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TESTIMONY OF THE PIPELINE SAFETY TRUST

Presented by:

Bill Caram, Executive Director

FOR THE

Subcommittee on Energy
of the
Committee on Energy and Commerce
United States House of Representatives

Hearing on:

Strengthening American Energy: A Review of Pipeline Safety Policy

July 22, 2025

Good morning, Committee Chair Guthrie, Subcommittee Chair Latta, Committee Ranking Member Pallone, Subcommittee Ranking Member Castor, and members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to speak today on the vital subject of pipeline safety. My name is Bill Caram, and I am the Executive Director of the Pipeline Safety Trust.


The Pipeline Safety Trust was created after the Olympic Pipe Line tragedy in Bellingham, Washington in 1999. That entirely preventable failure spilled nearly a quarter-million gallons of gasoline into a beautiful salmon stream in the heart of our community which eventually ignited and killed three boys. The U.S. Justice Department was so appalled at the operations of the pipeline company and equally appalled at the lax oversight from the federal government, that they asked the federal courts to set aside money from the settlement to create the Pipeline Safety Trust as an independent national watchdog organization over the pipeline industry and its regulators.

We work to ensure that no other community must endure the senseless grief that Bellingham has had to experience from a pipeline tragedy. Sadly, there have been many senseless pipeline tragedies and disasters since Bellingham. I am here today, hoping that we can continue to work together to help move towards our shared goal of zero incidents.


Pipeline Safety Data

Since this subcommittee held its last hearing on pipeline safety, just 18 months ago, on January 18, 2024, 18 people have been killed and 45 people have been injured to the point of in-patient hospitalization. There have been 881 reportable incidents, with over 400 of those deemed “significant” by PHMSA standards. That means there has been a significant incident nearly every day (a significant incident every 1.32 days, on average) and nearly four people killed or seriously injured every month since this subcommittee’s last hearing.


An analysis of trends within the publicly available data from the PHMSA database does not show measurable improvement. Looking at significant incidents on all systems over the last 20 years, we see insufficient progress towards lowering the number of significant incidents, let alone progress towards our shared goal of zero incidents.



For hazardous liquid pipelines, a multi-stakeholder group including PHMSA, the industry, and the Pipeline Safety Trust created a specialized metric for tracking progress, accidents Impacting People or the Environment (IPE). Looking at those incidents going back to the metric’s origin in the PHMSA data in 2010, we see a very slight downward trend. This is not statistically significant¹. We need meaningful progress.



And while we have made some progress over the last 20 years on fatalities, it’s clear that progress made early on but stalled for the last 10 years.





Integrity Management

A hallmark of pipeline safety regulations is the Integrity Management (IM) program. The regulations require operators to identify the areas of high, and sometimes moderate, consequence, and place stronger regulatory requirements on the sections of pipeline where failure could impact those areas. This program has led to some success. Due to requirements of operators to assess their pipelines with tools such as in-line inspections, causes of incidents that are more easily mitigated by these tools have decreased over time. This is most clearly seen with incidents caused by corrosion in High Consequence Areas (HCA).

¹ Using a significance threshold of $p < 0.05$

More broadly, the Integrity Management program requires an operator to identify all potential threats to the sections of pipeline that could impact an HCA, create a plan to mitigate those threats, and implement that plan. Given that, we would expect to see significantly lower incident rates within HCAs compared to outside HCAs if IM was functioning properly. However, we see similar incident rates within HCAs for gas transmission pipelines and significantly higher incident rates for hazardous liquid pipelines within HCAs.



There may be other reasons for this discrepancy besides program shortcomings. Unfortunately, I don't have any answers, but I think it's important stakeholders come together to figure out why this is happening and decide if we need to change the program. It's also important to note that PHMSA has made changes to the gas transmission IM program that are just now going into effect. The impact of those changes will take time to see. However, also important to note, PHMSA recently published an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Repair Criteria, which seeks input on making changes to IM programs. This ANPRM is written from a deregulatory perspective, hoping to alleviate operator burden and cost for repairs on defects on pipelines within HCAs. This would be the wrong direction for pipeline safety.

