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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Committee on House Administration
United States House of Representatives
May 10, 2021

Good afternoon and thank you for this opportunity to appear before you, the Committee on House Administration, to discuss our third Flash Report reviewing Counter-Surveillance and Threat Assessment.

I would like to extend my appreciation to the Committee for holding these additional hearings and for the continued support of my offices’ review. I feel that it is at the utmost importance to continue exploring and reviewing the causes and failures that led to the horrific events when the Capitol was violently attack. My goal is to provide each of you with a better understanding of how these events occurred in relation to the preparation and response of the Department. Other factors were involved and other entities are reviewing those aspects outside of USCP. I will discuss the non-law enforcement sensitive findings detailed in my third “Flash Reports.” I would be happy to answer any law enforcement sensitive questions in a “closed door” setting.

Once again, I would like to stress we did not design or intend our reports to cast blame on anyone individual or group. OIG intends these reports to be an independent objective review of the Department’s programs and operations to better protect the Capitol Complex, members, staff, visitors, as well as the rank and file officers, who have shown their commitment and bravery each and every day by keeping all safe.

In accordance with our statutory authority Public Law (P.L.) 109-55, the USCP Office of Inspector General began a review of the operations and programs that were in place prior to and during the takeover of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Our objective, for this review, is to
determine if the Department (1) established adequate measures for ensuring the safety and security of Members of Congress, their Staff and the Capitol Complex, (2) established adequate internal controls and processes that complied with Department policies and procedures and, (3) complied with applicable laws and regulations. The scope included reviewing the controls, processes, and operations surrounding the security measures prior to the planned demonstrations and the response during the takeover of the Capitol building. We made our recommendations by conducting interviews, document reviews, the combined knowledge and expertise of my staff and following best practices throughout the Federal Government of those relevant agencies with similar functions of the Department.

As our work continues, my office sees continuing areas in our findings that USCP needs addressing. Those areas are Intelligence, Training, Operational Planning, and cultural change. In regards to cultural change, we see that the Department needs to move away from the thought process as a traditional Police Department and move to the posture as a Protective Agency. Our third Flash Report reflects the continuing need for the Department to focus on the four areas of Intelligence, Training, Operational Planning and cultural change.

Based on ongoing work, this flash report is designed to communicate any deficiencies with the Department’s counter-surveillance and threat assessment operations. Deficiencies included (a) outdated or vague guidance, (b) failure to adequately report stop or contact activities, (c) lack of a dedicated counter-surveillance entity, (d) insufficient resources for supporting counter-surveillance operations, and (e) inadequate resources for supporting its Threat Assessment Section (TAS).

The Department did not adequately provide detailed and up-to-date guidance in place for its counter-surveillance and threat assessment operations, which could have led to unclear guidance and accountability. Additionally, a lack of clear and detailed communication procedures could have increased inefficiencies with processes as well as led to critical counter-surveillance information not being appropriately communicated throughout the Department. Furthermore, the Department did not adequately document, collect, and analyze PD-76 USCP
Stop or Contact Reports, which may have impeded its ability to identify trends or patterns that warranted further investigation or dissemination.

A stand-alone entity, with a defined mission dedicated to counter-surveillance activities in support of protecting the Congressional Community, would improve the Department’s ability to identify and disrupt individuals or groups intent on engaging in illegal activity directed at the Congressional Community and its legislative process. The entity should be sufficiently staffed to accomplish its mission and have adequate resources, including dedicated analyst support and a central desk to exploit, investigate, disseminate, and triage information in real time.

Although the Department has increased the number of Full-Time Employees within TAS, the section continues to experienced manpower issues. In a previous report, OIG found TAS caseloads steadily increased from the beginning of the calendar year 2017 through the end of 2019. Department officials and TAS agents stated that increased caseloads as well as staffing levels were some of the greatest challenges for TAS. TAS did not have Investigative Analysis and TAS agents performed tasks, such as database checks, that Investigative Analysts performed at other agencies. OIG found allowing Investigative Analysts to assume some responsibilities from agents would help TAS maintain a manageable caseload for its staff.

This is the third in a series of flash reports OIG will produce as part of the ongoing review of the events surrounding the takeover of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Therefore, we may still perform additional, in-depth work related to these areas during our review. We anticipate that our next flash report will focus on the Department’s Containment Emergency Response Team and First Responders Unit.

In conclusion, the Department is comprised of extraordinary men and women who are dedicated to protecting our democracy, putting their own lives in harm’s way in order for Congress to exercise their Constitutional duties in a safe and open manner. It is our duty to honor those officers who have given their lives but also ensuring the safety of all those working and visiting the Capitol Complex by making hard changes within the Department. As we move
forward, the Department is taking steps in addressing our recommendations from our previous two flash reports and I look forward to monitoring their further progress.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I would be very happy to answer any questions the Committee may have at this time.