of the final report required under this
paragraph, the Commission shall brief the ap-
propriate congressional committees.

(4) FORM OF REPORTS.—Reports submitted
under this subsection shall be made publicly avail-
able but may include a classified annex.

(e) POWERS OF COMMISSION.—

(1) HEARINGS AND EVIDENCE.—The Commis-
sion may, for the purpose of carrying out this sec-
tion—

(A) hold such hearings and sit and act at
such times and places, take such testimony, re-
ceive such evidence, and administer such oaths
as the Commission considers necessary to fulfill
the Commission’s duties; and

(B) subject to paragraph (2)(A), require,
by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and
testimony of such witnesses and the production
of such books, records, correspondence, cables,
memoranda, papers, documents, and any other
information as the Commission considers nec-
essary to fulfill the Commission’s duties.

(2) SUBPOENAS.—

(A) ISSUANCE.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—A subpoena may be
issued under this subsection only—

(I) by the agreement of the Chair

and the Vice Chair; or

(II) by the affirmative vote of a

majority of the Commission.

(ii) SIGNATURE.—Subject to clause

(i)—

(I) subpoenas issued under this

subsection may be issued under the
signature of the Chair and Vice Chair

of the Commission, or any member
designated by a majority of the Com-
mission; and
(II) subpoenas issued under this subsection may be served by any person designated by the Chair and Vice Chair of the Commission, or by a member designated by a majority of the Commission.

(B) ENFORCEMENT.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—In the case of contumacy or failure to obey a subpoena issued under this subsection, the United States district court for the judicial district in which the subpoenaed person resides, is served, or may be found, or where the subpoena is returnable, may issue an order requiring such person to appear at any designated place to testify or to produce documentary or other evidence. Any failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the court as a contempt of that court.

(ii) ADDITIONAL ENFORCEMENT.—In the case of any failure of any witness to comply with any subpoena or to testify when summoned under authority of this section, the Commission may, by majority
vote, certify a statement of fact constit-
uting such failure to the appropriate
United States attorney, who may bring the
matter before the grand jury for its action,
under the same statutory authority and
procedures as if the United States attorney
had received a certification under sections
102 through 104 of the Revised Statutes
of the United States (2 U.S.C. 192
through 194).

(C) PRIVILEGE CLAIMS.—Claims of com-
mon-law privileges made by any witness are ap-
licable only at the discretion of the Chair and
Vice Chair.

(f) INFORMATION FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Commission is author-
ized to secure directly from any executive depart-
ment, bureau, agency, board, commission, office,
independent establishment, or instrumentality of the
Federal Government such books, records, cor-
respondence, cables, memoranda, papers, documents,
and any other information for the purposes of this
section.

(2) COOPERATION.—In carrying out its duties,
operation of any executive department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the Federal Government in providing the Commission with analysis, briefings, and other information necessary for the fulfillment of the Commission’s duties.

(3) Furnishing Information.—Upon receipt of a written request made by the Chair and Vice Chair of the Commission, or by vote of a majority of the Commission, the head of the department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the Federal Government shall expeditiously furnish such books, records, correspondence, cables, memoranda, papers, documents, and any other information to the Commission. Claims of common-law privileges made by any executive department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the Federal Government are applicable only at the discretion of the Chair and Vice Chair.

(4) Receipt, Handling, Storage, and Dissemination.—Such books, records, correspondence, cables, memoranda, papers, documents, and any other information received by the Commission shall
only be received, handled, stored, and disseminated by members of the Commission and its staff consistent with all applicable statutes, regulations, and Executive orders.

(5) *PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.*—A department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the Federal Government shall respond to requests submitted pursuant to paragraph (2) in a manner consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

(g) *SUPPORT FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES.*—

(1) *DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.*—The Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the Commission, on a nonreimbursable basis, such administrative services, funds, staff, facilities, and other support services as are necessary for the performance of the duties of the Commission under this section.

(2) *SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.*—The Secretary of Defense may provide the Commission, on a nonreimbursable basis, with such administrative services, staff, and other support services as the Commission may request.
(3) **OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.**—In addition to the assistance set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2), other departments and agencies of the United States may provide the Commission such services, funds, facilities, staff, and other support as such departments and agencies consider advisable and as may be authorized by law.

(h) **TREATMENT OF INFORMATION RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The Director of National Intelligence shall assume responsibility for the handling and disposition of any information related to the national security of the United States that is received, considered, or used by the Commission under this section.

(2) **INFORMATION PROVIDED BY CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.**—Any information related to the national security of the United States that is provided to the Commission by a congressional intelligence committee may not be further provided or released without the approval of the chairman of such committee.

(3) **ACCESS AFTER TERMINATION OF COMMISSION.**—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, after the termination of the Commission under sub-
section (m), only the members and designated staff of the appropriate congressional committees, the Director of National Intelligence (and the designees of the Director), and such other officials of the executive branch of the Federal Government as the President may designate shall have access to information related to the national security of the United States that is received, considered, or used by the Commission.

(i) POSTAL SERVICES.—The Commission may use the United States mail in the same manner and under the same conditions as other departments and agencies of the Federal Government.

(j) GIFTS.—No member or staff of the Commission may receive a gift or benefit by reason of the service of such member or staff on the Commission.

(k) COMMISSION PERSONNEL MATTER.—

(1) COMPENSATION OF MEMBERS.—

(A) NONGOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES.—Each member of the Commission who is not otherwise employed by the Federal Government shall be compensated at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay prescribed for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States
Code, for each day (including travel time) during which the member is engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the Commission.

(B) Government Employees.—A member of the Commission who is an officer or employee of the Federal Government shall serve without additional pay (or benefits in the nature of compensation) for service as a member of the Commission.

(2) Travel Expenses.—A member of the Commission shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized for employees of agencies under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Commission.

(3) Staff.—

(A) Appointment and Compensation of Staff.—The Chair and Vice Chair of the Commission, in accordance with rules agreed upon by the Commission, shall appoint and fix the compensation of a staff director and such other personnel as may be necessary to enable the Commission to carry out its duties, without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, for each day (including travel time) during which the member is engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the Commission.
Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay fixed under this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that payable to a person occupying a position at level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of such title.

(B) Security clearances.—All staff of the Commission and all experts and consultants employed by the Commission shall possess a security clearance in accordance with applicable provisions of law concerning the handling of classified information.

(4) Detail of government employees.—A Federal Government employee, with the appropriate security clearance to conduct their duties, may be detailed to the Commission without reimbursement, and such detail shall be without interruption or loss of civil service status or privilege.

(5) Procurement of temporary and intermittent services.—The Chair and Vice Chair of the Commission may procure temporary and intermittent services under section 3109(b) of title 5,
United States Code, at rates for individuals that do not exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay prescribed for level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of that title.

(l) FUNDING.—

(1) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

There is authorized to be appropriated funds to the extent and in such amounts as specifically provided in advance in appropriations acts for the purposes detailed in this section.

(2) AVAILABILITY IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (1), the Director of National Intelligence shall make available to the Commission such amounts as the Commission may require for purposes of the activities of the Commission under this section.

(3) DURATION OF AVAILABILITY.—Amounts made available to the Commission under paragraph (2) shall remain available until expended or upon termination under subsection (m), whichever occurs first.

(m) TERMINATION.—The Commission shall terminate 90 days after the date on which the Commission submits the final report required under subsection (d)(3), but
in no event later than three years after the date of establish-
ment in subsection (a).

(n) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
Defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate con-
gressional committees” means—

(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelli-
gence and the Committee on Armed Services of the
House of Representatives; and

(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence and
the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

TITLE IV—MATTERS RELATING
TO NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ENTERPRISE

Subtitle A—Miscellaneous
Authorities and Limitations

SEC. 401. CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATIONS AND SUM-
MARIES OF MISCONDUCT REGARDING EM-
PLOYEES WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COM-
MUNITY.

(a) Annual Reports for Calendar Years 2024,
2025, and 2026.—Not later than 60 days after the end
of calendar years 2024, 2025, and 2026, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional in-
telligence committees a report on civilian employees in the
intelligence community placed on administrative leave
pending possible adverse personnel action during that calendar year.

(b) ELEMENTS.—Each report under subsection (a) shall include, for the calendar year covered by the report, the following:

(1) The total number of employees who were placed on administrative leave pending possible adverse personnel action, disaggregated by intelligence community element and pay grade.

(2) The number of employees placed on paid administrative leave pending possible adverse personnel action.

(3) The number of employees placed on administrative leave pending possible adverse personnel action whose leave has exceeded 365 days, disaggregated by paid and unpaid status.

(c) NOTIFICATION OF REFERRAL TO DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.—If a referral is made to the Department of Justice from any element of the intelligence community regarding an allegation of misconduct against a civilian employee of the intelligence community, the head of the element of the intelligence community that employs the covered employee shall notify the congressional intelligence committees of the referral not later than 10 days after the date on which such referral is made.
SEC. 402. IMPROVEMENTS TO URGENT CONCERNS SUBMITTED TO INSPECTORS GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

(a) Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.—Section 103H(k)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033(k)(5)) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (A), by inserting “in writing” before “to the Inspector General”;

(2) in subparagraph (B)—

(A) by striking “Not later than the end of the 14-calendar-day period beginning on the date of receipt from an employee of a complaint or information under subparagraph (A), the” and inserting “(i) The”;

(B) by striking “whether the complaint or information” and inserting “whether a complaint or information under subparagraph (A)”;

and

(C) by adding at the end the following:

“(ii) The Inspector General shall comply with clause (i) with respect to a complaint or information under subparagraph (A) not later than the end of the 14-calendar-day period beginning on the date on which the employee who reported the complaint or information confirms to the In-
spector General that the employee reported
the complaint or information to the Inspector
General with the intent to report to
Congress the complaint or information.”;

and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(J) In this paragraph, the term ‘employee’ includes a former employee, if the complaint or information reported under subparagraph (A) arises from or relates to the period during which the former employee was an employee.”.

