Statement of The Honorable Frank A. Rose

Joint Hearing of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade

“Consequences and Context for Russia’s Violations of the INF Treaty”

March 30, 2017

Introduction

Chairman Rogers, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Cooper, Ranking Member Keating, Members of the Committee, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss how the United States and its Allies should respond to Russia’s violation of its obligations under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (or INF) Treaty.

Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty is an issue that I worked on closely when I served as the Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance from December 2014-January 2017. In my statement, I’d like to focus on a couple of areas. First, I’ll briefly discuss the nature of the Russian violation and the attempts by the United States to find a diplomatic solution that brought Russia back into compliance with the Treaty in a verifiable manner. Second, I’ll provide you my assessment as to why I believe Russia chose to violate the INF. Third, I’ll outline my recommendations as to how the United States and our Allies should respond to the Russian violation. Finally, I’ll share my thoughts as to whether the United States should develop a new ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) or withdraw from the New Strategic Arms Treaty (New START) in response to the Russian violation.

The Russian Violation of the INF Treaty

In the July 2014 edition of the U.S. Department of State’s annual Arms Control Compliance Report, the United States declared that the Russian Federation was in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to produce launchers of such missiles. I assure you, the United States did not come to this decision lightly. Prior to the July 2014 declaration, there was over a year of senior-level diplomatic engagements with Russian officials on the INF Treaty violation. The objective of that diplomacy was to encourage Russia to acknowledge the existence of this new GLCM, and return to compliance with the Treaty in a verifiable manner. Although these initial diplomatic efforts were unsuccessful, we continued our diplomatic engagements with Russia after the July 2014 public declaration.

Despite two additional years of diplomacy, culminating in the November 2016 meeting of the INF Treaty Special Verification Commission (or SVC), the body under the Treaty responsible

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for resolving compliance concerns, Russia refused to acknowledge the existence of the new GLCM and has shown no interest in returning to compliance with the Treaty.

According to a February 14, 2017, *New York Times* article, Russia has moved forward with deployment of the new GLCM.² At a March 8, 2017, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, General Paul Selva, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, confirmed that Russia has deployed the system. Selva stated: “We believe that the Russians have deployed a land-based cruise missile that violates the spirit and intent of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty.”³

**Russia’s Political and Strategic Rationale for Violating the INF Treaty**

Let me now turn to the question of why Russia decided to violate the INF Treaty. I think it’s important to remember that the INF Treaty was always controversial within the Soviet Union. Indeed, some in the Soviet military did not want to sign the Treaty due to the fact that as a land power, the Soviet Union was always more dependent on ground-based missile systems than the United States. However, these concerns were overruled by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev who was seeking ways to defuse tensions with the West in order to restructure the Soviet economy.

In 2005, senior Russian officials proposed that the United States and Russia “jointly withdraw” from the INF Treaty, arguing that the strategic situation in Eurasia had changed dramatically since the INF Treaty was concluded in 1987.⁴ Specifically, Russia was concerned about the emergence of medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile threats on its periphery, and argued it needed its own medium- and intermediate-range systems to deter these threats. The United States declined to take Russia up on its offer for a “joint withdrawal” from the INF Treaty. That said, given the timelines associated with the development of new missile systems, it was probably in this general timeframe that Russia made the political decision to begin developing the new GLCM.

Russia has also been modernizing its air- and sea-launched cruise missiles – which are allowable under the INF Treaty – for over a decade. These new systems have been demonstrated effectively during recent combat operations in Syria. This begs the question if Russia possesses effective – and treaty-compliant – cruise missiles, why would it violate the INF Treaty by developing a treaty-prohibited GLCM?

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In my view, there are several military factors driving Russian decision-making. First, as part of its military modernization program, Russia has been seeking to improve its theater-strike capability. The deployment of a new GLCM would almost certainly improve Russia’s ability to strike theater-level targets in both Europe and Asia. The system also supports Russia’s evolving Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) strategy, which seeks to deny the United States and NATO access to key ports, airfields, and command and control nodes during a conflict.

