Countering Iranian Proxies in Iraq

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Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Trade, and Nonproliferation at the House Foreign Affairs Committee, on behalf of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, thank you for inviting me to testify. It is a privilege to present my analysis alongside Dr. Kimberly Kagan, Mr. Michael Pregent, and Ambassador Barbara Leaf, all of whose work on Iraq and Iran, as well as their service to our country, I respect and admire.

Today, I will focus my comments on Iran’s proxy strategy and militias while highlighting measures to counter these forces in Iraq. Designating Iran’s armed agents of influence can serve as a predicate for a new Iraq policy beyond the anti-Islamic State mission. It can also help implement the regional component of a more comprehensive Iran policy, which the current U.S. administration called for almost one year ago.1

Broader Iranian Motivations and Strategy

Properly orienting the present discussion about Iranian militias in Iraq begins not in Baghdad but in Tehran. The radical Khomeinist interpretation of Shiite Islam underpinning the 1979 Islamic Revolution was something Iranian revolutionaries intended for export. Despite emphasis on the prioritization of “regime survival”2 in assessments of Iranian strategy, the regime’s ideology and desire to export the revolution remain important drivers of Iranian foreign and security policy. Indeed, surveying the chaos in the Middle East in 2015, the commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds-Force (IRGC-QF), Qassem Soleimani, boasted, “We are witnessing the export of the Islamic Revolution throughout the region. From Bahrain and Iraq to Syria, Yemen and North Africa.”3 Scrutinizing that list reveals a host of conflict zones, almost all of which feature a malign Iranian element in the form of a proxy or militia group that is destabilizing the region or subverting the status quo.

Although Tehran also employs soft power methods to export the revolution throughout the region and beyond,4 the Islamic Republic’s reliance on a diverse array of militants to wield hard power abroad is unquestionable. Iran has spent nearly four decades creating, cultivating, arming, funding, and training groups in various theaters to further its revolutionary cause. Iran has also worked to

2 U.S. Department of Defense, “Unclassified Report on the Military Power of Iran,” April 2010, page 1. (https://fas.org/man/eprint/dod_iran_2010.pdf). Looking at history, the regime has always had a penchant for expediency and self-preservation, but only when backed into a corner. Notable instances include: 1) Ayatollah Khomeini’s begrudging acceptance of a United Nations Security Council-sponsored ceasefire agreement in July 1988 to end the bloody 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. Khomeini famously likened this acceptance to drinking from a “poisoned chalice.” 2) In September 2013, after years of escalating sanctions against Iran’s illicit nuclear program, Khomeini’s successor Ayatollah Khamenei called for showing “heroic flexibility,” thereby authorizing a new era of nuclear diplomacy with the P5+1 that led to the interim (JPOA) and final (JCPOA) nuclear deals.
4 For Iran’s penetration of the Western Hemisphere using this model, see: Emanuele Ottolenghi, “State Sponsors of Terrorism: An Examination of Iran’s Global Terrorism Network,” Testimony before the House Homeland Security committee Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, April 17, 2018, page 1. (http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/EO_HHSC_WrittenTestimony.pdf)
co-opt existing groups or their members. Among Iran’s longest-running and most successful attempts to do the former include Lebanese Hezbollah⁵ and the Badr Organization in Iraq.⁶ Evidence of the latter is found in Iran’s more recent arming⁷ of the Houthi rebels in Yemen.

Why Proxies?

The Islamic Republic’s proclivity for using proxies is not only consistent with its ideological goals, but also reflects a cognizance of escalation dynamics and the country’s military strengths and weaknesses.⁸ Iran uses proxies, terror groups,⁹ and militias throughout the Middle East (and in Iraq, in particular) because they enable the regime to do five key things:

- **Help mask its hand abroad:** By drawing on non-Iranian actors¹⁰ with pre-existing grievances, Tehran achieves a measure of plausible deniability in the asymmetric assaults and terror attacks it orders against its adversaries.

- **Dampen prospects for escalation against Iranian territory:** Should Iran’s “hand” be revealed, having a robust proxy network spread out across the Middle East – or even multiple groups within a single country like Iraq – can deter escalation against Iranian equities while keeping conflict localized and, most importantly, away from the Iranian homeland.