Recent Pipeline Failures

The National Transportation Safety Board's open investigations and recent reports give a glimpse into the current state of pipeline safety. The NTSB has nine open investigations, a very high number compared to its history, covering a host of pipeline-caused explosions in Jackson, MS, Youngstown, OH, Bel Air, MD, South Jordan, UT, Avondale, LA, Hutchinson, KS, Lexington, MO, and most recently Crestwood, IL. Recently finalized investigation reports include a million-gallon oil spill off the coast of Louisiana and a factory explosion that killed seven people. NTSB investigators, sadly, have their hands full.

In December, the NTSB held a Board meeting to discuss the 2023 UGI Utilities pipeline failure in West Reading, PA that resulted in an explosion that killed seven people and injured 11.² At the meeting, NTSB discussed the failed piece of pipeline infrastructure made from Aldyl A plastic

² Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., *UGI Corporation Natural Gas-Fueled Explosion and Fire*
<https://www.nts.gov/investigations/Pages/PLD23LR002.aspx>.

with family members of the victims present. PHMSA has known these Aldyl A components are prone to failure for decades.

The NTSB is also investigating an Enbridge pipeline explosion that occurred in November 2024 in South Jordan, UT that killed a 15-year-old child. The preliminary report finds that the pipeline was also Aldyl A.³

Just last year, in Jackson, MS, pipelines operated by Atmos Energy appear to have fueled two home explosions, one of which killed the 81-year-old wife of a community pastor. An NTSB preliminary report describes what appears to be an under-maintained system full of leaks. Neighbors had complained repeatedly about the smell of gas. Atmos didn't find any leaks it deemed to be hazardous before the home exploded.⁴

On the hazardous liquids side, we've seen two recent failures that have contaminated drinking water wells, and another incident on a chronically failing system. An Energy Transfer pipeline in Pennsylvania was discovered to have been leaking jet fuel. Evidence suggests this pipeline may have been leaking for at least 16 months, possibly much longer, after many complaints about the taste and smell of residents' water. And in December, an Enterprise Products pipeline spilled 23,000 gallons of gasoline, contaminating nine drinking water wells. And earlier this year, the Keystone Pipeline leaked yet again, this time spilling about 110,000 gallons of crude oil in North Dakota.

We still have a long way to go on pipeline safety.

5 Year Anniversary of the Denbury Carbon Dioxide Pipeline Failure in Satartia, MS

I want to take a moment to acknowledge the five-year anniversary of the harrowing carbon dioxide pipeline failure in Satartia, MS. Five years have passed since nearly 50 people went to the hospital experiencing seizures, loss of consciousness, foaming at the mouth, and many other terrifying effects of carbon dioxide exposure.⁵ Denbury's failure in Satartia laid bare many glaring regulatory shortfalls that have been clearly identified, but five years later, we haven't modernized the regulations. It took over 12 years for PHMSA to modernize regulations with lessons learned from PG&E's devastation in San Bruno. I hope it doesn't take nearly as long for PHMSA to update its carbon dioxide pipeline safety regulations with lessons learned from Denbury's disaster.

³ Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., *Enbridge Inc. Natural Gas-Fueled Home Explosion*
<https://www.nts.gov/investigations/Pages/PLD25FR001.aspx>.

⁴ Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., *Atmos Energy Corporation Natural Gas-Fueled Home Explosions and Fires* (Feb. 14, 2024)
<https://www.nts.gov/investigations/Pages/PLD24FR003.aspx>.

⁵ U.S. Dep't of Transp., Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Admin, *Failure Investigation Report – Denbury Gulf Coast Pipelines, LLC – Pipeline Rupture/Natural Force Damage* (May 26, 2022)
<https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/2022-05/Failure%20Investigation%20Report%20-%20Denbury%20Gulf%20Coast%20Pipeline.pdf>.

Economic Impact and Reliability

While economic impact and reliability are not central to the Pipeline Safety Trust's mission, I thought it prudent to address these issues in relation to pipeline safety given the significance to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce and its members.