(b) Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency.—Section 17(d)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (A), by inserting “in writing” before “to the Inspector General”;

(2) in subparagraph (B)(i)—

(A) by striking “Not later than the end of the 14-calendar day period beginning on the date of receipt from an employee of a complaint or information under subparagraph (A), the” and inserting “The”; and
(B) by striking “whether the complaint or information” and inserting “whether a complaint or information under subparagraph (A)”;

(3) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking “paragraph (1)” and inserting “subparagraph (A)”;

(4) in subparagraph (B)—

(A) by redesignating clause (ii) as clause (iii); and

(B) by inserting after clause (i) the following:

“(ii) The Inspector General shall comply with clause (i) with respect to a complaint or information under subparagraph (A) not later than the end of the 14-calendar-day period beginning on the date on which the employee who reported the complaint or information confirms to the Inspector General that the employee reported the complaint or information to the Inspector General with the intent to report to Congress the complaint or information.”;

and

(5) by adding at the end the following:

“(I) In this paragraph, the term ‘employee’ includes a former employee or former con-
tractor, if the complaint or information reported under subparagraph (A) arises from or relates to the period during which the former employee or former contractor was an employee or contractor, as the case may be.”.

(c) Inspectors General of Other Elements of the Intelligence Community.—Section 416 of title 5, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by adding at the end the following:

“(3) Employee.—The term ‘employee’ includes a former employee or former contractor, if the complaint or information reported pursuant to this section arises from or relates to the period during which the former employee or former contractor was an employee or contractor, as the case may be.”;

(2) in subsection (b), by inserting “in writing” after “may report the complaint or information” each place it appears; and

(3) in subsection (c)—

(A) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3);

(B) in paragraph (1)—

(i) by striking “Not later than the end of the 14-calendar day period beginning on
the date of receipt of an employee complaint or information under subsection (b), the” and inserting “The”; and

(ii) by striking “whether the complaint or information” and inserting “whether a complaint or information reported under subsection (b)”; and

(C) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following:

“(2) DEADLINE FOR COMPLIANCE.—The Inspector General shall comply with paragraph (1) with respect to a complaint or information reported under subsection (b) not later than the end of the 14-calendar-day period beginning on the date on which the employee who reported the complaint or information confirms to the Inspector General that the employee reported the complaint or information to the Inspector General with the intent to report to Congress the complaint or information.”.
SEC. 403. PROTECTION FOR INDIVIDUALS MAKING AUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES TO INSPECTORS GENERAL OF ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

(a) Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.—Section 103H(g)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033(g)(3)) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as clauses (i) and (ii), respectively;

(2) by striking “The Inspector General is authorized” and inserting “(A) The Inspector General is authorized”;

and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(B)(i) An individual may disclose classified information to the Inspector General in accordance with the applicable security standards and procedures established under section 102A or 803 of this Act, chapter 12 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2161 et seq.), Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to Classified National Security Information), or any applicable provision of law.

“(ii) A disclosure under clause (i) of classified information by an individual without appropriate clearance or authority to access such classified information at the time of the disclo-
sure shall be treated as an authorized disclosure
that does not violate a covered provision if the
disclosure—

“(I) does not include the access, han-
dling, retention, or storage of such classi-
fied information; and

“(II) is otherwise made in accordance
with the applicable security standards and
procedures for such classified information.

“(iii) In this subparagraph, the term ‘cov-
ered provision’ means—

“(I) any otherwise applicable non-
disclosure agreement;

“(II) any otherwise applicable regula-
tion or order issued under the authority of
chapter 18 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2271 et seq.) or Execu-
tive Order 13526;

“(III) section 798 of title 18, United
States Code; or

“(IV) any other provision of law with
respect to the unauthorized disclosure of
national security information.”.

(b) Inspector General of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency.—Section 17(e)(3) of the Central Intel-
intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(e)(3)) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as clauses (i) and (ii), respectively;

(2) by striking “The Inspector General is authorized” and inserting “(A) The Inspector General is authorized”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:


“(ii) A disclosure under clause (i) of classified information by an individual without appropriate clearance or authority to access such classified information at the time of the disclosure shall be treated as an authorized disclosure that does not violate a covered provision if the disclosure—
“(I) does not include the access, handling, retention, or storage of such classified information; and

“(II) is otherwise made in accordance with the applicable security standards and procedures for such classified information,

“(iii) In this subparagraph, the term ‘covered provision’ means—

“(I) any otherwise applicable non-disclosure agreement;

“(II) any otherwise applicable regulation or order issued under the authority of chapter 18 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2271 et seq.) or Executive Order 13526;

“(III) section 798 of title 18, United States Code; or

“(IV) any other provision of law with respect to the unauthorized disclosure of national security information.”.

(c) Other Inspectors General of Elements of the Intelligence Community.—Section 416 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
“(i) Protection for Individuals Making Authorized Disclosures.—

“(1) In general.—An individual may disclose classified information to an Inspector General of an element of the intelligence community in accordance with the applicable security standards and procedures established under section 102A or 803 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024, 3162a), chapter 12 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2161 et seq.), Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to Classified National Security Information), or any applicable provision of law.

“(2) Disclosure without clearance or authority.—A disclosure under paragraph (1) of classified information by an individual without appropriate clearance or authority to access such classified information at the time of the disclosure shall be treated as an authorized disclosure that does not violate a covered provision if the disclosure—

“(A) does not include the access, handling, retention, or storage of such classified information; and
“(B) is otherwise made in accordance with
the applicable security standards and proce-
dures for such classified information.

“(3) DEFINITION OF COVERED PROVISION.—In
this subsection, the term ‘covered provision’
means—

“(A) any otherwise applicable nondisclo-
sure agreement;

“(B) any otherwise applicable regulation or
order issued under the authority of chapter 18
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.
2271 et seq.) or Executive Order 13526;

“(C) section 798 of title 18; or

“(D) any other provision of law with re-
spect to the unauthorized disclosure of national
security information.

“(4) DEFINITION.—In this subsection, the term
‘intelligence community’ has the meaning given such
term in section 3 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).”.

(d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this sec-
tion, or the amendments made by this section, may be con-
strued to limit or modify the obligation of an individual
to appropriately store, handle, or disseminate classified in-
formation in accordance with applicable security guidance.
and procedures, including with respect to the removal of
classified information.

SEC. 404. CLARIFICATION OF AUTHORITY OF CERTAIN IN-
SPECTORS GENERAL TO RECEIVE PRO-
TECTED DISCLOSURES.

Section 1104 of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S. 3234) is amended—

(1) in subsection (b)(1), by inserting “or cov-
ered intelligence community element” after “the ap-
propriate inspector general of the employing agen-
cy”; and

(2) in subsection (c)(1)(A), by inserting “or
covered intelligence community element” after “the
appropriate inspector general of the employing or
contracting agency”.

SEC. 405. CODIFICATION OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
MANAGEMENT COUNCIL.

(a) Establishment of National Intelligence
Management Council.—

(1) In general.—Title I of the National Secu-

rity Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amend-
ed by inserting after section 103L the following (and
conforming the table of contents at the beginning of
such Act accordingly):
SEC. 103M. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT COUNCIL.

(a) Establishment.—There is within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence a National Intelligence Management Council.

(b) Composition.—

(1) The National Intelligence Management Council shall be composed of senior officials within the intelligence community and substantive experts from the public or private sector, who shall be appointed by, report to, and serve at the pleasure of, the Director of National Intelligence.

(2) The Director shall prescribe appropriate security requirements for personnel appointed from the private sector as a condition of service on the National Intelligence Management Council, or as contractors of the Council or employees of such contractors, to ensure the protection of intelligence sources and methods while avoiding, wherever possible, unduly intrusive requirements which the Director considers to be unnecessary for this purpose.

(c) Duties and Responsibilities.—Members of the National Intelligence Management Council shall work with each other and with other elements of the intelligence community to ensure proper coordination and to minimize
duplication of effort, in addition to the following duties and responsibilities:

“(1) Provide integrated mission input to support the processes and activities of the intelligence community, including with respect to intelligence planning, programming, budgeting, and evaluation processes.

“(2) Identify and pursue opportunities to integrate or coordinate collection and counterintelligence efforts.

“(3) In concert with the responsibilities of the National Intelligence Council, ensure the integration and coordination of analytic and collection efforts.

“(4) Develop and coordinate intelligence strategies in support of budget planning and programming activities.

“(5) Advise the Director of National Intelligence on the development of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (or any successor mechanism established for the prioritization of programs and activities).

“(6) In concert with the responsibilities of the National Intelligence Council, support the role of the
Director of National Intelligence as principal advisor to the President on intelligence matters.

“(7) Inform the elements of the intelligence community of the activities and decisions related to missions assigned to the National Intelligence Management Council.

“(8) Maintain awareness, across various functions and disciplines, of the mission-related activities and budget planning of the intelligence community.

“(9) Evaluate, with respect to assigned mission objectives, requirements, and unmet requirements, the implementation of the budget of each element of the intelligence community.

“(10) Provide oversight on behalf of, and make recommendations to, the Director of National Intelligence on the extent to which the activities, program recommendations, and budget proposals made by elements of the intelligence community sufficiently address mission objectives, intelligence gaps, and unmet requirements.

