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**CONSEQUENCES AND CONTEXT
FOR RUSSIA'S VIOLATIONS OF
THE INF TREATY**

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

MEETING JOINTLY WITH
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM,
NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
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CONSEQUENCES AND CONTEXT FOR RUSSIA'S VIOLATIONS OF THE INF TREATY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, MEETING JOINTLY WITH THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE, *Washington, DC, Thursday, March 30, 2017.*

The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:45 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. ROGERS. This joint hearing will come to order. Since we were called away for votes at a bad time, we have agreed to dispense with opening statements from the members and go directly to our witnesses. We want to thank our witnesses for being here and taking the time to not only attend, but to prepare. We know it takes a lot of time and energy, and it is a great help to us, so thank you very much.

We have a distinguished panel with us today. The Honorable Frank Rose, former Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance; the Honorable Bob Scher, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities; and Jon Wolfsthal, did I say that right?

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. Excellent, sir.

Mr. ROGERS. Former Senior Director of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, National Security Council.

We will start with Mr. Rose. You are recognized for an opening statement.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the Appendix on page 33.]

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK A. ROSE, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL, VERIFICATION, AND COMPLIANCE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. ROSE. Great. Chairman Rogers, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Cooper, Ranking Member Keating, members of the committee, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss how the United States and its allies should respond to Russia's violation of its obligations under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces, or INF, Treaty. As I outlined in my prepared statement, I believe it is highly unlikely that Russia will return to compliance with its obliga-

tions under the treaty for a variety of political and military reasons. Specifically, I believe that Russia no longer views the Euro-Atlantic security architecture put in place in the late 1980s and early 1990s as in its interest, and it is slowly but surely trying to, I would say, dismantle that architecture, and the INF Treaty violation is a symptom of that.

Therefore, a strong but proportional response is required by the United States and its allies to effectively deal with Russia's violation. I would recommend that the United States and its allies adopt a, quote, "countervailing strategy" in response to Russia's violation that seeks to enhance deterrence by holding critical Russian assets at risk. That response should also include limited defensive measures to deny Russia significant military benefit from the deployment of the new ground launch cruise missile. This approach would include several elements.

First, I think it is important that the United States remain focused on maintaining the unity of our alliance, both in Asia and in Europe. The INF Treaty is not simply a bilateral treaty between the U.S. and Russia, but it goes to the heart of Euro-Atlantic security. So as we develop our response options, I think it is imperative we do that in a way that maximizes coordination with allies. And, furthermore, as we look at military response options, I think it is important that we find ways to include the allies.

Secondly, I think the United States needs to place the blame for the demise on the INF Treaty squarely with Russia. It is Russia who has cheated on the treaty and got caught. We need to be careful, though, that we don't unilaterally withdraw and give Russia a victory. My predecessor in the Bush administration, Steve Rademaker, in testimony before this committee in July of 2014, made the same point. We don't want to give the Russians a gift.

Third, I think it is very important that the United States continue to fund the nuclear modernization program, specifically the new air-launch cruise missile, the long-range standoff system, or LRSO. This will improve our ability to hold critical Russian targets at risk.

Fourth, I think the United States should develop a conventional variant of the LRSO. Again, this conventional variant of the LRSO will further allow us to hold critical Russian targets at risk.

Fifth, I think we should facilitate allied acquisition of air- and sea-launch conventional strike capabilities, particularly the joint air and surface standoff missile, or JASSM, and we should also consider selling the Tomahawk sea-launch cruise missile to interested allies.

Sixth, I think it is critical that we remind Russia that NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] remains a nuclear alliance, and implement all of the key nuclear recommendations from NATO's Warsaw Summit of July 2016.

And, finally, the United States and NATO should deploy limited cruise missile defenses to protect key alliance assets in the event of a conflict with Russia. While I support the deployment of limited cruise missiles, I would caution against moving forward with the deployment of a larger set of mission defense capabilities aimed against Russia, especially Russia's strategic deterrent. Such an ap-

proach would be extremely expensive and technologically challenging.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the INF Treaty has served the security interests of the United States and our allies for almost 30 years. It is not just a bilateral treaty between the U.S. and Russia, but goes to the heart of European security. However, it is clear to me that Russia is not coming back into compliance, or unlikely to do; therefore, a strong but proportional response is required. Those response options should be implemented in a way that maintains alliance unity, and places the blame for the demise of the treaty squarely where it belongs, with Russia.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rose can be found in the Appendix on page 40.]

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Scher, you are recognized for your opening statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. SCHER, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR STRATEGY, PLANS, AND CAPABILITIES, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. SCHER. Thank you. Chairman Rogers, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Cooper, Ranking Member Keating, distinguished members, thank you for inviting me to testify today. As I am sure you all know, my testimony represents my personal views only, and not those of the previous administration. And I will try to touch on just the key highlights of my written testimony, which I know will be put into the record, in this opening statement to keep lots of time for questions and answers.

Russia's violation of the INF Treaty and its deployment of the violating system must be considered within the context of Russia's overall aggressive behavior. Given this, any approach to Russia's violation needs to be considered within a complete context of a strategy towards Russia. Having said that, within this context, I believe it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to bring Russia back into compliance, but I also believe that right now, it remains in our best interests to try to get Russia to return. Having the INF Treaty in force enhances strategic stability, and continuing to be seen by our allies as working diligently with Russia is important.

The centerpiece of any policy must be approaching this with all levers of national power and using these to demonstrate that we will not allow the Russians to benefit from their violation. As such, the administration should consider taking some combination of military actions along with diplomatic and economic actions to show Russia it will not achieve the advantages it seeks by deploying this system. And further, I would argue that U.S. government policies should be oriented towards demonstrating to Russia that they are actually going to be worse off militarily and diplomatically if they continue to field this system. Certain actions clearly need to be taken or are already being taken and should be built upon. We need to better protect our forces and our allies directly from these missiles, and I believe that there should be consideration of increasing those capabilities, especially in the area of cruise missile defense. The United States and its allies must look to field systems

into and around the region that can hold at risk key targets inside of Russia, including, but not limited to, the violating systems.

The U.S. and NATO should continue to improve the readiness and presence of their conventional and nuclear forces. As the United States and NATO allies step up pressure, other actions should be considered in any review. When considering these options, however, we must realize that any policy has to strike the difficult balance between demonstrating to Russia that it cannot take its aggressive actions and expect that there will be no response, against ensuring that any actions taken to increase overall strategic stability—sorry—that any actions will increase strategic stability, not reduce it.

Some examples of military actions I described in my testimony that could be considered are: increasing deployments of SSGNs [cruise missile submarines] in and around Europe to increase strike capacity of U.S. assets in the region; fielding unilaterally and in conjunction with NATO allies broader and more sophisticated rocket artillery systems on the territory of our eastern allies; speeding up the deployment of the LRSO and quickly developing a conventional cruise missile variant; transitioning the Air Force program office overseeing LRSO development into a joint program office; and considering how to develop or how we might field a ground-launch cruise missile similar to the one Russia has apparently deployed. While consideration of this option is not a violation of the INF Treaty, clearly, many would see this as the most escalatory of the options.

Critical to any coordinated political, economic, and military set of actions that we take is that they are developed and carried out in coordination with our allies. Our alliance structure is key to our strength, and it is a comparative advantage we have over Russia. However, we also cannot afford to let NATO drift into paralysis, and must make it clear to our allies that inaction is unacceptable.

I appreciate the attention that these subcommittees have paid to this important issue. I appreciate the chance to testify in front of you, and look forward to answering any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Scher can be found in the Appendix on page 49.]

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much for that statement.

Mr. Wolfsthal, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF JON BROOK WOLFSTHAL, FORMER SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. Chairman Rogers, Chairman Poe, Ranking Members Cooper, Keating, and other members, thank you very much for the opportunity and honor of testifying today. I will just note that I am also testifying in my personal capacity, and I will ask that my longer remarks be submitted for the record. I responded to many of the questions that the committee posed, but want to frame my remarks in three guiding principles that I think should influence any decision to take action in response to INF violation, and many of these are echoed, I think, by my colleagues here.

First and foremost is anything we do must maximize alliance unity, both in NATO and in East Asia. We have to remember that this is not just an Atlantic problem, this is also something that affects Japan and South Korea.

Second, we should make sure that Russia gain no military advantage through its violations. The Obama administration, as this program was under development, took steps in that direction. The deployment of this system, I think, does necessitate other steps to ensure that is the case, and I will recommend some in a minute.

And then, third, I am very mindful, as I know my colleagues are, about the danger to crisis stability in Europe. We should be mindful not to do anything that makes that problem worse, as long as it does protect our security interests. We are in an action-reaction cycle with Russia. It doesn't mean that we shouldn't take action, but we need to understand how it will affect that dynamic, because the risk of conflict is real and growing.

I want to include one last factor that I would not put in the same category as guiding principle, but I think is important, and that is that we should remember that arms control has never been a standalone purpose. It is a tool in our toolbox. The INF Treaty has allowed us to catch the cheating of Russia in time to take response, and it is one that we can use wisely if it is in the context of a larger policy, just as we are now with the new START [Strategic Arms Reduction] Treaty, which remains very much in our interest, and I don't believe should be an area where we think about counter-measures unless and until Russia fails to comply fully with that agreement.

So to the meat of how to respond to this violation. First and foremost, I think our response should and can be diplomatic. We need to be much more forceful in how we confront Russia's actions and the damage—and be clear about the damage that Moscow is doing to the global nuclear landscape. We must move to share publicly with our allies and with the broader public information about Russia's violation that heretofore has only been shared with Russia and to our closest allies. I believe that the scale should now tip much further towards public release, because that will assist in the second step of this campaign, which is to put increased public pressure on Moscow.

Why did Moscow cheat on the INF agreement as opposed to withdrawing from it, which it is legally entitled to do and they have mentioned for many, many years as a possibility? It is because they don't want to be responsible for the collapse of an arms control treaty. And so putting the onus directly on them, I believe, may be an effective way to cost them politically and diplomatically, and might guide some of their future actions. I don't suggest it is a be-all and end-all response, but it strikes me it is a clue to their thinking.

I also think that we should be unwilling to allow Moscow to maintain its traditional role as a leader in the global nonproliferation and arms control community. That is a responsibility that you earn, one that we have continually earned, that Moscow has abdicated. And so putting pressure on Moscow in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT], the permanent members of the

U.N. [United Nations] Security Council, the P5 fora, I think are all viable diplomatic measures.

Third, I believe that we can and should take legal countermeasures in response to this violation. If the administration finds Moscow in material breach, we have the right to not only take countermeasures within the context of the INF Treaty, but also within the context of other arms control treaties that Moscow may care about more than our own. We care about the INF Treaty; Moscow clearly does not. Moscow cares a lot about other treaties, like the Open Skies Treaty, one that is not as deeply rooted in our security interests as in Moscow. And so, I think that we can work within the alliance structure to put pressure on Russia and deny them their rights to fully exercise their Open Skies Treaty rights in a way that might put additional pressure on them to come back in compliance with the INF. The benefit of this is also it puts our allies in NATO, their skin in the game. They also care about Open Skies, but they are not parties to the INF Treaty, and so showing that we going to take measures in one area may bring them to take action in others.

I will sum up also in the military sphere. Some of what I will say echoes some of my colleagues' remarks. I do not support deploying land-based missiles in Europe in response to Russia's actions. I believe that we have many better options. We have the ability, and we already have the capability, to have air- and sea-launched cruise missiles in the European theater, but I think the risks of trying to push that avenue with our allies outweigh the benefits.

I do believe that we should establish a joint program office for the new long-range standoff missile, one that would look into the possibility of a conventional variant to this nuclear program. I would actually go further. I don't believe that there is a very strong case for the nuclear-armed LRSO with a penetrating bomber, so I would redirect the entire program towards conventional, but I know that is an issue that we looked at both by the administration and this committee. But I would also make a virtue out of necessity, and make clear that we are doing this in direct response to Russia's violations, and to echo my colleague Bob Scher, that this would make it very clear that Moscow will suffer from both a security and a diplomatic standpoint as a result of their actions.

So just to echo, I would say that we clearly do need to act in response to this, but we need to take care not to overreact, and to keep our security and the goals of stability and alliance management in mind as we craft our response.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wolfsthal can be found in the Appendix on page 63.]

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. I recognize myself for the first set of questions.

Mr. Scher and Mr. Rose, in 2015, the Congress asked Chairman Dempsey to come up with a list of recommendations for the President as to how the U.S. should respond to the INF violations, and we also wanted to know what they were later, but do you know what those recommendations were that Chairman Dempsey made to the President? Did you support his military options, why or why not?

Mr. SCHER. Yes. Certainly we in the Office of the Secretary of Defense were well aware and, frankly, worked with the Joint Staff to develop those military options and did see them. I supported them all going forward as credible options in different cases. Honestly, my memory will fail as to which ones specifically I didn't support or did support, but I did think it was a very useful exercise and to make sure that a full set of options was put on the table and delivered for interagency discussion.

Mr. ROGERS. Do you know if any of them were exercised?

Mr. SCHER. Honestly, I believe very few were exercised, if any. Some of the very—the small pieces, but, in fact, in large part, many of—most of them, I believe, were not. There were, however, things that were done in conjunction with conventional forces in ERI [European Reassurance Initiative] and other places that did fulfill some of those pieces, but they were not necessarily directly related or—said to be directly related to the INF Treaty violation, but to the full suite of Russia aggressive action, which is, in fact, what we have always said we were going to do.

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Rose.

Mr. ROSE. Yeah, I would just concur. I thought that was a very useful exercise. I was involved in that. I don't remember every single option, and a lot of that was classified. I would concur with Mr. Scher's statement that not many of the specific INF-related options were exercised, but they were, I would say, include—some of the other ones were included in that broader response to the Russian threat. And I think that is a really important point to make, is that we need to put this in a larger strategic context in which the INF is part of a larger challenge that Russia is presenting. As I mentioned in my opening statement, sir, I don't think the INF is a separate thing. I think it is part of this larger picture, and that is, Russia no longer sees the Euro-Atlantic security structure put in place in the 1980s and the 1990s as in its interests.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. At this time, if there is no objection, I am going to enter into the record a letter that Mr. Poe, Mr. Cooper, Mr. Sherman, and I sent to Chairman Dempsey in January of 2015 asking for a copy of these recommendations. We have never received it. And we have fenced off money in the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] last year from the administration until we do receive it.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 81.]

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Scher and Mr. Rose, again, are you aware of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff report in 2013 stating that there are at least four validated military requirements that call for the U.S. to use military capabilities prohibited in the INF?

I am going to include a copy of this unclassified report for the record as well.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 83.]

Mr. ROSE. Sir, I didn't become assistant Secretary until late 2014, so I wasn't directly involved on the INF work attending the IPCs [Interagency Policy Committees]. I am sure it was there, but I don't recall that specific document.

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Mr. Scher.

Mr. SCHER. I also did not work on the document, but I am aware of it, but wouldn't profess to be an expert on the contents.

Mr. ROGERS. And, Mr. Scher, you heard Mr. Wolfsthal make reference to the Open Skies Treaty. Why did the Department believe it was necessary to recommend that Russia was also violating the Open Skies Treaty? I understand that both the Joint Staff and OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] jointly made that recommendation, and why was there no determination ever made?

Mr. SCHER. Honestly, I cannot speak to the why not a determination was made, in part, because actually in the way that the OSD system was set up, it was not within my purview, but also that is sort of—you know, but I do understand that that was the determination from the Department and that was the recommendation put over. I would have to leave it to others to go into the details of any conversations about why it wasn't specifically brought up.

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Thank you. I yield to Chairman Poe for any questions he may have.

Mr. POE. I thank the chairman.

The Russians have a pattern, and I think because of their pattern and our reaction or lack of reaction, we are living in fantasy land if we think the Russians are ever going to come and comply with this treaty. In 2008, the Russians violated the treaty, and the administration told Congress in 2011 that the treaty was violated, and then it took—in 2014, 2015, and 2016, the State Department confirmed that the treaty was violated. And so here we are in 2017, with all of the other actions by the Russians; 2008, we might all remember, they invaded Georgia, then they went into Crimea, and then they went into eastern Ukraine. And so they are violating the treaty at the same time they are being an aggressor nation and taking territory that belongs to other countries, and nothing has happened to any of that.

So, that is the pattern of the Russians. And here we are in 2017, 9 years after the violation, and we are talking about, okay, finally we are going to do something about this, but there are still no solutions; nothing has been done to react to this aggressive tendency by the Russians.

And I agree with you, Mr. Rose, that we should try to work on solving this in a diplomatic way, that is always the ultimate answer to getting this, but I don't think the Russians are—they are calling our bluff about this.

So what specifically can Congress do or the administration or the Department of Defense do to get the attention of the Russians, or are they just going to keep being in violation of this treaty?

Mr. ROSE. Thanks very much for that question, sir. I would say a couple of things. One, we have taken some actions with our allies, specifically at the Warsaw Summit, to respond to Russian aggression. We have the enhanced readiness initiative. And Bob Scher, in his capacity as the NATO high level group chairman, the NATO group responsible for nuclear policy, has done a number of things to make sure that the alliance has the nuclear capabilities to conduct operations should deterrence fail.

I agree with you, we have tried diplomacy. As I outlined in my statement, there was almost 4 years of diplomacy beginning in

2013 with the objective of trying to bring Russia back into compliance. Those diplomatic efforts have not worked. So that is why—

Mr. POE. Let me reclaim my time, because I only have a total of 5 minutes.

Mr. ROSE. Yeah.

Mr. POE. And you have a lot of information. We have read all of the statements.

Mr. ROSE. Okay.

Mr. POE. Meanwhile, though, the Russians continued the deployment—or development and deployment, maybe, of the violation cruise missiles.

Mr. ROSE. Yep.

Mr. POE. And so we are at a place now where all of this has not helped—

Mr. ROSE. Right.

Mr. POE [continuing]. Hasn't solved the problem.

Mr. ROSE. Right.

Mr. POE. And I understand, I can even understand the reason the Russians are not in compliance. That is pretty clear to me. So what are the options of the U.S. right now?

Mr. ROSE. I think there are a number. Specifically, I think developing a long, conventional variant of the LRSO is very, very important. And I—

Mr. POE. So we can have that development and—

Mr. ROSE. Well, we have a nuclear capable version.

Mr. POE. But not a conventional?

Mr. ROSE. Not a conventional. But let me commend Chairman Rogers and his committee, because they have been pushing for a conventional variant. So that is number one.

Number two, we can make available to our allies strike capabilities, JASSM-ER [extended range], but also Tomahawk.

And, three, I think NATO should be developing some limited cruise missile defenses to protect key command and control nodes, ports, and airfields. So those are three things that I would do.

Mr. POE. Okay. Would you agree or not that we are more concerned about the Russian violation than maybe even our NATO allies are concerned about it?

Mr. ROSE. I think some of our NATO allies. It depends. I mean, some NATO allies are more concerned than others.

Mr. POE. Last question for all three of you. Should the United States suspend our portion of that treaty?

Mr. ROSE. I would not do it at this moment.

Mr. POE. All right. Mr. Scher.

Mr. SCHER. I am not sure that gets us any benefit that we can't accrue other ways, so, no.

Mr. POE. Okay. Mr. Wolfsthal.

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. I think we can take countermeasures under the rights afforded to us in international law without withdrawing or suspending from the treaty.

Mr. POE. Thank you. I yield back.

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes the ranking member, Mr. Cooper, for any questions he may have.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to follow up on Chairman Poe's line of questioning regarding our European

friends. The primary threat of these INF Treaty violations is to Europe, right? And I am worried we care more about this than our European friends do. Is there any information you can supply us with that shows that they really do care and are willing to pay and willing to make defense adjustments?

Mr. SCHER. So I think we have—I mean, we have seen that all of the NATO allies are actually—almost all of them are making progress towards getting to a 2 percent goal, or have ceased falling in terms of their defense budgets. That is not the strongest statement I would like to be able to say, and it certainly is insufficient.

I do think that your general assessment that there are a lot of European nations who don't take this as seriously as we do is correct. I also think it, unfortunately, is a political issue in many places where there are some people who do—within countries, do take it seriously and some other members of that same governing coalition who have a harder time with it.

It is our job to lead NATO. We need to make sure that NATO is part of this answer, but we need to lead it as well. And I think one of the things that was stated in Mr. Wolfsthal's testimony, in fact, trying to ensure that we do as much as we can to make it clear that this information that we have, the intelligence we have, is absolutely right and correct and bringing people onboard. So we can wait in terms of doing something, but we can't wait forever.

