



March 25, 2021

The Honorable Michael F. Doyle
Chair, Subcommittee on
Communications and Technology
House Committee on Energy and Commerce
2125 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable Jan Schakowsky
Chair, Subcommittee on
Consumer Protection and Commerce
House Committee on Energy and Commerce
2125 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable Robert E. Latta
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Communications and Technology
House Committee on Energy and Commerce
2125 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Consumer Protection and Commerce
House Committee on Energy and Commerce
2125 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representatives Doyle, Schakowsky, Latta, and Bilirakis:

New America's Open Technology Institute (OTI) appreciates the opportunity to submit a statement for the record for the joint hearing entitled, "Disinformation Nation: Social Media's Role in Promoting Extremism and Misinformation" being held by the Subcommittee on Communications and Technology and the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Commerce. OTI works at the intersection of technology and policy to ensure that every community has equitable access to digital technologies that are open and secure, and their benefits. We support and defend the right to privacy and freedom of expression, and recognize the online and offline harm that misinformation and disinformation surrounding COVID-19¹ and the 2020 presidential election² have disproportionately had on communities of color and already marginalized groups.

With regard to combating misinformation and disinformation, we press internet platforms to provide greater transparency and accountability around their policies, technologies, and actions. In June 2020, OTI released a report which outlines how eight internet platforms responded to the spread of COVID-19 misinformation and disinformation. The report makes recommendations on how internet platforms can provide greater transparency around these efforts, and how policymakers can encourage greater accountability from these platforms.³ Additionally, in order to examine the harmful effects that

¹ J. Jaiswal, C. LoSchiavo, and D.C. Perlman, *Disinformation, Misinformation and Inequality-Driven Mistrust in the Time of COVID-19: Lessons Unlearned from AIDS Denialism*, May 21, 2020
<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7241063/>

² Shannon Bond, *Black and Latino Voters Flooded With Disinformation In Election's Final Days*, October 30, 2020
<https://www.npr.org/2020/10/30/929248146/black-and-latino-voters-flooded-with-disinformation-in-elections-final-days>

³ Spandana Singh and Koustubh "K.J." Bagchi, *How Internet Platforms Are Combating Disinformation and Misinformation in the Age of COVID-19*, June 1, 2020,
<https://www.newamerica.org/oti/reports/how-internet-platforms-are-combating-disinformation-and-misinformation-age-covid-19/>.



misinformation and disinformation had on our electoral processes, OTI released a report that analyzes how ten internet platforms responded to election and voter suppression-related misinformation and disinformation in the run up to the election. The report provides substantive recommendations for how platforms can stem the tide of election misinformation and disinformation.⁴

This past year, we have seen the real world impact of online disinformation and misinformation. Furthermore, organized efforts, including the January 6 attacks on the Capitol, continue to promote distrust in our democratic institutions. It is therefore vital that the public is armed with accurate and reliable information. Misinformation and disinformation have the power to uproot democracy and democratic values, and internet platforms must do more to combat the spread of this harmful content. These companies must also provide greater transparency and accountability around these efforts, in order to ensure that they are safeguarding user rights and acting in the best interest of the public.

Please find attached OTI's reports entitled, "Protecting the Vote" and "How Internet Platforms Are Combating Disinformation and Misinformation in the Age of COVID-19" referenced above. Thank you for your leadership on these issues. We are happy to discuss any of the points raised in this submission further with you or your staff.

Thank you again for the opportunity to submit this statement for the hearing record.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "K. Bagchi".

Koustubh "K.J." Bagchi
Senior Policy Counsel

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Spandana Singh".

Spandana Singh
Policy Analyst

⁴ Spandana Singh and Margerite Blase, *Protecting the Vote*, September 30, 2020
<https://www.newamerica.org/oti/reports/protecting-vote/>



September 2020

Protecting the Vote

How Internet Platforms Are Addressing
Election and Voter Suppression-Related
Misinformation and Disinformation

Spandana Singh & Margerite Blase

Disclaimer

Given that the elections are quickly approaching, the landscape of platform policies and practices is constantly changing. In this report, we have aimed to capture as much accurate and relevant information related to how internet platforms are responding to the spread of election-related misinformation and disinformation as possible up until the date at which we went to press.

About the Author(s)

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About New America

We are dedicated to renewing the promise of America by continuing the quest to realize our nation's highest ideals, honestly confronting the challenges caused by rapid technological and social change, and seizing the opportunities those changes create.

About Open Technology Institute

OTI works at the intersection of technology and policy to ensure that every community has equitable access to digital technology and its benefits. We promote universal access to communications technologies that are both open and secure, using a multidisciplinary approach that brings together advocates, researchers, organizers, and innovators.

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Executive Summary

The 2016 U.S. presidential election demonstrated how internet platforms can be used to spread false and misleading information and suppress voting. This can be done through various means, including through posts and advertisements that spread inaccurate information about dates, locations, and voting procedures, as well as content that threatens or intimidates particular communities, particularly communities of color, into not voting. Our research dives into what several popular internet platforms—Facebook and Instagram, Google, Pinterest, Reddit, Snapchat, TikTok, Twitter, WhatsApp and YouTube—are doing to combat false and misleading election information, including potential voter suppression content around the 2020 U.S. presidential election and beyond. It also lays out recommendations for how platforms and policymakers can better protect the public from such content.

These platforms, and the policies and practices they deploy, can have a strong influence on the strength and nature of democracy and discourse, both in the United States and around the world. As the 2020 U.S. presidential election approaches, and as the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic shapes how and where people vote, strong practices to combat election misinformation and disinformation, including voter suppression material, including voter suppression material, are critical

Key Findings

- Many internet platforms are establishing online hubs to house information related to voter registration, voting processes, and more ahead of the 2020 U.S. election. However, not all of these hubs are easily accessible by users.
- A number of platforms we researched do not house content and advertising policies in one central location and do not have comprehensive policies that outline their approach. This makes it difficult to understand the parameters of these policies, and puts the onus on users and researchers to dig through numerous web pages and documents to figure out how and when these policies apply.
- Platforms are addressing misleading information in political ads in a myriad of ways, from banning political ads completely, to instituting restrictions on political ad targeting and delivery. However, there is no consensus on which approach is optimal, as they all present flaws and limitations.

- There is a discrepancy between the election-related policies that companies are creating and how they are being enforced. Companies fail to provide adequate transparency and accountability around the scope and scale of these policy enforcement and moderation efforts, and where they fall short. This raises some serious concerns around whether these policies and practices are effectively addressing the spread of election-related misinformation and disinformation online.
- Companies are relying on middle-ground moderation and curation efforts, such as labels and downranking, to handle election-related content. However, these policies and practices are applied inconsistently, and there is little transparency and accountability around the policies that guide their use.
- There is a fundamental lack of transparency and accountability around what platforms are doing to handle election misinformation and disinformation online, and if platforms' efforts are effective. Most internet platforms covered in this report publish transparency reports which include some data on the scope and scale of their content moderation efforts. However, only one company publishes data directly related to the moderation of election-related content and very few publish data related to the moderation of misleading information. This information is vital to understand where companies are taking action, what influence these actions are having, and where these efforts are falling short.
- There is contention over whether or not internet platforms should fact-check content and ads on their services. While some internet platforms fact-check user-generated content, fewer fact-check ads. This is concerning because entities and politicians could precisely target specific audiences with potentially false information.
- Some platforms are adopting labels and identity verification standards to provide transparency around which businesses—such as foreign media outlets and advertisers—are sharing information online. These efforts are largely seen as a response to the 2016 U.S. presidential election, where foreign actors used U.S. internet platforms to spread misleading information among U.S. voters without having to disclose their identity or location.
- Publishing an ad transparency library provides insight into the kinds of political ads that are run on a platform, but this practice is not widely adopted (and some platforms have banned political ads completely). In addition, there is a serious lack of quantitative and qualitative transparency around how platforms moderate ads based on their

advertising content policies, and what impact these efforts have on the ads available on their platforms.

- Algorithmic curation and amplification processes can significantly boost or undermine the reach of a piece of content or an ad. Some companies have recalibrated their algorithmic ranking and recommendation systems to prevent the amplification of election-related misinformation and disinformation. However, there is still a significant lack of transparency around how these tools are trained and used, what impact these disclosed changes have had on the spread of misleading and false election information, and how or if humans are kept in the loop.

Recommendations

Going forward, internet platforms and policymakers should consider the following set of recommendations prior to the 2020 U.S. presidential election as well as in the long-term to address future elections. The section below includes an excerpt of our recommendations on how companies can improve their efforts to connect users to, and lift up, authoritative information; address the spread of misleading information through content moderation and curation; tackle misleading ads; and provide meaningful transparency and accountability around these efforts. This section also includes recommendations for how U.S. policymakers can encourage greater accountability and integrity from internet platforms, although they are limited in the extent to which they can direct how internet platforms decide what content to permit on their sites.

Recommendations for Internet Platforms

Sharing and Lifting Up Authoritative Information and Empowering Informed User Decision-Making

- Partner with reputable fact-checking organizations and entities, as well as local and state election bodies to verify or refute information circulated through organic content and ads.
- Notify users who have engaged with misleading election-related content and direct them to authoritative sources of information.
- Institute a public interest exception policy that permits companies to leave content posted by world leaders, candidates for political office, and other government officials on their services, even if the content has been fact-checked and contains misleading information. In instances where the company determines that the content posted by officials could result in

imminent harm, this public interest exception policy should not be applied and the content should be removed.

- Conduct regular impact assessments and audits of algorithmic curation tools (e.g. ranking and recommendation systems), and recalibrate them as necessary so they do not direct users to or surface misleading content when they search for election-related topics and do not algorithmically amplify such content in trending topics and recommendations.
- Label organic content and ads that have been produced by state-controlled media outlets to inform users of the content's origins.

Moderating and Curating Misleading Information

- Create a comprehensive set of content policies to address the spread of election-related misinformation and disinformation with specific considerations for voter-suppressive content. Companies should house these policies in one location, provide public notice if their policies change, and include an archive of past policies.
- Companies should clarify to what extent election-related policies interface with content policies related to hate speech, deepfakes, bots, coordinated inauthentic behavior, etc. While manipulated media may be a part of user expression on social media and therefore permissible for user-generated content, platforms should consider banning the use of such manipulation technologies for political advertising.
- Institute a dedicated reporting feature which enables users to flag election-related misinformation and disinformation to the company.
- Remove, reduce the spread of, or label content that has been fact-checked and deemed to contain election-related misinformation.

Tackling Misleading Advertising

- Create and implement comprehensive policies for the content and targeting of ads that prohibit election-related misinformation and disinformation in ads. The policies should include specific considerations for voter-suppressive ad content and should clarify to what extent these policies interface with advertising policies related to hate speech, bots, deepfakes, etc.
- Establish a comprehensive review process for election-related ads and ad targeting categories. Companies should require all election-related ads to

be fact-checked and reviewed by a human reviewer before they are permitted to run on a platform. Companies should publicly disclose high-level information on what this review process consists of and to what extent it relies on automated tools and human reviewers.

- Create a comprehensive vetting process for advertisers which requires them to verify their identity and which country they are based in before running ads.
- Append “paid for” disclosures to all paid political, social, and issue ads and ensure labels are maintained even if ad campaigns end or if ads are organically shared online.
- Create policies that prevent users and entities from being able to monetize and advertise on the platform if they repeatedly spread misinformation and disinformation.

Provide Meaningful Transparency and Accountability

- Explain to users how and to what extent content that is flagged for violating election-related misinformation and disinformation policies is reviewed, moderated, and curated by human reviewers and by automated tools. Users should be notified of any significant updates to these processes.
- Preserve data on election-related content and advertising removals. Vetted researchers should have access to this data so they can identify where these content and advertising moderation policies and practices fell short and make recommendations on how they can be improved.
- Publish data related to the moderation, curation, and labeling of election-related misinformation and disinformation in their regular transparency reports.
- Create a publicly available online database of all ads in categories related to elections and social and political issues that a company has run on its platform.
- Publish data on the company’s election-related ad content and targeting policy enforcement efforts.

Recommendations for Policymakers

- Policymakers should enact rules to require greater transparency from online platforms, including regular reporting regarding their content moderation, curation, labeling, and ad targeting and delivery efforts.
- Authoritative election authorities such as the Federal Elections Commission (FEC), state election boards, and other state and local authorities should partner with internet platforms to provide and promote verified and legitimate information related to the election on their platforms. These entities should also help debunk misleading claims and information using their own online accounts.
- Policymakers should clarify that the Voting Rights Act, which prohibits suppressing voting through intimidation, applies in the digital environment. Further, Congress should amend the Act or pass new legislation to prohibit suppression of voting through deception, which is the primary means of vote suppression online.

Introduction

Following the 2016 U.S. presidential election, internet platforms have come under increased scrutiny for how they handle the spread of misinformation and disinformation on their services. Since that election, numerous researchers have found evidence that social media platforms served as hotbeds for the spread of election-related misleading content, including content designed to suppress voting. These efforts fanned existing societal tensions around race and socioeconomics, and they disproportionately impacted communities of color and other marginalized groups. For example, during the 2016 elections, Russian operatives fraudulently posed as Black Americans to actively dissuade the Black community from voting.¹

Social media platforms can and have been used to spread false information and suppress voting in a number of ways. These include posts and advertisements that spread inaccurate information about dates, locations, and voting procedures, as well as content that threatens or intimidates particular communities into not voting. These types of content can undermine trust in the electoral process and discourage voters from participating at all.

Since 2016, internet platforms have instituted a range of policies and practices that seek to identify and curb the spread of election-related misinformation and disinformation. However, experts and users have little confidence in the efficacy of these measures.² According to a 2018 national survey conducted by the Brookings Institution, 57 percent of those surveyed felt that they had seen fake news or misleading information during the 2018 U.S. midterm elections, and 19 percent believed that this information had influenced how they planned to vote.³ In addition, a January 2020 Pew Research Center study found that just 25 percent of U.S. adults felt confident that tech companies would be able to prevent the misuse of their platforms during the upcoming elections. This was a decrease from 33 percent prior to the 2018 midterm elections.⁴

As the 2020 U.S. presidential election draws near, experts are concerned that social media platforms will be used by both foreign and domestic actors to suppress votes and spread misleading information.⁵ In particular, many experts fear that because individuals are relying more on digital resources to learn about voting procedures and policies, they will be especially susceptible to misinformation and disinformation.⁶ In addition, watchdog organizations have also expressed concerns that these platforms will be used to suppress voting by exploiting users' fears around COVID-19 in order to encourage them to avoid polling places, which could particularly affect participation among older voters.⁷ Further, there are also concerns that entities seeking to suppress voting could use the ongoing protests related to racial justice in the United States to push out messaging that voters from certain communities should protest racial injustice by

not participating in the electoral process.⁸ Thus far, internet platforms have responded to concerns of election and voting-related misinformation and disinformation in a number of ways. Major tech companies, including Facebook, Google, Pinterest, Reddit, and Twitter have announced that they plan to meet regularly with each other and government agencies to discuss ongoing trends and ways to protect information around the 2020 election.⁹ Many platforms have created new policies or expanded existing ones to cover these categories of content, as well as related forms of content that could impact elections such as hate speech, fake accounts, and inauthentic behavior. In addition, many internet platforms have begun examining the role political advertising can play in fostering a false information ecosystem on their services. Some companies, such as Amazon and Twitter, have banned political advertising altogether. Other platforms, such as Google and Snapchat, have instead introduced guidelines for political ads. However, there is still a significant lack of transparency and accountability around how these platforms are creating and implementing these policies, sparking concerns that these policies are not being implemented consistently and are ineffective. In addition, this has also raised concerns that platforms may be prioritizing profit over the safeguarding of user rights and the electoral process.¹⁰ Internet platforms, used by millions of people in the United States every day, have assumed a central role as gatekeepers of speech in society. Given that there are no clear laws that address the spread of election-related misinformation and disinformation online, these platforms are also the de facto “legislative, judicial, and executive branches” in terms of preventing online voter suppression.¹¹ As a result, these platforms, and the policies and practices they deploy, can have a strong influence and impact on the strength and nature of democracy and discourse, both in the United States and around the world.

This report will provide an overview of how various internet platforms are addressing the rapid spread of election-related misinformation and disinformation, and particularly content that promotes voter suppression. The report concludes by offering recommendations on how platforms can improve the efficacy of their efforts and provide greater transparency for their users and the public. The report also includes recommendations on how U.S. policymakers can encourage further accountability and support efforts to combat the spread of misinformation and disinformation around voting.

Editorial disclosure: This report discusses policies by Facebook (including Instagram and WhatsApp) and Google (including YouTube), both of which are funders of work at New America, but neither of which contributed funds directly to the research or writing of this report. New America is guided by the principles of full transparency, independence, and accessibility in all its activities and partnerships. New America does not engage in research or educational activities directed or influenced in any way by financial supporters. View our full list of donors at www.newamerica.org/our-funding.

Amazon

Amazon is one of the most popular online platforms in the United States, with an average of 200 million unique visitors per month.¹² The platform has also played an important role during the COVID-19 pandemic as more consumers rely on online shopping.¹³ Between January and March of 2020, the company made \$75.5 billion in revenue, a 26 percent increase over the prior year's first quarter. Amazon, an e-commerce and advertising platform, can be a source of misleading information and voter suppression content through both its products and advertisements. Amazon sells products, such as t-shirts, books, and other merchandise that are related to politics, voting, and the election. The platform does not place specific requirements on these types of products. Rather, it utilizes the same general rules that apply to all of Amazon's products, which includes acting "fairly and honestly on Amazon to ensure a safe buying and selling experience."¹⁴ However, there is little transparency around how these policies are enforced or whether the company takes any steps to address voter suppression content within its e-commerce operations.

In 2018, Amazon accrued over \$10 billion in revenue from its advertising platform, making it the third-largest ad platform in the United States behind Facebook and Google.¹⁵ To help avoid the issue of voter and election misinformation, Amazon banned political ads. The platform's policy prohibits ad campaigns that are for or against a politician or political party or that are related to an election or political issue.¹⁶ Still, it is unclear how the platform intends to enforce this policy. An Amazon representative speaking with CNBC at the beginning of this year stated that Amazon uses automated tools and review teams to monitor and remove policy-violating ads.¹⁷ However, CNBC claims that it was able to easily locate ads for political products sold on Amazon, including "Talk Bernie to Me Sanders 2020" and "Trump 2020 The Sequel Make Liberals Cry Again" t-shirts. Going forward, Amazon should clarify whether its policy prohibiting political ads pertains to products sold on the platform that promote a particular candidate or party. The company should also share information around how it enforces its political ads ban, including information on how its automated review tools and moderation teams are trained and deployed to moderate political advertisements, and how effective these approaches are.

Furthermore, Amazon owns Alexa, an automated home assistant and cloud-based voice service that is available on millions of devices. Alexa can function as a search engine for voting and election information, such as the latest polling information or a candidate's stance on a certain topic.¹⁸ In order to stay up-to-date on general election and voting information, such as when voting polls are open, Alexa pulls information in from authoritative sources including Associated Press, Ballotpedia, RealClearPolitics, and Factba.se.¹⁹ However, Alexa is often unable to provide more contextual and regulatory information, such as whether

voting machines are going to be used in a certain area or whether a specific jurisdiction requires a voter ID.²⁰ According to Amazon, it decided to focus on areas where the platform sees the most amount of customer interest and need.²¹ However, because Alexa promotes itself as a service where individuals can obtain election and voting information, the platform should expand its efforts to connect users with more relevant, contextual, and accurate information related to the elections.

While Amazon has disclosed some of the information sources Alexa uses for voting and election information, the company has not publicly published information outlining how it addresses election-related misinformation, and it is unclear how, or if, the company vets the information it receives from its sources for accuracy. Going forward, the company should provide greater transparency on its policies for misinformation and disinformation on Alexa and whether it takes any steps to fact-check the information Alexa shares with its users.

Furthermore, Amazon should provide greater clarity on its advertising policies for Alexa. Advertising is generally not allowed on Alexa except for a few exceptions, such as promotional offers or deals in response to specific requests from customers.²² It is unclear whether Alexa has political advertising-specific policies and whether Amazon's ban on political advertising on its platform applies to Alexa as well.

Amazon receives millions of monthly unique users and is therefore at risk of playing a significant role in spreading misinformation. As elections occur across the country, the company should provide greater transparency and accountability around its policies and practices related to misinformation and disinformation across all of its products. In addition, the company should provide greater transparency around its ad policy enforcement efforts, especially as they relate to political ads. This should include information around how Amazon uses automated and human review components to enforce its ad policies, how effective these policies are, and how many policy-violating political ads the company has removed after erroneously permitting them to run on the service.

Facebook/Instagram

Facebook is the largest social media platform in the world, with over 2.4 billion active users.²³

Since the 2016 U.S. presidential election, numerous researchers concluded that Facebook was a prominent site for election-related misinformation and disinformation, including voter suppression content. Since then, Facebook has taken steps to improve its policies and practices related to elections and misleading information. Facebook has also adopted many similar policies and practices for Instagram, a photo and video sharing social media platform that it owns. As a result, this section also outlines some efforts implemented by Instagram to combat election and voter suppression misinformation and disinformation.

Prior to the 2018 U.S. midterm elections, the company expanded its policies addressing voter suppression and intimidation to explicitly ban misrepresentation of the dates, locations, times and ways that voting or voter registration can take place; misleading information about who is qualified to vote, whether a vote will be counted, and other parts of the voter process; and threats of violence related to voting, voter registration, or the outcome of an election.²⁴ According to Facebook, the company removes content in these categories regardless of who posted it.²⁵ The company also said that prior to the midterm elections its Elections Operations Center removed over 45,000 pieces of content that violated these policies, out of which 90 percent was proactively detected by Facebook's automated systems.²⁶ Further, in a June 2020 blog post, Zuckerberg stated that Facebook will remove any misleading claims that aim to discourage voting, and noted that politicians will be subject to these policies as well.²⁷

Facebook also introduced a reporting feature which enables users to flag potentially incorrect voting information. Additionally, the company established dedicated reporting channels that state election authorities can use to flag potentially false voting information as well.²⁸ Further, Facebook has established partnerships with over 30 voting rights and election protection groups, enabling these groups to monitor and flag election-related content that potentially violates the platforms' content policies for review.²⁹ In September 2020, the company announced that it would expand its partnership with state election authorities to address misleading information about polling conditions.

Facebook's Election Operations Center, which is responsible for enforcing voter and election-related policies, will be specifically tasked with addressing false claims about polling conditions. Facebook initially aimed to focus the Center's work on addressing misleading information about polling conditions on the 72 hours prior to election day,³⁰ when content volumes and flags are typically higher.

³¹ However, Facebook began instituting these efforts in September in response to the large number of early voters expected due to COVID-19.³²

Facebook partners with independent third-party fact-checking organizations such as the Associated Press, Reuters Fact Check, and PolitiFact to review content on the platform that is suspected to be misleading.³³ Once these fact-checking partners have debunked a piece of content, Facebook reduces the distribution, or downrank, this content in the Facebook News Feed. Facebook may also apply a warning label to the debunked content.³⁴ Facebook appends labels to photos and videos, as well as Instagram Stories,³⁵ with the intent of allowing users to decide whether or not they'd like to view the content. Each label contains a link to the fact-checkers' evaluation of the content at hand.³⁶ Facebook may also feature "Related Articles" written by fact-checkers alongside debunked content in order to add context to the debunked post.³⁷ When a user tries to share this debunked content on either Facebook or Instagram, they see a pop-up warning them that the content has been proven to be inaccurate.³⁸ Further, if Pages, domains, and Groups repeatedly post misleading content on the service, Facebook down ranks them and restricts Page owners from advertising and monetizing.³⁹ On Instagram, this content, as well as content posted by accounts that continuously share misleading information, is omitted from the Explore and hashtag pages.⁴⁰ Coordinated inauthentic behaviors and campaigns were a hallmark of the disinformation campaigns which sought to suppress voting and sow discord during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. As a result, the company has also updated its policies and practices in this regard. In particular, Facebook updated its policy regarding inauthentic behavior to better explain how the company responds to foreign, domestic, state, and non-state led deceptive efforts.⁴¹ Further, in order to prevent Page owners from masking their identity, Facebook requires that all Pages, including those that are election-focused, have a confirmed Page owner and provide verified information such as the organization's legal name and its website, among other things.⁴² Advertising also played a prominent role in spreading misleading information during the 2016 presidential election. As a result, Facebook introduced a series of metrics and features to provide greater transparency around its advertising operations. First, the company introduced a tracker which enables users to see how much money U.S. presidential candidates have spent on ads. This ad spending information can be broken down at the state or regional level to demonstrate what specific geographies candidates are focusing their ad spend on. The company is also making efforts to clarify whether an ad ran on Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, or on Facebook's Audience Network.⁴³ Facebook Audience Network allows advertisers to extend their Facebook and Instagram campaigns across the internet.⁴⁴ The company also introduced new features including API filters that allow journalists, researchers, and others to access and download ad creatives as well as a collection of frequently used API scripts.⁴⁵ Further, the company instituted new rules which require advertisers to assign a verified Page Owner to

their pages in order for them to run issue, electoral, or political ads in the United States.⁴⁶

Now, closer to the 2020 presidential election, Facebook has instituted additional policies and procedures that aim to tackle the spread of election and voter-suppression related misinformation and disinformation. This includes the launch of the Voting Information Center in August 2020, which has been dubbed “the largest voting information effort in U.S. history.” Through the Center, Facebook aims to increase participation in the election by helping 4 million Americans register to vote across the Facebook, Instagram, and Messenger products⁴⁷ and also seeks to promote accurate and authoritative information about elections in order to counter misinformation and disinformation.⁴⁸ The Center includes guidance on how to register to vote and how to vote (including information on both mail and in-person voting), as well as election results.⁴⁹ The Center is also a hub for updates from local election authorities regarding any changes to the voting process. The information in the Center is drawn from state election officials and other nonpartisan civic organizations.⁵⁰ However critics have expressed concerns that the Center is difficult to locate on the platform, as it requires users to navigate multiple drop-down menus.⁵¹ In September 2020, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg announced that the company will place information from the Center at the top of Facebook and Instagram in the days running up to the election.⁵²

In addition, in order to provide greater transparency around what governments and other entities are behind news posts on Facebook and Instagram, Facebook has instituted a labeling policy for media outlets that are partially or entirely state-controlled.⁵³ This is particularly important given the role foreign governments played in pushing content labeled as news during the 2016 presidential election. Facebook also said it would begin labeling ads from such publishers later in 2020, although a concrete launch date has not been announced.⁵⁴ Advocates and experts have raised concerns, however, about whether the effectiveness of these labeling efforts will be undermined by a failure to implement them consistently.⁵⁵ In response to growing concerns that Facebook’s advertising platform can and likely will be used to promote election-related disinformation including voter suppression content, the platform is permitting users to opt-out of all social issue, electoral, and political ads across all Facebook products.⁵⁶ Users who choose to view political ads will be able to see who paid for these ads even after they have been shared by other users.⁵⁷ However, this approach falls short in several ways. First, this new policy puts the onus on users to explicitly opt-out of viewing political ads. Further, the policy does not address pre-existing concerns around Facebook’s flawed advertising policies and policy enforcement process,⁵⁸ especially concerns that the company does not fact-check political ads. Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg has long argued that no social media company, including Facebook, should be the arbiter of truth.⁵⁹ As a result, he has pushed back on calls for the company to remove

false claims, particularly those made by politicians, on the platform.⁶⁰ While Facebook should not be the arbiter of truth, it can and should do more to ensure it is not amplifying and enabling the spread of harmful misinformation and disinformation on its platform. One way of doing this could be by fact-checking political ads and subsequently notifying users when content in political ads has been debunked.⁶¹ Finally, this new policy does not address broader concerns related to access to microtargeting tools, which enable advertisers to precisely target users based on a range of personal data points, and can be used to target specific groups of users with misleading information.⁶²

In September 2020, Facebook also announced that it would ban new political advertisements on the platform during the week preceding the November 3 election.⁶³ Campaigns can, however, continue to promote ads that they placed on or before October 27, as long as the ads were viewed by at least one Facebook user.⁶⁴ Although this policy change prevents new advertisements from being introduced immediately prior to the election, it does not address growing concerns that the company does not fact-check content in its advertisements. As a result, false information can still circulate through ads as long as they are posted on or before October 27.⁶⁵

In addition, Facebook said that since 2016, the company has tripled its workforce that focuses on “security and safety issues” and is responsible in part for content moderation on the platform.⁶⁶ The company has also stated that it uses machine-learning to rapidly identify and remove inaccurate voting information, and that these efforts have become more effective over time.⁶⁷ Due to the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic, Facebook, and many other internet platforms, had to adjust its content moderation operations as its content moderator workforce could not initially work remotely.⁶⁸ As a result, Facebook relies more heavily on automated tools to detect and flag certain categories of content. Although Facebook has since been able to readjust its content moderation operations to an extent, the company warned that users should expect more mistakes.⁶⁹ Given that a significant amount of election-related content moderation is occurring during the pandemic, Facebook should preserve data related to election-related content removals during this period so that researchers can evaluate these efforts later on.⁷⁰ This is a good best practice in general, as it allows researchers to assess where moderation efforts fell short and can be improved.

There is currently little transparency around how the company enforces its voter suppression and election-related content policies. In Facebook’s Community Standards Enforcement Report (CSER), the company outlines how it enforces some of its content policies, and how often it receives and takes actions based on appeals. However, the CSER does not include any data related to the enforcement of misinformation or voter suppression-related policies and related appeals. The report includes data on categories of content that could intersect with the company’s election-related misinformation policies, such as fake

accounts and hate speech. However, this data is not sufficient to fully understand the nature of election and voter suppression-related misinformation and disinformation on the platform.⁷¹ In addition, there is little transparency around how Facebook's machine-learning and automated tools are trained, refined, and used, and how effective they are.⁷²

Further, currently, content that users report to the platform as voter interference is not immediately sent for review by human review teams. Rather these flags are considered “user feedback” and are used to evaluate aggregate trends. If Facebook receives a large volume of user reports for a piece of content, then that content will be reviewed by its policy and operational teams. According to Facebook, the company relies on this process because during the 2018 midterm elections, a low number of user reports of voter interference involved content that actually violated the platform's policies. The majority of flagged content instead were posts that expressed differing political opinions from the flagger. Instead, Facebook said that during the midterm elections, over 90 percent of the content it removed for violating its voter suppression policy was detected proactively using its automated tools.

However, both online efforts to suppress voting and Facebook's voter suppression policies have changed since 2018, and civil rights experts have raised concerns around whether Facebook should subsequently change its moderation practices to route user-flagged content for human review. In addition, if Facebook does not review content, users cannot appeal moderation decisions. The decision to not review user flags for voter interference therefore denies users a right to appeal and redress.⁷³

In July 2020, Facebook introduced a new election-related labeling policy in response to push back from a range of organizations, including those who led the #StopHateForProfit campaign,⁷⁴ who argued that Facebook does little to address misinformation and hate speech in its content moderation and advertising practices.⁷⁵ The new policy allows Facebook to append “Get Voting Information” labels⁷⁶ to content that mentions voting to provide users with relevant information about the voting process.⁷⁷ However, although Zuckerberg stated this policy will also apply to politicians, researchers have expressed concerns that the labels will not be applied consistently and that they will fail to have a meaningful impact.⁷⁸ These concerns have been underscored by the fact that Facebook seems to be appending these labels to posts that refer in any way to voting, rather than posts that are inaccurate or misleading. For example, the company not only attached a “Get Voting Information” label to a July 21 post by President Trump which states mail-in ballots would result in the “most CORRUPT ELECTION” in the history of the United States⁷⁹ but also to a straightforward post by Kimberly Klacik, a Congressional candidate for Maryland's District 7, which states “Please vote KIM KLACIK on November 3rd. We are getting all of our ducks in a row. On Day 1 you will see you made a great

choice.”⁸⁰ Civil rights groups are concerned that Facebook’s decision to apply a label to any voting-related post, regardless of the content, creates no distinction between accurate and misleading content. Additionally, these groups have stated that the use of such broad labeling procedures could reduce the company’s sense of urgency around removing false election-related information, since the content will have a label directing users to the Voting Information Center.⁸¹ In addition, some watchdog groups have pressed the company to go one step further than labeling content and notify users who have viewed or engaged with misleading election-content while on the platform.⁸²

The platform also shared it would broaden its existing prohibition⁸³ on posting content that misleads individuals on how they can vote. As a result, claims such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents will be reviewing immigration papers at polling stations or individualized threats of voter interference would be banned on the platform.⁸⁴ These updated policies also ban threats of coordinated interference that could intimidate or discourage individuals from voting.⁸⁵ Facebook has also said that when posts aim to delegitimize the outcome of the election or undermine the legitimacy of voting methods, the company will add information labels to these posts that include links to authoritative information.⁸⁶

Further, Zuckerberg announced that politicians will be subject to all these new policies, although if there is public interest or newsworthy value in some of the content, it will be left up and labeled.⁸⁷ This sparked concern given recent events where political figures spread misleading content about the election process⁸⁸ that some experts say amounts to voter suppression.⁸⁹ Going forward, when companies deem there is a public interest value in leaving such content up, any labels that they use should provide sufficient contextual information that explains the content is misleading and is being left up for awareness purposes. The company should also create a central policy that guides such cases, rather than use a disparate series of ad hoc statements and policies to make these determinations. In September 2020, the company also updated its policies to prohibit using the COVID-19 pandemic to discourage voting in both content and advertising. The company also stated it would include a link to authoritative information around COVID-19 in such posts.⁹⁰

In 2018, Facebook committed to participating in an independent civil rights audit of the impact of its policies and practices on communities of color and other underrepresented groups.⁹¹ The final civil rights audit report, released in July 2020, outlined how Facebook has broadened its voter suppression and intimidation policies over the past two years to cover a more expansive set of threats and scenarios. However, the report also stated that in order for these policies to be effective, the company needs to interpret them in a more comprehensive and consistent manner.⁹² The overall audit outlined that the company’s lack of a strong civil rights foundation has resulted in numerous

concerning outcomes, including the creation of opaque policies and practices related to elections and voting-related content, as well as the inconsistent and incomplete enforcement of these policies. By contrast, the platform responded more proactively and aggressively to the rapid spread of COVID-19 misinformation and disinformation. Some have suggested that this shows that when Facebook is committed to addressing a category of harmful misinformation, it has greater capabilities than it has demonstrated in the context of election-related misinformation.⁹³ In furtherance of a commitment made by Facebook in the civil rights audit report released in June 2019,⁹⁴ the company implemented a new policy banning paid ads that state that voting is meaningless or discourages people from voting.

Google

Google, one of the world's largest technology companies, sees roughly 3.5 billion searches per day.⁹⁶ As the 2020 election approaches, people are likely going to increase their voting and election-related searches online, and it will be critical for Google to combat misleading information to ensure that its users can successfully participate in the electoral process.⁹⁷

Google does not have content guidelines or restrictions for the websites that appear within its search engine. According to Google, its goal is to identify relevant information on the web based on users' queries, not to decide whether the material is "in some sense wrongful."⁹⁸ However, due to recent concerns around election misinformation, Google announced on September 10, 2020 that it updated its search function to no longer suggest autocomplete search phrases for users looking up information on candidates or voting.⁹⁹ Searches for informational claims on a candidate, how to cast a ballot, or the legitimacy of the electoral process will need to be typed out fully. The search engine will still suggest phrases for questions around voting or the election, i.e. how to vote, but it will not autocomplete claims about voting or the election, i.e. you can not vote by mail. Google stated that it made this change to help prevent bad information from appearing in autocomplete suggested phrases.¹⁰⁰

Apart from its search function, Google places requirements on advertising that runs on its platforms. According to Google's ad policies, all ads must be "clear and honest, and provide the information that users need to make informed decisions."¹⁰¹ The company prohibits ads that deceive users by including misleading information about products, services, or businesses. This includes the use of false claims or "deceptively doctoring media related to politics, social issues, or matters of public concern."¹⁰² As of September 2020, Google's misrepresentation policy for ads also prohibits accounts from coordinating with other sites or accounts to conceal or misrepresent their identities or other material details if the content of the account relates to politics, social issues, or matters of public concern.¹⁰³ Although these general policies can help Google combat election and voting-related misinformation in advertising, the company does not have policies that specifically address ads aimed at suppressing voting. To ensure that these types of ads would not be allowed to run on its platform, Google's policies should be updated to specifically address voter suppression content as well as election-related misinformation, especially leading up to the 2020 election.

Google states that accounts that violate its updated misrepresentation policy will be suspended "upon detection and without prior warning" and will not be allowed to advertise on Google's platform in the future.¹⁰⁴ It is unclear if Google's standard appeals process for advertisers would apply to these accounts.

