

Opening Statement
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House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
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Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Himes, Members of this very important committee, thank you for the invitation to offer brief thoughts on the threats facing the United States, the Intelligence Community posture to assess those threats, and this committee's essential responsibilities – noting that the thoughts I provide are my own and not those of any firm or organization with which I am affiliated.

I believe that the national security threats currently facing the United States and our Intelligence Community are more numerous and more complex than at any point in our modern history, to include the height of the Cold War. In fact, we now face a phenomenon that is distinct from any our nation has had to manage before: simultaneous, multi-dimensional rivalries with two nuclear-armed global powers, China and Russia—each very different in its own right, but each with a major chip on its shoulder about the current world order that has the United States at its center.

Even as the challenges posed by China and Russia have grown in urgency and severity, however, other threats have not receded, but instead are interacting with great-power competition in consequential and often unpredictable ways. These other challenges include: two increasingly capable and aggressive regional revisionist powers, North Korea and Iran; the persistence of fanatical Islamist extremist networks that, while for the moment degraded in capability, have lost none of their desire to destroy us and our way of life; a number of failed and failing states that create tinder for great power and regional rivalries, and also humanitarian crises; and transnational threats that respect no borders, including pandemic diseases, organized criminal elements, human migration, and climate change.

As a global power with global interests, the United States cannot ignore any of these problems—as tempting as it may be to imagine otherwise. Rather, our country is best imagined as the guy in the circus who has to keep a tent full of plates spinning at the same time—that is, to deal with numerous threats simultaneously, albeit with the indispensable help of allies and partners. The China plate clearly is far and away the biggest and most important—the “pacing threat” as our National Defense Strategy properly identifies it. But that is not the only plate that has to be kept spinning—and if we lose control of one or more of the other plates, we should anticipate the likelihood of them crashing into several of the others.

It bears emphasizing, in particular, that our competition with China is global and multi-dimensional. This means that, even as we rightly increase resources for the Indo-Pacific, where the challenge is sharpest and the risk of military conflict the greatest, other parts of the planet—to include the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America—are also crucial theaters for various aspects of the Sino-American rivalry that cannot be neglected. We should recognize that Beijing seeks to divide the Euro-Atlantic alliance, pull longstanding U.S. partners in the Middle East into its orbit, establish military footholds in Africa, and secure access to sensitive technologies and natural resources from multiple geographies. Needless to say, the Intelligence Community has to be resourced to anticipate and understand China's global ambitions and activities, not just its regional ones.

For this reason, I want to recommend strongly that you seek to invest more in the most important asset in the Intelligence Community: its human capital. This is particularly warranted in the non-military agencies, especially the CIA, where, as Representative Spanberger knows, the tasks typically far exceed the available personnel, especially when it comes to our clandestine service officers, and thus professional development training and education is difficult to schedule and complete. By contrast, as Representatives Wenstrup, Stewart, Crawford, Gallagher, Crenshaw, Waltz, Kelly, Garcia, Houlihan, and Crow know from their time in uniform, the US military services have the best, most fully resourced professional development systems in government, with lengthy initial entry courses and then subsequent further courses every 3-5 years in an individual's career, culminating in full academic years at staff and war colleges for commissioned officers and a similar course for senior noncommissioned officers. There is also a large personnel account authorized and appropriated for in the military services for those *in* training and education, and that account encompasses the *instructors and trainers* in the school houses, as well. There is nothing like that in the non-military intelligence agencies beyond the very impressive initial on-boarding and periodic language and special skills training, and I strongly recommend examining how additional resources could be provided to enable greater investment in the exceedingly talented and committed members of the CIA in particular. Again, the Intelligence Community's human capital is its greatest asset, and I think that when you dig into this issue, you will agree that additional resources should be devoted to the development of it, especially in the CIA.

Another area I would encourage you to examine is the overall structure of the community, seeking to identify unnecessary duplication and layering, and ways to achieve efficiencies and savings in personnel that can be applied to address existing shortfalls and emerging needs. I would suggest a particular examination of the substantial growth of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Having discussed the intent behind the creation of ODNI and the other intelligence reforms enacted in the wake of the 9/11 attacks with Members of Congress who were part of that effort, it appears that the size of ODNI has expanded considerably beyond what was envisioned. I recognize fully that ODNI performs very important missions intended to prevent the kind of disconnects and failures that precluded prevention of the 9/11 attacks. And, it is important to note to this committee that much of the ODNI's growth is due to statute.

Regardless, the very substantial number of personnel in that headquarters creates a considerable challenge for the rest of the community from which those personnel tend to be drawn—noting that there are finite numbers of personnel with the expertise, experience, and skills needed—and that it is important to get the balance right between those pulled up to headquarters and those who are actually doing the vital work of gathering intelligence and processing and analyzing it. Having worked with DNI Haines closely in several capacities in the past and holding her in very high regard, I am confident that she would examine this issue and that of the overall IC structure with you in a very constructive manner. As an additional item in this area, and something that is a bit arcane, there likely also is a need to examine and rationalize the respective roles, responsibilities, and relationships of the National Mission Managers and National Intelligence Officers in ODNI, as well as the coherence of the assessments they offer to the National Security Council and the National Intelligence Council, respectively.

I would offer that the committee should focus as well on some of the most critical *enablers* helping those in the community as they endeavor to gather, analyze, and share intelligence on the

various threats I have discussed. Here I would suggest a particular focus on whether additional investments are needed in the areas of open source intelligence, tradecraft in an era of ubiquitous surveillance, and technologies to enable every aspect of intelligence work from gathering human, imagery, signals, cyber, open source, and other forms of intelligence to enabling the processing and analysis of that information by those performing such tasks—and doing all of that in greater partnership with the private sector, where much of the expertise and capabilities reside. I believe such issues will prove to be very significant for this committee to examine and oversee, and the results of that could be very beneficial to the community and to our country.

I want to bring my remarks to a close, Mr. Chairman, by applauding your intention to be bipartisan in your approach. The reality is that none of the threats we will discuss today is capable of defeating the United States: not China, not Russia, not Iran, not al Qaeda, not ISIS. The only force that can defeat the United States is the United States itself. It is our adversaries' fondest hope that we allow the disagreements that sometimes *divide* us to *define* us. Impassioned debate is inherent to our system and society, and as each of you appreciate from personal experience, I'm sure, democracy is a contact sport. Yet I do believe it important to remember that the institutions and values that unite us are stronger than our differences. And I am hopeful that this Committee will set a powerful example in this respect.

I was privileged to be Director of the CIA when Congressmen Mike Rogers and Dutch Ruppersberger were the Chairman and Ranking Member of the HPSCI. They embodied just such an approach, and it fostered very constructive and productive relationships with IC leaders, even as the Members of the committee pursued their oversight responsibilities very rigorously.

Finally, I hope that you will all be able to spend time with members of the Community's agencies, to meet them where they work, to see their facilities, centers of excellence, and capabilities here in the United States, *and* to spend time with them in our stations and operational deployments overseas, as well. As I know you recognize, the Community is comprised of very special Americans. And, particularly when times might be challenging in our Nation's capital, I am confident that visits with them will leave you with energy, enthusiasm, and inspiration, as well as deep appreciation for the extraordinarily important missions they perform around the world *and* the admirable way in which they seek to perform those missions. Thank you very much.