Testimony of Andrew S. Natsios, Professor
George H.W. Bush School of Government at Texas A&M University
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"America's Global Leadership: Why Diplomacy and Development Matter"

Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, I thank you for the opportunity to speak today on the importance of foreign aid programs. My comments today are my own; I am not representing the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University.

Since World War II, the United States' foreign aid programs have played a leading role in improving the livelihoods of the world's poor, cultivating good governance and democratic practice, protecting human rights, and accelerating economic growth. This country has shared its wealth and technical expertise to boost the economic and social development of lagging nations. However, our aid programs are also – and have always been –a critical part of our overall foreign policy and national security objectives. The Marshall Plan launched in 1948 aimed to rebuild war-torn Europe and revive its economies (goals it achieved quite successfully), but it also served to prevent the spread of Communism and to enable European economies to be trading partners for the United States. Similarly, when President Truman announced his Point Four plan in 1949, a technical assistance program to share American expertise with developing countries in the areas of agriculture, industry, and health, he aimed to attract developing countries to the U.S. sphere of influence and prevent them from joining the Communist bloc.

The U.S. aid program continued to play an important role in foreign policy as it developed in the second half of the century into an important tool for containing the Soviet threat. Just one month after East Germany began construction of the Berlin Wall, Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act, which established USAID. Shortly thereafter, Fidel Castro announced his embrace of Marxist-Leninist ideology and alliance to the Soviet Union. President Kennedy responded by announcing the Alliance for Progress, a program to increase economic growth, improve living standards, and promote democracy throughout Latin America. Many of the career staff at USAID during this era of containing the Soviet threat were the same individuals who had carried out the Marshall Plan.

After the Korean War, the USAID program expanded its work to Asia. It is in this context that the "Green Revolution" became a dominant focus of its programming. The Green Revolution - a term first used in 1968 by former USAID Administrator William Gaud - describes the advances in agricultural yields through development and dissemination of new technologies, including high-yielding and drought-resistant crop varieties, fertilizers and pesticides, irrigation, and new cultivation methods. Norman Borlaug, who developed an improved wheat variety and is considered the father of the Green Revolution, is credited with saving over one billion people

from starvation. (He taught at Texas A&M University in his later years, home of the Norman Borlaug Center for International Agriculture.) Dr. Borlaug won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1970 for his work.

In the 1960s and 1970s, USAID devoted a large share of its budget (in some years, well over 50%) to agricultural programming. This included establishing research institutes around the world to develop crop varieties suitable to particular environments; this work continues today under the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). CGIAR has now become an umbrella organization for 15 research centers around the world with specific foci, including particular staple crops (potatoes, rice, wheat, and maize), livestock, and agricultural innovations for particular climates (e.g. semi-arid, tropics). USAID has been and continues to be the largest funder of the CGIAR research centers, which continue to innovate to improve yields and farmers' livelihoods. The Agency founded 63 agricultural universities in 40 countries –most of them partnered with top U.S. agricultural schools –geared toward researching the specific agricultural issues of their environments. Additionally, Green Revolution programs worked to build local capacity for agricultural extension services, and supported policy-level change (for example, strengthening land rights to improve farmers' economic incentives to adopt new production methods). During this time, staple crop yields more than doubled.

These programs were far-reaching: from India and Taiwan to Brazil and Mexico. USAID placed special focus, however, on politically unstable Asian countries that U.S. policymakers feared would fall to Communism. In the late 1960s, USAID agricultural experts were sent to Vietnam. They offered technical training to farmers in an effort to boost the appeal of farming and reduce the incentives to join the Viet Cong. The Green Revolution produced transformative development results: gains in agricultural yields freed labor for industrial jobs, pushing many Asian economies that benefited from USAID agricultural assistance - such as South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, and Taiwan - to an impressive level of economic development. At the same time, it played a key role in America's foreign policy objectives.

Aid must continue as a tool in our government's arsenal for fighting the threats America and its allies face today. These include four major crises:

- **The largest forced migration crisis** since World War II: there are currently 68.5 million people forcibly displaced, either as refugees or within their own countries as IDPs. Disenfranchised youth in refugee or IDP camps are at risk of being recruited into organized crime and terrorist networks.
- **Pandemic disease**: The increasingly globalized economy and fragile medical supply chains raise the threat of infectious disease and pandemics. In 1918, the Great Influenza killed nearly 5% of the world population, or 90 million people, and a similar tragedy threatens us today. Such a crisis would shatter the world economy, shut down air transport, and cause widespread public panic.

- **Fragile and failing states**: The number of countries with weak state legitimacy or capacity to meet their responsibilities to their citizens is on the rise. After an increase in the number of fragile and failing states at the end of the Cold War, the incidence of these state crises began to decline. Today, the uptick threatens repression and humanitarian crisis for many of the world's citizens, which will continue to worsen the refugee crisis.
- **Food price volatility**: The global food production and delivery system, which feeds a world population of 7.5 billion people, is dependent on free trade, free markets, open seas, and innovations in plant breeding. These systems are under heavy stress. When food supply falls, prices jump; this was one of the major causes of the uprisings that caused chaos in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Tunisia, and Syria less than a decade ago.

This Congress has recognized the role foreign assistance has played and will play in advancing America's foreign policy objectives through its work in health, agriculture, education, democracy and good governance, and poverty reduction through economic growth, as improvements in these areas drastically mitigate the causes and effects of the threats I have described. USAID has contributed meaningfully to large improvements in these sectors in recent decades. Steven Radelet enumerates these gains in living standards in his 2015 book, *The Great Surge.* Between the early 1990s and 2015, one billion people across dozens of countries escaped extreme poverty, defined as consumption falling under $1.25 per day in purchasing power parity terms. This means that among the populations of developing countries, the percentage of the population living in extreme poverty has fallen from 42 percent to 17 percent. During the same time period, average life expectancy increased by six years, and millions of people gained access to clean water. The number of children dying from preventable diseases fell from 13 million in 1990 to 6.3 million in 2013, and continues to fall. Tens of millions more girls are attending school every year. The number of democracies in the world tripled between 1983 and 2013 (though there has been some backsliding in the last few years), and the change goes beyond simply holding elections: citizens' personal freedoms have expanded, and civil society is more robust. U.S. government programs did not achieve this in isolation: they accomplished these remarkable objectives alongside other donor governments, international organizations, civil society organizations, and, most importantly, the people of recipient countries. Without local leadership, none of these gains would have been achieved.

Many recipient countries, including Costa Rica, Botswana, Jordan, Panama, and Thailand have harnessed U.S. foreign assistance to become upper-middle-income countries. Others, including South Korea, Taiwan, and Chile, have graduated from their status as aid recipients and have become donor nations themselves. Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic States, among other former Communist states, have made a successful transition to democratic capitalism with the support of USAID programming. Many other countries have made great progress and are on the cusp of graduating to be middle income or advanced countries.

In humanitarian emergencies, teams from USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and Food for Peace (FFP) are often the first on the scene to provide relief. Consider Operation Provide Comfort, which assisted Kurdish refugees who had fled from Saddam Hussein's forces directly following the Gulf War in 1991. OFDA and FFP played a leading role in providing for the delivery of food, shelter, and medical supplies to refugee camps in Turkey. USAID worked closely with the Department of Defense to advise on the steps needed to allow Kurds to feel safe enough to return home to Iraq. Within two months of the refugee disaster declaration, OFDA and FFP teams were in northern Iraq, repairing essential services so that refugees could return. This prompt action prevented the crisis from devolving into a decades-long affair, as other refugee crises have done, in which a full generation of Kurds would have persisted in poverty in refugee camps without knowing their native home. Partially as a result of this intervention, the Kurds continue to be American allies in the Middle East today, demonstrating how humanitarian aid advanced broader foreign policy goals.

In 2004, fighting between government and rebel forces in Darfur, Sudan, forced 2.2 million people to flee their homes. The day the ceasefire took effect (thus allowing humanitarian aid to enter) USAID mobilized an OFDA team to provide relief commodities, emergency health care, and nutrition services for severely malnourished people. The team went beyond basic relief, however, to provide agricultural and animal health services. This assistance helped secure a more sustainable source of food. Furthermore, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) helped foster a peace process by supporting development of an active civil society and increasing access to independent information. OTI awarded grants to establish a local newspaper and radio station, provide capacity-building to civil society organizations, and support civic education initiatives.

In his book *Mass Starvation,* Alex de Waal finds that, of the one hundred million people who died in famines between 1870 and 2010, the vast majority perished before 1980 (see Figure 1). Because of the development of the humanitarian response system in the second half of the 20th century, individuals that would have died in earlier years were able to survive. Some of this was a result of globalization and economic growth, but much was a result of the international humanitarian response system. Though many countries and international bodies play vital roles in these response systems, the United States has undoubtedly played the leading role, and the rapidity and scale of our response efforts worldwide remain unmatched.



Figure 1: Famine Mortality by Decade: 1870-2015. From World Peace Foundation, as shown in de Waal, 2017.

Among aid programs, humanitarian assistance has attracted the most domestic support because its results are rapid and demonstrable, easily broadcast on American televisions to justify expenditure of tax dollars. Still, USAID has had countless notable successes in its longer-term development programs, aimed at alleviating poverty and spurring economic growth. Among this work is USAID's voluntary family planning programming. Recognizing that high fertility rates in low-income countries exacerbate hunger and endanger maternal and child health, USAID has sponsored community-based distribution systems worldwide to bring family planning information and contraceptives to women since 1970. Many of these programs have dramatically improved maternal and child health, expanded women's rights, and educated individuals on the related public health issue of HIV/AIDS prevention.

For example, a six-year USAID family planning program in Ethiopia in the mid-2000s utilized a community-based approach that involved local volunteers to deliver services. These services included information-sharing on family planning options and healthy practices, distribution of contraceptives, education on potentially harmful traditional practices (such as early marriage), and assistance to help women connect to antenatal and postpartum care. Since these volunteers were members of the communities in which they worked, they were seen as trustworthy. That, in turn, encouraged Ethiopians to adopt new practices. A survey conducted halfway through the project indicated that the regions that received this project saw a dramatic increase in contraceptive use: in fact, the increase was three times larger than it was in the regions that did not receive the project. The percentage of women of reproductive age using contraception increased by over 10 percentage points between 2003 and 2006 for the country as a whole, and by as much as 16 percentage points in one of the project regions (according to an independent evaluation). These results rank among the most rapid growth rates in contraceptive use in the world.

Family planning services continue as part of the USAID portfolio in Ethiopia, and contraceptive prevalence continues to rise. Use of contraceptive methods among women of reproductive age has risen from less than five percent in 1990 to 37% in 2017, according to World Bank data. Similarly, data from Ethiopia's Demographic and Health Survey shows that fertility rates have declined from 5.5 births per woman in 1990 to 4.6 births per woman in 2016. There is much room for further improvement, but these gains shed light on the usefulness of USAID programming in this context.

Health programs like this lend themselves well to the quantifiable results that I know this Committee wants to see. It is harder, however, to measure the creation of strong health systems that can be locally sustained and provide quality care for a population after aid programs end. The same concept rings true for programs in agriculture, education, and most other sectors. Because capacity-building and institution-strengthening take time, and because it is difficult to quantify success in these areas, these activities are consistently underfunded and neglected in policymaking. Unfortunately, these are the activities that are the most transformational and critical for reducing countries' dependence on aid.

Furthermore, aid programs can only make a sustainable impact if the elites in the countries we assist embrace their own development process through political, economic, and social reform. One of the reasons for success in the USAID family planning program in Ethiopia is that officials in the country's Ministry of Health considered reducing fertility rates to be a priority issue. Regional governments were also eager to improve in this area, and made good use of the USAID program's policy and advocacy support to get family planning services included in their regional health budgets. Without this buy-in from individuals in power in the recipient country, a program's impact is unlikely to be sustained after the program ends.

Sustainable development also requires the establishment and strengthening of local institutions. To build local expertise to lead both public and private institutions, USAID granted thousands of scholarships for study in U.S. universities to students from developing countries. These students gained expertise in fields relevant to their countries' development, such as economics, agriculture, health, and governance. Consider the scholarship program for Chilean students, which ran from 1956-1964. USAID's predecessor agency, the International Cooperation Agency (ICA), funded a partnership between the University of Chicago, famous for producing some of the world's most widely-respected economists, and two Chilean universities. Under the arrangement, thirty Chilean graduate students received funding to study economics at Chicago. Upon receiving their doctoral degrees, many returned to Chile, which was in the midst of an economic crisis. They later earned their famous moniker as the "Chicago Boys" responsible for drafting the country's economic plan. It was this economic plan, implemented starting in the 1970s, that kickstarted spectacular economic growth in Chile.