Over the last 10 years, pipeline incidents have been reported by operators to cost over \$6 billion. Incidents on pipelines such as Colonial's refined products pipeline that supplies the East Coast with 45% of its gasoline, diesel, heating oil, and jet fuel have put critical energy reliability at risk.

Pipeline failures don't just kill people; they cost billions, disrupt energy supplies, and undermine America's energy leadership. But the same solutions that save lives and protect our environment also strengthen our economy and energy security. Underfunded oversight and weak regulations create supply chain vulnerabilities that threaten energy reliability. Every dollar invested in inspection could prevent hundreds of dollars in disruption costs.

Congressional Oversight

The Pipeline Safety Trust urges Congress to fulfill its oversight responsibilities regarding PHMSA by requesting information about the status of staff reductions. We have heard very little official news from PHMSA about how many staff members have accepted retirement resignation offers or been terminated. We have heard from news sources about the high level of turnover at the senior leadership level, which, if true, represents an enormous drain of knowledge and experience from the agency. We haven't heard anything about the losses from elsewhere within the agency, though it appears from PHMSA's website that the Community Liaison department, PHMSA's department that engages with members of the public, has gone from 13 employees to three.⁶ I hope it's obvious that three employees are not nearly enough to engage with an entire nation of people living among over three million miles of pipelines. Full staff levels at a small safety agency such as PHMSA are essential to meet its responsibilities to the public.

Also, we encourage Congress to seek answers from PHMSA to explain the sudden drop in enforcement case initiations under the first few months of new leadership. The number of cases posted to PHMSA's Enforcement Transparency website⁷ represents the lowest number of cases initiated within the first months of any administration.

Legislative Priorities to Improve Pipeline Safety

While everyone on today's panel supports the goal of zero incidents, unfortunately, as my testimony has demonstrated, we have a long way to go. I commend this subcommittee for working on pipeline safety legislation.

⁶U.S. Dept. of Transp., Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Admin, Community Liaison Services, <https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/cats.htm>

⁷ U.S. Dept. of Transp, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Admin., *Summary of Enforcement Activity: Nationwide* (May 1, 2025) <https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/summaries>.

The Pipeline Safety Trust believes that making a meaningful difference on pipeline safety involves three components: improved regulations, financially meaningful enforcement, and widespread adoption of Pipeline Safety Management Systems (PSMS). Congress can play a key role in each of these efforts.

Critical to each of these is the existence of a strong regulator, both in PHMSA and each of the state programs. Not only has the agency been chronically underfunded, Congress has also hamstrung PHMSA with statutory restrictions such as the extra burdensome cost-benefit requirement, of which PHMSA is the only safety agency laden with this onerous and overly restrictive obligation. Also, the non-application clause, forbidding PHMSA from applying certain standards to existing pipelines, prevents the agency from being as strong a regulator as necessary to ensure safe communities and a healthy environment.

PHMSA Funding and State Programs

Congress can empower PHMSA to be a stronger regulator by giving it the resources it needs, which involves a substantial increase in funding. Congress has substantially expanded PHMSA's responsibilities, but funding has remained stagnant. For example, nearly 100,000 miles of gas gathering lines have finally come under PHMSA regulations and another approximately 300,000 miles are under new reporting requirements. Also on the horizon is a new generation of pipelines carrying carbon dioxide and hydrogen, requiring new expertise and personnel. State programs, responsible for oversight of more than 80% of the nation's pipeline mileage, are also feeling the squeeze on their capacity.

Because of the lack of resources, PHMSA has been reliant on the industry it is tasked to regulate for technical expertise on rulemaking. A 2015 Politico investigation⁸ found that PHMSA is an agency "that lacks the manpower to inspect the nation's... oil and gas lines, that grants the industry it regulates significant power to influence the rule-making process, and that has stubbornly failed to take a more aggressive regulatory role, even when ordered by Congress to do so." The fundamental resource and capacity challenges identified in that investigation remain significant today.