Second, the new GLCM would improve the survivability of Russian theater strike systems. While Russia has developed air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, ships can be sunk, and aircraft can be destroyed on the runway or shot down during flight. However, it’s very difficult to locate and destroy mobile missiles. For example, during the 1991 Gulf War, the United States and its Coalition partners flew over 3,000 sorties over Iraq with the objective of destroying Iraq’s mobile ballistic missile targeting Israel. According the most estimates, it is unlikely that the so called “Scud hunt” destroyed a single mobile ballistic missile or launcher. Russia is significantly larger than Iraq and it’s much easier to conceal mobile missile systems there. As a result, finding and destroying mobile missile systems based in Russia would be extremely difficult.

Third, there is probably a level of inter-service politics at play within the Russian defense establishment. For example, with the Russian Air Force and Navy procuring their own intermediate-range cruise missiles, it is quite possible that the Russian Army is seeking to acquire a similar capability.

In addition to the military reasons, there is also a larger political dynamic driving Russian decision-making. In my view, Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty is merely a symptom of a larger problem, that problem being that Russia believes that the Euro-Atlantic security system put in place at the end of the Cold War in the late 1980’s and early 1990s is no longer in its interest. There is a prevailing view among Russian foreign policy and security elites – not just President Putin – that the current Euro-Atlantic security system was put in place at a time when Russia was politically and militarily weak. Therefore, they believe that the current system needs to be replaced with one that better takes into account Russia’s interests.

If we look back over the last decade, it’s clear that Russia has been slowly removing the key building blocks of the Post-Cold War European security system. This process began with Russia’s unilateral suspension of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty in 2007, was reinforced by former Russian President Medvedev’s proposed European Security Treaty in 2010, Russia’s selective implementation of the Vienna Document, violation of the INF Treaty, occupation of Crimea, intervention in Ukraine, etc.

**Recommended U.S. Response Options to the Russia’s INF Treaty Violation**
It is extremely unlikely that Russia will return to compliance with its obligations under the INF Treaty. Therefore, a strong -- but proportional -- response is required by the United States and its Allies to effectively deal with Russia’s violation. In general, I would recommend that the United States and its Allies should adopt a “countervailing strategy” in response to Russia’s violation that seeks enhance deterrence by holding critical Russian assets at risk. That response should also include “limited” defensive measures to deny Russia any significant military benefit from the deployment of the new GLCM. Below are some my key recommendations for the Administration and Congress.

- **The United States should remain focused on maintaining Alliance unity.** The INF Treaty is not merely a bilateral arms control treaty between the United States and Russia, but it is fundamentally about wider Eurasian security and directly impacts the security of our Allies in both Europe and Asia. Therefore, as the United States develops response options to the Russian violation, it is critical that those actions be done is close coordination with our Allies. Not surprisingly, Russia will seek to drive wedges between the United States and its Allies by making false claims and accusations about our compliance with the INF Treaty. Continued close coordination with our Allies will help minimize Russian efforts to “wedge drive.” Furthermore, in the interest of burden sharing, the United States should seek ways to include Allies in the implementation of military response options.

- **Place the blame for the INF Treaty’s demise squarely on Russia.** From a diplomatic perspective, it is critical that the United States place responsibility for the demise of the INF Treaty exactly where it belongs -- with Russia. Under the INF Treaty, Russia has the option to legally withdraw from the Treaty, but chose not to exercise this option as the United States did when it legally withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2001. Instead, Russia chose to violate the Treaty in secret and was caught. There’s a reason for this: Russia did not want to suffer the negative political consequences of withdrawing from the Treaty. As the new Administration develops its response options to the Russian violation, I would strongly encourage them to take careful steps to ensure that the United States is not blamed to killing the INF Treaty by unilaterally withdrawing. From my perspective, this would be a gift to the Russians. Former Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control in the George W. Bush Administration Steve Rademaker took a similar approach at a July 17, 2014, hearing of HASC Strategic Forces Subcommittee. Rademaker stated: “I don't think we should respond to what we know Russia to have done at this point by pulling out of the treaty. I think from a Russian perspective that would be more of a reward than a punishment…Because from my personal dealings with them I know that they would very much like to get out from under the treaty. And so, I think they would welcome a U.S. decision to withdraw because that would obviate the need for them to withdraw.”