“(d) MISSION MANAGEMENT OF MEMBERS.—Members of the National Intelligence Management Council, under the direction of the Director of National Intelligence, shall serve as mission managers to ensure integration among the elements of the intelligence community
and across intelligence functions, disciplines, and activities for the purpose of achieving unity of effort and effect, including through the following responsibilities:

“(1) Planning and programming efforts.
“(2) Budget and program execution oversight.
“(3) Engagement with elements of the intelligence community and with policymakers in other agencies.
“(4) Workforce competencies and training activities.
“(5) Development of capability requirements.
“(6) Development of governance fora, policies, and procedures.

“(e) STAFF; AVAILABILITY.—

“(1) STAFF.—The Director of National Intelligence shall make available to the National Intelligence Management Council such staff as may be necessary to assist the National Intelligence Management Council in carrying out the responsibilities described in this section.

“(2) AVAILABILITY.—Under the direction of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Intelligence Management Council shall make reasonable efforts to advise and consult with officers and employees of other departments or agencies, or compo-
nents thereof, of the United States Government not otherwise associated with the intelligence community.

“(f) Support From Elements of the Intelligence Community.—The heads of the elements of the intelligence community shall provide appropriate support to the National Intelligence Management Council, including with respect to intelligence activities, as required by the Director of National Intelligence.”.

(2) Office of the Director of National Intelligence.—Section 103(c) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3025) is amended—

(A) by redesignating paragraphs (5) through (14) as paragraphs (6) through (15), respectively; and

(B) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following:

“(5) The National Intelligence Management Council.”.

(b) Sense of Congress with Respect to China Mission.—It is the sense of Congress that the Director of National Intelligence should create a role in the National Intelligence Management Council for a National Intelligence Manager dedicated to the People’s Republic of China.
(c) **Report to Congress on Strategic Competition.**—

(1) **Report.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of elements of the intelligence community determined relevant by the Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on strategic competition.

(2) **Matters.**—The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(A) Lessons learned by the intelligence community with respect to strategic competition from the reorganizations implemented consequent to—

(i) the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act;

(ii) the creation of the National Counterterrorism Center; and

(iii) any other reorganization effort within or among elements of the intelligence community.

(B) Examination of the potential effects of a new national intelligence center established to—
(i) integrate all-source intelligence analysis efforts with respect to the activities, plans, and intentions of strategic adversaries;

(ii) synchronize collection efforts among the intelligence community;

(iii) optimize resource investments in the intelligence community in support of strategic competition;

(iv) identify options for the President, other departments and agencies of the United States Government, and allies and foreign partners of the United States to support the standing of the United States with respect to strategic competition; and

(v) integrate other national intelligence centers to deter the efforts of strategic adversaries targeting the United States.

(3) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified appendix.

(d) SENSE OF CONGRESS WITH RESPECT TO COUNTERNARCOTICS MISSION.—It is the sense of Congress that, consistent with section 7325 of the Intelligence Au-
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (137 Stat. 1043),
the Director of National Intelligence should create a role
in the National Intelligence Management Council for a
National Intelligence Manager dedicated to the counter-
narcotics mission of the United States.

SEC. 406. ANALYSES AND IMPACT STATEMENTS REGARD-
ING PROPOSED INVESTMENT INTO THE
UNITED STATES.

Section 102A(z) of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3024(z)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (2)(A) by inserting “, including
with respect to counterintelligence” before the
semicolon; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(3) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection:

“(A) The term ‘a review or an investigation of
any proposed investment into the United States for
which the Director has prepared analytic materials’
includes a review, investigation, assessment, or anal-
ysis conducted by the Director pursuant to section
7 or 10(g) of Executive Order 13913 (85 Fed. Reg.
19643; relating to Establishing the Committee for
the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the
United States Telecommunications Services Sector),
or successor order.
“(B) The term ‘investment’ includes any activity reviewed, investigated, assessed, or analyzed by the Director pursuant to section 7 or 10(g) of Executive Order 13913, or successor order.”.

SEC. 407. RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

Section 102A(f)(10) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(f)(10)) is amended by striking the period and inserting “, and upon receiving any such direction, the Director shall notify the congressional intelligence committees immediately in writing with a description of such other intelligence-related functions directed by the President.”.

SEC. 408. ENABLING INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INTEGRATION.

Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 113B the following new section (and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly):

“SEC. 113C. NON-REIMBURSABLE TRANSFER OF GOODS AND SERVICES WITHIN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN CERTAIN CASES.

“(a) IN GENERAL.—

“(1) AUTHORITY.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an element of the intelligence com-
community may, subject to such guidance or regulations as may be developed by the Director of National Intelligence, provide goods or services to another element of the intelligence community without reimbursement or transfer of funds for such goods or services for the purposes of remote work and hoteling initiatives for intelligence community employees and affiliates.

“(2) PRIOR APPROVAL REQUIREMENT.—A transfer of goods or services under paragraph (1) may not occur without the prior approval of the heads of both the providing and receiving elements of the intelligence community.

“(b) HOTELING DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘hoteling’ means an alternative work arrangement in which employees of one element of the intelligence community are authorized flexible work arrangements to work part of the time at one or more alternative worksite locations, as appropriately authorized.”.

SEC. 409. PROTECTION OF INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS.

Section 102A(i) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(i)) is amended—

(1) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as paragraphs (4) and (5), respectively;
(2) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph:

“(3)(A) The Director, or the Principal Deputy Director acting on behalf of the Director, shall be responsible for the creation, modification, deconfliction, and oversight of special access programs (referred to as controlled access programs) pertaining to intelligence sources, methods, and intelligence activities (but not including military operational, strategic, and tactical programs).

“(B) In carrying out the responsibility under subparagraph (A), the Director shall—

“(i) ensure controlled access programs of the intelligence community conform with the requirements identified within Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified national security information), or any successor order;

“(ii) establish controlled access program minimum security requirements and guidance for the implementation of such requirements, to include general procedures, personnel security, physical security, and control marking requirements;
“(iii) ensure access to controlled access programs is based on a documented need-to-know;

“(iv) require controlled access programs to identify and periodically review Critical Program Information and to develop and periodically review a Program Protection Plan for each controlled access program;

“(v) require periodic reviews of and, as appropriate, closure of controlled access programs; and

“(vi) coordinate with other agencies to deconflict special access programs.”.

SEC. 410. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR STATE GOVERNORS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not less frequently than once per year, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, shall ensure that an officer of the Field Intelligence Directorate of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security located in each State shall engage proactively with senior officials for each State, such as the chief executive or Homeland Security Advisor of such State, with respect to matters concerning homeland security or national security, con-
sistent with any guidance provided by the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis.

(b) Requirement in Certain Territories of the United States.—In the case of a territory which does not have a permanent Field Intelligence Directorate officer located in such territory, the headquarters element of the Field Intelligence Directorate shall designate a Field Intelligence Directorate officer who is responsible for carrying out the requirement under subsection (a) with respect to such territory.

(c) State Defined.—For purposes of this section, the term “State” means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Guam, the United States Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.

SEC. 411. AUTHORIZATION RELATING TO CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF COAST GUARD.

The Commandant of the Coast Guard may use up to 1 percent of the amounts made available under the National Intelligence Program (as such term is defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)) for each fiscal year for the intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the Coast Guard for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, which
may be accounted for solely on the certification of the Commandant and each such certification shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein certified.

**SEC. 412. REQUIREMENTS WITH RESPECT TO ACCESS OF FOREIGN NATIONALS TO DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL LABORATORIES.**

(a) **IN GENERAL.—** The Secretary of Energy shall designate Senior Executive employees of the United States Government employed by the Department of Energy to have final approval authority with respect to authorizing the access of a foreign national into a National Laboratory in the event that an assessment of the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy identifies potential significant risks that are not agreed to by the Director of the relevant National Laboratory.

(b) **BRIEFING.—** Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a briefing with respect to the progress to enhance the United States Government’s responsibility for the Department of Energy’s approval processes with regard to authorizing the access of foreign nationals into National Laboratories, including with respect to requiring
that such decisions are the primary responsibility of
United States Government leadership, as opposed to the
Directors of the National Laboratories, and a plan for im-
plementation of such enhancement.

(c) NATIONAL LABORATORY DEFINED.—In this sec-
section, the term “National Laboratory” has the meaning
given that term in section 2 of the Energy Policy Act of

SEC. 413. FORMALIZED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE TRAINING
FOR DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PERSONNEL.

(a) TRAINING.—Section 215(d) of the Department of
Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7144b) is amended
by adding at the end the following:

“(3) The Director shall develop and implement—

“(A) a delineated and standardized training
plan with respect to counterintelligence to train all
personnel in the Department; and

“(B) a separate delineated and standardized
training plan with respect to counterintelligence to
train officers in the Office who have counterintel-
ligence responsibilities.”.

(b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 90
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Direc-
tor of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
of the Department of Energy shall provide to the congres-
1 sional intelligence committees a briefing on the plans de-
2 veloped under section 215(d)(3) of the Department of En-
3 ergy Organization Act (as amended by subsection (a)), in-
4 cluding with respect to—
5 1 (1) the training content;
6 2 (2) periodicity;
7 3 (3) fulfillment rate;
8 4 (4) internal controls; and
9 5 (5) oversight.
10
11 SEC. 414. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
12
13 PROACTIVE CYBER SUPPORT.
14
15 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the
16 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Fed-
17 eral Bureau of Investigation shall develop and make avail-
18 able an unclassified interface for use by owners and opera-
19 tors of United States critical infrastructure to connect
20 with the Federal Bureau of Investigation to request cyber-
21 related support.
22
23 (b) AVAILABILITY TO CONGRESSIONAL OFFICES.—
24 The interface described in subsection (a) shall be available
25 to congressional offices for purposes of facilitating connec-
26 tion with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
27
28 (e) INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS.—The interface de-
29 scribed in subsection (a) shall include information with re-
30 spect to the following:
(1) Best practices for cyber hygiene, specifically geared towards owners and operators of critical infrastructure.

