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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR THE

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Thursday, November 17, 2016

U.S. House of Representatives,

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:32 a.m., in Room HVC-304, Capitol Visitor Center, the Honorable Devin Nunes (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Nunes, Conaway, King, LoBiondo, Rooney, Pompeo, Ros-Lehtinen, Turner, Wenstrup, Stewart, Schiff, Himes, Sewell, Carson, Quigley, Swalwell, Murphy, and Castro.

Also Present: Representative Calvert.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Before we begin, I want to remind our members, our guests, and our staff that we are at the unclassified level for today's hearing. I am also obligated to remind the witnesses that providing false information to this committee or concealing material information from the committee is a crime punishable by law. Today, we welcome Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work, and the Under Secretary, Marcel Lettre, who will discuss the critical support that our Intelligence Community provides to our warfighters and the Department of Defense.

Thank you, all three of you, for being here today.

The United States faces grave security threats today, from terrorism threats to aggression by nation-states to cyber attacks. The Intelligence Community provides our military with critical information across the full spectrum of conflict. Yet when the IC and DOD do not integrate effectively, we risk intelligence failures that put our warfighters' lives at risk. We are here today because the DOD and the IC have failed to adequately respond to the concerns raised by this committee on a range of critical national security issues, including those raised by the committee during the worldwide threats hearing this past February.

The committee is alarmed by the manipulation of intelligence at U.S. Central Command, as we documented in our August report. Further, an ongoing committee investigation has found that the DOD and the IC facilities planning has been plagued by significant flaws, including

disregard for more cost-effective alternatives. Despite repeatedly raising these concerns, the committee has not seen any meaningful corrective actions by the DOD or the IC.

I want to thank the Department of Defense Inspector General's Office for their ongoing investigations into both of these issues. Once they are complete, I will invite the IG to present their findings in open session. If necessary, we may ask the three of you to return following the conclusion of those investigations.

I also commend the work of the Government Accountability Office, which recently released a report finding that the Department of Defense did not follow best practices when conducting its Joint Intelligence Analysis Complex consolidation analysis of alternatives process.

Thank you for being here, and with that, I would like to recognize the ranking member for any opening comments he would like to make. Mr. Schiff.

[The statement of The Chairman follows:]

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Mr. Schiff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am trying to get used to this new committee in the lap of luxury here in Ways and Means.

First, I want to thank you all for your many years of service to the country, indeed, decades of service to the country.

Director Clapper, in particular, I want to thank you for honorably serving us since the 1960s: first as an Air Force officer; later as Director of DIA, NGA, and as Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; and, of course, for the last 6 years at DNI. You took a position that was still very much in the process of formation and gave it very substantive and effective content, and we are very grateful for all you have done. You have always exhibited sober judgment and put the fate of the Nation first. I hope that, as you look back on your career, you don't lament your many appearances before us. We certainly don't. And, you know, there was a rumor out there that you might be asked to stay on a little longer during the transition. I am hoping you will stay on a little longer, maybe 4 years longer. But that is probably the last thing you want to hear.

Deputy Secretary Work and Under Secretary Lettre, I also want to thank you for your extraordinary service to the country. We are very grateful to both of you and look forward to our continued work together and whatever plans come to you both down the road.

As we near the end of Congress, now is an appropriate time to reflect on the values that shape our work and how those are manifest in the national security domain. Our country is best served when we put aside partisanship and conduct ourselves in a manner worthy of the

American people. This requires a commitment to intellectual honesty, respect for the rule of law, and a willingness to accept accountability for our mistakes, the responsibility to learn from them, and the commitment to avoid repeating them.

As we have done on this committee, we must all work together to solve problems on a bipartisan -- really nonpartisan -- basis. The Intelligence Community and, at times, the military operate in the shadows, but that in no way diminishes our responsibility to ensure that we act according to these principles. In fact, the responsibility is even greater.

At home, we rely on our military and Intelligence Community to be nonpartisan, objective, and honest about the challenges we face, and that candor is what allows the most senior leaders in this country to make hard choices about how to protect Americans.

Abroad, even as we engage in espionage and warfare to protect ourselves and our allies and world stability itself, we again rely on the IC and the military to comport with the rule of law and the highest moral standards. Even in the shadows, we must all act as if you are very much in the spotlight, because you are. The world often sees what we are doing. The Intelligence Committees do our best to shine a light in a constructive way. The people expect and deserve an Intelligence Community and military that are responsive and transparent as possible to the public and open to the oversight committees. The intelligence oversight committees in Congress act as a critical check on the most secret activities of the IC and the DOD and also provide oversight,

we hope sound judgment, and ultimately either authorization or disapproval.

Each of us must continually seek to strike the right balance between protecting privacy and civil liberties and ensuring our security. That balance is not always clear. It is never a bright line, nor have we always achieved it to perfection, but it always must be our goal in the IC, in the Department of Defense, and here in Congress.

So, today, I look forward to a far-reaching discussion about how the IC can and does support the Department of Defense as we in HPSCI pursue our meaningful, comprehensive, and bipartisan oversight of the critical work that you all do now and into the future.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.

[The statement of Mr. Schiff follows:]

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The Chairman. I thank the gentleman for yielding back.

I want to let the witnesses know that we do have your opening statements for the record. I want to keep your opening statements to no more than 5 minutes because we have a lot of questions, and I think we will have a series of votes, and so I want to get through as many of those questions as possible.

Who is going to start off? Director Clapper, will you start off?

Director Clapper, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENTS OF THE HONORABLE JAMES CLAPPER, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; THE HONORABLE ROBERT WORK, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; AND THE HONORABLE MARCEL LETTRE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES CLAPPER

Director Clapper. Chairman Nunes, Ranking Member Schiff, members of the committee, and thanks to the ranking member for your very gracious comments. I submitted my letter of resignation last night, which felt pretty good. I got 64 days left, and I think I would have a hard time with my wife, anything past that.

Thanks for having us here today to discuss the Intelligence Community's support to the Department of Defense. I am joined today, of course, by my friend and colleague Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work and my partner Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Marcel Lettre, two men whom I greatly admire.

We will certainly do our best to discuss as much of the IC's support to the Department in this unclassified environment, obviously noting that some details may require followup in a classified setting. In my written statement, I included a brief update on some of the national security challenges that this committee knows well. So, in the interest of time, I think I will skip by those. You are well familiar with them -- just as a stage setter for the constant challenges

that we face.

As I said before this committee many times, our Nation is facing the most diverse array of threats that I have seen in my 53-plus years in the intelligence business. That is what makes the topic of this hearing so important. Never before has the Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense needed to work so closely. We have a shared responsibility to keep our Nation safe and secure. I have a long history of serving in the Department and in intelligence roles, to include as the Director of Intelligence for three of the combatant commands, as Director of both DIA and NGA for almost 9 years, as Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence for over 3 years, and as commander of Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center, as commander of SIGINT wing, and I served two combat tours during a Southeast Asia conflict. So I have experienced firsthand the Department and IC's collaboration.

Since the standup of ODNI, the relationship between the Department and the community has grown steadily closer. When I first took over as USDI in 2007, I established a dual-hat relationship for the USDI within ODNI. It is called the Director of Defense Intelligence, or DDI. This position serves as a bridge to enhance integration, collaboration, and information sharing between the Intelligence Community and DOD. Marcel, I must say, has taken this arrangement to the next level.

ODNI does the hard work of integrating behind the scenes, so it is never a thought, or shouldn't be, on the front lines. My written statement walks through several examples, from operational support to

acquisition oversight to innovations by IARPA, that illustrate the support the IC renders to DOD. But in the interest of time, let me give you one real tangible example of how this works every day, and that is Joint Duty, a program championed and managed by ODNI. DOD knows well how jointness brings great value to the warfighter, and we in the IC adopted this same approach. We learned the hard way how stovepiping and insular approaches to intelligence are not the way to operate. To penetrate those stovepipes, one of the most valuable tools is Joint Duty, where IC officers serve rotations outside of their home agencies. This is intelligence integration at the most basic level, person to person. The IC's policy not only fosters Joint Duty, it mandates it for anyone who seeks to become a senior officer. Literally thousands of IC officers have completed Joint Duty assignments. This is in stark contrast to my war in Southeast Asia, where you rarely saw civilian employees in the war zone. Today civilians and service members are serving shoulder to shoulder, focusing on the same mission, sharing the same risks, and during the same challenging circumstances. I saw yet a more recent graphic example of that in my visit to Kuwait last week. Assigned Joint Duty is just one of the many ways that we build strong bridges between the IC and DOD.