The plan was first adopted in 1970 just before the dictatorial Pinochet regime took power in 1973. Though the plan continued under Pinochet's rule – a brutal and tragic period in Chilean history which no level of economic growth can justify – this rapid economic growth continued even in later democratic administrations. Many of these scholarship recipients accepted teaching positions at two of Chile's top universities, training younger economists. The economic teams of all Chilean administrations since the 1970s have overwhelmingly come from these two universities, highlighting the direct link between the scholarship program and Chile's sound economic policy. Dr. Arnold Harberger, a University of Chicago professor who went on to be USAID's Chief Economic Advisor, argues that Chile's remarkable economic performance is due, in great part, to "the pervasiveness of good economics in public discussion and public policy." Today, Chile continues to be a shining example of economic growth and development in the region, and became the first South American country to join the OECD - a club of developed countries - in 2010.

The scholarship program is notable as a project that was clearly transformational, but failed to produce the rapid, quantifiable results that foreign aid critics demand. The economists trained at the University of Chicago did not have a demonstrable impact on economic policy until several years after the program ended. They used their Chicago teaching to train younger economists in Chilean universities, but the beneficial influence of those students on Chilean economic policy was not fully recognized until decades later. This success story highlights the importance of building the capacity of local actors and local institutions to effect change in their own societies. To do this, we must accept that sustainable development impacts may only be seen in the longer term.

By expanding telecommunications services, USAID has helped equip local actors to push for change. From the 1970s to the mid-2000s in Egypt, the Agency funded a utility assistance program that improved water and wastewater, power, and telecommunications systems throughout the country. Reliable utilities are critical to meeting citizens' basic needs, and thus are important for achieving sustained economic growth. In particular, an expanded telecommunications network, which an independent evaluation estimates benefitted 4.2 million Egyptians, encouraged foreign travelers to consider Egypt as a destination, and incentivized foreign businesses to consider operating in the country. The intervention has thus contributed to improving tourism, trade, and investment. Notably, USAID did not focus only on building infrastructure, but worked closely with the Egyptian government to strengthen institutions and support reforms to attract private sector investment. President Hosni Mubarak, initially quite resistant to the expansion of cell service for fear of the power it would give his population to organize, eventually relented. Ironically, this improved access to telecommunications services allowed Egyptians to unite and rise up against Mubarak in 2011.

Similarly, USAID's African Global Information Infrastructure Gateway Project (also known as the Leland Initiative) expanded internet access for individuals and businesses throughout sub-Saharan Africa. In the mid-1990s, only about 1,000 people outside of South Africa used the internet. Access was low and costs were prohibitive. USAID involved a variety of African and international partners to address constraints to internet adoption: these included regulatory barriers, lack of telecommunications infrastructure, and low demand for internet services. By the year 2000, all 54 African countries were connected to the internet, and the number of users (excluding South Africa) had risen to 150,000. The project encouraged use of the internet by local actors to improve civil and political rights. For example, the Education Center for Women in Democracy in Kenya used Leland Initiative support to create a website that provides women with information on getting involved in politics.

Even in tenuous environments, aid programs have raised living standards, encouraged economic growth, and contributed to better governance. Unfortunately, the positive impacts of foreign aid have often been overshadowed by political events. Nowhere is this clearer than in the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan. After almost two decades of American forces on the ground, the country remains unstable: 35% of the population lives in insurgent-controlled territories, and attacks by the Taliban and Islamic State kill or injure over 8,000 civilians each year, according to a brief from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) this month. However, as Daniel Runde and Ambassador Earl Anthony Wayne argue in the CSIS brief, the media focus on the security situation has obscured impressive development gains throughout the U.S. engagement with Afghanistan. Since 2000, the under-five mortality rate and maternal mortality rate have been nearly halved. The proportion of the population with electricity access went from close to zero in 2000 to 85% in 2016, and access to safe drinking water more than doubled between 2008 and 2014. While women's education was prohibited under Taliban rule, the majority of primary-aged girls are now in school, and women make up one-third of university students.

