

Advancing Human Rights to Combat Extremism

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Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass and other members of the sub-committee:

Thank you for convening this hearing to call attention to what we at Human Rights First view as the imperative need to include human rights promotion as an indispensable element of effective policy aimed at countering and preventing violent extremism.

National counterterrorism measures that are not rooted in respect for human rights risk being counterproductive. When governments stifle peaceful dissent, muzzle the media, and prevent the legitimate activities of non-violent civil society organizations, they are not countering extremism; they are fomenting it.

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, we at Human Rights First have focused on the human rights consequences of counterterrorism policies, including those of the U.S. government, as well as many countries abroad. We have spotlighted and campaigned against the tendency of numerous governments—at times claiming to be following the example of U.S. government—to use the climate of urgency and fear around the need to counter terrorism as justification for violating human rights.

Unfortunately, in the aftermath of 9/11, through the use of torture, rendition, indefinite detention, and the use of the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, the United States set a damaging and counter-productive global precedent when it reacted to the

threat of terrorism by retreating from the rule of law, violating human rights, and over-emphasizing security-centric counterterrorism measures.

Our experience, and our cooperation with retired generals and admirals, veteran interrogators, and other security-sector leaders, has affirmed that counterterrorism efforts that curtail basic rights are not only immoral and illegal, but also counterproductive.

The recent histories of numerous countries—Egypt being one important example—point to the dangers inherent in counterterrorism responses that are overly focused on military force, repression, and denial of human rights. These approaches have a tendency to fuel grievances, which are in turn exploited by extremist groups. This dynamic creates escalating cycles of violence between state security forces and violent extremists that become hard to contain.

We welcome the subcommittee's emphasis on the link between advancing human rights and preventing violent extremism. The previous administration's Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) initiative was based on the premise that promoting human rights, good governance, and the rule of law calms the grievances on which violent extremism feeds. The UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy, adopted in 2006, which built on a flurry of largely U.S.-led activity after 2001, emphasized the need "to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism." Since then, many governments have paid lip-service to the need to protect human rights in fighting terrorism, but have nonetheless adopted policies that violated human rights.

Regrettably, in U.S. foreign policy, a short-term interest in cooperation with authoritarian governments has too often prevailed over the long-term imperative to end the oppressive governance that has been a major driver of violent extremism.

Trump Administration Policies

Human Rights First is concerned that the Trump administration has exhibited a marked preference for close cooperation with authoritarian leaders in the struggle against terrorism and violent extremism, instead of emphasizing the need for U.S. partners to end violations and extend human rights protections as an integral part of shared efforts to prevent extremism and combat terrorism.

The clearest example of this approach may be seen in President Trump's speech at the Arab Islamic American Summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on May 21 of this year. Trump spoke of "a new chapter" and of "new approaches," but there is nothing new about a U.S. approach to the Middle East rooted in alliances with authoritarian governments. United States policy in the Middle East has largely been based on this model for the last seventy years, with a few short intermissions. The results of this approach speak for themselves.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the refusal of authoritarian Arab states to respond to the aspirations of their growing populations has presented a constant challenge to the United States. Successive administrations have struggled with crises, from Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1991, to the 9/11 attacks ten years later, to the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq that followed. The Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 showed again the instability created by unreconstructed authoritarian rule in the region.

Alarmed by the tide of change sweeping away entrenched authoritarian rulers, Saudi Arabia and other GCC states have spent the last six years trying to shore up the rickety authoritarian state order, with distinctly mixed results. A Saudi-led military intervention in Bahrain has succeeded in pushing back popular demands for more representative government on the island, and the Saudis, together with other GCC states, have been the major backers of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's restoration of military-backed authoritarian rule in Egypt, but these countries remain deeply divided. A major Saudi military intervention in Yemen has embroiled the country in a prolonged war and caused a humanitarian crisis. Meanwhile, the devastating war in Syria continues, spreading instability throughout the region and beyond. Conflicts also continue in Iraq and Libya.