- **Continue to fund the modernization of U.S. strategic nuclear delivery systems.** Congress should fully fund the modernization of U.S. strategic delivery systems. This includes a new ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a new strategic bomber (the B-21), and a new air-launched nuclear cruise missile.

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(the Long-Range Stand-off system or LRSO). In particular, I want to stress the importance of the LRSO. Russia is developing increasingly sophisticated air defense systems. The LRSO will provide the United States the ability to penetrate these sophisticated air defenses, and improve our ability to hold critical Russian targets at risk.

- **Develop a conventional variant of the LRSO.** In addition to modernizing our nuclear delivery vehicles, it is also critical that the United States and its Allies improve their air- and sea-launched, conventional strike capabilities. Therefore, I recommend developing a conventional variant of the LRSO, which will allow the United States to deliver conventional payloads in heavily contested air defense environments with the appropriate stand-off range. This new system would improve upon the existing conventional variant of the Air-launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), the AGM-86 C/D or Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM). Chairman Rogers, I want to especially commend you and the HASC Strategic Forces Subcommittee for your leadership and advocacy on the need to develop a conventional variant of the LRSO.

- **Facilitate Allied acquisition of air- and sea-launched conventional strike capabilities.** We should also work closely with our Allies to improve their conventional strike capabilities. Several of our Allies and partners (e.g., Australia, Poland, Finland) currently deploy the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM). In response to the Russia violation of the INF Treaty, the United States should consider ways make JASSM available to more Allies. Additionally, we should sell Allies the extended-range variant of the missile, JASSM-ER. The JASSM-ER has a range of around 1000 km as compared to the JASSM's range of about 370 km. Finally, we should also give consideration to selling the Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) to interested Allies. A number of NATO Allies currently have the necessary infrastructure to launch the Tomahawk SLCM from their naval vessels. The United Kingdom is currently the only U.S. Ally to have purchased the Tomahawk SLCM. However, according to press reports, Poland has expressed interest in deploying Tomahawk on its new attack submarine. The United States should approve such as request if it is made by Poland or another Ally.

- **Remind Russia that NATO remains a nuclear Alliance.** We should remind Russia that NATO remains a nuclear alliance that possesses the appropriate military capabilities to conduct nuclear operations. At the NATO Warsaw Summit in July 2016, the Alliance endorsed a number of actions to revitalize nuclear planning, exercises, and burden sharing within the Alliance. I believe it is critical that NATO implement the initiatives agreed at the Warsaw Summit. Furthermore, NATO nations need to move forward with their plans to procure the dual capable version of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, and the United States must complete the refurbishment of the B61 gravity bomb.

- **Deploy “limited” cruise missile defenses to protect critical assets.** As I noted earlier, Russia is deploying this new GLCM as part of its overall A2AD strategy to deny the United

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States and its NATO Allies access to critical ports, airfields, and command and control nodes during a potential conflict. In response, the United States and NATO should deploy “limited” cruise missile defenses to protect key Alliance assets in the event of a conflict with Russia. While I support the deployment of “limited” cruise missile defenses, I would caution against moving forward with the deployment of larger set of missile defenses aimed against Russia, especially against its strategic deterrent. Such an approach would be extremely expensive, technologically challenging, and would likely encourage Russia to deploy additional missiles in response.

**Should the United States Develop and Deploy GLCMs?**

I’d also like to address the issue of whether the United States should develop and deploy its own GLCMs in response to Russia’s violation. Indeed, Chairman Rogers and Chairman Poe, I note that you have introduced legislation, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty Preservation Act of 2017, which among other things, would require the Secretary of Defense to establish a program of record to develop a dual-capable, road-mobile, ground-launched cruise missile system with a range of between 500 to 5,500 kilometers.

