AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H.R. 3524
OFFERED BY MR. MEEKS OF NEW YORK

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the “Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement Act” or the “EAGLE Act”.

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Findings.
Sec. 4. Statement of policy.
Sec. 5. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 6. Rules of construction.

TITLE I—INVESTING IN AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS

Subtitle A—Science and Technology

Sec. 101. Authorization to assist United States companies with global supply chain diversification and management.

Subtitle B—Global Infrastructure and Energy Development

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Sec. 121. Findings on regional economic order.
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SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—Unless otherwise defined, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(2) CCP.—The term “CCP” means the Chinese Communist Party.

(3) PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY; PLA.—The terms “People’s Liberation Army” and “PLA” mean the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China.

(4) PRC; CHINA.—The terms “PRC” and “China” mean the People’s Republic of China.

SEC. 3. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is leveraging its political, diplomatic, economic, military, technological, and ideological power to become a strategic, near-peer, global competitor of the United States. The policies increasingly pursued by the PRC in these domains are contrary to the interests and values of the United States, its partners, and much of the rest of the world.
(2) A number of policies being pursued by the PRC—

(A) threaten the future character of the international order and are shaping the rules, norms, and institutions that govern relations among states;

(B) will put at risk the ability of the United States to secure its national interests; and

(C) will put at risk the future peace, prosperity, and freedom of the international community in the coming decades.

(3) After normalizing diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1979, the United States actively worked to advance the PRC’s economic and social development to ensure that it participated in, and benefited from, the free and open international order. The United States pursued these goals and contributed to the welfare of the Chinese people by—

(A) increasing the PRC’s trade relations and access to global capital markets;

(B) promoting the PRC’s accession to the World Trade Organization;

(C) providing development finance and technical assistance;
(D) promoting research collaboration;

(E) educating the PRC’s top students;

(F) permitting transfers of cutting-edge technologies and scientific knowledge; and

(G) providing intelligence and military assistance.

(4) It is now clear that the PRC has chosen to pursue state-led, mercantilist economic policies, an increasingly authoritarian governance model at home through increased restrictions on personal freedoms, and an aggressive and assertive foreign policy. These policies frequently and deliberately undermine United States interests and are contrary to core United States values and the values of other nations, both in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In response to this strategic decision of the CCP, the United States has been compelled to reexamine and revise its strategy towards the PRC and reanimate its defense of the international order.

(5) The General Secretary of the CCP and the Chairman of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping, has elevated the “Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” as central to the domestic and foreign policy of the PRC. His program demands—

(A) strong, centralized CCP leadership;
(B) concentration of military power;

(C) a dominant role for the CCP in the state and the economy;

(D) an aggressive foreign policy seeking control over broadly asserted territorial claims;

and

(E) the denial of any universal values and individual rights that are deemed to threaten the CCP.

(6) The PRC views its Leninist model of governance as superior to, and at odds with, the constitutional models of the United States and other democracies. This approach to governance is lauded by the CCP as essential to securing the PRC’s status as a global leader, and to shaping the future of the world. In a 2013 speech, General Secretary Xi said, “We firmly believe that as socialism with Chinese characteristics develops further . . . it is . . . inevitable that the superiority of our socialist system will be increasingly apparent . . . [and] our country’s road of development will have increasingly greater influence on the world.”

(7) The PRC’s objectives are to first establish regional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and then to use that dominant position to propel the PRC to be-
come the “leading world power”, shaping an inter-
national order that is conducive to the its interests.
Achieving these objectives requires turning the PRC
into a wealthy nation under strict CCP rule by using
a strong military and advanced technological capa-
bility to pursue the PRC’s objectives, regardless of
other countries’ interests.

(8) The PRC is reshaping the current inter-
national order, which is built upon the rule of law
and free and open ideals and principles, by con-
ducting global information and influence operations,
seeking to redefine international laws and norms to
align with the objectives of the CCP, rejecting the
legitimacy of internationally recognized human
rights, and seeking to co-opt the leadership and
agenda of multinational organizations for the benefit
of the PRC and other authoritarian regimes at the
expense of the interests of the United States and the
international community.

(9) The PRC is encouraging other countries to
follow its model of development and governance.
During the 19th Party Congress in 2017, General
Secretary Xi said that the PRC could serve as a
model of development for other countries by utilizing
“Chinese wisdom” and a “Chinese approach to solving problems”.