Typically, if an advertiser feels that their ad was unfairly removed, they can appeal the decision directly in Google Ads, Google's online advertising platform, by hovering over a disapproved or limited ad and clicking on an "appeal" link.¹⁰⁵

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Google reduced its moderation and review workforce capacity because the number of people going into offices decreased and some content moderation tasks dealing with sensitive customer data or graphic content must be done onsite for security and wellness purposes.¹⁰⁶ The company warned that this may result in more content moderation mistakes as well as slower appeals review processes.¹⁰⁷ Given that a significant amount of election-related content moderation is occurring during the pandemic, Google should preserve data related to election-related content removals during this period so that researchers can evaluate these efforts later on. Additionally, the company should ensure that users and advertisers have access to a robust and timely appeals process. It is important for the company to remove *misleading* ads, but accurate voting and election-related ads on Google can be beneficial to encourage active participation and keep users informed, and advertisers who have their ads erroneously flagged should have the opportunity to appeal these decisions.

Google's general ad targeting and delivery practices have raised concerns in the past for infringing on users' privacy and for generating discriminatory outcomes.¹⁰⁸ In an effort to increase accountability for political ads and help combat misleading information on the platform, Google updated its political ad policies in November 2019.¹⁰⁹ Under Google's updated policies, political ads must "comply with local legal requirements, including campaign and election laws for any geographic areas they target."¹¹⁰ This covers any ad that is for a political organization, political party, political advocacy or fundraising event, or any ad pertaining to an individual candidate or politician.¹¹¹

While Google claims that it has never allowed "granular microtargeting" for election ads, under the new policies, election-related campaigns have additional targeting limitations compared to non-election campaigns.¹¹² For example, election ads may only target users based on geographic location (i.e. state or zip code), age, gender, or contextual targeting such as by topic or keywords against sites. Election ads may not utilize Google's other advertising options such as remarketing, customer matches, geographic radius targeting, or third-party audiences. Limitations on microtargeting and other granular targeting, like radius targeting, are important because these techniques can be used to divide the public into very small groups,¹¹³ allowing misinformation or misleading content to avoid scrutiny from the broader public and spread more easily.¹¹⁴ While having a ban on geographic radius targeting can have a positive impact on ad visibility, Google does allow political advertisers to target their ads based on other geographic information, including zip code. Zip code targeting can be problematic when it comes to ads for housing, employment, and credit

opportunities, because zip codes can be used as a proxy for race.¹¹⁵ While zip code targeting could be beneficial for election related ads on local elections or for a presidential candidate attempting to increase their visibility in a certain region, it is worth examining whether advertisers have been able to use zip code targeting to promote voter suppression tactics for the presidential election.¹¹⁶

Along with targeting restrictions, Google requires identity verification for advertisers running federal or state election ads.¹¹⁷ There is a specific U.S. election ads verification form that requires an organization or individual to provide a Google Ads Customer ID and email.¹¹⁸ Google reviews the application and provides an email notification within three to five business days. If the platform discovers that an account has violated election-related advertising policies or provided false information during the verification process, the account's verification is revoked. Political ads are also required to have an in-ad disclosure that displays the name of the party or individual paying. For most ad formats, the "paid for by" disclosure is automatically generated from the account's information. Otherwise, it is the advertiser's responsibility to add the disclosure.¹¹⁹

Google publishes a transparency report to keep the public informed about political advertising on Google, YouTube, and partner properties.¹²⁰ The report includes information such as the number and the amount of money spent on political ads since May 31, 2018, top advertisers by total ad spend, and ad spend by state. It also allows people to view or search for ads. Although these data points are a good starting point, the report does not break down certain information, such as ad type (i.e. search versus display), or provide granular details such as the type or amount of policy-violating ads that have been removed. In addition, the report only includes ads that feature a "current officeholder or candidate for an elected federal or state office, federal or state political party, or state ballot measure, initiative, or proposition that qualifies for the ballot in a state." As a result, the report does not provide a comprehensive overview of all political ads that are run on the platform, and it creates a significant gap in terms of which ads are available for public scrutiny.¹²¹ In addition, Google does not currently publish a comprehensive transparency report outlining its content policy enforcement for its web search product (it does publish one for YouTube).¹²² Going forward, the company should expand its transparency reporting efforts to include information on policy-violating content, and ensure that the report includes data on the enforcement of its election-related misinformation and disinformation policies. Further, in the run up to 2020 elections, the company should provide periodic updates on the enforcement of its election-related misinformation content policies and ad policies, including how much user content and how many accounts have been removed, and how many ads have been rejected and removed for violating election-specific policies or supporting voter suppression. Following the 2020 presidential election, the company should issue a comprehensive transparency

report detailing its moderation efforts that includes data on voter suppression and election related content.

Outside of advertising, Google also offers Google News, an aggregator that helps connect users to different news and media outlets.¹²³ The platform utilizes an algorithm to determine how news is ranked, which relies on factors such as relevance of content, prominence, location, and language.¹²⁴ Google does not accept payments to expedite or increase a site's visibility within the news aggregator.¹²⁵ To appear in Google News, a publisher does not need to submit their site for approval, they simply need to "produce high-quality content and comply with Google News content policies."¹²⁶ However, it is unclear how Google decides what type of content qualifies as high-quality. Under Google News' community policies for publishing partners, content may not contain deceptive practices or attempt to mislead users.¹²⁷ The platform also does not allow sites or accounts to impersonate any person or organization or misrepresent their primary purpose. However, Google News' policies do not specifically address election or voter suppression content.¹²⁸ Apart from providing information on how its algorithm ranks news sources, Google News should clarify how it first selects which news sources to include. The platform should also clarify if it takes steps to monitor the news sources for potential voter suppression and election misinformation content.

According to Google, in order to combat the spread of misinformation on its platforms, its Trust and Safety and Threat Analysis Group (TAG) teams monitor and combat inauthentic activity, disinformation campaigns, and other forms of abuse across Google's platforms on a 24/7 basis.¹²⁹ Google utilizes Jigsaw, a unit within the company that forecasts and fights against emerging threats, to help combat harassment and misinformation across a variety of topics, including voting and election information.¹³⁰ Google explains that Jigsaw's technology enables "deepfake" detection, therefore allowing the company to protect user accounts and campaigns that are targets of hacks or phishing attacks.¹³¹ Additionally, Google works with other technology companies and government agencies, such as the FBI's Foreign Influence Task Force, to help combat harmful interference online.¹³²

While Google has taken steps to combat voter and election related misinformation, the measures have not always proven effective. According to a Tech Transparency Project (TTP) analysis, Google failed to remove ads linking to websites that charged fees, in some cases fees up to \$129, to register to vote, although eligible voters can typically register directly with their states or territories for free.¹³³ From the analysis, it is unclear whether Google failed to remove these ads because they were overlooked or because they did not explicitly violate Google's policies. These types of ads can suppress voting because people may not be able to afford the supposed registration fees, or may not be willing to pay to register to vote. Also, if online users looking for

information about the election are sent to confusing websites or feel they are being manipulated, they may give up on trying to find important voting-related information. Furthermore, users may be directed to websites that are trying to extract personal information or receive fraudulent donations, which can have negative repercussions beyond voter suppression.

On August 13, Google released a blog post with additional steps they are taking to combat misinformation around the 2020 U.S. election.¹³⁴ The platform released two new features in Google Search that allow users to search for detailed information on how to register and when to vote by state, by searching “how to vote.” Google collects this information from Democracy Works, a third-party non-partisan organization that collects data directly from state and county election administrators.¹³⁵ The post also states that Google is reaffirming its investment in the company’s TAG and Trust and Safety teams, which are assigned to work together to prevent government-backed attacks and phishing campaigns on Google users. TAG tracks over 270 targeted or government-backed groups from over 50 countries, whose goals include “intelligence collection, stealing intellectual property, targeting dissidents and activists, destructive cyber attacks, or spreading coordinated disinformation.”¹³⁶ Google, along with other major tech companies including Facebook, Pinterest, Reddit, and Twitter, also participates in meetings with government agencies that are responsible for election integrity to discuss trends in the spread of misinformation.

While Google has been vocal about taking measures to combat voter and election-related misinformation and disinformation, the company should go further in providing transparency around how effective these efforts have been. For example, the company should include statistics in its transparency report on how many ads have been removed for violating ad policies and on how many government-backed attacks it stopped leading up to the 2020 election.

Pinterest

Pinterest, an image sharing and social media platform, allows users to discover new ideas or projects and share their own content with other users. As of 2019, the platform has more than 200 billion “pins” and more than 320 million monthly active users.¹³⁷ Given Pinterest’s role in allowing users to share and discover new ideas across a wide variety of topics, it could play an important role in elections and other forms of civic engagement. The company recently joined a cohort of other major tech companies, including Facebook, Google, and Twitter, and government agencies to discuss ongoing trends in deceptive online behavior and ways to combat misinformation.¹³⁸ In order to help avoid issues with voter misinformation and disinformation on its platform, Pinterest has banned all political advertising.¹³⁹ The platform’s ad policy does not allow advertising for:

- The election or defeat of political candidates running for public office, including fundraising for political candidates or parties
- Political parties or action committees
- Political issues with the intent to influence an election
- Legislation, including referendums or ballot initiatives
- Merchandise related to political candidates, parties, or elections

However, similar to other platforms that have banned political advertising, like Amazon, it is unclear how Pinterest enforces these policies on political ads. The platform does not provide details around the advertising approval process and whether potential ads are reviewed and approved by human-led teams or whether the platform utilizes algorithms.

Along with banning political advertising, Pinterest’s general Community Guidelines state that the platform is not a place for “misinformation, disinformation, mal-information or the individuals or groups spreading or creating it.”¹⁴⁰ The platform states that it removes any content it deems to fall into these categories. Under its misinformation section, Pinterest explicitly prohibits “false or misleading content that impedes an election’s integrity or an individual’s or group’s civic participation, including registering to vote.”¹⁴¹ Users can report content they believe violates Pinterest’s policies, and the platform states that it uses these reports to learn and improve its standards. The platform ensures that content meets its Community Guidelines through automated processes and human review,¹⁴² but it does not clarify if the company plans to use its standard review process for this or if it will take additional steps to combat

voter misinformation.¹⁴³ Given that there is little transparency around these review processes, going forward Pinterest should clarify what type of automated processes it has in place, how its tools are trained, updated, and used, and how effective they are. Further, in a January 2020 blog post Pinterest stated “we’ll take down content that misleads people about where, when or how to vote.” The company also shared that for accounts that have been suspended due to a single or repeat violation, the account owner will receive a suspension notice when they try to log in to Pinterest. There is a form on the platform’s website that allows users to appeal their suspension, but the guidelines do not provide a timeline for how long the review process can be.¹⁴⁴ A timely and robust appeals process is a vital method of remedy and redress for users. Going forward, the company should ensure users have access to such a process and provide clarity around the timeline for these processes.

While Pinterest has taken some steps to combat misinformation and disinformation, it should be more transparent on how they are actively combating voting and election misinformation. For example, the platform should share what steps it is taking to detect and remove voting-related ads or voting-related misinformation on users’ Pinterest accounts. For other areas of misinformation, such as anti-vaccination content, Pinterest has been more vocal about its efforts, which include conducting internal content moderation sweeps and utilizing automated tools to block URLs that frequently share anti-vaccination content.¹⁴⁵ Pinterest should confirm if they utilize similar steps for voting and election-related misinformation.

Currently, Pinterest’s annual transparency report only includes information on U.S. law enforcement requests for user information, such as the number of subpoenas or court orders the platform receives. The company currently does not provide data on its own content moderation efforts for ads or user-generated content. This lack of transparency makes it difficult to gauge the scope of misinformation on the platform and what potential impacts it may have on voter suppression. In order to increase visibility and accountability, Pinterest should expand its transparency reporting practices to include comprehensive content policy enforcement data. The report should include data related to the enforcement of misinformation and voter suppression-related policies and related appeals.

Reddit

Reddit is a popular social media platform that dubs itself “the front page of the internet.” Although the platform has a small user base (approximately 330 million monthly active users)¹⁴⁶ compared to platforms such as Facebook and YouTube, it is recognized as one of the online services on which viral content is frequently created and spread.¹⁴⁷ A significant amount of the conversation around the spread of misinformation and disinformation during the 2016 U.S. presidential election focused on larger internet platforms. However, research indicates that Reddit also played an instrumental role in this false information ecosystem.¹⁴⁸ The platform has not been a focal point of ongoing policy conversations, potentially because only approximately 4 percent of Americans use Reddit, and the majority of its users are U.S.-based.¹⁴⁹

Despite this lack of attention, Reddit’s unique format fosters an environment in which misinformation and disinformation related to voter suppression can easily spread. Reddit relies on a decentralized model of content moderation, in which the majority of content policy development and subsequent content moderation is carried out by volunteer user moderators, colloquially referred to as “Mods,” who are responsible for specific subreddits. Reddit has high-level content guidelines for the service, which are enforced by a team of employee moderators, known as Admins.¹⁵⁰ This approach to content moderation has allowed for niche, localized communities and norms to prosper on the platform. However, these individualized approaches have also enabled misinformation and disinformation to spread among subreddits.¹⁵¹ As a result, some of the most well-known conspiracy theories and misinformation-laden stories, such as the 2016 Pizzagate conspiracy¹⁵² and the QAnon conspiracy theory,¹⁵³ have gone viral on the platform. Reddit is also home to misleading election-related information which seeks to suppress voting. Reddit, however, does not have specific policies that cover voter suppression content, although the company says that its existing policies, such as those on impersonation, could cover such content.¹⁵⁴ These policies, introduced in January 2020, prohibit the impersonation of an individual or entity “in a misleading or deceptive manner.” The policy applies to instances including when a Reddit account is being used to impersonate someone, when a domain is being used to mimic others, and when deepfakes or other manipulated media are used to mislead users or are misleadingly attributed to an entity or person. Deepfake technology allows for the creation of falsified and manipulated content that could be used to spread misinformation by making it appear as if an individual is doing or saying something they did not actually do.¹⁵⁵ Reddit’s policy creates exceptions for parody and satire, and the company says it will take context into consideration when applying the policy.¹⁵⁶

According to Reddit, the company introduced its policy on impersonation to protect against elements that the platform had not yet seen numerous instances

of, but could in the future.¹⁵⁷ According to the company's latest transparency report, impersonation accounted for 0.6 percent of content removed and 1.4 percent of accounts removed or suspended by Admins for content policy violations.¹⁵⁸ Reddit says it could also use these policies in certain instances to clamp down on misinformation campaigns. In 2018, the company said it identified 944 "suspicious accounts" it associated with the Internet Research Agency (IRA),¹⁵⁹ a Russian-backed professional troll-farm and online influence operations company that has carried out campaigns to support Russian business and political aims.¹⁶⁰ Expert analysis after the 2016 U.S. presidential election found that the IRA was responsible for numerous voter suppression campaigns on social media platforms, including Reddit, which targeted Hillary Clinton voters, particularly voters of color.¹⁶¹

Although Reddit utilizes a more decentralized approach to content moderation, the company takes a more active role in moderating advertising on the platform. This includes steps to address the potential spread of misleading content related to voter suppression and elections in its advertising. The company bans "deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising" on the platform, including in political ads. Additionally, Reddit manually reviews and approves the messaging and creative content of each ad that is run on the platform. Reddit's political ads policies apply generally to ads that relate to campaigns or elections, solicit political donations, encourage voting or voter registration, and issue or advocacy ads that relate to topics of legislative or political importance, among other things. The company only permits ads from candidates and advertisers who are inside the United States, and who are running ads at the federal level. The company also explicitly states that discouraging voting or voter registration through its advertising services is prohibited.¹⁶² Further, Reddit says that all political ads must feature "paid for by" disclosures within the ads themselves, must be in alignment with all relevant laws and regulations, and must align with Reddit's content policies.¹⁶³

In order to provide transparency around its political ads operations and enforcement mechanisms, Reddit launched a subreddit dedicated to political ads that the company itself moderates. The subreddit includes data on all political ad campaigns that ran on the platform after January 1, 2019, as well as data on individual advertisers, their targeting selections, the impressions ads receive, and instances in which Reddit mistakenly approves ads.¹⁶⁴ This data on advertisements, as well as Reddit's errors during the enforcement process, is valuable for understanding how the company enforces its policies and how these practices shape the political ads landscape on the platform, as well as the misleading information ecosystem within it. Going forward, the platform should share further granular engagement data, such as the number of upvotes, downvotes, and comments political ads receive.¹⁶⁵ Reddit has responded to misinformation and disinformation on its platform by introducing "misinformation" as a category that Mods can choose to flag posts and

comments under. This reporting flow surfaces this content to Admins.¹⁶⁶ According to the platform, misinformation can be understood as “malicious and coordinated attempts to spread false information,” as well as users inadvertently spreading false information.¹⁶⁷ In the context of COVID-19 related misinformation and disinformation, Reddit says that unless a subreddit is specifically dedicated to spreading misleading information, the company will always aim to educate and cooperate with subreddits to address these forms of content, and will only use enforcement actions such as banning subreddits or “quarantining” if these cooperative efforts fail. When a community is quarantined, it does not appear in search results. Additionally, if a user tries to visit the quarantined community, they will be notified that the subreddit may contain misleading content, and they must explicitly opt in to viewing the content.¹⁶⁸ However, it is unclear whether the same policies apply in the context of other categories of misinformation and disinformation.¹⁶⁹ Along these lines, the company is also monitoring for content manipulation efforts, particularly ahead of the 2020 U.S. presidential election. One of the most common avenues for content manipulation on the platform takes advantage of the content voting system. On Reddit, users can rate each piece of content by “upvoting” or “downvoting” it. Reddit’s algorithms use these votes to assign each post a score and rank them in the news feed.¹⁷⁰ In this way, some of the content on the platform is community-curated and trends often emerge as a result of this democratic process. However, as experts have outlined, this system can be gamed by users who create several accounts to downvote or upvote a post, by coordinated attacks on certain forms of content,¹⁷¹ and through the use of existing features on Reddit such as “gilding” which is similar to a “super-vote” and is a mechanism that is generally available to users who have a Gold Reddit subscription or who purchase Reddit coins.¹⁷² In alignment with the company’s desires to better understand and track content manipulation efforts on the platform, the company shared some public information about the kinds of coordinated influence campaigns they have detected, such as one led by a Russian-connected group known as Secondary Infektion on the r/redditsecurity subreddit.¹⁷³ This is a valuable form of transparency that enables users to comment and ask questions about how these types of content are spreading on the platform and what the company is doing to address these issues. Further, the company began issuing a security report in Q4 of 2019 that focuses on efforts to keep the platform and user accounts safe, and includes content manipulation related data such as the number of reports, Admin removals, Admin account sanctions, and Admin subreddit sanctions. Prior to introducing its new hate speech policy, the company also expanded the data in the June 2020 report to include figures related to Admin account sanctions and Admin subreddit sanctions for abuse.¹⁷⁴ In addition, the company outlined in its security report that it is working on detecting bots on the platform and providing clear guidance around the use of bots. These policies will aim to address the use of malicious bots that can spread spam and abusive content at scale, manipulate the

amplification of content on the service by gaming the voting system, and more. These policies will not look to prohibit bots such as those used by Mods for content moderation purposes.¹⁷⁵ Although Reddit has a relatively comprehensive set of policies and transparency practices to address the spread of potential voter suppression misinformation and disinformation on its platform, the company can do more. In particular, given that the platform was an active hotspot for the spread of voter suppression content during the 2016 elections, the company should expand its content policies to explicitly address the voter suppression content, as it has done in its ads policy. Reddit's existing policies, including its impersonation policy, and its new hate speech policy, could address these issues. However, the lack of one central policy that lays out the company's stance and practices around this form of content could result in gaps and prove extremely problematic ahead of the 2020 elections. To this end, the company should also provide greater transparency around how much content has been removed under a new centralized policy through its transparency report. The company should also alert users who have come into contact with election-related misinformation and disinformation campaigns, particularly content that aims to suppress voting, and the company should clarify what the legitimate parameters around voting and voter registration are. Finally, given that content moderation efforts do not always yield entirely accurate results, the company should notify affected users with information related to the policies they violated, and provide them with the opportunity to appeal the decision.

