

**Hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
“The President’s New Cuba Policy and U.S. National Security”**

**Statement of
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Mr. Chairman,

Thank you the opportunity to testify on the national security threat posed by Cuba. As Washington considers a radical change in our relationship with Havana, Cuba’s world-class espionage operations against us demand careful review and deliberation.

I had the privilege of serving as a Counterintelligence Officer with the US Army and Defense Intelligence Agency for over 20 years. With regard to Cuba, I was deeply involved with most US Counterintelligence successes against Havana from 1996-2004. I was a central figure in the Ana Montes spy case and the lead military official in the 2003 expulsion of 14 Cuban diplomat-spies.

Cuba as a national security state

Underestimated and misunderstood for more than half a century, Havana remains a clear and present danger to the United States. It is a national security state and its military and intelligence agencies exist solely to ensure regime continuity. Its spy services are augmented by a million-member neighborhood informant program known as the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs). These entities combine to give the regime an omnipresent intelligence structure that is – on a per capita basis - 34 times larger than the US Intelligence Community.

Castro’s spies also benefit from a narrow focus on just two enemies: the Cuban people and the United States. In fact, the regime has three separate intelligence agencies arrayed against the United States. One of these services, the vaunted Directorate of Intelligence (DI), is ranked 5th or 6th best in the world.

Greed, not self-defense, is Cuba’s sole motive for its espionage efforts against the United States. Havana long ago earned the nickname “Intelligence Trafficker to the World” for its sale and barter of stolen US secrets. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the loss of Moscow’s \$3 billion annual subsidy, its auctioning of US classified information skyrocketed. Cuba’s intelligence brokering is now reportedly a key revenue stream, earning hundreds of millions of dollars annually in cash, goods, and services for the regime.

US Counterintelligence vulnerabilities

The administration's current outreach offers five seemingly unanticipated consequences which Havana will exploit as catalysts to increase US targeting.

First, opening Cuba to US travelers will bring a huge influx of desperately needed cash to Cuba's intelligence and security services that – along with their military brethren – run every major component of the tourism industry as profit-making enterprises.

Second, this flood of American tourists will provide Cuban spies unprecedented opportunities to assess and recruit new American traitors. "Home field advantage" will not only provide a secure environment for espionage, but also drive down Havana's costs.

Third, unrestricted access to US technology will trigger significant upgrades in Havana's technical capabilities for espionage and internal repression. No longer will it be encumbered by the expense and time delays prompted by circumventing the US embargo.

The fourth benefit will be the end of travel restrictions on its US-based diplomat-spies. This advantage will eventually be further enhanced by the opening of an Embassy, as well as consulates and *Prensa Latina* (PRELA) offices. As a reminder, when the US broke relations with Cuba in 1961, Havana had 28 Consulates in the US. Concurrently, the PRELA news agency had offices and correspondents in New York, Washington, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Miami, Denver, and Atlanta.

The fifth gain is a huge boost in the notion that Cuba poses "no threat" to the US. This well-choreographed myth has been aggressively promoted by the regime for five decades. The advantage the administration gave Havana with his new initiative elevates this fairy tale to heights Havana could not have achieved by itself.

Recommendations & Conclusion

I would like to conclude by making a single recommendation to the Committee. Do everything in your power to degrade or defeat Cuba's intelligence operations. Havana's appetite for US secrets is voracious and our failure to counter their spying fuels their addiction. Expanding relations accomplishes nothing other than to make Cuban Intelligence more effective, efficient, and profitable than it's ever been.

I hope this hearing will help educate all parties as to the high costs of this ill-advised outreach. I am grateful for the opportunity to be here today and look forward to the forthcoming Q&A period.