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THE HOUSE COMMITTEE OF ARMED SERVICES

STATEMENT OF

HONORABLE BRIAN P. MCKEON
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR POLICY

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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
AND
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

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Chairman Rogers, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Cooper, Ranking Member Sherman, distinguished members of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee and Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on Russian arms control compliance.

You asked me to describe current compliance by the Russian Federation with its arms control agreements and obligations and, in the cases of noncompliance, how the Administration is responding to and holding the Russian Federation accountable for its actions. In particular, you have asked me to describe Russia's noncompliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the Administration's response to this violation, including coordinating with our allies and partners in Europe and in the Asia-Pacific region.

Arms control improves U.S. national security by stabilizing the strategic balance between the United States and other nations at lower levels of weapons. The United States is made safer and more secure by such agreements.

Adherence by all parties to their treaty commitments is central to the effectiveness of such agreements. Issues of noncompliance must be addressed – and resolved – with our treaty partners. This involves a full interagency process in evaluating occurrences of noncompliance and aggressively responding to them in order to preserve the credibility and viability of the treaty regime.

The 2014 Compliance Report

The Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments is a critical part of this process. The report

covering calendar year 2013 was released by the Department of State in July 2014 and will be referred to as the 2014 Compliance Report.

In addition to including a detailed assessment of adherence of the United States to obligations in arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements, the statutorily required Compliance Report comprehensively assesses the compliance of other nations with their obligations under such agreements. Although this report was prepared for the President by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense was fully consulted on the preparation of the report as required by the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. The Office of the Secretary of Defense continues to take a very active role, along with the full interagency, in assisting the Department of State in the preparation of this very important report.

The Department of Defense (DoD) is responsible for overseeing DoD compliance with all U.S. arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments. DoD components ensure their various program offices adhere to department compliance directives. We have a robust compliance review process that ensures programs and activities comply with U.S. international obligations. Interagency consultation on DoD programs is also conducted in appropriate cases.

As a result of this diligence, the United States is in compliance with all its obligations under arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments, and continues to make every effort to comply with them.

Russian Compliance

The administration closely monitors the compliance of other States Parties, including that of the Russian Federation, to treaties and agreements. The 2014 Compliance Report chronicles

concerns about Russian noncompliance with its obligations under a number of treaties and agreements. These include the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the Treaty on Open Skies, and the INF Treaty. While assessed in a separate report, the Chemical Weapons Convention also falls in this category

My comments today will focus on Russia's violation of its INF Treaty obligations, but first I would like to address the New START Treaty.

New START Treaty

We assess that the Russian Federation is in compliance with its obligations under the New START Treaty. Despite the recent downturn in the U.S.–Russian relationship, implementation of the New START Treaty has proceeded with no recognizable change in its implementation. The United States and Russia continue to conduct their full quota of inspections and exchange information on numbers and status of their strategic forces. Both sides also continue to meet under the Treaty's Bilateral Consultative Commission to address issues related to implementation of the Treaty.

The New START Treaty enhances U.S. national security by providing predictability and stability in the strategic balance between the United States and the Russian Federation at lower levels of strategic nuclear forces. The Treaty's verification regime continues to provide visibility into and insights on Russia's strategic forces.

For our part, the United States remains in full compliance with its obligations under the New START Treaty. As such, we continue to work toward implementing the objectives of the

2010 Nuclear Posture Review and achieving the final New START Treaty force structure by the Treaty's February 2018 deadline. I particularly thank the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces for your continued support of the nuclear forces and the nuclear enterprise.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

For my remaining time, I want to describe our serious concerns regarding the Russian Federation's noncompliance with its obligations under the INF Treaty and the actions we are taking to resolve this important issue.

The INF Treaty entered into force in 1988 and is a treaty originally between the United States and the Soviet Union. It exists now as a treaty between the United States and twelve successor States to the former Soviet Union, one of them being the Russian Federation. The INF Treaty required the Parties to eliminate and permanently forswear nuclear and conventionally-armed ground-launched ballistic missiles (GLBM) and cruise missiles (GLCM) with ranges from 500 km to 5,500 kilometers, along with their launchers, and associated support structures and equipment. The INF Treaty specifically prohibits the possession, production, and flight-testing of such missiles. It also prohibits the possession or production of any launchers for such missiles. The INF Treaty places no restrictions on manned aircraft, air-launched or sea-launched systems, or ground-launched systems with ranges less than 500 km or greater than 5,500 km. It is important to note ground-launched ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 5,500 km and submarine-launched ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 600 km are limited under New START.

