



Statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Oversight and Intelligence
On US Accountability at the United Nations: Challenges and Opportunities for Reform

Leveraging US Funding and Influence for Reform in the United Nations

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Chairman Mills, Ranking Member Moskowitz, and honorable members of the Oversight and Intelligence Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.

My testimony focuses on United States membership in and funding of international organizations, actions by the Trump administration to reassess and refocus US participation and funding to better support US interests, and recommendations to better apply US pressure to realize that goal.

US PARTICIPATION IN AND FUNDING OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The US provides billions of dollars each year to the United Nations and other international organizations. According to annual reports by the State Department on US Contributions to International Organizations,¹ the US contributed \$147 billion to scores of international organizations in the ten fiscal years from 2015 to 2024. Most of these contributions (\$114 billion or 77 percent) were provided to the United Nations and its affiliated organizations and activities.

The number of international organizations receiving US funding fluctuated from a low of 151 in FY 2016 to a high of 195 in FY 2021. Overall, 279 entities were listed as receiving US funding in at least one report over the ten years. Within this period, 97 organizations received funding each year over the decade. A similar number were funded only in five or fewer years.


Contributions trended significantly upward over the decade, nearly doubling from \$10.8 billion in FY 2015 to \$19.5 billion in FY 2024. This increase has a sharp demarcation:

- Contributions averaged \$11.5 billion from FY 2015 to FY 2019, never exceeding \$12.3 billion.
- Contributions spiked to more than \$15.3 billion in FY 2020 and exceeded that level in each of the next four years, averaging over \$17.8 billion from FY 2020-2024.

According to the UN Chief Executives Board,² which tracks spending by calendar year rather than US fiscal years but allows system-wide comparisons, on average from 2015 to 2024 the US provided 28 percent of contributions from governments to the UN system with a low of 25 percent in 2018 and a high of 34 percent in 2022. In 2024, the US provided 30.5 percent of government contributions (\$14.3 billion).

- This is equivalent to the combined contributions of 183 other nations and 3 times the contributions of Germany in 2nd place (\$4.8 billion). The rest of the top 5 government contributors were the United Kingdom (\$3.1 billion), China (\$2.5 billion), and Japan (\$2.3 billion).
- The US provided \$3.2 billion in assessed contributions to all UN organizations in 2024 but provided \$11 billion in voluntary contributions, i.e., contributions it has no obligation to provide. This stands in stark contrast to China, which contributed \$2.2 billion in assessed contributions but only \$265 million in voluntary contributions in 2024.

US Contributions to International Organizations FY 2015-2024



¹ Section 4(b) of the United Nations Participation Act (UNPA, 22 U.S.C. § 287b(b)) calls for the Secretary of State to submit an annual report to Congress on the extent and disposition of all financial contributions made by the United States during the preceding year to international organizations in which the United States participates as a member. US Department of State, "U.S. Contributions to International Organizations," <https://www.state.gov/u-s-contributions-to-international-organizations>.

² United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, "Revenue by Government Donor," <https://unsceb.org/fs-revenue-government-donor>.

In terms of obligatory payments, the UN charges the US more than any other country.³ Specifically, the US is assessed 22 percent of the UN regular budget and just over 26 percent of the UN peacekeeping budget. These assessments total about \$2.2 billion for 2026. By comparison, the least assessed countries are charged less than \$40,000, but have equal votes to the US in the UN General Assembly.⁴ When the regular and peacekeeping budgets are totaled, the US is assessed more than 184 other countries *combined*.

While US contributions to the UN regular and peacekeeping budgets are substantial, other parts of the UN system have historically relied even more heavily on US funding. The largest recipients of US contributions have been international humanitarian and health organizations. For instance, in 2024, US funding accounted for over 50 percent of government contributions to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the World Food Program (WFP).⁵ Each received over \$1.5 billion from the US in 2024.

PRIORITIZING US PARTICIPATION

The US does not fund all international organizations equally and, in some cases, provides very little or no funding. In addition, the US historically has been more willing to withdraw from underperforming organizations than other nations and link its support to their contributions to US interests. This is appropriate as not all international organizations are the same. Some are irrelevant to US interests, such as the UN Industrial Development Organization and the World Tourism Organization from which the US withdrew in the 1990s.⁶ Some are flawed but fulfill important functions. For instance, the World Health Organization handled COVID terribly, but the US could benefit from selective engagement such as participating in the Epidemic Intelligence from Open Sources platform.⁷ Many organizations are important and participation is critical to US interests.