Snapchat

Snapchat, a multimedia messaging app owned by Snap Inc., saw roughly 210 million daily active users in Q3 2019; active Snapchat users opened the app up to 30 times per day.¹⁷⁶

Snapchat's main service is allowing users to upload photos and video messages that disappear after they have been viewed. The platform has affirmatively sought to engage in the electoral process through both its advertising services and user offerings. In 2018, for example, the app displayed a link to register to vote on the profile page of every user who was 18 years old or older, and allowed users to register directly within the app through a service called TurboVote.¹⁷⁷ This helped register over 400,000 voters, 57 percent of which were later confirmed to have cast a ballot, demonstrating the influence Snapchat can have when it comes to elections.¹⁷⁸ On August 6, 2020, Snapchat also announced it was planning to release new features in the coming months to encourage users to register to vote in the 2020 Presidential election.¹⁷⁹ These features include a voter checklist card as well as voter-related "Minis," which are miniature applications made by third-parties that run inside Snapchat.¹⁸⁰ The platform is planning to release a "Before You Vote" mini that lets users know where and how to vote and whether voting by mail is available in their state.¹⁸¹ These digital avenues for voter registration are particularly important in the run-up to the 2020 presidential election, as the COVID-19 pandemic has made it harder for people to register to vote in person at libraries or at local DMV offices. As a result, more people may be likely to rely on online platforms to register and participate in the election process.¹⁸²

Snap Inc.'s CEO Evan Spiegel has stated that the platform fact-checks all ads from political candidates and about the voting process and does not allow misinformation in these types of ads.¹⁸³ Spiegel explained that Snapchat wants to allow political advertising to encourage users, particularly young people and first-time voters, to engage in the political process.¹⁸⁴ Under its advertising policies, Snapchat prohibits ads that "are false or misleading, including deceptive claims, offers, functionality, or business practices" within its content guidelines.¹⁸⁵

In addition, as per Snapchat's political and advocacy advertising policies,¹⁸⁶ political ads must adhere to all applicable laws and regulations, including national election, copyright, and defamation laws, as well as (where applicable) Federal Election Commission (FEC) regulations.¹⁸⁷ The policies state that it is the responsibility of the advertiser to comply with all laws and regulations.¹⁸⁸ It is therefore unclear if Snapchat itself takes steps to ensure ads are compliant with state and federal laws. Furthermore, political ads must include a "paid for by" disclaimer that contains the name of the paying person or entity.¹⁸⁹ This applies to any ad with political messaging or any ad that links to political content.

Election related ads must also state whether or not an ad was authorized by a candidate or an organization.¹⁹⁰ If the ad is not paid for by the candidate, it must include contact information for the sponsoring organization. While Snapchat's general ad policies ban harassment or threats, the platform does not explicitly ban attack ads, (ads that express disagreement with candidates or political parties), as long as they do not violate any other guidelines.¹⁹¹ Snapchat does not currently provide information on what tools and processes it uses to review and approve ads. Going forward, the company should confirm to what extent it uses automated tools and human reviewers to review and approve ads and how these tools and individuals are trained.

Currently, Snapchat maintains a Political and Advocacy Ads Library to provide transparency around political advertising on Snapchat.¹⁹² The library includes information, such as the amount of ad spend and the identity of paying entities, on all political and advocacy advertising that has run on the platform from 2018 to 2020, and it is updated daily. Although this report is a helpful first step towards providing transparency around political advertising on the service, the reports are not readily accessible, as ad information must be downloaded from the website and viewed in Excel. Going forward, the platform should improve the user-friendliness and accessibility of the report by creating a web version of the report. The company should also expand the report to include information such as how many ads were removed for violating Snap's policies, particularly around voting and election misinformation.

When it comes to user-generated content, Snap prohibits hateful content, violent content, impersonation, spam, and illegal speech and activity.¹⁹³ The platform does not explicitly prohibit political or election-related misinformation—or any categories of misinformation—from standard users (i.e. non media partners), and has no restrictions on false or misleading content that may support voter suppression. The platform should expand its guidelines and clarify what type of political content is permitted on the service, and how, or if, it intends to address election and voter suppression misinformation. In addition, Snapchat's Community Guidelines state that, in certain cases, the platform “won't take action against content when it is newsworthy and relates to a matter of political, social, or other general concern to our community.”¹⁹⁴ It is unclear in what circumstances this policy would be applied, and whether it could potentially apply to political content broadly, as this content could be of general public interest.

Snapchat's Community Guidelines also have additional requirements for media partners, whose content is displayed in the Discover feed. Snapchat's Discover section is a space for publishers, like the New York Times, BuzzFeed, and Mashable, to post stories. These media partner-specific guidelines are not applicable to standard users, and they are similar to Snap's advertising policies in that they require that content is fact-checked and accurate.¹⁹⁵ Because Snapchat partners with these accounts and actively promotes their content, it is an

important step that there are additional requirements on these accounts. However, Snap should provide greater transparency around how they review these accounts and ensure that their content is accurate and fact-checked.

If Snapchat does, or plans to, prohibit voter and election related misinformation in user-generated content, the platform should ensure that it provides adequate notice to parties who have had their content removed for violating the platform's policies. The company should also allow these parties to access a robust and timely appeals process. The Community Guidelines state that Snapchat reviews reports of policy-violating content, and if an account violates the company's policies Snapchat "may remove the offending content, terminate the account, and/or notify law enforcement."¹⁹⁶ The Community Guidelines also state that if an account is terminated for violating Snapchat's content policies, the account holder may not use Snapchat again. However, it is unclear if the company currently offers users an appeals process and the Community Guidelines do not outline what steps a user can take if they feel their content was removed in error.

Unlike other platforms like Facebook and Twitter, Snap has not taken an active stance against deepfake videos.¹⁹⁷ While manipulated media such as deepfakes can exacerbate voter suppression by misleading users on election or candidate information, there is likely less risk that user-generated images manipulated with Snapchat's filters (and that disappear after viewing) will be a source of election misinformation. However, there is still a risk that political advertising on the platform could utilize its technology to create misleading deepfake videos. , Therefore, the company should develop explicit guidelines for this type of technology around political advertising. Snapchat's "paid for by" policy for political ads is one way users can understand who is creating certain videos and decide if they trust its content . However, the platform should go further in providing transparency around the allowed or restricted uses of deepfakes technology in political ads.¹⁹⁸

TikTok

TikTok is a relatively new internet platform compared to platforms such as YouTube and Facebook.¹⁹⁹ However, over the past several years the company has seen rapid growth around the world, with approximately 800 million active users globally today.²⁰⁰ The company's popularity makes its platform a focal point for misleading information. Further, experts have expressed concerns that it could particularly become home to election-related misinformation and disinformation, including voter suppression-related content, given that the company is nascent and has less robust content moderation practices.²⁰¹

In January 2020, in response to concerns that the platforms' rapid growth had not been met with tandem efforts to create responsive policies that safeguard users,²⁰² TikTok released a more comprehensive version of its Community Guidelines.²⁰³ These updated policies include a section on misleading information which states "we do not permit misinformation that could cause harm to our community or the larger public." This policy includes a prohibition on content that is meant "to incite fear, hate, or prejudice," "hoaxes, phishing attempts, or manipulated content meant to cause harm," content that misleads users "about elections or other civic processes," and "content distributed by disinformation campaigns."²⁰⁴ Under the company's integrity and authenticity content policies, it also bans spam-related activity, including "coordinated attempts to manufacture inauthentic activity" and operating accounts under false pretenses.²⁰⁵ In August 2020, TikTok broadened and clarified its Community Guidelines to address the spread of misinformation, disinformation, and related content that seeks to undermine the 2020 elections. As part of these efforts, the company updated its general policy on misleading content to include a clear prohibition on manipulated media such as deepfakes.²⁰⁶ In addition, the company clarified that it does not permit coordinated inauthentic behavior.²⁰⁷ Although these policies can apply to election-related content, the Community Guidelines do not include specific voter suppression-related content policies. In an August 2020 announcement, TikTok stated that it was expanding its partnerships with fact-checking organizations, such as PolitiFact and Lead Stories, to help review content and identify and debunk misleading election-related information. Further, the company shared that it would soon introduce an in-app feature permitting users to report content or accounts for election misinformation. The company will also establish an election information center to connect users to authoritative information surrounding the 2020 elections.²⁰⁸

TikTok's mission is "to inspire creativity and bring joy." According to the company, politics is not a topic that it views as bringing joy to its users. As a result, the company has actively discouraged the use of its services for political means. To this end, in 2019, the company banned political advertising.²⁰⁹ The ban prohibits any paid advertising that references, promotes, or opposes a

political candidate, current or former elected official, or political party or group. The ban also includes any content that advocates for a particular position on a local, state, or federal issue of public relevance that could influence political outcomes.²¹⁰ It is unclear how effective policy enforcement around political advertising is, however, as the company does not share any data related to enforcement of its political ads policy.

Some research indicates that the company has discouraged political content by suppressing its promotion and recommendation during election periods.²¹¹ The company states it does not remove political content, although it has not explicitly addressed the topic of algorithmic amplification and suppression.²¹² Although TikTok says it does not view politics and political content as creating joy for its users, and it therefore has instituted a political ads ban, some experts suggest the real reason for the ban is that the company is a small and nascent one that lacks the capacity to moderate and engage with such content in a scalable manner.²¹³ However, the majority of TikTok users in the United States are between the ages of 18 and 24,²¹⁴ and as a result, avoiding politics has been challenging given that this demographic often uses social media to engage in social and political discussions.²¹⁵ In addition, 70 percent of TikTok users are of voting age. TikTok videos with political content have been found to generate a significant amount of traffic on the platform.²¹⁶ In addition, despite the prohibition on paid political advertising, politicians and political groups have partnered with TikTok influencers to promote their ideas and gain popularity.²¹⁷ For example, progressive nonprofit ACRONYM has worked with influencers to encourage voter registration. Similarly, a Trump campaign manager stated he is exploring solidifying deals with TikTok influencers.²¹⁸

TikTok has also introduced a range of programs which could help address the spread of voter suppression misinformation and disinformation on its service. For example, in March 2020, the company established the TikTok Content Advisory Council, a group of external technology and safety experts tasked with providing the company guidance on its content moderation policies, including its misinformation and hate speech related policies. Further, in July 2020, the company introduced a media literacy and safety video series titled “Be Informed,” which features popular creators on the platform encouraging users to be cognizant of the spread of false information on the service. The video includes guidance on how users can evaluate content and sources on the platform, use in-app features to protect against the spread of misleading content, and recognize facts versus opinions.²¹⁹ According to senior officials from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), TikTok has an open line of communication and collaboration with DHS to combat election-related disinformation.²²⁰ However, TikTok is owned by a Chinese company called ByteDance; as a result, the expectations and outcomes surrounding this arrangement may be different. This is compounded by the fact that TikTok is under heavy scrutiny from U.S. lawmakers for its ties with China,

²²¹ prompting many U.S. agencies and branches of the armed forces to ban the use of the app on employee phones, citing national security concerns.²²² Most recently, President Trump called for a ban on the app.²²³ It is difficult to assess how these factors might impact the effectiveness of a collaboration between TikTok and CISA.

TikTok needs to implement clearer and more direct policies to address voter suppression misinformation and disinformation. In addition, the company should provide greater transparency and accountability around how it enforces these policies. In its July 2020 transparency report, which for the first time featured data on how the company enforces its own Community Guidelines, the platform states that less than 1 percent of content actioned violated the company's policies on hate speech, integrity and authenticity, and dangerous individuals and organizations. The majority of content the company actioned violated its policies on adult nudity and sexual activities, minor safety, and illegal activities and regulated goods. The company does not, however, include data related to misinformation, although the transparency report does state that the company often proactively removes harmful misinformation.²²⁴ This lack of transparency makes it difficult to understand the scope of voter suppression or election-related misinformation and disinformation on the platform, and how the company addresses these forms of content. Transparency around the effectiveness of the company's enforcement actions is also important, as despite the company's ban on disinformation campaigns, researchers have found examples of disinformation related to topics such as the COVID-19 pandemic circulating on the service.²²⁵ Similar transparency is needed around the enforcement of the company's political ads policies. The company also should outline what kinds of enforcement actions it takes against misleading content, and provide disaggregated data which outlines how often the company removes such content compared to how often the company employs another enforcement action such as algorithmically downranking content or appending a label to such content.

Twitter

Twitter is a microblogging and social media platform that has approximately 152 million daily active users.²²⁶ Twitter became a focal point of conversations on misleading information and the electoral process following the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

According to Twitter's civic integrity policy, individuals "may not use Twitter's services for the purpose of manipulating or interfering in elections or other civic processes. This includes posting or sharing content that may suppress participation or misleading people about when, where, or how to participate in a civic process."²²⁷ The company defines civic processes as "events or procedures mandated, organized, and conducted by the governing and/or electoral body of a country, state, region, district, or municipality to address a matter of common concern through public participation."²²⁸ For example, in September 2020, the company took action against a Tweet posted by Democratic House candidate Elizabeth Hernandez, which suggested that Republicans should vote on November 4, for violating its rules against voter suppression. Twitter required the campaign account to remove the Tweet, which Hernandez' team said was posted as a joke, before it could regain access to its account.²²⁹ Under its civic integrity policy, Twitter prohibits three categories of manipulative content and actions:

1. Misleading information about how an individual can participate in an election or civic process: This category includes the posting or promotion of misleading information about when a civic process such as an election is taking place as well as misleading information on how to participate, such as false claims that individuals can vote by Tweet or text messages.²³⁰
2. Content that aims to suppress, intimidate, or discourage individuals from participating in an election or other civic process: This category includes false claims that polling places are closed or experiencing equipment problems, misleading claims about law enforcement activity related to voting in an election, misleading statements related to process procedures which could discourage voting, and threats related to voting locations.²³¹ Twitter's violent threats policy is also applicable to instances of violent threats that are not covered by the civic integrity policy.²³²
3. False or misleading affiliations: This category prohibits the creation of fake accounts which misrepresent their affiliation or share and promote content that misrepresents an affiliation with a candidate, elected official, government entity, and so on.²³³

In September 2020, Twitter announced that it is updating its civic integrity policy to allow the company to label or remove false or misleading information that aims to undermine public confidence in an election or other civic processes. This policy change will apply to content that creates confusion around the laws related to a civic process, shares unverified claims related to election rigging and other procedures that could undermine faith in the civic process, or promotes misleading claims that call for interference in or that relate to the results of civic process.²³⁴ The company clarified that the civic integrity policy does not apply to inaccurate statements about an elected or appointed official; election or political-related content that is polarizing, controversial, or hyper partisan in nature; and high-level statements about the integrity of civic processes.²³⁵ In addition, if an elected or appointed official shares content that violates this policy but has a public interest value, the company may leave the content up under its public interest notice policy (discussed further below).²³⁶ Twitter's civic integrity policy also includes information on when and how users can report content they believe violates this policy. Reporting is available to users in relevant jurisdictions prior to the first officially-sanctioned event associated with major civic processes, and users can report content both via the Twitter app and desktop website.²³⁷ In addition, Twitter works with several government and civil society partners around the world who flag policy-violating content and receive expedited review on their flags.²³⁸ Further, the civic integrity policy details that consequences for violations vary depending on the nature of the violation and the user's history with the platform. In situations where a user violates the civic integrity policy for the first time, the platform blocks the user's ability to publish new tweets and mandates that the user deletes the violating tweet or content from their profile before they can regain full access. If a user violates the policy again after receiving an initial warning, their account will be permanently suspended. The company offers users whose accounts have been flagged for violating the policy access to an appeals process, although it is unclear whether this also applies to tweets.²³⁹ In August 2020, the company announced it is expanding its misinformation policies related to mail-in ballots and early voting.²⁴⁰

As the 2020 U.S. presidential election draws near, Twitter is under a significant amount of pressure to improve its efforts to detect and curb the spread of election-related misinformation and disinformation, particularly voter suppression-related content, and to connect users with reliable information on voting. In September 2020, Twitter debuted its election hub by adding a "US Elections" tab in the Explore menu on the platform. The hub will feature Twitter-selected election-related news in English and Spanish, debate live streams, state-related voting information and resources, and candidate information. Twitter has stated that the hub will also include public service announcements that aim to inform voters about important election-related topics such as voter registration, how to obtain a mail-in ballot, and guidance for safe voting during the pandemic.²⁴¹ The company has also banned deepfakes²⁴² and in January 2020, a few days before the Iowa caucuses, Twitter permitted users in the United States to report

misleading content related to the elections as well as instances of voter intimidation or suppression.²⁴³

According to Twitter, it designed the reporting tool to empower users in the United States to flag content that could harm the electoral process. However, experts have raised concerns that the tool could be abused by trolls seeking to attack candidates or undermine individuals they disagree with. In addition, there is little transparency around how effective this tool is. It was originally rolled out in India,²⁴⁴ during the general elections in April 2019, and in the European Union ahead of its May 2019 elections, but Twitter has not released information about whether the tool curbed the spread of voter suppressive-related misinformation and disinformation.²⁴⁵ Although Twitter publishes a transparency report which outlines how it enforces its content policies, the company only recently included data on how it enforces its civic integrity policy in the report.²⁴⁶ Currently, the report includes data on the unique number of accounts reported and actioned and the amount of content actioned for hateful conduct, impersonation, and violent threats.²⁴⁷ However, the metrics and data offered in the report do not provide any specific election-related data, and the data provided is not granular enough to understand the scope and scale of voter suppression-related misinformation and disinformation on the service, and how Twitter aims to combat such content.²⁴⁸ In addition, Twitter has continuously been criticized for inconsistently enforcing its policies.²⁴⁹ This raises further questions around whether Twitter's civic integrity policy and this new reporting tool will have any positive impact on preventing voter suppression on the platform.