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. If I may. So we have not been effective in our international diplomacy, because we have not been able to openly share the information we have about this violation. I think that would dramatically help. It would make it hard for Europeans to hide behind the "We are not sure" excuse, even though privately we have shared some of this information and they are convinced. But I think Mr. Scher's point, and I think Frank Rose would back me up on this, the Europeans are unwilling to get onboard any sort of INF response, in part, because they are not members to the treaty; and two, because we have not been clear in what it is we are trying to do. What are we asking them for? Nobody is going to give the United States a blank check in this environment, and so we need to determine what our position and policy should be, we need to work within the NATO context and keep them united, and then, I think, we have a very good chance of actually pushing back on the Russian violation.

Mr. COOPER. You don't have to be the signatories of a treaty to be the primary victims of a breach of the treaty. So that is kind of an illogical—

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. It is true that that is not an excuse. I am just trying to explain what we have heard from them. In part, however, we need to recognize the Europeans have already been targeted by Russian nuclear weapons even without the INF Treaty. Russia can strike everything in Europe with their long-range systems. What this violation actually allows them to do is use these systems against Europe and then have more weapons to strike at the United States. So it is not purely about Europe.

Mr. COOPER. Which countries in NATO care most about this violation?

Mr. ROSE. Well, sir, I don't want to get in in an open session too much into that, but I think it is fair to say our eastern allies tend

to be more concerned about the threats from Russia. And what I would also add is that, as Assistant Secretary, one of my primary objectives in 2015 and 2016 was to try to get as much intelligence information available—made available to allies. And what I would say is this: We are in a much better position now than where we were 2 years ago with the allies, and I think there is a very good foundation for the new administration to build upon.

Mr. COOPER. Final question. Is our reluctance to state the name of any NATO ally in this hearing proof of the success of Russian disinformation campaigns in Europe that makes this issue a hot potato politically?

Mr. ROSE. Well, sir, I don't necessarily think it is Russian propaganda. I think it is a concern that many of these countries cannot verify this information on their own, because, as you know, this is some of our most sensitive sources and methods, number one. And number two, they have so many other challenges with the Russians. So I would not say that.

Mr. SCHER. I would just add, I think, my belief is we will have a better chance to pull together as an alliance if we don't single people out individually. We want to do everything we can to help those within each of these countries who understand the problem fight their battle against other voices within their same countries who are having a harder time, and singling people out won't help build that alliance cohesion.

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. I would just point out, I wouldn't put this in the same category as what we are concerned about in interfering with elections and fake news. Russia has been stating, falsely, for many years, that the United States is in violation of the INF Treaty. We abide by our legal processes and ensure that we are, in fact, complying, but that muddying of the waters has been successful, in part, because we have had to keep much of this information classified. It is one of the reasons I suggest we now err on the side of release.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Keating for 5 minutes.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is great to welcome Mr. Rose, who comes from America's hometown in Plymouth, Massachusetts, and I think whose folks are still in Cape Cod, so welcome. But I want to just—we have said a lot about military response, we have touched upon some of the diplomatic response, but, Mr. Scher, in your remarks, your opening remarks, you talked about also economic response to this. And I would like to ask the whole panel, since we were just broaching on this, and I think it is important, what kind of economic responses, specifically, do you think we could undertake? I will start with Mr. Scher, since you brought it up yourself in your opening statement.

Mr. SCHER. I did, although that is a tried and true tactic of the Department of Defense to make sure that the other parts of the interagency are represented and get a voice. Fortunately, you have created this panel with that voice in mind. So I am going to defer to my State Department—my former State Department and former White House colleagues.

Mr. ROSE. Mr. Keating, what I would say is two things. First, there are very limited economic options on the table, so they would be more symbolic. I would say because of the Ukraine sanctions, that has basically sucked all the air out of the room, number one. Number two, we would likely need to implement these sanctions on our own. Most of our European and other allies don't have the legal mechanisms available to impose sanctions for the violation of the INF Treaty.

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. I would echo Mr. Rose's testimony. I think there are some limited options that we could choose if we are willing to have these be unilateral sanctions, and I think they can affect not only the Russian entities involved, but there are other countries who provide direct support to these programs. I won't get into that in this session, and I no longer have access to classified information, but I think there are some other opportunities there that bear digging into, and happy to talk about that off-line.

Mr. KEATING. I also want to touch on the possibility—and I hope it isn't a possibility—that, indeed, you know, actions like this could be used later on as creating a bargaining chip for other negotiations, and what comes to my mind is Crimea, and the danger, I think, in having this activity where they take this action, and then all of a sudden in other discussions, having them say, well, we are going to stop the suspension of this and conform to it in exchange for something else. I look at that as a terrible downward spiral that would have great implications. But can you comment on that kind of reaction or the use of this, you know, under those circumstances?

Mr. ROSE. Mr. Keating, that is a really good question, and it leads me to another point. I am not trying to dodge your question, but I think what it tells me is that we really need to have strategic stability discussions with the Russians. I am known, both publicly and privately, for being very tough on the Russians. However, we are not talking to them about the fundamental issues associated with strategic stability. So one of my key recommendations to the new team is that they initiate, not an arms control negotiation, but a set of discussions focusing on better understanding their strategic concerns and the Russians better understand our strategic concerns. I think that is very, very important.

Mr. SCHER. I think, Congressman, the only thing I would add is that your caution is well-taken. When you are looking at this as a broad set of issues, as you have to, and then a broad strategy with Russia, what we need to make sure we don't do is fall into the trap of if they do something bad, then we give them something to return to the situation it was before. That is a net win for them.

Now, if you look at it in a, you know, specific context, you might be willing to do that in order to gain overall, but it is always a concern about what we do. We have seen that pattern of behavior in North Korea, we have seen it all over the place, and it is something that we do need to watch for and, frankly, it is something, I think, we need to make sure that our alliance watches for as well. And simply by highlighting it, we actually go a long way to not letting that go down that path.

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. I agree with those comments. I would remind people there was a suggestion, I can't remember if it was during the transition or early in this administration, that perhaps we

would trade a new round of arms control with Russia in exchange for lifting sanctions over Crimea, and it doesn't work that way. We have to prioritize. We know that Russia is suffering as a result of these sanctions. I think it is one of the reasons you have heard us talk about not wanting to link INF directly to the Crimea sanctions, and that is something we are just going to have—we have to chew gum and walk at the same time.

Mr. KEATING. That is why I highlighted the question. And I wanted Russia to know that this Congress realizes the dangers in doing that. And I think I can speak for most of my colleagues, they are not going to go down that road.

I yield back.

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Franks, for 5 minutes.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Scher, I will direct this first to you. You know, I heard, I think, pretty compelling indications from you and Mr. Rose specifically that it was going to be very difficult to bring the Russians back into compliance, because obviously, they have already deployed systems in contradiction to that, and it seems like a real challenge; but in the interests of open pursuit here of that goal, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Brian McKeon testified on two occasions that DOD [Department of Defense] was going to recommend three categories of military response options to convince Russia to return to compliance under the treaty. These included active defenses and counter-force and countervailing military capabilities.

Mr. Scher, could you give me some examples of these capabilities as he may have been indicating?

Mr. SCHER. Certainly. I think—so in the active defense realm, that is—the majority of that is pointed at, you know, cruise missile defense, specific missile defense around specific areas, and I think that, as I said in my testimony, the written testimony, cruise missile defense, I think, is something that we don't do as good a job on as we would like to, as I think we should, and we need to kind of look at that as well as, you know, missile defense. We should not, however, get caught in the trap of believing that there is ever going to be enough missile defense, because it cannot ever get to the point where we can outspend our adversary of missiles versus missile interceptors; but we can get to the point where we can protect critical infrastructure, and that is something I think we might want to take a look at doing more.

The countervailing—the two other pieces are strike assets, and one is the concept is looking at how can you take out the offending—the actual offending, you know, system, and, certainly, we have many forces in and around the region that can do that. Then there is also saying we don't have to go just after the offending system, but we can go after other things that Russia holds of value, and obviously, those same effect—same that we have, you know, in terms of everything air-, ground-, sea-based, can go after those assets. And I think what all of us recommend, certainly I know I recommend it, is that we need to continue what we have done in terms of the European Reassurance Initiative, something that Congress has funded a number of years in a row and I hope continues to fund, so that we can move more forces more regularly in and

around the eastern parts of our NATO alliance, and that we can bring firepower there, as well as encouraging our allies to step up to the plate and purchase more systems that can be integrated into the NATO alliance.

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Rose, I am just taking off of what Mr. Scher said. Did any of these capabilities that Mr. McKeon indicated, did they really ever get developed to any extent?

Mr. ROSE. Well, you know, some of these capabilities, for example, JASSM-ER, extended range JASSM, we are deploying that, and that gives us the ability to hold conventional targets at risk with conventional weapons.

With regards to some of the nuclear things that we talked about for deterrence that we are procuring, the duel-capable F-35. So some of these things—

Mr. FRANKS. We are on our way in some of those areas?

Mr. ROSE. Yeah. Some of those areas.

Mr. FRANKS. But does it remain your opinion that it is going to be extremely difficult to pull Russia back into compliance?

Mr. ROSE. Sir, I think it is going to be extremely difficult to pull Russia back into compliance.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, the reason I emphasize that, obviously, is if that is our stated conclusion, then it certainly puts a great deal of emphasis on the question of how long we want to remain tied to its restrictions as well.

Mr. ROSE. Sir, can I just add, I just want to reemphasize the importance of alliance unity. And as the new administration moves forward, I would think that whatever they do, they want to be in close coordination with our allies in both Europe and Asia.

Mr. FRANKS. All right. Final question, and I will start with you, Mr. Rose. Do you think that—I mean, sometimes I have an opinion on the questions I ask, as you might imagine, but has Russia violated the Open Skies Treaty?

Mr. ROSE. What I would say, and I don't have access to classified information, if you look at this year's—or last year's compliance report, we had many compliance concerns about Russian implementation of the treaty.

Now, my understanding is that the administration is working with allies to resolve those compliance concerns, but we are not there yet. So we have certain—I wouldn't say it is a violation, but we certainly have compliance concerns.

Mr. FRANKS. And, Mr. Scher, would you characterize it that way?

Mr. SCHER. Yes. I think I always like to take my lead from the State Department colleagues about compliance issues, but it is certainly a concern for the Department of Defense.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I just want to add my list to those concerns. So with that, I will yield back.

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes Mrs. Davis from California for 5 minutes.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for joining us. Just taking from the discussion about NATO, and I am sort of trying to get a sense of where it falls on a range of issues that we have with our counterparts, a few of us will actually be joining them in a few hours overseas, and so I just wanted to get a sense.

Mr. Scher, you said that you would prefer to err on the side of releasing some of the information so that they could have a greater sense of what the challenges are. Is that something that—or Mr. Scher—Mr. Wolfsthal—I am sorry. Mr. Wolfsthal, I think you said that. I am sorry.

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. If it sounded smart, I usually—

I do think that we need to be more public about the information that we have and we need to be sharing it more widely within NATO. There is always a tension between not burning a source with inside the intelligence community, and revealing that information, because it will allow the Russians to take countermeasures and we won't have that source anymore. But I think now, particularly with the system reportedly in deployment, there is much more information, and even visual information that can be deployed diplomatically in the alliance and just as a public diplomacy campaign that can be very effective in galvanizing some support within NATO; but I also think we have to do that with the thought in mind what is it we want to do once we get that support, and so they have to be linked together.

Mrs. DAVIS. Yeah. I think part of my concern was in having those discussions, if they were appropriate, that it also might mean that we would take some actions in terms of deploying in Europe, and whether or not that would create some feeling of confidence in what we are doing as opposed to a real pushback.

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. I think that is exactly right, ma'am, and I think you have heard all of us talk about there is a great danger in the idea that we would move or suggest that we would move to deploy ground-based strike capabilities in Europe in response to INF. First, I don't believe, and I, again, have been out of the administration for several months, that the military believes that that is a military necessity or requirement. Without that, then I think we would risk alliance unity, because some countries might be willing to support it and others will be very much opposed. And having, I think, all of us work through the decision in the 1980s to deploy both GLCM [ground launched cruise missile] and Pershing II, I won't say it nearly broke the alliance, but it fed into the Soviet strategy of weakening it, and I don't think we need to do that at this point.

Mr. ROSE. Ma'am, can I just add on that point, I am not necessarily opposed to ground-based capabilities, but I think there are a couple of questions that you want to ask before you move down this road. One, do we need this to meet our military requirements? Two, is it cost-effective? And three, where are you going to deploy it? And having negotiated a number of basing agreements, I understand how challenging it is to put capabilities in foreign governments. And I—

Mrs. DAVIS. I guess I would ask—I am sorry, because my time is running out. I would just add, I mean, and is it the appropriate response to their violation of the INF?

Mr. ROSE. Ma'am, I would not recommend doing a GLCM in response. I think we can do what we need to do with sea- and air-launch capabilities.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Rose. Can I ask you, and I hope you can feel free to be forthcoming, does the State Department now

have the appropriate staffing level and expertise to deal with this issue as well as other issues that are out there, given the personnel shortfalls, and obviously the desire to slash the State Department budget?

Mr. ROSE. Ma'am, let me say this: I thought we had a good team when I was there, but we have a problem getting younger staff into the State Department. And this is a real problem, because we are losing expertise and we are not training the next generation. I gave a plea to the transition team when I left, is we have got to find a way to get younger people into the State Department. So previously, I thought we had a good team, but that was the concern that I had, is that we did not have a mechanism to bring junior staff, and we have a dearth of people who understand these issues.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. Mr. Wolfsthal.

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. If I can just make a point, I will be very quick. I was very honored in the administration to actually run an inter-agency process. I would convene Deputy Assistant Secretaries of State, Assistant Secretaries of State, and we would prepare materials up to the Deputies and the Secretaries to make decisions.

This administration has not yet even appointed people at those levels in the Defense or State Department. There are people available, and I think it is to our detriment to not have a fully staffed interagency in something that I think—it is not surprising that they may be a little slow off the mark, but it is something that worries me in terms of our ability to respond.

Mr. SCHER. Just to go back to your other point, even though I don't believe right now we need to field ground launch cruise missiles, I don't think it is proper for us to take it off the table, nor do I believe anyone is suggesting it. It is a real capability with real effects. If it didn't have real effects, the Russians wouldn't be fielding it. And I don't think it is something we should necessarily take off the table, because, depending on the combination of assets, it can be very effective, and can be very cost-effective, but it has got to be looked at in broad case and we have got to do it with our alliances. I don't think we are there yet, but as you noted in my testimony, I think it behooves us to take a look at it, and I think Russia will pay attention to that.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Brooks, for 5 minutes.

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Scher and Mr. Rose, what are some of the factors the United States should consider prior to the extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty?

Mr. ROSE. I would say a couple of things. One, is it in the interest of the United States to maintain the New START Treaty. My view is yes. You know, despite all the concerns that we have with INF, I believe it is in our interest to maintain the New START Treaty, because it puts limitations on Russian forces, and furthermore, it provides us insights we would not necessarily get from our national technical needs. But the bottom line is, are they in compliance. And two, does it serve our national interest?

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Scher.

Mr. SCHER. I would mirror exactly what was said, but obviously my focus is on, is it in the U.S. national interest? I believe it still

is, as long as they are not violating, and as long as we continue to have the ability to inspect and do other pieces, so, worthwhile.

Mr. BROOKS. All right. A follow-up question for Mr. Scher and Mr. Rose, but on a different treaty. Now, we have heard suggestions from some corners that we should try to multilateralize the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. According to unclassified reporting, Iran has roughly several hundred intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles that would be prohibited and have to be eliminated if Iran came under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Similarly, Pakistan has hundreds of missiles that would have to be eliminated—or limited by the treaty. China has at least 1,500. In what world would these countries agree to just give up these missiles? That is the first question. And, second, is there a risk that multilateralizing the INF will only give Russia a convenient excuse for its illegal behavior?

Mr. ROSE. Sir, what I would note is that in 2007, the United States and Russia proposed the idea of multilateralizing the INF, so it is not a new issue. However, I would caution, I would say, one, we should not entertain this idea until Russia comes back into compliance with its obligations under the treaty. And secondly, and I think you hit the nail on the head, it would be very difficult to get North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, China, and India to agree to give up their ballistic missiles. So I don't think it is very much a viable idea at this point.

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Scher.

Mr. SCHER. Yeah. I don't think that is the world in which we live right now.

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Wolfsthal, they were both briefer than I anticipated they might be. Would you like to comment on either of those two sets of questions?

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. I am as surprised as you are, sir.

On the multilateralization, I agree; I think it is not realistic to think that we will have a multilateral treaty that bans INF. I guess I would frame my response the following: What we are seeing Russia do is not just an action. They are reacting to the fact that we have developed tremendous military capability to protect our allies, and that they feel that they have not been able to do the same.

We have now seen them come online with both air- and sea-launch cruise missiles, as they demonstrated in Syria. And so while I think that they are not likely to come back into compliance with INF, I think we do need to be talking to them at a military level, and at a political level, to understand how we can reduce the risks of unintended and accidental conflict, and that could involve some agreement regarding how and when we would deploy certain capabilities in response to how and when they deploy certain capabilities.

I am not suggesting we validate what they are doing, because they have violated a treaty that has been ratified by the United States and there should be consequences for that, but we need to understand the broader context in which that is happening.

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Nevada, Ms. Titus, for 5 minutes.

Ms. TITUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am glad we are holding these hearings today about Russia's violation of the INF Treaty, because given the administration's potential ties to the Russian administration, I think it is very important that the congressional committees on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services keep a close eye on our relationship with Russia and what is happening in this area.

We have heard a lot from all of you on the panel about the need for alliance unity. In fact, Mr. Rose and I think Mr. Wolfsthal opened with that. That was your number-one recommendation, that we do it. But I am afraid that we are not going to be able to do it, given the set of circumstances that exist today. Just in the last 70 days of the Trump administration, we have had our allies disparaged and insulted; we have had conflicting information and opinions and positions come out of the administration on where we stand on NATO; we have had a Secretary of State who said he doesn't even want the job, his wife told him to do it; you mentioned, yourself, dozens of empty appointments at top levels, so I don't know who is going to be having these discussions that you think we need to have; and we have got a State Department budget that is cut by 30 percent.

Would you comment on that, whether you are even optimistic that we can do anything about holding anybody accountable, or set a new set of standards moving forward? All three of you.

Mr. ROSE. Well, ma'am, let me just say, every administration, it takes a little bit of time to get up. So let's hope that over the next couple of months, we see some solid appointments by the President. And I am actually encouraged to see some of the people at the Pentagon who I have worked with in the past. But the bottom line, I will come back to your point: Our allies are an asymmetric advantage of the United States. It is what makes the United States the United States. It is something Russia and China don't have. So we, in our foreign policy, should be doing whatever we can to maximize the benefits of those alliances, because those alliances provide us so many benefits from a diplomatic perspective, but also a military perspective.

Ms. TITUS. I couldn't agree more.

Mr. SCHER. You have listed an appropriate and a large set of problems that we have to face to overcome to get the 28 nations of NATO to agree to things. I would suggest that we have always had a lot of things to get over to get 28 nations to agree to pretty much anything, so I hold that while it sounds daunting, I still hold out some hope. And to emphasize the point that Mr. Rose made, we are better off with a less good solution in 28 countries working together than with the perfect solution and not having the alliance held. You have to believe—it is, as Frank said, an asymmetric advantage. If Russia didn't resent the fact that we had this and didn't think this was a plus on our side, they would not work so hard to try to divide it, and we can't let that happen.

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. I am an eternal optimist, and so I believe that things that are readily self-apparent, like maintaining a strong alliance is helpful to the United States, will take root and be endorsed

and blessed in any administration. And we have seen evidence in the past of skepticism when it comes to other things that I believe are self-evident; cooperative threat reduction and helping to eliminate stocks of nuclear, chemical, biological materials around the world was something quite controversial in the early Bush administration. They came to embrace that. So I think there is hope, but I think we have to keep reminding the body politic of exactly why we have NATO and why it benefits us.

Ms. TITUS. Thank you. All three of you mentioned the word “hope,” so we now have a foreign policy based on the concept of hope. I hope it works. Thank you. And I yield back.

Mr. ROGERS. I think the gentlelady. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Garrett, for 5 minutes.

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will just start with Mr. Rose. It is safe to say, based on the cost to procure and develop, that the IRBMs [intermediate-range ballistic missiles] and MRBMs [medium-range ballistic missiles] that we discussed and addressed in the INF, are cheaper and more readily available than an ICBM, correct?

Mr. ROSE. I think that is a fair assessment, sir.

Mr. GARRETT. And it is also fair to say, based on the Pershing platform and the Griffin platform and Soviet-era platforms, that the technology to fill that gap if we were to essentially flip the switch to off exists today, correct?

Mr. ROSE. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GARRETT. And we could also presumably upgrade that Griffin system, that land-based Tomahawk cruise missile that we abandoned with the INF to the Block IV capability pretty much with the flip of a switch, correct?