- **Play to its strengths – and its adversaries’ weakness – by operating in the “gray zone”:**¹¹ Iran’s ability to engage in graduated escalation without provoking an outright response from its conventionally superior foes highlights Tehran’s understanding of its

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adversaries’ high bar for the use of force as well as their reservations about employing that force. Iran frequently uses proxies and terror groups to impose costs on adversaries while avoiding direct retaliation, enabling Tehran to make incremental gains with limited costs.12

- **Enter conflicts at an earlier stage and shape the outcome:**13 Equipping and deploying militias to a theater of conflict is far cheaper than training and sending conventional forces. This reduced price tag lowers the bar for intervention and for the use of force by Iran and its proxies. Taken as a measure of their political commitment, an early intervention can – but does not always – enable Tehran greater say over the direction of a conflict over time.

- **Translate relatively cheap military power into durable political influence:** For Iran, a longstanding and successful relationship between a patron and a proxy moves beyond men, money, and munitions, and focuses instead on political support to co-opt key state institutions or the entire state where the proxy is active. Thus, Lebanese Hezbollah is playing an influential14 – and by some estimates, the most influential15 – role in Lebanese politics today. The same threat exists in Iraq today with respect to IRGC-backed militias.

*The Evolution of Iran Proxies’ Objectives*

Prior to the Arab Spring in 2011, Iran employed proxies for two basic purposes: conducting acts of terrorism against targets antithetical to regime interests and ideals, and subverting or co-opting central authority in states that were at odds with Tehran. After 2011, when Syria’s Assad regime was in peril, Iran surged Lebanese Hezbollah and the IRGC into the Syrian theater. Iran also created, trained, and armed Arab and non-Arab Shiite militias to rally in defense of the one Arab government Tehran could count as an ally. This soon became the model for the third type of proxy employment: militia support to shore up states aligned with, or favorable towards, Tehran. Building on Iran’s extensive proxy network in Iraq,16 a similar cadre of actors was marshaled in 2014 to reconquer territory from the Islamic State. The regime helped channel Iraqis (mostly Shiites) and other newly created proxies into the broad umbrella force called the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs). Battlefield experience for this “Shiite Liberation Army,”17 an

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16 Entities like Badr, Kata‘ib Hezbollah, and Asa‘ib Ahl al-Haq.

17 In Western parlance, this is called Iran’s “Shiite Foreign Legion.” But in 2016, an IRGC official coined the term “Shiite Liberation Army” during an interview with hardline media. See: “«فاطمیون» پیشکرایل نبرد سوریه بودند/‘فارش’، جنگیان لشکر داوطلب شهادت دارد (The Fatemiyoun Were The Forefront of The War In Syria/’The Artesh’ Has Several Volunteer Martyrdom Divisions),” *Tasnim News Agency* (Iran), August 18, 2016.
integrated multi-ethnic force loyal to the IRGC-QF that can be deployed across national boundaries in service of the Islamic Republic’s foreign adventures, marks a potentially new era in Iran’s use of proxy forces.

**Identifying Iran’s Agents of Influence in Iraq**

Shiite militias in Iraq have come a long way since the first years after the fall of Saddam Hussein, when firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) and the Badr Brigade dominated the scene. The multiplicity of militias in Iraq today is a product of the splintering of the JAM’s “Special Groups” during the Iraq War, as well as the mobilization of what became the PMU in 2014. The threat, according to experts, is that “this constellation of Iranian-backed militias is eclipsing official Iraqi institutions, and sowing the seeds of conflict for decades to come.” But more than checking or overshadowing Iraqi institutions is the threat that comes from integrating militias into the Iraqi security forces or seating them in government without vetting and disarming them, or ignoring what their true allegiances may be.

While political and religious groups lie outside the scope of this testimony, Iran-backed militias often contain some political or religious components that ground them in the state and society in which they operate. With reference to Iraq, it is important to recall that revolutionary Iran has had long-standing ties to the Da’wa party, and that Iran was once home to many Iraqi Shiites in exile, particularly during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. Iran’s continued relationship with, and cultivation of, these entities is strategic. Over time, these relationships have provided Iran with inroads into Iraq’s politics, society, and economy. As Soleimani once claimed, “We’re not like the Americans. We don’t abandon our friends.”