Twitter has also tried to address the spread of election and voter suppression misinformation and disinformation in advertising. In August 2019, the company banned all advertising from state-backed media.²⁵⁰ The company defines state-controlled media as entities that are financially or editorially controlled by a state. It does not include entities that receive some taxpayer funding but are otherwise independent—such as independent public broadcasters—in this definition. The company worked with academic and civil society leaders to curate its list of state-controlled media organizations.²⁵¹ In addition, in October 2019, the company banned political ads on the platform.²⁵² Further, Twitter introduced ad targeting limitations to prevent targeting of cause-based ads using an individual's age, race, or location.²⁵³ However, there is little transparency around how this ban and the limitations on cause-based ads are being enforced, and how effective these enforcement mechanisms have been to-date. In June 2019, Twitter introduced a public interest notice policy. The policy details that in certain instances in which a government official, individual who is running for public office, individual who is being considered for a government position, or user who is verified or has over 100,000 followers violates the company's policies, the company may leave the content up as it believes the content has a public interest value, but will append a notice over the tweet. The notice, which appears over these tweets in both the news feed and search results, informs users

the content has been deemed as violating, details which of the content policies it violated, and explains that the tweet has been left up because it has a public interest value. However, Twitter removes content that features direct threats of violence or calls to commit violence against an individual.²⁵⁴

The company has deployed these public interest notices in numerous instances. For example, in May 2020, President Donald Trump and his campaign shared unsubstantiated content that claimed vote-by-mail programs are efforts to commit voter fraud. The company responded by fact-checking the tweets and appending a warning label to two of President Trump's tweets that featured false claims related to mail-in voting. The notices also included a link where users could learn more about mail-in ballots.²⁵⁵ However, Twitter has not taken action on similar content, sparking concerns among civil society and civil rights groups that these policies are not applied consistently or transparently,²⁵⁶ which can undermine their effectiveness.²⁵⁷

In August 2020, the company also announced it will label Twitter accounts belonging to senior government officials and entities (e.g. foreign ministers, institutional entities, diplomatic leaders, etc.) and accounts belonging to state-affiliated media entities as well as their editors-in chief and their senior staff, from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States).²⁵⁸ The labels will contain information such as "Russia state-affiliated media" to provide greater transparency around who is sharing content on the platform. Twitter will not apply these labels to heads of states' personal accounts. Twitter also announced that state-affiliated media accounts and their Tweets will no longer be amplified through the platform's recommendation systems. This will impact their visibility on the home timeline, in notifications, and in search.²⁵⁹ Users who click on these new labels on account pages will be redirected to an article which explains this new policy²⁶⁰ as well as to the Twitter Transparency Report to provide further information.²⁶¹

Going forward, the company should provide greater transparency and accountability around how it uses methods such as labels to address voter suppression-related misinformation and disinformation on the platform. The company could do this by publishing data on how many times it has used such labels for different categories of content and different types of officials or entities in its transparency report. This is particularly important given that advocates have expressed concerns that such labeling processes could be ineffective if they are implemented inconsistently or are not implemented in a comprehensive manner.²⁶² Although the platform can still improve its efforts to prevent the spread of voter suppression-related content on its service, its efforts are notable compared to other similar platforms such as Facebook, who have taken a more hands-off approach on these issues.

On July 21, 2020, Twitter announced a range of enforcement actions against accounts related to far-right conspiracy group QAnon, one of the entities identified as responsible for promoting misinformation in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and promoting voter suppression.²⁶³ These enforcement actions include preventing QAnon-related content and accounts from appearing in the algorithmically-curated trending topics and recommendations, preventing QAnon-related links from being shared on the platform, and attempting to prevent the algorithmic amplification of QAnon-related content in search and conversation threads. These are important efforts to prevent the spread of voter suppression-related misinformation and disinformation on the platform. However, as mentioned above, in order for the impact of these efforts to be quantified, the company should provide greater transparency around the effectiveness and results of these enforcement actions.

Twitter should also expand its transparency reporting to include data related to misinformation, disinformation, and voter suppression, as well as data outlining how effective their enforcement of their political ads policies are. In addition, the company should also provide greater transparency around how users' news feeds and recommendations are algorithmically curated, and how this could result in the promotion of related misleading information. Users should also have access to controls that allow them to determine whether and how their data is used to enable these algorithmic curation processes, and to institute preferences around the types of content users see online.²⁶⁴ Finally, the company should preserve data related to election-related content removals and provide researchers with access to this data following elections so they can assess where the company's moderation policies fell short.

WhatsApp

WhatsApp is the world's largest messaging app, with over 2 billion users across the globe.²⁶⁵

The company is owned by Facebook and it offers end-to-end encrypted messaging services. Because WhatsApp offers encrypted messaging services, which are critical for privacy and security, the company is not able to view or review the content that users share. As a result, the company has adopted other approaches to address the spread of misleading information. This includes identifying indicators of problematic content at large, introducing mechanisms to limit the spread of content, and introducing features that enable users to fact check content that they receive.

Generally, WhatsApp aims to reduce the virality of misleading information on the service. In particular, in April 2020, the company instituted a new policy limiting the number of times a forwarded message can be shared to five. If a message has already been forwarded five times, the receiving user can only share it to other chats one at a time.²⁶⁶ According to Facebook, this approach has proven effective at preventing the spread of misinformation in many different countries and locations across the world, especially during elections. As a result, in September 2020, Facebook introduced similar forwarding limits on Facebook Messenger, requiring users to forward messages one at a time.²⁶⁷

The company also began labeling messages that are forwarded five or more times with a double arrow to indicate that they were not written by the sender.²⁶⁸ Further, the platform has a feature enabling users to prevent unknown numbers and contacts from communicating with them and adding them to groups through the app.²⁶⁹ WhatsApp also recently piloted a feature that allows users to upload forwarded messages into their browser to see if online sources support the information in the message. Users can access this feature without having to reveal the message to WhatsApp, thus maintaining their privacy and security. They can also use this feature to fact-check information in the messages they receive.²⁷⁰ Some researchers also suggest that the company institute features enabling device-side hashing and comparison of images against a pre-distributed on-device hash list of known disinformation images.²⁷¹ However, such an approach would not be consistent with offering fully end-to-end encrypted messaging services, and could undermine the privacy and security benefits that strong encryption provides. It would also raise some freedom of expression concerns in that it involves screening user content before it is uploaded and shared.²⁷²

In the context of the upcoming U.S. presidential election, WhatsApp is partnering with the International Fact-Checking Network and its member fact-checking

organizations to establish WhatsApp tip lines. These fact-checking organizations can use these tip lines to engage with users around misleading content and debunk and verify content. During elections around the world, WhatsApp accounts are often used to distribute messages at scale.²⁷³ This can result in the rapid spread of election and voter suppression misinformation and disinformation. As a result, the company works to identify and remove accounts that engage in automated or spam-like behaviors, which do not reflect the behaviors of human users.²⁷⁴ To do this, WhatsApp developed machine-learning systems to detect suspicious accounts at multiple stages of the product use cycle, including registration, during messaging, and in response to user feedback such as user reports and blocks. These systems then calculate a spam score for the accounts in question based on a range of indicators,²⁷⁵ and subsequently ban accounts that are found to be engaging in automated or spam-like behaviors.²⁷⁶ According to the company, it removes over two million accounts through this process every month, and over 75 percent of these removals take place without a user report flagging an account in the first place.²⁷⁷ However, aside from these figures there is little transparency around the scope and scale of these moderation efforts. The company offers users the right to appeal these decisions, and has a team of reviewers who manage these appeal requests.²⁷⁸ This is important given that appeals are a vital mechanism for providing accountability and redress, and given that these enforcement actions are largely taking place in an opaque setting. Going forward, the platform should publish data explaining these enforcement actions, and where possible break down this data by potential relevance to the elections.

YouTube

YouTube, one of Google's subsidiaries, is the most popular video platform in the market with approximately 2 billion users worldwide.²⁷⁹ YouTube is a major source of online information and advertising, and is poised to play a substantial role in the 2020 presidential election. Similar to other online platforms, YouTube has received scrutiny for potential election misinformation and disinformation, including voter suppression content, on its site.²⁸⁰ YouTube follows the same policies for ads and political content as Google, which ban misleading information in general. YouTube also maintains its own Community Guidelines that include policies that prohibit false or misleading content.²⁸¹

Under its Community Guidelines, YouTube prohibits content that contains “spam, scams, or other deceptive practices.”²⁸² The policies specifically call out voter suppression content by prohibiting content “aiming to mislead voters about the time, place, means or eligibility requirements for voting.”²⁸³ The policies also address issues like deepfake videos or fake content by prohibiting malicious manipulated media and stating that the company will terminate channels that attempt to impersonate others. The platform says that it is able to remove policy-violating content by investing in new technologies and tactics for identifying malicious actors. In 2018, for example, YouTube formed an Intelligence Desk to help detect new trends in inappropriate content and behavior. YouTube also partners closely with TAG, Google's Threat Analysis Group, to combat foreign and domestic entities trying to interfere with the electoral process. General users and Trusted Flaggers, which consists of individual users, government agencies, and non-governmental organizations, may also flag content for violating YouTube policies.²⁸⁴ Flagged content is then later reviewed by the platform's content moderators and either removed or kept online.²⁸⁵ In order to demonstrate accountability around the spread of misinformation on its service, YouTube should notify users who see or engage with content that has been flagged as misinformation and provide them with additional contextual information to understand why the post was misleading or false.²⁸⁶

YouTube also announced that it is working to raise authoritative voices on its platform to help reduce misinformation.²⁸⁷ In 2017, it started prioritizing known sources it deems authoritative—such as CNN, Fox News, and the Guardian—for news and information in search results and “watch next” panels. Although YouTube does not provide information on how it determines whether a source is “authoritative.” The platform continues to expand its Top News and Breaking News sections to highlight videos from news sources and display breaking news events directly on its homepage. YouTube also announced on April 28, 2020 that it was expanding its work on fact-check information panels, which connect users to authoritative information based on their search queries.²⁸⁸ One way YouTube uses information panels is to show whether a channel is owned by a news

publisher that is publicly funded or funded by a government.²⁸⁹ Increasing the visibility of reputable sources for news and keeping users informed about the sources of the content they view on YouTube can be a helpful tool to combat voter misinformation and voter suppression tactics.

Over the past several years, researchers have outlined the ways YouTube's algorithmic recommendation system contributes to the spread of misinformation.²⁹⁰ In response to these criticisms, the company instituted a number of changes.²⁹¹ YouTube's recommendation process typically ranks and recommends videos to users based on a range of signals, including likes, dislikes, watch history, and data from user feedback surveys.²⁹² Since January of 2019, the platform has worked to reduce the recommendation of borderline content that comes close to violating its Community Guidelines, but does not merit removal.²⁹³ As a result, YouTube limits recommendations for videos that, for example, promote a miracle cure for a serious illness or claim the Earth is flat. Users may also turn off recommendations to have more controls over the content they see.²⁹⁴ Although these tactics could be helpful for preventing the rapid spread of election misinformation and voter suppression content, the platform has not published information about how it tackles this type of content in its recommendations. In addition, YouTube does not provide users with a comprehensive set of controls for determining why YouTube recommends certain content to them. Going forward, the company should provide greater transparency around how it addresses misleading election content in its recommendation system. Further, it should empower users to decide how their data is used to shape the recommendations they receive.

YouTube uses both automated tools and human reviewers to moderate content and enforce its Community Guidelines.²⁹⁵ However, there is little transparency around how the platform's automated tools are trained, updated, or used, and how effective they are at combating misinformation. In addition, as previously discussed, Google (and YouTube) are increasingly relying on automated tools to review potentially violating content during the COVID-19 pandemic. The company has not provided adequate transparency around what categories of content this new process applies to, and what the consequences of this shift are.

YouTube also warns that this increased reliance may result in a higher number of removals for videos, some of which "may not violate policies."²⁹⁶ The company states that it won't issue strikes on content removed by automated systems without human review, unless it has a high confidence that the content actually violates policies. Strikes are typically issued when a user's content is removed for violating YouTube's Community Guidelines and, if a user receives three strikes within a 90-day period, their channel may be permanently removed from YouTube.²⁹⁷ If an account holder believes that their content was improperly removed, they can appeal the decision. Appeals are an important mechanism for remedy and redress, however, the company stated that appeals processes may

take longer than usual due to the pandemic. This raises concerns that a potentially higher number of mistaken removals combined with a slower appeals process could negatively affect election and voting content prior to the election. While it is important to remove and block misleading content, accurate voting and election-related content, which can be beneficial for potential voters, could also be taken down accidentally. The platform should therefore invest more in ensuring election content gets priority review in the run up to the election. In addition, because a significant amount of election-related content moderation is occurring during the pandemic, YouTube should preserve data related to election-related content removals during this period so that researchers can evaluate these efforts later on.

Google publishes a political advertising transparency report, which features data on Google, YouTube, and partner properties.²⁹⁸ However, the consolidated report does not break out reporting for each platform, and it does not provide granular information for YouTube specifically. The report also does not include the number of political ads that were flagged or removed for violating Google or YouTube's advertising policies, making it difficult to understand how effective Google's ad enforcement practices are. In addition, Google publishes a Community Guidelines Enforcement Report for YouTube, which outlines how the platform enforces its content policies.²⁹⁹ While the report shows the volume of videos, channels, and comments removed for being spam, misleading, or scams, it does not specifically break out the volume of videos, channels, or comments removed for attempting to mislead users about elections or voting information.

Recommendations

The 2016 U.S. presidential election illustrated the alarming levels of misinformation and disinformation that could spread and potentially influence an electorate. These misinformation and disinformation campaigns, many of which were designed to suppress voting on a large scale, particularly impacted communities of color. As the 2020 U.S. presidential election draws near, internet platforms can play an important role in promoting civic engagement. However, these platforms can also be manipulated and can cause serious harm to the electoral process. It is therefore critical that internet companies institute comprehensive policies and practices to respond to the continuous and rapid spread of election-related misinformation and disinformation, while distributing accurate voting and election information.

The section below includes short-term recommendations that internet platforms and policymakers should implement prior to the 2020 U.S. presidential election as well as long-term recommendations that should be used to help address future elections. The recommendations outline how companies can improve their efforts to connect users to, and lift up, authoritative information; address the spread of misleading information through content moderation and curation; tackle misleading advertisements; and provide meaningful transparency and accountability around these efforts. This section also includes recommendations for how U.S. policymakers can encourage greater accountability and integrity from internet platforms.

Recommendations for Internet Platforms

Sharing and Lifting Up Authoritative Information and Empowering Informed User Decision-Making

- Partner with reputable fact-checking organizations and entities, as well as local and state election bodies to verify or refute information circulated through organic content and advertisements.
- Partner with reputable organizations to launch media literacy efforts which aim to educate users on how to identify and evaluate misleading election-related content they may engage with online. These campaigns should also explain how users can report this content.
- Fund and partner with vetted fact-checking organizations to ensure that fact-checking efforts can adequately tackle the growing volume of election-related misinformation and disinformation.

- Educate users about potential attacks and scams related to elections that may appear on the platform and on methods to avoid becoming a victim of such efforts.
- Notify users who have engaged with misleading election-related content and direct them to authoritative sources of information.
- Institute a public interest exception policy that permits companies to leave content posted by world leaders, candidates for political office, and other government officials on their services, even if the content has been fact-checked and contains misleading information. In these cases, the company should label the content and provide additional context to users which explains that the content has been debunked but there is a public interest value in creating public awareness that political and government officials posted such content. Companies should also include links to authoritative information sources in the labels. In instances where the company determines that the content posted by officials could result in imminent harm, this public interest exception policy should not be applied. Rather, the companies should remove the content as they would with any other user.
- Conduct regular impact assessments and audits of algorithmic curation tools (e.g. ranking and recommendation systems), and recalibrate them as necessary so they do not direct users to or surface misleading content when they search for election-related topics and do not algorithmically amplify such content in trending topics and recommendations.
- Label organic content and advertisements that have been produced by state-controlled media outlets to inform users of the content's origins.
- Educate users on how their personal data is being collected and to what extent this data is being used to curate the content and ads that users are seeing online. Companies should also provide users with controls which allow them to determine how their data is collected, shared, and used to shape their content and ad experiences, especially as it relates to political advertising and election-related content.
- Provide vetted researchers with access to tools and datasets that could enable them to better evaluate company efforts to combat election-related misinformation and disinformation.

Moderating and Curating Misleading Information

- Create a comprehensive set of content policies to address the spread of election-related misinformation and disinformation with specific considerations for voter-suppressive content. Guidelines should include examples of how these policies are enforced and what kinds of content the policies do not apply to. Companies should house these policies in one location, provide public notice if their policies change, and include an archive of past policies.
- Companies should clarify to what extent election-related policies interface with content policies related to hate speech, deepfakes, bots, coordinated inauthentic behavior, etc. While manipulated media may be a part of user expression on social media and therefore permissible for user-generated content, platforms should consider banning the use of such manipulation technologies for political advertising.
- Institute a dedicated reporting feature which enables users to flag election-related misinformation and disinformation to the company.
- Remove, reduce the spread of, or label content that has been fact-checked and deemed to contain election-related misinformation.
- Label content that has been fact-checked and deemed to contain misinformation but does not qualify for removal. Labels should direct users viewing such content to authoritative sources of information. Companies should also provide adequate notice to users explaining what specific policies the user has violated and include information on how the user can appeal this decision.
- Establish a Trusted Flaggers program which allows vetted and reputable civil rights organizations, civil society groups, and individuals to flag election-related misinformation and disinformation at scale and receive priority review for these flags. Companies should publicly disclose how this program works, how entities and individuals can apply, and other relevant information.
- Collaborate with other internet platforms to share information on and strategies for addressing trending misinformation and disinformation campaigns, fraudulent accounts, coordinated inauthentic behavior, and debunked content. Any collaborations should be publicly disclosed and should be respectful of users' privacy and comply with antitrust laws.

