

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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On January 6, 2021, a physical breach of U.S. Capitol Building security occurred during a Joint Session of Congress to certify the Electoral College vote. See Appendix A for the United States Capitol Police's (USCP or Department) official timeline of events leading up to and during the physical security breach.

In accordance with our statutory authority Public Law (P.L.) 109-55, the USCP Office of Inspector General (OIG) began a review of the events surrounding the takeover of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Our objectives for this review were to determine if the Department (1) established adequate measures for ensuring the safety and security of the Capitol Complex as well as Members of Congress, (2) established adequate internal controls and processes for ensuring compliance with Department policies, and (3) complied with applicable policies and procedures as well as applicable laws and regulations. The scope included controls, processes, and operations surrounding the security measures prior to the planned demonstrations and response during the takeover of the Capitol building.

Based on ongoing work, this flash report is designed to communicate deficiencies with the Department's Containment Emergency Response Team (CERT) and First Responders Unit (FRU) operations. In Report Number 2021-I-0003-A, *Review of the Events Surrounding the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol, Flash Report: Operational Planning and Intelligence*, dated February 2021, OIG reported a lack of a comprehensive, Department-wide operational plan and inconsistencies in how the Department planned to use CERT on January 6, 2021. Our work revealed further deficiencies and inconsistencies with how the Department planned to use CERT on January 6, 2021. In Report Number 2021-I-0003-A, OIG recommended that in order to improve its operational planning capabilities, USCP should implement detailed guidance for operational planning.

The Department should increase oversight and define a mission for CERT that better supports its primary mission of security and protection of Congress. Realigning CERT from the Special Operations Division (SOD) to the Protective Service Bureau (PSB) would provide the Department more opportunities for using CERT in support of protection details, congressional delegations, air operations, and motorcades. Implementing recurring training between CERT and other USCP elements it may support and assuming a greater role in pursuing appropriate, mission driven training opportunities for CERT from its Federal partner agencies would assist the Department in developing competencies within CERT that are appropriate for improving the Department's ability to achieve its mission. The Department did not have adequate, updated Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in place for CERT, and the Department did not always comply with guidance related to tactical command, communication device function checks, instructor certification, weapons qualifications, or equipment inventories.

The Department did not have adequate, updated SOPs in place for FRU operations. A lack of adequate and updated policies and procedures can create ambiguity and lack of accountability and coordination. As well, a lack of adequate policies and procedures can also inhibit readiness

for FRU and loss of Department equipment. Additionally, completion of monthly remote locking devices drills and resources such as less lethal weapons, mountain bicycles, physical access, and training are needed for FRU to successfully complete its mission. See Appendix B for a complete list of recommendations.

This is the fourth in a series of flash reports OIG is producing as part of the ongoing review of the events surrounding the takeover of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Therefore, we may still perform additional, in-depth work related to these areas during our review. We anticipate that our next flash report will focus on the Department's Command and Coordination Bureau.

## *Listing of Recommendations*

**Recommendation 1:** We recommend the United States Capitol Police (USCP) realign its Containment and Emergency Response Team (CERT) from its Operational Services Bureau Special Operations Division to its Protective Services Bureau and define a mission for CERT that better supports USCP's primary mission of security and protection of Congress.

**Recommendation 2:** We recommend the United States Capitol Police pursue additional mission-driven training opportunities for its Containment and Emergency Response Team from its Federal partner agencies.

**Recommendation 3:** We recommend the United States Capitol Police (USCP) develop and implement recurring training between its Containment and Emergency Response Team (CERT) and other USCP elements such as the Dignitary Protection Division, Civil Disturbance Unit, First Responders Unit, Crisis Negotiation Team, and any other elements CERT may deploy to support.

**Recommendation 4:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police update Standard Operating Procedure OS-110-12, *Noise Flash Diversionary Device*, dated July 9, 2018.

**Recommendation 5:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police establish policies that outline its procedures for completing advances and other recurring responsibilities it may have when supporting Dignitary Protection Division protective operations.

**Recommendation 6:** We recommend the United States Capitol Police enforce compliance with Standard Operating Procedure OS-110-02, *CERT Response Operations*, dated July 11, 2018, requirements to have a Containment and Emergency Response Team Commander present in the Command Post during high-risk events to include during any Joint Sessions of Congress.

**Recommendation 7:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police ensure that the Containment Emergency Response Team Supervisors are held accountable for completing the bi-annual equipment checks including communication device function checks.

**Recommendation 8:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police determine the number of Containment Emergency Response Team (CERT) instructors needed relative to the size of the unit and ensure that only certified instructors are conducting CERT training. Additionally, the Department should consolidate all CERT training under the Training Services Bureau.

**Recommendation 9:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police immediately enforce weapons qualification requirements for Containment Emergency Response Team officers on all assigned weapons as detailed in SOP OS-110-20, *Procedures for Containment Emergency Response Team (CERT) Operators Who Fail to Meet Weapons Qualifications*, dated June 19, 2018.

**Recommendation 10:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police ensure that Containment Emergency Response Team (CERT) Supervisors are held accountable for completing monthly equipment inventories for all Property and Asset Management Division issued equipment for each Containment Emergency Response Team officer.

**Recommendation 11:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police update SOP US-000-73, *USB Division Mountain Bikes*, dated December 22, 2017, to identify which mountain bike programs meet the Department requirement for mountain bike training.

**Recommendation 12:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police establish a Standard Operating Procedure that identifies the procedures for maintaining an inventory and proper storage of ballistic helmets and vests strategically placed around the Capitol Complex.

**Recommendation 13:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police update SOP AC-000-04, *Remote Locking Device*, dated October 1, 2018, to identify the procedure for documenting the performance of the semi-annual inspections of remote locking devices.

**Recommendation 14:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police establish a Standard Operating Procedure that reflects a requirement that First Responder Unit officers be M4 certified.

**Recommendation 15:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police explore options to secure ballistic helmets and vests at First Responder Unit posts.

**Recommendation 16:** We recommend that the Department train and provide First Responder Unit officers with additional less lethal weapon systems.

**Recommendation 17:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police provide the First Responder Unit with additional bicycles.

**Recommendation 18:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police provide First Responder Unit officers with advanced medical training similar to Emergency Medical Technicians.

**Recommendation 19:** We recommend that the Department's First Responder Unit train together as a unit concerning M4 long rifle tactics.

**Recommendation 20:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police coordinate with personnel from the Architect of the Capitol to resolve physical access issues.

**Recommendation 21:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police ensure that First Responders Unit management are held accountable for completing and documenting remote locking device drills.