Identifying those international organizations that are most important to US interests and allocating funding accordingly is not just prudent, but long overdue.⁸ The February 4 executive order mandating a review of US participation in international organizations and multilateral treaties and the State Department Agency Strategic Plan objective to “engage in international organizations only when it advances America’s national interests” are welcome steps toward this goal.⁹

Problems with Implementation. Unfortunately, implementation has been irregular, tardy, and incomplete. Early on, the US announced decisions to withdraw from and/or end funding for the World Health Organization (WHO), the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), the International Criminal Court (ICC), the UN

³ Assessments are based on a country’s gross national income adjusted for ceilings and floors (maximum and minimum assessments) and relief measures for debt and low per capita GNI. Over two-thirds of the 193 UN member states receive some sort of reduction to their assessment through relief measures and the ceilings lowering their UN assessment below their share of global GNI. Brett Schaefer, “The US Should Freeze and Adjust UN Contributions to Support American Priorities,” AEI Working Paper, March 11, 2025, <https://www.aei.org/research-products/working-paper/the-us-should-freeze-and-adjust-un-contributions-to-support-american-priorities/>.

⁴ The minimum assessment of 0.001 percent for the UN regular budget is equivalent to \$34,504 in 2026. The minimum assessment of 0.0001 percent for the UN peacekeeping budget is equivalent to \$5,386 under the 2025-2026 budget.

⁵ United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination.

⁶ United States General Accounting Office, “U.S. Participation in Special-Purpose International Organizations,” GAO/NSIAD-97-35, March 1997, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/nsiad-97-35.pdf>.

⁷ Brett Schaefer and Roger Bate, “After Withdrawal: How the United States Can Shape Global Health from Outside the WHO,” AEI Working Paper, January 14, 2026, <https://www.aei.org/research-products/working-paper/after-withdrawal-how-the-united-states-can-shape-global-health-from-outside-the-who/>.

⁸ Brett Schaefer, “U.S. Should Demand Increased Transparency and Accountability as U.N. Revenues Rise,” Heritage Foundation, February 26, 2014, <https://www.heritage.org/report/us-should-demand-increased-transparency-and-accountability-un-revenues-rise>.

⁹ President Donald Trump, “Withdrawing the United States From and Ending Funding to Certain United Nations Organizations and Reviewing United States Support to All International Organizations,” Executive Order 14199, February 4, 2025, <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/02/10/2025-02504/withdrawing-the-united-states-from-and-ending-funding-to-certain-united-nations-organizations-and> and US Department of State, “Agency Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2026-2030,” <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Agency-Strategic-Plan-for-Fiscal-Years-2026-2030.pdf>.

Relief and Works Agency for the Near East (UNRWA), and the Human Rights Council (HRC).¹⁰ Later, the US announced that it would withdraw from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).¹¹

However, the 180-day timeline in the February 4 executive order was not met. It was not until January 2026 that the White House released a Presidential Memoranda announcing its decision to withdraw from 35 non-UN organizations and 31 UN entities that “operate contrary to US national interests, security, economic prosperity, or sovereignty.”¹²

The announced decisions to withdraw are defensible and, in many cases, deserved. But there are many organizations that were not mentioned, including major recipients of US funding, whose current and future relationship with the US remains unclear. This is a problem because the US indisputably does have an interest in supporting the activities of some UN organizations. In some cases, the US is seeking to appoint US citizens to prominent positions, which uncertainty over engagement and funding hinders.

The Administration signaled continued support for some organizations. For instance, it requested funding in its FY 2026 Congressional Budget Justification for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and NATO.¹³ Other organizations, including the Global Fund, UNHCR, UNICEF, and the WFP, have received US funds in the past 12 months.¹⁴ Presumably, these organizations are considered important to merit US funding, but a specific rationale explaining why remains absent.

Overall, an evaluation of US interests in continued participation in and funding of international organizations called for in the February 4 Executive Order, is welcome and necessary. However, the implementation is a missed opportunity for several reasons.