Soleimani’s dictums matter not only because they offer insight into the mind of a noted terrorist, but because as IRGC-QF chief, he is one of few Iranian security officials sufficiently empowered...
to have the capability to see his intentions through. Many Shiite militias have received training, weapons, or direction from Tehran, usually at the behest of the IRGC-QF. Recent news of Iranian missile proliferation to Shiite militias in Iraq should come as no surprise as it is a measure of Tehran’s fondness for, and investment in, these groups. For these militias, it is a point of pride to be visited by Soleimani on the battlefield and be photographed alongside him.

Knowing Your Enemy – Profiles of Four Key Militias

The profiles below present important details about four of the most influential Iran-backed Shiite militias in Iraq. Of those four, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba have the most overt links to Iran and to (not yet designated) elements of the Iranian threat network in Iraq. The list below is not exhaustive. There are many other Iran-backed forces in Iraq, as well as others operating in Syria and across the region. For additional information on militias operating in both theaters, I highly recommend the scholarship of my colleagues David Adesnik and Amir Toumaj, who produced 10 militia profiles for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in February 2018.

Munathama Badr (Badr)

- Name (English): The Badr Organization
- Year founded: 1982, renamed in 2012
- Current leader: Hadi al-Amiri
- Current sanctions: None

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26 For example, see: “Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq,” Stanford University, March 24, 2017. (http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/143?highlight=haqqani+network)


30 Transliterated from Arabic: منظمة بدر


• Ties to Iran: Badr sided with Iran against its fellow Iraqis during the Iran-Iraq War.\(^{33}\) Badr, which is popularly known as “Iran’s oldest proxy in Iraq,”\(^{34}\) has adopted Iran’s Khomeinist interpretation of Islam.\(^{35}\)

• Threat: Badr has effective control of Iraq’s interior ministry,\(^{36}\) strong presence in many PMU units, and retention of weaponry.\(^{37}\) Al-Amiri has reportedly threatened to topple any American-imposed government.\(^{38}\)

• Other notes:
  
  o Badr holds 22 seats in Iraq’s parliament as part of the Fatah coalition.\(^{59}\)
  
  o The militia was originally named *Faylaq al-Badr* (The Badr Corps), which was the armed wing of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (which later became the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq).\(^{40}\)
  
  o Badr partook in the offensive to dislodge the Peshmerga from Kirkuk after the 2017 independence referendum by Iraqi Kurds.\(^{41}\)

**Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH)**

• Name (English): The Hezbollah Brigades/Brigades of the Party of God

• Year founded: 2007 (with roots in 2003)\(^{42}\)

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• Current leader: Jamal Jaafar Ibrahimi (aka Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis)\(^43\)
• Current sanctions: In 2009, the U.S. designated KH as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and employed counterterrorism authorities from Executive Order (EO) 13224 as well EO 13438, which targets those who destabilize Iraq. EO 13438 also targeted al-Muhandis.\(^44\) Al-Muhandis is “subject to secondary sanctions,” according to the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control.\(^45\)
• Ties to Iran: The most recent State Department Country Reports on Terrorism notes that KH receives material support from Iran.\(^46\) KH has also received training in Iran.\(^47\) U.S. military officials have stated that KH takes direct “orders” from the IRGC-QF.\(^48\) According to Stanford University’s Mapping Militant Organizations Project, KH collaborated with Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq to create Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba.\(^49\) Al-Muhandis also worked for the IRGC, aiding in the bombings of the U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait City in 1983.\(^50\)
• Threat: KH leader al-Muhandis has threatened violence on multiple occasions against the U.S.,\(^51\) claiming the group anticipates targeting U.S forces after the Islamic State campaign.\(^52\)
• Other notes:
  o An offshoot of KH now has one seat in the Iraqi parliament under the Fatah coalition.\(^53\)

o Iran has come to rely on KH, among several other Iraqi Shiite militias, to bolster Tehran’s pro-Assad coalition in Syria.54

Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH)
- Name (English): The League of the Righteous
- Year founded: 200655
- Current leader: Qais al-Khazali56
- Current sanctions: None
- Ties to Iran: AAH is “extensively trained and funded by” Iran’s IRGC.57 According to a noted scholar, “Khazali has reportedly pledged allegiance to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.”58
- Threat: AAH claims to have carried out at least 6,000 attacks on American military and coalition forces from its inception in 2006 to the end of the Iraq War in 2011.59 The group is capable of carrying out lethal ambushes, such as the one in January 2007 that killed five American service members.60
- Other notes:
  o AAH’s political wing, “al-Sadiqoun,” won an estimated 13-15 seats in the recent parliamentary elections and was part of the Fatah coalition.61
  o The group is more than just a militia – AAH provides social services to Shiites in Iraq.62
  o AAH has sent forces to fight in Syria to defend the Iran-aligned Assad regime.63

