

NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE COMMITTEES ON ARMED SERVICES AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

STATEMENT OF

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FOR POLICY

BEFORE THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
AND
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
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THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ARMED SERVICES

Chairman Rogers, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Cooper, Ranking Member Keating, distinguished members, thank you for the opportunity to testify on Russia's Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty violation and the Obama administration's responses.

Russian Compliance with Arms Control Treaties and Agreements

I will not belabor the point you already know and which Under Secretary Gottemoeller has already discussed: the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 to 5,500 kilometers, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles. We also have reported in the most recent arms control compliance report our concerns with regard to Russian adherence to several other arms control treaties.

Our determination on the INF Treaty violation has not changed since we first announced the violation in July 2014. There has been some speculation about what missile the United States is referring to and whether we have mistaken its testing for a treaty-compliant sea-based cruise missile. The evidence is conclusive. Russia has tested this ground-based system well into the ranges covered by the INF Treaty. We are talking about a real system and not a potential capability.

Since determining that Russia is in violation of its INF Treaty obligations, our objective has been to preserve the viability of the INF Treaty by convincing Russia to come back into compliance with those obligations. We believe it is in our national security interest and our allies' interest that the INF Treaty remains in force and that Russia remains a State Party to the Treaty and complies with its obligations. This means Russia must cease its noncompliant activity and eliminate all INF Treaty-prohibited missiles and launchers in a verifiable manner.

Equally important, our approach has focused on ensuring that Russia gains no significant military advantage from its violation. Doing so will ensure that our efforts to bring Russia back into compliance will not come at the expense of our security or that of our friends and allies.

Diplomatic Engagement with the Russian Federation

Under Secretary Gottemoeller has described how we began raising our concerns through diplomatic discussions with Russia in May 2013 and have repeated them on numerous occasions since that time. We have conveyed to Russian officials that we expect the Russian Federation to cease any further development, testing, production, and deployment of this noncompliant system and to eliminate the existing missiles and launchers in a verifiable manner. Since I last testified on this issue, U.S. and Russian technical experts met to discuss the issue. Unfortunately, the meetings did not resolve our concerns. Russia has not been forthcoming with any information, nor has it acknowledged the existence of the noncompliant cruise missile. Russia instead used the meetings as an opportunity to repeat tired and long-ago addressed accusations of the United States violating the INF Treaty.

We remain ready to have a discussion with the Russian Federation on this serious matter, but we cannot, and will not, have a one-way dialogue. Russia needs to take responsibility for its actions and the resultant consequences for European and Asian security.

Military Assessment

As a result of Russia's actions, in 2014, the Joint Staff conducted a military assessment of the threat posed by Russia if it were to deploy an INF Treaty-prohibited ground-launched cruise missile in Europe or the Asia-Pacific region. The assessment tells us that the deployment of such

a system by the Russian Federation would increase the risk to our allies and an indirect threat to the United States. My Joint Staff colleague can address this in the closed session.

The Joint Staff assessment led us to review a broad range of military response options and to consider the effect each option could have on convincing Russian leadership to return to compliance with the INF Treaty and on countering the capability of a Russian INF Treaty-prohibited system. This assessment occurred at the same time that we were confronting a new strategic reality in Europe: a Russia that is modernizing its military capabilities across a range of its systems, a Russia that has destabilized the European security order by purporting to annex Crimea and through its illegal activities in eastern Ukraine, and a Russia that is actively seeking to undermine NATO and to erode the security and economic ties that bind us all together. Finally, Moscow's nuclear weapons saber rattling has raised questions about Russia's commitment to strategic stability. As Secretary Carter said in Berlin six months ago, these reckless comments cause us to wonder whether Russia continues to respect the profound caution that world leaders in the nuclear age have shown with regard to the brandishing of nuclear weapons or nuclear-inspired rhetoric.

Military responses to Russia's actions

Over the course of the last year, the Administration determined that we needed to consider Russian actions with regard to the INF Treaty in the context of its overall aggressive and bellicose behavior that flouts international legal norms and destabilizes the European security order. Russia is not violating the INF Treaty in isolation from its overall aggressive behavior; therefore, we concluded that our responses cannot focus solely on the INF Treaty.

Stated another way: this is not just an arms control issue, and it represents a broader challenge to Trans-Atlantic security.

Accordingly, we are developing a comprehensive response to Russian military actions and are committing to investments that we will make irrespective of Russia's decision to return to compliance with the INF Treaty due to the broader strategic environment we face. And while we do not seek to make Russia an enemy, and we will cooperate with Russia where it is in our interests to do so – such as in the P5+1 negotiations with Iran – the President has made clear that we will uphold our Article 5 obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty.

Our core objective remains the same: to ensure that Russia does not obtain a significant military advantage from its INF violation. We believe that our overall efforts to prepare for the defense in Europe can achieve this goal and ensure that Russia's INF violations do not leave them with any appreciable advantage over us or our allies. As we consider the changed strategic environment in Europe, we are factoring Russia's increased cruise missile capabilities, including its INF violation, into our planning.