Finally, I want to take note of the fact that Secretary Carter recently presented me with the Department of Defense Distinguished Public Service Award, the highest such award that he can give. The award was not for me. I accepted it on behalf of the men and women of the Intelligence Community who work tirelessly to support our

missions, many of them directly supporting the warfighters. The award is a symbol of that commitment to mission, and I want to publicly thank the Secretary for so honoring us, the Intelligence Community.

Mr. Chairman, if I may, I did want to comment specifically on the issue of analytic integrity at CENTCOM. I have some very recent information I thought would be useful to share with you. We have now 2016 results of our analytic survey, which reflected that 22 percent of CENTCOM J-2 and JIOC analysts, respondents experienced objectivity issues. This represents a decrease from 41 percent in 2015 and is comparable to 16 percent who reported issues in 2014. CENTCOM J-2 objectivity numbers are on par with the 2016 combatant command average of 25 percent and slightly higher than 2016 IC-wide average of 17 percent.

They also indicate that CENTCOM J-2 and JIOC experiencing objectivity issues were more likely to seek assistance to resolve incidents: 60 percent of CENTCOM J-2 respondents experiencing objectivity issues sought assistance, up from 42 percent in 2015. Of those seeking assistance in resolving objectivity issues at CENTCOM J-2 and JIOC in 2016, 67 percent rated senior CENTCOM intelligence management at satisfactory at protecting analytic products from deliberate distortion.

So I mention this only to make -- this is a 1-year period, but it does show a positive trend. And I would also comment that, of course, there has been a change in both the Commander and the J-2 in CENTCOM, and I think just that -- I am not casting aspersions on the

prior incumbent -- I just think that a change has been a very positive development. So, with that, I will stop and turn to Secretary Work.

[The statement of Director Clapper follows:]

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The Chairman. Thank you, Director.

Deputy Secretary Work, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT WORK

Mr. Work. Chairman Nunes, Ranking Member Schiff, distinguished members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today to discuss the support the Department of Defense has received from the Intelligence Community. As Chairman Nunes said, this is the unclassified hearing, so it precludes me from getting into any specific details. So let me just state that the support that we receive from the IC community has been absolutely superb. It is a great to be here with the Director of National Intelligence, Jim Clapper. There is nobody more qualified.

Jim, I would like to state for the record that Marcel has been tasked by me to find your letter of resignation and lose it, because we would certainly like to see you stay as long as possible.

But as Jim gets ready to hang up his spurs, I want to say that Secretary Carter and I are exceedingly grateful to his tremendous contributions to the Intelligence Community and intelligence support to DOD. He knows better than anyone the value the DOD's eight members of the IC bring to the intelligence arena.

Marcel Lettre, who is down here, is also my battle buddy in intelligence in the Department of Defense. He is the primary intelligence adviser to the Secretary and me. He is also responsible

to Jim in the role of the Director for Defense Intelligence. This dual-hat role was established and institutionalized when Jim was the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and it has been a smashing success, in our opinion. So I can't overstate the importance of having a USDI team who understands the warfighting requirements is plugged in closely with the IC community and appreciates the entire capabilities the IC can bring to bear.

Now we all understand and appreciate the importance of these personal relationships, which is why I comment on them, and thanks to Jim, Marcel, CIA Director John Brennan, and the directors of the combat support agencies, the relationship, in our view, between DNI, CIA, the rest of three of the Intelligence Communities, and DOD have never been better. I have worked in this business now for a little bit over 2-1/2 years. I have had an opportunity to work not only closely with Jim but with his principal deputy, Stephanie O'Sullivan. She is one of the three members -- along with the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Paul Selva -- we chair the Advanced Capability and Deterrence Panel, which indicates the close relationship we have between the IC and the Department.

These relationships and cooperation are absolutely crucial as we seek to allocate our intelligence sources to meet the challenges that Jim spoke about around the world, from fighting ISIL and other extremist groups; monitoring North Korea's very active ballistic missile and nuclear weapons program; ensuring Iran does not develop further nuclear capability; keeping a watchful eye on Russia's actions in the Ukraine,

Eastern Europe, and elsewhere; and scrutinizing China's activities in the South and East China Sea. The demands on the Intelligence Community are formidable, and the IC is working as best as they can -- and we would consider their job to be outstanding -- to try to apply scarce intelligence resources across all of these challenges.

The USDI and DNI rely upon several joint forums where the joint service intelligence chiefs, the intelligence combat support agencies, CIA, and the DNI convene, and these include regular visits to all of our regional and functional combatant commands, participation in the Afghan and the counter-ISIL Warfighter Senior Integration Groups, which we call the Warfighting SIG, and all of these are designed to address the warfighters' most urgent operational needs.

We have 10 combatant commands who have IC representatives on them. That is another indication of how close our relationship is. And their robust presence, even in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other places worldwide, especially in this zero-sum budget environment, really speaks highly for the mission orientation of the entire IC.

So I am very grateful to be here today, and I am very grateful for the committee's interest in this area, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you, sir.

[The statement of Mr. Work follows:]

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The Chairman. Thank you, Deputy Secretary.

Mr. Under Secretary, do you have an opening statement?

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARCEL LETTRE

Mr. Lettre. Mr. Chairman, I do not have a formal opening statement. I would like to just briefly make two points. First, as Director Clapper and Deputy Secretary Work have indicated, I essentially have two reporting chains, reporting to DNI Clapper on the Intelligence Community side and to the Deputy Secretary and the Secretary on the DOD side, with really my full-time focus and my team's full-time focus being to manage and focus the relationship between the Intelligence Community and the military and ensure that, in both directions, the military is providing support to the Intelligence Community and the Intelligence Community is providing support to the military. I think we have had a very interesting transformative experience since 9/11 in fundamentally integrating those efforts far more than ever before, and I look forward to touching on some of that in the questions and answers today.

And the second point, Mr. Chairman, is just to echo the thanks that have been provided around the table this morning. Thanks to the team that I have been able to serve with here on this side, Director Clapper and the Secretary and Deputy, but also to this committee. I suspect that this will be my last opportunity to appear before you before the transition in government in January. I, at an early point

in my career, had an opportunity, an honor really, to serve as a staff member on this committee for 3 years, which was an opportunity to learn about the importance of oversight and the critical driver that oversight can be in ensuring that government functions effectively. And I want to just thank the committee for that opportunity early in my career to be able to do that as well as to have a productive relationship over many years since. Thank you.

[The statement of Mr. Lettre follows:]

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The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Under Secretary, and that is actually a good segue into our opening questions.

We are here in a rare open session for this committee because we have struggled to get a lot of answers and provide transparency to the public, which is really one of our most important constitutional duties that we have as the legislative branch of government. I have many questions that I want to get through, so I want to try, if we can keep your answers as short and concise as possible.

First, I want to start, and maybe I will just start with you, Mr. Lettre. This is for all of you. Are you familiar with Wikipedia, the free online encyclopedia?

Mr. Lettre. Yes, I am.

The Chairman. Mr. Clapper --

Director Clapper. Generally. Generally, I am. Generally, yes, sir.

The Chairman. Does the Department of Defense or the Intelligence Community edit Wikipedia pages on behalf of the U.S. Government?

Mr. Lettre. I really can't speak authoritatively on that. I know I personally have never edited a Wikipedia page.

Director Clapper. I don't know off the top of my head. I don't think so, but I don't know.

The Chairman. Mr. Work?

Mr. Work. I have no knowledge whether or not it happens or not, sir.

The Chairman. Does the DOD or the IC use Wikipedia as an official

source of information?

Mr. Lettre. I just don't know, Congressman.

Director Clapper. I would have to look into that. I don't know offhand if it has ever been. I don't know.

Mr. Work. I know that the Department and the IC community uses a lot of open-source information. I don't know whether or not Wikipedia is one of those open sources.

The Chairman. Deputy Secretary Work, on March 21, you and Director Clapper met with Chairman Thornberry, Chairman Frelinghuysen, and myself to discuss the analysis required by the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2016 regarding the Joint Intelligence Analysis Complex slated to be built at the Croughton Air Base in the U.K. Do you recall that meeting?

Mr. Work. I do, indeed, sir.

The Chairman. Director Clapper, do you recall that meeting?

Director Clapper. Yes, I do.

The Chairman. Secretary Work, you informed the committee that the Department of Defense did not intend to fully reevaluate lower cost alternative sites for the intelligence center. As justification for your decision, you provided the committee with two documents regarding communications infrastructure supporting Lajes Field in Portugal's Azores Islands.