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58 Ahmad Majidyar, “Iran-Backed Iraqi Militia Leader Intensifies Propaganda against U.S. and Its Allies,” Middle East Institute, August 1, 2017. (http://www.mei.edu/content/io/iran-backed-iraqi-militia-leader-intensifies-propaganda-against-us-and-its-allies)
Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (HHN)

- Name (English): The Movement of the Noble of Hezbollah/Movement of the Noble of the Party of God
- Year founded: 2013
- Current leader: Sheikh Akram al-Ka’abi
- Current sanctions: The U.S. Treasury Department designated al-Ka’abi in 2008, prior to HHN’s founding, pursuant to EO 13438 “for threatening the peace and stability of Iraq and the Government of Iraq.”
- Ties to Iran: Al-Ka’abi is dedicated to Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei and Iran’s vision of Islamic governance. Al-Ka’abi has met with, and is widely admired by, Iran’s revolutionary elite. Sheikh Mokhtar, Nujaba’s Syria commander, reportedly told a group of Hezbollah fighters in 2016, “We will go to defend anywhere the Islamic Republic of Iran deems necessary, because we are committed to [the] Supreme Leader.”
- Threat: The U.S. designated Al-Ka’abi for “leading attacks against members of the Government of Iraq and Coalition Forces.” Al-Ka’abi said publicly he would overthrow the Iraqi central government if the Supreme Leader asked him to do so.
- Other notes:
  - HHN partook in the siege of Aleppo.
  - In early 2017, Iranian outlets reported comments from an HHN spokesman claiming that the group had established a “special brigade” in Syria “ready to take actions to liberate [the] Golan.”

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Debating a Designation for Iran’s Proxies in Iraq

The ascendancy of Iran-backed militias in Iraq is a threat to U.S. interests since it further draws the country into Iran’s orbit and has the potential to erode U.S. influence and room for maneuver. This was recently demonstrated when militias attacked U.S. diplomatic facilities in two Iraqi cities.73 Iran-backed Shiite militias spent nearly a decade targeting U.S. service members during the Iraq War,74 cutting their teeth on the issue of resistance against America. Now, despite some setbacks,75 these groups are seeking to translate their military success76 into greater political power77 in Baghdad.

Three U.S. Presidents – George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and now Donald Trump – have relied on designations to push back on the expansive influence of Iran’s IRGC by disrupting its financial support networks, exposing its agents and affiliates, and publically stigmatizing them. It is now time to apply that approach in Iraq. It is my recommendation that the U.S. move to designate select Iranian proxies in Iraq that retain close ties to Iran and the IRGC. The legal authorities for such a move already exist, as does the evidence required for designations. This makes the main issue one of political will.

As a cautionary note, my recommendation of a terrorism designation for such entities should not preclude future U.S. actions against Iran in Iraq and in defense of Iraqi sovereignty. Designations will not do away with the Iranian proxy threat in Iraq. But they can help the U.S. approach the problem of Iranian expansionism and subversion more directly and by using all elements of national power.

Below is a brief overview of the legal authorities available to U.S. policymakers to designate elements of Iran’s proxy network in Iraq. I then summarize arguments in favor of designations, followed by an attempt to engage with and refute counterarguments to such a move.

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Survey of Legal Authorities Already in Place

- **Designation Pursuant to EO 13224**
  - Name: Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten To Commit, or Support Terrorism
  - Date signed: September 23, 2001
  - Summary of punishments: Enables the U.S. to block the assets of foreign individuals and entities related to the subject matter of the order, as well as their agents, affiliates, and associates.
  - Recommendation: To target select Iran-backed militias in Iraq with this order, since they are agents of Iran’s IRGC and are overseen by Iran’s IRGC-QF. This EO was used to designate both the IRGC and IRGC-QF.