Perhaps most importantly, USAID's efforts to build a free and independent media, with hundreds of radio stations, print media outlets, and TV stations which have opened since 2001, have increased Afghans' access to reliable information. Cell service subscriptions have surged, and Afghans use phones for mobile payments, which can contribute to lessening corruption since transfers are more easily tracked. By improving life for Afghans, aid contributes to the broad U.S. foreign policy objectives in the country by reducing the appeal of the Taliban and encouraging citizens to push for legitimate, democratic governance. USAID continues to play a critical role in America's national security strategy in Afghanistan.

While great success can be achieved when development, diplomatic, and defense activities work toward complementary goals, their objectives sometimes clash. For example, the State Department pursues public diplomacy – enhancing the image of America in the world – as one of

its primary objectives. When we redesigned the USAID logo (Figure 2) during my time as Administrator in the early 2000s, however, we were very sensitive to the fact that using the American flag on the USAID logo (and thus emphasizing the source of funding for aid projects) would undermine local ownership of these projects, which is crucial for sustainability of results.

Figure 2: USAID Logo, adopted 2004

The State Department's Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy toured the Middle East and queried local populations about U.S. aid programs. Responses were mixed: some people appreciated the programs, but others were embarrassed by or resented them because they highlighted the fact that their own governments were not providing basic public services. It was a case of wounded national pride. At USAID, we felt that promoting a perception that host country governments were equal partners in programming might help. We conducted surveys among citizens of USAID host countries, and found that when the host country's flag was posted alongside the USAID logo, projects received a more favorable reaction. In short, we found a solution to the branding question that met the dual objectives of American public diplomacy and local ownership. Nonetheless, this example illustrates that strategic planning is needed to ensure that diplomatic goals do not displace good development.

As I have discussed, the most transformative and sustainable development is not rapid, is not immediately visible, and is not easily quantifiable in the short term. Since the inception of USAID, critics have attacked aid programs. The problem, however, is not development work, but the fact that oversight agencies—called the counter-bureaucracy –are using a measuring stick unsuitable to development work. The political pressures to produce quick results or meet diplomatic or defense objectives on short timelines forces USAID programming away from sound and sustainable development practice.

Our country is now entering a period of intense geostrategic competition. Apart from the threat posed by other states - most notably China and Russia - we face a massive forced migration crisis, and fragile and failing states have become magnets for organized crime and terrorism. Our increasingly globalized world and fragile medical supply chains make for a growing risk of a worldwide pandemic, which would trigger global economic crisis. Volatile food prices, which led to uprisings across the Arab world around 2010, threaten both food security and state

stability. The world's growing population indicates that by 2050, we must increase food supply by 60 percent; if not, we will face widespread political unrest.

In the United States and Europe, policymakers often neglect the truth that development is intricately connected to broader U.S. foreign policy. Meanwhile, the rise of nativism and isolationism encourages many policymakers to withdraw support from foreign aid programs. This is the wrong decision in light of the pressing threats I have described. We need foreign aid programs to strengthen governance, stimulate economic growth, fortify health systems, and improve agricultural productivity through innovation. To pursue these goals fruitfully, USAID must have greater autonomy to make decisions that align with good development practice. To achieve this, I propose four areas for reform.

First, the federal government's complex program oversight systems must adapt reporting requirements to the realities of development work. USAID faces pressure to demonstrate rapid and quantifiable results in order to continue receiving funding. This, in turn, forces program officers to spend their time conducting countable activities rather than building capacity and strengthening institutions. Quantitative measurement can be productive for service delivery aspects of foreign aid, such as humanitarian relief or some health programs. However, programs in governance and economic growth suffer when work toward long-term results is displaced in favor of short-term outputs for the sole benefit of reporting. Congressional oversight committees must recognize that not all development is quantitatively measurable, at least in the short term. They must also acknowledge that sustainable development takes time, and should allow for a longer time horizon in reporting program impacts. USAID programs are typically five years, but programs should be 10-20 years to allow for adequate support for institution building in the recipient country.

Second, USAID would benefit from decentralization of program management to its field missions. In his book *Navigation by Judgment,* Johns Hopkins Professor Dr. Dan Honig argues that in highly unpredictable environments (as most developing countries are), programs will have a greater chance of success if they vest decision-making power in local aid managers. Aid program managers have local, contextual information that cannot be easily communicated in a timely manner to managers in Washington. Allowing them to use this information to guide their projects creates opportunities for improving the project and surmounting unforeseen challenges. Throughout the Cold War and into the 1990s, USAID mission directors had high degrees of local authority. Since then, however, the demands of oversight organizations and the constant political pressures on USAID funding have made the Agency increasingly risk-averse, pushing authority toward Washington. Decentralization could be accomplished by reauthorizing the delegation of authority to the USAID mission directors so they have discretion in the design of country strategy and projects, the determination of partner organizations, and the management and implementation of programs.