- **Pace.** Over the past year, the Trump administration has limited US funding for international organizations pending the outcome of the review so that it would not fund organizations not considered to be in the US national interest. This made sense on the original 180-day timeline. But the review has dragged on for more than a year with announced decisions on only a fourth of international organizations receiving US funding over the past decade. The FY 2025 report on US contributions to international organizations, when released, will illustrate a sharp decline in funding versus FY 2024. Organizations have become accustomed to delayed US payments. But no payment at all is very disruptive. What was intended to be an exercise in appropriately allocating US funding and improving US influence has been weakened by delay and uncertainty. The US must accelerate the pace of the review if the US is to support and influence organizations supportive of US interests.
- **Balance.** The review has so far focused on announcing terminations of US membership and funding.

¹⁰ President Donald Trump, “Withdrawing the United States From and Ending Funding to Certain United Nations Organizations”; President Donald Trump, “Withdrawing the United States From the World Health Organization,” January 20, 2025, <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/29/2025-01957/withdrawing-the-united-states-from-the-world-health-organization>; President Donald Trump, “Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court,” February 6, 2025, <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/02/12/2025-02612/imposing-sanctions-on-the-international-criminal-court>; President Donald Trump, “Enforcing the Hyde Amendment,” January 24, 2025, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/enforcing-the-hyde-amendment/>.

¹¹ US Department of State, “The United States Withdraws from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),” July 22, 2025, <https://www.state.gov/releases/2025/07/the-united-states-withdraws-from-the-united-nations-educational-scientific-and-cultural-organization-unesco>.

¹² President Donald Trump, “Withdrawing the United States from International Organizations, Conventions, and Treaties that Are Contrary to the Interests of the United States,” Presidential Memoranda, January 7, 2026, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/01/withdrawing-the-united-states-from-international-organizations-conventions-and-treaties-that-are-contrary-to-the-interests-of-the-united-states/>.

¹³ US Department of State, “Congressional Budget Justification for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs,” Fiscal Year 2026, p. 87-8, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/FY-2026-State-CBJ-.pdf>.

¹⁴ USA Spending, <https://www.usaspending.gov/>.

This is needed, but the review should also be utilized to affirm US support, funding, and engagement. Many large international organizations that historically received hundreds of millions or billions of dollars in US funding remain in limbo, perhaps receiving some US funding, but not certain if it will be maintained. Even organizations that have received funding or have other reasons to believe that the US intends to maintain membership and funding, such as the US announcing its endorsement of a second term for ITU Secretary General Doreen Bogdan-Martin, may have ongoing questions. If the US knows that it will continue its membership and funding, it should announce that conclusion. This would give organizations clarity, bolster US influence, and greenlight US agencies to engage with and fund the organization and its activities.

- **Reform.** In the deliberative process to implement the President’s Executive Order, an assessment of each organization is doubtlessly conducted and debated in the interagency process. Yet, for the most part, US announcements that it would withdraw or cease funding to international organizations were not accompanied by a justification or rationale. Failing to communicate the justification for the decision makes them seem arbitrary even if they are carefully considered. To correct this, the US should issue a summary of the underlying analysis as a supplement to White House announcements or in State Department documentation. This need not be exhaustive, but provide a clear explanation of the foreign, economic, or strategic benefit – or lack thereof – to US interests from membership in and support for each organization.¹⁵ No organization, even those that the US values and wishes to continue to support, are perfect. If done correctly and applied across the board, this summary of US interests in discrete organizations accompanied by an assessment of where they fall short or are duplicative of other organizations could guide a reform agenda for each organization that the US can pursue using its financial leverage and the threat of lessening US engagement or withdrawal. Moreover, an explanation, even if brief, would create pressure for a future administration who wished to reverse these decisions – as occurred with the WHO and UNESCO when President Biden was elected – to explain to Congress and the American public how it had addressed the flaws that led to the US withdrawal and what interests are served by restoring US membership and funding.

SECURING REFORMS UNDER TRUMP

As with other nations, the US uses diplomacy and persuasion to influence the decisions of international organizations. America’s capacity to address global issues is extensive, rivaled by few nations, and its diplomatic successes in the UN over the decades have been numerous aided by tools that most nations do not possess.