(2) Tailored information that is relevant based on the threats to specific sectors of critical infrastructure.

(3) Suggestions for actions owners and operators of critical infrastructure are recommended to take in response to a cyber incident.

(4) Information on the best ways to liaise with the Federal Bureau of Investigation for cyber-related issues.

(d) Critical Infrastructure Defined.—The term “critical infrastructure” has the meaning given that term in the Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195e).

SEC. 415. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO CONFIDENTIAL HUMAN SOURCE PROGRAM OF FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

(a) Operational Requirements for Confidential Human Source Program.—

(1) In General.—No agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may open an individual as a confidential human source before the Special Agent in Charge of the relevant Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation field office has verified the individual’s identity.

(2) Prohibition with respect to FBI Headquarters.—No Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation whose principal place of duty is at the Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters may open an individual as a confidential human source.

(3) Additional vetting in certain cases.—With respect to a potential or actual confidential human source who is identified as a potential counterintelligence concern or is the subject of an investigation for any criminal or counterintelligence purposes, a Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters agent shall conduct a validation assessment and report for such source in addition to such source validation requirements as are in effect pursuant to policies and procedures governing the confidential human source program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(4) Unauthorized illegal activity of confidential human source.—If the handling agent with respect to a confidential human source has reasonable grounds to believe that a confidential human source has engaged in any unauthorized illegal activ-
ity, including any misdemeanor or felony criminal activity—

(A) the agent shall promptly notify a confidential human source coordinator or the assigned Federal prosecutor;

(B) a record of such event shall be recorded in the source's case file; and

(C) the confidential human source will be subject to immediate source validation procedures.

(5) **Prohibition on Commitments of Immunity in Civil Proceedings.**—The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may not intervene in any way to impact the outcome of any proceeding relating to a civil action or administrative hearing to which a confidential human source managed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation is a party.

(6) **Prohibition with Respect to Members of Congress.**—No agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may open an individual as a confidential human source if such individual is a current Member of Congress (including a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to the Congress) or a candidate in an election for Federal office.
(7) **Effective Date.**—The requirements of this subsection shall take effect not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act with respect to any confidential human source under the confidential human source program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(b) **Annual Validation Review Requirement With Respect to Field Offices.**—

(1) **In General.**—Each Special Agent in Charge of a Federal Bureau of Investigation field office shall conduct an annual review of each confidential human source who is being managed out of such field office.

(2) **Notification Requirement.**—At the conclusion of each annual review conducted under paragraph (1), the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall, on an annual basis, submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report with respect to—

(A) the number of active confidential human sources managed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

(B) the number of investigations opened as the result of annual reviews of confidential human sources;
(C) the number of confidential human sources whose relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investigation has been terminated in the last year as a result of an investigation opened as a result of an annual review; and

(D) the amount of funds expended on confidential human sources in the last fiscal year, including a delineation of funds expended from both National Intelligence Program and non-National Intelligence Program funds.

(c) OVERSIGHT.—Beginning not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall develop and implement an oversight mechanism within the Bureau for activities with respect to any confidential human source under the confidential human source program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation the management of which is funded through the National Intelligence Program.

(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees; and
(B) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and of the Senate.

(2) **CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP.**—The term “congressional leadership” means—

(A) the Speaker of the House of Representatives;

(B) the minority leader of the House of Representatives;

(C) the majority leader of the Senate;

(D) the minority leader of the Senate;

(E) the Chair and Ranking Member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and

(F) the Chair and Vice Chair of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

(3) **NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.**—The term “National Intelligence Program” has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
SEC. 416. CONGRESSIONAL NOTICE OF FBI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS INTO INDIVIDUALS WHO HOLD OR ARE CANDIDATES FOR FEDERAL ELECTED OFFICE.

Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section (and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly):

“SEC. 517. NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT WITH RESPECT TO FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS REGARDING INDIVIDUALS WHO HOLD OR ARE CANDIDATES FOR FEDERAL ELECTED OFFICE.

“(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding section 533 of title 28, United States Code, the delegation of the authorities of the Attorney General, or any other delegation of authority, direction, or policy of the executive branch, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall notify congressional leadership not later than 5 days after the commencement of a counterintelligence investigation into an individual who holds an elected Federal office or an individual who is a candidate in an election for Federal office.

“(b) CONTENTS.—A notification under subsection (a) shall include, to the extent consistent with the need to pro-
tect the integrity of ongoing counterintelligence investiga-
tions or other exceptionally sensitive national security or
law enforcement matters, a summary of the relevant facts
associated with the counterintelligence investigation and
the identity of the person subject to such investigation.

“(c) CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP DEFINED.—In
this section, the term ‘congressional leadership’ means—
“(1) the majority leader of the Senate;
“(2) the minority leader of the Senate;
“(3) the Chair and Vice Chair of the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
“(4) the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives;
“(5) the minority leader of the House of Rep-
resentatives; and
“(6) the Chair and Ranking Member of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives.”.

SEC. 417. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COUNTERINTEL-
LIGENCE OFFICE AT THE DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
mittees” means—
(A) the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, the Committee on Appropriations,
and the Committee on Transportation and In-
frastructure of the House of Representatives;
and
(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence,
the Committee on Appropriations, and the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Trans-
portation of the Senate.

(2) DEPARTMENT.—The term “Department”
means the Department of Transportation.

(3) SECRETARY.—The term “Secretary” means
the Secretary of Transportation.

(b) ESTABLISHMENT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OFFICE.—

(1) AGREEMENT WITH SECRETARY OF TRAN-
SPORTATION.—The Director of National Intelligence,
acting through the Director of the National Counter-
intelligence and Security Center, shall seek to enter
into an agreement with the Secretary under which
the Director of National Intelligence and the Sec-
retary shall establish within the Department an of-
office, which shall be known as the “Intelligence Com-
community Counterintelligence Office”, in accordance
with this section.
(2) LOCATION.—The Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office established pursuant to this section shall be physically located within the headquarters of the Department and within reasonable proximity to the offices of the leadership of the Department.

(3) SECURITY.—The Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall be responsible for the protection of classified information and for the establishment and enforcement of all security-related controls within the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office.

(c) PERSONNEL.—

(1) DIRECTOR.—

(A) APPOINTMENT.—There shall be at the head of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office a Director who is appointed by the Director of National Intelligence. The Director of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office shall—

(i) be supervised and subject to performance evaluations by the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, in consultation with the Secretary;
(ii) be an employee of the intelligence community with significant counterintelligence experience; and

(iii) serve for a period of 3 years.

(B) RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Director of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office shall carry out the following responsibilities:

(i) Serving as the head of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office, with supervisory responsibility for the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office and any other personnel assigned to the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office.

(ii) Advising the Secretary on counterintelligence and intelligence information.

(iii) Ensuring that counterintelligence threat information and, as appropriate, finished intelligence on topics related to the functions of the Department, are provided to appropriate personnel of the department or agency without delay.
(iv) Ensuring critical intelligence relevant to the Secretary is requested and disseminated in a timely manner.

(v) Establishing, as appropriate, mechanisms for collaboration through which Department subject matter experts, including those without security clearances, can share information and expertise with the intelligence community.

(vi) Correlating and evaluating counterintelligence threats identified within intelligence community reporting, in coordination with the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, and providing appropriate dissemination of such intelligence to officials of the Department with a need-to-know.

(vii) Advising the Secretary on methods to improve the counterintelligence posture of the Department.

(viii) Where appropriate, supporting the Department’s leadership in engaging with the National Security Council.

(ix) In coordination with the National Counterintelligence and Security Center,
establishing counterintelligence partnerships to improve the counterintelligence defense of the Department.

(2) DEPUTY DIRECTOR.—There shall be within the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office a Deputy Director who is appointed by the Secretary, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence. The Deputy Director shall—

(A) be supervised and subject to performance evaluations by the Secretary, in consultation with the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center;

(B) be a current or former employee of the Department with significant experience within the Department; and

(C) serve at the pleasure of the Secretary.

(3) OTHER EMPLOYEES.—

(A) JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT.—There shall be within the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office such other employees as the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary, determines appropriate. Employment at the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office is an intelligence community joint duty assignment. A permanent
change of station to the Intelligence Community
Counterintelligence Office shall be for a period
of not less than 2 years.

  (B) Supervision.—The Director of the
Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Of-
vice shall be responsible for the supervision and
management of employees assigned to the Intel-
ligence Community Counterintelligence Office,
including employees assigned by program ele-
ments of the intelligence community and other
Federal departments and agencies, as appro-
riate.

  (C) Joint Duty or Assigned Personnel
Reimbursement.—The Director of National
Intelligence shall reimburse a program element
of the intelligence community or a Federal de-
partment or agency for any permanent change
of station employee assigned to the Intelligence
Community Counterintelligence Office from
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

  (D) Operation Under Authority of Di-
rector of National Intelligence.—Emp-
loyees assigned to the Intelligence Community
Counterintelligence Office under this paragraph
shall operate under the authorities of the Director of National Intelligence for the duration of their assignment or period of employment within the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office, except for temporary duty assignment employees.

(E) Incentive Pay.—

(i) In general.—An employee who accepts employment at the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office during the 120-day period after the date of the establishment of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office shall receive an incentive payment, which shall be payable by the Director of National Intelligence, in an amount equal to 10 percent of the base annual pay of the employee. Such an employee who completes 2 years of service in the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office may receive an incentive payment in an amount equal to 10 percent of the base annual pay of the employee if the Director of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office de-
terminates the performance of the employee is exceptional.

(ii) ELIGIBILITY.—An employee is only eligible for an incentive payment under clause (i) if the employee enters into an agreement with the Director of National Intelligence to serve in the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office for a period of at least 2 years.