- **Designation Pursuant to EO 13438**
  - Date signed: July 17, 2007
  - Summary of punishments: “prohibit[s] all transactions between the designees and any U.S. person and freeze[s] any assets the designees may have under U.S. jurisdiction.”
  - Recommendation: This EO can be used against militia networks in Iraq. In fact, it has already been used against the leaders of select militias, but the stigma surrounding a terrorism designation is greater.

- **Addition to FTO List**
  - Maintained by the U.S. Department of State since 1997, the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list is public, thereby naming and shaming foreign militant groups that partake in terrorism or “retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.” Listing an entity makes its members subject to a U.S. visa/travel ban, prohibits U.S. persons from supporting the listed entity, and requires U.S. financial institutions to take control of any funds in accounts linked to an FTO or its affiliates.

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Arguments in Favor of Designating Iran’s Proxy Network in Iraq

- A step towards a coherent Iraq policy
  - Righting wrongs: For several years, Washington has not had a clear Iraq policy other than its support for the anti-Islamic State mission. When it comes to the fate of Iraq, operating without a clearly articulated and operationalized vision can lead to regional perceptions of American aloofness at best and disinterest at worst. American passivity was most evident when it came to confronting issues like sectarian slaughter committed by Shiite militias,84 the response from Shiite militias to the Kurdish independence referendum in 2017,85 as well as the 2018 parliamentary election and the political crisis that has ensued. A designation against groups that have American blood on their hands in Iraq or report directly to Iran in attempts to frustrate American foreign policy in Iraq would begin to change that.

  - Signaling capabilities and newfound resolve: Designating groups like AAH and HHN signals that the U.S. does care about a wide array of issues ranging from government formation to Iraqi sovereignty, the fate of the PMU, as well as checking Iranian influence in Iraq. It also indicates that the U.S. can and will use all avenues available to produce favorable outcomes, even if it means openly angering the Iranians in Iraq.

  - Sending a deterrent message: Designating AAH and HHN sends a message to Iran’s current (and potential) partners in Iraq. There is a plethora of Iran-linked actors in the PMU86 as well as individuals seeking positions within the Iraqi government that want to subordinate Iraq’s national politics to Iranian interests. By issuing designations, the U.S. can incentivize groups to move away from Iran and lay the predicate for targeting others.
    - Given Badr’s already entrenched political and military influence, a U.S. designation may not influence its behavior. But stigmatizing AAH, which just gained a substantial bloc of seats in the Iraqi parliament, may be

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86 Nicholas A. Heras, “Iraq’s Fifth Column: Iran’s Proxy Network,” Middle East Institute, 2017. (https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/PP2_Heras_IraqCT_0.pdf)
possible and could reinforce the message that America stands with those who work in Iraq’s national interest.

- **Operationalizing the call to push back on Iran in the region**
  
  - *Building on words:* In his October 2017 address on the Iran deal, President Trump promised that he would engage with “allies to counter the regime’s destabilizing activity and support for terrorist proxies in the region.”87 In an address this month, Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook said, “We don’t make a distinction between the Iranian government and these Iranian Shiite militias that are around the Middle East.”88 These are both powerful statements, but must be followed up with concrete action. Iran is still able to support its militias in Iraq and carry out its proxy strategy, which is designed to eject America from Iraq and permanently keep Baghdad weak.

  - *Holding groups accountable:* Stigmatizing and impeding the financing of groups that have blood on their hands and meet the criteria of being an agent or affiliate of the IRGC and/or the IRGC-QF is consistent with long-standing bipartisan efforts to pressure Iran. It also represents a serious effort to prevent Iran from solidifying its hold on Iraq.

  - *Recognizing the regional challenge:* If Iran’s modus operandi in the region is to use proxies, terror groups, and militias to disguise its hand, then U.S. policy must expose Iran and its activities at every turn. By using a variety of legal and economic means to name and shame AAH and HHN, the U.S. would contest an important component of Iran’s Iraq policy.

  - *Thinking beyond Iraq:* Given that many of Iran’s Iraqi proxies are also active in Syria, designating them could have second or third order effects on a different battlefield. As Iran’s militias work to bolster the Assad regime, a designation can stigmatize those actors before they become feature into any political settlement or become legitimized.