- **Security Council veto.** As a veto-wielding member of the UN Security Council, the US can block nominees for Secretary General and resolutions on matters of international peace and security, including sanctions, military action, and peacekeeping mission mandates and duration. Application of this power, combined with the ability to act independently, is a formidable combination.
- **Foreign assistance.** The US has historically been the largest source of foreign assistance to developing countries which comprise more than two-thirds of the UN member states. Yet most recipients of US assistance vote against the US most of the time in the UN General Assembly on non-consensus votes.¹⁶ For more than 40 years, since the Congress required the State Department to track voting in the General Assembly, voting coincidence with the US, on average, has been about 35 percent. Historically, the US has rarely linked US assistance to support for US policies in multilateral

¹⁵ As an illustration of what this could look like, this past summer, AEI published the United Nations Organizations Assessment Project that racks and stacks the UN and 39 affiliated organizations and agencies into three tiers based on their contribution to US security, foreign policy, and economic interests. In addition to providing recommendations on US engagement and funding, each assessment offers basic facts about the organization, including US funding levels, the number of US nationals the organization employs, a summary of the organization’s mission, upcoming elections, and governance rules. Brett D. Schaefer, “United Nations Organizations Assessment Project,” American Enterprise Institute, <https://www.aei.org/un-review/>.

¹⁶ Brett Schaefer and Anthony Kim, “Use U.S. Aid to Increase Support in the United Nations,” December 16, 2024, The Heritage Foundation, <https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/use-us-aid-increase-support-the-united-nations>.

organizations. Congress recently required the Secretary of State to consider a country's United Nations voting record and support for Taiwan's observer status in international organizations when allocating assistance.¹⁷ Properly used, this could sway support for US priorities.

- **Financial leverage.** The UN system is heavily dependent on US funding. Historically, leveraging this dependence through withholding and pressure has been the most effective method of imposing budgetary restraint, improved oversight, and other reforms on a resistant organization and indifferent UN member states. The most prominent, successful example of this tactic was the Helms-Biden legislation that linked payment of US arrears to lower assessments and other management reforms.¹⁸

The Trump administration has effectively used US influence to pressure the UN to bend to US priorities. For instance, the US pressed the Security Council to sunset the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), endorse a Moroccan proposal to resolve the autonomy of Western Sahara, secure UN support for the Gang Suppression Force in Haiti, and endorse the Board of Peace to oversee the ceasefire in Gaza. Despite condemnations by Russia and China, the Security Council has been muted in response to US actions in Venezuela and Iran. Observers credit the willingness of the US to use its influence:

Council members are frank about why they do not challenge their U.S. counterparts at these moments: U.S. officials play hardball, threatening to wield the U.S. veto liberally and penalize other countries that do not cooperate... There is also an underlying sense among U.N. members that the alternative to playing along with the U.S. may be that Trump walks away from the global body altogether [or] could simply cut the Security Council out...¹⁹

Over the past year, the Trump administration has also applied financial leverage in an unprecedented manner. It has withheld most payments to the UN system pending its review of organizations. In New York, the US has used this withholding to reduce the UN regular budget by \$270 million — the largest reduction, both in dollar and percentage terms, in its history — and eliminate over 2,900 UN staff posts, improve UN oversight of capital projects, and consolidate or terminate UN envoys.²⁰ The US also successfully pressed the Secretary General to impose a 15 percent reduction in budgets for UN peacekeeping operations, including a 25 percent cut in civilian and uniformed personnel.

The US has used financial leverage effectively to pressure the UN and other member states to undertake tough budgetary measures. But sticks, though necessary, are insufficient. Carrots must also be used to entice cooperation from the UN and the other member states. This is why the US was right to pay \$160 million in arrears to the UN regular budget and \$684 million in peacekeeping assessments after the reauthorization of missions and securing UN support for the Gang Suppression Force in Haiti.

BUILDING ON SUCCESS

But much more can be done. Currently, the US owes about \$4 billion²¹ to the UN in assessed contributions for the regular budget, peacekeeping budget, and international tribunals.²² The level of US

¹⁷ "Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026," P.L. 119-75, Section 7048(a), February 3, 2026, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/7148/text>.

¹⁸ Brett Schaefer, "Time for a New Helms-Biden Agreement to Reform the U.N.," The Heritage Foundation, March 7, 2022, <https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/time-new-helms-biden-agreement-reform-the-un>.

¹⁹ Richard Gowan, "Trump May Not Need a 'Board of Peace.' He Has the U.N. Under His Thumb," World Politics Review, March 17, 2025, <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trump-board-of-peace-un-under-thumb>.

²⁰ Brett D. Schaefer, "US Financial Leverage Works at the United Nations," The National Interest, January 15, 2025, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/us-financial-leverage-works-at-the-united-nations>.