Mr. ROSE. I would have to go into the specifics, but I am—

Mr. GARRETT. Well, and we can't go into but so many specifics, but—

Mr. ROSE. Yeah. Yeah.

Mr. GARRETT. In the theoretical abstract world.

Mr. ROSE. Theoretically, absolutely.

Mr. GARRETT. So I am looking at a New York Times article, which is entitled “Russia Deploys Missile, Violating Treaty, Challenging Trump,” specifically addressing new Russian land-based cruise missiles. And, again, I would source it from The New York Times. We don't have any current capability, nor do our allies in the European theater, to match this. Am I correct?

Mr. ROSE. Sir, what I would say is we don't have ground-launch capabilities with a range between 500 and 5,500. Sorry. However, we do have a series of capabilities, air- and sea-launch capabilities, that I can believe—I believe holds at risk what the Russians view as critical, and I think we need to continue to improve those capabilities. I would just add, I am not opposed to a GLCM.

Mr. GARRETT. Let me—I am not hostile to you, but I have a finite amount of time. We have no idea what our generation 5 aircraft can do against the S-300, S-400.

Mr. ROSE. I don't know.

Mr. GARRETT. We just don't know. So we think we have a capability. I guess what I am ultimately driving at is, if the multilateralization of the treaty is not an option, because people who want

to be ICBM players can't afford it, and the Soviets can essentially replicate capabilities for cheaper by virtue of violation of this treaty, and there are no ramifications today, right? The Obama administration addressed the potential deployment as early as 2014, now the present administration has a quandary, is it not in our best interest to encourage our European allies to do what was suggested earlier, and that is start picking up some of their own weight, as they are not signatories to the INF Treaty, and the United States is already carrying a lot of water for a lot of people in a lot of places.

Mr. ROSE. Sir, I think there are things that our allies should do, specifically, purchasing JASSM-ER and Tomahawk. On ground-launch cruise missiles, my point is this, do we have a military requirement? Is it cost-effective, compared to, for example, developing a conventional variant of the LRSSO, and where would we deploy it? I want to emphasize that, because this is controversial in some allies within NATO, and we don't want to give the Russians an opportunity to create mischief.

Mr. GARRETT. Mr. Chairman—Mr. Scher, am I pronouncing that correctly? I had the opportunity to speak with the defense minister in Germany in February, and very gently and tactfully, I would like to believe, suggested that that 2 percent expenditure on defense was a welcome addition that the Germans as they are aware, are the long pole in the European defense tent. You know, we can spend money on this, or our allies can spend money on this, ironically having the benefit, potentially, of helping us help them, if you don't mind me grabbing from the movie Jerry Maguire. What is to stop our allies from taking this responsibility, and what is the best way to convey this request in a diplomatic and tactful manner so that we can live in a safer world?

Mr. SCHER. I think the key is, certainly—and nobody—you know, in my past job, and I think all of us made the point to the European allies that they had to start pulling more weight than they had been doing previously. Two percent is a nice figure. It is a good talking point. It is not the extent of what we need them to do. In some cases, I would argue some countries need to do more; in some cases, maybe they can do less, but do more elsewhere.

Having said that, it is a nice target, frankly, and a target that most of the NATO countries are not meeting.

As much as it would be great to be able to focus only on the violation, I think we have to look at the Russian aggression writ large, use that as the piece to make it clear to our allies, both in Western Europe and in Eastern Europe, that there is a concern and a problem. The Eastern Europeans understand it inherently; the Western Europeans have conflicts within their own populace. We need to help that process along and get them to spend more and do more. If it is ground launch cruise missiles, maybe, who knows, but more has to be done.

Mr. GARRETT. I just hope the Russians don't force their hands sooner rather than later.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Washington State, Mr. Larsen, for 5 minutes.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize. I have a little bit of a variety pack of questions, but certainly related to the big topic we are talking here.

But some—Mr. Wolfsthal, I will start with you. You mentioned—we have all talked about the Open Skies Treaty. This is not a bilateral treaty, right? So why is it important, therefore, to consult our allies in any discussion about using the Open Skies Treaty with regards to Russia?

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. So we have been working with our allies over our concerns regarding Open Skies and Russia for many years. I think that has been a very fruitful exercise. It has been—as we have been able to work with them so they understand our concerns, and we have also supported our allies when Russia has been selectively complying in ways that affect them.

My suggestion, that we think about countermeasures for INF violations in the Open Skies context, was a response, in part, to the fact right now, Europe aren't members to INF but they are members to Open Skies. And so if we wanted to try this approach, we would have to coordinate in advance with the allies. But I think we have a firm legal basis, both within the Open Skies and the INF context, that that might have some potential to actually motivate them a bit more. Because we have to view all of these treaties as a network. They are designed to create stability and predictability in the European theater. Russia's undermining them means that they cannot, and that is something that directly affects us and our European friends.

Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Rose, do you have any comment on that?

Mr. ROSE. I would agree with my former colleague from the NSC [National Security Council].

Mr. LARSEN. You don't have to anymore, you know.

Mr. SCHER. It is fun.

Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Scher, could you talk a little bit about this question that came up a couple of days ago at our HASC [House Armed Services Committee] hearing with General Scaparrotti, the request to have a full division, an additional division in the European theater, and how that—do you have thoughts from your past life in how that would fit into the signaling part of deterrence as we have the capabilities here, or does it? What would the use be other than to have 10,500 more troops, U.S. troops, in the European theater?

Mr. SCHER. So I will admit to have not gone—not done my homework to go back and see what General Scaparrotti proposed.

Mr. LARSEN. Sure.

Mr. SCHER. But I think you need to have enough forward presence of U.S. forces to demonstrate clear commitment to the alliance, and deterrence to the adversary.

There is a point at which you would like to have all the forces you could ever imagine and want there, but you won't be able to because there are commitments that we have elsewhere. I would—I think that having a maneuver division—the capability to have a maneuver division in Eastern Europe on a short amount of time is an incredibly important—important in terms of both deterrence to show our will to Russia, and real capability and assurance. More than that, certainly, would add, but also, you would have to look

at the broader context of strategic stability. Does that actually make Russia want to do more and put more forces forward. So there is a balance there. And also, recognizing that we never had enough forces on the continent to win. That was not the goal of our forces, even during the height of the Cold War. The focus was forces there, and then you pull forces forward, you know, from the continental United States and elsewhere if you needed it.

We shouldn't imagine that forces that are in Europe are going to stop any, you know, push by Russia, should they so choose with no warning, but we need to have enough to demonstrate to our allies that we are there, and to Russia that we are not—

The exact numbers are always—it is an art rather than a science. A full maneuver division with all of the enablers that go along with it to land quickly and be able to maneuver immediately is critically important. I don't know how much more than that we need. I would leave that to the folks who are still in office.

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, sure. The reason I am asking the questions is in the context of this particular hearing, because I think all three of you have made the case that a tit-for-tat on INF Treaty really isn't the—wouldn't be the top option for us to take, that there are many other options that we ought to consider before we get to the point where we pull out of the INF, just because the Russians are not in compliance.

Mr. SCHER. And I would say the—you know, there is certainly a political aspect to the INF Treaty violation, without a doubt.

Mr. LARSEN. Yes.

Mr. SCHER. There is a real operational piece as well of what those missiles, if deployed at scale, could do, and what they hold at risk within NATO. So that is how I would argue that my successors in the Department of Defense need to think about this. So what military capability can we bring to make sure that those don't achieve an overwhelming balance of power on the Russian quickly and immediately.

But it is a real capability, make no doubt about it. It is hard to find; it is hard to take out; it is hard to defend against; and it is immediate and quick. You don't have to do any movement for them to suddenly hold at risk a lot of NATO. We won't be able to counter all of it, but can we make it clear that our forces will be there, they will be affected, we will be part of that war immediately and that—but critically, that the NATO alliance will go at it together.

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The Chair will now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mast, for 5 minutes.

Mr. MAST. Thank you all for your testimony. I say this very seriously, it ranked among some of the best testimony that I have had the opportunity to read. I really did enjoy it. You know, in that, I am going to focus primarily—as much as I love the kinetic side of things, I am going to focus on more of the other side of things.

And I want to point to you, first, Mr. Wolfsthal and some of your comments. I find myself just a little bit confused by them, and I think we can find ourselves in a good place, maybe by clarifying them. You made some of these comments: You know, in the last administration it was very clear that violations of arms control treaties would be confronted and have consequences. But in a—you

know, in a different piece you said: Up until now, the U.S. has been reserved in its condemnation of Russia. And then in another place, you know, you said about the Russkies, that they shouldn't be allowed to gain a military advantage, and then went on further to say: You know, to this point, the Russians have been allowed to pretend that they are a responsible nuclear actor, and that very specifically—this is what interests me—we should no longer provide cover for that posture of them pretending to be a responsible actor.

So I want to know, you know, diplomatically, what can we learn from the past so that we don't make that same mistake going forward in the next 8 years? What cover was provided to them that we should do that now going forward? What did they miss? What do we need to learn from that so they don't give us the political middle finger in this?

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. Sure, Congressman. Thank you, and thank you for the thoughtful reading and response.

Russia is a nuclear power. They have the largest nuclear arsenal outside of our own, and they have the ability to destroy the United States and any other country that they choose. We recognize that they have that capability. But at the same time, they also have been very active in working with us over many decades to support the cause of nonproliferation. We worked with them very closely for 20 years to enhance nuclear security. They had been active supporters in trying to deal with the challenge of nuclear Iran. But over the last 5 to 10 years, we have seen a lot of that cooperation ebb. And, so, we still go through the motions in places like the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, inside the United Nations Security Council, inside the P5 meetings of nuclear states on nonproliferation, and treat them as coequals. We have chosen not to take that fight that we have, and the very serious concerns, into those fora, because we don't want to do further damage to the nonproliferation system, because that matters to us, too. We care about people complying with the NPT and putting pressure on North Korea.

My point was simply that we should be very clear and direct in those fora that Russia is not living up to its historic responsibility, that we in the United States are, and that Russia has a lot of work to do if they want to be a legitimate international actor in those areas.

Mr. MAST. They do have a lot of work to do, unquestionably. But I really want to get to, you know, can you see any specific points beyond that cover that we have given them—and that is an important word, “cover”—and beyond that, I would ask you to follow up with, do you see us having to readdress—obviously, you know, there is going to be another nuclear posture review going on, but our nuclear strategy in general? You know, we have gone through the tide of years from mutually assured destruction all the way up to selective ambiguity. Do you see a need to readdress what is our nuclear strategy?

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. Very specific point I would make, in my private capacity, is I think we should not engage Russia in the P5 on nonproliferation and nuclear security. I think that we should resolve back down to the P3 with us and the British and the French. The

Chinese can be supporters in that. That, I think, has limited effect, but I think it is something that we can do and that would send a very strong message to Russia diplomatically.

In terms of the Nuclear Posture Review, every President has the right, and I think should put their stamp on nuclear policy. What are nuclear weapons for? Why do we have them? When would we consider using them? Those are critical decisions that only the President of the United States can answer.

We worked very hard to make sure that our policy was supportive in the Obama administration of our global nonproliferation efforts and our global efforts to prevent the use and spread of nuclear weapons. And I think in that, we were very effective.

The Trump administration has, quite frankly, spoken on multiple sides of the issue: Let there be an arms race on the one hand, but it would be great if we could get rid of all weapons on the other hand. These are issues that I think a fully formed interagency needs to wrestle with, and that the President needs to digest and internalize before putting a stamp on them. But I think there is room for adjustments, both towards real reductions—I think we have more nuclear weapons than we need—but we may want to have more strategic ambiguity if that is the desire of the President, that is his right as the President.

Mr. MAST. Thank you for your comments. I appreciate it. I yield back, sir.

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Schneider, for 5 minutes.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to, as well, thank the witnesses. I will concur. I found the testimony very helpful, and I appreciate you sharing your experiences with us.

As I read through the testimony last night, as I have listened this afternoon, one of the common threads that seem to run through all of your testimony is this emphasis on maintaining unity, maintaining unity with our allies.

And I would like to discuss in the little bit of time that we have, both short and long term. I will start with the short term. In the short term, if each of you could expand, on what opportunities are there that you would highlight for the administration and for Congress? What are some of the cautions you would give us? And the key priorities we should focus on short term?

And, Mr. Rose, we will start with you.

Mr. ROSE. With regard to the allies?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes.

Mr. ROSE. With regard to the allies, number one, I would focus on implementing—

Mr. ROGERS. Your microphone needs to be turned on.

Mr. ROSE. Sorry. Sorry, sir.

With regard to the allies, number one has to be implementing the recommendations of the Warsaw Summit, both on the conventional side of the house but also on the nuclear side of the house.

Number two, improving their strike capabilities, in a conventional area, specifically JASSM-ER as well as Tomahawk. And, three—and this is something that is bipartisan—we need to continue to push our allies to spend more on defense. This is—you

know, it is not just the Trump administration who has been pushing this pressure on the allies, but it has also been the three or four previous administrations. So those would be my key recommendations. But you are right, sir, alliance unity is key, and the Russians are trying to undermine alliance unity.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. Mr. Scher.

Mr. SCHER. I think Frank is showing his Department of Defense roots. He has, I think, ably put forward some of the key elements. Following up on the commitments is always critical, continued spending. But I also think we need to—frankly, they need a sense of predictability, right? We need to both be able to tell them they need to do more, while simultaneously ensuring that they know that we will be there. That it is in our interests, not anybody else's, for us to be a part of the NATO alliance, and that we are better off because more things—we get to fight away games. We get to be out into other places. That is directly and foremost in our interests. Maintaining that alliance is critical. They should never—we should never lose fact—lose sight of that. They should not lose sight of the fact they benefit by being in the alliance just as much as we do.

I think with—you know, because those are the facts of the case, in my opinion, it should be easy to push forward with alliance management if we can do it deftly and make sure that they both spend more, continue to move forward on the Warsaw commitments, but also realize that the world is changing around them.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Wolfsthal.

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. I would say in the near term, we need to understand that tone and form matter, that we need to be prioritizing the schedule of the NATO Summit; we need to be prioritizing the visits by the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Members of Congress, the House, the Senate. We need to show that this is the most important military alliance on the face of the planet, and has preserved the peace for two generations plus, and talking about NATO as an integral part of our defense strategy is part of that. And I don't mean that to be a partisan comment. I think you can put pressure on NATO for spending. You can put pressure on them to take their defense requirements more seriously, but in the end, we have to talk as a responsible international leader, because that is what the United States is.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Great. Thank you.

In the minute left, I know it is not fair to put you on the spot like this, but Mr. Rose, you used the term “strategic stability discussions.” In the context of where we are today, what is happening—we talked about the State Department earlier—to what extent have our strategic stability considerations changed, and how do we effectively communicate those, both to people in the State Department, but to the outside world as well?

Mr. ROSE. Sir, what I would say is this: We need to reestablish a forum to talk with the Russians on strategic stability issues. That doesn't mean moving forward with a new negotiation, but we don't have that mechanism. We tried at—the last couple of months of the Obama administration to reestablish that mechanism; the Russians decided not to move forward. However, I strongly encouraged the new administration to begin a very serious discussion with Russia about strategic stability.

And, furthermore, that relationship over the last 25 years has been based on further strategic reductions. I think we may be in a different place. I am not necessarily convinced that the Russians are interested in further strategic reductions; however, I think it is in our mutual interests to maintain stability, and we should take actions to encourage that.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. Obviously, an issue that needs more than 5 minutes, but I very much appreciate your input. And I yield back.

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, for 5 minutes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much.

Does the INF Treaty—it covers, basically, intermediate-range and cruise missiles? Is that what we are talking about? Okay.

Let me just say that some of the premises of this discussion has been one that is disturbing to me. And let me just ask: Is it your premise that if there was a nuclear exchange, we should be preparing for a situation where we could come out of a nuclear exchange with some warfighting capabilities left? I mean, when you are talking about we need to defend, with missile defense, some particular storage or some capabilities, if there is ever a nuclear exchange. Do you believe that we could have a limited nuclear exchange with the Russians?

Mr. ROSE. Sir, no. Why I am such a supporter of the modernization is we want to deter that from happening. And the best way to deter a nuclear exchange is to have capable U.S. nuclear forces.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, certainly. But anything but capable nuclear forces that are after an exchange, I will have to say that if there—do we believe that if Russia actually invades Western Europe that they—that that would happen without a nuclear exchange? That we would not, then, move forward? That there wouldn't be rockets going off? That they would take the chance of just going in and allowing us a first strike? That is a—anyway, is that—it makes no sense, when I am listening to you, talk about these things.

Quite frankly, we—as you are aware, we have enough weapons to destroy them instantaneously.

Do we believe that the Russians have a plan to invade Western Europe?

Mr. SCHER. So I won't touch on whether—on the intel perspective. The key from the Department of Defense is we need to plan as if they would, and as if they do. And planning to do that—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Is part of our plan that they can invade, and we wouldn't have a nuclear exchange?

Mr. SCHER. We would love—yes, absolutely. If they do not use nuclear weapons, I would argue that we have sufficient—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You actually—any sane person who thinks that there would be a massive invasion of Western Europe, and there wouldn't be a nuclear exchange is living in la-la land.

Let me ask you this: When you say about—when we have—okay. Are sea-based and air-based nuclear weapons, you know, the cruise and intermediate-range weapons, are they covered in the INF Treaty?

Mr. ROSE. No, sir. The INF Treaty only deals with ground-based capabilities.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. Okay. So when we have maneuvers, which we have had in Estonia, when we put—by the way, when we put our—have our maneuvers right on their border, and we are not expecting them—that to have an impact on their view of the world, when we do that, if we have B-52 bombers flying from England as part of the maneuvers that we have had in the Balkans, is the B-52 bomber capable of carrying these cruise missiles, and these intermediate-type range nuclear weapons?

Mr. SCHER. Yes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. We have ships that have also been part of these maneuvers in the Balkans—excuse me, the Baltics. Are the ships that we send there, are they capable of carrying these nuclear weapons?

Mr. ROSE. Well, sir, my understanding—and I will defer to Bob—is that we made a decision in the early 1990s to remove nuclear-tip cruise missiles from our surface ships, but we do maintain the ability, and deploy conventionally armed Tomahawks.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The answer is, yes, they are capable of this?

Mr. SCHER. No, sir.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We have—and we are complaining about the Russians and their intent with developing some weapons that are now in their country, but now we are sitting engaged in sending to their border—to their border, weapons systems that can deliver these very same nuclear weapons.

Mr. SCHER. And they are doing the same to us. In fact, I would argue that their exercises on their border with NATO allies are even more provocative.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. They are doing it to us. They are doing it in their country. We are not in our country. We are—they are doing it—you know, we had—I just had a hearing a couple of weeks ago on the Baltics. And, no, I personally don't buy that when Russia has maneuvers inside their own country versus us having maneuvers on their border is the same. No. When they have maneuvers in their country, just like we have maneuvers in our country, it is not something that, in some way, we should look at as a hostile act. They might even be a defensive act, perhaps us flying our B-52 bombers right at them, and then turning around at the last minute, or our stationing ships that deliver nuclear weapons, perhaps that—and perhaps sending more armored units right up to their border in the Baltics, perhaps that is the reason they have those maneuvers.

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Scher, you were wanting to make a response.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, please.

Mr. ROGERS. I would like to hear your response.

Mr. SCHER. First of all, just to be clear, despite the fact that surface ships could theoretically retain the capability to launch nuclear weapons, they currently do not have them on, that can't always be the case, necessarily, but we do not have that capability, period, full stop. Secondly—

Mr. ROGERS. Go ahead. I want to hear your statement.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You are here. That is right.

Mr. SCHER. We all—we all have—you know, everyone gets to see the exercises going on in different perspectives. I would argue that a Russian exercise on its border out of its garrison that is oriented towards NATO allies is something that we need, as an alliance, to understand and respond to. It is certainly a potentially vicious cycle, and wonders—you know, but I would argue that we, in the alliance, have done nothing to make it clear that we—we have done nothing that says we are looking to invade Russia. Russia has done all of—many things that make it very uncomfortable, and we are there to protect the alliance and make it clear that our commitment to our allies is as steadfast as it always has been, and that an invasion of, an attack on, any ally is the same as if it were on the United States per our treaty commitment.

Mr. ROGERS. I want to thank all the witnesses. Your testimony has been very enlightening and helpful to these committees.

And with that, we are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MARCH 30, 2017

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 30, 2017

**Opening Statement of Hon. Mike Rogers,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
Joint Hearing of the Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on
Strategic Forces and the Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on
Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
“Consequences and Context for Russia’s Violations of the INF Treaty”
March 30, 2017**

Good morning.

This Joint House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces/House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade hearing on the “Consequences and Context for Russia's violations of the INF Treaty” is hereby called to order.

I note this is the third joint hearing of these two subcommittees on this subject since 2014.

