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**“Israel and the Middle East at a Crossroads: How Tehran's Terror Campaign Threatens
the U.S. and our Allies”
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Chairman Burchett, Ranking Member Phillips, distinguished Members of the subcommittee; thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to speak about the growing threat the Islamic Republic of Iran poses to American interests. I join you all in wishing for the good health and quick recovery of Chairman Joe Wilson.

The Iranian threat is often conceptualized as a Middle Eastern problem; while it poses an outsized risk to our interests in the region, to view it exclusively in geographic terms is mistaken. As my testimony will show, the growing alliance between Russia, China, and Iran, alongside the Iranian nuclear program’s rapid development, has enabled Iran to project power far outside the Middle East. As a result, Iranian influence has been growing in the Western hemisphere, posing a direct threat to Americans here at home. While rolling back the regime’s influence will be a challenge, history provides key lessons that can help inform a coordinated, united response that preserves American and allied security, prosperity, and freedom.

Iran’s Global Reach: The Axis of Aggression and the Nuclear Program

The Iranian threat reaches well beyond the borders of the Middle East. Iran’s ability to project power outside the Middle East is largely due to two factors: its relationship with global powers Russia and China, and its nuclear weapons program.

The Axis of Aggression

The relationship between Russia, China, and Iran, often described as the Axis of Aggression, undermines American interests by de-stabilizing the Middle East, bolstering the Russian war machine in Ukraine, sowing confusion and disinformation within friendly democracies, and providing the resources and technical cooperation to shield each other from the effect of U.S. sanctions. While there is no formal treaty relationship between these three nations, their mutual interest in countering American power has led to increased informational and military coordination.

The informational relationship between Russia, China, and Iran is rooted in their shared antagonism toward the West. As the spokesman of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee of the Iranian parliament Mahmoud Abbaszadeh-Meshkini explained in 2022, “in the new world order, a triangle consisting of three powers – Iran, Russia, and China – has formed in Asia. This new arrangement heralds the end of the inequitable hegemony of the United States

and the West.”ⁱ In concrete terms, this has resulted both in significant efforts by all three nations to influence policy and the U.S. election in 2024 as well as in the perpetuation of anti-American sentiment on social media and university campuses. Chinese state-media has actively promoted Iranian anti-Israel and antisemitic propaganda on TikTok,ⁱⁱ while both Chinese and Iranian sources have provided fundingⁱⁱⁱ and organization to anti-Israel protests in the United States.^{iv} One such example is the People’s Forum, recently revealed to be bankrolled by a pro-CCP propagandist, which not only organized anti-Israel walkouts in New York City public schools but also encouraged students to engage in antisemitic chants calling for the elimination of the Jewish state.^v Why China would care about perpetuating anti-Israel disinformation within our borders is clear - to undermine America’s confidence in our leaders and institutions and imperil the resilience of our democracy.

Unlike informational cooperation, which appears more informal, military coordination between Russia and Iran is official policy and has reached unprecedented levels. This is particularly relevant given recent news that Iran has been supplying Russia with an unspecified number of short-range Project 360 ballistic missiles^{vi} in addition to unmanned aerial vehicles and drones. Iran has been described as a “key enabler” of Putin’s war campaign in Russia, providing over 4,000 Shahed drones and scores of artillery shells, anti-tank rockets, and mortar bombs.^{vii} In exchange, Russia is providing jamming systems, training aircraft, and Western equipment captured from the battlefield for Iran to reverse engineer.^{viii} This is on top of the significant role Russia has been playing in both developing and benefiting from Iran’s nuclear weapons program, which was highlighted in a previous hearing held jointly by this subcommittee and the Subcommittee on Europe.^{ix} Ultimately, the scale of this Iranian-Russian cooperation has led U.S. officials to suggest it is now “a full-scale defense partnership.”^x The military coordination between Iran and China is not at the same level; however, there have been regular joint military drills in the Sea of Oman since 2018^{xi} intended to “expand multilateral cooperation among the participating countries.”^{xii}