Russia's Violation of the INF Treaty

The Administration has determined that the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a GLCM with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.

We have briefed you regularly on our concerns about Russia's actions and discussed it with our allies and partners.

We have engaged the Russian Federation in diplomatic discussions since early 2013, including senior-level discussions in Moscow in September 2014. We have conveyed to Russian officials we expect the Russian Federation to cease any further development, testing, production, and deployment of this noncompliant system and to eliminate the missiles and launchers in a verifiable manner. Unfortunately, Russia has not been forthcoming with any information, nor has it acknowledged the existence of such a noncompliant cruise missile.

We believe it is in the mutual security interests of the United States and all the Parties to the INF Treaty that they all remain Parties to the Treaty and uphold their obligations. The INF Treaty contributes not only to the parties' security, but also to that of U.S. allies and partners, and to regional security and stability in Europe and in the Asia-Pacific region. Russian possession, development, or deployment of a weapons system in violation of the INF Treaty will not be ignored.

U.S. Response to Russia's INF Treaty Violation

From the moment we determined that we had a concern with a new Russian program, our objective has been to preserve the viability of the INF Treaty and convince Russia to come back

into compliance with its obligations. This means Russia must cease its noncompliant activity and eliminate all INF Treaty-prohibited missiles and launchers in a verifiable manner.

Our approach to this issue has been multipronged, beginning with engaging Russia diplomatically while discussing potential economic measures in coordination with allies. Consideration of other response options has always been part of our strategy as well and I can address that aspect in more detail during the closed session.

Diplomatic Engagement with the Russian Federation:

We began raising our concerns with Russia in May 2013 and have repeated them on numerous occasions since that time. Most of these interactions have been carried out by my State Department colleagues.

Since the release of the 2014 Compliance Report in July of this year, the United States has engaged at senior levels with the Russian Federation in an attempt to move constructively toward resolving our concerns and convincing Russia to return to compliance. Shortly after the release of the Report, Secretary Hagel discussed the violation with his counterpart, Russian Minister of Defense Shoygu. Chairman Dempsey had a similar conversation with General Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff. Following these interactions, Russian President Putin accepted President Obama's suggestion of having senior-level teams convene to discuss this matter.

In September of this year, Under Secretary Gottemoeller led a senior U.S. delegation to Moscow to discuss the concerns of both sides regarding compliance with the INF Treaty. I attended for the Office of the Secretary of Defense along with a full interagency team. We had a

frank exchange, but the meetings did not resolve our concerns. We will continue to pursue a dialogue with the Russian Federation on this serious matter.

Military Assessment and Military Response Options

As a result of Russia's actions, the Joint Staff has conducted a military assessment of the threat if Russia were to deploy an INF Treaty-range ground-launched cruise missile in Europe or the Asia-Pacific region. This assessment will continue to be updated as developments warrant.

The assessment tells us that development and deployment of such a system by the Russian Federation would pose a threat to the United States and its allies and partners.

The Joint Staff assessment has led us to review a broad range of military response options and consider the effect each option could have on convincing Russian leadership to return to compliance with the INF Treaty, as well as countering the capability of a Russian INF Treaty-prohibited system.

I can go into more detail on the military assessment in the closed session.

Russian Allegations of U.S. Noncompliance with the INF Treaty

Shortly after we began raising our concerns with Russia regarding violation of its INF Treaty obligations, the Russian side began formally accusing the United States of violating its obligations under the INF Treaty. Russia raised some of these allegations in the past, but has not done so formally for many years. All of Russia's claims, past and present, are categorically unfounded. The United States has been and remains in compliance with all of its obligations under the INF Treaty. These Russian claims are meant to divert attention from its own violation.