By aligning the United States uncritically with a Saudi-led authoritarian regional order, President Trump may hope that he is turning the clock back to a more stable time. But the protracted collapse and inherent instability of the Arab authoritarian order has been one of the root causes of both the spread of terrorism over the last twenty years, and of the region's many unresolved conflicts, which have provided hospitable territory and recruitment opportunities for violent extremist groups.

In his May speech, President Trump referred several times to the "shared values" of the United States and his Saudi hosts. Yet the president himself tweeted in June 2016 that the Saudis "want women as slaves and to kill gays." Leaders of GCC states proudly assert that they ["do not share our values."](#) so it is hard to understand why the president should insist that they do. Despite Saudi [claims of moderation and co-existence](#), they jail non-violent critics, deny women basic rights, forbid religious freedom

and propagate a harsh, sectarian interpretation of Islam around the world that has inspired the ideology of terrorist groups like ISIS and al-Qa'eda. Just a few weeks before President Trump's visit to Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom used its influence to persuade its allies on the UN Security Council, Egypt and Senegal, to [block](#) a move to add the Saudi ISIS affiliate to the UN's list of terrorist groups. Simply put, the values that the Saudi government stands for and propagates are very much part of the problem, not the solution. By pretending otherwise, President Trump is willfully turning his back on reality.

One of the few specific policy proposals in the Riyadh speech was a call on "all nations of conscience to isolate Iran." President Trump is right to point to the destabilizing activities of the regime in Tehran, and we should call out the Iranian government for its abysmal approach to upholding human rights standards. Yet we need to grapple with the fact that many of Iran's actions are perceived in Tehran as defensive responses to threatening rhetoric from the United States, Saudi Arabia and other governments, and to the increasing U.S. military presence in Qatar, Bahrain, Iraq and Afghanistan. Such a one-sided position in the regional conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which has taken on an increasingly inflammatory, sectarian tone in recent years thanks to the policies of both sides, will only escalate violence and instability.

Egypt is a key partner for the United States in the struggle against terrorism. The appalling massacre of at least 305 people attending prayers in a mosque in Rawda in Egypt's troubled North Sinai on November 24 should be a moment for reflection for all

those with the ability to influence the conduct of the Egyptian government's self-declared war on terrorism.

Abdel Fattah al-Sisi seized power in July 2013 on a promise of restoring order and defeating extremism and terrorism, but his methods have made things far worse. Violence has risen [claiming civilian and military casualties on an unprecedented scale](#). Friday's attack was the most lethal terrorist attack in Egypt's history, but it fits into an escalating spiral of violence by the state and violent extremist groups that has claimed thousands of lives in the last four years.

Egypt has experienced spikes in violence before in conflict between the state and violent extremism. In the late 1980s, the state fought a brutal counter-terrorism campaign against Islamist extremists, mainly in Upper Egypt, killing hundreds, detaining tens of thousands and subjecting many to torture. It took [a change in tactics, and the dismissal of the abrasive Minister of the Interior](#) most associated with the crackdown to reduce the killing.

Egypt and the world has paid a high price for that episode--some of the leading figures in what became al-Qa'eda were radicalized by their experiences in Egypt's torture cells in the 1980s--so it is especially troubling to see the Sisi government repeating the same mistakes, but on an even bigger scale.

President Trump's tweeted response to the Rawdah mosque killings, as it so often has been after foreign terrorist attacks, was [self-serving and unhelpful](#). President Sisi needs no encouragement to employ more military force in a futile, counterproductive bid to solve his security problems.

In Sinai, and increasingly throughout the country, the casualty statistics tell their own story. The Sinai insurgency long predates the Sisi presidency. Decades of marginalization and underdevelopment have fueled grievances among the population. However, Sisi's militarization of the conflict has greatly escalated the violence, as victims of state attacks have sought to take revenge on representatives of the security forces. The so-called Islamic State, or ISIS, has taken advantage of these grievances, providing fighters with the means and resources to carry out attacks, and injecting their poisonous, hate-filled, sectarian ideology, which explains the targeting of a mosque associated with a Sufi order for attack.