(d) FUNDING.—To the extent and in such amounts as specifically provided in advance in appropriations Acts for the purposes detailed in this subsection, the Director of National Intelligence may expend such sums as are authorized within the National Intelligence Program of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for—

(1) the renovation, furnishing, and equipping of a Federal building, as necessary, to meet the security and operational requirements of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office;

(2) the provision of connectivity to the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office to enable briefings, secure audio and video communications, and collaboration between employees of the Department and the intelligence community at the unclassified, secret, and top secret levels;
(3) the provision of other information technology systems and devices, such as computers, printers, and phones, for use by employees of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office;

(4) the assignment of employees of the intelligence community to support the operation of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office; and

(5) the provision of other personal services necessary for the operation of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office.

(c) Deadline for Establishment of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office.—

(1) Establishment.—Not later than January 1, 2026, the Director of National Intelligence shall seek to establish, in accordance with this section, the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office within the Department.

(2) Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the plan to establish the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office required under paragraph (1).
Such report shall include the costs and schedule associated with establishing the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office.

SEC. 418. UKRAINE LESSONS LEARNED WORKING GROUP.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly establish a working group to identify and share lessons that the United States intelligence community has learned from the Ukraine conflict.

(b) MEMBERSHIP.—The composition of the Working Group may include any officer or employee of a department or agency of the United States Government determined appropriate by the Director of National Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense.

(c) CHAIR.—The Working Group shall be jointly chaired by—

(1) an officer or employee of the Department of Defense chosen by the Secretary of Defense; and

(2) an officer or employee of an element of the intelligence community chosen by the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the head of the element concerned.

(d) DUTIES.—The duties of the Working Group shall be the following:
(1) Identify tactical and operational lessons derived from the Ukraine conflict.

(2) Develop a repeatable process for promulgating such lessons to elements of the Department of Defense responsible for the development of joint and service-specific doctrine, acquisitions decisions, and capability development.

(3) Provide recommendations on intelligence collection priorities to support the elements of the Department of Defense identified under paragraph (2).

(e) MEETINGS.—The Working Group shall meet not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and quarterly thereafter.

(f) TERMINATION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), the Working Group shall terminate on the date that is 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(2) EXTENSION.—The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense may extend the termination date under paragraph (1) to a date not later than 4 years after the date of the enactment of this Act if the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense jointly—
(A) determine that an extension is appropriate and agree to such extension; and

(B) submit to the appropriate congressional committees a notification of the extension that includes a description of the justification for the extension.

(g) BRIEFS TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter, the Working Group shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the activities of the Working Group.

(h) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees; and

(B) the congressional defense committees.

(2) CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES.—The term “congressional defense committees” has the meaning given that term in section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code.

(3) WORKING GROUP.—The term “Working Group” means the working group described in subsection (a).
SEC. 419. MODIFICATION TO WAIVER FOR POST-SERVICE EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 304(a)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3073a(a)(2)) is amended—

(1) by amending subparagraph (A) to read as follows:

“(A) AUTHORITY TO GRANT WAIVERS.—

The applicable head of an intelligence community element may waive a restriction in paragraph (1) with respect to an employee or former employee who is subject to that restriction only after—

“(i) the employee or former employee submits to the applicable head of the intelligence community element a written application for such waiver in such form and manner as the applicable head of the intelligence community element determines appropriate; and

“(ii) the applicable head of the element of the intelligence community determines that granting such waiver will not harm the national security interests of the United States.”.
(2) in subparagraph (B), by striking “Director” and inserting “applicable head of the intelligence community element”; 

(3) in subparagraph (C), by striking “Director” each place it appears and inserting “applicable head of the intelligence community element”; and 

(4) by amending subparagraph (E) to read as follows:

“(E) REPORTING TO CONGRESS.—On a quarterly basis, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written notification of each waiver or revocation that shall include the following:

“(i) With respect to a waiver issued to an employee or former employee—

“(I) the covered intelligence position held or formerly held by the employee or former employee; and

“(II) a brief description of the covered post-service employment, including the employer and the recipient of the representation, advice, or services.
“(ii) With respect to a revocation of a waiver issued to an employee or former employee—

“(I) the details of the waiver, including any renewals of such waiver, and the dates of such waiver and renewals; and

“(II) the specific reasons why the applicable head of the intelligence community element determined that such revocation is warranted.”.

(b) WRITTEN ADVISORY OPINIONS WITH RESPECT TO POST-SERVICE EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS.—Section 304(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3073a(d)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(4) WRITTEN ADVISORY OPINIONS.—Upon request from a current employee who occupies a covered intelligence position or a former employee who previously occupied a covered intelligence position, the applicable head of the element of the intelligence community concerned may provide a written advisory opinion to such current or former employee regarding whether a proposed employment, representation, or provision of advice or services constitutes
covered post-service employment as defined in sub-
section (g).”.

(c) COVERED POST-SERVICE EMPLOYMENT.—Section
304(g)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3073a(g)(2)) is amended by striking “relating to national
security, intelligence, the military, or internal security to,
the government of a foreign country or any company, enti-
ty, or other person whose activities are directly or indi-
rectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or sub-
sidized, in whole or in major part, by any government of
a foreign country” and inserting “to the government of
a foreign country or any company, entity, or other person
whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, di-
rected, controlled, financed, or subsidized, in whole or in
major part, by any government of a foreign country if such
employment, representation, or provision of advice or serv-
ices relates to national security, intelligence, the military,
or internal security”.

(d) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—Section 304(a)(1)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3073a(a)(1)) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking “para-
graph (2)(A)(i)” and inserting “paragraph (2)(A)”; and
(2) in subparagraph (B), by striking “paragraph (2)(A)(ii)” and inserting “paragraph (2)(A)”.

SEC. 420. PROHIBITION OF FUNDS FOR INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS GROUP.

None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security may be obligated or expended to support the Intelligence Experts Group of the Department of Homeland Security, or any successor group.

SEC. 421. PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR CERTAIN ACTIVITIES OF THE OVERT HUMAN INTELLIGENCE AND OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROGRAMS OF THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) COVERED ACTIVITY.—The term “covered activity” means—

(A) with respect to the Overt Human Intelligence Collection Program, an interview for intelligence collection purposes with any individual, including a United States person, who has been criminally charged, arraigned, or taken into the custody of a Federal, State, or
local law enforcement agency, but whose guilt
with respect to such criminal matters has not
yet been adjudicated, unless the Office of Intel-
ligence and Analysis has obtained the consent
of the interviewee following consultation with
counsel;

(B) with respect to either the Overt
Human Intelligence Collection Program or the
Open Source Intelligence Collection Program,
any collection targeting journalists in the per-
formance of their journalistic functions; and

(C) with respect to the Overt Human In-
telligence Collection Program, an interview for
intelligence collection purposes with a United
States person where the Office of Intelligence
and Analysis lacks a reasonable belief based on
facts and circumstances that the United States
person may possess significant foreign intel-
ligence (as defined in section 3 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)).

(2) OVERT HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
PROGRAM.—The term “Overt Human Intelligence
Collection Program” means the program established
by the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for
Intelligence and Analysis pursuant to Policy Instruc-
tion 907 of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, issued on June 29, 2016, or any successor program.

(3) OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROGRAM.—The term “Open Source Collection Intelligence Program” means the program established by the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis for the purpose of collecting intelligence and information for potential production and reporting in the form of Open Source Information Reports as reflected in Policy Instruction 900 of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, issued on January 13, 2015, or any successor program.

(4) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term “United States person” means—

(A) a United States citizen;

(B) an alien known by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis to be a permanent resident alien;

(C) an unincorporated association substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens; or

(D) a corporation incorporated in the United States, except for a corporation directed
and controlled by a foreign government or gov-
ernments.

(5) UNITED STATES PERSON INFORMATION

(USPI).—The term “United States person informa-
tion”—

(A) means information that is reasonably
likely to identify 1 or more specific United
States persons; and

(B) may be either a single item of informa-
tion or information that, when combined with
other available information, is reasonably likely
to identify one or more specific United States
persons.

(b) PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR
COVERED ACTIVITIES OF OVERT HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTION PROGRAM AND OPEN SOURCE INTEL-
LIGENCE COLLECTION PROGRAM.—None of the funds au-
thorized to be appropriated by this Act may be made avail-
able to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the De-
partment of Homeland Security to conduct a covered ac-
tivity.

(c) LIMITATION ON PERSONNEL.—None of the funds
authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be used
by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security to increase, above the staffing
level in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (division G of Public Law 118–31), the number of personnel assigned to the Open Source Intelligence Division who work exclusively or predominantly on domestic terrorism issues.

(d) **Rules of Construction.**—

1. **Effect on other intelligence oversight.**—Nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting or superseding the authority of any official within the Department of Homeland Security to conduct legal, privacy, civil rights, or civil liberties oversight of the intelligence activities of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis.

2. **Sharing and receiving intelligence information.**—Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit, or to limit the authority of, personnel of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security from sharing intelligence information with, or receiving information from—

   (A) foreign, State, local, Tribal, or territorial governments (or any agency or subdivision thereof);

   (B) the private sector; or
(C) other elements of the Federal Government, including the components of the Department of Homeland Security.

SEC. 422. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PENDING SUBMISSION OF INFORMATION REGARDING IMPROVEMENTS RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFFING, DETAILS, AND ASSIGNMENTS.

Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2025 for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, not more than 95 percent may be obligated or expended until the date on which the Director of National Intelligence submits to the congressional intelligence committees the document required to be established by the Director under section 7307(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (50 U.S.C. 3025 note).