I am going to ask the clerk to please distribute exhibit 1 and exhibit 2, which includes one of the documents provided as justification for the Department's decision.

[The information follows:]

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The Chairman. I think everybody has the documents now.

Secretary Work, are you aware that significant portions of this document that you passed to three committee chairmen to meet a public law were plagiarized from Wikipedia?

Mr. Work. Well, sir, I can state with certainty that I did not provide exhibit 2. I have never seen exhibit 2.

The Chairman. I can help explain it. Exhibit 2 is the Wikipedia pages that were plagiarized for exhibit 1 that you provided to meet the public law.

Mr. Work. I see. No, I did not know that the information in that document came from Wikipedia.

The Chairman. Okay. So you can see basically all of the graphics in this, what you have provided us, everything that is highlighted, that was all taken directly out of what we have in exhibit 2 to provide to three committee chairmen to fulfill the requirements of the National Defense Authorization Act?

Mr. Work. If I may, sir, I would just like to clarify. What I did in that meeting, I was required by the National Defense Authorization Act to make a determination that our movement to Croughton was operationally the right call to make, and I made that determination and communicated my intent to do that.

The second thing I needed to do was to certify that there were no DOD missions that could be transferred to Lajes, and I certified that we were not intending to do so. At that meeting, you asked me two questions. You said, what about the housing costs in Lajes? And

you questioned me on the communications information. I provided you a piece of -- one document that was provided to me -- I think it was by DISA -- and I committed to you to make a deep dive, which I did.

The Chairman. Well, I am just alarmed, Secretary Work, that we would rely on Wikipedia free online encyclopedia that is famously known for most high school students plagiarizing their homework and that you would even -- that the Department of Defense would even use Wikipedia, a free online service, to provide any information to Congress to put in any report.

Mr. Work. Well, again, Mr. Chairman, this had no bearing on my determination or my certification, which was required by law.

The Chairman. So you are not bothered at all that the Department of Defense, a hundred and hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars agency, that anyone in your Department would be providing you information to give to the Congress that was plagiarized -- and it is not just that it was plagiarized off of Wikipedia; it was every single graph in the document was taken from Wikipedia?

Mr. Work. Again, sir, the cost for the cables and the cables were not --

The Chairman. Secretary Work, you are not answering the question here. We need to know whether or not it is appropriate -- is it appropriate to take information off of Wikipedia and provide it to the Congress?

Mr. Work. I would say that I am surprised that this comes directly from a Wikipedia page.

The Chairman. All right. Let me move on because we are going to have votes. Are you aware that the committee first asked for the bandwidth requirements for this intelligence center in early August 2015?

Mr. Work. Yes, sir, I am.

The Chairman. Are you aware that the committee again requested communications requirements on May 24, 2016?

Mr. Work. Yes, sir, I am.

The Chairman. Are you aware the committee again requested requirements on October 5, 2016?

Mr. Work. I am not certain of the exact dates, but I know that we have been in communication, yes, sir.

The Chairman. Are you aware that the committee finally received this information on the intelligence center requirements earlier this week?

Mr. Work. I am.

The Chairman. On Tuesday, the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer testified before this committee that Department of Defense leadership decided not to brief committee staff because of the tone of a letter sent from the committee to the Department of Defense. Did you direct the Department of Defense CIO not to provide the requested information to the committee because of the tone of the letter?

Mr. Work. No, I did not, but I would like to explain what, in my view, has happened. You called me in September 2015. As the Chief

Operating Officer of the Department of Defense, I oversee developing a defense program for the Secretary in accordance with his strategic guidance. As a result, I am responsible for every single aspect of that program. And as you can imagine, certain items do not rise to my level of attention and certain do.

In September 2015, you called me and asked me to personally get involved in reviewing the information that was being provided, and I committed to you that I would. We briefed you and the two other chairmen in March. At that point, you brought up new information that was new to me. You said, "I don't believe that you are being served right in the information on the communications, and I don't think you are being served right by the information on housing." I committed to you to do a deep dive, which we did. That deep dive was finished in May.

Since May, we have been trying to get that information to you. From the very beginning, Mr. Chairman, I thought this was a communication between you and me. You asked me to do this personally for you. All of the interactions that I had were with you and the other chairmen. We offered to provide this information to you. We were told that you would not want to receive it. We actually had a hearing scheduled in September which was postponed. I regret that this information was not communicated, but we have had the information since March -- excuse me, since May, and we have been trying to communicate it to you.

The Chairman. So the issue with this is your Chief Information

Officer refused to -- or the Department -- I shouldn't say "you" -- or the Chief Information Officer said the reason that you would not brief the committee staff was because of the tone of a letter. But you did remind me of one thing, and I do remember that phone call. And I just, for the record, you do acknowledge that I informed you that the Congress had been given false or misleading information in that September phone call?

Mr. Work. I understood that was your opinion, yes, sir.

The Chairman. Okay. So you were informed by this committee that we were provided false and misleading information by the Department of Defense?

Mr. Work. And I had no indication that that was true.

The Chairman. So I am going to pass out the email -- that is exhibit 3 -- that went from our staff to the Department of Defense because I would like to just ask you, what is the problem with the tone of this letter that would lead the Department of Defense not to send us the requirements for an intelligence center?

[The information follows:]

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Mr. Work. Mr. Chairman, I haven't seen this particular one. All I can tell you is you asked me in March to do a deep dive, and I got the absolute best experts in the Department of Defense to do that deep dive. It included the Chief Information Officer --

The Chairman. But this is -- we are the legislative branch of government. We asked in August of 2015, and your Chief Information Officer said that he was told by superiors not to provide the information because of the tone of the letter. This is the letter, and I mean, to me, it seems like a very nice letter. It says, "Thanks for the quick reply." It even says, "Thanks for the help."

Is there a problem with the tone of this letter?

Mr. Work. Mr. Chairman, I don't know what letter Mr. Halvorsen was talking about. What I can say is that, ever since our first meeting, I said: "It is very important to the three chairmen that we provide this information to them. I want to deal directly with the chairmen. I want to provide them with the best information that we have." Everything that you ask, or any of the other chairmen ask, we take very seriously.

The Chairman. I appreciate that, but your department, as testimony from just 2 days ago, decided not to send information to this committee because of the tone of a letter, and this is the letter. And I don't see anything wrong with the tone of the letter.

Mr. Work. Well, Mr. Chairman, you mentioned at the early part of the hour that there are two investigations ongoing: one by this committee, and one by the DOD IG made at your request. Normally, when

an IG investigation occurs, we stop all interactions with the committees, but we have said, because this is so important to the chairmen, we will continue the interaction with the chairmen, and we will be very careful and deliberate on the way that we come forward. I regret that Mr. Halvorsen used the term "tone." I have instructed everyone that we need to be very deliberate because of the close attention that you have placed to this, and I have emphasized to everyone in the chain of command that all of our analysis has to be unimpeachable.

The Chairman. So, Deputy Secretary, I understand there are two investigations ongoing, but just so you know, this was in August -- this was August 3 of 2015. The letter to the DOD IG requesting an investigation was not until 9 months later. So why for 9 months did you not -- did your department decide not to provide what is really basic information to this committee?

Mr. Work. Again, sir, when you asked me to get involved in this, I did. I have ordered the deep dive. I have absolute confidence that the J-6 on the Joint Staff, the CIO, DISA, and DIA, now have come together, worked the information that you requested --

The Chairman. So, clearly, Deputy Secretary, you are not responsible for not providing the information, or you don't recall that, but someone in your department told the CIO that. So do you know who would have instructed the CIO not to provide the information because of the tone of the letter?

Mr. Work. I don't believe anyone did, and I don't believe that

Mr. Halvorsen was trying to make any aspersion. We believe congressional oversight is extraordinarily important. Since the meeting with you in March, we have had six separate letters, I believe. We have provided over 1,000 pages of documents. We have provided 11 people to testify before the committee. There are people being testified. We believe we have been extraordinarily responsive. You mentioned the GAO report --

The Chairman. I would like to talk about the responsiveness. The committee's investigation has uncovered multiple instances where the Department of Defense provided information to other committees, particularly the Senate Armed Services Committee, months before providing the same information to this committee. Is it the DOD's policy to provide information to the Senate before providing it to the House?

Mr. Work. No, sir, it is not.

The Chairman. Then why did it happen?

Mr. Work. Again, sir, we have offered to brief this information to you since May. And twice, once when you --

The Chairman. This has nothing to do with that, Secretary Work. This has to do with information that we asked for a year and a half ago that we did not receive.