(10) The PRC is promoting its governance model and attempting to weaken other models of governance by—

(A) undermining democratic institutions;
(B) subverting financial institutions;
(C) coercing businesses to accommodate the policies of the PRC; and
(D) using disinformation to disguise the nature of the actions described in subparagraphs (A) through (C).

(11) The PRC is progressing toward becoming the global leader in science and technology. In May 2018, General Secretary Xi said that for the PRC to reach “prosperity and rejuvenation”, it needs to “endeavor to be a major world center for science and innovation”. The PRC has invested the equivalent of billions of dollars into education and research and development and established joint scientific research centers and science universities.

(12) The PRC’s drive to become a “manufacturing and technological superpower” and to promote “innovation with Chinese characteristics” is coming at the expense of human rights and long-
standing international rules and norms with respect to economic competition, and presents a challenge to United States national security and the security of allies and like-minded countries. In particular, the PRC advances its illiberal political and social policies through mass surveillance, social credit systems, and a significant role of the state in internet governance. Through these means, the PRC increases direct and indirect government control over its citizens’ everyday lives. Its national strategy of “civil-military fusion” mandates that civil and commercial research, which increasingly drives global innovation, is leveraged to develop new military capabilities.

(13) The PRC is using legal and illegal means to achieve its objective of becoming a manufacturing and technological superpower. The PRC uses state-directed industrial policies in anticompetitive ways to ensure the dominance of PRC companies. The CCP engages in and encourages actions that actively undermine a free and open international market, such as intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers, regulatory and financial subsidies, and mandatory CCP access to proprietary data as part of business and commercial agreements between Chinese and foreign companies.
(14) The policies referred to in paragraph (13) are designed to freeze United States and other foreign firms out of the PRC market, while eroding competition in other important markets. The heavy subsidization of Chinese companies includes potential violation of its World Trade Organization commitments. In May 2018, General Secretary Xi said that the PRC aims to keep the “initiatives of innovation and development security . . . in [China’s] own hands”.

(15) The PRC is advancing its global objectives through a variety of avenues, including its signature initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (referred to in this section as “BRI”), which is enshrined in the Chinese Constitution and includes the Digital Silk Road and Health Silk Road. The PRC describes BRI as a straightforward and wholly beneficial plan for all countries. Eventually, it seeks to create a web of economic relations with the PRC at its center, making it the most concrete geographical representation of the PRC’s global ambitions. BRI increases the economic influence of state-owned PRC firms in global markets, enhances the PRC’s political leverage with government leaders around the world, and provides greater access to strategic nodes such as
ports and railways. Through BRI, the PRC seeks political deference through economic dependence.

(16) The PRC is executing a plan to establish regional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and displace the United States from the region. As a Pacific power, the United States has built and supported enduring alliances and economic partnerships that secure peace and prosperity and promote the rule of law and political pluralism in a free and open Indo-Pacific. In contrast, the PRC uses economic and military coercion in the region to secure its own interests.

(17) The PRC’s military strategy seeks to keep the United States military from operating in the Western Pacific and erodes United States security guarantees.

(18) The PRC is aggressively pursuing exclusive control of critical land routes, sea lanes, and air space in the Indo-Pacific in the hopes of eventually exercising greater influence beyond the region. This includes lanes crucial to commercial activity, energy exploration, transport, and the exercise of security operations in areas permitted under international law.
(19) The PRC seeks so-called “reunification” with Taiwan through whatever means may ultimately be required. The CCP’s insistence that so-called “reunification” is Taiwan’s only option makes this goal inherently coercive. In January 2019, General Secretary Xi stated that the PRC “make[s] no promise to renounce the use of force and reserve[s] the option of taking all necessary means”. Taiwan’s embodiment of democratic values and economic liberalism challenges General Secretary Xi’s goal of achieving national rejuvenation. The PRC plans to exploit Taiwan’s dominant strategic position in the First Island Chain and to project power into the Second Island Chain and beyond.

(20) In the South China Sea, the PRC has executed an illegal island-building campaign that threatens freedom of navigation and the free-flow of commerce, damages the environment, bolsters the PLA power projection capabilities, and coerces and intimidates other regional claimants in an effort to advance its unlawful claims and control the waters around neighboring countries. Despite General Secretary Xi’s September 2015 speech, in which he said the PRC was not militarizing the South China Sea, during the 2017 19th Party Congress, General Sec-
retary Xi announced that “construction on islands
and reefs in the South China Sea have seen steady
progress”.