I want to thank Chairman Poe and Ranking Member Keating, along with my Ranking Member, Mr. Cooper, for the seriousness and bipartisanship with which we have focused on this very grave matter.

In fact, I’m not sure if it gets more bipartisan than for two Republican Majority subcommittees to convene a hearing with an entire panel of witnesses from the other party.

But this has not, and should not, be a partisan matter.

The violations of the INF treaty are a particularly acute symptom of a very dangerous disease: Russian revisionism and belligerence under the dictator Vladimir Putin.

I fear that our failure to confront Russia’s violation of INF in a meaningful way to date, especially after we publicly acknowledged it almost three years ago, encouraged and encourages more lawlessness on arms control and, indeed, other areas of Russian adventurism.

But, we’ll have a chance to more completely explore these subjects today.

We have a distinguished panel of witnesses; they are:

- The Honorable Frank Rose
Former Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance.
- The Honorable Robert Scher
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities
- Mr. Jon Wolfsthal
Former Senior Director for Arms Control and Nonproliferation,
National Security Council

Just this past Tuesday, in response to questions, the Commander of U.S. European Command, and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, stated, “we have to respond to their violation of that treaty, one way or the other, we have to take steps we have to address it.”

He also stated regarding Russia’s intention to return to compliance with the treaty that, “I don’t have any indication that they will at this time.”

So that’s our task this morning: we have a new Administration and a critical inflection point in our relationship with Russia and the seminal arms control treaty of the nuclear era.

As a co-equal policy-making branch of the United States government, it is our role to help fashion a policy regarding how we deal with Russia’s violation of this, and other, arms control treaties and agreements.

So, I hope when we are through here this morning we will have a clear view on a policy to work with the new Administration to implement.

**Statement for the Record Submitted by Congressman Ted Poe
Chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
House Foreign Affairs Committee**

This is the third time we are holding this hearing. It's a little like Groundhog Day. Every year we meet again to discuss Russia's continued violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and talk about the lack of consequences for their violations.

But this year things have gotten worse. In past years we discussed Russian tests of missiles prohibited under the INF Treaty. This year we know there have been actual deployments.

According to reports, Russia has actually deployed prohibited cruise missiles at two locations in Russia. This game-changing action makes our hearing especially crucial as we search for appropriate U.S. responses to these dangerous violations.

These violations should not be viewed in isolation. They are a mark of a continued pattern of Russian aggression.

In 2008, the same year that Russia first violated the INF Treaty, it invaded a sovereign country – the Republic of Georgia. I was there shortly after and saw the Russian tanks up on the hill. Nine years later Russia still occupies a quarter of the country.

Then in 2014, Putin was at it again. He told the world that Russian troops were not in Crimea as we all watched Russian tanks and troops rolling into the peninsula.

So it is no surprise that Russia is breaking its word again when it comes to arms control agreements.

We entered into the INF treaty with Russia in 1987. The treaty places limits on ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. It was a landmark agreement between two countries with the largest nuclear arsenals in the world. It also showed that Washington and Moscow could find areas to cooperation even in the midst of the Cold War.

We've held up our end of the bargain. The Russians have not.

Their blatant violations of the treaty go back to 2008 when they tested a ground launched cruise missile.

For some reason, it took the past Administration a full three years until they notified Congress in 2011.

Even more surprising is that fact that it took the past Administration a whole five years to even bring up this violation directly to the Russians.

While the White House was biding its time, the Kremlin continued violating the treaty. The State Department confirmed in its 2014, 2015, and

2016 report on arms control agreements that the Russians were in breach of the INF treaty.

All we've done in response is to tell the Russians our concerns. We have urged them over and over again to come back into compliance.

Not only did the Russians refuse to come back into compliance, they denied even violating the treaty and simultaneously increased their violations.

Now that the Russians have actually deployed missiles prohibited under the treaty, U.S. security is in jeopardy.

The result is that now the Russians have weapons that we don't. American allies and interests abroad are vulnerable to the Russian bear.

Chairman Rogers and myself have been tracking this serious national security threat for years. We've made several appeals to the State Department and the Defense Department about this issue.

The responses we received led me to believe that our government was simply not taking this issue seriously.

That's why we included an amendment to the NDAA last year that prohibits government contracts with entities that have contributed to Russia's INF Treaty violations.

We've also introduced H.R. 1182 – The INF Treaty Preservation Act which would fund research and development of countervailing military capabilities and puts suspension of U.S. compliance with the treaty on the table if Russia remains in violation of the treaty.

More needs to be done to confront the Napoleon of Siberia. Putin needs to be held accountable.

That is exactly why we've called a hearing on this topic yet again. How are we going to convince the Russians that we mean business? How will we protect U.S. national security in light of the most recent Russian deployment?

The US needs to show leadership and coordinate a unified and meaningful response with our NATO allies.

A treaty with a party of one is no treaty at all.

And that's just the way it is.

Opening Statement for Ranking Member Jim Cooper
Joint House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces/House
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and
Trade

“Consequences and Context for Russia's violations of the INF Treaty”

March 30, 2017

I join Chairman Rogers in welcoming our witnesses, Robert Scher, Frank Rose and Jon Wolfsthal. We thank you for your service to national security and welcome you today to this hearing on how to respond to Russia's on-going Intermediary Nuclear Forces Treaty violation. On this issue, we have a strange convergence of bipartisan consensus on having three Democratic witnesses! I look forward to hearing your insights.

Russia's violation of the INF, including testing, producing and now deploying a new ground-based cruise missile, demands a firm response. Russia constitutes a unique threat to the West by maintaining an enormous nuclear arsenal and undermining the stability of our strategic relationship embodied in negotiated agreements. The best way to manage the risk of an unconstrained nuclear arms race is through negotiated agreements, but now Russia is violating many of these, creating grave uncertainty about the future of negotiated nuclear security.

Raising the Russian violation of the INF Treaty, which has stood for thirty years as a pillar for European security and as a key tenet of the US-Russian strategic relationship, must be done publicly. The intelligence community uncovered these actions and the Obama administration diligently and repeatedly raised US concerns to Russia.

However, Russia has continued its violation of the Treaty, producing and more recently apparently deploying the system. The Obama administration reviewed three kinds of response capabilities to ensure that Russia does not gain a significant military advantage from its alleged violation of the INF treaty: “active defenses” to enhance the defense of locations the noncompliant Russian cruise missiles could reach, “counterforce capabilities” to actually attack these missiles, and “countervailing strike capabilities” to enhance U.S. or allied forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue their review to shape an appropriate response. In 2014, General Martin Dempsey, then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, states in a letter in October to the Senate Armed Services Committee, that the INF violation constituted “a serious challenge to the security of the United States and our allies” and “These actions, particularly when placed in the context of Russian regional aggression, must be met with a strategic response.”

The Trump administration must continue to take these actions seriously, confront Russia and demand that Russia reverse course and return into compliance. Given the administration's ties to Russia, I am concerned that this will be yet another grave security threat that will go unchallenged.

We should also consider taking specific and direct action in response to Russia's actions, but we must do so in coordination with our NATO allies. In doing so, it is important for the free world to be unified to deter to Russian aggression. Responding in a way that keeps NATO unified is a key component of an effective response to Russia.

First, while we must protect sources and methods, must share additional information on Russia's violation with our allies and raise this issue, together with NATO allies, more publicly.

Second, we should use military as well as non-military responses. These responses could include imposing additional sanctions on Russia. They should also include effective steps to enhance European Deterrence Initiative and European Reassurance Initiative. As examples, deploying additional conventional cruise missiles such as JASSM-ER in NATO and forward-deploying them could provide a strong military response that would not cause a violation of the treaty but send a strong signal that we will not stand for Russia's latest nuclear provocation.

Third, we must not play into Russian hands by further undermining strategic stability or risking a divided NATO. Developing and deploying a new intermediate ground-launched nuclear cruise missiles may not respond to any military requirement, undermine regional stability in a crisis, and elude NATO consensus. Similarly, developing and deploying cruise missile defense could further divide NATO consensus by prioritizing certain NATO sites while leaving other populated areas undefended, and prove very costly. Additionally, we must preserve and extend the New START Treaty as we buy time to resolve the INF issue, and maintain a frank but open dialog with Russia to attempt to address concerns on both side and to urge Russia to return to compliance with its legally-binding commitments under the INF Treaty.

I look forward to hearing your views on how to best address this issue at this important turning point.

Ranking Member Keating Opening Remarks
Joint House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
and House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade
“Consequences and Context for Russia's Violations of the INF Treaty”
March 30, 2017

Thank you, Chairman Rogers and Chairman Poe, for holding this hearing today. And, thank you to Ranking Member Cooper for your leadership on this issue.

In December 2015, our Subcommittees held a hearing on this very topic. Since then, Russia’s role at the center of many concerning issues has only increased:

- ...closest to home, with their interference in our recent elections;
- ...with their ongoing interference not only in the elections of our European allies but with respect to their territorial integrity;
- ...and through their involvement in Syria and Afghanistan, just to name a few.

Today, we take up yet another, in Russia’s continued violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

This Congress and this Administration have decisions to make with respect to our foreign policy towards Russia.

Today, I hope that we can hear from our expert panel about the options on the table for addressing Russia’s violations, the costs and benefits of these options, and how we can look at this globally alongside our allies, so that we may be strategic in our policy towards Russia’s treaty violations and other destabilizing actions going forward.

Russia cannot be trusted to negotiate honestly nor to uphold its negotiated commitments. We have witnessed Moscow become increasingly willing to engage in provocative actions and rhetoric.

We must, therefore, choose a path forward that avoids unnecessary or miscalculated escalations, while remaining steadfast in promoting security and adherence to the rule of law.

I look forward to our insightful testimony this morning, and to working with my colleagues on both the Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees as we consider policy options moving forward.

Thank you, and I yield back my time.

Statement of The Honorable Frank A. Rose**Joint Hearing of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and House
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade****“Consequences and Context for Russia’s Violations of the INF Treaty”****March 30, 2017****Introduction**

Chairman Rogers, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Cooper, Ranking Member Keating, Members of the Committee, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss how the United States and its Allies should respond to Russia’s violation of its obligations under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (or INF) Treaty

Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty is an issue that I worked on closely when I served as the Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance from December 2014-January 2017. In my statement, I’d like to focus on a couple of areas. First, I’ll briefly discuss the nature of the Russian violation and the attempts by the United States to find a diplomatic solution that brought Russia back into compliance the Treaty in a verifiable manner. Second, I’ll provide you my assessment as to why I believe Russia chose to violate the INF. Third, I’ll outline my recommendations as to how the United States and our Allies should respond to the Russian violation. Finally, I’ll share my thoughts as to whether the United States should develop a new ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) or withdraw from the New Strategic Arms Treaty (New START) in response to the Russian violation.

The Russian Violation of the INF Treaty

In the July 2014 edition of the U.S. Department of State’s annual Arms Control Compliance Report, the United States declared that the Russian Federation was in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to produce launchers of such missiles.¹ I assure you, the United States did not come to this decision lightly. Prior to the July 2014 declaration, there was over a year of senior-level diplomatic engagements with Russian officials on the INF Treaty violation. The objective of that diplomacy was to encourage Russia to acknowledge the existence of this new GLCM, and return to compliance with the Treaty in a verifiable manner. Although these initial diplomatic efforts were unsuccessful, we continued our diplomatic engagements with Russia after the July 2014 public declaration.

Despite two additional years of diplomacy, culminating in the November 2016 meeting of the INF Treaty Special Verification Commission (or SVC), the body under the Treaty responsible

¹ U.S. Department of State, *2014 Report on Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments*, p. 8, July 2014.

for resolving compliance concerns, Russia refused to acknowledge the existence of the new GLCM and has shown no interest in returning to compliance with the Treaty.

According to a February 14, 2017, *New York Times* article, Russia has moved forward with deployment of the new GLCM.² At a March 8, 2017, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, General Paul Selva, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, confirmed that Russia has deployed the system. Selva stated: “We believe that the Russians have deployed a land-based cruise missile that violates the spirit and intent of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty.”³

Russia’s Political and Strategic Rationale for Violating the INF Treaty

Let me now turn to the question of why Russia decided to violate the INF Treaty. I think it’s important to remember that the INF Treaty was always controversial within the Soviet Union. Indeed, some in the Soviet military did not want to sign the Treaty due to the fact that as a land power, the Soviet Union was always more dependent on ground-based missile systems than the United States. However, these concerns were overruled by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev who was seeking ways to defuse tensions with the West in order to restructure the Soviet economy.

In 2005, senior Russian officials proposed that the United States and Russia “jointly withdraw” from the INF Treaty, arguing that the strategic situation in Eurasia had changed dramatically since the INF Treaty was concluded in 1987.⁴ Specifically, Russia was concerned about the emergence of medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile threats on its periphery, and argued it needed its own medium- and intermediate-range systems to deter these threats. The United States declined to take Russia up on its offer for a “joint withdrawal” from the INF Treaty. That said, given the timelines associated with the development of new missile systems, it was probably in this general timeframe that Russia made the political decision to begin developing the new GLCM.

Russia has also been modernizing its air- and sea-launched cruise missiles – which are allowable under the INF Treaty – for over a decade. These new systems have been demonstrated effectively during recent combat operations in Syria. This begs the question if Russia possesses

² Michael Gordon, “Russia Deploys Missile, Violating Treaty and Challenging Trump,” *The New York Times*, February 14, 2017.

³ John M. Donnelly, “Hill Wants Answers on Russia’s Fielding of New Missiles,” *CQ Roll Call*, March 8, 2017.

⁴ Brian Green, *Statement of Brian D. Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic Capabilities Before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces: Hearing on the FY08 Budget Request for Missile Defense Programs*, March 27, 2007, accessed at www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/congress/2007_h/070327-green.pdf on March 24, 2017.

effective – and treaty-compliant – cruise missiles, why would it violate the INF Treaty by developing a treaty-prohibited GLCM?

In my view, there are several military factors driving Russian decision-making. First, as part of its military modernization program, Russia has been seeking to improve its theater-strike capability. The deployment of a new GLCM would almost certainly improve Russia's ability to strike theater-level targets in both Europe and Asia. The system also supports Russia's evolving Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) strategy, which seeks to deny the United States and NATO access to key ports, airfields, and command and control nodes during a conflict.

Second, the new GLCM would improve the survivability of Russian theater strike systems. While Russia has developed air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, ships can be sunk, and aircraft can be destroyed on the runway or shot down during flight. However, it's very difficult to locate and destroy mobile missiles. For example, during the 1991 Gulf War, the United States and its Coalition partners flew over 3,000 sorties over Iraq with the objective of destroying Iraq's mobile ballistic missile targeting Israel. According to the most estimates, it is unlikely that the so-called "Scud hunt" destroyed a single mobile ballistic missile or launcher. Russia is significantly larger than Iraq and it's much easier to conceal mobile missile systems there. As a result, finding and destroying mobile missile systems based in Russia would be extremely difficult.

Third, there is probably a level of inter-service politics at play within the Russian defense establishment. For example, with the Russian Air Force and Navy procuring their own intermediate-range cruise missiles, it is quite possible that the Russian Army is seeking to acquire a similar capability.

In addition to the military reasons, there is also a larger political dynamic driving Russian decision-making. In my view, Russia's violation of the INF Treaty is merely a symptom of a larger problem, that problem being that Russia believes that the Euro-Atlantic security system put in place at the end of the Cold War in the late 1980's and early 1990s is no longer in its interest. There is a prevailing view among Russian foreign policy and security elites – not just President Putin – that the current Euro-Atlantic security system was put in place at a time when Russia was politically and militarily weak. Therefore, they believe that the current system needs to be replaced with one that better takes into account Russia's interests.

If we look back over the last decade, it's clear that Russia has been slowly removing the key building blocks of the Post-Cold War European security system. This process began with Russia's unilateral suspension of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty in 2007, was reinforced by former Russian President Medvedev's proposed European Security Treaty in 2010, Russia's selective implementation of the Vienna Document, violation of the INF Treaty, occupation of Crimea, intervention in Ukraine, etc.

Recommended U.S. Response Options to the Russia's INF Treaty Violation

It is extremely unlikely that Russia will return to compliance with its obligations under the INF Treaty. Therefore, a strong -- but proportional -- response is required by the United States and its Allies to effectively deal with Russia's violation. In general, I would recommend that the United States and its Allies should adopt a "countervailing strategy" in response to Russia's violation that seeks enhance deterrence by holding critical Russian assets at risk. That response should also include "limited" defensive measures to deny Russia any significant military benefit from the deployment of the new GLCM. Below are some of my key recommendations for the Administration and Congress.

- **The United States should remain focused on maintaining Alliance unity.** The INF Treaty is not merely a bilateral arms control treaty between the United States and Russia, but it is fundamentally about wider Eurasian security and directly impacts the security of our Allies in both Europe and Asia. Therefore, as the United States develops response options to the Russian violation, it is critical that those actions be done in close coordination with our Allies. Not surprisingly, Russia will seek to drive wedges between the United States and its Allies by making false claims and accusations about our compliance with the INF Treaty. Continued close coordination with our Allies will help minimize Russian efforts to "wedge drive." Furthermore, in the interest of burden sharing, the United States should seek ways to include Allies in the implementation of military response options.
- **Place the blame for the INF Treaty's demise squarely on Russia.** From a diplomatic perspective, it is critical that the United States place responsibility for the demise of the INF Treaty exactly where it belongs -- with Russia. Under the INF Treaty, Russia has the option to legally withdraw from the Treaty, but chose not to exercise this option as the United States did when it legally withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2001. Instead, Russia chose to violate the Treaty in secret and was caught. There's a reason for this: Russia did not want to suffer the negative political consequences of withdrawing from the Treaty. As the new Administration develops its response options to the Russian violation, I would strongly encourage them to take careful steps to ensure that the United States is not blamed for killing the INF Treaty by unilaterally withdrawing. From my perspective, this would be a gift to the Russians. Former Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control in the George W. Bush Administration Steve Rademaker took a similar approach at a July 17, 2014, hearing of HASC Strategic Forces Subcommittee. Rademaker stated: "I don't think we should respond to what we know Russia to have done at this point by pulling out of the treaty. I think from a Russian perspective that would be more of a reward than a punishment... Because from my personal dealings with them I know that they would very much like to get out from under the treaty. And so, I think they would welcome a U.S. decision to withdraw because that would obviate the need for them to withdraw."⁵
- **Continue to fund the modernization of U.S. strategic nuclear delivery systems.** Congress should fully fund the modernization of U.S. strategic delivery systems. This

⁵ U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, "Russian Violations of the INF Treaty: After Detection-What?" July 17, 2014 [HASC 113-120].

includes a new ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a new strategic bomber (the B-21), and a new air-launched nuclear cruise missile (the Long-Range Stand-off system or LRSO). In particular, I want to stress the importance of the LRSO. Russia is developing increasingly sophisticated air defense systems. The LRSO will provide the United States the ability to penetrate these sophisticated air defenses, and improve our ability to hold critical Russian targets at risk.

- **Develop a conventional variant of the LRSO.** In addition to modernizing our nuclear delivery vehicles, it is also critical that the United States and its Allies improve their air- and sea-launched, conventional strike capabilities. Therefore, I recommend developing a conventional variant of the LRSO, which will allow the United States to deliver conventional payloads in heavily contested air defense environments with the appropriate stand-off range. This new system would improve upon the existing conventional variant of the Air-launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), the AGM-86 C/D or Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM). Chairman Rogers, I want to especially commend you and the HASC Strategic Forces Subcommittee for your leadership and advocacy on the need to develop a conventional variant of the LRSO.
- **Facilitate Allied acquisition of air- and sea-launched conventional strike capabilities.** We should also work closely with our Allies to improve their conventional strike capabilities. Several of our Allies and partners (e.g., Australia, Poland, Finland) currently deploy the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM). In response to the Russia violation of the INF Treaty, the United States should consider ways make JASSM available to more Allies. Additionally, we should sell Allies the extended-range variant of the missile, JASSM-ER. The JASSM-ER has a range of around 1000 km as compared to the JASSM's range of about 370 km.⁶ Finally, we should also give consideration to selling the Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) to interested Allies. A number of NATO Allies currently have the necessary infrastructure to launch the Tomahawk SLCM from their naval vessels. The United Kingdom is currently the only U.S. Ally to have purchased the Tomahawk SLCM. However, according to press reports, Poland has expressed interest in deploying Tomahawk on its new attack submarine⁷. The United States should approve such as request if it is made by Poland or another Ally.
- **Remind Russia that NATO remains a nuclear Alliance.** We should remind Russia that NATO remains a nuclear alliance that possesses the appropriate military capabilities to conduct nuclear operations. At the NATO Warsaw Summit in July 2016, the Alliance endorsed a number of actions to revitalize nuclear planning, exercises, and burden sharing within the Alliance. I believe it is critical that NATO implement the initiatives agreed at the Warsaw Summit. Furthermore, NATO nations need to move forward with their plans to procure the dual capable version of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, and the United States must complete the refurbishment of the B61 gravity bomb.