Tackling Misleading Advertising

- Create and implement comprehensive policies for the content and targeting of ads that prohibit election-related misinformation and disinformation in advertisements. The policies should include specific considerations for addressing voter suppressive ad content and should clarify that advertisers must adhere to all applicable laws and regulations. Companies should include examples of how these ad policies are enforced and what kind of content does not fall under these policies. If these policies change, companies should provide public notice of these changes and share an archive of past policies. Companies should also clarify to what extent these policies interface with ad content and targeting policies related to hate speech, bots, deepfakes, coordinated inauthentic behavior, etc.
- Establish a comprehensive review process for election-related ads and ad targeting categories. Companies should require all election-related ads to be fact-checked and reviewed by a human reviewer before they are permitted to run on a platform. Companies should publicly disclose high-level information on what this review process consists of and to what extent it relies on automated tools and human reviewers.
- Explain to users to what extent advertisements that are flagged for violating election-related ad policies are reviewed, moderated, and curated by human reviewers and by automated tools. Users should be notified of any significant updates to these processes.
- Create a comprehensive vetting process for advertisers which requires them to verify their identity and which country they are based in before running ads.
- Provide adequate notice to advertisers who have had their ads removed, algorithmically curated (e.g. downranked), or labeled. This notice should explain what specific policies the advertiser violated and include information on how the advertiser can appeal this decision.
- Give political advertisers the opportunity to appeal ad moderation decisions. This appeals process should be timely and enable advertisers to provide additional information on the case and have their case reviewed by a new reviewer or group of reviewers.
- Append “paid for” disclosures to all paid political, social, and issue ads and ensure labels are maintained even if ad campaigns end or if ads are organically shared online.

- Create policies that prevent users and entities from being able to monetize and advertise on the platform if they repeatedly spread misinformation and disinformation.

Providing Meaningful Transparency and Accountability

- Explain to users how and to what extent content that is flagged for violating election-related misinformation and disinformation policies is reviewed, moderated, and curated by human reviewers and by automated tools. Users should be notified of any significant updates to these processes.
- Provide adequate notice to users who have had their content removed, algorithmically curated (e.g. downranked), or labeled. This notice should explain what specific policies the user has violated and include information on how the user can appeal this decision.
- Give users the opportunity to appeal moderation decisions. This appeals process should be timely and enable users to provide additional information on the case and have their case reviewed by a new reviewer or group of reviewers. Users who flag content and accounts should also have access to an appeals process.
- Preserve data on election-related content and advertising removals. Vetted researchers should have access to this data so they can identify where these content and advertising moderation policies and practices fell short and make recommendations on how they can be improved.
- Publish data related to the moderation, curation, and labeling of election-related misinformation and disinformation in their regular transparency reports. At a minimum, this data should include:
 - The number of accounts flagged, the number of accounts suspended, and the number of accounts removed for violating these policies
 - The number of pieces of content that were flagged, removed, downranked, and labeled as a result of policy violations
 - How much of the content and accounts that were removed, suspended, downranked, and labeled were identified proactively using automated tools and how much of the content and accounts were identified through human flags (e.g. from users, Trusted Flaggers, etc.)

- A breakdown of content and accounts that were removed, suspended, downranked, or labeled by product (e.g. Facebook, Instagram, or WhatsApp)
 - A breakdown of content and accounts that were removed, suspended, downranked, or labeled by format (e.g. video, text, image)
 - A breakdown of content and accounts that were removed, suspended, downranked, or labeled by category of misinformation/disinformation (e.g. voter suppression, impersonation, etc.)
 - The number of appeals received for action taken against content and accounts in this category
 - The number of pieces of content restored and the number of accounts restored as a result of appeals in this category
 - The number of pieces of content restored and the number of accounts restored as a result of proactive recognition of errors by the company
- Create a publicly available online database of all ads in categories related to elections and social and political issues that a company has run on its platform. This database should include search functionality. In order to protect privacy, the information in this database should not permit the identification of specific users who received the ads. At a minimum, this database should disclose the following information about each of the ads:
 - The format of the ad (e.g. text, video, etc.)
 - The name of the advertiser
 - What state the ad was run in
 - How much the ad spend was
 - The time period during which an ad was active
 - Granular engagement and interaction information such as how many users saw the ad and the number of likes, shares, and views an ad received

- What targeting parameters the advertiser selected
 - What categories of users the ad was eventually delivered to (i.e. what targeting parameters did the ad delivery system eventually select and optimize for)
 - Whether the ad was delivered to a custom set of users or ones generated by an automated system
- Publish data on the company’s election-related ad content and targeting policy enforcement efforts. This should include:
 - The total number of ads and advertiser accounts removed for violating the platform’s election-related ad content and targeting policies
 - A breakdown of ads and advertiser accounts removed based on which policy they violated
 - A breakdown of ads and advertiser accounts removed based on the format of the ad (e.g. text, audio, image, etc.)
 - A breakdown of ads and advertiser accounts removed based on the country of the advertiser
 - A breakdown of ads and advertiser accounts removed based on the product or service on which the ad was run
 - The detection method used (e.g. user flag, automated tools, etc.). This data should not reveal the identity of individual flaggers
 - Provide periodic updates on content and advertising moderation, curation, and labeling efforts in the run up to the 2020 U.S. presidential election.
 - Following major elections, publish an election-specific transparency report that summarizes the scope and scale of content and advertising moderation, curation, and labeling efforts surrounding the elections.

Recommendations for Policymakers

Although the U.S. government is limited in the extent to which it can direct platforms how to decide what content to permit on their sites, policymakers can

do more to encourage greater transparency and accountability from internet platforms around how they are addressing the rapid spread of election-related misinformation and disinformation on their services.

- Policymakers should enact rules to require greater transparency from online platforms, including regular reporting regarding their content moderation, curation, labeling, and ad targeting and delivery efforts.
- Government agencies and representatives should ensure that when they post online they are only disseminating verified information related to the elections and are not spreading unproven or debunked information.
- Authoritative election authorities such as the Federal Elections Commission (FEC), state election boards, and other state and local authorities should partner with internet platforms to provide and promote verified and legitimate information related to the election on their platforms. These entities should also help debunk misleading claims and information using their own online accounts.
- Policymakers should clarify that the Voting Rights Act, which prohibits suppressing voting through intimidation, applies in the digital environment. Further, Congress should amend the Act or pass new legislation to prohibit suppression of voting through deception, which is the primary means of vote suppression online.
- Policymakers should fund vetted fact-checking organizations around the world to ensure that fact-checking efforts can adequately tackle the growing volume of election-related misinformation and disinformation.
- Policymakers should update campaign finance laws to address gaps and ensure that federal laws and regulations comprehensively cover digital political advertising.

Conclusion

Over the past several years, it has become clear that internet platforms can play an influential role in providing a platform for civic conversations and the distribution of accurate election-related information. It has also become apparent that many of these platforms are hotbeds for the spread of election-related misinformation and disinformation, which can suppress voter participation and particularly impact communities of color. Going forward, internet companies should demonstrate greater commitment to improving their efforts to tackle misleading election-related information, while preserving the important role their platforms can play in providing a space for civic engagement and access to legitimate election information. They should also ensure that they provide greater transparency and accountability around these efforts. Given the significant impact these platforms can have during electoral processes, these companies should continuously work to improve these approaches, for the upcoming 2020 U.S. presidential election, and beyond.

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June 2020

How Internet Platforms Are Combating Disinformation and Misinformation in the Age of COVID-19

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Introduction

During a speech in February, the director-general of the World Health Organization (WHO) explained how “fake news spreads faster and more easily than this virus, and is just as dangerous.”¹ Indeed, the unprecedented spread of COVID-19 across the globe has sparked a significant new wave of misinformation and disinformation online. In late March, fact-checking organization Snopes was forced to scale back its routine content production, as the amount of misinformation related to the COVID-19 pandemic overwhelmed its fact-checkers.² By April, a new report came out with analysis on how one-in-three people across Argentina, Germany, South Korea, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States say they have seen false or misleading information on social media linked to the coronavirus.³

The proliferation of misinformation in the time of COVID-19 has also spread harmful claims that unfortunately, appear to have resonated with marginalized communities. African-American communities have disproportionately suffered from the pandemic in some parts of the United States,⁴ and one reason behind this may be that misinformation has perpetuated mistrust and inaction toward public health entities in these communities.⁵ For example, one headline shared on Facebook read, “People Of Color May Be Immune To the Coronavirus Because of Melanin.”⁶ Further, a study indicated that the false belief that the coronavirus was created in a lab was more prevalent among Hispanic and African-Americans than among whites.⁷ The same study concluded that educational attainment is also a factor in being susceptible to misinformation.⁸ Specifically, those with a bachelor’s degree or more education were less likely than those with a high school diploma or less education to say the coronavirus was created in a lab.⁹

In a time when the public must be armed with the most accurate information to combat this pandemic, many internet platforms have developed policies to reduce the spread of (also known as downranking) and remove misleading and inaccurate information related to the virus. In response to the pressure to respond to misinformation and disinformation around this pandemic, Facebook, Google, YouTube, Microsoft, LinkedIn, Reddit, and Twitter announced that they are collaborating with one another and government health agencies in order to promote accurate information around the virus from authoritative sources.¹⁰ The majority of platform efforts during this time have centered on connecting users to authoritative information, moderating and reducing the spread of misleading content, and altering advertising policies to prevent exploitation and the marketing of misleading products and items. Although these efforts are valuable, platforms need to do more to provide transparency and accountability around how these initiatives are being implemented and how they are impacting users and their online expression.

This report will provide an overview of how various internet platforms are individually addressing the rapid spread of COVID-19-related misinformation and disinformation. While this report aims to be comprehensive, it is important to note that platforms' response efforts to the virus are rapidly changing and expanding, and as a result, this report may not encompass all efforts instituted by these companies. This report concludes by offering recommendations on how these platforms can improve the efficacy of their efforts and also provide greater transparency to their users and the public. The report also includes recommendations on how U.S. policymakers can encourage further accountability and support efforts to combat the spread of misinformation and disinformation during this time.

Editorial disclosure: This report discusses policies by Google (including YouTube) and Facebook (including WhatsApp), both of which are funders of work at New America but did not contribute funds directly to the research or writing of this report. New America is guided by the principles of full transparency, independence, and accessibility in all its activities and partnerships. New America does not engage in research or educational activities directed or influenced in any way by financial supporters. View our full list of donors at www.newamerica.org/our-funding.

Amazon

As a major e-commerce platform that sees 197 million global visitors visit daily, Amazon has been a critical supplier of household and medical goods for families wanting to employ responsible social distancing.¹¹ However, as the pandemic has spread, thousands of sellers engaging in price gouging flooded the platform with high-priced listings. In early March, in response to reports of price gouging, Amazon shared it had removed 530,000 offers from the marketplace and suspended more than 2,500 seller accounts in its U.S. marketplace for violating its price-gouging policies.¹² By the end of March, Amazon stated that it took down 3,900 selling accounts from the U.S. store alone for violating its fair pricing policies.¹³ Further, in a response to a letter sent by Sen. Ed Markey (D-Mass.) on this topic, the company explained that it uses machine learning models, in part, to detect price gouging, but has recently stepped up human monitoring as price gouging has spread in light of the coronavirus.¹⁴ Amazon is now deploying “an additional dedicated team” that’s working “24 hours, seven days a week” to spot price gouging on items such as protective masks and hand sanitizers.¹⁵

During the pandemic, misleading information has spread on Amazon primarily through product listings that make false claims, often related to cures or treatments for the virus. The company’s *Prohibited Product Claims for Diseases* policy states, “Amazon prohibits the sale of products that claim to cure, mitigate, treat, or prevent diseases in humans or animals without FDA approval.”¹⁶ The list of examples of diseases that products cannot claim to cure includes “Coronavirus and/or COVID-19.”¹⁷ In February, the company notified third-party merchants that it was taking down listings for items claiming to be a treatment, cure, or remedy for the coronavirus.¹⁸ After that notice, the company confirmed that it blocked or removed more than 1 million products for suspect or misleading claims.¹⁹ While Amazon has told sellers it would remove their listings for making unapproved medical marketing claims, the company has given sellers the opportunity to keep their valid product up without the prohibited medical claims.²⁰

Given that Amazon has emerged as a crucial platform during the pandemic, the company needs to provide greater transparency and accountability around its operations during this time. In particular, Amazon should publish periodic updates during the pandemic outlining the number of listings the company has taken down and the number of sellers the company has banned for violating COVID-19 specific policies. Following the pandemic, the company should publish a comprehensive COVID-19 transparency report outlining the scope and scale of these enforcement actions more broadly. It should also expand this reporting to cover non-emergency periods. In addition, where appropriate, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) should enforce Section (5)(a) of the Federal

Trade Commission Act of 1914 and hold businesses accountable when they engage in unfair and deceptive trade practices on the platform.

Another issue Amazon has faced as the pandemic has spread worldwide is that “essential” goods such as face masks, cleaning products, and hand sanitizers rapidly sold out, leaving those who needed the items the most, like medical workers, without access to such supplies. In mid-March, to keep up with surging demand for essential goods, Amazon announced that it would no longer accept other items at its warehouses until April 5.²¹ This decision had immediate impacts on third-party sellers and vendors who came to rely on Amazon’s warehouse to get their products into the hands of consumers. By April 13, Amazon began allowing sellers to start shipping nonessential items again.²²

Facebook

Facebook is the largest social media platform in the world, with over 2.4 billion active users,²³ the majority of whom are based outside the United States.²⁴ The company therefore has significant global reach, as does the misinformation and disinformation that is spread on the platform.

Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, false and misleading information related to COVID-19 has spread like wildfire on the platform, through user posts, in private groups, and through advertisements.²⁵ Some of these posts have made innocuous claims, while others have shared more harmful ideas, such as promoting certain medicines or behaviors as preventive or curative measures, or suggesting that social distancing does not help stem the spread of the virus.²⁶

In response, Facebook has launched a COVID-19 information center that houses all updates and information related to the platform's efforts around the virus.²⁷ This online hub includes a section called "Get the Facts," which features articles that have been written by Facebook's independent fact-checking partners and often link to fact-checked posts or articles.²⁸ These articles are selected by Facebook's News Feed team and are updated weekly and available to Facebook's U.S. users.²⁹

According to Facebook, the company currently works with more than 60 fact-checking organizations that are responsible for reviewing and rating content in over 50 languages around the globe. The company has stated it is expanding its fact-checking partnerships to include more organizations and languages. It also announced the first set of recipients of the company's \$1 million grant program, which is hosted in collaboration with the International Fact-Checking Network, a forum for fact-checkers worldwide that is hosted by the Poynter Institute for Media Studies.³⁰ Further, the company donated \$1 million to the International Fact-Checking Network.³¹

These fact-checking organizations play an important role in misinformation and disinformation management on the platform. Pre-pandemic, when a piece of content was debunked by one of Facebook's fact-checking partners, Facebook would append a warning label to the content and reduce the distribution of the content on the platform by demoting or downranking the post's position in the platform's algorithmic content ranking system. This was especially true for posts that shared misleading health information, such as sensational health claims, or that tried to sell products or services based on these exaggerated health claims.³² Facebook would also detect these types of content by identifying commonly used terms in such misleading posts and using them to predict and detect similar misleading posts.³³ Facebook's Community Standards outline that the platform does not remove false information, as there is a fine line between false news and

satire and opinion.³⁴ As a result, these fact-checking and downranking efforts have formed the foundation of Facebook’s efforts to counter such misinformation and disinformation.

Facebook’s efforts to downrank and reduce the distribution of COVID-19 misinformation and disinformation are based on these prior efforts. Through the use of automated tools, the platform is also able to identify duplicates of debunked stories and reduce their distribution.³⁵ According to Facebook, these efforts are a continuation of work the company has been doing since 2018.³⁶ The company has also begun directing users to authoritative sources on COVID-19 information³⁷ and has stated that in the context of the pandemic, it will also remove content that contains misinformation that could lead to “imminent physical harm.”³⁸

According to a Facebook post from CEO Mark Zuckerberg, over 2 billion users on Facebook and Instagram have been directed to “authoritative health resources,” and 350 million of those users actually clicked through to the resources.³⁹ In addition, a blog post published by Facebook’s Vice President of Integrity Guy Rosen shared that the company had appended warning labels on approximately 40 million posts related to COVID-19 on the Facebook platform, based on the review of nearly 4,000 articles by the company’s independent fact-checking partners. 95 percent of the time, users did not click on content that had a warning label.⁴⁰ Additionally, when people search for information related to COVID-19 on Facebook, the platform will surface an educational pop-up with credible information from expert and governmental organizations such as the WHO and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).⁴¹ In addition, the company is giving free advertising credits to enable such organizations to run coronavirus education campaigns on Facebook and Instagram, and the company has said it is also discussing ways to provide additional assistance and support to health authorities.⁴²

Further, on April 16, Facebook announced that it would begin alerting users if they had engaged with or viewed harmful misleading content related to the virus that had been debunked by the company’s fact-checking partners.⁴³ Users who have liked, reacted to, or commented on these posts will receive alerts in their news feeds that direct them to the WHO’s “myth busters” page.⁴⁴ This is a valuable method for providing transparency and accountability to users regarding their engagement with misleading content on the platform.

As highlighted above, Facebook’s Community Standards do not include clear policies related to the removal of false information. However, in the context of the pandemic, the platform has begun prioritizing the removal of COVID-19-related misinformation and disinformation that could cause imminent harm.⁴⁵ Prioritizing the removal of this content during this time is especially important given that the company’s content moderation operations have radically

transformed during the pandemic. Facebook announced that due to safety, privacy, and legal concerns, a large portion of their content moderation workforce, who are contractors, are unable to work from home.⁴⁶ As a result, Facebook is increasingly relying on automated tools for content moderation. However, researchers and activists have extensively illustrated how these tools are limited and can often result in erroneous takedowns of content.⁴⁷ In the absence of a robust content moderation workforce, Facebook has begun training a small group of its other employees, who have experience working in content policy, to moderate high-priority categories of content, such as COVID-19-related misinformation.⁴⁸ The platform, however, has warned that users should expect numerous mistakes, given the decreased capacity for human review.⁴⁹

During this time, the platform has also suspended its appeals process, instead enabling users to notify the company if they disagree with a moderation decision.⁵⁰ This is concerning as it leaves users with no method for remedy or redress for erroneous decisions on whether to remove content.

Given that Facebook's content moderation operations have changed drastically during this period, but are ever more important, the company should provide periodic updates on the scope and scale of its efforts to moderate and reduce the spread of misleading content during the pandemic. Following the pandemic, Facebook should publish a COVID-19-specific transparency report that outlines the scope and scale of these efforts throughout the entire pandemic. Further, Facebook should expand its general transparency reporting efforts to include data on the scope and scale of its efforts to remove and reduce the spread of misinformation more broadly.