²¹ The exact amount is disputed as the US does not recognize some of the arrears the UN claims it owes. Reuters, "U.S. plans initial payment towards billions owed to the UN, envoy Waltz says," February 8, 2026, <https://www.cnbc.com/2026/02/08/us-plans-initial-payment-towards-billions-owed-to-the-un-waltz-says.html>.

²² If the US does not pay its arrears or its 2026 assessment, it may lose its vote in the UN General Assembly in 2027. Under Article 19 of the UN Charter, a member state "shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years." The General Assembly can override this suspension and has done so often when the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond its control. For instance, the General

arrears has precipitated, in the words of the UN Secretary-General, the possible “imminent financial collapse” of the organization. Pressure on the UN to implement changes to secure US payments is high. Going forward, the US should link arrears payments to specific reforms on four tracks.

- Pressing the Secretary General to implement reforms within his authority, such as appointing more US citizens into key positions and clarifying when the UN will waive privileges and immunities.
- Using its power in the Security Council to review, reorient, and terminate the mandates of UN peacekeeping operations and seek other desired policy outcomes like the listing of Hamas and Hezbollah on the UN Security Council consolidated (sanctions) list.
- Seeking institutional and budgetary reforms that require support from UN member states, such as a maximum peacekeeping assessment of 25 percent, aligning UN salaries with equivalent US civil servants and eliminating extravagant benefits, eliminating UNRWA, and consolidating outdated, redundant, or unnecessary UN organizations, mandates, and activities.
- Establishing explicit, published conditions for the continuation of voluntary contributions to each major recipient — including UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, and IOM — specifying the programmatic, governance, or personnel reforms the US expects in exchange for sustained funding.

Critically, to maximize US influence, it must be seen to be negotiating in good faith. Implementation of reforms desired by the US needs to be rewarded with payments of arrears. Likewise, the US needs to be clear about what needs to be done to maintain US membership and funding, whether budgetary or programmatic reforms or appointment of US officials, in specialized agencies, funds, and programs.

History shows that US efforts to reform the UN and other international organizations are most successful when committed diplomacy by senior executive branch officials is backed by congressional engagement and legislation linking US funding to specific reforms. Congress can cement the reform agenda by enacting prohibitions and requirements into statute and legislatively linking arrears payments to reforms.

The recent FY 2026 appropriations bill is an excellent example. The legislation includes a broad swath of policy requirements tied to funding, including: requiring the Secretary of State to review UN voting practices when considering bilateral assistance; prohibiting payments to the UN Human Rights Council; seeking to withhold UN payments to peacekeeping units if they have engaged in sexual exploitation and abuse; withholding funding to the UN or UN agencies pending a determination that it is meeting best practices on whistleblower protection from retaliation; restricting first and business class travel; and vetting UN staff for affiliations with terrorist organizations. It also instructs the Secretary to seek written agreements with each international organization that receives US funds to provide timely access to the State Department Inspector General and the Comptroller General of the United States to financial data and other relevant information.²³

Such legislative measures, ideally adopted with bipartisan support, reinforce reform efforts of the State Department and US Missions to the UN and communicate broad, lasting political commitment to use US influence to press the UN and other member states to implement specified outcomes.²⁴

Assembly waived Article 19 for Bolivia and Sao Tome and Principe in 2025. Waivers were not approved for Afghanistan, Ecuador, and Venezuela. The General Assembly is unlikely to conclude that failure to pay was beyond the control of the US. While it is not ideal for the US to lose its vote in the General Assembly, the US vote in the Security Council is unaffected by Article 19. Thus, the US will maintain its ability to protect its interests in the most important UN body. UN General Assembly, “Countries in arrears in the payment of their financial contributions under the terms of Article 19 of the UN Charter,” <https://www.un.org/en/ga/about/art19.shtml>.

²³ P.L. 119-75, Section 7048.

²⁴ For instance, laws enacted in the 1990s to cap US contributions to UN peacekeeping at 25 percent and prohibit funding to UN organizations that grant full membership to the Palestinians remain in effect. See P.L. 101-246 and P.L. 103-236.

United Nations Scale of Assessments for 2026

	Regular Budget		Peacekeeping Budget	
	Assessment (Percent)	Dollars	Assessment (Percent)	Dollars
		\$3,450,426,300		\$5,386,157,000
Permanent Members of the UN Security Council				
China	20.004	\$690,223,277	23.7657	\$1,280,057,914
France	3.858	\$133,117,447	4.5835	\$246,874,506
Russian Federation	2.094	\$72,251,927	2.4878	\$133,996,814
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3.991	\$137,706,514	4.7415	\$255,384,634
United States of America	22	\$759,093,786	26.1371	\$1,407,785,241
Non-Permanent Members of the UN Security Council				
Bahrain	0.05	\$1,725,213	0.0463	\$2,493,791
Colombia	0.197	\$6,797,340	0.0394	\$2,122,146
Democratic Republic of the Congo	0.01	\$345,043	0.001	\$53,862
Denmark	0.531	\$18,321,764	0.531	\$28,600,494
Greece	0.28	\$9,661,194	0.168	\$9,048,744
Latvia	0.05	\$1,725,213	0.03	\$1,615,847
Liberia	0.001	\$34,504	0.0001	\$5,386
Pakistan	0.123	\$4,244,024	0.0246	\$1,324,995
Panama	0.086	\$2,967,367	0.0258	\$1,389,629
Somalia	0.002	\$69,009	0.0002	\$10,772
Total All Current Security Council Members	53.277	\$1,838,283,620	62.582	\$3,370,764,774
Other Highly Assessed Countries				
Australia	2.04	\$70,388,697	2.04	\$109,877,603
Canada	2.543	\$87,744,341	2.543	\$136,969,973
Germany	5.692	\$196,398,265	5.692	\$306,580,056
Italy	2.813	\$97,060,492	2.813	\$151,512,596
Japan	6.93	\$239,114,543	6.93	\$373,260,680
Netherlands	1.298	\$44,786,533	1.298	\$69,912,318
South Korea	2.349	\$81,050,514	2.349	\$126,520,828
Saudi Arabia	1.217	\$41,991,688	1.1257	\$60,631,969
Spain	1.895	\$65,385,578	1.895	\$102,067,675
Switzerland	1.029	\$35,504,887	1.029	\$55,423,556
Large Peacekeeping Troop Contributors				
Nepal	0.01	\$345,043	0.001	\$53,862
Rwanda	0.003	\$103,513	0.0003	\$16,158
Bangladesh	0.01	\$345,043	0.001	\$53,862
India	1.106	\$38,161,715	0.2212	\$11,914,179
Notable Groupings				
Lowest assessment (28 countries regular budget, 14 countries peacekeeping budget)	0.001	\$34,504	0.0001	\$5,386
Least assessed 177 countries (regular budget)	19.425	\$670,245,309		
Least assessed 186 countries (peacekeeping budget)			25.3374	\$1,364,712,144
Geneva Group (18 countries)	62.602	\$2,160,035,872	67.1513	\$3,616,874,446
G-77 without China	10.979	\$378,822,303	4.3199	\$232,676,596
NAM (119 countries)	8.952	\$308,882,162	3.8992	\$210,017,034
OIC (56 countries)	5.65	\$194,949,086	2.8361	\$152,756,799

Notes:

The regular budget is the approved appropriations for 2026. The peacekeeping budget is the approved resources for 1 July 2025 through 30 June 2026.

The Geneva Group is comprised of 18 countries who share a common view on administrative and budgetary matters. Membership is Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the U.S. and the U.K. Reportedly, Russia was suspended from the Group following its 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

The G-77 is comprised of 132 countries plus "Palestine." China is sometimes included with the G-77, but not always. Membership list available at The Group of 77, "The Member States of the Group of 77," <https://www.g77.org/doc/members.html>.

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is comprised of 119 countries plus "Palestine." There are 17 NAM observers and 10 NAM observer organizations. Membership list located at <https://www.worlddata.info/alliances/non-aligned-movement.php>.

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is comprised of 56 countries plus "Palestine." Membership list available at Organization of Islamic Cooperation, "Members," <https://new.oic-oci.org/SitePages/MemberStates.aspx>.

Sources:

United Nations, "Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2025 to 30 June 2026," A/C.5/79/34, June 25, 2025, <https://docs.un.org/en/a/c.5/79/34>; United Nations, "Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of United Nations peacekeeping operations: Implementation of General Assembly resolutions 55/235 and 55/236," A/79/318/Add.1, December 31, 2024, <https://docs.un.org/en/a/79/318/Add.1>; and United Nations, "Programme budget for 2026," A/RES/80/244 A-C, December 31, 2025, <https://docs.un.org/en/a/res/80/244%20A-C>.