⁶ CSIS Missile Defense Project, "JASSM/JASSM-ER (AGM-158A/B)," accessed at <https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/jassm> on March 27, 2017.

⁷ Jaroslaw Adamowski, "Poland To Launch Sub Tender, Eyes Tomahawks", *Defense News*, March 12, 2015.

- **Deploy “limited” cruise missile defenses to protect critical assets.** As I noted earlier, Russia is deploying this new GLCM as part of its overall A2AD strategy to deny the United States and its NATO Allies access to critical ports, airfields, and command and control nodes during a potential conflict. In response, the United States and NATO should deploy “limited” cruise missile defenses to protect key Alliance assets in the event of a conflict with Russia. While I support the deployment of “limited” cruise missile defenses, I would caution against moving forward with the deployment of larger set of missile defenses aimed against Russia, especially against its strategic deterrent. Such an approach would be extremely expensive, technologically challenging, and would likely encourage Russia to deploy additional missiles in response.

Should the United States Develop and Deploy GLCMs?

I’d also like to address the issue of whether the United States should develop and deploy its own GLCMs in response to Russia’s violation. Indeed, Chairman Rogers and Chairman Poe, I note that you have introduced legislation, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty Preservation Act of 2017, which among other things, would require the Secretary of Defense to establish a program of record to develop a dual-capable, road-mobile, ground-launched cruise missile system with a range of between 500 to 5,500 kilometers.

I am not necessarily opposed to the development of such a capability by the United States if Russia fails to return to compliance with the INF Treaty and the United States requires such a capability to meet its military requirements. However, there are a number of questions that should be asked before we begin the development of such a capability. First, are there military missions that require us to have a new GLCM that cannot be addressed with existing U.S. air- and sea-launched cruise missiles? Second, how cost-effective would it be to develop a new GLCM, especially given that the United States faces numerous budget challenges modernizing its military forces, in particular its strategic nuclear delivery vehicles? For example, would it be more cost-effective to develop a conventional variant of the LRSO instead of a new GLCM?

Third, where would United States deploy a new GLCM if we decided to develop such a system? Anyone who is familiar with the history of previous attempts to deploy ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles overseas knows how politically and diplomatically contentious such deployments have been. For example, the deployment of U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles in Europe in the 1980s was highly controversial. If the United States were to propose deploying GLCMs in Europe in response to the Russian violation, it would likely be highly controversial within NATO. Furthermore, Russia would almost certainly do everything in its power to create political problems for the Alliance.

The political challenges associated deployment of ground-based missile systems are not limited to Europe. Though the system is purely defensive, the recent deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system in the Republic of Korea (ROK) has proven to be controversial within the ROK and in the region. That said, I believe the deployment of THAAD to the Korean Peninsula is necessary to defend U.S. deployed forces and the ROK against North Korea’s medium-range ballistic missiles, in particular its large number of extended-range Scuds and No Dongs.

Russia's Violation of the INF Treaty and the New START Treaty

Finally, some have argued that in response to the Russia violation of the INF Treaty, the United States should withdraw from the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). In my view, the United States should not withdraw from the New START in response to Russia's violation of the INF Treaty. I strongly believe that the continued implementation of the New START Treaty is in the national security interests of the United States for a variety of reasons. First, it places limitations on the number of strategic nuclear systems that Russia can deploy against the United States and our Allies. Second, through New START's on-site inspection regime, data declarations, and notifications, the Treaty provides the United States with key insights into Russian strategic nuclear forces that we might not have access to without the Treaty. Third, according to the U.S. Department of State's *Annual Report on Implementation of the New START Treaty*, Russia is adhering to its obligations under the Treaty.⁸

Unlike the existing Euro-Atlantic security system, it appears that Russia still believes that the bilateral U.S.-Russia strategic nuclear framework, of which the New START Treaty is the foundation, remains in its national interest. For example, according to press reports, during his January 2017 telephone call with President Trump, Russian President Putin proposed extending the New START Treaty by five years, as allowed by the Treaty.

The Reagan Administration had serious concerns about the Soviet Union's compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, as result of its building of the Krasnoyarsk ballistic missile early warning radar. However, these concerns did not prevent the United States from negotiating and ratifying the INF Treaty in 1988, because despite concerns about Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty, it was felt that the INF Treaty was in the national security interest of the United States. In my view, the same holds true for the New START Treaty today.

Conclusion

The INF Treaty has served the security interests of the United States and its Allies in Europe and Asia for almost thirty years. The Treaty is not just a bilateral arms control treaty between the United States and Russia, but goes to the heart of Eurasian security. However, it is clear that Russia, for a variety of political and military reasons that I have outlined, no longer sees the INF Treaty as in its interest and is unlikely to return to compliance.

Therefore, a strong -- but proportional -- political and military response is required by the United States and its Allies to effectively address Russia's violation. I would recommend that the United States and its Allies should impose a "countervailing strategy" that seeks to enhance deterrence by holding critical Russian assets at risk. That response should also include "limited" cruise missile defenses that would deny Russia significant military benefit from the deployment of the new cruise missile. These response options should be implemented in a way that maintains Alliance unity and places the blame for the demise of the INF Treaty squarely where it belongs -- with Russia.

⁸ U.S. Department of State, *Annual Report on Implementation of the New START Treaty*, January 2016.

Biography of Frank A. Rose

Frank A. Rose served as assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification, and compliance from 2014-17. In this position, he was responsible for advising the secretary of state on a wide variety of arms control, strategic policy, verification, and compliance issues. From 2009 to 2014, Rose served as the deputy assistant secretary of state for space and defense policy where he was responsible for key issues related to arms control and defense policy including missile defense, military space policy, chemical and biological weapons, and conventional arms control.

Prior to joining the State Department in June 2009, Mr. Rose held various national security staff positions in the US House of Representatives, including service as a professional staff member on both the House Armed Services Committee and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Mr. Rose has also held numerous positions within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including as special assistant to the assistant secretary of defense for strategy and threat reduction; and policy advisor in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. Previous to that, he worked as a national security analyst with Science Applications International Corporation and on the staff of U.S. Senator John F. Kerry (D-MA).

Mr. Rose received his bachelor's degree in history from American University in 1994 and a master's degree in war studies from Kings' College, University of London in 1999. He is also a recipient of numerous awards including: the Department of Defense Exceptional Public Service Award (2001); the Office of Secretary of Defense Award for Excellence (2002); the Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service (2005); the State Department Superior Honor Award (2012); and the Ordinul National Serviciul Credincios (Knight) from Romania (2014) in acknowledgement for his role as the lead US negotiator for the 2011 missile defense basing agreement..

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STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. SCHER

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE HOUSE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

AND

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND

TRADE

“CONSEQUENCES AND CONTEXT FOR RUSSIA'S VIOLATIONS OF
THE INF TREATY”

MARCH 31, 2017

Introduction

Chairman Rogers, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Cooper, Ranking Member Keating, distinguished members, thank you for inviting me to testify on possible next steps in light of Russia's violation of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. This is the first time I have had the honor to testify in front of this Foreign Affairs Subcommittee and the first time I have testified since leaving my position in the Obama Administration. As such, I do want to emphasize that my testimony represents my personal views only, not those of the previous or current Administrations.

To begin my testimony today, I want to start with a somewhat obvious and critical point that deserves emphasizing: Russia's violation of the INF Treaty and its subsequent deployment of the violating system must be considered within the context of Russia's overall aggression and the security environment more broadly. While some believe, myself included, that it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to bring Russia back into compliance, I also believe that right now it is in our best interest to do all we can to press the Russians to return. Having the INF Treaty in force enhances strategic stability, and our Allies want to see that we have worked diligently to try to convince Russia. Any such diplomacy must be accompanied by clear indications that we will not allow the Russians to benefit from their violation. The Administration should consider taking a combination of military actions—all of which would be Treaty compliant—along with diplomatic and economic actions to tangibly demonstrate that we can ensure Russia does not achieve the advantages they seek by deploying this system. These actions must be developed and carried out in coordination with our Allies. Our Alliance structure is key to our strength, and it is imperative that we continue to maintain and cultivate it.

Background

The INF Treaty has been a mainstay of stability in Europe since it was signed in 1987 and entered into force in 1988. Since that time, while there are many military systems and forces in Europe, no one on the Continent has had to worry about the threat from these types of missiles.

That is until recently. The US State Department officially announced in July of 2014 in the Department's Compliance Report: "The United States has determined that the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles." This determination should not have surprised anyone given that Russian leader Vladimir Putin had made it clear he no longer felt that this treaty was in Russia's interests.

So while this hearing is about what to do now that the Vice Chairman has indicated his belief that the violating system has been deployed, I would note that it is not the deployment of the missiles that violated the treaty...the Russians had already been in violation of the treaty for a long time. However, there is now a need for a stronger and more concrete US response.

Impact of the Treaty Violation

The violation of the INF Treaty is important for both political and operational reasons. Politically, INF was one of the more stable, and stabilizing treaties signed during the Cold War. It was one of the few arms control treaties that did what many thought could not be done...it eliminated a class of weapons, not just reduced their number. And the treaty's survival beyond the dissolution of the Soviet Union was another example that Russia valued strategic stability and that these Cold-War era treaties remained valuable in the region. The fact that Russia is willing to violate this treaty cannot be taken lightly, although the fact that they continue to deny this violation indicates that they still place some value

in the perception that they are compliant with the treaty and that the treaty itself still exists.

Operationally, these Russian missiles provide Russia with a significant offensive capability that would directly threaten the whole of Europe and nearly all NATO Allies. These missiles are by no means the only way to hold NATO territory at risk—Russia has multiple systems that can do that without violating the INF Treaty. Yet these missiles, deployed in significant numbers, would give Russia an operational capability to immediately and significantly threaten and, with little warning, attack NATO capitals and facilities. While the Alliance has some overall capabilities to counter these threats, the violation presents a diplomatic and operational problem today, and any increase in the number of these Russian missiles would continue to complicate Alliance planning, increase significantly the number of priority targets in any operation, and quickly overwhelm any current air and missile defense systems deployed in Allied nations.

Context of the Violations

While I do not want to speculate on why Russia has chosen to develop, test, and field a system that violates the INF Treaty, I do think that it is important to see this activity within the context of the entirety of Russian aggression over the past few years. The House Armed Services Committee heard much of the military context from General Scaparrotti during the hearing earlier this week. While we do not have time to delve into all of Russia's recent activities, the broader point remains: we have seen a series of both meditated and opportunistic actions taken by Russia to either expand its influence in the nations nearest to Russia, or to try weaken the international system, most notably—but not limited to—the NATO Alliance. In some cases this has been done with the use of force, for example the illegal invasion and annexation of Crimea along with support to separatists in other parts of Eastern Ukraine. In other cases Russia's actions have been more subtle and targeted at sowing discord within European

democracies, and even here in the United States. All the while, Russia has flaunted international norms while brandishing its nuclear arsenal for the first time in a generation, as if daring the world to respond. Fielding this system, denying that they are violating the INF Treaty, and then countering US findings of their violation with specious assertions of US violations falls directly within this pattern of behavior.

The question then turns to what to do about this violation and the serious nature of the political and operational threat caused by Russia's actions. I will focus on what I believe are the operational and Defense Department responses that we should consider as a result of the violation and leave the diplomatic and economic recommendation to my fellow witnesses and former colleagues, but I do want to repeat that I endorse the idea of trying to bring Russia back into compliance with the INF Treaty. Continuing to talk to the Russians while they maintain denial may have the effect of somewhat slowing down their fielding of the system.

While we work to persuade Russia to comply with the treaty, I recommend we plan as if they will continue to produce and field the violating system. This planning is prudent and strategic—our only chance at getting the Russians to even contemplate compliance is by pursuing concrete measures across all elements of US power to convince the Russians that violating the treaty makes them worse off and less secure. And the foundation of that pressure should be measures taken by the US Department of Defense in conjunction with our NATO Allies.

US and Allied Responses

From the defense perspective, the first requirement is that the United States and our Allies take action to ensure that Russia does not achieve any operational advantage from fielding a system that violates the INF Treaty. Even though politically the violation is a significant problem, given what I have read to be the

assessed small scale of the current deployment, the actual military implications right now would be relatively easy to address within our current structure and forces in Europe and globally deployed. However, any prudent planner would have to consider that the operational challenge will become more difficult if Russia continues to increase its deployment of this system. Further, I would argue that since the US government has assessed that this system has been fielded and is not just in testing, our policies should be oriented towards demonstrating to Russia that they are actually going to be worse off militarily if they continue to field this system. That is a harder task, and will require more thought and likely more or different equipment than we have in Europe right now.

But, it is important that we not think about responses to this violation only in terms of the threat from a particular system or missile. Since this violation is in the broader context of the range of aggressive behavior we've seen from Russia and in the context of an across-the-board modernization of its military equipment, I would argue that the United States can and should think about countering the military capabilities of the missiles using the full range of US military capabilities. In other words, we need not think that the only response to their violation is to pursue the same type of system that they are now fielding...although that is certainly a possibility.

The first question the US government should address is how do we better protect our forces and our Allies directly from these missiles? We have some tactical air and missile defense systems in place in Europe, as do our Allies, but I believe that there should be active consideration of increasing those capabilities. Cruise missile defense is an issue that the US military has not focused on as much as I think is warranted given this and other developments worldwide, and a real push in that area is needed.

Even with increased defensive capabilities, no air and missile defense system can keep up with the number of offensive missiles Russia might choose to field.

While we might be able to protect certain discreet locations, the answer cannot be only defense. The United States and its allies must look to field systems into and around the region that can hold at risk key targets inside of Russia, including, but not limited to the violating systems. While it is tempting to think about just going after those particular missiles, that would be an unproductive and unnecessary path...in the end, this missile system is just one way they have of striking NATO territory. From a military perspective, we should not become so consumed by this one system that we either 1) think that the threat to NATO is gone if these missiles are destroyed (whether by Russia or by us); or 2) that the only way to ensure that Russia does not get an advantage by this deployment is to field a similar system of our own. We do not have to match Russian deployments in a tit-for-tat manner. We have a flexible and resilient set of conventional and nuclear capabilities that can respond to a range of threats, and that flexibility puts us in a good position to deal with growing Russian aggression.

In fact, the United States and our Allies have many ways that we can and do deter the Russian Military, and I would like to briefly highlight some of these ongoing initiatives. Since the Wales Summit in 2014, we have seen NATO Allies recognize a need to bring its forces to higher states of readiness with the Very High Readiness Joint Task Forces; invest more in defense overall; and position more forces on a rotational basis further east with NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence forces. The Alliance is once again becoming familiar with nuclear deterrence policy, doctrine, and capabilities so that it improves what some call its "nuclear IQ" and ensure that the full spectrum of its nuclear capabilities presents a credible deterrent to Russia or any other potential adversary. Unilaterally, the United States has enhanced its forward presence forces in Europe through the European Reassurance Initiative funds appropriated by Congress that allow for a larger rotational presence of armored forces in Europe than we have had in the recent past. These activities are in response to the overall changes in the security environment caused by aggressive and illicit actions on the part of Russia, which have included the development and deployment of a system that

violates an existing arms control treaty. And, these activities help to show that Russia's aggressive actions have caused a response that does not make Russia safer.

New Possibilities for US and Allied Response

The question now is what should we be doing to better position ourselves given the INF violation and other aggressive behaviors from Russia. I would argue there are some actions we can take to provide the United State with additional strike options and/or tangibly demonstrate that Russia's violation will make it less secure. When considering these options, however, we must realize that the overall goal has to strike the difficult balance between demonstrating to Russia that it cannot take its aggressive actions and expect that there is no response, with ensuring that any actions taken increase strategic stability not reduce it. I predict the issues I have discussed here today would be a part of any nuclear posture review from this Administration—a review that will be a critical part of any overall review of the defense program.

First, we could increase deployments of SSGNs in and around Europe. These submarines bring incredible capabilities to, and increase the net strike capacity of, US assets in the region.

Second, we could look to field unilaterally and in conjunction with NATO Allies broader and more sophisticated rocket artillery systems on the territory of our eastern Allies. These systems, like High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), do not violate the INF Treaty, and provide significant firepower to the Alliance that can range key locations and targets inside of Russia. Acquisition of these systems by our Allies would be a serious signal of their displeasure and a real boost to the operational capabilities of the Alliance.

Third, we could do whatever we can to speed up the deployment of the follow-on nuclear cruise missile (the Long-Range Standoff missile or LRSO) and quickly develop a conventional cruise missile variant. Nuclear and conventional air-launched cruise missiles have been around for decades and have been effective at enhancing strategic stability as well as providing the United States with important strike assets.

Fourth, we could transition the Air Force program office overseeing LRSO development into a joint program office to explore potential applications for a conventional cruise missile for other Services besides just the Air Force.

Finally, we could begin to consider what alternatives exist for us to develop or field a ground-launched cruise missile similar to the one Russia has developed and deployed. To be clear, I believe that exploring this would *not* be a violation of the INF treaty, nor would any of the other recommendations I have made, but Russia and even our Allies could see this as escalatory. However, if Russia decides to formally pull out of the treaty, or if the US government is compelled to make the decision that the treaty is, in practice, dead, then I believe that it would be important to know what it would take for us to deploy a new missile to symmetrically counter the threat posed by Russia's system. We would have to work carefully with Allies on this alternative.

In fact, any effort will only be effective if we respond as a cohesive alliance with real actions. A combined response is key for maintaining strategic stability as it shows our strength to Russia and proves that its efforts to weaken the Alliance are failing. One of the United State's most unique and important comparative advantages are the friendships we have earned. These alliances are critical to national security, and the security of the world in which we live. Russia understands this reality, which is why one of it's main objectives is to weaken, exploit fissures in, or ultimately even break the Alliance. We cannot let that happen. So, we cannot act unilaterally...but nor can NATO afford paralysis. And

while we may all find it frustrating at times, less than perfect action taken together as an Alliance is far better than what might be seen as the perfect response if it is executed unilaterally.

Conclusion

While I, like all of us, hope that Russia will admit that it has violated the INF Treaty and come back into compliance, as we always said in DoD, "hope is not a strategy." I do believe that there is a chance that we can convince Russia that it is better off coming back into compliance with the Treaty, but up to this point, making that case to them through diplomacy has been ineffective, and I doubt that will change. As a result, I believe that the United States and our NATO Allies can and should take concrete actions across the diplomatic, economic, and military dimensions to make it clear to Russian decision makers that fielding their system will not give them any military or political advantage. In fact, the deployments would actually make Russia less safe by allowing and mandating that the Alliance take actions that Russia has professed not to want, for example more forces further east on NATO territory. Considering some of the additional military options listed above would have the dual advantage of more effective pressure on Russia to come back into compliance *AND* better position the Alliance to deal with the military threat should Russia scrap the INF Treaty permanently.

I appreciate the attention these Subcommittees have paid to this important issue. I also appreciate the chance to testify today in front of you, and I look forward to answering any questions you may have for me.

Robert M. Scher
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities

Mr. Robert Scher was appointed the Assistant Secretary of Defense for the new office of Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities in December 2014 and served in that position until January 2017. Mr. Scher was responsible for advising the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on national security and defense strategy; the forces and contingency plans necessary to implement defense strategy; global allocation and posture of the US military; nuclear deterrence and missile defense policy; and security cooperation plans and policies.

Mr. Scher previously served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans within the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Forces. In this role, he oversaw the development of guidance for military campaign and contingency plans, the processes for reviewing and assessing these plans, and the development and implementation of U.S. global defense posture. Prior to serving as DASD Plans, Mr. Scher was the Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Southeast Asia within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. In this capacity, Mr. Scher served as the principal advisor to senior leadership within the Department of Defense for all South and Southeast Asia policy matters pertaining to strategies and plans, including international strategy development, and implementation. He was responsible for managing the bilateral security relationships with the nations of this region and spearheaded DoD participation in regional multilateral fora.

Prior to his first appointment in 2009, Mr. Scher was an associate at the consulting firm of Booz Allen Hamilton where he led efforts to assist Asian nations in improving their defense and national security decision-making processes. He also led analytical efforts supporting the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) on strategy development and Asia-related issues. Earlier, Mr. Scher worked for 15 years in the Departments of Defense and State, and held numerous posts covering Asian security and defense policy issues. He served as Chief-of-Staff to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, overseeing the operation of the OSD office responsible for bilateral and multilateral security relations in Asia. Additionally, Mr. Scher helped develop the strategic basis for U.S. defense strategy, participating in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review. He co-authored Presidential Decision Directive-56 on conducting complex contingency operations, and was involved in planning for U.S. support to operations ranging from Iraqi election support to deploying U.S. forces to East Timor and the southern Philippines. While at the Department of State, he served on the Secretary's Policy Planning Staff providing advice on Asia, counterterrorism and political military affairs. Mr. Scher entered government service through the Presidential Management Fellowship Program.

Mr. Scher has a Bachelor of Arts from Swarthmore College, conferred with High Honors, and a Masters of International Affairs from Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, where he was awarded a DuPont International Affairs Fellowship.

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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

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2015

Foreign contract/ payment	Foreign government	Dollar value	Subject of contract or payment

PREPARED STATEMENT BY

JON BROOK WOLFSTHAL

JOINT HEARING BEFORE THE

BEFORE THE HOUSE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

AND

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

“AFTER DEPLOYMENT:

WHAT? RUSSIAN VIOLATIONS OF THE INF TREATY”

MARCH 30, 2017

Chairman Rogers, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Cooper, Ranking Member Keating, distinguished members, I appreciate and am honored by the opportunity to testify before your joint subcommittees on such an important topic. As a former official of the Obama Administration, I wanted to note for the record that I am testifying today in my personal capacity, and not speaking for any organization or governmental agency or institution.

I was asked to address a series of questions regarding Russia's violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces or INF Treaty, and I know my colleagues at the witness table will also provide their views on this issue. We were asked to assess: the significance of Russia's violation of the INF Treaty; why Russia is violating the treaty and what they hope to gain; how the United States should respond to this violation including all of the tools at its disposal; what is the future of the INF Treaty and does it make sense for the United States to remain a party to this agreement; and how should Russia's violation be seen given its belligerent behavior around the world. To help make my answers as clear as possible, I have framed my remarks within a set of guiding principles that I believe the United States should use as we decide how to manage the political, diplomatic and military consequences of Russia's violation of the INF Treaty.

The United States should have three priorities for addressing Russia's violation of the INF Treaty, and all three must be factored into any response for it to benefit US and allied security. **1) The US approach should maximize NATO and East Asian alliance unity; 2) Russia should gain no military advantage from its violation of the INF Treaty; and 3) any response should not further undermine crisis stability.** To some, these may seem obvious, but spelling them out helps explain why developing a direct, simple and compelling response to Moscow's INF violations that benefits our security is a challenge.

In the end, some of these objectives may have to be subordinated to others, but there should be a clear discussion of those tradeoffs, just as we had had under the previous Administration. There is no magic bullet that will compel Russia to return to compliance or that will ensure the deterrent and military status quo ante. Russia's decision to deploy

the SSC-8 ground-launched cruise missile is a more substantial violation than its testing program and makes it very difficult to see how the INF Treaty can be preserved. That said, if a way could be found to bring Russia back into full compliance, it would be in the security interests of the United States and American allies in Europe and Asia. These are hard choices that should be made analytically, and should not be influenced by the desire for a quick or easy fix as none exists.

I want to include one last factor. We should be clear, as we were in the last Administration, that real violations of arms control agreements must be confronted, and must have consequences. However, while we pursue this goal, we need to remember that arms control has never been and should never be a stand-alone objective. As has been said for many decades by both Republican and Democratic administrations, arms control is one tool among many that can advance our security, reduce security threats, promote stability and create predictability. This was the case with the INF Treaty, just as it remains with the New START agreement now, an agreement both very much in the interests of both the United States and Russia. We should be careful not to throw the arms control baby out with the INF bath water. While I believe it politically impossible to seek new agreements with Russia while it remains in compliance with INF, I would not hesitate to pursue new steps if we can effectively verify Russia's compliance and if it enhances US and allied security.

In any decision to adopt, or to withdraw, from a treaty, we should be mindful that we should only do so when we can enhance our security or if there is a specific objective we can achieve through its implementation. Arms control is a means to an end and we should have no qualms about withdrawing from agreements, or entering into new ones, as long as the net result for our security is positive. The underlying impacts, goals, and assumptions must always be clearly defined when doing so.

Now onto your specific questions.

How significant is Russia's violation of the INF Treaty? From a military perspective, it is

not clear that Russia's deployment of a limited number of SSC-8s is strategically significant. This is a question that should best be answered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the context of our overall European defense plans, and coordinated within the appropriate defense mechanisms in NATO and European Command.

There is no question however that the violation is politically and diplomatically significant. It is another clear sign that Russia is no longer fully committed to the strategic stability model we support, and that Moscow remains committed to a failed strategy of destabilization and division in Europe, and to a lesser extent in East Asia. Russia pursued this approach throughout the Cold War and in the 1980s. NATO responded to the Soviet deployment of the SS-20 by deploying US Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe, at some political and economic cost. However, that move led to the INF Treaty itself because the overall balance hurt Russia's security more than that of the United States. The INF Treaty eliminated those missiles and increased crisis and strategic stability in one step. Russia may believe that a prosperous NATO and distracted United States is unwilling or unable to respond effectively to this challenge, but we must be clear that the United States cannot be blackmailed or deterred from meeting our solemn Treaty and political commitments to our allies. Fortunately, we do not need to, nor should we consider repeating our deployments in Europe from the 1980s. Such a move would play into Russia's hands to weaken and divide Europe. I do not believe repeating the Dual Track decision is in our interest. We have other, better options.

Regardless, Russia's decision to back up its rhetoric on the possible resort to the early use of nuclear weapons with military capabilities designed to carry out that approach confirms that our models of strategic and crisis stability have diverged. Serious analysis here and engagement with Russia is needed to reduce the risks of accidental or sudden conflict. Secretary of State Tillerson should pursue a balanced approach when he next travels to Moscow, making clear our concern over the INF violations is real, while pursuing efforts to preserve New START and initiate wide-ranging strategic stability talks to define and address conflicts with Moscow. Reports suggest President Putin

offered to take up the Obama-era offer of strategic stability talks in his phone call with President Trump. If so, we should accept as long as they include representatives from the Kremlin and General Staff.

Why is Russia violating the treaty and what they hope to gain? Russia has stated for many years that the bilateral nature of the INF agreement, the development and deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range missiles by third countries (all of which are nearer to Russia than to the United States), and the development by the United States of air- and sea-based, long-range precision strike capabilities has reduced the value it derived from the INF Treaty. Russia even sought, weakly and for a limited time to push a globalization of the INF treaty, but to no avail and with little real sense of commitment on their part. Their concern about the development of such capabilities outside of the bilateral context, however, seems a driving motive.

While I make no excuses for Russia's behavior, I do understand why they might see the INF Treaty as having less value in the post-Cold War setting than does the United States. At the very time Russia's military was in decline in the 1990s and 2000s, the United States and our allies gained an ability to hold more targets at risk with conventional strike capabilities. These are capabilities that Russia has only now been able to acquire, as evidenced by their displays of air- and sea-launched cruise missiles in Syria. However, Russia also cites the proliferation of cruise missiles in South Asia and China – capabilities ironically they have helped to proliferate – as further justification for their concern that the burden of the INF Treaty has fallen disproportionately on them. This of course ignores Russia's large arsenal of strategic nuclear and other capabilities that more than offset any third-country's intermediate-range missiles. It also ignores the original and continued value of the INF – to avoid a dangerous deployment of short flight time and highly accurate missiles in and around Europe and Asia that reduced leader decision time and created great pressures of crisis instability. This is a lesson Russia has either forgotten or chosen to ignore as it pursues its regional destabilization strategy. Regardless, we need to understand their motive to ensure we can craft an effective response.

It is not for me to say whether Russia is right to think the way they appear to think. But analytically it is clear that Russia has complained about this dynamic for many years and now apparently has taken steps to reduce what the Russians regard as an unfair burden on them. Of course, as an American who respects the rule of law and who believes that negotiated agreements have an important place in bilateral and multilateral security, I am concerned that instead of availing itself of the legal withdrawal provision in the INF Treaty, Russia has decided to act illegally and dangerously in concealing its actions in the hopes of escaping notice and the diplomatic fallout from its formal withdrawal. This, however, may also inform how we respond.

How should the US respond to this violation? The United States has many tools at its disposal and I have no doubt that the overwhelming factors of economic, political and military resources are strongly in our favor. I believe we have to pursue three lines of action.

1) Diplomatic – First, we need to be more forceful and public about Russia’s actions and the damage Moscow is doing to the global nuclear landscape. We must move to share publicly with our allies and the general public the information we have shared with Russia about its violations. I know why this information has not been released, and respect the concerns of my friends in the intelligence community. However, I believe that the scale should now tip toward the release of more information to the public. This information is both compelling and could be used to put increased pressure on Russia over its illegal actions. Moscow has been allowed to pretend it is a responsible nuclear actor. We should not longer provide them cover for this posture.

This leads to my second diplomatic point. Up until now, the United States has been reserved in its condemnation of Russia. This should end. Moscow is threatening the fabric of both preserving a stable strategic balance (strategic stability) and increasing the incentives on both sides to initiate and escalate conflict (crisis stability), as well as the broader nuclear arms control and nonproliferation system we have championed for

almost 50 years. We should no longer let Russia play the charade that they are a leader in nonproliferation fora such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the United Nations, the P-5, or other venues. This is a role they must earn, just as we have. It is a role I hope Russia will take seriously and that our combination of pressure and engagement could encourage. But as Moscow moves to deploy this INF Treaty violating system, this is no longer a hypothetical and Moscow should not be afforded any courtesies in this regard. I believe given the effort Moscow has gone to hide their violations that this holds out some prospect for putting real pressure on Moscow's international legitimacy, something the Kremlin's leadership values.

Third, if the Administrations finds Russia to be in material breach on the INF Treaty, we have the ability to take countermeasures against Russia in both the INF and other arms control contexts. One agreement Russia clearly values in the Open Skies Treaty. While I believe we should remain party to the INF Treaty, something we can do with no reduction in our security, I do support taking countermeasures to deny Russia to right to fully exercise its rights under the Open Skies Agreement until such time as they return to compliance with the INF Treaty. These responses must comply with international law and be proportionate and such a step should only be taken after extensive consultations with our European allies, who also value the OST. This step would have the added advantage of giving our European allies a stronger stake in resolving the INF violations with Russia.

I do want to be crystal clear, however, on one important factor. I do not support taking steps that would undermine our implementation or of Russia's of the New START Treaty. This agreement remains very much in our security interest as long as Russia fully implements its central limits. Putting this pillar of nuclear stability, predictability and of transparency over Russia should not be on the table in response to Russia's current INF Treaty violation.

The diplomatic track, however, cannot be all negative. We must continue to seek a negotiated solution as this holds out some hope of success in returning Russia to full INF

Treaty compliance. Doing so also increases our ability to get our allies, who value the Treaty, to support our efforts. This positive agenda should include a willingness to provide Russia with transparency measures including on-site visits to US missile defense deployments in Europe to counter Russian claims that these are INF Treaty violations and to provide assurances that these systems are not altered to deploy and fire offensive missiles. However, any such steps should be contingent on Russia providing necessary access for US inspectors to both its missile testing and deployment sites to verify the elimination and non-deployment of the SSC-8. While some will complain that this allows Russia to claim we are in some sense validating their false claims that Aegis Ashore is a violation of the INF Treaty, if that would open the door to eliminating the SSC-8 system and restoring a measure of crisis stability in Europe, it is worth the effort. If coupled with a public diplomacy campaign that includes evidence of Russia's violations and open briefings about why EPAA is compliant with the INF, this concern could be greatly reduced.

2) Economic – Moscow is under great economic strain due to the sanctions put in place over their seizure and illegal annexation of Crimea and their support for separatism in eastern Ukraine. Given the high stakes, we should not make resolving the Crimea crisis and implementing the Minsk accords any harder by linking our sanctions over Crimea to Russia's violation of the INF Treaty. At the same time, European allies have said that since they are not parties to the INF Treaty, they lack the legal basis for imposing sanctions over INF violations. Nonetheless, I believe there is value in the United States unilaterally imposing sanctions on Russian and companies in other countries who are linked directly to the INF Treaty violations.

3) Military – As mentioned above, I do not support development and deployment of land-based INF range systems in Europe in response to Russia's violations. Until and unless the Joint Chiefs determine that such a weapon capability is needed for deterrence or defense, the risks of such buying and seeking to station such systems in Europe or Asia outweigh the prospective benefits in my mind. It would be potentially disruptive for the United States to ask NATO countries, Japan and South Korea to host deployment of such

weapons systems on their territory. This is especially true under current political circumstances. I am also concerned about redirecting the European Phased Adaptive Approach – including Aegis Ashore - to protect it and other European assets against Russian systems. I would support a plan developed under a European-wide defense plan that added some means to protect the EPAA against direct threats but do not see the value of redirecting the EPAA itself against Russia and there are many political and diplomatic downsides to doing so. Explicitly making EPAA about Russia may be required in the future but I would only support doing so if there was a direct military need as doing so could validate a long-standing and previously unsubstantiated claim by Russia that EPAA is in fact geared to undermine Russian capabilities. It also remains highly questionable that broader cruise missile defenses in Europe, or in the United States for that matter, will ever be cost effective. It may be more effective for us to counter Russia's capabilities with asymmetric systems of our own, such as enhanced ISR and counter-mobile missile capabilities.

I do support the creation of a joint program office within the Pentagon to assess how the proposed Long-Range Stand-Off (next generation cruise missile) can be adapted to a conventional role for deployment on sea and air platforms. I do not support pursuing a land-based variant of the LRSO – nuclear or conventional - as both are unneeded and would muddy the waters over Russia's violations. Personally, I believe there is a strong case against pursuing a nuclear-armed LRSO in any form, and would rather re-direct the entire program toward a conventional capabilities for possible deployment on bombers, surface ships and submarines, but that is a decision under the purview of the new Administration's Nuclear Posture Review and that will also be decided by Congressional funding decisions. I do support JASSM-ER deployments in Europe and Asia and we should be prepared to enhance those further where and when there is a direct military benefit and that benefit outweighs the impact on crisis instability.

It seems readily apparent that Russia is vastly more concerned about our conventional precision strike capabilities than our nuclear capabilities. That being the case, given the likely need for conventional precision strike capabilities in the future, we should make a

virtue out of necessity and make clear to Russia that it is their actions that have precipitated a move by the United States not to reduce our conventional capabilities, but to enhance them. The future size, and possibly even limits on these could be considered as part of a broader political and negotiated agreement with Russia, but again only in the wake of a satisfactory resolution on the INF Treaty violation.

What is the future of the INF Treaty and does it make sense for the United States to remain a party to this agreement? Unless and until the United States needs to undertake a military or diplomatic action that is not permitted under the INF Treaty, including those that could be taken as a legal counter-measures in the wake of a finding of material breach, I support the United States remaining a fully compliant party to the INF Treaty. Doing so will clearly enhance our ability to bring diplomatic and even economic pressure against Russia and give us a stronger political standing among our friends and allies. Withdrawing from the Treaty, or at least doing so without careful diplomatic and political preparation and military justification, would run the risk that the United States would be seen as responsible for the collapse of the agreement. We should not bear the burden of ending the treaty; that would provide aid and comfort to Russia, free them of the politically costly step with withdrawing themselves, and leave Moscow free to deploy intermediate-range missiles.

If we cannot ensure our security and that of our allies in East Asia or Europe under the INF Treaty, including steps we can take as a legal counter-measure, then I remain open to arguments for our withdrawal. After having worked this issue closely for some time, I have yet to hear of or assess such a scenario, however.

How should Russia's violation be seen given its belligerent behavior around the world?

I came of age in the final days of the Cold War. I grew up under the fear of a nuclear strike at any time, living in ground zero New York. I cut my political teeth in the nuclear activism of the late 1970s and 1980s and am proud to have played a small part in a bigger movement that helped end the cold war nuclear competition in the 1980s. I am constantly reminded of how we thought in those days about the Soviet threat and the cold

blooded and calculating Soviets who were waiting for their chance to attack if only a bomber or missile gap could be created and exploited.

History has proven both how stupid and lucky we were. Far from the beast of global domination we projected, Soviet leaders were as worried about our plans for their destruction as we were of theirs. This cycle of fear led to trillions of dollars in inefficient investments that bankrupted them and led to systemic shortfalls in US investments in education, infrastructure, healthcare and other areas.

I have no illusions about Vladimir Putin's Russia. But it also remains abundantly clear that his actions are driven as much from weakness and fear (often baseless) as from a desire to dominate Europe or destroy the West. To be sure, such ambitions can emerge over time, so and we must be firm in our resolve and strategy and our watchfulness of Russia – the same commitment that brought the INF violation to light in a timely fashion. However, my desire that we not take steps that would further undermine crisis stability is rooted here in a concern not to overplay Russia's actions and further a growing narrative we are witnessing today, especially in light of other concerns about Russia's global behavior and actions here in the United States.

The risks of conflict with Russia are real and growing. The danger of an accidental or unintended conflict, or military engagement driven by concern over short decision times, miscommunication or mechanical malfunction are as high as they have been since the collapse of the Soviet Union. We have the most to lose from nuclear war and open conflict, and we should take the steps we need to take in order to protect ourselves and our allies while preserving crisis stability and ensuring we have the means and the time to react rationally and firmly in a crisis. Time for decision makers to engage, defuse and if necessary de-escalate is critical and a fundamental goal of many of the improvements we have made in the nuclear arena over the past decade. We should be careful not to undermine those goals through our response to the INF issue.

Russia is a declining power. Moscow can undermine our security and our alliances, and

undermine our institutions to bring us down to their level of dysfunction. They also remain the only country that can challenge our nuclear capabilities and bring about a global Armageddon. But it remains true that we are vastly more capable, richer and stronger than Russia and we hold the best cards and have the best chance to shape the global landscape for the 21st century. Only we, with the wrong choices, can deny ourselves that influence. Preserving our advantages means we must confront Russian aggression where it threatens our interests, remain committed to our allies, and to preserving a world order based on economic vitality. This depends on our credibility, and our championship of the legal, liberal democratic order. By staying true to these values, and understand that our leadership is based as much on our tone as our policies, the United States can effectively protect the foundations of our security. Any decision made in response to Russia's violation of the INF Treaty should be viewed in this context.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

Bio for Jon Brook Wolfsthal

Jon Wolfsthal is currently a fellow at the Managing the Atom Project at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is also a Senior Advisor to Global Zero.

Jon Wolfsthal is the former Special Assistant to the President of the United States for National Security Affairs and senior director at the National Security Council for arms control and nonproliferation. Before that, he was Deputy Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute for International Studies in Monterey. He joined Monterey after having been Special Advisor to Vice President Joseph R. Biden for nuclear security and nonproliferation and as a director for nonproliferation on the National Security Council from 2009-2012.

During his time in Government he was involved in almost every aspect of U.S. nuclear weapons, arms control, nonproliferation and security policy. He helped negotiate and secure the ratification of the New START arms reduction agreement with the Russian Federation, and helped support the development of nuclear policy including through the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and other elements of the Obama Administration's security policies. He was previously a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and deputy director for nonproliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He served in several capacities during the 1990s at the U.S. Department of Energy, including an on-the-ground assignment in North Korea during 1995-96.

With Joseph Cirincione, he is the author of Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction and a leading authority on nuclear weapons policy, regional proliferation, arms control and nuclear deterrence. His work has included extended assignments in Russia, North Korea and travel to Iran. He is the author of dozens of scholarly articles and op-eds and has appeared on or been quoted in most leading domestic and international news media outlets. He is an avid cook, fly fisherman and runner and lives in Washington DC with his wife and two children.

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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
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INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(5), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 115th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants), or contracts or payments originating with a foreign government, received during the current and two previous calendar years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness and related to the subject matter of the hearing. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Committee on Armed Services in complying with the House rule. Please note that a copy of these statements, with appropriate redactions to protect the witness's personal privacy (including home address and phone number) will be made publicly available in electronic form not later than one day after the witness's appearance before the committee. Witnesses may list additional grants, contracts, or payments on additional sheets, if necessary.

Witness name: Jon Brook Wolfsthal

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

Individual

Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented: _____

Federal Contract or Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) or grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

2017

Federal grant/ contract	Federal agency	Dollar value	Subject of contract or grant

2016

Federal grant/ contract	Federal agency	Dollar value	Subject of contract or grant

2015

Federal grant/ contract	Federal agency	Dollar value	Subject of contract or grant
	NNSA	less than \$10,000	contract management for MIIS

Foreign Government Contract or Payment Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts or payments originating from a foreign government, please provide the following information:

2017

Foreign contract/ payment	Foreign government	Dollar value	Subject of contract or payment

2016

Foreign contract/ payment	Foreign government	Dollar value	Subject of contract or payment

2015

Foreign contract/ payment	Foreign government	Dollar value	Subject of contract or payment
Oxford Analytica		\$2,000	articles for publication on risk analysis

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 30, 2017

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

January 13, 2015

General Martin Dempsey
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
9999 Joint Staff Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Chairman Dempsey:

On December 10, 2014, the Strategic Forces Subcommittee conducted a joint hearing with the Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to review the latest information on Russia's continued violation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The hearing was followed by a closed session with additional Administration briefers to discuss classified details of Russia's actions and the United States' response.