According to [reports from witnesses](#) collected by Egyptian journalists defying the government's reporting ban, the masked attackers flew the back flag of ISIS and referred to themselves as Mujahidin. They told their victims that they had defied instructions from ISIS not to engage in Sufi practices and therefore must be killed.

The virulently anti-Sufi propaganda of ISIS was a clear contributory factor in the attack. This sectarian hate speech is propagated by the religious establishment in Saudi Arabia and put into bloody practice by ISIS. After this latest atrocity Trump should be urgently in touch with his friends in Riyadh to end the incitement to violence against Sufis in Saudi religious teaching, but [Trump's support](#) for the aggressive sectarian agenda championed by the energetic Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has been so effusive and uncritical that such an approach hardly seems likely.

A second area where the U.S. government can exert influence is through its military and intelligence cooperation on counterterrorism issues with Egypt. The Congress has been raising concerns that Sisi's counterterrorism approach is

exacerbating the problem, but more needs to be done. The Senate version of [the 2018 Appropriations Bill](#) includes some strong and specific language imposing human rights conditions on military assistance, but specifically exempts funds appropriated for counterterrorism from these conditions. Earlier this year Secretary Tillerson denied over \$90 million of previously appropriated foreign assistance and withheld a further \$195 million of military assistance in part out of concern about human rights violations.

The Rawda massacre provides a moment for the U.S. government to urgently engage the Egyptian authorities on the disastrous results of Sisi's efforts to fight terrorism through almost exclusively military means. The Egyptian government claims success in its fight against terrorism because it is killing terrorists and denying ISIS control of territory but killing and destruction [are not deterring](#) Egypt's terrorists. Sisi's government is badly in need of a new plan and the U.S. government should be forthright in urging Cairo to look beyond a failed security-centric approach.

Context Specific Examples

The human rights discourse has been devalued in practice. The tide of instability that has taken the place of initial optimism after the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011 has paralyzed western policy makers. In the United States, the Obama administration had set as its goal disengagement from conflicts in the Middle East, an approach that has been continued by the Trump administration. In the absence of political will or popular support, the United States government determined that it could not exert sufficient weight or influence to shape events in conflict zones from Libya to Syria, to Yemen and Iraq. This left a void which the U.S. and other western governments have encouraged

their traditional authoritarian partners to fill. Thus the United States has turned a blind eye to the sustained repression of non-violent demands for more representative government in Bahrain, and has abetted the consolidation of power of Egypt's repressive former military leader, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, sustained by massive injections of financial support from autocratic monarchies in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

The Obama administration's single-minded pursuit of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action deal to prevent the development of nuclear weapons by the Iranian government also had human rights costs. In return for acceptance of the deal by skeptical allies, like Saudi Arabia, the administration gave its support to Saudi Arabia's military operations in Yemen. The priority given to the nuclear deal has meant that less pressure has been applied to Iran to rein in its support for the murderous tactics pursued by its ally, President Assad in Syria, than might otherwise have been the case.

In **Egypt**, severe repression of Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular has driven elements within the Muslim Brotherhood towards violent confrontation with the authorities. Violent extremist groups have been strengthened by the disastrous political trajectory of the Brotherhood: from being a majority in the parliament, through the Freedom and Justice Party, and having one of its leaders, Mohamed Morsi, elected as Egypt's first civilian president in 2012, to military take-over in July 2013, the killing of hundreds of its supporters in street protests, and the jailing of tens of thousands more in a continuing state-backed campaign of repression marked by disregard of national and international legal standards.

While there is a legitimate debate to be had about the sincerity of the Brotherhood's long-term commitment to open, pluralistic politics; the Egyptian authorities' decision to remove a democratically elected president, and then to subject his supporters to a sustained wave of state reprisals of a brutality not seen in Egypt since the 1960s cannot fail to have fueled the narrative of violent Islamist extremists.

Such extremists point to the plight of the Brotherhood in Egypt and draw two lessons: 1) State structures will never allow a democratically elected Islamist party to govern; and 2) the Islamist project can only be advanced through violent means, such as those advocated by al-Qa'eda and the so-called Islamic State.

In that respect, the lawless repression imposed on the Brotherhood and its supporters in Egypt since July 2013 has been a driver of violent extremism on a national and regional level.

With the Brotherhood's senior political leadership – who had over decades agreed upon and implemented a program of engagement with non-violent elective politics – in jail or in exile, more radical elements, who favor violent confrontation with the state, are gaining influence. Continuing attacks against police and military personnel, and against members of the judiciary are the products of this turn towards violent extremism by some Islamists in Egypt.

The harsh treatment inflicted on Islamist detainees in Egyptian prisons, where use of torture is on the increase and sexual humiliation is common, also fuels grievances that are exploited by violent extremists. The increasing use of secret unregulated detention centers and arbitrary detention removes oversight and facilitates abuses against detainees only exacerbates the problem.

Islamists are not the only victims of state violence and repression in Egypt and yet it is Islamist groups, notably Ansar Beit al-Maqdes which later declared itself to be the Sinai Province of the self-proclaimed Islamic State, that have been involved in most of the violent attacks since the military takeover. This points to the relevance of Islamist ideology as a mobilizing factor in violent extremism. Other persecuted groups, like secular youth activists associated with the 2011 uprising, or Copts, have not turned to political violence in the same way that some Islamists, including some part of Muslim Brotherhood supporters, have.

The weakness of state structures in the Sinai region has facilitated its becoming a focal point of violent extremism in Egypt. A local activist describes it as “a military zone caught in a spiral of terrorism, corruption and violence with thousands detained, hundreds killed and hundreds of houses destroyed.”

Oversight of operations by security forces in Sinai has never been strong, but with the imposition of restrictions on press coverage of events in the Sinai, criminal penalties for casting doubt on official accounts of security incidents and a worsening security situation there is effectively no oversight, and little public attention inside or outside Egypt, to an increasingly violent conflict.

Absence of state control over territory has been a factor in the development of violent extremism in **Syria** and **Iraq**. Syria also presents one of the clearest examples of the self-sustaining symbiotic relationship between a repressive government and terrorism. Leaders across the Middle East and Africa often seek to build legitimacy by portraying themselves as engaged in a life or death struggle protecting their nation

against terrorism, in so doing they have an interest in making their opposition appear to be as extreme as possible. Suppressing non-violent political opponents by restricting access to the media, and access to the political process means that the political choice becomes polarized between the authoritarian incumbent and the violent extremist alternative. This fuels violent extremism at the expense of non-violent, pluralistic politics. Syria is an extreme case of the government using terrorism to legitimize violent repression, thereby contributing to the growth of the most visible global violent extremist threat: the so called Islamic State or ISIS.

The massive humanitarian crisis in Syria also illustrates the fact that by far the greatest number of victims of terrorism perpetrated by Islamist extremist groups have been Muslim citizens of majority Muslim countries, notably Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. It is a grim irony that multilateral efforts to end the Syria conflict only moved up the policy agenda after high-profile terrorist attacks in the West, like the Paris attacks of November 2015, and after the mass migration of refugees fleeing conflict in Syria and Iraq into the European Union. This gives the impression that western governments only care about violent extremism when it has a direct impact on them, and that they are indifferent to the suffering of millions of victims of conflict in non-western countries. It is easy to see how this perceived lack of empathy might itself fuel grievances on which violent extremism can feed.

The devastating conflict in Syria and Iraq has been fueled by sectarian incitement fueling divisions between Shi'a and Sunni Muslims. These sectarian fault lines have been exacerbated by the strong backing for the Assad regime from the Shi'a government in Tehran, and the deployment of Shi'a Hezbollah fighters, from Lebanon,

and military advisers from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps on the government's side. Sunni powers like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey have provided support to forces opposed to the Assad regime, including highly sectarian violent extremist groups. The proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia has heightened the sectarian character of the conflict and thereby made sectarianism a primary driver of violent extremism in many parts of the region with conflicts in Yemen and continuing tensions in Bahrain and within Saudi Arabia being worsened by sectarian incitement.

The Tunisian context provides a point of contrast. The negative experiences of other North African countries, notably Libya and Egypt where uprising and revolution have produced resurgent authoritarianism or chaotic internal conflict, are a cautionary tale. Avoiding falling into the declining spiral of a destructive binary struggle between authoritarianism and violent extremism is something that binds Tunisians together, despite abiding political differences, a weak economy and a fragile internal security situation.

Tunisia is not paradise; its discontented youth have provided thousands of foreign fighters to ISIS in Syria. In part this is a product of the lingering harm inflicted by decades of authoritarian rule, notably the weakening of traditional religious power centers, tainted by close association with state authorities. Corruption, youth unemployment and lack of opportunity fuel grievances, especially among educated youth, who have ready access to the Internet and social media. Like other Arab authoritarian governments, the Ben Ali regime suppressed non-violent Islamism thereby

ensuring that violent Islamists could make the case that they offered the only viable path to advance the Islamist political project.

This type of tactic, which is common to authoritarian regimes of the past and present in the Arab region, provides ideal conditions for the growth of violent extremism. When political dialogue is forbidden and discredited, extremists are empowered and extremist ideology vindicated. Suggesting that all Islamism is inevitably violent is self-fulfilling. It is especially dangerous in states where a significant proportion, or even the majority, of the political opposition to the government identifies as Islamist. By suppressing other types of political expression and organization, squeezing pluralism out of the system, authoritarian states have made this problem worse.

Tunisia's democratic transition has particular importance to the struggle against violent extremism on a regional and global level. It offers an alternative way that breaks out of the vicious circle of perpetual conflict between authoritarianism and extremism. To succeed, Tunisia will need the sustained support of the international community; it will also need to continue to implement in practice the maxim that fighting terrorism is not just something that the state does for its people; it is something that people are motivated to do for themselves in partnership with the state and the security forces, but also through strong, independent civil society organizations.

The United States maintains close relations with many states that are both engaged in active efforts to combat terrorism and engaging in systematic violations of human rights. It should not be a surprise that these two conditions often coincide: states that violate human rights systematically produce violent extremism.

Key U.S. partners in the fight against violent extremism restrict rights and use the rubric of counterterrorism to do so. If the United States is to effectively champion a more effective strategy to counter violent extremism, then it must show its commitment to promoting human rights in its bilateral relationships.

We recognize that the U.S. government doesn't have a magic wand it can wave to bring a halt to these abuses. Even a robust relationship provides the United States with limited leverage over its partners' behavior. But the United States can do much more to confront violators and, perhaps even more importantly, to reinforce the link between human rights and security. Too many governments continue to view human rights as an obstacle to security-related efforts. It is therefore incumbent on the U.S. to explain why the exact opposite is true.

Recommendations

Human rights violations and the denial of rights and freedoms contribute to the problems of regional instability and violent extremism. Counterterrorism assistance should promote— rather than undermine—the rule of law and human rights. Human rights are not secondary in any strategy to promote stability and counter violent extremism; they are essential to its success.

SECURITY FORCES

- Human rights are key to achieving security and stability. The effectiveness of security forces will improve as relations with communities improve, which will in turn foster longer-term security. Security efforts rife with human rights violations undermine security and encourage violent extremism.

- The U.S. should upgrade its extensive military to military training programs to instill as a priority respect for human rights, transparency, pluralism, and the rule of law. U.S. security agencies should encourage the establishment of dedicated entities within security services that are responsible for investigating complaints of abuses and for ensuring compliance with the rule of law.
- In situations where other states are involved in armed conflicts with terrorist and/or insurgent groups, governments should include well-resourced training in international human rights law and international humanitarian law as an integral component of any form of military or other security assistance provided to that government.

COUNTERTERRORISM/CVE POLICIES AND LEGISLATION

- U.S. embassies should broaden dialogues with civil society and human rights groups in partner countries to include discussion of counterterrorism cooperation, the effects of U.S. assistance and to solicit recommendations for how the United States can advance human rights protections through its counterterrorism assistance.
- The U.S. should offer resources to local civil society figures and other community-based stakeholders to counter violent extremism and develop programming designed and/or implemented by those local groups

HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS AND CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

- A civil society that is free to operate without intimidation or repression is a strong antidote to extremism, and the United States should protect civil society as part of its counterterrorism objectives.
- Protecting and promoting civil society is not just the job of the State Department, but includes the Department of Treasury, Defense, and Justice, the Office of the United States Trade Representative, and other U.S. agencies engaged abroad. Senior U.S. officials of agencies, when travelling abroad, should actively seek opportunities to meet with representatives of civil society, especially those who face restrictions on their work and who may benefit from international support and solidarity.
- The U.S. should call public attention to incidents when international media, international human rights organizations and representatives of multilateral organizations that are denied access and call for them to be admitted.
- Senior U.S. officials should publicly urge the immediate release of all jailed human rights defenders and call for the lifting of restrictions on legitimate, non-violent human rights advocacy. Objections to restrictions on independent non-violent civil society activists should be on the agenda of every bilateral meeting until the country's crackdown on human rights defenders is ended.
- Local civil society groups and other community based stakeholders should be free to access resources from domestic and international sources to counter violent extremism and develop programming designed and implemented by those local groups.

U.S. EXPORT CONTROL OF ARMS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT

- U.S. government officials should conduct a comprehensive assessment of American sales of military and law enforcement equipment to ensure U.S. technology is not enabling the repression of civilians and thereby fueling the grievances on which violent extremism feeds.
- The Defense Department should insist that all future training of security force personnel in ethnically and religiously diverse countries should include proportionate representation of minority service men and women.
- U.S. government officials should enhance the export control process by strengthening existing restrictions and providing more funding for monitoring of the use of weapons and other equipment after sale.

LEAHY LAW

- The U.S. government should enhance the implementation of the Leahy Law so that it can be more effective ensuring that U.S. counterterrorism assistance does not support security forces engaged systematic violations of human rights.
- U.S. government officials should invest in remediation procedures to retrain, re-evaluate, and eventually restore access to units denied assistance under the Leahy Law vetting process.

COUNTER-THREAT FINANCE

- The U.S. government should modernize counter-threat finance to increase pressure on state supporters of violent extremist groups and promote inter-state

cooperation to halt support for those groups from private individuals and institutions.

- Where disclosure would not jeopardize efforts to prevent terrorism or cut off funds to terrorist groups, the U.S. government should confront partner nations with information on their role in enabling or actively financing violent extremists, through U.S. diplomatic channels, and hold partner governments accountable.
- The U.S. government should ensure governments do not use tools to block financing of terrorist groups, like the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), as a justification for actions that crack down on legitimate civil society organizations and political expression.

Conclusion

Beyond ensuring that bi-lateral relationships with authoritarian governments do not contribute to increased violations of human rights, thereby fueling grievances that can be exploited by terrorists and extremists, there are positive human rights objectives to be advanced that should be at the center of bi-lateral relationships with partners in the multilateral struggle against terrorism.

Closing space for civil society and peaceful political activities facilitates the expansion of violent extremism and terrorism. Conversely, respecting fundamental freedoms, especially the freedom of assembly and association, is one of the most important defense mechanisms against violent extremism. Crackdowns on political dissent and diminishing space for political freedom reinforce extremist narratives and directly contribute to radicalization.

Respect for religious freedom is an essential part of countering violent extremism. The extremist discourse of some religious institutions is part of the problem; independence for those institutions is an essential part of the solution. A comprehensive strategy must address the religious and ideological narratives that lure the vulnerable and disenfranchised segments of society to violent extremism. To be effective as counterweights to extremist discourse, religious institutions must be—and be seen to be— independent of political control, and governments must ensure that diverse religious views are not only tolerated but encouraged.

One of the primary root causes that must be addressed more vigorously is the proliferation of armed conflicts and of ungoverned spaces that provide opportunities to violent extremist groups.

The United States, because of its unique reach and influence, has an inescapable responsibility to lead and energize multilateral efforts through the United Nations and other multilateral institutions to end these devastating conflicts. The absence of effective conflict resolution mechanisms, on both national and international levels, is one of the greatest challenges to the implementation of a comprehensive countering violent extremism strategy.