(21) The PRC is rapidly modernizing the PLA
to attain a level of capacity and capability superior
to the United States in terms of equipment and con-
duct of modern military operations by shifting its
military doctrine from having a force “adequate
[for] China’s defensive needs” to having a force
“commensurate with China’s international status”.
Ultimately, this transformation could enable China
to impose its will in the Indo-Pacific region through
the threat of military force. In 2017, General Sec-
retary Xi established the following developmental
benchmarks for the advancement of the PLA:

(A) A mechanized force with increased
informatized and strategic capabilities by 2020.
(B) The complete modernization of China’s
national defense by 2035.
(C) The full transformation of the PLA
into a world-class force by 2050.

(22) The PRC’s strategy and supporting poli-
cies described in this section undermine United
States interests, such as—
(A) upholding a free and open international order;

(B) maintaining the integrity of international institutions with liberal norms and values;

(C) preserving a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific;

(D) ensuring the defense of its allies;

(E) preserving open sea and air lanes;

(F) fostering the free flow of commerce through open and transparent markets; and

(G) promoting individual freedom and human rights.

(23) The global COVID–19 pandemic has intensified and accelerated these trends in the PRC’s behavior and therefore increased the need for United States global leadership and a competitive posture. The PRC has capitalized on the world’s focus on the COVID–19 pandemic by—

(A) moving rapidly to undermine Hong Kong’s autonomy, including imposing a so-called “national security law” on Hong Kong;

(B) aggressively imposing its will in the East and South China Seas;
(C) increasing its territorial aggression in South Asia, including against India; and

(D) engaging in a widespread and government-directed disinformation campaign to obscure the PRC Government’s efforts to cover up the seriousness of COVID–19, sow confusion about the origination of the outbreak, and discredit the United States, its allies, and global health efforts.

(24) The CCP’s disinformation campaign referred to in paragraph (24)(D) has included—

(A) concerted efforts, in the early days of the pandemic, to downplay the nature and scope of the outbreak in Wuhan in the PRC, as well as cases of person-to-person transmission;

(B) claims that the virus originated in United States biological defense research at Fort Detrick, Maryland;

(C) Chinese state media reports insinuating a possible link between the virus and other United States biological facilities; and

(D) efforts to block access to qualified international infectious disease experts who might contradict the CCP’s narrative.
(25) In response to the PRC’s strategy and policies, the United States must adopt a policy of strategic competition with the PRC to protect and promote our vital interests and values.

(26) The United States policy of strategic competition with respect to the People’s Republic of China is part of a broader strategic approach to the Indo-Pacific and the world that aligns with cooperation with United States allies and partners to advance shared values and interests and to preserve and enhance a free, open, democratic, inclusive, rules-based, stable, and diverse region.

(27) The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409) contributed to a comprehensive framework for promoting United States security interests, economic interests, and values in the Indo-Pacific region, investing $7,500,000,000 over 5 years—

(A) to support greater security and defense cooperation between the United States and allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region;

(B) to advance democracy and the protection and promotion of human rights in the Indo-Pacific region;
(C) to enhance cybersecurity cooperation between the United States and partners in the Indo-Pacific;

(D) to deepen people-to-people engagement through programs such as the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative and the ASEAN Youth Volunteers program; and

(E) to enhance energy cooperation and energy security in the Indo-Pacific region.

SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

(a) OBJECTIVES.—It is the policy of the United States to pursue the following objectives:

(1) The United States global leadership role is sustained and its political system and major foundations of national power are secured for the long-term in the political, economic, technological, and military domains.

(2) The United States position as an indispensable power in the Indo-Pacific and globally is sustained through diplomacy, multilateralism, and engagement.

(3) The United States deters military confrontation with the PRC and both nations work to reduce the risk of conflict.
(4) The United States and its allies maintain a stable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific with China. The United States and its allies maintain unfettered access to the region, including through freedom of navigation and the free flow of commerce, consistent with international law and practice.

(5) The allies and partners of the United States—

(A) maintain confidence in United States leadership and its commitment to the Indo-Pacific region;

(B) can withstand and combat subversion by the PRC; and

(C) work closely with the United States in setting global rules, norms, and standards that benefit the international community.

(6) The combined economic and military strength of the United States and its allies and partners demonstrates to the PRC that the risks of attempts to dominate other states outweigh the potential benefits.