Based on the discussion at these events, we understand the Joint Staff has prepared a comprehensive assessment of, and is evaluating potential responses to, Russian violations of the INF Treaty. We also understand that, based on this assessment, you provided recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the President regarding options that should be pursued.

We request that you provide our subcommittees a briefing by January 30, 2015, on this options assessment, the recommendations you made to your civilian leaders based on this assessment, and the implications of those recommendations for allied and national security, deterrence, and ensuring strategic stability. Our subcommittees believe Russia's violation of the INF treaty is a paramount national security concern for the U.S. and our allies—particularly in the context of Russia's larger aggressive actions in the past years. Our deliberations on the way ahead for addressing this violation and encouraging Russia to return to compliance, if possible, would be greatly enhanced by a full understanding of the objective military assessment and the best military advice of the nation's senior military officer.

We appreciate your attention to our request and look forward to continue to work with you in support of our armed forces.

Sincerely,



Mike Rogers
Chairman
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces



Ted Poe
Chairman
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Non-
Proliferation, and Trade

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Jim Cooper
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces



Brad Sherman
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Non-
Proliferation, and Trade

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This UNCLASSIFIED report is the redacted/edited version of the CJCS approved report, by the same name and date, that was classified SECRET.

**Report on Conventional Prompt Global Strike
Options if Exempt from the Restrictions of the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Between
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics**



Prepared September 2013 in consultation with



Preparation of this report cost the Department of Defense a total of approximately \$8,550 for the 2013 Fiscal Year.
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(U) Executive Summary

(U) The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2014 directed *“the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to provide a report to the congressional defense committees not later than September 30, 2013, detailing what additional conventional prompt global strike concepts the military warfighters would seek to develop and deploy in the event the United States was no longer constrained by the INF treaty. Such report should include an assessment of the specific military requirements that exist that could be provided for with such INF treaty unconstrained capabilities as well as an assessment of any cost, technology risk, and timeline advantages that could be achieved with capabilities that are presently not available to the United States due to its adherence to the INF treaty. The report should also include an assessment of any risks and benefits to strategic stability of developing such systems.”*

(U) The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) defined strategy is based on a comprehensive set of offensive and defensive capabilities supported by a robust infrastructure. The report noted the addition of non-nuclear strike forces, including conventional strike, could reduce U.S. dependence on nuclear weapons to provide its offensive deterrent capability. Subsequently, U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) embarked on an effort to advocate for the development of a high-precision conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) capability.

(U) In 2006, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) validated the Prompt Global Strike (PGS) Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) which defines CPGS as a system that “provides the capability to strike globally, precisely and rapidly with kinetic and non-kinetic effects against high-payoff, time-sensitive targets: (1) in a single or multi-theater environment, (2) when US and Allied forces have no permanent military presence or only limited infrastructure in a region, (3) regardless of anti-access threats. The ICD requirements were validated by the JROC in 2013.

(U) The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty eliminated nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles ranges between 500 and 5,500 km. The treaty prohibits the production, flight test or launch of any shorter- (500-1,000 km) to intermediate- (1,000-5,500 km) range ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles or production or possession of any stages and/or launchers of such missiles. In the absence of the INF Treaty, four types of weapons systems could assist in closing the existing JROC-validated capability gap:

- (1) Modifications to existing short range or tactical weapon systems to extend range
- (2) Forward-based, ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs)
- (3) Forward-based, ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs)
- (4) Forward-based, ground-launched intermediate-range missiles with trajectory shaping vehicles (TSVs).

(U) Because of INF restrictions, examination of prohibited concepts has not been performed by industry or the Services. Trade studies regarding capability, affordability, and development

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timelines would have to be completed prior to providing an accurate estimate of cost, technology risk, and timeline advantages that could be achieved with respect to these concepts. Extensive knowledge could be leveraged from past and current land- and sea-based systems to assist in potential development and deployment of these currently prohibited concepts.

1.0 (U) Background

- 1.1 (U) This report is submitted as a response to Enclosure 9 posted in the "HASC Report 113-102 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 Classified Annex Report of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives on H.R. 1960, dated 7 June 2013."

2.0 (U) Conventional Prompt Global Strike

- 2.1 (U) Per the PGS ICD and as stated in USSTRATCOM's CPGS Concept of Operations, CPGS systems could be employed to strike globally, precisely, and rapidly with lethal kinetic effects against high-payoff, time-sensitive targets in denied and/or geographically isolated areas when other forces are not available, not responsive enough, or not preferred.
- 2.2 (U) The 2010 NPR noted the DoD "is studying the appropriate mix of long-range strike capabilities, including heavy bombers as well as non-nuclear prompt global strike, in follow-on analysis to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and the NPR." DoD has not made any decisions regarding system concepts, basing strategies, or acquisition programs for CPGS operations deployment. CPGS capabilities will be implemented in compliance with all relevant U.S. arms control treaty obligations.

3.0 (U) Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

- 3.1 (U) The INF Treaty is a 1987 agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union that eliminated and permanently prohibits nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km, along with their launchers and associated support structures and equipment. The treaty prohibits the production, flight test or launch of any shorter- (500-1,000 km) to intermediate-range (1,000-5,500 km) missiles or production or possession of any stages and/or launchers of such missiles. The treaty places no restrictions on manned aircraft, air-launched or sea-launched systems, or ground-launched systems with ranges less than 500 km or greater than 5,500 km.¹
- 3.2 (U) If the INF Treaty ceases to be in effect, the Department could choose to develop, flight test, and deploy conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles of any range and basing construct. Furthermore, the Department could obtain foreign missile systems, the possession of which is prohibited by the INF Treaty. Impacts regarding other treaties would need to be assessed, namely New START (NST)

¹ National Research Council of the National Academies, U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Issues for 2008 and Beyond, 2008

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accountability. INF and NST use the same or similar definitions that could impact CPGS efforts (see Enclosure A).

- 3.3 (U) Clear range separation exists between INF and NST. Any weapon system that might be developed in absence of the INF Treaty would need to be mindful of the 5,500 km range that could make it accountable as defined by the NST (Figure 2).

4.0 (U) Military Requirements

- 4.1 (U) Any CPGS capability using conventional ground-launched ballistic or cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km should comply with the specific military requirements outlined in the PGS ICD. These requirements were validated by JROC in 2006 and revalidated in 2013. These requirements are not affected by the status of the INF treaty.

- 4.2 (U) Absent INF treaty prohibitions, four additional types of weapon systems could assist at various levels to close the JROC-validated capability gap (Figure 3):

4.2.1 (U) Modifications to Existing Short Range or Tactical Weapon Systems: Modifying current weapon systems could provide a near-term solution to close the shorter-range portion of the CPGS capability gap. Existing tactical systems could potentially be modified to extend range into the lower ranges currently prohibited by the INF Treaty (i.e., “shorter-range missiles” with 500 to 1,000 km range as defined by the INF Treaty). Further study would be required to determine tradeoffs between range extension, warhead weight, and payload capability.

4.2.2 (U) Forward-Based, Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles: Development of GLCMs could leverage extensive technical development from current and previous air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) and GLCM programs. Increased capabilities may be required in anti-access environments.

4.2.3 (U) Forward-Based, Ground-Launched Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles: Intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), when forward-based at multiple locations, could mitigate the capability gap in terms of time and range. Despite high re-entry velocities, a weapon system with a purely ballistic trajectory could be susceptible to modern missile defense systems and lack the precision required to effectively strike targets with conventional munitions due to in-flight guidance errors.

4.2.4 (U) Forward-Based, Ground-Launched Intermediate-Range Missiles with Trajectory Shaping Vehicles: This concept is an evolution of the IRBM; instead of a simple re-entry vehicle following a ballistic trajectory, the re-entry vehicle incorporates maneuvering and glide capabilities. Increased capabilities may be required in anti-access environments.

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- 4.3 (U) Any future CPGS system with greater than 50 percent non-ballistic trajectory would not fall under NST restrictions as long as the remaining weapon characteristics are not defined as an ICBM or SLBM. Without INF prohibitions, the United States could develop ground-launched systems with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km capable of using any trajectory (ballistic, shaped, or non-ballistic). This would result in systems with the required timeliness, effects on target, and survivability needed to close the existing capability gap.
- 4.4 (U) Due to current INF prohibitions, specifically the definition of a ballistic missile, the Department is pursuing technology development concepts using boost-glide vehicles to achieve a greater than 50 percent non-ballistic flight profile. Without INF, the key benefit would be the ability to field a ground-launched ballistic system, such as an IRBM with a TSV. This type of system could deliver the same or better capability as a boost-glide vehicle, with potentially less technological risk and cost.

5.0 (U) Assessments of Cost, Technology Risk and Timeline Advantages

- 5.1 (U) Current CPGS efforts do not include nuclear or conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km. Neither Service nor industry partners has examined INF prohibited concepts. Cost and acquisition timelines for such systems cannot be accurately estimated until decisions are made regarding which technologies, concepts, and systems to examine in the formal development process. Further concept specific Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) would be required if the Department chooses to pursue a capability outside the current focus of the CPGS Defense Wide Account's (DWA's) RDT&E.

5.1.1 (U) Modifications to Existing Short-Range or Tactical Weapon Systems: Compared with a new start development, modification of currently fielded weapons could accelerate initial operational capability timelines because the technology is mature. Development costs could be relatively low to field a modified system; however, cost/benefit analysis would be required to assess near-term military usefulness versus a more capable weapon system with longer RDT&E timelines. Shorter-range systems would require a greater number of basing locations to provide global coverage. This would increase overall program cost.

5.1.2 (U) Forward-Based, Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles: Leveraging existing cruise missile and hypersonic test programs, a forward-based GLCM would present low-to-moderate technological risk and acquisition timelines. The costs of such a program could be comparable to current cruise missile programs such as the Long Range Standoff cruise missile; however, it would require increases in capabilities such as range, speed, stealth, and warhead lethality.

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5.1.3 (U) Forward-Based, Ground-Launched Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles: IRBMs could provide a low technical risk approach to field a CPGS weapon system. Extensive knowledge exists in ballistic missile technologies based on past and current ICBM and SLBM RDT&E. Leveraging existing mature technologies, IRBMs could be developed and fielded in the near term at potentially lower costs relative to other concepts.

5.1.4 (U) Forward-Based, Ground-Launched Intermediate-Range Missiles with Shaped Trajectories: Hypersonic boost/glide re-entry vehicles have been the major focus of the PGS DWA's research since 2008. Prior to that, the Services, National Laboratories, and industry have done extensive experimental work. Hypersonic glide vehicles can vary in technological complexity. Without the range prohibitions of the INF Treaty, the Department could pursue lower technology risk solutions leveraging proven success in numerous test flights. The timeline to field a system would be comparable to any other option, especially in light of the extensive testing experience. Expected costs would likely be higher than the IRBM option, but could yield improvements in military effectiveness.

6.0 (U) Potential Effects on Strategic Stability

- 6.1 (U) The request to assess the risks and benefits to strategic stability associated with withdrawing from the INF Treaty and developing weapon delivery systems currently prohibited by it is an inherently political question, as stability in the international security environment is inextricably linked to political aspirations and strategic intentions of many state and non-state actors. It is important to note that there is nothing fundamentally unique about the weapon technologies prohibited by the INF Treaty that makes them inherently destabilizing.
- 6.2 (U) U.S. development of shorter- and intermediate-range weapon delivery systems of a type currently prohibited by the INF Treaty could likely elicit political criticism regarding the potential for increased instability from potential adversaries. Meanwhile, Russian development and deployment of IRBMs and ground-launched cruise missiles could generate Allied concerns. This would likely be due, in part, to the short time of flight of forward-deployed systems. However, those same Russian systems could also affect the strategic calculus of other potential adversaries, such as China, in ways beneficial to stability.
- 6.3 (U) It is also foreseeable that U.S. development and deployment of these capabilities could enhance our strategic position vis-à-vis rival powers by bolstering our deterrent and extended deterrent capabilities. Stability could be preserved and strengthened in critical areas where U.S. and Allied interests might otherwise be challenged by competing state aspirations. Militarily, forward-deployed options, while sacrificing some survivability due to fixed-site positioning, could provide a persistent presence and decrease mission burden to submarine or ship launched systems. They could provide new and effective PGS capabilities, which reduce the nuclear ambiguity risk associated with conventionally armed ICBMs. Conversely, shorter times of flight of

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forward-deployed systems risk increased instability depending on the location and situation.

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(U) ENCLOSURE A**1.0 (U) New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty**

- 1.1 (U) NST is a nuclear arms reduction treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation. It was entered-into-force on 5 February 2011 and is expected to remain in place until 2021. The Department of State Fact Sheet on "Investment in Conventional Prompt Global Strike" states "The New START Treaty allows the United States to deploy CPGS systems, and does not in any way limit or constrain research, development, testing, and evaluation of such concepts and systems, which offer the prospect of striking any target in the world in less than an hour." CPGS weapon systems would count under the central limits of the treaty if they meet the NST definitions of an intercontinental or submarine launched ballistic missile.
- 1.2 (U) New START Treaty definitions that could impact CPGS:
- 1.2.1 (U) Ballistic Missile: A missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight.
- 1.2.2 (U) ICBM: A land-based ballistic missile with a range in excess of 5,500 km.
- 1.2.3 (U) SLBM: A ballistic missile with a range in excess of 600 km of a type, any one of which has been contained in, or launched from, a submarine.
- 1.2.4 (U) Weapon-delivery vehicle: For ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, a missile of a type, any one of which has been launched or flight-tested, or deployed to carry or be used as a weapon, that is, as any mechanism or any device that when directed against any target, is designed to damage or destroy it.
- 1.2.5 (U) Cruise Missile: A missile that is an unmanned, self-propelled weapon-delivery vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path.
- 1.2.6 (U) "New Type" of ICBM: A type of ICBM, the technical characteristics of which differ from the technical characteristics of an ICBM declared previously in at least one of the following respects: (a) number of stages, (b) type of propellant of any stage, (c) either the length of the assembled missile without front section or the length of the first stage, by more than 3 percent, or (d) diameter of the first stage, by more than 3 percent.
- 1.2.7 (U) Prototype: ICBMs or SLBMs, an ICBM or SLBM of a new type, no more than 20 missiles of which have been launched, and no launcher of missiles of which have been deployed.
- 1.2.8 (U) "New Kind" of weapon refers to new offensive arms of strategic range that do not meet the treaty's definitions of these existing strategic offensive arms.

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- 1.3 (U) INF and NST use the same definition for ballistic missiles. NST carries the discussion a step further, into a distinction between “new types” of weapons (new ICBMs, SLBMs, etc.) versus “new kinds” of weapons (hypersonic glide).

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MARCH 30, 2017

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS

Mr. ROGERS. Please discuss your views on the risks of the treaty currently being negotiated to ban nuclear weapons. Is it inconsistent for a NATO member who just signed on to the Warsaw Communiqué to now sign on to this treaty? What about non-NATO members who rely on our nuclear umbrella?

Mr. ROSE. I oppose the current efforts to negotiate a nuclear weapon ban treaty. Such a treaty would be fundamentally at odds with long-standing U.S. and Alliance defense and deterrence policies. A key objective of the proponents of the treaty is to undermine U.S. extended deterrence. I urge the United States and its allies not to participate in the negotiations, and not become parties to the treaty if one is negotiated.

Mr. ROGERS. Why does Russia's violation matter? Is this something that has to be confronted? Why?

Mr. ROSE. The INF Treaty has served the security interests of the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia for almost thirty years. The Treaty is not just a bilateral arms control treaty between the United States and Russia, but goes to the heart of Eurasian security. However, it is clear that Russia no longer sees the INF Treaty as in its interest and is unlikely to return to compliance. Therefore, a strong—but proportional—political and military response is required by the United States and its Allies to effectively address Russia's violation. I would recommend that the United States and its Allies should impose a “countervailing strategy” that seeks to enhance deterrence by holding critical Russian assets at risk. That response should also include “limited” cruise missile defenses that would deny Russia significant military benefit from the deployment of the new cruise missile. These response options should be implemented in a way that maintains Alliance unity and places the blame for the demise of the INF Treaty squarely where it belongs: with Russia.

Mr. ROGERS. How long was the INF violation teed up in the interagency before the policy decision was made to call Russia's conduct a violation?

Mr. ROSE. I was not directly responsible for this issue at the State Department until I became assistant secretary in December 2014, after Russia was declared in violation of the INF Treaty.

Mr. ROGERS. Do you believe Russia will return to compliance with INF? Do you think we could effectively verify a return to compliance? How? Please be specific.

Mr. ROSE. I believe that it is unlikely that Russia will return to compliance with its obligations under the INF Treaty for a variety of reasons, which I outlined in my written statement. That said, if Russia were to make a decision to return to compliance with the treaty, I do believe it could be done in a verifiable manner. This would likely require resuscitating the INF Treaty verification protocols, which expired in 2002, or similar measures.

Mr. ROGERS. Is it possible to take certain steps to convince them to return to compliance? How? By doing what?

Mr. ROSE. Again, I believe it is extremely unlikely that Russia will return to compliance with its obligations under the INF Treaty for a variety of reasons, which I outlined in my written statement.

Mr. ROGERS. Then Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Brian McKeon testified on two occasions that DOD was going to recommend three categories of military response options to convince Russia to return to compliance with the treaty. These included active defenses, and counter-force and countervailing military capabilities. What are some examples of these kinds of capabilities? Did they ever get developed?

Mr. ROSE. I would defer to my colleague Robert Scher who was actively involved in the development of these options when he served as assistant secretary of defense for strategy and capabilities. That said, many of the response options that I recommended in my written testimony are consistent with the military options that Under Secretary McKeon noted in his.

Mr. ROGERS. If the Russians were developing more than one system that violated the treaty, what would that mean for their intent to return to compliance? How

would such a fact influence how the U.S. should proceed on developing its own capabilities?

Mr. ROSE. I cannot confirm whether or not Russia is developing additional systems that violate the INF Treaty. However, if they were developing additional systems, it would only strengthen my view that Russia is unlikely to return to compliance. Therefore, I recommend moving forward with the military response options that I outlined in my written testimony, in particular developing a conventional variant of the Long-range Standoff (LRSO) cruise missile, and facilitating the sale of air- and sea-launched cruise missile capabilities (e.g., JSSM-ER and Tomahawk) to allies.

Mr. ROGERS. Are you familiar with the recommendations to confront Russia's violation made by then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey? Did you support them? How many of these recommendations were implemented by the administration? If none, why?

Mr. ROSE. I am familiar with those recommendations, but was not the assistant secretary of state at the time they were made.

Mr. ROGERS. Would you support R&D, as distinct from flight test or acquisition, of the long-range stand-off weapon (also known as LRSO) in a ground- or sea-launched option? Would such R&D violate the INF Treaty?

Mr. ROSE. I support the development of air- and sea-based variants of the LRSO. While R&D of the ground-based variant of the LRSO would not violate the INF Treaty, I would not recommend the development of a ground-based version of the LRSO at this time. Such a move could generate strong political opposition among some NATO allies, as we saw in the early 1980s, and provide an opening for Russian wedge-driving. U.S. and Allied military requirements can be met with air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, with less risk of political controversy.

Mr. ROGERS. It occurs to me that testing a sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missile, of which we have several thousand missiles in inventory, on a fixed-test stand would not violate the treaty. Am I right? What if we then demonstrated the ability to mate it to a mobile ground launcher, but didn't flight test it? Would that violate the treaty? Would these actions send the Russians a powerful message?

Mr. ROSE. It is my understanding that testing a sea-launched cruise missile on a fixed-test stand would not violate the INF Treaty. While demonstrating the ability to mate a Tomahawk on a mobile ground launcher and not testing might not be a "violation" of the treaty, it would be inconsistent with the "spirit" of treaty and could raise political concerns among allies. Furthermore, I'm not convinced that it would have much of an impact on Russian thinking. I believe that U.S. and Allied military requirements can be met with air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, with less risk of political controversy. Therefore, I recommend moving forward with the military response options that I outlined in my written testimony, in particular developing a conventional variant of the Long-range Standoff (LRSO) cruise missile, and facilitating the sale of air- and sea-launched cruise missile capabilities (e.g., JSSM-ER and Tomahawk) to allies.

Mr. ROGERS. Isn't it a false narrative that developing ground-launched cruise or ballistic missiles at an intermediate range means we're redeploying nuclear-armed Pershing IIs in Germany or the U.K.? Isn't this a false narrative spun by Russia and their allies?

Mr. ROSE. It is my understanding that the United States currently has no plans to develop, or deploy, intermediate-range ground-launched cruise or ballistic missiles, nuclear or conventional, to Europe.