Advertising can also promote the spread of misinformation on the platform. For example, some sellers have been advertising products that they claim can prevent or treat the virus. In response, Facebook has prohibited sellers from making COVID-19-related health or medical claims in product listings and has also banned ads that intend to foster panic related to the virus.⁵¹ In addition, the company has temporarily banned ads and commerce listings, such as those on Marketplace, which sell medical face masks,⁵² hand sanitizer, surface disinfecting wipes, and COVID-19 testing kits.⁵³ The platform has also said it will remove organic posts that aim to sell these items.⁵⁴ This is both to preserve this equipment for medical personnel and to prevent the sale of fraudulent or misleading items in these categories. Further, the company has established a dedicated channel for local governments to share listings they believe violate local laws.⁵⁵ Going forward, Facebook should provide periodic updates on the number of listings it removes and the number of sellers it bans in Marketplace for violating its COVID-19-specific commerce policies, as well as its pre-existing commerce policies. Following the pandemic, Facebook should publish comprehensive data on its commerce policy enforcement efforts during this time.

This reporting should also be expanded so that it is consistent and covers non-emergency periods as well.

Finally, after an investigation by *The Markup*, Facebook has removed the targeting category that enables advertisers to target users who are interested in pseudoscience. According to the investigation, this interest category contained over 78 million users, and it could enable advertisers to run and profit from ads that cater to users who are vulnerable to conspiracy theories and misleading information.⁵⁶

As discussed, Facebook's ad targeting and delivery tools can be used to promote the spread of misinformation. The platform has taken some important steps toward trying to prevent these misuses of their tools, however, there is little transparency around how effective these efforts have been. During the pandemic, Facebook should publish periodic updates on its efforts to enforce its advertising targeting and delivery policies. Following the pandemic, Facebook should publish comprehensive data that outlines the scope and scale of its ad policy enforcement during this time period, including data on the number of ads the company removed for violating its COVID-19-specific advertising policies, and data on the number of ads approved in error during this period. In addition, this is an area in which the U.S. government can use existing law to take action, as appropriate, against businesses and sellers who engage in unfair and deceptive trade practices during the pandemic. In particular, the FTC should enforce Section (5)(a) of the FTC Act to hold businesses and sellers who engage in unfair and deceptive trade practices through their online ad campaigns accountable.

Google

Google, one of the world's largest technology companies and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Alphabet, took an important step in combating misinformation among its products by investing \$6.5 million in the fight against misinformation.

⁵⁷ This funding will go toward fact-checkers, news organizations, and nonprofits around the world.⁵⁸ The money will also help certain news outlets expose and track coronavirus misinformation.⁵⁹ Sundar Pichai, CEO of Alphabet and Google, also announced that Google's Trust and Safety team was working across the globe to safeguard users from phishing, conspiracy theories, malware, and misinformation, and is regularly on the lookout for new threats.⁶⁰

Google Search, the platform's search engine, is the most popular search engine worldwide with a recent statistic illustrating an 87.35 percent market share.⁶¹ As the year has progressed, COVID-19 has become the most searched topic, surpassing even some of the most common and consistent queries found in Search with questions such as "Is sneezing a sign of coronavirus?" and "What is PPE for coronavirus" dominating the search engine.⁶² Given the size and reach of this search engine, it is critical for the platform to combat misleading information.

Prior to the spread of the coronavirus, Google published a white paper in February 2019 describing its three strategies for dealing with misinformation across all of its products, including Search, by stating that they "make quality count in our ranking systems, counteract malicious actors, and give users more context."⁶³ Specifically, Google stated that it uses ranking algorithms to organize search results. These ranking algorithms are designed to surface content that the platform determines is high-quality and relevant to a user's query. Although there has been some contention that the company uses its ranking algorithms to provide preference to content that aligns with certain ideological viewpoints,⁶⁴ the company has stated that Search is designed to make determinations about the usefulness and relevance of a webpage based on a range of signals, and not to promote the political and ideological perspectives of the individuals who built or audited the system.⁶⁵ When Search's ranking algorithms identify content as misinformation, they will downrank that content so that it appears lower down in search results.⁶⁶

Google employs other tools to combat misinformation including human review systems and systems that can reduce spam activity at scale.⁶⁷ Google says its algorithms can detect the majority of spam and automatically prevent the ranking system from promoting such content by demoting or removing these webpages.⁶⁸ The remainder of spam results are typically manually addressed by a spam removal team.⁶⁹ They review the pages in question, typically based on user feedback, and flag them for penalty if they have been found to violate the

webmaster guidelines.⁷⁰ Manual actions can be used to penalize an entire website, subdomain, sections of a website, or specific pages.⁷¹ Manual action can also demote websites in search rankings and delist them.⁷² However, it is unclear how much manual action is taken in response to COVID-19 misinformation.

Finally, for some content, Google provides more context to users through mechanisms such as knowledge panels that connect a variety of sources on a topic, fact-check labels that illustrate verified information, and feedback buttons that directly send information to Google.⁷³ These mechanisms play an important role in the search engine to help inform the user. Knowledge panels are information boxes that appear on Google when a user searches for entities (people, places, organizations, things) that are in the Knowledge Graph.⁷⁴ The Knowledge Graph is the engine that powers the panel.⁷⁵ Specifically, the Knowledge Graph is Google's systematic way of putting facts, people, and places together to create interconnected search results that they determine are more accurate and relevant.⁷⁶ Knowledge panels are automatically generated, and information that appears in a knowledge panel comes from various sources across the web.⁷⁷

Fact-check labels are appended to articles that include information fact-checked by news publishers and fact-checking organizations.⁷⁸ These labels appear when a user conducts a search on Google that returns an authoritative result containing fact-checks for one or more public claims.⁷⁹ When this occurs, the user will see that information clearly on the search results page.⁸⁰ The snippet will display information on the claim, who made the claim, and the fact-check of that particular claim.⁸¹ However, this information isn't available for every search result, and there may be search result pages where different publishers checked the same claim and reached different conclusions.⁸²

After COVID-19 was declared a public health emergency by the WHO in late January of 2020, Google launched an SOS Alert with resources and safety information from the WHO.⁸³ Additionally, Google worked with relevant agencies and authorities in the United States to roll out a website focused on education, prevention, and local resources.⁸⁴

Google has also taken major steps to prevent the spread of misinformation across its other products. For example, the platform announced it was blocking all ads in its Google Ads service that capitalize on the coronavirus.⁸⁵ Google Ads is the primary mechanism through which businesses can deliver and place ads on Google.

In addition, Google updated their *Inappropriate Content* policy so that it amended their "Sensitive Events" category. The policy now prohibits acts.⁸⁶

“Appearing to profit from a tragic event with no discernible benefit to users; price gouging or artificially inflating prices that prohibits/limits access to vital supplies; sale of products or services (such as personal protective equipment) which may be insufficient for the demand during a sensitive event; using keywords related to a sensitive event to attempt to gain additional traffic.”

This policy also includes a ban on the sale of face masks.⁸⁷ Further, Google Play has begun prohibiting developers from capitalizing on sensitive events, in addition to enforcing their long-standing content policies that strictly prohibit apps featuring medical or health-related content that is misleading or potentially harmful. Additionally, Neil Kumaran, product manager for Gmail Security, and Sam Lugani, lead security of product marketing management for G Suite and Google Cloud, shared some steps for administrators to effectively deal with the rising tide of spam emails, and detailing best practices for users to avoid threats.⁸⁸ According to them, Gmail blocked more than 240 million coronavirus-related spam messages.⁸⁹

Given the massive changes occurring across Google’s many products, the company must provide greater transparency and accountability around its COVID-19-related efforts. Specifically, the company should provide periodic updates to consumers on a number of data points, including how many ads have been rejected and removed, how many COVID-19 misinformation-related search results have been downranked or removed, how many spam emails related to the pandemic have been blocked, and statistics on the types of searches made over the course of the global crisis (i.e. searches for specific treatments mentioned by policymakers, searches about the origin of the virus, and searches for critical products). The latter will allow researchers and civil society to better understand information-flow stemming from the virus. Following the pandemic, Google should also publish a comprehensive report on these factors. In addition, where appropriate, the FTC should hold businesses and sellers who run online ad campaigns accountable, by enforcing Section (5)(a) of the FTC Act against any who engage in unfair and deceptive practices.

Reddit

Reddit is a popular social media platform that has approximately 330 million monthly active users around the world.⁹⁰ The platform is distinct from other social media platforms in that it does not have a comprehensive top-down content moderation strategy. Rather, the platform operates using a high-level set of content guidelines that are enforced by a team of employee moderators (known as admins), and subreddit-specific content policies that are created and enforced by users who act as moderators of individual subreddits (known as mods).⁹¹ This localized approach to content moderation has permitted a number of niche communities and groups to flourish on the platform.⁹² However, this structure has also created conditions that can enable misinformation and disinformation to spread easily across the service.

In response, the company has begun promoting a number of resources containing authoritative information related to COVID-19, stating that unless a subreddit is focused on spreading misleading content, admins will prioritize educating and cooperating with users in the subreddit. If these efforts fail, the platform will then take steps to ban the subreddit, in a process known as “quarantining.”⁹³ When a community is quarantined, it does not appear in search results. Additionally, if a user tries to visit the quarantined community, they will be notified that the subreddit may contain misleading content and they must explicitly opt-in to viewing the content.⁹⁴

In addition to these efforts, Reddit has announced that its site integrity team is also working on investigating claims and evidence of coordinated attempts to spread misleading COVID-19 information across the platform. The company has stated that these efforts include detection experiments, which are being conducted in conjunction with other companies such as Microsoft and Google.⁹⁵ Further, the company has been organizing “Ask Me Anything” (AMA) series in which users can ask scientific and medical experts, as well as public officials, questions about the virus, therefore enabling users to access verified, real-time information.⁹⁶ The company is also using banners to highlight content that has been verified and deemed legitimate on the Reddit homepage and in search results.⁹⁷

Reddit has also stated that it is working to equip both admins and mods with the necessary resources and guidance to remove misinformation. In a Reddit admin post on safety in late April, the company shared that it is striving to rapidly moderate content that contains claims that encourage violence (e.g. calls to vandalize phone towers or attack individuals of a specific nationality) or physical harm (e.g. suggesting that drinking bleach helps prevent or cure the virus).⁹⁸ To this end, the company has compiled a set of resources outlining authoritative and verified information on COVID-19 for mods who are reviewing content for

COVID-19-related misinformation. In its April post, Reddit also outlined that mods can use the AutoModerator tool (known as AutoMod) to identify and remove obvious forms of misinformation in their subreddits.⁹⁹ The AutoMod is a built-in, customizable bot that provides basic algorithmic tools to mods to proactively identify, filter, and remove objectionable content. The AutoMod operates based on mod-chosen parameters such as keywords, website links, or specific users, that are not permitted in a particular subreddit.¹⁰⁰ Mods who identify cases of misinformation that are spreading across the platform, or an account that is behaving suspiciously, can also report these instances to the platform.¹⁰¹ Reddit has stated that it will be giving all users the option to report such content shortly.¹⁰² In this way, Reddit presents an interesting case study for fact-checking and review of misleading content during the pandemic, as rather than taking on these roles and responsibilities entirely, or partnering extensively with independent third-party groups, it distributes and localizes these tasks among a certain group of users.

Currently, Reddit's transparency report does not outline how much content is being removed by admins or mods under the platform's misinformation policies. During the pandemic, the company should provide periodic updates on their content moderation and advertising policy enforcement efforts, particularly related to misinformation. Following the pandemic, the company should publish a COVID-19-specific transparency report that outlines the scope and scale of content moderation efforts by both admins and mods, as well as ad policy enforcement efforts by the company. This report should also include granular information on the number and types of quarantined communities. Further, Reddit should expand its general transparency reporting to include data on removals of misleading content by admins and mods.

TikTok

The short-form video application, TikTok, was reported as the third-most downloaded non-game app of the year in 2019.¹⁰³ Last year, it was estimated that TikTok, a China-based company, has around 625 million monthly active users globally,¹⁰⁴ and as a result, the platform has become a lucrative service for spreading misinformation related to the pandemic.

Like many other platforms, TikTok has created a page that outlines their COVID-19 response efforts. This page features a number of announcements outlining how the company is partnering with the WHO to ensure that users have access to accurate information related to the virus. This includes an in-app notice that provides easy links to the WHO's website and reminds users to report content that violates the platform's Community Guidelines when users use hashtags related to the coronavirus.¹⁰⁵ The platform also clearly states on their COVID-19 resource page that misinformation that could cause harm to an individual's health or wider public safety will be removed.¹⁰⁶ Additionally, in March 2020, TikTok announced the creation of a TikTok Content Advisory Council, which brings together thought leaders who can help develop policies and plans for the future. However, the announcement does not appear to be in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.¹⁰⁷

In late April, TikTok's director of trust & safety announced other efforts the platform was instituting to address misinformation related to COVID-19.¹⁰⁸ Specifically, the platform introduced an enhanced in-app reporting feature.¹⁰⁹ If users come across content they believe contains intentionally deceptive or misleading information, they can report it by selecting the new "Misleading Information" category within the app. Further, if the content pertains to COVID-19, they can choose a sub-category within the feature. When users report any content as "COVID-19 Misinformation," it is sent to a priority moderation queue that is run by an internal taskforce and escalated to third-party fact-checkers.¹¹⁰ The taskforce has been set up as a proactive measure to strengthen the platform's capabilities in addressing misinformation around COVID-19 and is supported by an internal team working on content safety across TikTok.¹¹¹

TikTok does not appear to have any specific policies relevant to misinformation around COVID-19 in the context of advertising on the platform.

Given that TikTok is newer to the social media scene, the company has only released one transparency report, in December 2019.¹¹² However, given the amount of misleading content on the platform, especially related to COVID-19, the company must provide greater transparency and accountability around its efforts to combat misleading content during the pandemic. Specifically, TikTok should provide periodic updates on their content moderation efforts during the

pandemic. Following the pandemic, the company should publish a COVID-19-specific transparency report. In addition, the company should expand its general transparency reporting to include granular data around the moderation of misleading content.

Twitter

Twitter is one of the world's most popular social media platforms,¹¹³ with over 330 million monthly active users around the globe.¹¹⁴ Like other social media platforms, Twitter has been heavily scrutinized for its role in facilitating the spread of misinformation and disinformation, particularly related to COVID-19. In response, Twitter launched a range of initiatives and efforts, which are documented, alongside regular updates, in an online repository hosted on the company's website.¹¹⁵

In January 2020, the company shared that it expanded its dedicated search prompt feature to ensure content from authoritative sources appears at the top of search results related to COVID-19. According to the company, this feature is now available in approximately 70 countries, and the company has partnered with national public health agencies, the WHO, and local partners to ensure users have access to verified information.¹¹⁶ Twitter has also prevented its auto-suggest feature from directing users to misleading sources when they enter COVID-19 related search terms.¹¹⁷ This change was part of an expansion of the company's "Know the Facts" prompt,¹¹⁸ which was established in 2019 to provide users with access to clear, legitimate information related to immunizations and vaccinations.¹¹⁹

Like Facebook, Twitter has stated that it is increasingly relying on automated and machine learning tools to moderate content during the pandemic.¹²⁰ In particular, these automated tools will be used to identify reports related to pieces of content that are likely to cause harm and surface them for priority review and proactively identify violating content before it is reported.¹²¹ As a result of this increased reliance on automated tools, users have been told to expect more moderation errors.¹²² Consequently, the company has said it will not permanently suspend any accounts as a result of automated enforcement decisions. The company has also said it will maintain its appeals process, although there may be delays, and it will implement human review procedures where possible.¹²³ The company shared that, during this pandemic, it will prioritize the review of content that poses a direct risk to the health and well-being of individuals¹²⁴ and that content that requires contextual analysis, including misleading content related to the pandemic, will undergo human review.¹²⁵ The platform has warned, however, that it will not be able to review every tweet that contains misleading or disputed information about the virus during this time.¹²⁶

In addition, Twitter has responded to the rapid spread of misleading information related to the virus on the platform by expanding its definition of harmful content to include content that goes against guidance provided by "authoritative sources of global and local public health information."¹²⁷ Twitter enforces these policies

with the support of its trusted partners, which include public health authorities and governments, and reviews content flagged for violating these policies against information provided by these trusted partners.¹²⁸ In addition, the platform has shared that it will continue to enforce its policies on platform manipulation during this time, which prohibits the use of the Twitter platform “in a manner intended to artificially amplify or suppress information or engage in behavior that manipulates or disrupts people’s experience on Twitter.”¹²⁹ The company has said that it has not yet seen any major coordinated platform manipulation efforts related to the virus.¹³⁰

On April 22, the company also announced that it will prioritize the removal of content that could lead to the destruction or damage of critical 5G infrastructure.¹³¹ This policy shift is in response to the spread of an internet conspiracy theory that claims radio waves emitted by 5G technology are eliciting changes in people’s bodies that make them more susceptible to the coronavirus. The spread of such misinformation has resulted in dozens of acts of arson against wireless towers and telecom equipment, as well as the harassment of countless telecom employees in many countries.¹³²

Under Twitter’s COVID-19 content policies, the company does not permit tweets that:

- Deny global or local health authority recommendations (e.g. related to social distancing)
- Deny established scientific facts about transmission of the virus and the difference between the virus and other diseases
- Promote unproven or harmful treatments, protection measures, diagnostic criteria, and cures for the virus
- Share claims that intend to manipulate behavior to support a third-party (e.g. the virus is not real, leave your house and support business X)
- Propagate information that creates panic, unrest, and disorder
- Share claims made by an individual who is impersonating a government or health official or organization (e.g. parody accounts)
- Promote the notion that certain nationalities or groups are more or less susceptible to the virus¹³³

The company has outlined, however, that it may apply its public interest exception policy to cases in which world leaders and elected and other government officials have violated these COVID-19 content guidelines. In these

cases, the company will determine that there is public interest value in keeping the content on the service, such as, the public will be able to know that these leaders are publishing misinformation. Therefore, instead of removing the content, Twitter will place the content behind a notice that provides context about the violation and allow people to view the content only if they wish to see it.¹³⁴ Users have a right to access information, including from world leaders and elected and other government officials, as well as a right to know what their leaders are saying, especially during a crisis period such as this one. Online platforms are a major outlet for information and as a result companies should institute such a public interest exception and notice policy. However, companies should institute this policy responsibly. If a leader's content violates the platform's content policies, in most cases, it should be left up with a clear notice that explains why the content has been left up. In addition, this content should be fact-checked and platforms should provide additional context to users in the notice detailing whether the post contains misleading information. However, if content posted by these leaders poses imminent harm, platforms should remove this content just as they would for content from anyone else, as it can have significant offline consequences.

In an update on April 1, the company shared that since the expansion of its content policies during the pandemic, the company has removed over 1,100 Tweets with misleading and harmful content, and its automated tools have challenged over 1.5 million accounts for spam or manipulative behavior in COVID-19 discussions.¹³⁵ These periodic updates are valuable for providing transparency and accountability around the platform's efforts to combat misleading content during the pandemic. However, the company's existing *Twitter Rules Enforcement* report does not currently cover moderation of misleading content. Going forward, Twitter should continue to provide periodic updates on its moderation efforts during the pandemic. Following the pandemic, the company should publish a comprehensive COVID-19-specific transparency report outlining the scope and scale of these moderation efforts during the pandemic as a whole. Further, the company should begin regularly reporting on the moderation of misleading content in its regular transparency report.