We will go on. On Monday, the Department of Defense finally provided the committee with the communications requirements. I understand that Lajes infrastructure as it is configured today does not have the desired bandwidth. Did the DOD ever ask

telecommunications providers if they could upgrade their infrastructure to support the specific requirements?

Mr. Work. Mr. Chairman, I would defer all questions to the experts in J-6, the CIO, DISA, and DIA. However, I have been briefed that it is not normal policy for us to go out and say, what is the art of the possible in the future? We do all our analysis on what is available today.

The Chairman. So, when the DOD's CIO testified before us 2 days ago, he did indicate that they did not ask the local provider. So now I have a -- this is the same question I asked the other day, which is, when our bases around the world need extra bandwidth, do we just not ask and we just start laying cables all over the globe? Or do we ask the local provider, "Can we increase our bandwidth?"

Mr. Work. Sir, you have to put this within the context of what this question is about. What was better, Croughton or Lajes? There is no comparison. Croughton is absolutely the best information hub.

The Chairman. That is not the question. The question is, could the communications infrastructure meet the requirements or not?

Mr. Work. I understand that was the question.

The Chairman. That was the question.

Mr. Work. But the question you posed to me was whether or not the movement to Croughton was operationally --

The Chairman. How do you know the answer if you never asked the provider if the local communications infrastructure would work?

Mr. Work. I know the answer, sir, because CAPE, who is the best

independent cost-analysis section that we have in the Department of Defense, took a look at all of the one-time costing factors. They looked at seven. In all of them, there was never an instance where CAPE was able to close the business case for Lajes.

The Chairman. We were briefed on the CAPE study. It was quite entertaining.

On September 1, 2016, you sent a letter to the committee stating that you released funding for phase 2 of the intelligence center construction. When did you release the funding?

Mr. Work. Soon after that letter, I assume, sir.

The Chairman. Soon after the letter that was dated on September 1?

Mr. Work. I cannot tell you the exact dates that money transferred, but that was the date that I notified you that we were going to go forward.

The Chairman. There would be no reason that this notification would have been delayed?

Mr. Work. I can't imagine one, sir. It might have been delayed simply because of the staffing process of the letter coming up through me. I go through hundreds and hundreds of pages. So perhaps it was delayed slightly.

The Chairman. At the time of your decision, was there an active GAO investigation into this location, into the analysis on this location?

Mr. Work. There was an analysis of our AOA, yes.

The Chairman. At the time of your decision, was there an active DOD IG investigation into DOD personnel providing false information to Congress related to this intelligence center?

Mr. Work. Yes, and I believe it is ongoing now.

The Chairman. Secretary Lettre, I want to understand how DOD sets requirements for the locations of facilities. We asked you this question earlier this year in closed session, but I want to make sure it is on the record today as well. Does the Department of Defense choose location of facilities based upon where personnel want to live?

Mr. Lettre. We do not. We have a range of factors that go into the decisions about where to base facilities. And particularly when it comes to intelligence facilities, the operational mission orientation and criteria associated with that are the greatest of the factors.

The Chairman. So we choose location of intelligence facilities based upon mission requirements?

Mr. Lettre. That is one of a range of criteria that do factor in, but for me, wearing my intelligence hat and with my intelligence responsibilities, the mission relevance and the ability of that location to service the intelligence mission tends to rise to the top of the list, yes.

The Chairman. Okay. I am going to stop here, and we will come back later, but I am going to yield to the ranking member.

Mr. Schiff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director Clapper, I wanted to ask you about your parting thoughts

on Russia and the threat posed by Russia. You and the Secretary of Homeland Security acknowledged about a month ago that Russia had been hacking into our political institutions and interfering with our election and that this was coming from the highest levels of the Kremlin. What is your assessment of whether that activity is likely to continue into the next administration if President-elect Trump, if a rapprochement between he and Mr. Putin doesn't materialize, would you anticipate that the Russians will hack and dump documents that might be damaging to a Trump administration? Would that be consistent with what you know of their playbook?

Director Clapper. Thanks for the question, sir. I don't anticipate a significant change in Russian behavior. We gave considerable thought to diming out Russia with that statement. We waited until we felt we had sufficient basis for it, and we did, both from a forensic as well as other sources of intelligence that led us to that statement. It may have had the desired effect since, after that, after the issuance of the statement and the communication that I know took place between our government and the Russian Government, it seemed to have curtailed the cyber activity that the Russians were previously engaged in.

The Russians have a very active and aggressive capability to conduct information operations, so-called hybrid warfare. That has been a longstanding practice of theirs, going back to the Soviet era, and I anticipate that it will continue.

Mr. Schiff. Director, I want to drill down a little further into

your comment that the Russian activity curtailed after the issuance of the statement. The dumping of documents didn't end with the issuance of the statement. Are you implying by this that we know whether the documents provided to either cutouts or WikiLeaks had all been provided prior to the statement that was issued, or is it entirely possible that the dumping of documents continued after the statement and what may have been avoided was a further escalation of the interference in the form of trying to monkey around on election day or thereafter?

Director Clapper. I was referring to the cyber reconnaissance that we had observed, many State entities had observed, prior to the statement. And that sort of activity seemed to have curtailed.

As far as the Wikileaks connection, the evidence there is not as strong, and we don't have good insight into the sequencing of the releases or when the data may have been provided. We don't have as good insight into that.

Mr. Schiff. And based on what the Russians have done in Europe and elsewhere, what would you anticipate they would do during the coming administration in terms of their hacking and dumping and active measures campaign in the United States?

Director Clapper. Well, that is hard to say, Congressman Schiff. I can't say what they will do, and I can't forecast what the impact of our new administration might have on Russian behavior. That is kind of speculative. I just don't know

Mr. Schiff. Let me ask you about their intentions vis-a-vis the

Minsk accords and Ukraine. Do you see any intensification of the Russian efforts to disrupt Ukraine or destabilize the Ukraine Government, or do you see efforts in the opposite direction? Are Russian incentives aligned to tamping down the violence there or dialing it up at this point?

Director Clapper. I think, for now, they will sustain a presence in the Donbass. We continue to see firing incidents exchanged along the line of contact, and recently since, yet another reaffirmation of the ceasefire, the number of incidents per week has increased. I think both countries will probably engage in actions and counteractions to try to promote instability. Clearly, the Russians want to sustain influence in a traditional part of greater Russia, which is Ukraine. And so I suspect that sort of pressure will continue. I don't see much prospect for a resolution or compliance with the Minsk accords. I think we will just continue the sort of semi-stalemate we are in.

Mr. Schiff. In terms of Russian conduct in the war in Syria, obviously Putin and the Kremlin are aware that the incoming President wants to have a different relationship with Russia. How do you see that as influencing their policy in Syria? Is the Kremlin likely to conclude by that that they have more or less a green light to continue the siege of Aleppo or the bombing of civilians? Do you ascribe any significance to the timing of their resumption of that campaign following the discussion with the President-elect Trump?

Director Clapper. I can't speculate on, again, what impacts any discussions with the new administration would have, but I can tell you,

right now, the Russians are sustaining their behavior. They are increasingly putting more pressure on oppositionists in Aleppo, indiscriminately bombing women, children, hospitals, this sort of thing. And that will continue. That is having a negative effect on the oppositionists in terms of morale and willingness to continue to fight. And, of course, this plays to Assad's objective of achieving a military victory. That is the position he is in. I think he is probably less interested in any form of negotiations.

Mr. Schiff. Do you see foresee any change in the increasing Russian belligerence vis-a-vis NATO countries? Their provocative acts in the air and in the sea, do you see any changes in that in light of a potentially different relationship between the President-elect and the Kremlin?

Director Clapper. Well, no, I don't, at least right now. The Russians recently deployed their lone carrier and are conducting some ops off of that. They have sustained the presence of their artillery and the deployment of their very advanced air defense systems. And so, at least, I think that what that indicates that clearly the Russians are there to stay. They want to maintain the presence, and the base in Syria is their only base outside the former Soviet Union, a permanent base that they maintain, and I expect they are planning on expanding their presence at Tartus to support naval operations in the eastern Med.

Mr. Schiff. Let me ask one last question on Russia, sort of the 30,000-foot question. And that is one aspect of the Putin doctrine

has been to enhance his own stature at home by provoking confrontation with the West, by framing for his people at home the United States as the Russian equivalent to the Great Satan. How will he square that with his comments or overtures to the President-elect? In other words, does the Kremlin need the American bogeyman to maintain popularity at home, and how will they deal with that conflict if there is a different relationship between the President-elect and the Kremlin?