Our responses to Russia's activities in Ukraine as well as the complex security challenges in the South involve a broad range of efforts – within the Department, bilaterally with Allies and partners, and with the NATO Alliance.

First, we have focused on posture and presence. In the last year, under the European Reassurance Initiative, or ERI, for which Congress generously provided \$985 million in FY 2015, we have maintained a persistent, rotational air, land, and sea presence of U.S. forces in the Baltics and in Central Europe, to reassure our Allies and to build up their capacity. ERI also enables us to expand our bilateral and multilateral exercises in Europe, in order to improve interoperability and to strengthen our warfighting capability in the face of these newer threats.

We are planning to continue ERI, with \$789.3 million requested in FY 2016, and I expect that the Administration will continue to seek funding for ERI in FY 2017.

We are also transforming our posture in Europe in order to be more responsive and sustainable for the 21st Century. American rotational forces need to move more quickly and easily to participate in training and exercises in Europe. That's why we are prepositioning tanks, artillery, infantry fighting vehicles, and other equipment to rapidly respond to crises and provocation rapidly. Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland have agreed to host company- to battalion-sized elements of this equipment, which will be moved around the region for training and exercises

Second, the United States and the NATO Alliance are focused anew on planning and shaping our future military activities in Europe. We have energized planning and resourcing efforts in response to the changed security environment in and around Europe.

Third, we are working to improve our defensive measures to deny Russia offensive capabilities by modifying and expanding air defense systems, including addressing the difficult challenge posed by cruise missiles. As Secretary Carter stated last month at the Reagan Defense Forum in California, we are investing in the technologies that are most relevant to Russia's provocations, developing new unmanned systems, a new long-range bomber, a new long-range stand-off cruise missile, and a number of innovative technologies. We are also following through with plans announced in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review to modernize our nuclear arsenal – strategic and non-strategic – to be safe, secure, and effective to both deter nuclear attacks and reassure our allies.

Fourth, we are leading the NATO Alliance to prepare for the new challenges posed by Russia and instability and terrorism in the South. We are working to implement agreements

made at the Wales Summit and to plan for the next leaders' summit in Warsaw in July 2016. NATO has reorganized the NATO Response Force, set up new command centers, and established the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force. We are pressing our NATO Allies to fulfill the commitment made at the Wales Summit to invest more in defense, with a particular focus on new capabilities.

Let me provide two recent examples. We have energized defense activity focused on security challenges to NATO's Nordic region, as evidenced by Deputy Secretary Work's travel earlier this fall to Iceland and Norway; in Oslo, he joined a multilateral meeting with his counterparts from NATO Allies Norway, Denmark, and Iceland, as well as non-NATO partners Finland and Sweden, where they discussed opportunities to further cooperate and to address threats to the region. With the United Kingdom, the Department worked closely with our counterparts during the development of the 2015 Strategic Defense and Security Review, and we appreciate the UK's announcement last week of its plans to invest in a broad range of capabilities, focused on power projection, innovation, and deterrence.

We continue to look for ways to improve Alliance capabilities and decision-making. With regard to NATO's nuclear deterrence mission, Allies remain strongly committed to burden sharing as a foundational element of NATO's deterrence and defense posture. Our dual-capable F-35A is also on track and should complete operational testing of its dual capability in 2024. The B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb Life-Extension Program, a critical element of both our NATO commitment and our strategic forces, is on schedule and on budget to meet a March 2020 First Production Unit goal. We are also focusing on new threats to the Alliance, including cyberattacks, hybrid warfare, and the type of propaganda campaigns that we have seen emanating from Russia.

In confronting this challenge, we will take what Secretary Carter calls a strong and balanced approach. We will not go back to the old Cold War playbook of having hundreds of thousands of forces in Europe. We are also mindful that we do not need to, nor should we, return to a world where we match every Russian action with a direct and mirror imaged reaction. We will use a smaller footprint, high impact rotational presence, build partner capacity, and integrate planning between space, cyber, conventional, and nuclear forces.

In sum, we will take the necessary steps to build U.S. and NATO capabilities, posture and plans to deter Russia's destabilizing influence, coercion and aggressive actions, all while keeping the door open for cooperation when and if Russian is willing. These efforts will require expenditures we were not planning to make, and which will be challenging under a constrained budget. But make no mistake: we will undertake these efforts. Our security and that of our NATO Allies requires require an effective response and comprehensive strategy.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the pursuit of strategic stability remains in the interest of both the United States and Russia, and we hope Russia will remember why the Soviet Union signed the INF Treaty in the first place. Arms control agreements have enhanced our security for decades but they must be faithfully implemented, and we must be prepared to take effective steps should our treaty partners fail to meet their obligations. By agreeing to the Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union ensured that both Parties benefited from the removal of weapons systems that posed a real and credible threat to regional and international security. The reintroduction of such weapons systems is destabilizing and not in the interests of the United States, Europe, Asia, or

Russia. Russia's violation of the Treaty, and its policies that challenge the European security order, will not go unanswered.

We appreciate the attention of the Congress to these issues, and will keep you informed of developments. Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions.