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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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On January 6, 2021, a physical breach of U.S. Capitol Building security occurred during a Joint Session of Congress to certify the Electoral College vote. See Appendix A for the United States Capitol Police's (USCP or Department) official timeline of events leading up to and during the physical security breach.

In accordance with our statutory authority Public Law (P.L.) 109-55, the USCP Office of Inspector General (OIG) began a review of the events surrounding the takeover of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Our objectives for this review were to determine if the Department (1) established adequate measures for ensuring the safety and security of the Capitol Complex as well as Members of Congress, (2) established adequate internal controls and processes for ensuring compliance with Department policies, and (3) complied with applicable policies and procedures as well as applicable laws and regulations. The scope included controls, processes, and operations surrounding the security measures prior to the planned demonstrations and response during the takeover of the Capitol building.

Based on ongoing work, this flash report is designed to communicate any deficiencies with the Department's counter-surveillance and threat assessment operations. Deficiencies included (a) outdated or vague guidance, (b) failure to adequately report stop or contact activities, (c) lack of a dedicated counter-surveillance entity, (d) insufficient resources for supporting counter-surveillance operations, and (e) inadequate resources for supporting its Threat Assessment Section (TAS).

The Department did not have adequately detailed and up-to-date guidance in place for its counter-surveillance and threat assessment operations, which could have led to unclear guidance and accountability. Additionally, a lack of clear and detailed communication procedures could have increased inefficiencies with processes as well as led to critical counter-surveillance information not being appropriately communicated throughout the Department. Furthermore, the Department did not adequately document, collect, and analyze *PD-76 USCP Stop or Contact Reports*, which may have impeded its ability to identify trends or patterns that warranted further investigation or dissemination.

A stand-alone entity, with a defined mission dedicated to counter-surveillance activities in support of protecting the Congressional Community, would improve the Department's ability to identify and disrupt individuals or groups intent on engaging in illegal activity directed at the Congressional Community and its legislative process. The entity should be sufficiently staffed to accomplish its mission and have adequate resources, including dedicated analyst support and a central desk to exploit, investigate, disseminate, and triage information in real time.

The number of threat cases has significantly increased in the last 5 years. Although the Department has increased the number of Full-Time Employees (FTEs) within TAS, the section has experienced issues because of the increase of threats cases. Because its caseload continues to increase, TAS has been requiring more resources to keep pace with demand without sacrificing quality. See Appendix B for a complete list of recommendations.

This is the third in a series of flash reports OIG will produce as part of the ongoing review of the events surrounding the takeover of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Therefore, we may still perform additional, in-depth work related to these areas during our review. We anticipate that our next flash report will focus on the Department's Containment Emergency Response Team and First Responders Unit.

## *Listing of Recommendations*

**Recommendation 1:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police update the following standard operating procedures to reflect current practices: (a) Standard Operating Procedure PS-100-02, *Investigations Division Protective Intelligence Team Responsibilities*, dated March 31, 2009; (b) Standard Operating Procedure PS-100-03, *Investigations Division Protective Intelligence Team Assignments*, dated March 31, 2009; (c) Standard Operating Procedure PS-100-06, *Investigations Division—Criminal Intelligence Collections*, dated July 7, 2009; (d) Standard Operating Procedure PS-100-07, *Investigations Division—Suspicious Activity Trend Analysis Reporting*, November 20, 2009; (e) Standard Operating Procedure PS-100-08, *Investigations Division—Task Force Assignments*, dated July 7, 2009; and (f) Standard Operating Procedure PS-100-10, *Investigations Division (ID) Guidelines and Procedures*, dated May 26, 2010.

**Recommendation 2:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police establish a formal policy detailing communication procedures for Counter-Surveillance Agents including how and what detailed information is communicated through the chain of command and throughout the Department.

**Recommendation 3:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police establish a formal policy detailing basic and advanced training requirements for the Threat Assessment Section and Intelligence Operations Section.

**Recommendation 4:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police enforce its policies regarding completion of form PD-76, *USCP Stop or Contact Report*, for stops or contacts officers initiate.

**Recommendation 5:** We recommend the United States Capitol Police establish a stand-alone entity with a defined mission dedicated to counter-surveillance activities in

support of protecting the Congressional Community and that is adequately staffed to accomplish its mission.

**Recommendation 6:** We recommend the United States Capitol Police use Investigative Analysts to augment its counter-surveillance resources.

**Recommendation 7:** We recommend the United States Capitol Police establish a central desk staffed with analysts, agents, and officers that can exploit, investigate, disseminate and triage information for counter-surveillance activities in real time. The desk should have a dedicated commander whose focus is on that process and providing guidance and direction to agents in the field.

**Recommendation 8:** We recommend the United States Capitol Police increase the number of Threat Assessment Agents as the caseload increase.

**Recommendation 9:** We recommend the United States Capitol Police use Investigative Analysts to augment its Threat Assessment Section at an analyst-to-agent ratio comparable to its partnering agencies.

**Recommendation 10:** We recommend the United States Capitol Police consider providing more of their highest priority threat cases to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Behavioral Analysis Unit Task Force for in-depth analysis of their priority subjects.