Third, all international development and disaster response programs across the federal government should be consolidated into one cabinet-level agency, as is the Environmental Protection Agency or the CIA, with a direct reporting line to the President. This would improve the coordination and efficiency of development programming and disaster relief. Additionally, status as a cabinet-level agency would improve USAID's ability to coordinate with the other departments of the foreign policy apparatus: most notably the Department of Defense and the State Department. Clashes between defense, diplomacy, and development goals throughout the last few decades have made for developmentally unwise decisions; in Afghanistan, the subordinate organizational placement of USAID threatened development outcomes there because USAID voices were not considered in decision-making.

Fourth, this Congress should amend the Foreign Service Act to allow USAID to assign foreign service officers (FSOs) to countries for up to ten years. Since institutions are very weak in the countries where USAID works, personal relationships are absolutely critical to success. Abandoning the social capital FSOs have forged by forcing them to accept a new country assignment after just a few years is counterproductive. Furthermore, the more unstable and fragile a country, the longer FSO assignments should be, given the relative value of relationships over formal rules in these contexts.

Last year, USAID Administrator Mark Green announced a reform that would create a career cadre of USAID officers trained to live in unstable and fragile settings, to be known as Rapid Expeditionary Development, or RED, teams. This proposal was borne out of the recognition that the U.S. government as a whole is underperforming in non-permissive environments. Thus, there exists a need for teams of development officers specially trained to live and work in such environments, and prepared with a skillset to advance programming in communities vulnerable to violent extremism. In 1989, during my time as Director of OFDA, we established the Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs): expeditionary teams prepared to survive in any environment. In the 2000s, USAID began a process to extend this idea to longer-term field staff living in fragile countries, but the process was never completed. It should be implemented now.

USAID has demonstrated that it can produce impactful development results without the current restrictive levels of oversight. During my time as Administrator, the Agency established the Global Development Alliance (GDA), a mechanism for public-private partnerships in development programming. USAID began to explore alliances with corporations, foundations, NGOs, churches, and universities as a source of not only funding, but also expertise, logistical capacity, and innovative technologies. These partnerships became a grand experiment in the development results that can be achieved when aid programming is freed from burdensome central control structures and excessive regulatory oversight. Furthermore, the GDA was

structured to empower USAID program managers in missions to create and administer their own alliances; the central office in Washington was constrained to a limited staff and budget.

The GDA has been a remarkable success. Companies from Wal-Mart to Starbucks have entered into partnerships with USAID, as have private non-profits such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. In one notable project, USAID linked Rwandan coffee farmers with international coffee retailers, which provided training to farmers on high-quality coffee standards. The family incomes of these coffee farmers (50,000 farm families) more than quadrupled. In Angola, the USAID mission director formed a partnership with ChevronTexaco Corp, which delivered financial and business development services to small and medium enterprises during the country's transition to peace. The partnerships are not limited to huge international companies: USAID/Haiti worked with a fledgling Haitian bank to channel a small portion of remittance transactions from the Haitian diaspora to fund public school construction. As of 2016, USAID had entered into more than 1,500 alliances with over 3,500 partner organizations, with an estimated total value of 20 billion dollars (including public and private funds, and both cash and in-kind contributions). The program has had such impressive results that several other federal departments, including the State Department, have established similar programs.

I urge this Congress to consider these reforms, which will contribute to our common goal of making development assistance more effective. The burdensome reporting requirements placed on USAID are inconsistent with the realities of the development process, and force aid officers to divert time and resources toward generating short-term outputs because of pressure from the counter-bureaucracy. The subordination of USAID to the priorities of cabinet-level agencies undermines its ability to contribute to this country's broader foreign policy goals. Failing to grant appropriate autonomy to USAID threatens not only the welfare of our allies in the developing world, but the future security and prosperity of the United States itself. Given the threats facing the United States and our allies around the world, we need to strengthen USAID and other aid programs, not weaken them through an ill-advised budget cut.

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