Director Clapper. Well, all I can say here is that clearly Putin has played to the spirit of nationalism, if you want to call it that, in Russia by appealing to the citizenry and I think somewhat as a distraction for, or at least to offer compensation, for the economic privations that the Russian population continues to suffer because of the economic straits they are in and the continued contraction of their economy. And so he does exhort and appeal to the patriotic spirit of the Russian people and to conjure up his standing up to opponents in the West, not only in the United States, and as a way of reaffirming in their minds Russian greatness.

Mr. Schiff. Let me ask one last question, both Director Clapper and Secretary Work, about ISIS and the campaign in Syria. There have been a number of statements from the Pentagon about the timing of the campaign against Raqqa, and I have had concerns about whether we have the forces ready to undertake that, whether it is premature, but there have been public comments about two imperatives of accelerating that campaign. One is an intensification of plotting by ISIS against the United States in Raqqa and the need to move quickly to diminish that

threat, and the other is the fear of people, ISIS figures, leaving Mosul and reinforcing efforts in Raqqa. How much are those two concerns driving the timing of that campaign? And how do you ascribe the threat to the United States from ISIS at the moment in terms of their external operations planning and the military tradeoff of moving more quickly than maybe the forces are prepared, but the necessity of cutting people off that are fleeing Mosul?

Mr. Work. Thanks for the question, sir. First of all, the campaign design, which was settled on about a year ago today, is generally going along the lines of which we expected. It always was to isolate Mosul and Raqqa and then to reduce them. We are farther ahead on the Mosul campaign because we have reliable partners on the ground. The Iraqi security forces, especially their counterterrorism service, have really been getting after the bad guys. Throughout this time, we have been providing a lot of support in going after the external operations leaders, both in Iraq and Syria. That is the President's and the Secretary's and everybody's number one concern going after the external ops guys, and we are really having a lot of success in doing so. The campaign to isolate and reduce Raqqa was always number two in the queue. The SDF, the Syrian Democratic Forces, are the isolation force, and they are in the process of isolating Raqqa. And the force that will ultimately reduce Raqqa is now being determined among all of the actors in the region. Meanwhile, we continue to hit every single external ops guy, either al-Nusrah Front or al-Qa'ida in Syria or ISIL, and we are having a lot of success in doing so.

Director Clapper. I don't think we can make a direct correlation between as the pressure increases on the caliphate and it shrinks, that we can relate that directly. We don't have any evidence that that somehow heightens the threat to the homeland or threat of external attack. That has been a constant with ISIL anyway, and I don't think there is a direct relationship between diminishment of their territory and the magnitude of that threat. It is still a concern of ours. As Secretary Work indicates, we have had a lot of success in taking out both leaders of the external operations and some of their lesser, lower level people.

Mr. Schiff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The Chairman. Mr. Conaway is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate that. I hadn't intended to ask this, but since the ranking member is pursuing it. Russia today, the propaganda arm of Putin that is well funded, really in effect, RT, the television programs, they have a scheme, a playbook, that says if we can force the Americans to question each other about what is going on in their country, that they win. How does the ranking member's line of questioning relative to trying to create some sort of a sinister link between whatever Mr. Trump might or might not have done versus Mr. Putin, how does that play into the playbook that RT has been successful at, in your opinion? As trained professionals, intelligence professionals, is that, in fact, exactly what RT is trying to get done, trying to get us to do?

Director Clapper. Well, they have incurred some budget cuts, the RT network, and have not been all that successful in conveying messages here in the United States. Now, they do certainly broadcast elsewhere, and that is exactly what they try to do, particularly in Europe. Having traveled there and watched RT, they are focusing much more, I think, on Europe than the United States.

Mr. Conaway. Well, it is their playbook, though, if you look at what they did in the Ukraine and other places to get the citizens to turn on themselves to go after it. It appears to me that that whole line of questioning that you are going to hear all day today will be playing directly into the RT's playbook, and they are quite successful in Europe, and they are coming here as well.

Turning from that, though, we have been in the fight in Afghanistan and Iraq for a long, long time. Can you ensure that we are better at coordinating intelligence and providing intelligence to DOD? Can you give us two or three examples where we are better today than we were when we first started this, some lessons learned kind of thing that are now a part of the normal versus what happens in --

Director Clapper. You mean in terms of sharing intelligence with DOD?

Mr. Conaway. Well, gathering and sharing it. Are you guys better today than you were in 2003 when this thing started?

Director Clapper. Oh, I think so.

Mr. Conaway. So can you give us two or three examples of where that is the case?

Director Clapper. Well, I don't think I can go into specifics in this setting. I do know I visited Kuwait and the task force command there last week and was briefed on some very graphic examples of the contributions that the national agencies make, specifically NSA, NGA, and DIA, to the warfighting effort there. And General Townsend, very high in his praise of what the Intelligence Community is doing on his behalf. And, of course, this is, I think, emblematic of the relationship because of the fact that these are combat support agencies in DOD as well, as well as parts of the Intelligence Community. I am happy to give you specific examples that would be classified that would illustrate that.

Mr. Conaway. That would be fine.

You mentioned Joint Duty and the successes. Early on, I had some questions as to the impact it would have on the personnel's career paths if they had left their home agency or home units and went somewhere else. Can you talk to us about the impact it has had on career development for those folks who have participated by going to other agencies, as well as are commanders willing to give up their best and brightest to go to -- has DOD given up the best and brightest to go to intel agencies and vice versa? From a personnel standpoint, is this Joint Duty working the way that you intended it?

RPTR BRYANT

EDTR HOFSTAD

[10:32 a.m.]

Mr. Lettre. Congressman, I will take a first crack at this.

In my experience, the Joint Duty Program for intelligence officers really has sought to model a lot of the successes of the joint tours of duty on the military side under Goldwater-Nichols, which have been successful at driving that immigration over the last 30 years for the military. The same is starting to play out in the Intelligence Joint Duty Program.

My observation is that, in almost all cases, individuals who serve a joint duty gain experiences that make them far more valuable and developed as leaders for the Intelligence Community upon completion of that joint duty tour.

That said, one of the things that we need to continue to work on in the years ahead is how to make that in-and-out or the return back to the home organization even more effective so that in a seamless way they are able to come back to their home organization, do the right kind of job that fully leverages that joint assignment.

Mr. Conaway. All right.

Director Clapper. We have had to go to school on this a bit on managing this arrangement. It is obviously easier and more convenient when you manage a workforce that is self-contained within a particular agency. I know in my own headquarters where we have maintained 40

percent of our workforce are detailees from other components. And you do have to pay attention to that, manage their assignments, ensure they get appropriate ratings and bonuses where appropriate.

And I think, though, that the enrichment of the force and the professional capability of the force is far better. You know, there has been really a profound sociological change in the entire Intelligence Community. There are thousands of employees who have deployed multiple -- civilian employees who have deployed multiple times since 9/11. And that has had, I think, a profound change in the professionalism and identification with the mission --

Mr. Conaway. All right. And --

Director Clapper. -- of our civilian employees.

Mr. Conaway. -- I am sorry, Director Clapper. Thank you.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Quigley is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. Quigley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service.

Mr. Clapper, a word of advice. You talk about retirement. You mentioned your wife. A friend of mine recently retired, and his wife said, "I married you for better or worse, but I didn't marry you for lunch." So good luck on that.

In the time we have, could you give us a little bit of your thoughts concerning the homeland and security? What are your priorities or chief concerns besides cyber or Orlando-type attacks?

To me, it is a concern that the attacks could be more generated

from outside but also less sophisticated and, therefore, harder to stop or even know about.

Director Clapper. Well, you have touched on what is of course a great concern to us -- not so much the massive, complex attack that we suffered on 9/11 but, rather, those caused by individuals or small cells of people. That is a tremendous challenge for us.

One of the things I have tried to work in my time as the DNI is promoting not only the horizontal integration across our IC agencies but also vertically with the State, local, tribal, and private sector. I think we have made a lot of improvement there. I will, for example, be meeting with my Homeland Security and Law Enforcement Advisory Group tonight, which is an outstanding group of chiefs of police and law enforcement and intelligence representatives who do great work. I think, you know, the creation and operation of the fusion center network across the country, which are increasingly becoming inter-netted, is a great bulwark against foreign attacks.

But I will leave this job concerned about the impact of so-called lone wolves or homegrown violent extremism. That is a very complex problem. It requires, I think, first and foremost, community involvement. I think intelligence and law enforcement can only do so much to help clarify the picture of what that threat is.