(7) The United States leads the free, open, and rules-based international order, which comprises resilient states and institutions that uphold and defend principles, such as sovereignty, rule of law, indi-
individual freedom, and human rights. The international order is strong enough to withstand attempts at destabilization by illiberal and authoritarian actors.

(8) The key rules, norms, and standards of international engagement in the 21st century are maintained, including—

(A) the protection of human rights, commercial engagement and investment, and technology; and

(B) that such rules, norms, and standards are in alignment with the values and interests of the United States, its allies and partners, and other stakeholders in the liberal international order.

(9) The United States counters attempts by the PRC to—

(A) undermine open and democratic societies;

(B) distort global markets;

(C) manipulate the international trade system;

(D) coerce other nations via economic, cyber, and military means; or
(E) use its technological advantages to undermine individual freedoms or other states’ national security interests.

(10) The United States deters military confrontation with the PRC and both nations work to reduce the risk of conflict.

(b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States, in pursuit of the objectives set forth in subsection (a)—

(1) to strengthen the United States domestic foundation by reinvesting in market-based economic growth, education, scientific and technological innovation, democratic institutions, and other areas that improve the ability of the United States to pursue its vital economic, foreign policy, and national security interests;

(2) to pursue a strategy of strategic competition with the PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic, development, security, informational, and technological realms to maximize the United States’ strengths and increase the costs for the PRC of harming the interests and values of the United States and its partners and allies;

(3) to lead a free, open, and secure international system characterized by the rule of law, open markets and the free flow of commerce, and a
shared commitment to security and peaceful resolution of disputes, human rights, good and transparent governance, and freedom from coercion;

(4) to strengthen and deepen United States alliances and partnerships by pursuing greater bilateral and multilateral cooperative initiatives that advance shared interests and values and bolster partner countries’ confidence that the United States is and will remain a strong, committed, and reliable partner that respects the views and interests of its allies and friends;

(5) to encourage and collaborate with United States allies and partners in boosting their own capabilities and resiliency to pursue, defend, and protect shared interests and values, free from coercion and external pressure;

(6) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and healthy, constructive competition in United States-China economic relations by—

(A) advancing policies that harden the United States economy against unfair and illegal commercial or trading practices and the coercion of United States businesses; and

(B) improving United States laws and regulations as necessary to prevent any PRC at-
tempts to harm United States economic competitiveness;

(7) to demonstrate the value of private sector-led growth in emerging markets around the world, including through the use of United States Government tools that—

(A) support greater private sector investment and advance capacity-building initiatives that are grounded in the rule of law;

(B) promote open markets;

(C) establish clear policy and regulatory frameworks;

(D) improve the management of key economic sectors;

(E) combat corruption;

(F) foster and support greater collaboration with and among partner countries and the United States private sector to develop secure and sustainable infrastructure; and

(G) support American workers and create American jobs.

(8) to play a leading role in advancing international rules and norms that foster free and reciprocal trade and open and integrated markets;
(9) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy in support of United States companies and businesses in partner countries that seek fair competition;

(10) to ensure that the United States is second to none in the innovation of critical and emerging technologies, such as next-generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, semiconductors, and biotechnology, by—

(A) providing necessary investment and concrete incentives for the private sector to accelerate development of such technologies;

(B) modernizing export controls and investment screening regimes and associated policies and regulations;

(C) enhancing the role of the United States in technical standards-setting bodies and avenues for developing norms regarding the use of emerging critical technologies;

(D) reducing United States barriers and increasing incentives for collaboration with allies and partners on the research and co-development of critical technologies;

(E) collaborating with allies and partners to protect critical technologies by—
(i) coordinating and aligning export control measures;

(ii) building capacity for defense technology security;

(iii) safeguarding chokepoints in strategically critical supply chains; and

(iv) ensuring diversification; and

(F) designing major defense capabilities for export to vetted allies and partners;

(11) to collaborate with like-minded democracies and other willing partners to promote ideals and principles that—

(A) advance a free and open international order;

(B) strengthen democratic institutions;

(C) protect and promote human rights;

and

(D) uphold a free press and fact-based reporting;

(12) to develop comprehensive strategies and policies to counter PRC disinformation campaigns;

(13) to demonstrate effective leadership at the United Nations, its associated agencies, and other multilateral organizations and ensure the integrity
and effectiveness of these organizations in facilitating solutions to global challenges;

(14) to advocate for the defense of fundamental freedoms and human rights in the United States relationship with the PRC;

(15) to cooperate with allies, partners, and multilateral organizations that sustain and strengthen a free and open order and address regional and global challenges posed by the Government of the PRC regarding—

(A) violations and abuses of human rights;

(B) restrictions on religious practices; and

(C) the undermining and abrogation of treaties, other international agreements, and other international norms related to human rights;

(16) to expose the PRC’s use of corruption, repression, and coercion to attain unfair economic advantages or compel other nations to defer to its political and strategic objectives in ways that threaten the United States or its allies and partners;

(17) to maintain United States access to the Western Pacific, including through necessary investments in United States military capabilities, policies, and concepts in the Indo-Pacific, as well as robust
cooperation, exercises, and interoperability with allies and partners;

(18) to deter the PRC from—

(A) initiating armed conflict;

(B) coercing nations; or

(C) using grey-zone tactics below the level of armed conflict;

(19) to strengthen United States-PRC military-to-military communication and improve both military and civilian crisis avoidance and management procedures to de-conflict operations and reduce the risk of unwanted conflict, including through high-level visits and recurrent exchanges between civilian and military officials and other measures, in alignment with United States interests; and

(20) to strengthen stability and reduce suspicions, cooperate with the PRC when interests align, including through bilateral or multilateral means and at the United Nations, as appropriate, and especially in the following areas—

(A) global fight against climate change;

(B) nuclear security; and

(C) global financial stability.
SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that the execution of the policy described in section 3(b) requires the following actions:

(1) Revitalizing American leadership globally and in the Indo-Pacific will require the United States—

(A) to marshal sustained political will to protect its vital interests, promote its values, and advance its economic and national security objectives; and

(B) to achieve this sustained political will, persuade the American people and United States allies and partners of—

(i) the current challenges facing the international rules based order; and

(ii) the need for long-term investments and engagement to defend shared interests and values.

(2) The United States must coordinate closely with allies and partners to compete effectively with the PRC, including to encourage allies and partners to assume, as appropriate, greater roles in balancing and checking aggressive PRC behavior.

(3) Effective United States strategy toward China requires—
(A) bipartisan cooperation within Congress; and

(B) frequent, sustained, and meaningful collaboration and consultation between the executive branch and Congress.

(4) The United States must ensure close integration among economic and foreign policymakers and provide support to the private sector, civil society, universities and academic institutions, and other relevant actors in free and open societies to enable such actors—

(A) to collaborate to advance common interests; and

(B) to identify appropriate policies—

(i) to strengthen the United States and its allies; and

(ii) to promote a compelling vision of a free and open order.

(5) The United States must ensure that all Federal departments, agencies, and overseas missions are organized and resourced to effectively defend and advance United States interests, by—

(A) dedicating more personnel in the Indo-Pacific region, at posts around the world, and in Washington, DC;
(B) placing greater numbers of foreign
service officers, international development pro-
fessionals, members of the foreign commercial
service, intelligence professionals, and other
United States Government personnel in the
Indo-Pacific region; and

(C) ensuring that this workforce has the
training, demonstrated proficiency in language
and culture, technical skills, and other com-
petencies required to advance a successful strat-

ey in relation to the PRC.

(6) The United States must place renewed pri-

ority and emphasis on strengthening the nonmilitary
instruments of national power, including diplomacy,
information, technology, economics, foreign assist-
ance and development finance, commerce, intel-
ligence, and law enforcement, which are crucial for
addressing the challenges posed by the PRC.

(7) The United States must sustain military ca-
pabilities necessary to achieve United States political
objectives in the Indo-Pacific, including—

(A) promoting regional security in the
Indo-Pacific;

(B) reassuring allies and partners while
protecting them from coercion; and
(C) deterring PRC aggression and preventing unwanted conflict.

(8) Competition with the PRC requires skillful adaptation to the information environment of the 21st century. United States public diplomacy and messaging efforts must effectively—

(A) promote the value of partnership with the United States; and

(B) counter CCP propaganda and disinformation that threatens United States interests.

SEC. 6. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.

(a) Applicability of existing restrictions on assistance to foreign security forces.—Nothing in this Act shall be construed to diminish, supplant, supersede, or otherwise restrict or prevent responsibilities of the United States Government under section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) or section 362 of title 10, United States Code.

(b) No authorization for the use of military force.—Nothing in this Act may be construed as authorizing the use of military force.
TITLE I—INVESTING IN AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS

Subtitle A—Science and Technology

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST UNITED STATES COMPANIES WITH GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN DIVERSIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT.

(a) AUTHORIZATION TO CONTRACT SERVICES.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, is authorized to establish a program to facilitate the contracting by the Department of State for the professional services of qualified experts, on a reimbursable fee for service basis, to assist interested United States persons and business entities with supply chain management issues related to the People's Republic of China (PRC), including—

1. exiting from the PRC market or relocating certain production facilities to locations outside the PRC;
2. diversifying sources of inputs, and other efforts to diversify supply chains to locations outside of the PRC;
3. navigating legal, regulatory, or other challenges in the course of the activities described in paragraphs (1) and (2); and
(4) identifying alternative markets for production or sourcing outside of the PRC, including through providing market intelligence, facilitating contact with reliable local partners as appropriate, and other services.

(b) CHIEF OF MISSION OVERSIGHT.—The persons contracted to perform the services described in subsection (a) shall—

(1) be under the authority of the United States Chief of Mission in the country in which they are hired, in accordance with existing United States laws;

(2) coordinate with Department of State and Department of Commerce officers; and

(3) coordinate with United States missions and relevant local partners in other countries as needed to carry out the services described in subsection (a).

(c) PRIORITIZATION OF MICRO-, SMALL-, AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES.—The services described in subsection (a) shall be prioritized for assisting micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises with regard to the matters described in subsection (a).

(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated $15,000,000 for each of fis-
cal years 2022 through 2026 for the purposes of carrying
out this section.

(e) Prohibition on Access to Assistance by
Foreign Adversaries.—None of the funds appropriated
pursuant to this section may be provided to an entity—

(1) under the foreign ownership, control, or in-
fluence of the Government of the PRC or the CCP,
or other foreign adversary;

(2) determined to have beneficial ownership
from foreign individuals subject to the jurisdiction,
direction, or influence of foreign adversaries; and

(3) that has any contract in effect at the time
of the receipt of such funds, or has had a contract
within the previous one year that is no longer in ef-
fect, with—

(A) the Government of the PRC;

(B) the CCP;

(C) the PLA;

(D) an entity majority-owned, majority-
controlled, or majority-financed by the Govern-
ment of the PRC, the CCP, or the PLA; or

(E) a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of an
entity described in subparagraph (D).

(f) Definitions.—The terms “foreign ownership,
control, or influence” and “FOCI” have the meanings
given to those terms in the National Industrial Security
Program Operating Manual (DOD 5220.22–M), or a suc-
cessor document.

Subtitle B—Global Infrastructure and Energy Development

SEC. 111. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.

In this subtitle, the term “appropriate committees of
Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
resentatives.

SEC. 112. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL QUAL-
ITY INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT STAND-
ARDS.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COLLABORATIVE
STANDARDS.—It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should initiate collaboration among governments,
the private sector, and civil society to encourage the adop-
tion of the standards for quality global infrastructure de-
development advanced by the G20 at Osaka in 2018, includ-
ing with respect to the following issues:
(1) Respect for the sovereignty of countries in which infrastructure investments are made.

(2) Anti-corruption.

(3) Rule of law.

(4) Human rights and labor rights.

(5) Fiscal and debt sustainability.

(6) Social and governance safeguards.

(7) Transparency.

(8) Environmental and energy standards.

(b) Sense of Congress on Commitment to Co-operation.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should launch a series of fora around the world showcasing the commitment of the United States and partners of the United States to high-quality development cooperation, including with respect to the issues described in subsection (a).

SEC. 113. SUPPORTING ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE FROM THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

(a) Finding.—It is in the national interest of the United States to establish a coordinated interagency strategy to marshal the resources of the United States Government to provide foreign countries with financing that strengthens independent economic capacity and therefore reduces a foreign government’s need to enter into agree-
ments with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including to obtain support from its Belt and Road Initiative.

(b) Strategy.—

(1) Authority.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall develop and submit a strategy to the relevant congressional committees to use the resources of Federal agencies to counteract offers of assistance and financing from the PRC to foreign governments that are of strategic importance to the United States.

(2) Components of strategy.—The strategy shall—

(A) identify primary sectors where the United States could provide a competitive advantage to increase a country’s economic independence;

(B) select countries with corresponding economic needs, with priority given to those who are vulnerable to Chinese economic influence;

(C) identify any corresponding existing financing available from United States Government entities to prioritize and devise specific fi-
nancing tailored to the needs of such foreign
governments if none are currently available;

(D) identify any cooperative and com-
plementary assistance and financing from
friendly foreign governments, including coordi-
nated assistance and co-financing;

(E) create a streamlined decision-making
process, directed by the National Security
Council, to devise financing and make agency
decisions and commitments on a timely basis to
support United States competitive offers;

(F) establish a formal G7+European Com-
mmission Working Group to develop a com-
prehensive strategy to develop alternatives to
the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative for develop-
ment finance; and

(G) integrate existing efforts into the
strategy, including efforts to address the Gov-
ernment of the PRC’s use of the United Na-
tions to advance the Belt and Road Initiative,
including the proliferation of memoranda of un-
derstanding between the PRC and United Na-
tions funds and programs regarding the imple-
mentation of the Belt and Road Initiative.
(3) PARTICIPATING AGENCIES.—Participating Federal agencies should include the Department of State, Department of the Treasury, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), United States International Development Finance Corporation, Millennium Challenge Corporation, United States Trade and Development Agency, Department of Commerce, and other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate.

(4) EXECUTION OF STRATEGY.—The President should issue an Executive Order to implement the strategy and make such changes in agency regulations and procedures as are necessary to put the strategy into effect.

(5) RELEVANT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—In this section, the term “relevant congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.
(c) AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the USAID, is authorized to establish or continue an initiative, to be known as the “Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network”, under which the Secretary of State, in consultation with other relevant Federal agencies, including those represented on the Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee, may carry out various programs to advance the development of sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastructure worldwide in the Indo-Pacific region by—

(1) strengthening capacity-building programs to improve project evaluation processes, regulatory and procurement environments, and project preparation capacity of countries that are partners of the United States in such development;

(2) providing transaction advisory services and project preparation assistance to support sustainable infrastructure; and

(3) coordinating the provision of United States assistance for the development of infrastructure, including infrastructure that uses United States manufactured goods and services, and catalyzing investment led by the private sector.

(d) TRANSACTION ADVISORY FUND.—As part of the “Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network” de-
scribed under subsection (c), the Secretary of State is au-

thorized to provide support, including through the Trans-

action Advisory Fund, for advisory services to help boost

the capacity of partner countries to evaluate contracts and

assess the financial and environmental impacts of poten-
tial infrastructure projects, including through providing

services such as—

(1) legal services;

(2) project preparation and feasibility studies;

(3) debt sustainability analyses;

(4) bid or proposal evaluation; and

(5) other services relevant to advancing the de-
velopment of sustainable, transparent, and high-
quality infrastructure.

(e) STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE FUND.———

(1) IN GENERAL.—As part of the “Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network” described

under subsection (c), the Secretary of State is au-

thorized to provide support, including through the

Strategic Infrastructure Fund, for technical assist-

ance, project preparation, pipeline development, and

other infrastructure project support.

(2) JOINT STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS.—Funds authorized for the Strategic In-

frastructure Fund should be used in coordination
with the Department of Defense, the International Development Finance Corporation, like-minded donor partners, and multilateral banks, as appropriate, to support joint infrastructure projects that are in the national security interest of the United States and vulnerable to strategic competitors.

(f) Authorization of Appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2022 to 2026, $75,000,000 to the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network, of which $20,000,000 should be made available for the Transaction Advisory Fund.

SEC. 114. STRATEGY FOR ADVANCED AND RELIABLE ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE.

(a) In General.—The President shall direct a comprehensive, multi-year, whole of government effort, in consultation with the private sector, to counter predatory lending and financing, including in the form of providing support to companies incorporated in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that engage in such activities, by the Government of the PRC in the energy sectors of developing countries.