Mr. ROGERS. Do you have any doubt that Russia is violating the treaty? Why then do some allies not agree with the U.S. position? Is it a political choice or are they really not convinced?

Mr. ROSE. I have no doubt that Russia has violated the INF Treaty. However, during my tenure as assistant secretary of state, I had access to significant intelligence information related to the issue. Allies have not had access to the same level of information. Therefore, I would strongly encourage the U.S. Government to make additional intelligence information on the subject available to allies.

Mr. ROGERS. I gave you a copy at the hearing of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's report from 2013 that lists at least four validated military requirements that call for the U.S. to use military capabilities prohibited by INF. It appears to be the case that our adherence to this treaty has a very real price for the U.S. and our military forces, in that we cannot meet these validated military requirements. Do you agree? How might such capabilities be useful in countering A2/AD in Asia?

Mr. ROSE. I believe that the United States can meet its current military requirements without deploying INF Treaty-prohibited systems. However, as I noted in my written testimony, I am not necessarily opposed to the development of such a capability in the future if: 1) Russia fails to return to compliance with the INF Treaty;

and 2) and the United States requires such a capability to meet its military requirements. However, I remain concerned about where we would deploy such a system if it were eventually developed. History has shown that deployments of ground-based missile systems remain politically controversial in democratic countries. For example, the deployment of U.S. INF-range ballistic and cruise missiles in Europe in the 1980s was highly controversial. Furthermore, the recent deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system to the Republic of Korea (ROK), though strictly a defensive system, has proven to be controversial both within the ROK, and in the region.

Mr. ROGERS. What are some of the factors the U.S. should consider prior to the extension of the New START treaty, which isn't required until 2021?

Mr. ROSE. A U.S. decision to extend the New START Treaty should be based two overarching factors. First, is extension of the treaty in the national security interest of the United States and its allies? Second, is Russia in full compliance with its obligations under the treaty?

Mr. ROGERS. Please discuss your views on the risks of the treaty currently being negotiated to ban nuclear weapons. Is it inconsistent for a NATO member who just signed on to the Warsaw Communiqué to now sign on to this treaty? What about non-NATO members who rely on our nuclear umbrella?

Mr. SCHER. The discussions underway to ban nuclear weapons are not in our interests or in the interests of our allies. Any ally who believes in the security assurances of the United States and NATO should not participate in the nuclear weapons ban negotiations, nor consider signing any such treaty. These discussions have set a dangerous course that if realized would destabilize NATO and undermine global security. While there are some who will state that this treaty is just aspirational, consideration of a nuclear ban runs counter to how the United States and its allies should think about the deterrent value of nuclear weapons and how we seek to deter nuclear war. As such, signing on to the treaty would be in direct conflict with Alliance statements in the Warsaw Communiqué and elsewhere and would severely damage the Alliance and the extended deterrence commitments of the United States in Europe and East Asia.

Mr. ROGERS. Why does Russia's violation matter? Is it something that has to be confronted? Why?

Mr. SCHER. Russia's violation of the INF treaty is dangerous from an operational and political perspective. It also undermines the relevance of treaties and arms control treaties beyond the INF treaty.

From an operational perspective, the intermediate-range missiles that Russia is building provide Russia with another capability to hold NATO forces and territory at risk. While we can address the threat from these missiles in different ways, their presence forces us to pursue costly defenses and additional offensive strike capabilities for the defense of NATO.

On the political side, the continued violation falls into a pattern of Russian actions that threatens its neighbors, weakens strategic stability, and defies international norms. Russia's behavior also has a direct impact on the validity and purpose of international agreements. If there is no reaction to their violation of the treaty, the entire system of arms control is weakened and calls into question international agreements globally.

Mr. ROGERS. How long was the INF violation teed up in the interagency before the policy decision was made to call Russia's conduct a violation?

Mr. SCHER. I took up my position overseeing these issues within the Office of the Secretary of Defense after the State Department officially announced that Russia was violating the INF treaty in July 2014. Hence, I do not know how long the interagency community was examining the evidence before making that formal declaration.

Mr. ROGERS. Do you believe Russia will return to compliance with INF? Do you think we could effectively verify a return to compliance? How? Please be specific.

Mr. SCHER. I do not believe that Russia will return to compliance with the INF treaty. However, it continues to be in the best interest of the United States to try to convince Russia to return, even as we do more to counter the operational and political threat from the deployment of the violating system for reasons noted in my testimony.

I am not an expert on verification, but I do know from many discussions that verification would be very difficult and likely require an expansive and intrusive regime that Russia would be unlikely to accede to. However, if for some reason Russia were to claim to want to come back into compliance, this kind of intrusive compliance regime should be a part of any deal that the United States would accept.

Mr. ROGERS. Is it possible to take certain steps to convince them to return to compliance? How? By doing what?

Mr. SCHER. As noted, I believe it unlikely that the Russians will agree to come back into compliance with the INF treaty. The only way to get Russia to consider compliance is by convincing Russian leaders that fielding the violating system will ultimately be costlier operationally and politically than returning to the treaty and that will require the coordinated military and political approach of the United States and the NATO alliance. For example, on the military side of the equation, Russia would need to see that because of the violation, the balance of forces between it and NATO had shifted and that the Alliance had become increasingly unified and militarily potent.

Mr. ROGERS. Then Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Brian McKeon testified on two occasions that DOD was going to recommend three categories of military response options to convince Russia to return to compliance with the treaty. These included active defenses, and counter-force and countervailing military capabilities. What are some examples of these kinds of capabilities? Did they ever get developed?

Mr. SCHER. Active defenses would include some point-missile defense systems we currently have in inventory such as the Patriot systems and some additional systems we have or could develop to target cruise missiles. Counter-force and countervailing capabilities are strike capabilities we have across the armed forces that would either directly target the violating systems or target other critical capabilities in Russia. The U.S. military currently has many such systems, but is always looking to improve its strike capabilities.

Mr. ROGERS. If the Russians were developing more than one system that violated the treaty, what would that mean for their intent to return to compliance? How would such a fact influence how the U.S. should proceed on developing its own capabilities?

Mr. SCHER. I believe that the Russians do not intend to return to the treaty now, but certainly the development of any additional, violating systems would make me even more certain about that fact. However, an additional system on their side does not change my calculus about the United States developing its own intermediate-range cruise missile. That should be done when and if the Administration, in coordination with Congress, believes 1) that this type of capability is needed for offensive purposes, 2) is a better investment than other strike capabilities, 3) increases strategic stability.

Mr. ROGERS. Are you familiar with the recommendations to confront Russia's violation made by then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey? Did you support them? How many of these recommendations were implemented by the administration? If none, why?

Mr. SCHER. I am generally familiar with the recommendations made by then Chairman Dempsey and support them as credible options that were rightfully presented to the President for his decision. I believe that very few were implemented by the Obama Administration but do not know what has happened since. In some cases, the recommendations were assessed to not be operationally necessary at the time and would, in fact, reduce strategic stability and run counter to the efforts being undertaken to try to convince Russia to return to compliance with the Treaty.

Mr. ROGERS. Would you support R&D, as distinct from flight test or acquisition, of the long-range stand-off weapon (also known as LRSO) in a ground- or sea-launched option? Would such R&D violate the INF Treaty?

Mr. SCHER. As I understand it, R&D for a ground-launched variation of the LRSO could be done in a way that does not violate the INF treaty—although that ultimately is a determination made by treaty lawyers at the Department of State. Assuming that my initial understanding is true, I would support such R&D at this time.

Mr. ROGERS. It occurs to me that testing a sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missile, of which we have several thousand missiles in inventory, on a fixed-test stand would not violate the treaty. Am I right? What if we then demonstrated the ability to mate it to a mobile ground launcher, but didn't flight test it? Would that violate the treaty? Would these actions send the Russians a powerful message?

Mr. SCHER. I believe that the actions you describe would send a clear message to the Russians that they would view as a direct consequence of their violation of the Treaty. I am not a lawyer and cannot formally comment on whether or not that would be a violation of the treaty, although based on what has been briefed to me, it would not seem to be a violation.

Mr. ROGERS. Isn't it a false narrative that developing ground-launched cruise or ballistic missiles at an intermediate range means we're redeploying nuclear-armed Pershing IIs in Germany or the U.K.? Isn't this a false narrative spun by Russia and their allies?

Mr. SCHER. Yes, it is not true that simply developing ground-launched cruise missiles or ballistic missiles at an intermediate range means that it is inevitable that these capabilities would be redeployed into Europe or that they would be nuclear armed. In fact, any such new capability would have applications globally and could more easily be conventionally armed.

Mr. ROGERS. Do you have any doubt that Russia is violating the treaty? Why then do some allies not agree with the U.S. position? Is it a political choice or are they really not convinced?

Mr. SCHER. I do not have any doubt that Russia is violating the treaty. I cannot speak for other nations about why they have not made the same statements. It is, however, critical that the United States continue to share as much intelligence as possible to make it abundantly clear that Russia is in violation of the INF Treaty, and I believe as Russia continues to deploy these systems, that will become an easier task.

Mr. ROGERS. I gave you a copy at the hearing of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's report from 2013 that lists at least four validated military requirements that call for the U.S. to use military capabilities prohibited by INF. It appears to be the case that our adherence to this treaty has a very real price for the U.S. and our military forces, in that we cannot meet these validated military requirements. Do you agree? How might such capabilities be useful in countering A2/AD in Asia?

Mr. SCHER. If the United States made the determination to withdraw from the INF treaty, there would be capabilities militarily useful for our forces that DOD could then develop. However, I do not believe that simply because these systems would be militarily useful or that they fill validated requirements necessarily means that they are the only, or even the best way, to address those requirements. Hence, pursuing any such capabilities would have to be done with an overall look at what options are available to meet the military requirements in a way that best reinforces strategic stability and supports U.S. interests.

The value of intermediate range systems in Asia would be our ability to locate them within the range of many systems China installed and developed to keep some U.S. systems out of range of Chinese forces. While this could have some operational advantages, it would also present more fixed targets to any adversary. Beyond this reality, we also have other systems that can penetrate and/or survive in the Pacific.

Mr. ROGERS. What are some of the factors the U.S. should consider prior to the extension of the New START treaty, which isn't required until 2021?

Mr. SCHER. I believe that the New START treaty, if implemented as agreed to, remains in U.S. interests and that extending New START makes sense. However, given recent Russian actions in regards to the INF treaty and its other aggressive actions, extending it early should only be done if we have confidence that it would be implemented in accordance with U.S. views of the treaty.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER

Mr. COOPER. Should the United States withdraw from the INF Treaty or the New START Treaty? Why/why not?

Mr. ROSE. I believe that continued implementation of the New START Treaty is in the national security interests of the United States for several reasons. First, it places limitations on the number of strategic nuclear systems that Russia can deploy against the United States and our allies. Second, through New START's on-site inspection regime, data declarations, and notifications, the Treaty provides the United States with key insights into Russian strategic nuclear forces that we might not have access to without the Treaty. Third, according to the U.S. Department of State's Annual Report on Implementation of the New START Treaty, Russia is adhering to its obligations under the Treaty. Indeed, the Reagan Administration had serious concerns about the Soviet Union's compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, as result of its building of the Krasnoyarsk ballistic missile early warning radar. However, these concerns did not prevent the United States from negotiating and ratifying the INF Treaty in 1988, because despite concerns about Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty, it was felt that the INF Treaty was in the national security interest of the United States. In my view, the same holds true for the New START Treaty today.

Mr. COOPER. Should the United States and NATO countries pursue cruise missile defense to counter the Russian INF violations? Why/why not?

Mr. ROSE. Russia is deploying the new GLCM as part of its overall A2AD strategy to deny the United States and its NATO Allies access to critical ports, airfields, and command and control nodes during a potential conflict. In response, the United States and NATO should deploy "limited" cruise missile defenses to protect key Alli-

ance assets in the event of a conflict with Russia. While I support the deployment of “limited” cruise missile defenses, I would caution against moving forward with the deployment of larger set of missile defenses aimed against Russia, especially against its strategic deterrent. Such an approach would be extremely expensive, technologically challenging, and could undermine strategic stability.

Mr. COOPER. Why did Russia develop and deploy the SSC-8 in violation of the INF Treaty? In addition to responding strongly to Russian violation, should we address Russian alleged concerns, and if so, how?

Mr. ROSE. In my view, Russia developed and deployed the SSC-8 in violation of the INF Treaty for a variety of political and military reasons, which I outlined in my written testimony. From 2013 to 2016, the United States attempted—unsuccessfully—to resolve Russia’s noncompliance with the INF Treaty through diplomatic efforts. During those discussions, the United States directly addressed each of Russia’s alleged concerns about U.S. compliance with the INF Treaty. Based on this history, I believe it is unlikely that Russia will return to compliance with the treaty.

Mr. COOPER. This is currently prohibited by law per a congressional mandate in the national defense authorization, but should we have a channel that allows military-military dialogue with Russia to discuss strategic stability issue, particularly in a crisis? Why/why not?

Mr. ROSE. I believe that is in the mutual interest of United States and Russia to initiate strategic stability talks to help prevent misperceptions and miscalculations.

Mr. COOPER. Should the United States withdraw from the INF Treaty or the New START Treaty? Why/why not?

Mr. SCHER. The United States should not withdraw from the INF treaty right now. It continues to be in the best interest of the United States and our Allies to do everything we can to bring Russia back into compliance, even if we eventually fail. However, I do believe that there is a range of actions that the United States should take within the bounds of the treaty to improve our operational position and make it more likely that Russia might see it in their interest to return to compliance.

I believe that the New START treaty remains in our interests given that it reduces the number of deployed nuclear weapons and established a solid verification regime, especially as Russia continues to implement that treaty.

Mr. COOPER. Why did Russia develop and deploy the SSC-8 in violation of the INF Treaty? In addition to responding strongly to Russian violation, should we address Russian alleged concerns, and if so, how?

Mr. SCHER. I cannot speak to why Russia violated the INF treaty, nor do I believe that they had any reason to do so. As they have not admitted to deploying this system, I have also not seen any publicly stated rationale for why they have developed the violating system. Russia certainly talks about how it is threatened by NATO, but given what has transpired over the past few years, Russia has been the aggressor on its periphery, not the Alliance.

Mr. COOPER. Does the Russian deployment of this missile threaten the U.S. ability to defend the United States and our European allies? Does it threaten our nuclear deterrence capability?

Mr. SCHER. At this point, I do not believe that this missile threatens the ability of the United States to defend ourselves and our Allies, and it does not significantly threaten our nuclear deterrence capabilities overall. However, the violation is not just a political statement; it is a real military capability. This system, especially if deployed in greater numbers, would have a measurable effect on the strike capability of Russia and would directly threaten NATO forces and territory, including possibly part of the air leg of the nuclear triad. Threatening our air leg would force the United States and NATO allies to spend more money on protection of the Alliance and more money on systems that could strike Russia in order to maintain the level of security we currently enjoy.

Mr. COOPER. This is currently prohibited by law per a congressional mandate in the national defense authorization, but should we have a channel that allows military-military dialogue with Russia to discuss strategic stability issue, particularly in a crisis? Why/why not?

Mr. SCHER. I believe that there is often a benefit to talking with other nations. Whether or not a military-to-military channel is the right approach depends on the particulars of the case. Given that strategic stability is much more than just a military concern, I am not convinced that such military talks between the United States and Russia would be the best approach. However, I do believe that there is value in retaining this channel as an option and not have it be specifically restricted by law as it could be helpful to those seeking to find the best way to enhance strategic

stability. And, yes, it would be particularly useful to have open channels of communication in the event of a crisis.

Mr. COOPER. Should the United States withdraw from the INF Treaty or the New START Treaty? Why/why not?

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. The United States has a vested interest New START's continued full implementation and the United States should not withdraw from New START. New START provides critical insights into Russian nuclear developments and also provides the only constraint on Russia nuclear modernization. It provides a critical element in an otherwise destabilized relationship with Russia and should be preserved as long as Russia continues to comply with its terms. It should be extended for five years if the Executive Branch and U.S. military believe that we can achieve our goals of deterrence and reassurance under the mutual constraints adopted under the agreement. I do not believe the United States should withdraw from the INF agreement unless the U.S. military determines that we have to develop and deploy a system denied to us by the terms of the agreement. Even then, it would be preferable for us to pursue such a program as a counter-measure under the INF given Russia's violations of the agreement. U.S. withdrawal from the INF is a favor to Russia and would enable Russia to claim we, not they, are responsible for the demise of the agreement.

Mr. COOPER. Should the United States and NATO countries pursue cruise missile defense to counter the Russian INF violations? Why/why not?

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. The missile defense options within our technical and military capability will make no significant impact on Russian or European military thinking, deterrence or reassurance. Moreover, the decision to deploy missile defenses in Europe was made to protect NATO allies from Iranian missile capabilities. Russia remains convinced that this is cover for American ambitions to direct missile defenses against Russia to deny it a retaliatory capability to deter American military actions. As such, any decision to direct the European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense against Russia has significant political and diplomatic implications. If there is no significant military gain and directing missile defense against Russia adds to the damaging political narrative in Europe that the United States is undermining strategic stability in Europe, then such steps should be approached cautiously. I do not believe at this time that EPAA should be redirected against cruise missiles and even if it is, it is unlikely to have any significant military capability.

Mr. COOPER. Why did Russia develop and deploy the SSC-8 in violation of the INF Treaty? In addition to responding strongly to Russian violation, should we address Russian alleged concerns, and if so, how?

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. Russian actions suggest that they are seriously concerned about the expansion of NATO and the growing ability of the United States to hold at risk strategic assets in Russia without resorting to use of nuclear weapons. Russian military doctrine now reserves the right to escalate to the use of nuclear weapons if it is facing a conventional military defeat with strategic implications, and their strong pursuit of precision strike conventional and nuclear capabilities on land, air and sea are consistent with this effort. While I have no doubt that Russia is in full violation of the INF Treaty, Russian thinking on the issue is unclear. Some officials in Russia may not be aware that the testing and development of such missiles is prohibited. However, if media reports of actual deployments are accurate, any such distinction is mute. Russia is in violation of the INF Treaty. I do believe that it is worth the effort to seek to preserve the INF Treaty and to bring Russia back into compliance. If a dialogue at a high enough level could be initiated, there is a chance that Russia would agree—in exchange for certain American actions or inaction—to reverse course and come back into compliance with the INF Treaty. Moreover, making such an effort would steady the resolve of NATO allies and should Russia refuse to come back into compliance, make a strong NATO response easier to achieve.

Mr. COOPER. Are there non-military responses that have yet to be used to respond to this violation? Which ones would you recommend?

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. I am a strong advocate for naming and shaming Russia actions. I believe that we should declassify a large majority of the information that confirms Russia's violations with our allies and to call Russia out in multiple international and legal form for their actions. Russia takes great pride in being a depository state for the nuclear nonproliferation Treaty and for being a responsible nuclear superpower. Making clear that their actions are no longer responsible and are a major detriment to international peace and security is one way to create pressure on Russia to return to compliance and avoid such destabilizing actions.

Mr. COOPER. This is currently prohibited by law per a congressional mandate in the national defense authorization, but should we have a channel that allows military-military dialogue with Russia to discuss strategic stability issue, particularly in a crisis? Why/why not?

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. The lack of a strategic stability dialogue with Russia is a major concern and adds to the danger that an accident or conflict could escalate out-of-control. Russian high-level officials or convince the United States is seeking to undermine the current political leadership control of the country and to deny Russia what it sees as it's rightful place in European global affairs. This paranoia can only be addressed through direct and sustained dialogue including national leadership and high-level military officials. This is in no way a reward for Russian actions but a necessary step to manage the strategic competition that is growing between two nuclear superpowers.

Mr. COOPER. Russia was also in violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) with the construction of its Krasnoyarsk ballistic missile early warning radar. Did the Russians eventually resolve those concerns? How many years did it take?

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. In contravention of the ABM treaty Russia built the radar system that was capable of performing battle management functions for missile defenses. It took five years for the United States and Russia to address these concerns and to bring Russia back into compliance.

Mr. COOPER. You mentioned in your testimony that you do not believe the Long-Range Stand-Off Weapons is necessary. Why?

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. The United States currently has five different means of delivering nuclear weapons globally. The Air Force has determined that a new Stealth bomber is necessary to replace the aging fleet of strategic B-52 and B-2 bombers. The goal of a Stealth bomber is to penetrate enemy defenses and delivered it's payload at close range. The cost for developing a Stealth bomber a significantly higher than for developing a standoff strategic bomber aircraft. It makes little sense to invest the extreme sums of money necessary to develop a truly stealthy bomber and also invest considerable psalms to develop a long-range standoff missiles. I am in favor of bought building either a non-stealthy long-range bomber and a long range stand off missile OR a stealth bomber with gravity bombs. I am not in favor of spending scarce resources on a redundancy and is redundant to our land and sea based ballistic missiles.