Mr. Lettre. Congressman, may I just add that, in addition to the counterterrorism and cyber types of threats that the Director mentioned, on the military side we also think about threats to the homeland from more traditional military capabilities, ballistic

missiles, cruise missiles and so forth. And one of the main projects we have underway is to look at how to improve our intelligence indications and warning to be able to better respond to those types of contingencies as well.

So I think it is important to think about the full spectrum of threats to the homeland that we face.

Mr. Quigley. And I have heard several talk about the effects of sequestration on our protection of the homeland. What concerns me, if you could add a thought -- and I know it doesn't come out of this committee, necessarily, but homeland security grants to local governments cut by 50 percent, roughly, in the last 5 years; transportation security grants, 75 percent. The infrastructure aspects, like setbacks and bollards, were zeroed out.

Your thoughts, if you may?

Director Clapper. Well, the specter of sequestration, which, of course, runs through 2021, continues, and it potentially has impact across the board. And that is something, you know, we struggle with every program year and, of course, the uncertainty that creates and the painful trades we have to make.

You know, it is a fact of life, and, programmatically, it has gotten to be the new normal now. We have been living with it for about 5 years.

Mr. Quigley. Thank you.

Thank you all.

The Chairman. Mr. Pompeo is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. Pompeo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The questions are for Director Clapper and Deputy Secretary Work.

I sit on a joint task force, along with Mr. Calvert and Mr. Wenstrup, that was looking into the manipulation of intelligence at Central Command. Have both of you had a chance to read the interim report that the task force filed?

Director Clapper. You mean the committee report?

Mr. Pompeo. Yes, sir.

Director Clapper. Yes, sir, I have read it.

Mr. Pompeo. Mr. Work?

Mr. Work. I have not read it in detail, sir.

Mr. Pompeo. In that, there are pretty clear cases of intelligence manipulation. And my question is, what accountability for any person associated with that has been held to date?

Mr. Work?

Mr. Work. Sir, what we have been waiting on is the completion of the IG investigation --

Mr. Pompeo. Mr. Work, it has been -- just for the record, it is 2 years. We have soldiers in the field, and we had intelligence that wasn't getting to the right place to keep these young men and women safe so that we could make good policy decisions.

It has been 2 years. To tell a soldier that you are waiting on an IG report is unacceptable. Tell me who has been held accountable.

Mr. Work. I would have to ask Under Secretary of Defense Lettre if any particular people have been held accountable.

What the Secretary and I have said over and over and over again, we expect the highest standards in the Intelligence Community --

Mr. Pompeo. Did we get that, Mr. Work?

Mr. Work. Well --

Mr. Pompeo. Did our soldiers get that?

Mr. Work. -- the IG report will tell us. But, as Director Clapper spoke to, the overall assessment is that we are improving.

Mr. Lettre. Congressman, I will just add, we are not able to take authoritative personnel-related actions on these instances and allegations until the IG investigation is done. It has taken quite a while. I think we are as eager as this committee is to get the results of that IG investigation and be able to take action on those.

In the interim, there are some systemic and management actions that we have taken on the DOD side, working closely with Director Clapper and his team.

First and foremost, as Director Clapper mentioned, in the natural changeover of duties at Central Command with the Commander and the J-2, we both have, along with General Stewart, the Director of DIA, strongly emphasized the need for the J-2 to look at its business practices and ensure that all analysts have the ability to call it like they see it and speak truth to power.

In addition, more broadly across the enterprise, we have taken a number of initiatives to reinforce the importance of analytic integrity. We are in the process of ensuring that every organization has an analytic ombudsman in place, someone that analysts can come to

anonymously and report concerns that they may have and have an advocate --

Mr. Pompeo. Well, I am --

Mr. Lettre. -- and a number of other initiatives.

Mr. Pompeo. -- glad you are doing those things. Those all sound great to me. I have to tell you that the American people and our soldiers and sailors, airmen and Marines deserve not to wait 2 years to hold accountable folks who put bad information in the field.

Director Clapper, there are reports, press reports, that indicate that there was information withheld from a Presidential daily briefing until after General Austin had testified. Are you aware of the reports, and, if so, are those reports accurate?

Director Clapper. I am aware of the reports, and the examination done by our analytic integrity officer didn't find any substantiation of that.

Mr. Pompeo. There are also press reports, Director Clapper, that you had -- and our task force also looked into this -- that you had direct conversations with General Grove with great frequency, circumventing the chain of command there. And yet you testified that, quote -- this was before the Senate Armed Services Committee -- "Intelligence assessments from CENTCOM come to the national level only through the DIA."

How do you square conversations that you are having with the J-2 at one command with that testimony?

Director Clapper. The conversations I had with the J-2 by VTC

were only for tactical updates, not to discuss broad assessments. And I will also comment that, in every one of these, it was a split-screen, and the JCS J-2 was always represented in these dialogues.

So the reference to assessments finding their way into, say, National Intelligence Estimates or PDB articles is done through the Defense Intelligence Agency, not direct from CENTCOM or any other combatant command.

Mr. Pompeo. Great. Thank you, Director Clapper.

Director Clapper, President Obama removed Iran Air's designation as a proliferator of weapons of mass destruction on January 15, 2016, as part of the JCPOA. Did Iran Air's activities change in any way to prompt this removal?

Director Clapper. I believe, if I am correct, Iran is still a state sponsor of terrorism. I don't think we have reclassified Iran.

Mr. Pompeo. Right, no, that is my question. But the President removed Iran Air's designation as a proliferator of weapons of mass destruction and a provider of material support to the IRGC as part of the JCPOA -- or simultaneously with the JCPOA, more properly.

Can you tell me if Iran Air's behavior changed in any way, or has changed, to justify such a removal?

Director Clapper. I can't say that Iran's behavior has changed. It has continued aggressive missile development and missile fielding.

I think, in terms of its proliferating to other countries, I would have to research that and provide on a classified basis if we have information on that.

Mr. Pompeo. Thank you, Director Clapper.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Mr. Himes is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. Himes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen. I want to devote my 5 minutes to the topic of cybersecurity.

And, in particular, let me start with you, Director Clapper. And thank you for your service. We really appreciate all that you have done over the length of a long career. I would like to start with you. Let me give you the bulk of the time here.

What I am really interested in is not achievements and the progress we have made, because, clearly, we have, with the Integration Center and everything else. But as you think about withdrawing from the field, what would you identify as the topmost specific weaknesses, unaddressed vulnerabilities, areas of focus for both the IC and this committee in terms of our defense against cyber threats?

Director Clapper. Well, we, I think, make a very healthy investment in the National Intelligence Program on intelligence to support cyber threats. Obviously, it would always be good to have more money, but I think, as a proportion of everything else that we have to look at, I think we are in reasonably good shape.

I think the challenge for us is always going to be the fundamental fact that the Internet is insecure. And anytime you have a dependency on the Internet, we are going to be playing catch-up and reaction to defending our networks.

The other issue I would mention is the creation of both the substance and the psychology, I guess, of deterrence in the cyber realm. That has been a challenge. The issue there is whether you react on a binary basis or a symmetrical basis. You have a cyber assault, and do you react in a cyber context or do you retaliate some other way? I think that is going to be a challenge for the country, is our --

Mr. Himes. Could I just stop you there and ask a question? Is the challenge there, as you identify it, one of the development of doctrine, or is it a technical issue?

Director Clapper. I think it is more a development of doctrine and policy and developing a body of law through experience. You know, it took hundreds of years to develop the Law of the Sea, which is maybe a rough analog to where we are with cyber. And we haven't had enough time yet, I think, to develop that body of law.

And until such time as there are some norms developed and we have a firm definition of what "deterrence" means that is recognized by both state and nonstate actors, we are going to have a problem with the cyber defense.

Mr. Himes. Let me ask one specific question on the topic. The committee spent obviously a great deal of time in the creation of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act. How are we doing with respect to the private sector working with security agencies to address the cyber threat? Is there enough communication there? Is there more that can be done?

Director Clapper. I think there is. And this is a shared

responsibility across the IC. The FBI is involved, and, of course, very importantly, the Department of Homeland Security.

This, too: I mean, when you say engagement with the private sector, that is as big as all outdoors. And finding and keeping active the right conduit so that we can share -- and, by the way, the sharing needs to be two ways, both from them to us and from us to them.

I think there is a lot of improvement that has been made. I think the Department of Homeland Security has made huge strides here. That is not to say there is not more to do.

Mr. Himes. Okay. Thank you.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Oh. Yeah, Mr. Work?