Subtitle B—Reports and Other Matters

SEC. 431. FOREIGN MALIGN INFLUENCE INTERAGENCY GUIDANCE.

Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees
the interagency guidance that governs engagement with
social media companies for each element of the intelligence
community.

SEC. 432. FOREIGN MALIGN INFLUENCE STANDARD OPER-
ATING PROCEDURES.

Not later than 30 days after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation shall provide to the congressional intelligence
committees the most recently updated standard operating
procedures document, without restrictions, that governs
the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s engagements with
social media companies.

SEC. 433. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR CERTAIN EXECU-
TIVE BRANCH DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.

(a) BRIEFING.—Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National In-
telligence shall provide to the congressional intelligence
committees a briefing with respect to intelligence support
provided to executive branch departments and agencies
that are not a part of the intelligence community in ac-
cordance with Intelligence Community Directive 404 (re-
lating to Executive Branch Intelligence Customers), or
successor directive.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The briefing required under sub-
section (a) shall include the following:
(1) A list of United States Government departments and agencies that have a Federal Senior Intelligence Coordinator, an Intelligence Point of Contact, or a Federal Intelligence Coordination Office.

(2) A description of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s insight into how departments and agencies that have individuals holding a position described in paragraph (1) are selected for such position, and what role the Office of the Director of National Intelligence plays in that process, if any.

(3) An assessment of the successes, shortcomings, effectiveness, utility, and future planning for engaging with executive branch customers pursuant to Intelligence Community Directive 404 or any successor directive.

c) Definitions.—In this section, the terms “Federal Senior Intelligence Coordinator”, “Intelligence Point of Contact”, and “Federal Intelligence Coordination Office” have the meaning given such terms in Intelligence Community Directive 404.
SEC. 434. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RECRUITMENT FOR CERTAIN SECURITY-CLEARED SEPARATING MILITARY MEMBERS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Intelligence Community Chief Human Capital Officer shall, not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, develop a human resources strategy for enhancing the recruitment into the intelligence community of covered military members.

(b) CONTENTS.—The strategy developed under subsection (a) shall address—

(1) a requirement for each intelligence community element to facilitate job applications for qualified covered military members on each element’s job application portal, on USA Jobs, or other appropriate hiring platform;

(2) additional authorities or policy waivers required to overcome identified barriers to enhancing the recruitment into the intelligence community of covered military members to include those military members with technical training and experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree; and

(3) in consultation with military services, the development of best practices for matching job applications from among covered military members who have transferable qualifying backgrounds, skills, or
expertise to relevant intelligence occupational specialties within the Federal civilian intelligence community workforce, to include coordinating intelligence community recruiting events and hiring blitzes.

(c) Briefing and Implementation Plan.—Not later than 30 days after the development of the strategy under subsection (a), the Intelligence Community Chief Human Capital Officer shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a briefing regarding the strategy developed under subsection (a), including a plan for how each element of the intelligence community intends to implement such strategy.

(d) Covered Military Member Defined.—In this section, the term “covered military member” means any servicemember transitioning out of military service who holds a current top-secret security clearance.

SEC. 435. STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RECRUITMENT EFFORTS IN THE UNITED STATES TERRITORIES.

(a) In General.—The Director of National Intelligence, acting through the Intelligence Community Chief Human Capital Officer, shall, in coordination with the human capital offices of such elements of the intelligence community as determined appropriate, develop an intel-
ligence community-wide strategy to strengthen efforts to recruit qualified individuals residing in the United States territories.

(b) BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the Intelligence Community Chief Human Capital Officer, shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a briefing with respect to the strategy developed under subsection (a), including with respect to a plan for the implementation of such strategy.

(c) UNITED STATES TERRITORIES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “United States territories” means Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa.

SEC. 436. EXTENSION OF REQUIREMENT FOR ANNUAL REPORT ON STRIKES UNDERTAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES AGAINST TERRORIST TARGETS OUTSIDE AREAS OF ACTIVE HOSTILITIES.

Section 1723(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92; 133 Stat. 1811) is amended—
(1) by striking “May 1 2020” and inserting “December 31, 2024”; and
(2) by striking “2022” and inserting “December 31, 2027”.

SEC. 437. ADVISABILITY AND FEASIBILITY STUDY ON UPDATING INTELLIGENCE SHARING REGULATIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with each head of an element of the intelligence community, shall assess the advisability and feasibility of revising applicable policies and regulations with respect to the sharing of intelligence by an element of the intelligence community with foreign governments to incorporate the principles described under subsection (b).

(b) PRINCIPLES.—The principles to be assessed for advisability and feasibility shall be the following:

(1) The intelligence community may not share actionable intelligence with another country unless the intelligence community receives such credible and reliable written assurances from a representative of the country that the country shall use the intelligence in accordance with applicable international law.
(2) Any policies authorizing the sharing of actionable intelligence shall require special protections to reduce the risk of violations of applicable international law as a consequence of sharing such intelligence.

(3) Any policies authorizing the sharing of actionable intelligence with another country shall require the element of the intelligence community concerned to document the risks and benefits of requiring the country receiving the intelligence to make credible and reliable written assurances that the country, when using the intelligence, will conduct only lethal or capture operations that comply with policy standards of the United States with respect to detainee treatment and direct action counterterrorism operations outside areas of active hostilities.

(4) If the head of an element of the intelligence community receives or conducts an assessment calling into question the credibility or reliability of written assurances provided by another country to comply with applicable international law with respect to the intelligence, the head shall, within 45 days of receiving or conducting the assessment—
(A) inform the Director of National Intelligence and, as appropriate, the Secretary of Defense; and

(B) take appropriate action to assess further and remediate the situation, which may include suspending further sharing of intelligence or receiving further assurances from the country of compliance with applicable international law.

(c) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the advisability and feasibility of incorporating the principles described in subsection (b) into regulations on the sharing of intelligence by an element of the intelligence community, including the degree to which the current practices of each element of the intelligence community for the sharing of intelligence are consistent with such principles.

(d) ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE DEFINED.—In this section, the term “actionable intelligence” means information sufficiently detailed and timely to permit, assist, or allow an action or operation in the near-term.
SEC. 438. BUDGET TRANSPARENCY FOR OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

(a) Budget Summaries to Director of National Intelligence.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall submit to the Director of National Intelligence a complete and comprehensive summary of all budget information with respect to the element’s open-source intelligence activities.

(b) Report to Congress.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report compiling the information in the summaries submitted to the Director pursuant to subsection (a).

(c) Open-Source Intelligence Defined.—In this section, the term “open-source intelligence” means intelligence derived exclusively from publicly or commercially available information that addresses specific intelligence priorities, requirements, or gaps.

SEC. 439. ENHANCING PUBLIC-PRIVATE SHARING ON MANIPULATIVE ADVERSARY PRACTICES IN CRITICAL MINERAL PROJECTS.

(a) Strategy Required.—The Director of National Intelligence shall, in consultation with the heads of such Federal agencies as the Director considers appropriate,
not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, develop a strategy to improve the sharing be-
tween the Federal Government and private entities of in-
formation and intelligence to mitigate the threat that for-
eign adversary illicit activities and tactics pose to United
States persons in foreign jurisdictions on projects relating
to energy generation and storage, including with respect
to critical minerals inputs.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required by subsection
(a) shall cover——

(1) how best to assemble and transmit informa-
tion to United States persons—

(A) to protect against foreign adversary il-
licit tactics and activities relating to critical
mineral projects abroad, including foreign ad-
versary efforts to undermine such United States
projects abroad;

(B) to mitigate the risk that foreign adver-
sary government involvement in the ownership
and control of entities engaging in deceptive or
illicit activities pose to the interests of the
United States; and

(C) to inform on economic espionage and
other threats from foreign adversaries to the
rights of owners of intellectual property, includ-
ing owners of patents, trademarks, copyrights, and trade secrets, and other sensitive information, with respect to such property; and

(2) how best to receive information from United States persons on threats to United States interests in the critical mineral space.

(c) Implementation Plan Required.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director completes developing the strategy pursuant to subsection (a), the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)), or provide such committees a briefing on, a plan for implementing the strategy, which shall include a description of risks, benefits, opportunities, and drawbacks.

SEC. 440. BRIEFING ON POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR ADDRESSING THREATS FROM KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TERRORISTS.

(a) In General.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, representatives from the Department of Homeland Security, which shall include representatives from Customs and Border Protection, Homeland Security Investigations, and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which shall include representa-
tives from the Threat Screening Center, shall jointly pro-
vide a briefing to the appropriate congressional commit-
tees with respect to existing policies and procedures for
handling encounters with known or suspected terrorists at
the borders of the United States.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The briefing required under sub-
section (a) shall include a description of the following:

(1) The existing processes for handling encoun-
ters with individuals at or between ports of entry, to
include the difference in process for individuals en-
countered at and between ports of entry.

(2) The existing processes for the handling and
sharing of potentially derogatory information con-
cerning individuals who are known or suspected ter-
rorists.

(3) The existing processes for managing asylum
claims of known or suspected terrorists.

c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congress-
ional committees” means—

(1) the congressional intelligence committees;

(2) the Committee on Homeland Security of the
House of Representatives; and

(3) the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
SEC. 441. ASSESSMENT ON INTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL.

(a) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of such elements of the intelligence community as the Director determines appropriate, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report assessing the intelligence relationship between Israel and Egypt that includes an assessment of intelligence failures with respect to either country and with respect to intelligence sharing between the two countries that contributed to the attack on Israel by Hamas on October 7, 2023.

(b) MATTERS.—The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) An assessment of the state, strengths, and limitations of any intelligence relationship between Egypt and Israel, especially with respect to Hamas and Gaza.