**Countering the Counterarguments to Designating Iran’s Proxy Network in Iraq**

Below, I present four likely counterarguments to designating elements of Iran’s proxy network as well as my attempt to refute each counterargument. Whichever argument ultimately prevails, prudence and a nuanced understanding of Iran’s security strategy and Iraqi internal politics will remain essential. To be clear, there are risks to designating AAH and HHN. But if the U.S. does nothing, Iran’s subversion of the political process and security forces in Iraq will be guaranteed.

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• **Efficacy:** Designations are not effective and are at best symbolic. They will only bolster those in Iraq who peddle anti-Americanism.
  
  o The idea that designations will instantaneously dry-up funding to a terror group is a misunderstanding of the applicability of this policy tool. Designations against Iranian proxies are only a component of a U.S. strategy against Iran in Iraq.
  
  o While there are limited financial restrictions and penalties that come with a designation, these designations send an important message. This symbolism can be most effective in Iraq, with the goal to show militias – by virtue of their patronage – as agents of Iran at a time when Iraqi Shiites are grieving and have stormed an Iranian consulate.

• **Stratification:** A graduated approach to sanctions, initially focused just on militia leaders, is preferable to a blanket designation of elements of Iran’s proxy network.89
  
  o The logic behind graduated escalation – whether bombing90 or sanctions – is to incrementally increase costs to an adversary to incentivize a change in behavior. But parceling out and delaying designations at such a low level would more likely signal timidity.
  
  o The growing influence of Iran’s Shiite militias in Iraq – as well as the regime’s willingness to resort to overt punishment against targets in Iraq91 – means that it is too late to stratify and sub-divide designations. Those who sought graduated measures should have made their case years earlier, as the militia threat was forming.
    
    ▪ I do not oppose the principle of graduated pressure, but designations against an Iranian proxy should form the baseline for that pressure strategy, not its upper limit.

• **Timing:** Given the ongoing talks over government formation in Iraq, now is not a good time for sanctions.
  
  o U.S. attempts to stigmatize IRGC-linked actors while a government is forming in Baghdad could actually have a positive effect. Such a move signals U.S. resolve to push back against Iran in the region and provides backing to local actors looking to marginalize those who subvert Iraqi policy for Iran’s benefit. It will also become increasingly clear who in the Iraqi government is willing to work with a proxy of Iran instead of the U.S. That in turn, could facilitate the introduction of harsher political and economic measures.

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The desired designation – by virtue of congressional mandate – is likely to take time to be implemented. Take for example the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) of 2017. The bill offered a 90-day window for the president to designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization pursuant to EO 13224.\(^\text{92}\) It is likely that any new attempt by Congress to direct the actions of the executive branch’s hand will feature a similar countdown.

- **Harm:** Sanctioning proxies would anger Iran, which in turn could cause serious harm to U.S. personnel in Iraq

  - This is the most serious counterargument because Iran and its proxies retain the capability to retaliate against the U.S. in Iraq. However, to believe that Iran and its proxies have been entirely peaceful until now ignores hostilities such as the recent attacks in Baghdad and Basra against American diplomatic properties. U.S. designations of Iranian proxies is not the driver of violence in Iraq.
    - Contingency planning and force protection must be critical elements of U.S. policy in Iraq. However, like designations, they cannot be the only elements of that policy.

  - Despite the risk of retaliation, there is also reason for very cautious optimism. Iran has threatened massive retaliation before, but it has also backed down when faced with a firm threat of reprisal.\(^\text{93}\)

  - In October 2017, Washington ended the debate over the question of “is the IRGC a terrorist group”\(^\text{94}\) by designating it under EO 13224. Since then, the IRGC has not wrought havoc in Iraq because of that label due to its own concerns about escalation as well as responding to a non-violent move with overt violence. Moreover, the designation has helped stigmatize the IRGC and its affiliates while increasing the pressure on Iran. It is also the predicate by which the U.S. is able to designate HHN and AAH – for having ties to the IRGC and IRGC-QF.

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\(^{94}\) The debate surrounding the designation of the IRGC-QF in 2007 centered on fears of Iranian retaliation in Iraq. According to David Crist, the Bush administration wanted to target the entire IRGC, but settled on the Quds Force instead. For more on this, see: David Crist, *The Twilight War: The Secret History of America’s Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran* (New York: The Penguin Press: 2012).
Lastly, should any Iranian militia respond to a terrorism designation – a label which at least one group, AAH, openly applauds – with an act of terrorism, then that militia has only proven that it rightfully deserves the terrorist label and should be aggressively countered.