Notwithstanding recent international outcry, this trilateral partnership is not likely to end. Just last week, on the margins of the BRICS Security Summit in Moscow, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with key figures in global authoritarian regimes including Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Russia Sergei Shoigu; Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi; Secretary General of the National Defense Council of Venezuela Jose Adelino Ornelas Ferreira; and Russian President Vladimir Putin.^{xiii}

It would be an overstatement to describe this trilateral relationship as either permanent or formal. All three nations have potential spoilers in their relationship— from serving as competitors in the oil market to disputes in the South Caucasus. What unites America’s adversaries, however, is much more powerful to them than what divides them; namely, their commitment to undermine and replace the American-led international system.^{xiv} **Failing to recognize the connection between the three may lead to a policy that is overly myopic and fails to protect key American interests in peace, stability, and security around the world.**

The Nuclear Program

Just as Iran’s relationship with Russia and China allows it to project its power beyond its region, so too has Iran’s nuclear program. Over the last few years, the International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA) has repeatedly reported on Iran’s non-compliance with its safeguards agreement under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, declaring in June 2024 that they had “lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the production centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water, and uranium.”^{xv} This non-compliance diminishes the ability for the international community to ascertain whether the regime is advancing nuclear weaponization efforts.

Recent IAEA reports further note the feverish pace of Iranian activity surrounding its nuclear sites, including enriching uranium at 83.7% purity - just south of the 90% purity generally considered to be weapons-grade enrichment.^{xvi} As of late August 2024, Iran’s stockpile of 60% enriched uranium was reportedly equivalent to the amount necessary to produce three bombs (142.1 kg), and its stockpile of 20% enriched uranium was enough to produce five bombs (751.3 kg).^{xvii} This suggests Iran could reach break out within days.^{xviii} Furthermore, new satellite imagery shows the construction of a nuclear site buried as far as 150 meters underground.^{xix}

These findings have changed the analysis of our intelligence community as well as the urgency of our European partners. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), which has been responsible for annually assessing Iran’s nuclear weapons capability since 2019, for the first time dropped its affirmative conclusion that Iran is not actively undertaking nuclear weapons activity.^{xx} Instead, the ODNI assessment warns that the Iranian regime has “undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device, if it chooses to do so.”^{xxi} **In an increasingly dangerous world, a nuclear weapon in the hands of a state sponsor of terrorism like Iran would be a devastating and irreversible blow to American national security.**

The Iranian Threat in the Western Hemisphere

Iranian power projection has long been extant in Latin America and the Caribbean, a fact recognized by Congress in the passage of the *Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act* of 2012 and the ongoing oversight work done by this committee. Given it is home to the largest Lebanese and Palestinian diasporas outside of the Middle East, its proximity to the United States, and its permissive environment for money laundering, Latin America and the Caribbean has been a key target of Iranian regime influence to spread anti-Americanism and recruit for terrorist networks.

Spreading Anti-Americanism and Challenging American Objectives in the region

Iran’s efforts to challenge American objectives in the region are empowered by a combination of friendly authoritarian leaders and Iranian state-run Spanish language media. From 2005-2007, former Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez visited each other’s country a total of three times,^{xxii} signaling the start of what would be a key relationship for Iran going forward. The friendship was rooted in anti-Americanism; in 2009, Chavez welcomed Ahmadinejad as a “gladiator of anti-imperialist struggles,”^{xxiii} a worldview that has since endured. The partnership is not merely rhetorical; there are regular flights between Tehran and Caracas, often suspected of carrying either terrorists or arms shipments between the two nations.^{xxiv} The Iranian regime has also publicly offered Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officials to protect Maduro’s dictatorship.^{xxv} As recently as February 2024, the Department of Justice completed enforcement for the forfeiture of a cargo plane registered to

Venezuelan airline Emtrasur Cargo, formerly owned by Mahan Air and piloted by an ex-commander for the IRGC Gholamreza Ghasemi.^{xxvi}

Another key aspect of Iran's influence in the region is through the creation of Iranian-regime controlled Spanish language outlets. In 2011, the Iranian regime began broadcasting on a new propaganda outlet, HispanTV, which as of 2021 was operating in over 17 countries in the region. Run entirely by the sanctioned Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting cooperation, HispanTV and other outlets including Al-Manar en Espanol are used to promote pro-Hezbollah and pro-Iranian propaganda to audiences in the hemisphere and are often republished by Spanish or Latin American media.^{xxvii} Recently, HispanTV commentators compared Netanyahu to Hitler, described the terrorist attacks of October 7 as a "legitimate right to self-defense," and claimed the horrifying images of violence against Israel were generated by AI.^{xxviii} Through these media campaigns, Iran seeks to sow anti-Western propaganda to undermine the United States and its relationships in the region.

Recruiting for Terrorism

Iran's desire to make inroads with authoritarians and the people of Latin America is also centered on raising funds for, and committing, acts of terrorism.

Here, Iran relies on a network of cultural centers whose objective is to export the Islamic Revolution and radicalize local communities. In 2020, the United States Treasury sanctioned one such entity, Al Mustafa University (AMU), for serving as an "international recruitment network" for the IRGC.^{xxix} Operating in 50 countries, including in Latin America, the network is one of many Iranian-controlled efforts to indoctrinate and radicalize Latin American populations. Sadly, we have seen this radicalization bear fruit. This year, we commemorated the 30th anniversary of the AMIA bombing, a devastating antisemitic attack on a Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires that was the largest mass slaughter of Jews since the Holocaust prior to October 7th. A Hezbollah operative detonated a car bomb just outside the Asociacion Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA) Jewish community center, killing 85 and injuring over 300. This attack was preceded by the March 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, in which 29 civilians were killed and 242 were injured by the same Hezbollah terrorist responsible for the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut.

The perpetuation of this radicalization and violence is even more horrifying when one considers that Iran has publicly threatened the lives of over two dozen former U.S. officials, including President Donald Trump, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, National Security Advisors John Bolton and Robert O'Brien, Deputy National Security Advisors Matt Pottinger and Victoria Coates, Senior NSC Director Robert Greenway, Special Envoy for Iran Brian Hook, CIA Director Gina Haspel, and others.^{xxx} This is no empty threat – Iran has conducted targeted assassinations of over 20 officials from around the world as of August 2022,^{xxxi} and Latin America is a fertile ground from which to conduct the planning. The FBI has warned that at least one senior Iranian spy, Majid Dastjani Farahani, frequently travels between Venezuela and Iran and sought to recruit allies in the assassination effort against American officials,^{xxxii} Likewise, the four Iranian spies who sought to assassinate journalist Masih Alinejad on American soil plotted to transport her from the U.S. to Caracas by speedboat.^{xxxiii}

It is vital that this Committee continue highlighting and seeking ways to curtail the Iranian threat in Latin America and the Caribbean. The combination of unprecedented illegal immigration, attempted Iranian weapons transfers to the region, decades-long efforts at radicalization in the region, and direct threats against American officials poses a uniquely significant security risk to all Americans.

Effective Deterrents to Iran

In light of these growing threats, the key question is what the United States can do to contain and ultimately reverse the Iranian regime's behavior. **Here, history teaches us that Iran is less likely to maintain either the will or resources for continued aggressive action when faced with decisive military or economic overmatch.**

Perhaps the most illustrative military example is from the Iran-Iraq War. At the time, Iran and Iraq engaged in a series of anti-shipping campaigns beginning in 1981 as part of what later became known as the Tanker War. By 1987, the situation had grown so dire to global shipping, and specifically to Iraq's neighbors like Kuwait, that the United States intervened by sending naval forces, reflagging Kuwaiti oil and gas tankers, and escorting neutral vessels through the Persian Gulf.

While there were many engagements during this campaign, perhaps the most notable was Operation Praying Mantis. In retaliation for an Iranian attack on the U.S. frigate *Samuel B. Roberts*, the United States engaged in direct combat that ultimately sunk or disabled multiple Iranian vessels in a single day, including two Iranian oil platforms and three Iranian warships.^{xxxiv} Further, just under two weeks later, Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci announced a critical policy change – the United States would no longer “stand by and watch innocent people be killed or maimed by malicious, lawless actions when we have the means to assist, and perhaps prevent them.”^{xxxv} Facing this combination of a credible future threat and the recent devastation of overwhelming American firepower, the Iranian regime not only ended its anti-shipping operations, but in combination with other losses to Iraq, ended the war just a few months later. Through decisive military action, the United States reversed the threat on global shipping, re-established American dominance in the region, and helped bring an end to an otherwise seemingly endless war. More recently, research from the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies studied 26 cases of Iranian maritime aggression from January 2021 through July 2023, similarly revealing that Iranian forces were more likely to back down when fearing retaliation from U.S. Navy and partner ships.^{xxxvi}

Strength, however, does not exclusively refer to military power. While sanctions alone are not likely to result in Iranian deterrence, comprehensive sanctions as part of a multi-faceted pressure campaign can constrain the resources Iran would otherwise use to pursue its nuclear program or arm its proxies. For example, prior to the negotiation that led to the *Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action* (JCPOA), the Senate sanctioned the Central Bank of Iran and other key sectors of the Iranian economy as part of the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act. Despite objections by the Obama administration, the Senate passed the amendment by 100 – 0,^{xxxvii} uniting Democrats and Republicans in favor of a maximum pressure campaign to force the Iranian regime to negotiate over its nuclear weapons development. In 2012 and 2013, Congress further

passed the *Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act* (TRA) and the *Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act* (IFCA), both of which expanded primary and secondary sanctions on a variety of Iranian sectors. This was critical but not isolated action; the European Union, too, joined in sanctions on Iranian oil,^{xxxviii} Iran’s nuclear program was hit by a cyber attack,^{xxxix} and Israel announced its famous “redline” at the UN General Assembly,^{xl} reinforcing the credible threat of military action. Collectively, these actions achieved their intended purpose – to support the diplomatic effort and force the regime to come to the table. While the final negotiated deal was woefully insufficient, the initial willingness of the regime to engage at all can reasonably be connected to the pressure campaign that Congress initiated and our partners reinforced.^{xli}

We must be careful to avoid needlessly provocative actions; however, the last few decades have shown that developing a credible threat, constraining Iran’s financial resources, and establishing a clear track record of response to Iranian aggression is the most effective way to deny the Iranian regime both the resources it would otherwise spend on its acts of aggression and its will to risk greater escalation.

Congressional Action

The U.S. government has many options for a strategic and coordinated response. As we approach the one year anniversary of the Iranian-enabled October 7th terrorist attack in Israel, we must focus on actively containing and reversing the Iranian regime’s influence on the global stage.

In today’s political environment, this is not a popular thing to say. It is, however, true. American elections lately are won on the promise to do less abroad, as the ghost of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq – and in particular, of the catastrophic and heartbreakingly mismanaged evacuation from Afghanistan – looms large in American collective memory. And yet, taking limited action now is the only way to prevent the necessity of pursuing more kinetic and escalatory options later. Our leaders abjure their responsibilities by seeking to make us feel safe rather than actually be safe.

In July 2024, a coalition of ten national security organizations published a call to action, highlighting a four-pronged approach to the Iranian threat that would degrade and reverse Iran’s convention and nuclear weapons expansion, deter Iran from aggression and terrorism, empower internal dissidents within Iran, and ensure appropriate American defenses against Iranian efforts.^{xlii} While some of these recommendations fall under the purview of the executive branch, Congressional authorities will play a critical role in shaping the landscape to maintain advanced deterrence and protect American security.

- **Respond when American citizens, entities, or allies are attacked.** As noted previously, the Iranian regime responds to shows of strength. While it is desperate to get the United States embroiled in conflict with proxies around the world, the regime is equally hopeful to avoid direct confrontation with us. America, however, has failed to signal this commitment to countering Iran. Iranian-backed militias in the region have now hit American assets over 280 times^{xliii} since the start of the Biden administration – 175 times since October 2023. The U.S. has only responded 11 times.^{xliv} Three U.S. servicemembers were killed by an Iranian drone in Jordan in January 2024,^{xlv} and recent indictments^{xlvi} against Hamas operations including the late Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar hold Iranian-proxy terrorist organization Hamas responsible for the slaughter of

43 American citizens on October 7th – not including Hersh Goldberg-Polin, who was one of eight Americans still^{xlvii} in Hamas captivity until his murder and discovery on August 31, 2024. We continue to put our citizens and assets at risk if we fail to respond forcefully to attacks against Americans.

- **Encourage our European allies to trigger UN Security Council Resolution 2231 snapback provisions.** Over the last few years, we’ve seen significant United Nations sanctions on Iran’s conventional and ballistic missiles programs expire. In October 2025, the resolution as a whole expires, along with the legal right and obligation to conduct inspections or interdictions on any suspected shipments of missiles and other arms to and from Iran. Given the recent provision of ballistic missiles to enable Russia’s war in Ukraine, it is vital we retain and expand these powers by implementing snapback.
- **Encourage partners to penalize key Iranian proxies and entities involved in weapons transfers to deny their proliferation and squeeze regime resources that would otherwise be used for malign activity.** The United States should prioritize encouraging our allies and partners to designate key Iranian proxies as terrorist organizations and implement related sanctions. This should include the IRGC, Hamas, and Hezbollah. The same multilateral effort should be undertaken as it relates to Iranian aircraft and Iranian banks involved in weapons proliferation. The recent announcement that multiple partners have established sanctions on Iran Air in light of the discovery of its provision of ballistic missiles to aid in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is an important step.^{xlviii} European partners should join the United States in designating Mahan Air, which the Justice Department notes is “known to ferry weapons and fighters for the IRGC and Hezbollah.”^{xlix}
- **Engage in a “maximum support” campaign for the people of Iran.** In 2023, the National Union for Democracy in Iran (NUFDI) published a strategy highlighting the importance of strengthening the people of Iran relative to their regime abusers.^l The last few years have seen extreme courage on the part of the people of Iran. This hearing is taking place just a few days after the two-year anniversary of the killing of Masah Amini, and yet, there have been no human rights related sanctions placed on the Supreme Leader of Iran or the Iranian President. Establishing consequences for the regime’s oppression of its people through such human rights sanctions is a critical step for American policy toward the region, and a key Congressional priority in light of the passage of the *Mahsa Amini Human rights and Security Accountability Act* (MAHSA Act) in April 2024. At the same time, the United States must find tangible ways of supporting the people of Iran, including providing the Iranian people access to the internet via Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), resourcing the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) to provide for medium wave broadcasting ability, and creating a strike fund to support Iranian workers who are willing to stand up to the regime. The more we support the people of Iran, the more pressure we are inherently putting on their regime.
- **Demand executive branch compliance with key Iran-related legislation.** Congress passed three critical Iran-related acts in April 2024 – the previously mentioned *MAHSA Act*, the *Stop Harboring Iranian Petroleum Act* (SHIP Act), and the *Fight and Combat Rampant Iranian Missile Exports Act* (Fight CRIME Act). Collectively, these bills provide authorities to sanction various entities that enable either the financing of Iranian malign activity or weapons transfers.^{li} Each of these bills requires the administration to submit a report – 90 days from passage under the MAHSA and Fight Crime Acts and 120 days after passage under the SHIP Act. We are now nearing 150 days from the passage of

these acts and have not seen full compliance from the administration. The House Foreign Affairs Committee and Congress should insist State provide the reports immediately.

- **Remain united behind the idea that all elements of American national power will be deployed to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon.** The passage of a sense of Congress, for example, would signal to Iran the seriousness with which the United States is taking the Iranian nuclear program and the unity of the government in committing to a response.

By enacting these policies and exercising appropriate oversight on existing congressionally mandated activities, the United States can deny the Iranian regime both the will and the resources to project power outside the confines of its own borders. This, in turn, would be an enormous victory for the security of Americans everywhere.

Chairman Burchett, Ranking Member Phillips, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you again for calling attention to such an important issue, and for the critical work you perform in defending America's security and vital national interests.

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ⁱⁱ <https://www.newsweek.com/china-iran-propaganda-douyin-social-media-antisemitic-1836806>

ⁱⁱⁱ <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/05/world/europe/neville-roy-singham-china-propaganda.html>

^{iv} <https://www.timesofisrael.com/biden-intel-chief-iran-funding-emboldening-anti-israel-protests-in-us-to-sow-discord/>

^v <https://freebeacon.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/4-24-2024-Werfel-CCP-Singham-Letter1.pdf>

^{vi} <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3901774/iran-gives-russia-short-range-missiles-while-us-partners-expect-to-keep-bolster/>

^{vii} <https://warontherocks.com/2024/07/the-uncomfortable-reality-of-russia-and-irans-new-defense-relationship/>

^{viii} <https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2023/11/28/2996773/deal-done-iran-to-get-mil-mi-28-chopper-sukhoi-su-35-jet>

^{ix} <https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA13/20240417/117148/HHRG-118-FA13-Wstate-NoronhaG-20240417.pdf>

^x <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/12/09/russia-iran-drone-missile/>

^{xi} <https://news.usni.org/2024/03/14/russia-china-and-iran-finish-drills-in-gulf-of-oman>

^{xii} <https://en.irna.ir/news/85416320/Russian-Chinese-warships-arrive-in-Iran-s-territorial-waters>

^{xiii} <https://iranpress.com/putin-meets-brics-security-envoys-in-st-petersburg>

^{xiv} <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/russian-iranian-cooperation-and-threats-us-interests>

^{xv} <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202406033227>

^{xvi} <https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-natanz-uranium-enrichment-underground-project-04dae673fc937af04e62b65dd78db2e0>

^{xvii} <https://jinsa.org/blocking-the-breakout-red-lines-and-the-iranian-nuclear-program/>

^{xviii} <https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/analysis-of-iaea-iran-verification-and-monitoring-report-august-2024>

^{xix} <https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/imagery-update-construction-is-ongoing-at-the-natanz-tunnel-facility>

^{xx} <https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/08/10/u-s-intelligence-assessment-drops-claim-that-iran-not-currently-undertaking-nuclear-weapons-development/>

^{xxi} <https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ODNI-Unclassified-Irans-Nuclear-Weapons-Capability-and-Terrorism-Monitoring-Act-of-2022-202407.pdf>

^{xxii} <https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/iran-and-venezuela/ahmadinejad-chavez-partnership>

^{xxiii} <https://www.brecorder.com/news/amp/3705190>

^{xxiv} <https://www.foxnews.com/us/exclusive-venezuela-cancels-round-trip-terror-flight-to-syria-and-iran>

^{xxv} <https://www.infobae.com/america/venezuela/2019/04/15/iran-le-ofrecio-a-nicolas-maduro-soldados-de-elite-de-la-guardia-revolucionaria-islamica/>

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^{xxvii} <https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/iran-expands-its-influence-in-latin-america/>

^{xxviii} <https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/10/31/hispantv-is-irans-propaganda-arm-in-latin-america-why-is-it-still-being-broadcast/>

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^{xxxi} <https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/iran-still-trying-kill-american-officials>

^{xxxii} <https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/terrorinfo/majid-dastjani-farahani>

^{xxxiii} <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jul/13/iran-intelligence-officer-kidnap-plot-us-journalist>

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^{xxxvii} <https://www.congress.gov/amendment/112th-congress/senate-amendment/1414>

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^{xxxix} <https://www.reuters.com/article/world/netanyahu-draws-red-line-on-irans-nuclear-program-idUSBRE88Q0GI/>

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^{xli} <https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/08/29/deterring-irans-dash-to-the-bomb/>

^{xlii} https://vandenbergoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Call-to-Action_Americans-Must-Take-the-Iran-Threat-Seriously.pdf

^{xliiii} **Calculated based on assessment combining analysis from the Biden inauguration until November 2023, and then from October 7 2023 onward using** <https://www.voanews.com/a/us-forces-attacked-151-times-in-iraq-syria-during-biden-presidency-/7360366.html> and <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tracking-anti-us-and-anti-israel-strikes-iraq-and-syria-during-gaza-crisis>

^{xliiii} <https://www.fdd.org/iranattacksusforces/>

^{xliiii} <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3659809/3-us-service-members-killed-others-injured-in-jordan-following-drone-attack/>

^{xliiii} <https://static01.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/8a2d47f177709bab/d803cd4c-full.pdf>

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