Currently, state utility commissions and state pipeline inspectors can take over direct safety authority and oversight of intrastate gas pipelines from PHMSA. These state programs can be reimbursed by PHMSA for up to 80% of their spending. However, in recent years, no state has been reimbursed at the maximum level. In 2023, the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) wrote a letter⁹ to Congress requesting sufficient funding for PHMSA to be able to reimburse state safety grants at the 80% rate. PST agrees that state inspection

⁸ Andrew Restuccia & Elana Schor, *Pipelines Blow up and People Die*, POLITICO (Apr. 21, 2015) <https://www.politico.com/story/2015/04/the-little-pipeline-agency-that-couldnt-217227>.

⁹ Letter from Greg White on behalf of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) to House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee (Sept. 18, 2023) (regarding pipeline safety/PHMSA reauthorization legislation).

programs in good standing with PHMSA should be granted 80% of their expenditures. Thus, Congress should appropriate PHMSA with enough funding to accomplish this.

The House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure's PIPES Act of 2023¹⁰ proposed a funding increase of about 10%. PST would like to see PHMSA's budget be increased by at least 30%. This recommendation is based on factors such as inflation, PHMSA's increased authority for regulating new types of pipelines, and PHMSA's historic underfunding. Inflation has increased costs 24% since PHMSA was last authorized in December 2020.¹¹ Accounting for inflation, a 10% increase would not even be equivalent to PHMSA's previous funding levels and would in fact place PHMSA even more behind.

Rupture Mitigation Valves

Because of the statutory limitations described above, PHMSA's improved regulations on rupture mitigation valves do not apply to existing pipelines, including on older pipes in areas that could affect densely populated or ecologically sensitive areas. Arguably these are the pipelines that need this technology the most.

In 2022, PHMSA revised its pipeline safety regulations to require rupture mitigation valves (RMVs), or alternative equivalent technologies, to newly constructed or entirely replaced onshore gas transmission and hazardous liquid pipelines with diameters of 6 inches or greater.¹² The rule did not, however, require operators to retrofit older pipes because of the non-application clause found at 49 U.S.C. § 60104(b), which prohibits PHMSA from applying certain regulations to existing facilities. Because of this, PHMSA fell short of fully implementing the NTSB's recommendations made after the San Bruno tragedy.¹³ In 2024, PHMSA proposed an information collection effort regarding valves and shutoff times that could inform future rulemakings and NTSB recommendations, but that proposed effort appears to have stalled.

Excluding certain pipelines from implementation of critical safety technology based on age is dangerous. Older pipes are likely more prone to failure, and it is arbitrary to require critical safety technology on some but not all pipelines. Requiring operators to retrofit older pipelines with RMVs in High Consequence Areas (HCAs) would protect areas with more people and buildings that could be affected by a failure. Because of the nonapplication clause, however, Congress must draft self-executing language for PHMSA to have the authority to promulgate these regulations.

¹⁰ Promoting Innovation in Pipeline Efficiency and Safety Act of 2023 (PIPES Act of 2023), H.R. 6494, 118th Cong. (2023) <https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/6494/text?s=2&r=1&q=%7B%22search%22%3A%22pipes+2024%22%7D>.

¹¹ U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator* https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (calculating the rate of inflation from December 2020 to March 2025).

¹² *Pipeline Safety: Requirement of Valve Installation and Minimum Rupture Detection Standards*, 87 Fed. Reg. 20,940–992 (Apr. 8, 2022).

¹³ Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., *Press Release: NTSB Issues Response to PHMSA's Valve and Rupture Detection Rule*, (Apr. 1, 2022) <https://www.nts.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/NR20220401B.aspx>.

Carbon Dioxide Pipeline Safety

PHMSA regulations for CO₂ pipelines lack the detail necessary to ensure the safe operation of these pipelines. Given the Congressional incentives driving carbon capture and sequestration investment, many experts expect a large increase in the mileage of the nation's carbon dioxide pipelines. Once relatively rare and remote, these pipelines could soon be much more common and closer to people and communities. The Denbury CO₂ pipeline failure in Satartia, MS demonstrated the unique safety risks that these pipelines pose. An asphyxiant that is heavier than air, CO₂ can move as a plume in a dangerous and even lethal concentration close to the ground for long distances after a pipeline failure. Current PHMSA safety regulations are inappropriate and insufficient, as described in a Pipeline Safety Trust report.¹⁴

In early 2025, PHMSA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for CO₂ pipelines. PST supported the NPRM, as it contained provisions that would have drastically improved CO₂ pipeline safety but believed there was still room for improvement. Unfortunately, on January 23, 2025, the NPRM was withdrawn as part of the Trump administration's "Regulatory Freeze Pending Review" Executive Order.¹⁵

Congress should require PHMSA to re-issue its notice of proposed rulemaking on CO₂ pipelines, accept public comment, and finalize the rule within the next eighteen months.