General Recommendations for U.S. Policy toward Iraq

While targeting AAH and HHN in Iran’s proxy network in Iraq is important, designations alone do not constitute a successful policy. Congress should reinvigorate its oversight role to make sure there is bipartisan synergy on U.S.-Iran policy and on regional U.S. interests like the stability of Iraq. Helping lay the groundwork for what a successful Iraq policy post-Islamic State looks like can go a long way. Below is a list of recommendations for the U.S. Congress on this matter:

- **Task and Target:** Congress should ask the intelligence community about sources of revenue of key Iran-backed Shiite militias in Iraq. This will aid in target selection if it can be assessed that harsher coercive economic tools will impede Iran’s financing of Iraqi Shiite militias. Simultaneously, Congress should require a report from the administration about sectors of the Iraqi economy (if any) that IRGC-owned or -controlled entities have penetrated.

- **Name and Shame:** The U.S. government must escalate its campaign to stigmatize Iran’s Shiite militias to keep the spotlight on Iraqi groups like AAH, HHN, and KH.

- **Inquire:** Congress should meet with members of the executive branch to determine what, if any, information operations are underway against Iran-backed Shiite militias in Iraq.

- **Upgrade:** Congress should urge U.S. government-funded Arabic language programming to better cover local events in Iraq and the rise of Iraqi nationalism, particularly in the wake of anti-Iran protests in Basra.

- **Deliver:** Congress and the administration should consider a robust non-military aid package to Iraq that can be centered on improving the lives of ordinary Iraqis.

- **Review and Reassess:** When the new Iraqi government is formed, revisit the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) between the U.S. and Iraq and look for areas to improve.

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95 "کنیم که در فهرست تروریسم آمریکا قرار داریم عراق: افتخار می‌کنیم که در فهرست تروریسم آمریکا قرار داریم" (‘Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’ of Iraq: We are Proud That We are On The Terrorism List of America), “Fars News Agency” (Iran) May 29, 2018. (https://www.farsnews.com/news/13970308000282/)


There is a need now more than ever to make sure both countries interpret the document the same way. The U.S. must clarify to the Iraqi government that integrating designated entities into the government can entail risks to the U.S.’s ability to carry out the political and economic sections of the SFA in its entirety.

- **Meet and Plan:** Continue to meet with members of the executive branch – especially the Defense Department – to red team contingency plans that include scenarios about Iraq’s political future and the integration of Iran-backed militias into the Iraqi state. The goals should be how best to secure U.S. interests should America face low-probability but high-impact scenarios.

- **Communicate:** Members of the U.S. government (and especially members of Congress) must clearly communicate that stabilizing Iraq is a national security priority. As a major oil exporting state, especially one that has seen ample American blood and finances invested in its defense and stabilization, Iraq cannot fall prey to Iran’s regional machinations. This message must be conveyed to both domestic and foreign audiences who are cognizant of the paradox of an administration that wants to be less involved in the Middle East but simultaneously more active in contesting and confronting Iran.

- **Build and Expand:** Some Gulf states are increasingly the targets of Iran’s ire and have sought ways to counter and deter Iranian aggression, both at the local and international levels. Congress and the administration should focus get these states to support a strong, stable, and sovereign Iraq to check Iran in the region and impede its use of proxies.

- **Reach out and Connect:** Congress should commence a high-level dialogue with the new Iraqi government on Iran deal-related sanctions. With the heaviest U.S. sanctions on Iran returning in early November, Iran will be looking for ways to bust sanctions using its militia and proxy networks, as well as pressuring Iraq (among other jurisdictions of weak central authority) to not enforce U.S. sanctions.98 The U.S. must educate Iraqi lawmakers, politicians, as well as banks and businesses about the risks of financial dealings with Iran after November 4. It should also make clear that despite the re-imposition of sanctions waived by the nuclear deal, America still wants its international partners to respect UN restrictions and travel bans from that deal, which Iraq has not been enforcing.99

There is an impression right now that America can do, “perhaps not much,”100 in Iraq. But targeting Iran’s network in Iraq is one way to change that. America cannot afford to cede Iraq, with its human capital, natural resources, and legacy of more than a decade of American investment in

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terms of blood and treasure, to Iran. Thank you very much for your time and attention, and I look forward to your questions.