We fully addressed each of Russia's concerns during the September 11 meetings in Moscow, and provided the Russian side with detailed explanations and Treaty-based explanations as to how U.S. actions are compliant with our obligations under the Treaty.

Specifically, the Russians have accused the United States of violating its obligations as a result of three different activities.

First, the Russian side claims that certain U.S. ballistic target missiles are not compliant with INF Treaty provisions.

The United States uses various booster configurations to simulate certain aspects of threat missiles for the purpose of testing our missile defense systems. The purpose of these tests is research and development of missile defense systems, not the development of the target booster systems into banned offensive missiles. The INF Treaty explicitly permits the use of older booster stages for research and development purposes subject to specific Treaty rules. This includes their use as targets for missile defense tests.

Second, the Russian Federation, despite its own development of such systems, claims that armed, unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, are ground-launched cruise missiles and therefore banned by the INF Treaty.

The United States employs a number of armed versions of UAVs. All of them are two-way, reusable systems. The INF Treaty imposes no restrictions on the testing, production, or possession of two-way, reusable, armed UAVs. Such UAVs are not missiles and, therefore, are not covered by the INF Treaty.

Third, Russia claims that the launcher complex for the Aegis Ashore missile defense system is capable of launching Tomahawk cruise missiles. A launcher with such a capability would be prohibited under the INF Treaty.

The Aegis Ashore missile defense system is fully consistent, and complies with U.S. obligations under the INF Treaty. The Aegis Ashore vertical launching system is not the same launcher as the sea-based Mk-41 Vertical Launching System, although it utilizes some of the same structural components as the sea-based system. Equally important, the Aegis Ashore system is only capable of launching defensive interceptor missiles, such as the SM-3. It is incapable of launching cruise missiles.

Despite our explanations, the Russian Federation says that it remains unconvinced and continues to assert its claims about our activities.

Reassuring Allies and Partners

We have also kept our allies informed of Russia's violation and its implications. After our meeting in Moscow in September, Under Secretary Gottemoeller briefed the North Atlantic Council by a secure videoconference call. We continue to consult our European and Asian allies and partners as we assess the political and military implications of Russia's actions and discuss the need for and the type of possible responses. Reassuring our allies and partners of our commitment to our collective security is essential as we develop our responses to Russia's violations, and we will continue to stress the importance of building a strong, international consensus in responding to it.

Review of Policy toward Russia

It is also important we consider Russian actions with regard to the INF Treaty in the context of its overall behavior.

Ongoing assessments within the Administration are not only looking at Russia's INF Treaty violation, but are seeking to develop a comprehensive Russia policy in light of other Russian actions, including those in Ukraine. We are insisting Russia abide by its international agreements, and the Administration continues to evaluate its overall strategy toward Russia taking into account all of Russia's activities. We will not ignore Russia's actions. The United States has made this clear to the Russian Federation.

We do not want to find ourselves engaged in an escalatory action/reaction cycle as a result of Russia's decision to possess INF Treaty-prohibited weapons. However, Russia's lack of meaningful engagement on this issue, if it persists, will ultimately require the United States to take actions to protect its interests and security along with those of its allies and partners. Those actions will make Russia less secure.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we have a significant challenge ahead of us. Since 2009, we have engaged Russia on taking mutually beneficial steps for enhancing strategic stability. Similarly, with our allies and partners we have made considerable progress in strengthening extended deterrence and assurance.

We believe this pursuit of strategic stability remains in the interest of both the United States and Russia, and we hope the Russian Federation will remember why the Soviet Union signed onto the INF Treaty in the first place. By agreeing to the Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union ensured that both Parties benefited from the removal of weapon systems that posed a real and credible threat to European security. The reintroduction of such weapons

systems is destabilizing, and not in the interests of the United States, Europe, Asia, or the Russian Federation.

The United States takes treaty compliance very seriously. The ramifications of Russia's actions and our response affect more than just one arms control agreement. They affect our ability to pursue future arms control and nonproliferation regimes. Such a violation threatens the national security and collective security of many allies and partners, and, ultimately, Russia's actions affect strategic stability. This violation will not go unanswered because there is too much at stake.

We look forward to keeping you informed on this matter as the situation develops. Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions.