"Thoroughly Reforming Them Towards a Healthy Heart Attitude"

- China's Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang

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Abstract

Since spring 2017, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China has witnessed the emergence of an unprecedented reeducation campaign. According to media and informant reports, untold thousands of Uyghurs and other Muslims have been and are being detained in clandestine political re-education facilities, with major implications for society, local economies and ethnic relations. Considering that the Chinese state is currently denying the very existence of these facilities, this paper investigates publicly available evidence from official sources, including government websites, media reports and other Chinese internet sources. First, it briefly charts the history and present context of political re-education. Second, it looks at the recent evolution of re-education in Xinjiang in the context of ‘de-extremification’ work. Finally, it evaluates detailed empirical evidence pertaining to the present re-education drive. With Xinjiang as the ‘core hub’ of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing appears determined to pursue a definitive solution to the Uyghur question.

Since summer 2017, troubling reports emerged about large-scale internments of Muslims (Uyghurs, Kazaks and Kyrgyz) in China's northwest Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). By the end of the year, reports emerged that some ethnic minority townships had detained up to 10 percent of the entire population, and that in the Uyghur-dominated Kashgar Prefecture alone, numbers of interned persons had reached 120,000 (The Guardian, January 25, 2018).

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Despite increasing media coverage starting in late 2017, the Chinese government has denied the very existence of Xinjiang’s re-education camps. In February 2018, during an interview with the Almaty Tengrinews, Zhang Wei, China’s Consul General in Kazakhstan, claimed that "we do not have such an idea in China" (AKIPress, 2018). Similarly, in a May 2018 response to a press comment request, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it "had not heard" of such a situation (Shih, 2018). Since then, the Global Times, the CCP’s English-language mouthpiece, reported that over a million residents especially in southern Xinjiang have been subject to "government-organized occupational education programs" as a "poverty alleviation" measure (2018a). Subsequently, it published an article on the education of imprisoned "religious extremists" in order to curb extremism (2018b). Notably, however, neither of these pieces acknowledges the existence of a large-scale extra-judicial detention system designed to indoctrinate large swaths of the general population.

There is mounting anecdotal and eyewitness evidence on re-education from Western news outlets (Dooley, 2018; Chin, 2017; Shih, 2017, 2018). This article demonstrates that one can find also a substantial body of PRC governmental sources, produced for a domestic audience, that prove the existence of the camps. Official public tenders indicate the construction of such facilities on city, county, township and village levels. Based on the available documentary evidence, we can surmise that the region’s current re-education system exceeds the size of China’s entire former "education through labour" system that was officially abolished in 2013.
Government and state media reports show that re-education efforts among especially the Uyghur population began in late 2013 and gradually became more institutionalised. However, it was not until spring 2017, under the auspices of the XUAR's new Party Secretary Chen Quanguo, that the scale of these internments reached unprecedented levels. Under Chen, Muslim majority regions are being assigned detention quotas, resulting in the internment of large swaths of Muslim populations without due process. Rather than representing court-sanctioned criminal punishments, official documents portray re-education in terms akin to free medical treatment of a dangerous addiction to religious ideology. Re-education reports often cite "transformation success rates" to demonstrate this "treatment's" effectiveness. Drawing on Foucault, Sean Roberts argued that the state has been framing the Uyghur population almost as a biological threat to society that must be contained through physical separation, surveillance and detention (Roberts, 2018). This article suggests that Chen Quanguo’s re-education drive epitomises the "biopolitics" of China’s "war on terror".

Xinjiang is China’s largest administrative unit, strategically located along a 5,600 kilometre border with eight nations. It has long been a strategic zone of intercultural contact and conflict. Since the creation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has spent billions of dollars asserting its sovereignty and authority over this remote region. However, the intensification of Beijing’s integrationist project, notably in the wake of the Great Western Development Initiative that was inaugurated in 2000, has also led to increased resistance, especially among the native Uyghur population (Bequelin, 2004). After the September 11, 2001 terror attack on the World Trade Center, China launched its own “war on terror” against Uyghur Muslim separatism. In particular, the 2008 Lhasa uprising and the 2009
Ürümchi riots raised the specter of a Soviet-style ethnic implosion, which further emboldened state advocates of an integrationist minority policy approach (Millward, 2009). Rather than decreasing ethnic tensions, these assimilationist tendencies have increased Uyghur feelings of cultural insecurity (see Smith Finley in this Special Issue). Xinjiang’s ethnic relations are further complicated by the fact that Beijing has to take a tough stance against any hint of minority separatism in order to appease the region’s Han, which in 2015 constituted 37 percent of the population (Cliff, 2016).

Since the inception of Xi Jinping’s ambitious “Belt and Road Initiative” in late 2013, stability maintenance (weiwen; 维稳) in this volatile region has become an even greater priority. Xinjiang became a “core region” (hexin qu; 核心区) in the BRI, just at a time when deadly acts of resistance there were reaching a peak (Clarke, 2016). After the suicide car bombing in Beijing’s Tian’anmen square (October 2013), the train station stabbing in Kunming (March 2014) and the market bombing in Urumqi (April 2014), Chinese President Xi Jinping responded with a call for “walls made of copper and steel” and “nets spread from the earth to the sky” to capture these terrorists (China Daily, 2014). Under Secretary Chen Quanguo, who was drafted into the region in late August 2016, the XUAR embarked on a massive human and technological securitization drive that turned the region into one of the most heavily fortified and policed regions in the world (Zenz and Leibold, 2017).

Firstly, this article briefly charts the context of political re-education in China. Secondly, it looks at the evolution of re-education in Xinjiang in the context of "de-extremification" work. Then, it evaluates the unprecedented re-education drive initiated by Chen
Quanguo. Lastly, the article presents detailed empirical information on current re-education facilities in their various guises.

**Political Re-Education in China**

The concept of re-education has a long history in Communist China. In the 1950s, the state established the so-called "reform through labour" (laodong gaizao; 劳动改造), commonly referred to as laogai (Seymour and Anderson, 1998). The laogai system is part of the formal prison system, and inmates are convicted through legal proceedings. In contrast, the "re-education through labour" system (laodong jiaoyang; 劳动教养) or in short laojiao was established in 1957 as an administrative penalty and internment system. Anyone could be sentenced to laojiao by the public security agencies without trials or legal procedures (Mühlhahn, 2009). Revived in the 1980s, laojiao was widely used for dissidents, petitioners or petty criminals. Even family members or employers could recommend persons for re-education (Laogai Research Foundation, 2008, 17). Both the leadership under Xi Jinping and the population felt that sending people into such camps without legal proceedings, merely at the whims of local police authorities, was no longer appropriate in a modern society governed by the rule of law. A pertinent example is the case of Tang Hui, who was placed into laojiao in 2012 for protesting the lenient sentences given to those who had forced her daughter into prostitution, causing considerable public outrage (Green, 2014). Since their abolition, many laojiao facilities have become centres for coercive isolated detoxification treatments given to drug addicts (qiangzhi geli jiedu; 强制隔离戒毒) (Sina News, 2013).

In the early 2000s, another term for re-education emerged. In order to convert Falun Gong followers away from their spiritual pursuits, the state initiated so-called
"transformation through education" (jiaoyu zhuanhua; 教育转化) classes (Tong, 2009, 106). The Chinese term zhuanhua, which effectively turns "education" into (political) re-education, literally means to "transform" or to "convert". It is also used to describe the chemical process of isomerization by which one molecule is transformed into another. A state media report from 2001 describes the initiation of Falun Gong-related "re-education classes" (jiaoyu zhuanhua xuexiban; 教育转化学习班) throughout the country, including Xinjiang’s Ürümchi (Renminwang, 2001).

Besides combating the Falun Gong, the state also employs "transformation through education" in educational contexts. So-called "problem students" are subjected to "transformation through education", although this often takes place in regular school contexts and only sometimes in closed training contexts or dedicated institutions. Finally, "transformation through education" is a common concept in the context of China’s coercive isolated detoxification.

Political Re-Education in Contrast to Other Forms of Internment

Akin to re-education through labour (laojiao), political re-education in Xinjiang is an extrajudicial procedure that does not replace criminal punishment or reform through labour (laogai). The region’s re-education facility network therefore operates alongside the regular prison and detention system.

For example, an official report on Dunbar Village (Kashgar Prefecture) distinguishes between: a) convicts who have been sentenced (panxing; 判刑, i.e. to prison), b) suspects who have been detained (shouya; 收押, i.e. in detention centres, awaiting judgment), and c) those in political re-education (jiaoyu zhuanhua renyuan; 教育转化人员) (Liu, 2017).
Similarly, sources with close acquaintances in Xinjiang told the author that detained suspects there may be first placed in detention centres (*kanshousuo*; 看守所) in order to evaluate whether they will be sent to political re-education or to prison (see also Shih, 2018).

Typically, the use of the term "transformation through education" in Xinjiang is restricted to: a) political re-education of the general population (especially of Muslim minorities), b) political re-education of cadres (especially so-called "two-faced persons" *liangmianren*; 两面人), and c) persons detained for coerced detoxification (XUAR Food and Drug Inspection and Management Bureau, 2017). Occasionally, it is also applied to those in prison, usually in connection with the concept of "de-extremification" (and therefore presumably in regard to sentenced "religious extremists"). However, the more common term for the re-education of those sentenced to prison terms is *jiaoyu gaizao* (教育改造), akin to "reform through labour" (*laodong gaizao*).

In terms of the different facility names, reform through labour typically takes place in prisons (*jianyu*; 监狱) while the former re-education through labour system was located in re-education "facilities" or "camps" (*laojiaosuo*; 劳教所). In contrast, Xinjiang's contemporary political re-education drive is conducted through a network of "transformation through education" "centres" (*zhongxin*; 中心), "bases" (*jidi*; 基地) and "schools" (*xuexiao*; 学校) (compare Table 1). Locals often refer to re-education internment as "attending/entering class" (*jin xuexiban*; 进学习班), or "getting an education" (*shoudao jiaoyu*; 受到教育).
Despite some exceptions, these distinct uses and terminologies have aided the author's task of identifying material related to the political re-education of Muslim populations in Xinjiang.

**The Inception of "De-Extremification" through Re-Education in Xinjiang**

It was not until 2014 that the "transformation through education" concept in Xinjiang came to be used in wider contexts than the Falun Gong, Party discipline or drug addict rehabilitation. Prior to that year, public references to "transformation through education" in the context of combating religious extremism and stability maintenance are very rare. A district in Turpan City, a majority Uyghur region, reported in August 2013 that it was undertaking "transformation through education work" (*jiaoyu zhuanghua gongzuo*; 教育转化工作) in order to deal with "four special types of people" (*sizhong teshu renqun*; 四种特殊人群), including young men who grow beards (Turpan City Party Net, 2013). Transformation through education goals were determined on a case-by-case basis and implemented through home visits and vocational training rather than internment in dedicated facilities. Back then, re-education efforts concentrated on a limited number of "focus persons" (*zhongdianren*; 重点人).

The increasingly widespread application of "transformation through education" to Uyghur or Muslim population groups arose in tandem with the "de-extremification" (*qu jiduanhua*; 去极端化) campaign. The phrase "de-extremification" was first mentioned by Xinjiang’s former Party secretary Zhang Chunxian at a January 2012 meeting in Khotan Prefecture and de-extremification measures became local legislation in April 2015 (Phoenix Information, 2015). On April 1, 2017, the region then enacted a comprehensive "de-extremification ordinance" (*Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu qujiduanhua tiaoli*; 新疆维吾尔自治区去极端化条例).
新疆维吾尔自治区去极端化条例）（XUAR Government, 2017). Since 2013, "transformation through education" work has been closely tied to "de-extremification".

For example, an August 2014 news report about "de-extremification" work in Qaghiliq (Yecheng) County, a Uyghur majority region in Xinjiang's southern Kashgar Prefecture, described a newly established centralized re-education initiative that subjected 259 "problem persons" (wenti renyuan; 问题人员) to 10 days of "closed-style" training (fengbishi peixun; 封闭式培训) (Lin, 2014). Activities followed a detailed schedule and included discussions, writing personal reflections, and watching educational videos. This is one of the first reports that describes re-education in a closed setting and over a limited time period. Whether this took place in a dedicated facility is unclear.

Similarly, in 2015, Chapchal County in Ili Prefecture, which has a 66 percent minority population (28 percent Uyghur), held a 15 day "centralized transformation through education training class using a fully closed-style management" (This Year's Graduating Class Net, 2015). This training targeted 42 persons categorized as "class A" group (i.e. the most recalcitrant). The training included military drill, patriotic singing, criminal law, marriage law, patriotic videos, writing personal statements and reflections, acting out contents through drama performance, and other activities. According to the report, the whole class rose up, broke out in tears, with participants emotionally announcing that they must "repent" and "become new persons". Such graphic descriptions of emotional displays of personal repentance as the necessary and expected result of political re-education are highly reminiscent of oral histories of self-criticisms conducted during the Maoist era. Eyewitnesses who went through re-education in 2017 told Western media outlets that they were made to memorize patriotic texts, confess their "faults", criticize
their religious traditions and denounce fellow internees (Shih, 2018). Those who fail to follow these orders face harsh punishments, including sleep and food deprivation, solitary confinement and beatings.

Meanwhile, the re-education system also began to evolve into a network of dedicated facilities. A November 2014 news report stated that Konashäär (Shufu) County located in Kashgar Prefecture had established a three-tiered "transformation through education base" (jiaoyu zhuanhua jidi; 教育转化基地) system as part of its "de-extremification" efforts (Xinjiang Daily, 2014a). So-called "problem persons" were subjected to "centralized transformation through education" (jizhong jiaoyu zhuanhua; 集中教育转化) (Xinjiang Daily, 2014b). This system of bases, some titled "legal system training schools" (fazhi peixun xuexiao; 法制培训学校), was set up at county, township and village levels, with participants who failed to achieve "transformation" being successively passed on to the base at the next highest level. A three-tiered re-education system on these levels is likewise mentioned in a 2017 government research paper, and has apparently found widespread adoption (Qiu Yuanyuan, 2017, 76). Similarly, bid documents discussed below prove the existence or construction of such facilities at city, county, township and village levels.

By late 2014, Konashäär’s re-education system had held a total of 203 sessions involving 3,515 persons, of which 88 percent were successfully "transformed through education". Detainees thoroughly studied the "harmful" ways of religious extremism and sang patriotic songs. "Out of their own initiative", they replaced their burkas with modern Uyghur ethnic dress and "returned to a secular lifestyle." According to informants and observers, re-education classes in 2017 and 2018 additionally placed an
increasing and significant emphasis on the learning of the Chinese language (the “national language”). In 2018, at least one person was said to have successfully avoided re-education internment by voluntarily taking a Chinese language exam, thereby proving significant Chinese language skills (personal communication).

In 2015 also appeared the first media report stating the actual capacity of a centralized re-education facility. Khotän City's dedicated "de-extremification transformation through education training centre" (qujiduanhua jiaoyu zhuanhua peixun zhongxin; 去极端化教育培训中心) was reported to hold up to 3,000 detainees whose thinking was "deeply affected" by "religious extremism" (Xinjiang Daily, 2015a). "Transformation through education" was achieved through ethnic unity education, psychological counselling, lectures in government policy and other activities. Khotän's facility began operations in March 2015 and used "military-style management" (Xinjiang Daily, 2015b). As confirmation of the internment-like character of these facilities, a late 2015 government report of an official visit to Lopnur (Yuli) County's "de-extremification transformation through education centre" (qujiduanhua jiaoyu zhuanhua zhongxin; 去极端化教育培训转化中心) shows a picture of a barbed wire-clad walled compound (Lopnur County Government, 2015).

Meanwhile, re-education methods had also become increasingly sophisticated. Ghulja (Yining) County, a majority Uyghur region in Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, subjected 5,000 persons to re-education in 2014 (China Daily, 2015). In order to improve transformational effectiveness, "focus persons" were grouped into four groups, labelled A to D, based on perceived severity. Group A, the most recalcitrant "strike hard detainees", received 20 days training. Group B, the "stubborn of thinking" group, got 15
days. Those with "unstable thinking" who were influenced by extremist thought were assigned to group C and subjected to 7 days training. Those who had only received light influence or may already have been reformed were in group D (4 days training). According to a similar report in the "Observer" (Guanchazhe), the "success rate" of this system stood at 70 percent (Guanchazhe, 16 October 2015).

The same four-group re-education system was set up in Yuli County where one third of the population is Uyghur. According to the county's 2015 government work report, there had been 96 "transformation through education training classes" (jiaoyu zhuanghua peixun ban; 教育转化培训班) where 91.6 percent of the 1,945 participants were successfully "transformed" (Lopnur County Government, 2016). The four-group (or "ABCD") system continued to be deployed in subsequent years. In 2016, Ghulja County set up "transformation through education classes" in its "social correction centre" (shehui jiaozhi zhongxin; 社会矫治中心) (Yili News Net, 2017). That year, it held 85 such classes involving 2,292 persons, achieving a "transformation rate" (zhuanhualü; 转化率) of 85 percent.

**Cleansing the Countryside: Presumed Religious Thought "Pollution" Ratios Among the Population**

In late 2015, Xinjiang's justice department’s party committee secretary stated that in a typical (Muslim) village, 70 percent of the population merely "change with the wider surroundings" and are hence "easily transformed" (Phoenix Information, 2015). In contrast, the other 30 percent are "polluted by religious extremism". This latter group "requires concentrated education...work; ...when the 30 percent are transformed...the village is basically cleansed". In the same report, the secretary of Khotân County's
politics and law committee argued that of those who received religious extremist influence, "about 5 percent belong to the hardened faction, 15 percent are supporters, and 80 percent are illiterates".

About 18 months later, in April 2017, the region unleashed an unprecedented re-education drive, with internment rates in Muslim-dominated regions bearing a striking resemblance especially to the ratios stated by the Khotän County secretary in the above-mentioned 2015 report (RFA, 2018c). His statements reveal the logic by which XUAR regions with a majority Muslim population share are simply being assigned fixed internment quotas for re-education, regardless of whether those interned can in fact be convicted of any legal transgressions.

Generally, the evidence presented above concerning re-education experiences gathered between 2014 and 2016 provides an important backdrop for understanding how in 2017, the regional authorities brought this approach to its logical conclusion. Rather than just focusing on "problem persons" or similar focus groups, it began to intern vast shares of the Muslim adult population (i.e. between 5 and 15 percent as indicated above) in newly constructed or remodeled re-education facilities. To a substantial extent, this large-scale internment is being carried out under the guise of providing vocational skills training.

**Chen Quanguo Intensifies Re-Education**

In 2016, Chen Quanguo became Xinjiang’s new Party Secretary. Previously, Chen had gained a reputation in Beijing for having pacified the restive Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) through a combination of intense securitization and penetrating social control...
mechanisms (Zenz and Leibold, 2017). In Xinjiang, Chen has implemented the same policies as he did in the TAR, including massive police recruitment and the deployment of hundreds of thousands of cadres to monitor villages. But only about half a year after assuming power, Chen initiated in Xinjiang a much more drastic measure than anything he had done in Tibet.

Informant reports, some made available to the author and others derived from the Western media, place the onset of massive detentions among the Uyghur population at late March or early April 2017 (RFA, January 22). This timing closely coincides with the publication of Xinjiang's "de-extremification ordinance" (XUAR Government, 2017). Directive no. 14 in section 3 of this document states that:

De-extremification must do transformation through education well, jointly implementing individual and centralized education, jointly implementing legal education and supporting activities, thought education, psychological counselling, jointly implementing behavioural correction and skills education, jointly implementing transformation through education and care for the person [lit. humanistic concern], strengthening the outcome of transformation through education.

A potentially influential document in this development was a research paper published in June 2017 by Xinjiang’s Ürümchi Party School (Qiu Yuanyuan, 2017). According to this paper, the “punishment of criminal offenders and transformation through education are the key elements of de-extremification work” (p.74). In order to demonstrate the
"success" of re-education, the research paper cites survey results among 588 re-educated persons in Ili, Aqsu, Kashgar and Khotän prefectures. Whereas prior to re-education, 68 percent of respondents were unaware of their "mistakes", afterwards 99 percent were able to "distinguish illegal religion" or showed a willingness to report others who were transgressing legal regulations (p.75). Consequently, the paper recommends the creation of "centralized transformation through education training centres" in all prefectures and counties, with capacities for at least 300 persons each.

The research paper lists three types of re-education facilities: "centralized transformation through education training centres" (jizhong jiaoyu zhuanhua peixun zhongxin; 集中教育转化培训中心), "legal system schools" (fazhi xuexiao; 法制学校), and "rehabilitation correction centres" (kangfu jiaozhi zhongxin; 康复矫治中心). These different naming conventions are also reflected in official government procurement and construction bids related to these facilities, and all of them have at least some bids that specify strong security features such as walls, fences, barbed wire, monitoring systems and guard rooms (Table 1). According to the paper, re-education facilities may be located at existing criminal detention centres (kanshousuo or baoliusuo; 抱留所), in police training centres (jingcha peixun zhongxin; 警察培训中心), or will have been newly constructed. Government construction bids indicate that they are sometimes part of extensive new compounds that also host criminal detention centres, police stations or even supermarkets (Table 1).

In May 2017, the first official "education through transformation" related recruitment notices appeared, although the overall very low recruitment figures suggest that most such staff were recruited by unofficial means. The Ürümchi Party School research paper
had noted a lack of formal recruitment of qualified staff as a key weakness of the region’s re-education system. Qaramay, a city in northern Xinjiang, advertised for 110 re-education centre staff for four different "centralized transformation through education classes" as well as 248 police officers for police stations, checkpoints and "transformation through education bases" (Qaramay Public Employment Service Desk, 2017; Baijiantan Information Network, 2017). Later, Lop (Luopu) and Keriya (Yutian) Counties in Khotan Prefecture advertised several "transformation through education centre" teaching positions, requiring knowledge in applied and criminal psychology, "heart health education", Marxism and other subjects (Public Service Recruitment Net, 2017). Additionally, authorities have been setting up modern remote classrooms or video conferencing facilities in some re-education centres (Table 1).

In August 2017, Meng Jianzhu, then Secretary of China’s Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, visited Xinjiang’s prisons and detention centres (Supreme Court, 2017). He emphasized that:

[Through] religious guidance, legal education, skills training, psychological interventions and multiple other methods, the effectiveness of transformation through education must be increased, thoroughly reforming them toward a healthy heart attitude...

In this context, a "healthy heart attitude" not only denotes a general attitude of submission to the state and its laws, but also a way of thinking that is aligned with core Socialist ideological tenets (and consequently largely irreligious).
The Costs and Features of Re-Education Facilities

The start of Chen Quanguo’s re-education initiative is indicated not only by public recruitment notices but also by related government procurement and construction bids (caigou xiangmu; 采购项目 and jianshe xiangmu; 建设项目). Local and regional governments increasingly advertise construction projects or equipment procurements through public or private bidding announcement websites. This research uses a conservative approach by largely restricting the analysed bid data set to procurements that specifically mention "transformation through education" or "legal system training". It includes a limited number of vocational training centre and correction centre bids in instances where these facilities appear to serve as loci of re-education and/or internment.

Only one re-education related bid was advertised prior to Chen Quanguo's ascent to power in Xinjiang in August 2016. Nearly all bids were announced from March 2017, just prior to the publication of the “de-extremification ordinance” and start of the re-education drive (Figure 2, based on Table 1). Likewise, the values attached to these bids were by far highest in the months immediately after the start of the re-education campaign (Figure 3). We can assume that only a fraction of re-education facility construction is reflected in these bids, since not all construction is done through public bidding and several re-education camps are converted existing facilities such as schools. Also, several bids did not specify a cost estimate. Even so, this data indicates a pattern consistent with re-education policy and implementation.
Figure 2. Source: Government procurement bids (Table 1).

Figure 3. Source: Government procurement bids (Table 1). Values for some projects were not available. For others, advertised values pertained to the construction of several different facilities. In the latter cases, values for re-education facilities were estimated.

Bid descriptions (all listed in Table 1) indicate both the construction of new as well as upgrades and enlargements of existing re-education related facilities. Some pertain to adding sanitary facilities, warm water supplies and heating or catering facilities,
indicating that existing buildings will be used to house more people for longer periods of time. Several of the listed facilities are very large, with total compound sizes in excess of 10,000sqm. One bid combines vocational training and re-education facilities over a total area of 82,000sqm. Another calls for a hospital and a supermarket within the same compound. A former detainee estimated that his re-education facility held nearly 6,000 detainees (RFERL, 2018). At a reported occupancy density of 1.5-2 detainees per sqm of dorm floor space, this would require a 3,000-4,000sqm dormitory, which is certainly realistic for the larger facilities (Twitter, 2018).

Many bids mandate the installation of comprehensive security features that turn existing facilities into prison-like compounds: surrounding walls, security fences, wire mesh, barbed wire, reinforced security doors and windows, surveillance systems, secure access systems, watchtowers, guard rooms, police stations or facilities for armed police forces (wujing; 武警). One re-education centre procurement bid called for "special doors and beds for prison cell use", emphasizing that this equipment must comply with criminal detention centre standards. Another bid noted that the surveillance system must comprehensively cover the entire facility, leaving "no blind spots" (wusijiao; 无死角). Evidently, these features are not merely designed to prevent unauthorized access to these compounds, as could be expected in a highly securitized environment. Rather, they are explicitly set up to keep internees securely detained.

In total, Table 1 lists 78 re-education facility related procurement and construction bids valued at approximately 755 million RMB in respect to their re-education components (some bids did not show cost estimates).² These documents provide solid evidence of

² In the latter instances, the value of re-education components was estimated.
facility construction at city/prefecture, county, township and village levels. Nearly all of these were for regions with significant Uyghur or other Muslim populations.

Due to the scale of re-education facility construction, local budget reports sometimes contain related information. Aqto (Aketao) County’s budget report shows that in 2017 it spent 383.4 million RMB or 9.6 percent of its entire annual budget on various security-related projects, including "transformation through education centres infrastructure construction and equipment purchase" (Aqto County Finance Bureau, 2018). Similarly, Chārchān (Qiemo) County’s reported budget activities list 105.1 million RMB spending on security-related investments, including the construction of three re-education centres (Qiemo County Finance Bureau, December 28, 2017). Chaqiliq (Ruoqiang) County adjusted its 2017 budget to provide an additional 6 million RMB spending on re-education (Ruoqiang County Government, January 29, 2018). All of these counties are located in regions with significant or majority Uyghur (or other Muslim) populations.

The Relationship Between Re-Education and Vocational or Other Types of "Training"

Further evidence of the unprecedented scale of Chen Quanguo’s re-education initiative comes from the link between re-education and vocational or other types of "training". For example, Xinjiang's 2017 mid-term budget report states that nearly 10 billion RMB was spent on various stability maintenance related items, including "centralized, closed-style education and training work" (jizhong fengbi jiaoyu peixun gongzuo; 集中封闭教育培训工作) (XUAR Finance Department, 2017). Overall, 1.47 million rural surplus labourers and 444,000 "persons of various types" (gelei renyuan; 各类人员) received vocational training. Similarly, Ili Prefecture's human resource and social security
department mandated a comprehensive vocational training scheme for rural surplus labourers (XUAR Department of Human Resources, 2017). Training topics were to include military drill, Chinese language, legal knowledge, ethnic unity education and patriotic education. Each facility was mandated to train "at least" 300 persons per year.

Several Uyghurs and others with direct links to Xinjiang told the author that re-education facilities are often disguised as vocational training centres, a practice also witnessed by reporters and in interviews with former detainees (e.g. Rajagopalan, 2017). This can be corroborated by information gleaned from government procurement and construction bids (all in Table 1).

For example, in September 2017, Qaramay City in northern Xinjiang commissioned a construction bid for a new "vocational skills education and training centre" (zhiye jineng jiaoyu peixun zhongxin; 职业技能教育培训中心). According to the bid description, this facility is designed to meet the city's critical security need to subject "key persons" to "transformation through education." In December 2017, Baghrash (Bohu) County in Bayingholin Prefecture issued a bid for various "stability maintenance" facilities, including a vocational training centre similarly specified to function as a "transformation through education base". The entire project, with a cost estimate of nearly 320 million RMB, was to include a police station, a detention centre and a special police base.

In July 2017, Qaraqash County (Khotän Prefecture) commissioned a large "educational training centre" (jiaoyu peixun zhongxin; 教育培训中心) that was to include multiple buildings, including a "transformation for education centre" and a massive 2,074sqm armed police forces facility. Similarly, a district in Ürümchi published a construction bid
for a 36,000sqm vocational training compound that was to include a surrounding wall, fences, a 500sqm police station, a surveillance and monitoring system, and "equipment for visiting family members". The latter is a video-based intercom system typically found in prisons. A vocational training centre bid for Yengisar (Yingjisha) County (Kashgar Prefecture), valued at 28 million RMB, was likewise to include a surrounding wall, a surveillance and monitoring system, equipment for visiting family members, and a police station. Satellite images of a combined re-education and a vocational training facility in Qaghiliq County show massive surrounding walls with watchtowers (details discussed below).

These security features corroborate informant reports that so-called vocational or other training facilities frequently function as well-secured internment camps. In some instances, they were retrospectively "hardened" for stronger internment capabilities, as with an October 2017 bid for the "centralized closed education and training centre" (jizhong fengbi jiaoyu peixun zhongxin; 集中封闭教育培训中心) in Nilqa County (Ili Prefecture) to add a security fence and a monitoring and surveillance system. There is probably a continuum of facilities, with some vocational training centres having a primary focus on vocational training and a secondary focus on political re-education, while others operate with a reverse focus and likely in a more internment-like fashion. Much evidence, however, points towards the latter.

Besides bids, public recruitment notices provide another key data source. From about May 2017 onwards, multiple counties with large Muslim populations initiated a wave of recruitments for so-called "education and training centres". Notably, this timing coincides with the onset of Chen Quanguo's re-education initiative. Often, job
descriptions and requirements of these "training centre" adverts fail to indicate any relationship with vocational skills training. Rather, numerous counties recruited "education and training centre" staff in the same advert as other police positions, potentially in line with the Ürümchi Party School research paper which states that re-education also takes place in police training centres. It is significant that these recruitment notices often did not call for relevant degrees, related knowledge or prior teaching expertise.

For example, Kucha (Kuche) County in Aksu Prefecture, where nearly the entire population is Uyghur, advertised 60 "education and training centre" staff positions in the same intake as its convenience police station recruitment advert (Kucha County Government, 2017). The advert preferred applicants with a background in the military or police, and prospective teachers did not need to possess specific degrees or documented skills. Qaghiliq County issued one of the few recruitment notices that appeared to actually pertain to a "vocational skills training centre" (zhiye jineng peixun zhongxin; 职业技能培训中心). However, the 200 prospective teaching staff only needed a middle school degree and demonstrated Chinese language skills, an interesting requirement given that re-education facilities typically implement Chinese language teaching (Yecheng County Government, 2017). Similarly, Maralbeshi (Bachu) County in Kashgar, where Uyghurs make up 95 percent of the population, also advertised 320 "training centre" positions where all applicants must be Han and the minimum educational requirement was a middle school degree. Rather than stipulating even a trace of either academic or practical skills, applicant requirements centred squarely on political loyalty (Bachu County Government, February 26, 2017). In no other part of China would genuine vocational teaching staff get hired based on such low educational
requirements and narrow skills sets. Indeed, Aqsu Prefecture's regular public service intake advertised much smaller numbers of teaching positions for a "vocational skills school" (*zhiye jishu xuexiao*; 职业技术学校), with an apparent focus on actual vocational skills training, that required at least a bachelor's degree in relevant subjects, for example software engineering or videography (Aksu Government, July 28, 2017).

In December 2017, Qitai County in Changji Prefecture, with a Muslim population of 26 percent, published a procurement bid for 260 special police unit outfits for its "public security bureau vocational skills training centre security staff", spending 431,860 RMB (Table 1). If this were just a regular vocational skills training facility, the recruitment of such high numbers of dedicated security personnel with expensive special police outfits would be difficult to explain.

The actual operations of each vocational or other training facility evidently need to be examined on an individual basis. However, the available evidence is sufficient to establish clear links between the region's large-scale vocational training initiative, the re-education drive, and the widely observed phenomenon that large numbers of the adult Muslim population are being disappeared to receive "training" in various clandestine forms of internment.

**Verification Through Satellite Images**

Drawing on the work of Shawn Zhang, the author was able to verify the location and construction time frames of a number of re-education facilities in accordance with the information provided by construction bids. Of particular interest here is the ability to compare construction timings and floor sizes in order to provide additional verification.
For example, satellite images show the Konashähär County legal system transformation through education school next to a detention center, as specified in the construction bid dated April 26, 2017 (Table 1). While satellite images from March 7 show only green fields, those dated May 27 already show the first three buildings under construction. Images from December 1 indicate that all buildings, wire fences, surrounding walls and watchtowers are finished. Since Google Earth permits a fairly precise measurement of distances, the total floor size of all major buildings could be calculated at approximately 26,200sqm. Together with a few smaller buildings, this essentially adds up to the 26,855sqm specified in the bid.

Another example is the Qaghiliq County legal system transformation through education and vocational training school. The bid issued in August 2017 called for the construction of a combined total of 82,000sqm floor space (Table 1). Satellite images from June 8, 2017 of the specified location (Kuqi Village) show a large empty space next to the existing detention facility. Images from October 2017 show that construction was mostly completed, and images from April 2018 display the finished complex along with surrounding walls and watchtowers. From the images we can estimate the total floor space of the eight large buildings at about 69,000sqm. Together with several smaller buildings located on the compound, this estimate comes close to the bid specification. As with the facility in Konashähär, the watchtowers have a square design and colorful roofs, distinct from the round towers found in the respective neighboring detention centres.

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3 Location: 39°21'35.07"N, 75°51'50.05"E.
4 Location: 37°55'00.40"N, 77°21'05.30"E.
Influencing Popular Perceptions of Re-Education

In February 2018, Zhang Chunlin, Xinjiang Party Standing Committee member and head of the Development and Reform Committee, visited Yäkän (Shache) County in Kashgar Prefecture (XUAR Development and Reform Committee, February 26). During this visit, university student Abdullah A. was asked about his feelings regarding his family members who had been detained for "transformation through education". Abdullah is cited as saying:

This is a measure taken by the party and the government to cure illness and save people. It is to save my family from being punished under the law. I fully understand and hope that they will be corrected as soon as possible, and be persons who will benefit society. (XUAR Development and Reform Committee, February 26)

These types of reports are intended to make the population more understanding of extensive re-education measures. Related efforts apparently started immediately after the massive re-education campaign began. In April 2017, the Khotän Prefecture government published a bilingual Chinese-Uyghur document titled "Transformation through education classes are like a free hospital treatment for the masses with sick thinking" (2017). The document begins by stating that:

In the recent period...a small number of...especially young people have been sent to transformation through education classes to receive study; many parents, relatives and the general population
do not understand transformation through education classes and may have some misgivings.

The document then promises to dispel these misgivings by extolling the benefits of "transformation through education" as a free "treatment", effectively equating religiosity with a dangerous drug addiction. According to this logic, replacing religious beliefs with "correct" state ideology through re-education is akin to a detoxification process that is freely provided by a benevolent state. In other contexts, the state equates the battle against religious "extremism" with "eradicating the tumours" (Dooley, 2018)

These medical analogies explain why the state feels no need to implement proper legal procedures for re-education, instead simply mandating arbitrarily high extra-judicial internment quotas (RFA, 2018c). Since re-education is presented as a "cure" for an "addiction", it cannot have harmful effects and must be applied indiscriminately. One Han Chinese official explained this approach in blunt words:

...you can’t uproot all the weeds hidden among the crops...—you need to spray chemicals to kill them all ... re-educating these people is like spraying chemicals on the crops. That is why it is a general re-education, not limited to a few people. (RFA, 2018a)

**Estimating Re-Education Detainee Numbers**

Unfortunately, there is no official information available on numbers of re-education detainees. A Uyghur exile media organization based in Istanbul published a table of re-education detainee figures for 69 counties in Xinjiang, reportedly leaked from a reliable
source within the region’s public security agencies (Mizutani, 2018). According to this source, the 27 counties in Khotān, Kashgar and Aqsu prefectures, with a combined Uyghur, Kazakh and Kyrgyz population share of 90.2 percent, had 693,273 detainees in mid-February 2018. This would represent 12.3 percent of their Muslim population aged 20-79 (of 4.45 million).

A RFA report cites the head of security at a township in Kashgar City as estimating the total number of detainees in Kashgar City at about 32,000, which would constitute 10.4 percent of its Uyghur and Kazakh population aged 20-79 (RFA, 2018b). Similarly, another report cites local officials in Ghulja County as saying that their officially mandated adult internment rate was 10 percent (RFA, 2018c).

The leaked document placed the total number of detainees in 68 Xinjiang counties, excluding regional and prefecture-level cities as well as the administrative units of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), at about 892,000 for spring 2018 (Mizutani, 2018). When assuming a Muslim adult internment rate of 10 percent for cities with a majority Muslim population share and of 5 percent for cities where this population share is below 50 percent, Xinjiang’s total re-education internment figure may be estimated at just over one million (approx. 1,060,000). This would suggest an overall internment rate of Uyghurs and Kazakhs (aged 20-79) of up to 11.5 percent (12.3 percent for Aqsu, Khotān and Kashgar, and 10.2 percent for other regions). The accuracy

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5 This and other calculations in this paragraph are based on 5-year age cohort population data from the China 2010 census by county (National Bureau of Statistics of China, Table 2). The 5-year cohort format explains why the chosen age range does not start at 18 but at 20 years. The combined 20-79 year age cohort shares of the entire population from the census data were multiplied with 2015 Xinjiang county and prefecture population data, and again multiplied by the combined Uyghur and Kazakh population shares (sources: Xinjiang Bureau of Statistics, 2016, Tables 3-7). The report shows potentially unrealistically high detention share for a few counties, which may result from the major population shifts triggered by Chen Quanguo’s ethnic economic policies in late 2016 and early 2017. Alternatively, they may indicate inaccuracies in the report.

(c) Adrian Zenz (Sept 6, 2018)
of this estimate is of course predicated upon the supposed validity of the stated sources. Additional confirmation comes from numerous anecdotal accounts from majority Uyghur regions which indicate that adult internment shares frequently range between 10 and 20 percent, which is also consistent with the "problem population" ratios stated by the Khotân official (cited above). According to multiple reports, re-education centres are extremely crowded (RFA, 2017). While there is no certainty, it is reasonable to speculate that the total number of detainees might range anywhere between several hundred thousand and just over one million.

According to government sources, China’s former re-education through labour system operated about 350 facilities with 160,000 detainees in 2008 (Wang, 2012). By comparison, Xinjiang has 119 city-level, prefectural and county-level administrative units, along with 1,079 township-level administrative units and over 11,000 village-level administrative units. Public bid documents indicate re-education facility construction at all levels. Even if the three-tier re-education facility system was only implemented at county and township levels, the region’s re-education network would count around 1,200 facilities. Each facility would on average host 250 to 880 internees (depending on total internment estimates). This is broadly in line with the Ürümchi Party School research paper’s suggestions, government bid data and informant reports. It is therefore possible that Xinjiang’s present re-education system exceeds the size and capacity of the entire former Chinese re-education through labour system.
The Socio-Economic Impact of the Re-Education Campaign

The social ramifications of re-education are pervasive. On a private legal counselling website one netizen asked whether one can divorce a detained spouse (Hualv.com, April 16). The person pointed out that her husband has been in re-education for over one year now, evidently citing this long time period as grounds for divorce. The post was dated April 16, 2018, just over a year after the massive re-education campaign started, providing additional evidence regarding the timing of the inception of this campaign. In another instance, a Uyghur child posted on a similar legal advice website that his or her mother was detained after following the Muslim custom of washing the body of a deceased person (9ask.com, March 12).

The extrajudicial nature of re-education also means that it can be deployed as an increasingly effective and widespread threat. An informant stated that minorities who complain to their work superiors about working conditions are threatened with re-education. Similarly, an assistant policeman from Qizilsu, a Kyrgyz minority region with a significant Uyghur population share, posted on a legal advice website that he wants to resign, but that his superior is threatening him with being sent to a re-education camp should he do so (china.findlaw.cn, February 3, 2018). These incidents exemplify how the extrajudicial nature of re-education can turn the system into a major source of abuse. The fact such threats typically target minorities rather than Han renders this especially problematic.
Conclusions

The comprehensive evidence presented in this article shows how Xinjiang authorities adopted the transformation through education concept and are now indiscriminately subjecting large swaths of the Muslim population to extensive extrajudicial indoctrination procedures.

China’s re-education drive in Xinjiang is arguably the country’s most intense campaign of coercive social re-engineering since the Cultural Revolution. It represents the epitome of China’s securitization approach in its restive western minority regions. With Xinjiang as the "core hub" of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing appears determined to pursue a definitive solution to the Uyghur question.

While the region’s securitization drive reduced the number of officially reported violent incidents in 2017 to nearly zero, mere behavioural compliance is not sufficient. Communist regimes have long considered political re-education as a core instrument for achieving lasting social control through "thought reform", ultimately resulting in an imagined "New Socialist Man" (Chen, 1969). In this sense, the lessons learned from Xinjiang’s re-education drive could become important for China's battle for the hearts and minds of the next generation. One potential way forward would be to prescribe different forms of re-education treatments for individuals with low scores in the upcoming nationwide social credit system (Roberts, 2018). Aided by high-tech surveillance, such new forms of re-education could be much sleeker and more sophisticated than the blunt instrument Beijing is currently using among the Uyghurs. Just as Xinjiang has become China’s testing ground for cutting-edge surveillance
technology, the state may use the experiences gathered from re-educating this large Muslim minority group for its social reengineering efforts across the nation.

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Table 1: List of Government Bids Related to Re-Education Facilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region (date)</th>
<th>Bid title</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cost estimate</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lopnur (Yuli) County, Bayingholin (April 7, 2016)</td>
<td>Construction of de-extremification transformation through education base (去极端化教育转化基地)</td>
<td>Teaching room, dining hall, guard room, generator room (498sqm)</td>
<td>2.5 million</td>
<td><a href="http://www.bidchance.com/info.do?channel=calgg&amp;id=14020371">http://www.bidchance.com/info.do?channel=calgg&amp;id=14020371</a></td>
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<td>Alternative URL: <a href="http://archive.is/cbc1d">http://archive.is/cbc1d</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kalpin (Keping) County, Aqsu Prefecture (September 30, 2016)</td>
<td>Legal system school (法制学校)</td>
<td>Canteen and guard or duty room (228sqm), surrounding wall</td>
<td>0.81 million</td>
<td><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180617184624/http://www.bidcenter.com.cn/newscontent-31302329-1.html">https://web.archive.org/web/20180617184624/http://www.bidcenter.com.cn/newscontent-31302329-1.html</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ulughchat (Wuqia) County, Qizilsu Prefecture (November 14, 2016)</td>
<td>Construction of transformation through education center (教育转化中心)</td>
<td>Office, video surveillance control room, multi-media room, police supervision office, dormitory, dining hall (1,836sqm)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180617184625/http://www.cmccard.com/bid/a50349a0671133591a4e43af1535f81.html">https://web.archive.org/web/20180617184625/http://www.cmccard.com/bid/a50349a0671133591a4e43af1535f81.html</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Qaghiliq (Yecheng) County, Kashgar Prefecture (December 23, 2016)</td>
<td>Transformation through education class facility (教育转化班)</td>
<td>Renovate and expand facility: office, teacher room, dormitory, canteen, toilets (1,500sqm). Install security fence, surrounding wall (120m, enclosed area 2,000sqm), guard facilities</td>
<td>0.19 million</td>
<td><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180617184624/http://www.bidcenter.com.cn/newsyj-33730567-3.html">https://web.archive.org/web/20180617184624/http://www.bidcenter.com.cn/newsyj-33730567-3.html</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ulughchat (Wuqia) County, Qizilsu Prefecture (March 9, 2017)</td>
<td>Legal system transformation through education center (司法局教育转化培训中心)</td>
<td>Police equipment (警用装备, first installment), security doors, hand-held security inspection devices, access verification system, access control device with access card</td>
<td>0.15 million and 0.14 million</td>
<td><a href="http://www.bidchance.com/info.do?channel=calgg&amp;id=18802752">http://www.bidchance.com/info.do?channel=calgg&amp;id=18802752</a></td>
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<td>Location</td>
<td>Project Description</td>
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<td>Source</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bayingholin Hejing County, 9, 2017</td>
<td>Legal system transformation through education center (司法局教育培训转化中心)</td>
<td>0.024 million</td>
<td>[website](<a href="https://www.baidu.com/link?url=qkyuYrcdm-S">https://www.baidu.com/link?url=qkyuYrcdm-S</a> hyzPu_Va2zT7q2P3dwoQ4Z4Gix3yUw90_zo8v-8eN- JW3o5v6d5GQA1doJl02xf bnC3ph2s7&amp;wd=&amp;eqid=b3d8a7f001821c0000000065a40378)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qaghiliq (Yecheng) County, Kashgar Prefecture (March 24, 2017)</td>
<td>Video surveillance equipment for transformation through education center (教育转化中心)</td>
<td>2.77 million</td>
<td><a href="http://www.xjyc.gov.cn/html/lz/DC41HHI508A9B04A.html">website</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Yengisar (Yingjisha) County, Kashgar Prefecture (April 14, 2017)</td>
<td>Legal system transformation through education and training center (法制教育转化培训中心), 1st and 2nd phase</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td><a href="http://www.qianlima.cn/zb/detial/20170417_54433234.html">website</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Yengisar (Yingjisha) County, Kashgar Prefecture (April 17, 2017)</td>
<td>Legal system transformation through education and training center (法制教育转化培训中心), 4th phase</td>
<td>8 million</td>
<td><a href="http://www.qianlima.cn/zb/detial/20170417_54433234.html">website</a></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>XPCX Third Division, Section 51, Kashgar Prefecture (May 3, 2017)</td>
<td>Legal system education and training center (法制教育培训中心)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>[website](<a href="https://web.archive.org/w">https://web.archive.org/w</a> eb/20180617184622/<a href="http://www.okcis.cn/newscontent-369682731.html">http://www.okcis.cn/newscontent-369682731.html</a>)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Keriýä (Yutian) County, Khotän Prefecture (May 9, 2017)</td>
<td>Transformation through education center (教育转化中心)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180906128011/http://www.okcis.cn/20170502191357530414.html">website</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hejíng County, Bayingholin</td>
<td>Transformation through education</td>
<td>1.7 million</td>
<td><a href="http://www.bidchance.com/info.do?channel=calggk">website</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(May 15, 2017)</td>
<td>training center (教育转化培训中心)</td>
<td>Legal system transformation through education school (法制教育转化学校)</td>
<td>School construction, including dormitory, dining hall, classrooms, guard room (22,000sqm)</td>
<td>77 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yopurgha (Yuepuhu) County, Kashgar Prefecture (May 23, 2017)</td>
<td>Legal system transformation through education school (法制教育转化学校)</td>
<td>School construction, including dormitory, dining hall, classrooms, guard room (22,000sqm)</td>
<td>7.25 million</td>
<td>n/a (likely construction or expansion of existing facility)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Päyzawat (Jiashi) County, Kashgar Prefecture (June 12, 2017)</td>
<td>Legal system transformation through education center (法制培训教育转化中心)</td>
<td>Video surveillance system</td>
<td>11.3 million</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wusu City, Tacheng Prefecture (June 9-12, 2017)</td>
<td>Centralized closed education training center (集中封闭教育培训中心)</td>
<td>Dining hall, electrical equipment, beds, office furniture (several bids)</td>
<td>8 million</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xinjiang Construction Corps, 4th division, 68th regiment (June 19, 2017)</td>
<td>Transformation through education training center (教育转化培训中心)</td>
<td>Video surveillance system</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maralbeshi (Bachu) County, Kashgar Prefecture (June 19, 2017)</td>
<td>Legal system training school (法制培训学校) no.1</td>
<td>School construction (4,404sqm)</td>
<td>11.3 million</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maralbeshi (Bachu) County, Kashgar Prefecture (June 19, 2017)</td>
<td>Legal system training school (法制培训学校) no.2</td>
<td>Renovate, expand and build a police building, two prison buildings, a study building, armed police living quarters, a hospital, a meeting room, a detention room and a supermarket (10,533sqm)</td>
<td>8 million</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maralbeshi (Bachu) County, Kashgar Prefecture (June 19, 2017)</td>
<td>Legal system training school (法制培训学校) no.2</td>
<td>Two police officer buildings, four prison buildings, two armed police quarters, two teaching blocks (total: 20,267sqm), including support facilities and equipment.</td>
<td>17 million</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maralbeshi (Bachu) County, Kashgar Prefecture (June 2017)</td>
<td>Legal system training school (法制培训学校) no.2</td>
<td>Renovate 2,990m of draining and heating pipes, renovate guard room, meeting room, bathroom (310sqm), four watchtowers,</td>
<td>4.5 million</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location Description</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Cost</td>
<td>Source</td>
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<tr>
<td>21, 2017</td>
<td>Changji City, Changji Prefecture (June 21, 2017)</td>
<td>Transformation through education training center (教育转化培训中心)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td><a href="https://www.chinabidding.cn/zbgg/CU2k15.html">https://www.chinabidding.cn/zbgg/CU2k15.html</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yengisar (Yingjisha) County, Kashgar Prefecture (July)</td>
<td>Convert former office building into transformation for education center (教育转化培训中心)</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td><a href="http://www.qianlima.com/zb/detail/20170703_59880936.html">http://www.qianlima.com/zb/detail/20170703_59880936.html</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Cost</td>
<td>Source</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug 15, 2017</td>
<td>Prefecture County, Kashgar</td>
<td>Construction of new 3-floor teaching building (2,393 sqm) and 5-floor dormitory (7670 sqm). The government construction work report states that new security features were added to the facility, including a police station and steel-reinforced concrete walls.</td>
<td>40 million</td>
<td><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180617184617/http://www.bidchance.com/info-gonggao-21000457.html">web archive</a> and <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180617184618/http://www.xjws.gov.cn/publicity_wsszfhsjj/ywgg/2827">web archive</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 13, 2017</td>
<td>Keriyä (Yutian) County, Khotan</td>
<td>County transformation through education center (县教育转化中心)</td>
<td>0.49 million</td>
<td><a href="http://zfqz.xjcz.gov.cn/mos/cms/html/108/1046/201707/302555.html">web archive</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 15, 2017</td>
<td>Qaghililq (Yecheng) County, Kashgar Prefecture</td>
<td>Legal system transformation through education school (法制教育转化学校) construction - Phase II</td>
<td>10 million</td>
<td>bidchance.com</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 15, 2017</td>
<td>Qaghililq (Yecheng) County, Kashgar Prefecture</td>
<td>Legal system transformation through education school and vocational training</td>
<td>1.7 million (design only, plus 0.15 million for support)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.bidcenter.com.cn/newscontent-40309497.html">web archive</a> and <a href="http://www.bidchance.com/info.do?channel=calgg&amp;id=21887805">web archive</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
---|---|---|---
Guma (Pishan) County, Khotän Prefecture (August 22, 2017) | Legal system transformation through education base (司法局教育转化基地) | Surveillance system (as part of PPP project) | 336 million (city-wide comprehensive surveillance system) |
Maralbeshi (Bachu) County, Kashgar Prefecture (August 30, 2017) | Legal system transformation through education school (法制教育转化学校) | Construction of the general building (4 levels) and an office building (5 levels), combined 16,319sqm | 40 million |
Maralbeshi (Bachu) County, Kashgar Prefecture (August 31, 2017) | Legal system transformation through education school (法制教育转化学校) in the "old police office" (老公安局) | Two dormitory buildings, one school building, armed police station (9,250sqm), surrounding wall (820m length), dining hall (500sqm), change doors and windows, install security fence, hot water facilities | 7.5 million |
Qobuqsar (Hebuksaier) County, Tacheng Prefecture (September 6, 2017) | Transformation through education and training center (教育转化培训中心) | Construct new facility with 262sqm | 0.82 million |
Qobuqsar (Hebuksaier) County, Tacheng Prefecture (September 6, 2017) | Vocational skills training base (职业技能培训基地) | Video surveillance system and sound broadcasting system | n/a |
Sawan (Shawan) County, Tacheng Prefecture (September 11, 2017) | Public Security Bureau | Integrated Information Collection Platform (一体化信息采集工作台) that can (among other things) monitor the information collection situation on those detained or in re-education as part of the "strike hard campaign" (严打收押人员及教育转化人员) | 0.13 million |
Maralbeshi (Bachu) County, Kashgar Prefecture (September 12, 2017) | Legal system transformation through education school (法制教育转化学校) of the county prison (巴楚监狱) | Installation of 180m of 10kV high voltage lines, 3,306m of low voltage cables, intelligent circuit breakers, etc. | 4 million |
Aqto (Aketao) County, Qizilsu Prefecture (September 13, 2017) | Transformation through education center (教育转化中心) - 2nd phase | Construction of second floor based on a concrete structure | 3.7 million |
Khotän City, Khotän Prefecture (September 19, 2017) | Smartphone device procurement for Khotan "transformation through education centers" (教育转化中心) | 900 smartphone devices for persons in re-education to communicate with their outside relatives and friends | 0.8 million |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>Cost (millions)</th>
<th>URL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qaramay City (September 26, 2017)</td>
<td>Vocational skills education and training center (职业技能教育培训中心)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>[web.archive.org](<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180617184611/http://www.bidchance.com/inf">https://web.archive.org/web/20180617184611/http://www.bidchance.com/inf</a> o.do?channel=calgg&amp;id=22809944)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorbilijn (Emin County, Tacheng Prefecture (September 28, 2017)</td>
<td>Transformation through education base (教育转化基地)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>[web.archive.org](<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180617184611/http://www.bidchance.com/inf">https://web.archive.org/web/20180617184611/http://www.bidchance.com/inf</a> o.do?channel=calgg&amp;id=22897388)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yengishahār (Shule) County, Kashgar Prefecture (October 11, 2017)</td>
<td>Legal system transformation through education school(法制教育转化学校)</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>[web.archive.org](<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180617184611/http://www.bidchance.com/inf">https://web.archive.org/web/20180617184611/http://www.bidchance.com/inf</a> o.do?channel=calgg&amp;id=22181924)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashgar City (October 17, 2017)</td>
<td>City transformation for education work group office (市教育转化工作领导小组办公室)</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>[web.archive.org](<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180617184611/http://www.bidchance.com/inf">https://web.archive.org/web/20180617184611/http://www.bidchance.com/inf</a> o.do?channel=calgg&amp;id=2327135950)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bagrash (Bohu) County, Bayingholin Prefecture (December 12, 2017)</td>
<td>&quot;Stability maintenance&quot; facilities, including a vocational training center (职业技能培训中心) that functions as...</td>
<td>318.5</td>
<td>[web.archive.org](<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180617184611/http://www.bidchance.com/inf">https://web.archive.org/web/20180617184611/http://www.bidchance.com/inf</a> o.do?channel=calgg&amp;id=22897388)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Area</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Facilities</td>
</tr>
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<td>---------</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Chärchän (Qiqiu) County, Bayingolin Prefecture (December 12, 2017)</td>
<td>Township stability maintenance facilities, including a transformation through education training base (教育培训转化及矫治中心)</td>
<td>Facility size 6,100sqm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Qitai County, Changji Prefecture (December 22, 2017)</td>
<td>Vocational skills education and training center (职业技能教育培训中心)</td>
<td>260 sets of special police (特警) uniforms, shoes, caps etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Chapal (Chabucha'er) County, Ili Prefecture (February 7, 2018)</td>
<td>Transformation through education and correction center (教育转化及矫治中心)</td>
<td>Monitoring system, reinforcement of doors and windows, wire mesh, fences, renovation of electricity and water system, canteen renovation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Chaqiliq (Ruqiang) County, Bayingolin Prefecture (January 11, 2018)</td>
<td>Correction and rehabilitation center (矫治康复中心)</td>
<td>Surveillance and monitoring system with 122 cameras to cover the entire facility, leaving &quot;no dead angles&quot; (无死角), plus voice IP communication to the dormitory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Altay City (March 13, 2018)</td>
<td>Vocational skills education and training center (职业技能教育培训中心)</td>
<td>Facility construction, including a convenience police station</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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By Adrian Zenz - Version of this paper accepted for publication by the journal Central Asian Survey

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| station (便民警务站) for skills training center (技能培训中心) | //www.xj.ceigov.cn/info/10856/368774.htm |