I am not necessarily opposed to the development of such a capability by the United States if Russia fails to return to compliance with the INF Treaty and the United States requires such a capability to meet its military requirements. However, there are a number of questions that should be asked before we begin the development of such a capability. First, are there military missions that require us to have a new GLCM that cannot be addressed with existing U.S. air- and sea-launched cruise missiles? Second, how cost-effective would it be to develop a new GLCM, especially given that the United States faces numerous budget challenges modernizing its strategic nuclear delivery vehicles? For example, would it be more cost-effective to develop a conventional variant of the LRSO instead of a new GLCM?

Third, where would United States deploy a new GLCM if we decided to develop such a system? Anyone who is familiar with the history of previous attempts to deploy ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles overseas knows how politically and diplomatically contentious such deployments have been. For example, the deployment of U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles in Europe in the 1980s was highly controversial. If the United States were to propose deploying GLCMs in Europe in response to the Russian violation, it would likely be highly controversial within NATO. Furthermore, Russia would almost certainly do everything in its power to create political problems for the Alliance.

The political challenges associated deployment of ground-based missile systems are not limited to Europe. Though the system is purely defensive, the recent deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system in the Republic of Korea (ROK) has proven to be controversial within the ROK and in the region. That said, I believe the deployment of THAAD to the Korean Peninsula is necessary to defend U.S. deployed forces and the ROK against North Korea’s medium-range ballistic missiles, in particular its large number of extended-range Scuds and No Dongs.

**Russia’s Violation of the INF Treaty and the New START Treaty**
Finally, some have argued that in response to the Russia violation of the INF Treaty, the United States should withdraw from the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). In my view, the United States should not withdraw from the New START in response to Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty. I strongly believe that the continued implementation of the New START Treaty is in the national security interests of the United States for a variety of reasons. First, it places limitations on the number of strategic nuclear systems that Russia can deploy against the United States and our Allies. Second, through New START’s on-site inspection regime, data declarations, and notifications, the Treaty provides the United States with key insights into Russian strategic nuclear forces that we might not have access to without the Treaty. Third, according to the U.S. Department of State’s *Annual Report on Implementation of the New START Treaty*, Russia is adhering to its obligations under the Treaty.\(^8\)

Unlike the existing Euro-Atlantic security system, it appears that Russia still believes that the bilateral U.S.-Russia strategic nuclear framework, of which the New START Treaty is the foundation, remains in its national interest. For example, according to press reports, during his January 2017 telephone call with President Trump, Russian President Putin proposed extending the New START Treaty by five years, as allowed by the Treaty.

The Reagan Administration had serious concerns about the Soviet Union’s compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, as result of its building of the Krasnoyarsk ballistic missile early warning radar. However, these concerns did not prevent the United States from negotiating and ratifying the INF Treaty in 1988, because despite concerns about Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty, it was felt that the INF Treaty was in the national security interest of the United States. In my view, the same holds true for the New START Treaty today.

**Conclusion**

The INF Treaty has served the security interests of the United States and its Allies in Europe and Asia for almost thirty years. The Treaty is not just a bilateral arms control treaty between the United States and Russia, but goes to the heart of Eurasian security. However, it is clear that Russia, for a variety of political and military reasons that I have outlined, no longer sees the INF Treaty as in its interest and is unlikely to return to compliance.

Therefore, a strong -- but proportional -- political and military response is required by the United States and its Allies to effectively address Russia’s violation. I would recommend that the United States and its Allies should impose a “countervailing strategy” that seeks to enhance deterrence by holding critical Russian assets at risk. That response should also include “limited” cruise missile defenses that would deny Russia significant military benefit from the deployment of the new cruise missile. These response options should be implemented in a way that maintains Alliance unity and places the blame for the demise of the INF Treaty squarely where it belongs – with Russia.

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