Mr. Work. A couple things. In terms of cybersecurity, the number-one thing we are trying to do is secure our networks. We have made a lot of progress on this. We are also building up our cyber workforce. We should have all of the cyber mission teams in fiscal year 2017 and making sure we have the right people.

The other thing we are really worried about now and we are looking at hard are the Internet of DOD Things. All of our weapons systems that we generally operate today were designed in an era where cybersecurity threats were not all that stressing. So going through all of the different systems that we have, identifying the cyber vulnerabilities, and prioritizing those has been a big focus of the Department.

We have a cyber scorecard that is briefed to the Secretary and

I every month to 6 weeks, and we are looking at all of these different factors on trying to improve our cybersecurity. We have a long way to go, but we have made a lot of progress.

Mr. Himes. Thank you.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.

Mr. Calvert is recognized.

Mr. Calvert. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Clapper, for your service. We have known each other for a number of years.

I would like to get back into this CENTCOM discussion. And the reason why we investigated this in the first place is, you remember General Jim Mattis left abruptly in 2013. The Director of Intelligence pretty much remained in place for the first part of 2014 under General Austin. And around June, that changed. There was a turnover of people over at CENTCOM. And intelligence started coming out regarding Mosul, which is again in the news today, which was inaccurate. I think everybody can look back at that now and say, yeah, Mosul did fall; it didn't have the capabilities that some people thought.

But the intelligence since then has been in dispute. As you know, 40 percent of the workforce, twice the number of typical combatant commands, felt that the final product has been somewhat distorted. And, through our review, many of those employees to this day believe that the culture at CENTCOM has been somewhat toxic, to use the word that came up time and time again.

Right now, we are back in Mosul again. We have people there. How do we know that the intelligence that is coming out of CENTCOM today is any more reliable than the intelligence that was coming out 2 years ago?

Director Clapper. Well, we don't depend only on CENTCOM for intelligence reporting. In fact, one of the reasons why I do consult with them is to ensure that we are on the same page. So we have other assets, national assets, that tell us whether what we are seeing operationally or what we are hearing reported operationally comports with what we are seeing through intelligence. And at least my observations through the current Mosul campaign are that they do.

Mr. Calvert. Well, as you know, we have the largest number of folks working in intelligence at CENTCOM than any of the combatant commands. We spend quite a bit of money, appropriate quite a bit of money, to make sure that these folks are well-equipped and well-manned to make sure that they provide the best intelligence to the warfighter and to the combatant commander as possible.

Are you confident that that is occurring today, that the intelligence that is coming out of CENTCOM has improved? Because I think it is beyond dispute that we had a problem 2 years ago. And has that problem been cleared up, and is it continuing to get cleared up right now?

Director Clapper. I am somewhat removed from the command, but from what I have observed, that is the case.

And I don't know if you were here, sir, earlier when I quoted the

latest statistics from our analytic survey, which reflect a positive trend. And so the number of respondents reflecting analytic integrity issues has declined, and, importantly, their comments on management response when they did have issues has increased.

And so that the behavior -- the reflections of this at CENTCOM are beginning to level out and comport with all the other combatant commands. I do think, by virtue of the change in commanders and the change in the J-2, that that has been a change in the atmosphere there. And so I have been encouraged by the trends, particularly this year.

Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. I am going to tell the members we have three votes now and then a motion to recommit with a 10-minute debate. So I am going to try to keep this open through those three votes where members can try to go and come back, if possible. But then, at the end of the motion to recommit, we will have to end the hearing.

Mr. Murphy is recognized.

Mr. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all for your time.

Back to cyber real quick. Director Clapper, how important do you think it is that we have some sort of rules of engagement with cyber, that adversaries know, whether they are state-sponsored or not, that they know that there will be a response, that we move out of this gray area? How important is that?

Director Clapper. Well, again, this gets to the point about developing a body of law. And conveying those messages is much easier

with nation-states, because everyone recognizes that there are mutual vulnerabilities.

The greater challenge, at least for my part, is non-nation-state entities, which over time are going to develop more capabilities in the cyber realm to render attacks. And so I think the notion of building a sense of deterrence, the psychology of deterrence, in non-nation-state entities is going to be difficult.

I think there is certainly progress with the Chinese as a result of the agreement that was struck in September of 2015, and we will have to see whether that is continued. But I think the greater challenge is non-nation-state entities.

Mr. Murphy. With things moving as quickly as they do with technology, cyber, how has your experience been and do you feel, as Director, if we are recruiting the best talent in the world to make sure we are a step ahead?

Director Clapper. I think we sustained our level of recruitment, and we continue to be able to bring great young people into the community.

The greater challenge, though, is retention. And they will come to us, either as young civilians or military, and then they become very, very attractive and very appealing to the commercial sector. And so then we have a challenge there with retaining people in the face of some pretty appealing compensation packages that a lot of our people that have had experience in the Intelligence Community get, and that makes them very attractive.

Mr. Murphy. And I think we would be remiss if we didn't pick your brain just briefly, what you think, based on your experience, over the next 5 to 10 years the greatest threats we face as a Nation, what we are doing to address that and what we should be doing, especially with the new administration coming in. What is your advice, big picture, to them?

Director Clapper. Are you speaking only of cyber or just generally?

Mr. Murphy. In general.

Director Clapper. Well, that is a hard question to answer because, from an intelligence perspective, we have to be alert to all of these threats. I wish I could rank them and pick and choose which ones to worry about, but, unfortunately, they are all a problem for us.

So, whether it is the nation-state challenges posed by the likes of Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran or transnational concerns like counterterrorism, like proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which is personally a growing concern for me, the challenges posed in the cyber dimension, we have to and our approach has been to try to maintain a balance so that we can detect and address the full range of threats.

So I am hesitant to try to pick one that says that this is the one that is going to confront us or is going to be the worst for us over the next 5 or 10 years.

Mr. Murphy. All right.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate it.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Dr. Wenstrup?

Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am pleased to hear that things are better at CENTCOM. I have served on that investigation. And, clearly, we have concerns about what went on in 2015, and I know that has been addressed, to some degree.

Secretary Work, what are the root causes, in your opinion, of the unacceptable command climate that was existing at CENTCOM during that time?

Mr. Work. Well, this is something that Secretary Carter and I have discussed. We want to know what happened and why it happened. We have been looking to Director Clapper and Under Secretary of Defense Lettre to say, look, this is what we think the problems were, we have really tried to get after it.

The thing that the Secretary and I, trying to stay above the IG investigation, is simply to say, we expect -- we expect -- all of our intel analysts to have full freedom to say what they need to say, to speak truth to power. We expect the chain of command to pass that information up the chain.

Every decision we make on the campaign is based on the assumption of good intelligence, so it is very important to us. And we are awaiting the judgments of the intelligence professionals on how we can improve.

Dr. Wenstrup. When do you expect that we will get that? I mean,

this has been quite a while. We have gotten a lot of information, just on our committee and our investigation. Open Source News has provided much information. When do you expect that we are going to get something back?

Because it is hard to right a wrong if you just keep playing around with it. And how do we avoid it from happening again if we are taking way too much time in figuring out why it happened and where it happened?

And we have pretty much honed it down to the section in the chain where things seemed to change. So what are we waiting for? Why is this taking so long when we have gathered so much information and this isn't even our full-time job to investigate it?

Mr. Work. Sir, one of the hardest jobs as a senior leader in the Department is to be patient when these types of investigations are ongoing. I can't tell you exactly when it will be finished.

Dr. Wenstrup. Well, I don't know that you should be patient, actually. I think that it is time that we come forward, let the American people know what was taking place, at least let this committee understand what had been taking place. Hopefully, it is corrected.

Frankly, I am surprised that you are content with 25 percent in the survey as being an acceptable number. I would be shooting for a lot less than that. But -- and you are free to comment, Director Clapper, if you would like to.

Director Clapper. Well, I think it is a good thing to bear in mind here that this is a debate about subjective subjects, where there can be room for honest analytic disagreement, because we are always

operating from incomplete or less-than-perfect facts. And so people who are experts in this can have, and do have, honest disagreements.

So I don't find the figure -- again, given the subjectivity of the subject matter, I don't find that alarming, and that is pretty much on a par with the behavior. I would be more concerned if it were zero. If there were no disagreement, no dissent anywhere anytime, that would be disturbing to me. I would want to know why that is so.

Dr. Wenstrup. I can understand that argument for the 25 percent, but I sure can't for the 40 percent, sir. That just doesn't fly in the face of what is going on at the other commands, and it is certainly unacceptable. And the fact that we have had so many whistleblowers come forward certainly speaks volumes.