(2) The role of the United States, if any, in the relationship and an identification of the areas in which the participation of the United States would most strengthen the relationship and improve cooperation between Egypt and Israel going forward.

(3) A review of the failures in national and regional intelligence analysis, collection, and sharing
that occurred before the attack on Israel by Hamas on October 7, 2023, and any lessons learned for future intelligence activities.

(c) Form.—The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form.

SEC. 442. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMIC COERCION BY THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION AND STRATEGIES TO ENHANCE THE ECONOMIC RESILIENCE OF COUNTRIES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION.

(a) Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, in consultation with Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the heads of other elements of the intelligence community determined appropriate by the Assistant Secretary, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report assessing the economic coercion efforts by the People’s Republic of China in the Indo-Pacific region and strategies that would enhance the resilience of countries in the Indo-Pacific region to economic coercion by the People’s Republic of China.

(b) Matters.—The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) A description of recent economic coercion efforts by the People’s Republic of China against countries in the Indo-Pacific region.

(2) An analysis of the effectiveness of economic coercion efforts against countries in the Indo-Pacific region by the People’s Republic of China in achieving the stated or assumed goals of the People’s Republic of China.

(3) An assessment of measures that would dissuade the People’s Republic of China from engaging in acts of economic coercion in the Indo-Pacific region and would encourage actions supporting the economic prosperity and security of the Indo-Pacific region.

(4) An assessment of measures, including trade diversion or regional trade agreements, that would diminish the sway and influence of the market of the People’s Republic of China with respect to countries in the Indo-Pacific region.

(5) An analysis of measures that would help countries in the Indo-Pacific region to build supply chains independent of the People’s Republic of China.

(c) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form.
(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party of the House of Representatives; and

(C) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

(2) INDO-PACIFIC NATIONS.—The term “Indo-Pacific region” includes the following countries:

(A) Australia.

(B) Bangladesh.

(C) Brunei.

(D) Burma (Myanmar).

(E) Cambodia.

(F) China.

(G) Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
1 (H) Federated States of Micronesia.
2 (I) Fiji.
3 (J) French Polynesia.
4 (K) India.
5 (L) Indonesia.
6 (M) Japan.
7 (N) Kiribati.
8 (O) Laos.
9 (P) Malaysia.
10 (Q) Maldives.
11 (R) Mongolia.
12 (S) Nauru.
13 (T) Niue.
14 (U) Nepal.
15 (V) New Zealand.
16 (W) Palau.
17 (X) Papua New Guinea.
18 (Y) Philippines.
19 (Z) Republic of Korea.
21 (BB) Samoa.
22 (CC) Singapore.
23 (DD) Solomon Islands.
24 (EE) Sri Lanka.
25 (FF) Thailand.
GG) Timor-Leste.

(HH) Tonga.

(II) Tuvalu.

(JJ) Vanuatu.

(KK) Vietnam.

SEC. 443. REPORT ON THE MISSION EFFECT OF CIVILIAN HARM.

(a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Council and in coordination with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community determined appropriate by the Director, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report examining the extent to which civilian harm that occurs during counterterrorism operations informs analyses of the intelligence community on the mission success of campaigns to degrade, disrupt, or defeat foreign terrorist organizations.

(b) MATTERS.—The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) The methodology of the intelligence community for measuring the effect of civilian harm.

(2) The extent to which analysts of the intelligence community apply such methodology when as-
sessing the degree to which a terrorist group is degraded, disrupted, or defeated.

(3) A framework to enable analysts to assess, as objectively as possible, the effect that civilian harm has had on the mission of degrading, disrupting, or defeating a terrorist group, or an explanation of why such framework cannot be generated.

(4) The extent to which dissenting opinions of analysts of the intelligence community are included or highlighted in final written products presented to senior policymakers of the United States.

(5) Recommendations to improve the quality of future intelligence community analyses by accounting for the effects of civilian harm on efforts to successfully degrade, disrupt, or defeat a foreign terrorist group.

(c) FORM.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form, but if so submitted, the report shall include an unclassified summary of key findings that is consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

(2) ANNEX.—The report under subsection (a) shall include a classified annex that provides an inventory of the following:
(A) Collection gaps and challenges that may affect the analysis of the success or failure of campaigns against terrorist groups.

(B) Actions taken by the Director of National Intelligence to mitigate such gaps and challenges.

(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the congressional intelligence committees;

(2) the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and

(3) the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

SEC. 444. REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK OF CHINA.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Council, shall, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the economic outlook of the People’s Republic of China, which
shall include alternative analyses of the economic projections of the People’s Republic of China.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) Assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of the economy of the People’s Republic of China, including the potential effects of debt, demographics, and China’s international relationships.

(2) Potential challenges for the People’s Republic of China to sustain economic growth and the potential for global effects as a result.

(3) The implications of the economic future of the People’s Republic of China on the country’s foreign and defense policy.

SEC. 445. REPEAL OF REQUIREMENT WITH RESPECT TO ASSESSMENTS REGARDING THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE AND MEXICO.

Section 5522 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92; 133 Stat. 2152) is repealed.
TITLE V—MATTERS RELATING TO DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AND OVERHEAD ARCHITECTURE

SEC. 501. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE NEED FOR INCREASED EFFORT AND RESOURCES IN THE FIELD OF GEOMATICS.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the intelligence community and the broader United States Government require professionals with advanced training in geomatics and geodesy and that the preservation of these skillsets is crucial to advancing geospatial intelligence tradecraft for the United States for national security and military operations;

(2) the intelligence community should use existing authorities to engage in novel ways with academic and industry partners to ensure the intelligence community’s demand signal for geomatics and geodesy professionals is received by the largest possible number of United States citizens while also seeking to foster a culture of academic excellence and research to propel the field of geomatics forward at the pace of innovation;
(3) by engaging with academic and industry partners the intelligence community can help speed the reversal of the current trend wherein the United States not only produces fewer geomatics scientists and engineers compared to its global competitors and potential adversaries, but such competitors and adversaries also provide them with training and expertise that could be used against the United States;

(4) there is abundant opportunity for the intelligence community to advance its growing need for geomatics and geodesy professionals by partnering with American universities and researchers with proven experience in diverse fields who can lead the way to solving the United States most vexing geomatics challenges; and

(5) the intelligence community must balance the increasing demand for recruiting the best geomatics and geodesy talent while still ensuring a dedicated and patriotic workforce with allegiance to the Constitution and the United States Government.

SEC. 502. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT OFFICIAL.

Subchapter I of chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
“§ 430c. Senior Intelligence Oversight Official

“(a) Establishment.—The Secretary of Defense, or a designee of the Secretary determined by regulations prescribed by the Secretary, shall designate a civilian employee of the Department of Defense in the Senior Executive Service to serve as the Senior Intelligence Oversight Official.

“(b) Responsibilities.—The Senior Intelligence Oversight Official shall exercise independent oversight of all intelligence, intelligence-related, and sensitive activities of the Department of Defense, including activities involving—

“(1) tradecraft;

“(2) the operational use of an individual; or

“(3) clandestine operational tactics, techniques, and procedures.

“(c) Access.—The Senior Intelligence Oversight Official shall have—

“(1) complete and unrestricted access to all information concerning any intelligence, intelligence-related, or sensitive activity of the Department of Defense regardless of classification or compartmentalization, including special access programs, from any personnel or organizational entity of the Department of Defense, to the extent nec-
essary to carry out the responsibilities and functions of the Senior Intelligence Oversight Official; and

“(2) direct access to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, as circumstances require in the determination of the Senior Intelligence Oversight Official.

“(d) REVIEW OF REGULATIONS.—The Secretary of Defense shall review and update Department of Defense Directive 5148.13, and any associated or successor regulation or directive, to conform to this section.”.

SEC. 503. EXTENSION AND MODIFICATION OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE EXPENSE AUTHORITY.

Section 1057 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116-92; 133 Stat. 1593) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by striking “2025” and inserting “2030”;

(2) in subsection (d), by striking “2025” and inserting “2030”; and

(3) in subsection (e), by striking “$100,000” and inserting “$125,000”.
SEC. 504. AUTHORITY OF ARMY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AGENTS.
(a) In general.—Section 7377 of title 10, United States Code, is amended—
(1) in the section heading, by inserting “and Army Counterintelligence Command” before the colon; and
(2) by amending subsection (b) to read as follows:
“(b) AGENTS TO HAVE AUTHORITY.—Subsection (a) applies to any employee of the Department of the Army who is—
“(1) a special agent of the Army Criminal Investigation Command (or a successor to that command) whose duties include conducting, supervising, or coordinating investigations of criminal activity in programs and operations of the Department of the Army; or
“(2) a special agent of the Army Counterintelligence Command (or a successor to that command) whose duties include conducting, supervising, or coordinating counterintelligence investigations in programs and operations of the Department of the Army.”.

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 747 of such title is amended
by striking the item relating to section 7377 and inserting the following new item:

“7377. Civilian special agents of the Criminal Investigation Command and Army Counterintelligence Command: authority to execute warrants and make arrests.”.

SEC. 505. MODIFICATIONS TO NOTIFICATION ON THE PROVISION OF DEFENSE SENSITIVE SUPPORT.