Hydrogen Blending Pipeline Safety

Hydrogen has been highly incentivized in recent legislation such as the Production Tax Credit in the Inflation Reduction Act. Gas distribution operators are considering blending hydrogen into existing gas distribution infrastructure and the trade group the American Gas Association includes hydrogen blends of 20% as a key component of its Net Zero plan for the industry¹⁶. However, hydrogen transportation by pipeline poses many safety risks and key knowledge gaps remain. The risks run highest when the pipelines are near people. At least one operator has blended hydrogen, however that system in Hawai'i is unique enough that it cannot serve as a model for the rest of the country.

Hydrogen has a much higher flammability range than methane and is known to embrittle certain types of steel and plastic pipelines. A report on blending hydrogen commissioned by the California Public Utility Commission from University of California Riverside found an alarming number of safety risks and knowledge gaps.¹⁷ A report by Accufacts commissioned by the

¹⁴ Richard B. Kuprewicz, *Accufacts' Perspectives on the State of Federal Carbon Dioxide Transmission Pipeline Safety Regulations as it Relates to Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Sequestration within the U.S.* (Mar. 23, 2022) available at <https://pstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/3-23-22-Final-Accufacts-CO2-Pipeline-Report2.pdf>.

¹⁵ Exec. Order, *Regulatory Freeze Pending Review* (Jan. 20, 2025) <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/regulatory-freeze-pending-review/>.

¹⁶ American Gas Association, *Net-Zero Emissions Opportunities for Gas Utilities* 61 (2021) <https://www.aga.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/aga-net-zero-emissions-opportunities-for-gas-utilities.pdf>

¹⁷ Cal. Public Utilities Commission, *Hydrogen Blending Impacts Study* (July 18, 2022) <https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M493/K760/493760600.PDF>.

Pipeline Safety Trust stated that the weakest safety link for hydrogen blends in the distribution system were the pipes inside residences.¹⁸

In the same proposed information collection effort described under the valve section, PHMSA also proposed requiring operators to report blended hydrogen in their natural gas systems. Astonishingly, as it currently stands, if hydrogen remains under 50% of the gas mix in the pipeline, operators do not need to report that fact. Again, the proposed information collection effort appears to have stalled.

Congress should not allow hydrogen blends into gas distribution systems until the National Academy of Sciences has issued a report on the safety risks and knowledge gaps and PHMSA has updated its regulations.

In-Home Methane Detectors

Although pipeline operators may discover or be alerted to leaks through various activities, such as maintenance or odor complaints, these strategies will not consistently locate all hazardous leaks. When natural gas migrates through the soil into a home, the odorant may be stripped from the gas, and the resident would not be aware of the need to evacuate and alert the pipeline operator. In-home methane detectors are one method of continuous monitoring that can help the public and pipeline operators identify leaks and improve public safety. 2023 and 2024 was the deadliest two-year period for pipelines in over a decade,¹⁹ with much of those fatalities from building explosions that could have benefited from in-home methane detection.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has recommended the use of in-home methane detectors,²⁰ sometimes also referred to as natural gas detectors, to alert the public of dangerous gas leaks and prevent home explosions. Methane detectors are like smoke and carbon monoxide detectors in that they are easy to install and relatively inexpensive. Where they differ is that they can detect a gas leak well before it ignites, preventing a potentially catastrophic explosion. Multiple NTSB investigations of home explosions have determined that the presence of an in-home methane detector could have helped mitigate the consequences.