And, you know, we have an obligation here to have oversight. Lives depend on this, as you well know. Lives depend on the type of reporting that is going up. So we have had plenty of testimony on our side. There certainly should be something that the IG should come forward with and very soon, not just try to run out the clock.

And I would think that before you go, sir, that this is something you would want to have resolved and taken care of.

Director Clapper. Yes, it is, sir, because your report took me and the rest of the Intelligence Community to task for seemingly sitting on our hands and not doing anything, not taking any corrective action about this, when we were enjoined not to because of the DOD IG.

And so, yes, I would like it very much to get resolved. I think, in the interest of General Grove, who has since moved on to another

assignment, exactly what the IG finds would be very important, and it would be great if it happened before I leave.

And, if I may, I do need to clarify about my statement about resignation. It is not effective until noon on 20 January 2017, not immediate, as is being reported in the media.

Dr. Wenstrup. Well, I appreciate your time and service to the country. And I hope that this is wrapped up and rectified so that we can move forward in a positive way before you leave, sir.

Thank you, and I yield back.

The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.

Mr. Castro is recognized.

Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony this morning.

Director Clapper, thank you for your service to the Nation in this role and so many others before it. We appreciate it very much.

We have just come off of unprecedented intrusion by a foreign government in our democratic process after an election that finished just last week, and also unprecedented intrusion by a director within our own Intelligence Community in our democratic process. So, based on those two things, I have a few questions.

The first is, do we know whether the Russian Government or those responsible for the hacking of the Democratic National Committee and other Democratic groups shared any information with any American or Americans during the last year, year and a half?

Director Clapper. Sir, I would rather not respond right off the

top of my head. And, in any event, this would probably be best left to a classified session.

Mr. Castro. Okay. Thank you. I will be sure to follow up with you all on that.

The second question is, as head of the U.S. Intelligence Community, do you believe that Director Comey breached any protocol in his actions during the last month?

Director Clapper. I have no reason to question Director Comey. I think extremely highly of him. And so, whatever actions he took, he did so in what he felt was the best. And I have no basis for questioning that.

Mr. Castro. Okay. Thank you.

Thank you, Chairman. I pass.

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Castro.

I don't know if Mr. Schiff is coming back or not, but I am going to get back to some of the remaining questions that I have. So I will just try to get through them quickly.

Secretary Work, are you familiar with the decision by EUCOM in 2011 where the requirement for the new intelligence center was to be an hour outside of London?

Mr. Work. I do know that an AOA that was conducted by the European Command suggested that we should consolidate a JIAC at RAF Croughton. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Right, but the requirement was specifically to be an hour outside of London. Are you aware of this requirement?

Mr. Work. I am not aware of a specific requirement. I know of the AOA and the analysis that was done to support the move.

The Chairman. Director Clapper, are you aware of the requirement to be an hour outside of London?

Director Clapper. No, I am not.

The Chairman. So this committee has learned through an investigation that the decision was made before an AOA was ever completed. And, as the GAO found, there is no -- the GAO claims that, despite DOD's claims that they looked at 16 locations, 15 of the 16 alternatives, there is no documentation on 15 of the 16 other alternatives other than Croughton.

Do you know what happened to this documentation?

Mr. Work. No, sir. I do know that the GAO investigation occurred approximately 6 years after that was done. So one of the things they did say, that we were lacking documentation, but the most important conclusion that they made was that our actions were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of describing DOD's rationale for choosing RAF Croughton at the location for JIAC consolidation. That, to me, is pretty much a slam dunk.

The Chairman. Except for the fact that this committee cannot find any documentation of any work being done on 15 of the 16 sites that you supposedly looked at.

Mr. Work. Sir, all I can say is that three different Secretaries of Defense, five four-star combatant commanders -- one Navy, one Air Force, two Army, one Marine -- two Under Secretaries of Defense for

Intelligence, the current DNI, the current PDNI; we have had three successive AOAs. These AOAs were looked at in an audit by the GAO, and they said that our conclusions were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of making our decision.

So, in my view, we have looked at this three different times. Congress itself has agreed with our finding by funding phase one of the project, and they also approved phase two, subject to my determination and certification that we spoke to earlier.

The Chairman. So you think it is okay that there is no evidence that shows that you ever looked at 15 of the 16 sites.

Mr. Work. Well, I will have to go back and look at all -- it was described by GAO, Mr. Chairman, as the DOD body of evidence. Another finding straight out of the GAO report is DOD has provided the required information in response to committee direction and statutory provisions. So --

The Chairman. Well, we have evidence that a commander's decision brief was done in 2011 where the requirement was an hour outside of London, and we have had people testify to that fact.

After the fact, it just appears like there is no information. So you can do all the studies you want, but if you have people come to this committee and say, "Well, we are not going to give Congress the answers because we don't like the tone of the letter," you delay those answers, I'm sorry, I mean, there is just no evidence here that shows that -- essentially, someone just wanted to go to Croughton back in 2011, and that is the decision that was made then. And everything since

then, there is no documentation to document why that decision was made.

Let me go back to Director Clapper.

On July 27, 2015, I visited you in your office and informed you that a whistleblower had approached the committee, indicating that false information had been provided to the committee regarding the intelligence center. Do you remember that meeting?

Director Clapper. Yes.

The Chairman. In the same meeting and again on March 21 this year, you told Chairman Thornberry, Chairman Frelinghuysen, and myself, if we moved the intelligence center outside of the London suburbs that IC civilians and contractors would not move to the new location.

Can you explain why that is the case?

Director Clapper. No, I don't think I said that, sir. I think what I said was that, based on briefings I had received at JAC Molesworth, the civilians there probably would not move to Lajes. That was the specific reference. But a general statement that they wouldn't go anywhere else, I don't believe I ever said that.

The Chairman. Oh, so they would go other places but not Lajes.

Director Clapper. Well, I don't know. The specific issue that I was briefed on was the reaction to the possibility of a move to Lajes Air Base in the Azores.

The Chairman. And this was a briefing by DOD civilians or contractors?

Director Clapper. No. This was a briefing from the commander

when I visited there sometime -- I am not sure when.

The Chairman. The commander of the --

Director Clapper. The JAC.

The Chairman. -- intelligence center? Of the JAC. Said that the civilians would not move to Lajes?

Director Clapper. Well, yes. You know, these are older people, you know, that have children in schools, particularly high school age. And I don't think -- the reaction to that, to move to an island in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, was not very positive.

And, of course, that has been compounded by the section 414 of the Intelligence Authorization Act taking away their housing allowance, which has a very discriminatory and very negative impact not only on DIA civilians but on IC employees in general.

The Chairman. So it sounds like we are making decisions based on where people want to live.

Director Clapper. No, I -- this whole issue of moving or not was kind of a wash to me. I didn't get involved in it until there was some potential for expense to the National Intelligence Program. And, of course, as I got into this, I discovered the potential morale impacts and the fact that people would probably not take their families to Lajes Air Base in light of the facilities that they knew weren't there.

The Chairman. Are you aware that the Azore islands are a popular vacation spot for people from the U.S. and Europe and have daily flights?

Director Clapper. No, I am not.

The Chairman. Do we have trouble getting people to move to Hawaii?

Director Clapper. Actually, we do, because there are issues there with compensation for the very high cost of living. So that is problematic as well.

The Chairman. Well, the cost of living in the Azores is low, so it doesn't seem to have that problem. I mean, both are vacation spots.

Director Clapper. Are you talking about Hawaii?

The Chairman. Yeah. Last I checked, Hawaii was a popular vacation spot.

Director Clapper. Oh, it is. It is a very popular vacation spot, so you spend a lot of money for a week or two. But living there permanently, supporting a family, that sort of thing -- I have spent two tours in Hawaii, and it is quite expensive.

The Chairman. So the Azores is also a vacation spot, and it has the cheapest cost of living in Western Europe. Why would that not be a place that people would go?

Director Clapper. Well, in Hawaii, there are high schools and there are medical facilities and there are PXs and commissaries, and that is kind of lacking right now at Lajes.

The Chairman. Well, the last I checked, I don't think there is anything lacking there, through the work that we have done at this committee.

I don't know if Mr. Schiff is going to be back or not. Have we heard? Is he on his way back?

Gentlemen, I want to thank you for appearing here today. The committee remains deeply concerned about these issues. We look forward to the IG CENTCOM report and the IG's report on false information and misleading information provided to Congress. Hopefully, the IG can get to the bottom of these problems and help the committee uncover what exactly has happened here.

Our robust oversight will continue the remainder of this year and into the next Congress. But I want to thank all of you for your service and for your attendance here today.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]