Section 1055 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328; 10 U.S.C. 113 note) is amended—

(1) in subsection (b)—

(A) in paragraph (1), by striking “paragraph (3)” and inserting “paragraphs (3) and (4)”;

(B) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (5) as paragraphs (4) through (6), respectively;

(C) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph:

“(3) Routine defense sensitive support.—In the event that the provision of defense sensitive support is routine defense sensitive support, the Secretary shall provide notification under paragraph (1) on a quarterly basis after providing the support.”;

(D) in paragraph (4), as so redesignated—
(i) in the paragraph heading, by inserting “AND EXTRAORDINARY SECURITY PROTECTIONS” after “SUPPORT”; 

(ii) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A)—

   (I) by inserting “or requires extraordinary security protections” after “time-sensitive”; and

   (II) by inserting “shall” after “Secretary”; 

(iii) in subparagraph (A)—

   (I) by striking “may”; 

   (II) by inserting “or after the activity supported concludes” after “providing the support”; and

   (III) by striking “; and” and inserting “; or”; and

(iv) in subparagraph (B)—

   (I) by striking “shall”; and

   (II) by striking “notice as soon as practicable after providing such support, but not later than 48 hours after providing the support” and inserting “notification simultaneously
with the execution of the supported activity”; and

(E) in paragraph (5), as so redesignated, by striking “paragraphs (1) and (3)” and inserting “paragraphs (1), (3), and (4)”; and

(2) in subsection (c)—

(A) in the subsection heading, by striking “DEFENSE SENSITIVE SUPPORT DEFINED” and inserting “DEFINITIONS”;

(B) by striking “the term ‘defense sensitive support’ means support provided by the Department of Defense to a non-Department of Defense Federal department or agency that requires special protection from disclosure.” and inserting a colon; and

(C) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:

“(1) The term ‘defense sensitive support’ means support provided by the Department of Defense to a non-Department of Defense Federal department or agency that requires special protection from disclosure.

“(2) The term ‘routine defense sensitive support’ has the meaning given such term elsewhere in
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025.”.

SEC. 506. REVISION OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES AS SECURITY FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES.

(a) EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY.—Section 431(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking “December 31, 2024” and inserting “December 31, 2027”.

(b) INTERAGENCY COORDINATION AND SUPPORT.—Section 431(b)(1) of such title is amended to read as follows:

“(1) be pre-coordinated with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency using procedures mutually agreed upon by the Secretary of Defense and the Director, and, where appropriate, be supported by the Director; and”.

SEC. 507. PROMULGATING GUIDANCE RELATED TO CERTAIN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTS.

Not later than January 31, 2025, the Secretary of Defense shall issue guidance on the governance and oversight of the contracts of the Department of Defense that support or enable sensitive activities.
SEC. 508. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SPACE FORCE ACQUISITION WORKFORCE.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the National Reconnaissance Office and the United States Space Force jointly benefit from a robust United States Space Force military and civilian acquisition workforce that includes contracting officers, acquisition program managers, engineers, and program control and finance professionals;

(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives is concerned that the United States Space Force’s uneven emphasis on developing space operators and making fewer acquisition professionals available for assignments at the National Reconnaissance Office can negatively affect the procurement goals of the National Reconnaissance Office, particularly in support of United States Space Force requirements; and

(3) a robust United States Space Force acquisition workforce, that encourages assignment opportunities at the National Reconnaissance Office, both benefits the procurement goals of the National Reconnaissance Office and provides valuable experience that acquisition professionals can apply to future United States Space Force assignments.
TITLE VI—MATTERS RELATING TO CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SEC. 601. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SPECIAL VICTIM INVESTIGATOR.

Section 32(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3533(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following: “No individual appointed as the Special Victim Investigator may, at the time of such appointment, be a current employee of the Central Intelligence Agency.”.

SEC. 602. RESERVE FOR CONTINGENCIES NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.

Section 504(a)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3094(a)(2)) is amended by inserting “and, not later than 10 days after the date of the obligation or expenditure of such funds, of the activity requiring such obligation or expenditure” before the semicolon.

SEC. 603. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE STUDY AND REPORT ON MODERNIZATION INITIATIVE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

(a) REQUIREMENT.—The Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct a study on the impacts of the Central Intelligence Agency’s modernization initiative.
(b) ELEMENTS.—The study required under subsection (a) may include the following:

(1) An assessment of the Agency’s implementation of changes pursuant to the modernization initiative, including organizational changes and changes to Agency activities.

(2) An assessment of how any new administrative requirements made pursuant to the modernization initiative have affected Agency activities.

(3) An evaluation of whether the Agency’s implementation of changes pursuant to the modernization initiative have affected the Agency’s ability to anticipate and respond to emerging issues.

(4) An assessment of the extent to which the Agency’s implementation of changes pursuant to the modernization initiative have—

   (A) fostered an organizational climate and structure that allows personnel in analytic and operational fields to take professional risks;

   (B) grown the role of analytic personnel and provided opportunities for them to become subject matter experts within the analytical career fields; and
(C) changed the number of personnel from analytical fields represented in managerial and policy positions.

(5) Other matters deemed relevant by the Comptroller General.

(e) BRIEFING; REPORT.—

(1) BRIEFING.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the preliminary findings of the study conducted under subsection (a) at a time that is mutually agreed upon by the appropriate congressional committees and the Comptroller General.

(2) REPORT REQUIREMENT.—

(A) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the results of the study conducted under subsection (a).

(B) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.
(d) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

(1) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Appropriations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Appropriations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(2) **AGENCY.**—The term “Agency” means the Central Intelligence Agency.

**TITLE VII—MATTERS RELATING TO TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION**

**SEC. 701. SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITY ACCREDITATION.**

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security shall, not later than December 31, 2029—

(1) assign responsibility to the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency for the accreditation of sensitive compartmented information facilities for all components of the Department of Defense, including the military departments, except
with respect to the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and

(2) ensure that the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency has the appropriate staff to successfully carry out such responsibility.

(b) Notification With Respect to Resource Requirements.—The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security shall notify the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees with respect to the resource requirements for the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency to carry out the accreditation responsibility under subsection (a).

(c) Submission of Report to Congress.—The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security shall, in consultation with the Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report not later than December 31, 2027, on the feasibility of the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency assuming accreditation responsibility with respect to sensitive compartmented information facilities for the Na-
127
1 National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency by December 31, 2029.

(d) CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “congressional defense committees” has the meaning given that term in section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code.

SEC. 702. STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RESEARCH SECURITY.

(a) Study.—The Director of National Intelligence shall conduct a study on preventing intelligence community research grant funding from improperly benefiting foreign countries of concern.

(b) Elements.—The study under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) An evaluation of the intelligence community’s current research security practices, including with respect to the requirements under section 121 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3061).

(2) An evaluation of the feasibility and effects of prohibiting the award of an intelligence community grant for research to any individual or institution if the head of the relevant element of the intelligence community cannot verify that such grantee
does not partner, formally or informally, with individuals from institutions located in any country of concern, or with institutions or entities from or located in any country of concern, subject to a waiver of such prohibition, on a case by case basis, by the head or deputy of the element of the intelligence community.

(3) Recommendations for the operational implementation of the prohibition described in paragraph (2).

(c) Report.—

(1) In General.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing the results of the study conducted under subsection (a) and the recommendations required under subsection (b)(3).

(2) Form.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(d) Country of Concern Defined.—For purposes of this section, the term “country of concern” has the meaning given that term in section 1(m)(1) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a(m)(1)).
SEC. 703. REPORT ON BIOTECHNOLOGY.

(a) Reporting Requirement.—Not later than June 30, 2025, the head of each covered element of the intelligence community shall submit a separate report to the congressional intelligence committees with respect to biotechnology threats and intelligence activities related to biotechnology threats.

(b) Matters Included.—Each report under subsection (a) shall include, with respect to each covered element of the intelligence community, the following:

(1) A description of any gaps that exist with respect to intelligence activities that impede such element from fully targeting, collecting, and analyzing intelligence related to biotechnology threats.

(2) A description of any existing formal mechanisms by which the intelligence community provides intelligence and support with respect to biotechnology threats to—

(A) departments and agencies of the Federal Government outside the intelligence community;

(B) the governments of foreign countries; and

(C) private industry and academic institutions.
(3) An assessment of any existing mechanisms and manners by which the intelligence community consults with biotechnology experts and other outside experts with related expertise.

(c) COVERED ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—For purposes of this section, the covered elements of the intelligence community are as follows:

(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

SEC. 704. DATA WITH RESPECT TO TIMELINESS OF SECURITY CLEARANCE DETERMINATIONS.

Section 7702 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (50 U.S.C. 3352h) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(d) DATA WITH RESPECT TO TIMELINESS OF SECURITY CLEARANCE DETERMINATIONS.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—With respect to each report on compliance with timeliness standards for rendering determinations of trust for personnel vetting prepared pursuant to subsection (b), the Director of National Intelligence shall make available to the con-
gressional intelligence committees as soon as practicable the raw data with respect to the timeliness of security clearance determinations used to prepare each such report in machine-readable format for each element of the intelligence community that collects such data.

“(2) FORM AND CLASSIFICATION JUSTIFICATION.—The data provided to the congressional intelligence committees under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form to the greatest extent possible and shall contain a justification for the classification of any such data provided, which shall include citations to the applicable classification guide which explain the reason any such data is classified.”

SEC. 705. DATA WITH RESPECT TO TIMELINESS OF POLYPHGRAPH EXAMINATIONS.

Section 7702 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (50 U.S.C. 3352h), as amended by section 704, is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(e) DATA WITH RESPECT TO TIMELINESS OF POLYPHGRAPH EXAMINATIONS.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—With respect to each report on compliance with timeliness standards for ren-
dering determinations of trust for personnel vetting prepared pursuant to subsection (b), the Director of National Intelligence shall make available to the congressional intelligence committees as soon as practicable the raw data with respect to the timeliness of polygraph examinations used to prepare each such report in machine-readable format for each element of the intelligence community that collects such data.

“(2) FORM AND CLASSIFICATION JUSTIFICATION.—The data provided to the congressional intelligence committees under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form to the greatest extent possible and shall contain a justification for the classification of any such data provided, which shall include citations to the applicable classification guide which explain the reason any such data is classified.”.