Congress should mandate the installation of in-home methane detectors in all residential and commercial occupancies receiving gas service.

¹⁸ Richard B. Kuprewicz, *Report: Safety of Hydrogen Transportation by Gas Pipelines* (Nov. 28, 2022) <https://pstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/11-28-22-Final-Accufacts-Hydrogen-Pipeline-Report.pdf>.

¹⁹ U.S. Dept. of Transp., Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Admin., *Serious Incidents 20 Year Trends* https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages&PortalPath=%2Fshared%2FPDM%20Public%20Website%2F_portal%2FSC%20Incident%20Trend&Page=Serious.

²⁰ Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., *Improve Pipeline Leak Detection and Mitigation* (Dec. 22, 2022) <https://www.nts.gov/Advocacy/mwl/Pages/mwl-21-22/mwl-rph-01.aspx>.

Fire Shutoff Valves

In the event of a fire in a structure that has natural gas service, gas distribution piping is often compromised and serves as fuel. This adds literal fuel to the fire and puts occupants and first responders at increased risk of injury and death. According to PHMSA, for this reason, it is necessary to quickly shut off the flow of gas to the structure.

It may take considerable time to complete the shutoff of gas, including notification of first responders and the gas company, arrival of first responders and gas company at the scene, determining the appropriate method to shut off the gas, executing shut off, and release of the gas in the pipe between the shutoff location and the structure. Reviews of accident reports have shown that it is not unusual for this to take hours, prolonging the emergency. Use of automated shutoff valves can significantly reduce the time to shut off gas to the structure. One such device is a fire shutoff valve (FSV), also known as a thermally activated shutoff valve.

A typical FSV uses a spring-loaded plug held in place by a fusible link made of a low melting point alloy. When the fire shutoff valve is exposed to fire, the link melts and the spring closes the valve, shutting off the gas. FSVs are typically installed in the service line either before the regulator, before the meter, or after the meter.

FSVs are commercially [available](#) and have been used in gas service lines before the gas meter and in gas supplies to appliances. Currently, there are no federal regulations requiring their use in natural gas distribution systems. They are required in Massachusetts²¹ and have been used in Germany since the 1990s. The Pipeline Safety Trust supports the widespread use of these safety devices and advocates for federal regulations that would make their use mandatory.

Congress should require PHMSA to amend subpart H of 49 C.F.R. Part 192 to require operators to install fire shutoff valves on all gas distribution service lines. Alternatively, Congress could require PHMSA to amend 49 C.F.R. § 192.1007(b) to identify fires as a threat to meters in the distribution system.

Financially Meaningful Enforcement

With few exceptions, civil penalties are not financially meaningful to operators. When we try to chart penalties levied on operators because of fatal pipeline failures against their quarterly earnings, we often can't even visualize the penalty since it's such a tiny percentage of earnings. Giving PHMSA more enforcement authority is critical to improving pipeline safety.

²¹ General Laws of Massachusetts Part 1, Title XXII, Chapter 164, Section 75 A.

Pipeline Safety Management Systems

Pipeline Safety Management Systems (PSMS) have been developed over the last ten years. Lessons have been incorporated and updated. When implemented properly it leads to better safety outcomes. However widespread adoption still eludes the pipeline industry.

PHMSA recently released its required report to Congress on the progress of the gas distribution pipeline industry towards adoption of PSMS. While progress has been made on total mileage of pipelines that are under control of an operator that has made a commitment to PSMS, only about half of the distribution operators have made that commitment. PHMSA also recently released an Advisory Bulletin encouraging the voluntary adoption of PSMS by the pipeline industry.

Congress could make a meaningful difference in pipeline safety by directing PHMSA to take steps towards widespread industry adoption beyond voluntary efforts.

Conclusion

As you discuss how to move forward on authorizing PHMSA's pipeline safety program and make improvements to the law, I implore you to think of the empty seats at dinner tables across the country because of pipeline failures. I've been with families who have lost their loved ones recently and some who lost their loved ones 25 years ago. I can tell you: the pain never goes away. Please give PHMSA the authority and the resources it needs to meet its responsibility to the American people.

Thank you.