On May 11, Twitter also announced that it will begin appending labels to tweets that feature potentially misleading or harmful information related to the virus. These labels will direct users to a page, curated by the company or by an external trusted source, that contains additional information on the content of the tweet. The company has also stated that it will append a warning to certain tweets depending on their "propensity for harm and type of misleading information." These warnings will notify users, before they view the tweet, that the information in the tweet goes against public health guidance. The company shared an infographic,¹³⁶ included below, that outlines the scenarios in which the company would add a label, add a warning, remove, or take no action against a tweet that potentially contains misinformation during this time. Labels may be visible on

tweets even when they are embedded or when they are being viewed by individuals who are not logged in.¹³⁷ This new policy will also apply to posts shared by public officials, and may be applied retroactively.



Misleading Information	Label	Removal
Disputed Claim	Label	Warning
Unverified Claim	No action	No action*
	Moderate	Severe
Propensity for Harm		

Source: Twitter

According to Twitter, the company will use its internal tools to proactively monitor content on the platform and to make sure that the company is not amplifying content by appending labels to them. Twitter is also working with its trusted partners to flag content that could yield harmful offline consequences, and will be prioritizing the review and labeling of content that could result in increased exposure to or transmission of the virus.¹³⁹

As previously highlighted, advertising can also be a source of COVID-19-related misinformation and disinformation. As a result, Twitter has introduced new rules that only permit advertisers to explicitly or implicitly mention the virus in their ads if they are discussing “adjustments to business practices and/or models in response to COVID-19” and “support for customers and employees related to COVID-19.”¹⁴⁰ Twitter does not permit advertisers to run ads that feature sensational content and inflated product prices, or which are for products that are in high demand as a result of the pandemic (e.g. face masks, alcohol hand sanitizers, etc.).¹⁴¹ Under Twitter’s political ads content policy,¹⁴² news publishers receive an exemption to these advertising rules and are able to promote content that discusses vaccines, treatments, and test kits.¹⁴³ The company is also permitting government entities to disseminate public health information through advertising on the platform. Further, Twitter is using its “Ads for Good” program to provide advertising credit to nonprofit organizations so that they can run advertising campaigns for fact-checking services and promote reputable health information.¹⁴⁴

During the pandemic, Twitter should publish periodic updates on its ad enforcement efforts, including the number of ads the company has removed for violating its COVID-19-specific ad policies and the number of ads that were erroneously permitted. Following the pandemic, Twitter should publish more comprehensive data outlining the scope and scale of its ad enforcement efforts during this time, especially as they relate to COVID-19-specific advertising policies. In addition, where appropriate, the FTC should enforce Section (5)(a) of the FTC Act, and hold businesses and sellers accountable when they engage in unfair and deceptive trade practices through online ad campaigns.

YouTube

YouTube, one of Google's subsidiaries, is the most popular video platform on the market with approximately 2 billion users on the service worldwide.¹⁴⁵ Given its reach, the website has become a major provider of health information. In an interview, Chief Product Officer Neal Mohan said YouTube's response to the spread of COVID-19 misinformation on its platform has been focused on a twofold approach: "making authoritative information more prominent and aggressively removing policy-violating content."¹⁴⁶

While the video service reports that it has been working quickly to remove misleading videos, one watchdog organization, the Tech Transparency Project, found instances of YouTube profiting from videos pushing unproven treatments for the coronavirus.¹⁴⁷ Specifically, the platform was running advertisements with videos pushing herbs, meditative music, and potentially unsafe over-the-counter supplements as cures for the coronavirus.¹⁴⁸ Yet, around this same time, analysis from other researchers showed that among a sample of 320 videos related to the pandemic, four-fifths of the channels sharing coronavirus news and information are maintained by professional news outlets and that search results for popular coronavirus-related terms returned mostly factual and neutral video results.¹⁴⁹ Since the publication of both these studies, YouTube has taken other actions to address misleading information.

YouTube has taken a number of proactive steps to educate users from verified sources and to dissuade misinformation attempts, however, some of their efforts may have negative consequences for content creators. First, the company established clear guidelines and restrictions for demonetizing content related to COVID-19, including content that misinforms users about health matters related to the virus.¹⁵⁰ Additionally, the site is directing users from YouTube's homepage to the WHO or other locally relevant authoritative organizations when they search for terms related to COVID-19 on the site.¹⁵¹ Further, the company has committed to donating ad inventory to governments and NGOs in affected regions to use for education and information.¹⁵²

In addition, in late April, YouTube announced that it would expand the use of its algorithmically-recommended information panels to connect users to authoritative information when they search for COVID-19-related queries. Information panels were originally introduced in 2018, and they provide users with contextual information from third-party fact-checked articles. With regard to broad misinformation, these panels were primarily used to surface contextual and authoritative information related to longstanding misinformation stories, such as "flat earth" theories.¹⁵³

Information panels have also been employed by YouTube to provide the user with topical context. As mentioned above, when a user engages with videos or search results related to COVID-19, the information panels will connect them to information from the WHO, CDC, or local health authorities. Additionally, in order to tackle misinformation that spreads as part of the rapidly-moving news cycle, when a user enters a query seeking information that relates to a specific claim for which the platform has a relevant third-party fact-checked article, YouTube may display an information panel at the top of the search results that includes: the fact-checked article title, a link to the article, and the publisher's name. If more than one relevant fact-checked article exists, YouTube will show a carousel that allows users to scroll through the available articles.¹⁵⁴ In addition to this roll out, YouTube announced that it will provide \$1 million through the Google News Initiative to the International Fact-Checking Network to bolster fact-checking and verification efforts across the world.¹⁵⁵

Like Facebook and Twitter, YouTube's content review capacity has significantly decreased during the pandemic, and the company is increasingly relying on automated tools for content review and moderation. Therefore, while these efforts to combat misinformation should yield positive results, YouTube has warned that the service's reliance on automated tools may lead to an increase in erroneous removals of videos that appear to be in violation of YouTube's policies.¹⁵⁶ Typically, YouTube utilizes machine learning algorithms to flag potentially harmful content, which is then sent to human moderators for review.¹⁵⁷ One major consequence of the shift to a mostly automated system is that content creators who feel that their content was mistakenly taken down or demonetized may face delays in the appeals process. Although the process has not changed, decreased human content review capacity means it will take longer to assess appeals.¹⁵⁸ However, despite the delays, it is important that the company is still maintaining an appeals review process, as this is a vital source of redress and remedy in the content moderation process.

YouTube's shift in content moderation operations will undoubtedly have a major impact on the amount of content that is removed. It is therefore important for YouTube to provide periodic updates on its content moderation efforts during the pandemic. In addition, following the pandemic, YouTube should create a comprehensive COVID-19 report that highlights the scope and scale of content moderation efforts during this time, and that provides data showing the amount of content that was removed as a result of automated detection as well as human flags. This reporting will help civil society organizations and researchers further understand the use of automated tools in moderating misleading content. In addition, YouTube should expand its general transparency reporting to include more granular data on the moderation of misleading content.

WhatsApp

WhatsApp is the world's largest messaging app, with over 1.6 billion users around the globe.¹⁵⁹ The messaging platform, which was acquired by Facebook in 2014, has received significant criticism for fueling the spread of misinformation and disinformation globally, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic.¹⁶⁰

While Facebook and WhatsApp jointly post updates on their efforts through Facebook's COVID-19 information center, the fact that WhatsApp is an end-to-end encrypted messaging platform raises other challenges related to combating disinformation and misinformation. Encryption is vital for privacy and security, and therefore, managing misinformation and disinformation in an encrypted environment requires different approaches. Because the company cannot see the content of messages, WhatsApp cannot identify and fact-check misleading content and/or subsequently append warnings and explanations to such content. Instead, the platform has worked to connect users with legitimate and authoritative information related to the virus.¹⁶¹ On March 20, WhatsApp launched the WHO's Health Alert, a free tip line feature that enables users to access timely and legitimate information related to the virus, such as how it is spread, travel guidance, and information that debunks commonly circulated misinformation stories. The service was initially launched in English, and will also be available in Arabic, Chinese, French, Spanish, and Russian.¹⁶²

In addition, in early April, the company also placed new, stricter limits on the number of times a forwarded message can be shared.¹⁶³ If a message has already been forwarded five times, the receiving user can only pass it on to other chats one at a time. These restrictions are far more stringent than those that were previously introduced. For example, two years ago, WhatsApp limited forwarding to 250 groups at once, and one year ago, these restrictions were tightened so that forwarding was limited to five groups.¹⁶⁴ According to WhatsApp, the latest restrictions have resulted in a 70 percent drop in the spread of "highly forwarded messages" around the globe.¹⁶⁵

WhatsApp also has the capability to detect and ban accounts that engage in spam or suspicious behavior.¹⁶⁶ To the extent that WhatsApp is using these approaches to combat the spread of misinformation and disinformation on the service during the pandemic, the company should publish data outlining the scope and scale of these enforcement actions during the pandemic. This data should be published periodically during the pandemic as well as in a COVID-19-specific transparency report following the pandemic. WhatsApp does not currently publish this data generally. Going forward, the company should also begin publishing this data during non-emergency time periods as well.

Recommendations

As indicated by health experts around the world, the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to last for some time. It is therefore imperative that companies begin thinking about how they can combat the spread of misinformation and disinformation related to the virus while also providing transparency and accountability around their efforts. The recommendations below center on how companies can improve their efforts to connect users to authoritative information, moderate or reduce the spread of misleading content, alter and enforce advertising policies, and provide transparency around their efforts during the pandemic. This section also includes recommendations for how U.S. policymakers can encourage further accountability, and support efforts to combat the spread of misinformation during this time.

Internet Platforms

Connecting Users To and Uplifting Authoritative Information:

In the context of efforts to combat COVID-19 and health-related misinformation and disinformation, platforms should:

- Partner with reputable fact-checking organizations and authoritative entities such as the WHO, CDC, and public health organizations to verify or refute information circulated through organic content as well as advertisements.
- Fund vetted fact-checking organizations around the world to ensure that fact-checking efforts can adequately tackle the growing volume of COVID-19-related misinformation and disinformation.
- Educate users about potential attacks and scams related to COVID-19 that may appear on the platform and on methods to avoid becoming a victim of such nefarious efforts.
- Institute a public interest exception policy that enables companies to leave content that has been posted by world leaders and elected and other government officials on their services, even if the content has been fact-checked and deemed to contain misinformation. In such instances, the company should append a label to the content that provides additional context, including notice that the content has been fact-checked and contains misleading information. Companies should also direct users viewing such content to authoritative sources of information. However, where companies determine that content posted by such officials could

result in imminent harm, they should not apply this public interest policy, and should instead promptly remove the content as they would with any other user.

- Provide adequate notice to users who have engaged with misleading content related to COVID-19 in the past and direct them to authoritative sources of information.
- Conduct regular periodic reviews of algorithmic recommendation and ranking tools, and recalibrate them as necessary so they do not direct users to or surface misleading content when they search for COVID-19-related topics.

Moderating and Reducing the Spread of Misleading Information:

Companies that have specific policies related to how COVID-19 or health-related misinformation and disinformation content is moderated or downranked should:

- Remove or reduce the spread of content that has been fact-checked and deemed to contain misinformation.
- Publish a detailed description of these policies online including examples of how these policies are enforced. Companies should also provide public notice if these policies change and should include an archive of past policies.
- Explain to users to what extent content that violates these policies is reviewed and moderated by human reviewers and by automated tools. Users should be notified of any updates to these procedures.
- Provide adequate notice to users who have had their content removed or who have had their content downranked.
- Give users the opportunity to appeal moderation decisions. Given that many companies have chosen to increase their reliance on automated tools to detect and remove content at scale during the pandemic, they should enable users to appeal moderation decisions which have resulted in the removal or suspension of their content and accounts. This appeals process should be timely and should enable users to provide additional information on the case and have their case reviewed by someone new. Users who flag content and accounts should also have access to an appeals process. In addition, given the high potential for error when increasingly relying on automated tools, companies should consider not permanently suspending accounts during the pandemic.

Altering and Enforcing Advertising Policies:

Companies that have specific policies related to how COVID-19 or health-related information appears in advertisements should:

- Publish a detailed outline of their ad content and targeting policies online including examples of how these policies are enforced. Companies should also provide public notice if these policies change and should include an archive of past policies.
- Explain how the company's ad content and targeting policies are enforced and whether and how this process is reliant on automated tools and human review.
- Establish and disclose a comprehensive process to review ads and targeting categories that are related to COVID-19, as they can have significant real-life consequences. Companies' policies should require them to review ads before they are permitted to run on a platform. The company should disclose whether and how this process is reliant on automated tools and human review.
- Give advertisers who have their ads flagged or removed for violating COVID-19-specific advertising policies the opportunity to appeal these decisions. Given that companies are increasingly relying on automated tools to review ads during the pandemic, an appeals process is necessary to ensure legitimate advertisers are not undermined.

Providing Transparency Around COVID-19-Related Moderation and Enforcement Efforts:

Companies that have specific moderation and advertising policies related to COVID-19 should:

- Publish a COVID-19-specific transparency report following the pandemic that outlines the scope and scale of content moderation efforts and efforts to reduce the spread of misinformation during this period. At a minimum, this should include data on:
 - The number of accounts flagged, the number of accounts suspended, and the number of accounts removed
 - The number of pieces of content that were flagged, the number of pieces of content that were removed, the number of pieces of content that were downranked, and the number of pieces of content that were left up but labeled

- How much of the content that was flagged was identified proactively through automated tools and how much of the content was identified through human flags (from users, Trusted Flaggers, etc.)
 - How much of the content that was removed or downranked was identified proactively through automated tools and how much of the content was identified through human flags (from users, Trusted Flaggers, etc.)
 - A breakdown of content that was removed or downranked by product
 - A breakdown of content that was removed or downranked by format (e.g. video, image, text)
 - A breakdown of content that was removed or downranked by category of misinformation/disinformation (e.g. fake cures, public health, false origin narratives, claims that impact public safety, etc.)
 - The number of appeals received for action taken against content and accounts in this category
 - The number of pieces of content restored and the number of accounts restored as a result of appeals in this category
 - The number of pieces of content restored and the number of accounts restored as a result of proactive recognition of errors by the company
- Publish a COVID-19-specific transparency report that includes data on the number of listings that the company has removed and the number of sellers the company has banned for violating its COVID-19 specific policies as well as its preexisting commerce policies. This pertains to companies operating a marketplace or e-commerce service.
 - Provide periodic public updates on content moderation, advertising policy enforcement, and commerce policy enforcement efforts during the pandemic. This is particularly important given that the pandemic is likely to be ongoing for some time.
 - Expand their reporting to include information on their efforts to remove or reduce the spread of misleading content in their general transparency reports, if they do not currently publish this information.

- Create a publicly available online database of all ads in categories related to COVID-19 that a company has run on its platform. This database should include search functionality. In order to protect privacy, the information in this database should not enable the identification of users who received the ad. At a minimum, this database should disclose the following information about each of the ads in the database, including ads that were approved in error:
 - The format of the ad (e.g. text, video, etc.)
 - The name of the advertiser
 - What region the ad was run in
 - How much the spend for the ad was
 - The time period during which an ad was active
 - Granular engagement and interaction information, such as how many users saw the ad, and the number of likes, shares, and views that an ad received
 - What targeting parameters the advertiser selected
 - What categories of users the ad was eventually delivered to (i.e. what targeting parameters did the ad delivery system eventually select and optimize for)
 - Whether the ad was delivered to custom sets of users or ones generated by an automated system

- Publish a COVID-19-specific transparency report that provides a granular overview of the platform’s advertising policy enforcement procedures. At a minimum, this transparency report should disclose the following information for ads that have been flagged or removed from the platform during the pandemic:
 - The total number of ads flagged for violating the platform’s preexisting advertising content policies and its COVID-19-specific content policies
 - The total number of ads removed for violating the platform’s preexisting advertising content policies and its COVID-19-specific content policies

- The total number of ads flagged for violating the platform’s preexisting ad targeting policies and any COVID-19-specific targeting policies
- The total number of ads removed for violating the platform’s preexisting ad targeting policies and any COVID-19-specific targeting policies
- A separate breakdown of the ads and accounts flagged and removed for violating the platform’s preexisting advertising content policies and COVID-19-specific content policies by:
 - The advertising content policy they violated
 - The format of the ad’s content (e.g. text, audio, image, video, live stream)
 - The country of the advertiser
 - For companies that operate more than one platform, the product or service on which the ad was run
 - The detection method used (e.g. user flag, automated tool). Note that the identity of individual flaggers should not be revealed
- A separate breakdown of the ads and accounts flagged and removed for violating the platform’s ad targeting policies by:
 - The ad targeting policy they violated
 - The format of the ad’s content (e.g. text, audio, image, video, live stream)
 - The country of the advertiser
 - For companies that operate more than one platform, the product or service on which the ad was run
 - The detection method used (e.g. user flag, automated tool). Note that the identity of individual flaggers should not be revealed

Policymakers

The U.S. government is limited in the extent to which it can direct platforms how to decide what content to permit on their sites. However, in the context of the pandemic, the U.S. government can take certain steps to improve accountability mechanisms from platforms and to support efforts to combat the spread of misinformation.

- Policymakers should enact rules to require greater transparency from online platforms, including regular reporting regarding their content moderation, ad targeting and delivery, and commerce enforcement efforts.
- The FTC should enforce Section (5)(a) of the FTC Act, as appropriate, against businesses that engage in unfair and deceptive trade practices during the pandemic, including through online ad campaigns and e-commerce.
- Government agencies and representatives should ensure that they are disseminating verified information related to the pandemic and are not contributing to the spread of unproven or debunked information.
- Government public health officials (such as those from the CDC) and relevant agencies (such as the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the Federal Emergency Management Agency) should collaborate with internet platforms to provide and promote verified and legitimate information related to the pandemic on their platforms. These entities should also help debunk misleading claims and information using their own online accounts.
- Given the increase of misinformation-fuelled discrimination, policymakers should clarify that all offline anti-discrimination statutes apply in the digital environment. Congress and state legislatures should also enact appropriate legislation where necessary in order to fill gaps or clarify the applicability of such laws.
- Policymakers should fund vetted fact-checking organizations around the world to ensure that fact-checking efforts can adequately tackle the growing volume of COVID-19-related misinformation and disinformation across the globe.

Notes

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