(b) Policy.—It is the policy of the United States to—
(1) regularly evaluate current and forecasted energy needs and capacities of developing countries, and analyze the presence and involvement of PRC state-owned industries and other companies incorporated in the PRC, Chinese nationals providing labor, and financing of energy projects, including direct financing by the PRC government, PRC financial institutions, or direct state support to state-owned enterprises and other companies incorporated in the PRC;

(2) pursue strategic support and investment opportunities, and diplomatic engagement on power sector reforms, to expand the development and deployment of advanced energy technologies in developing countries;

(3) offer financing, loan guarantees, grants, and other financial products on terms that advance domestic economic and local employment opportunities, utilize advanced energy technologies, encourage private sector growth, and, when appropriate United States equity and sovereign lending products as alternatives to the predatory lending tools offered by Chinese financial institutions;

(4) pursue partnerships with likeminded international financial and multilateral institutions to le-
verage investment in advanced energy technologies in developing countries; and

(5) pursue bilateral partnerships focused on the cooperative development of advanced energy technologies with countries of strategic significance, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, to address the effects of energy engagement by the PRC through predatory lending or other actions that negatively impact other countries.

(c) ADVANCED ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES EXPORTS.—

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a United States Government strategy to increase United States exports of advanced energy technologies to—

(1) improve energy security in allied and developing countries;

(2) create open, efficient, rules-based, and transparent energy markets;

(3) improve free, fair, and reciprocal energy trading relationships; and

(4) expand access to affordable, reliable energy.
1 SEC. 115. REPORT ON THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S
2 INVESTMENTS IN FOREIGN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT.
3
4 (a) IN GENERAL.—No later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter
for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the ap-
propriate committees of Congress a report that—

(1) identifies priority countries for deepening
United States engagement on energy matters, in ac-
cordance with the economic and national security in-
terests of the United States and where deeper en-
ergy partnerships are most achievable;

(2) describes the involvement of the Government
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and
companies incorporated in the PRC in the develop-
ment, operation, financing, or ownership of energy
generation facilities, transmission infrastructure, or
energy resources in the countries identified in para-
graph (1);

(3) evaluates strategic or security concerns and
implications for United States national interests and
the interests of the countries identified in paragraph
(1), with respect to the PRC’s involvement and in-
fluence in developing country energy production or
transmission; and
(4) outlines current and planned efforts by the United States to partner with the countries identified in paragraph (1) on energy matters that support shared interests between the United States and such countries.

(b) Publication.—The assessment required in subsection (a) shall be published on the Department of State’s website.

SEC. 116. ENSURING THE UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION IS POSITIONED TO ACHIEVE NATIONAL SECURITY, ECONOMIC, AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES.

(a) Findings.—Congress finds the following:

(1) When establishing the United States International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), Congress sought to facilitate the participation of private sector capital and skills in the economic development of countries with low- or lower-middle-income economies and countries transitioning from nonmarket to market economies in order to complement United States assistance and foreign policy objectives.

(2) The priority for such support has been and remains intended for less developed countries with a
low-income economy or a lower-middle-income economy; however, using income as a discriminator for which countries merit investment will not often capture other important factors, such as the wealth disparity within a country, vulnerability to external shocks including from natural disasters, and United States foreign policy and national security concerns. For this reason, Congress has currently authorized DFC investment in less developed countries with an upper-middle-income economy where the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such support furthers the national economic or foreign policy interests of the United States and such support is designed to produce significant developmental outcomes or provide developmental benefits to the poorest population of that country.

(3) It is the intent of Congress that this flexibility in DFC directed assistance be made available to all countries, including those with so-called high-income economies such as the Bahamas, Barbados, Chile, Trinidad and Tobago, and other allies and partners exceeding the Gross National Income per Capita definition threshold for high-income country. Otherwise, previously eligible partner countries find themselves now ineligible.
(4) The United States already provides a similar national security interest exception for high income countries under the European Energy Security and Diversification Act of 2019, which gives the DFC the authority to work in Europe and Eurasia on energy and energy related investments regardless of the income status of the countries.

(b) **SENSE OF CONGRESS.**—While continuing to prioritize DFC investment in low and lower-middle income countries, it is the sense of Congress that the DFC should support investments in certain projects in both upper-middle income and high-income countries that address key national security and economic interests. The DFC is authorized to and should support projects in any country regardless of income status when not doing so would damage the United States’ interest or those of its allies and partners vis-à-vis its global strategic competitors.

(c) **AMENDMENT.**—Section 1412(c) of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9612(c)) is amended by striking subsection (c) and inserting the following:

“(c) **LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRY FOCUS; SUPPORT IN UPPER-MIDDLE-INCOME AND HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES.**—
“(1) LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRY FOCUS.—The Corporation shall prioritize the provision of support under title II in less developed countries with a low-income economy or a lower-middle-income economy.

“(2) SUPPORT IN UPPER-MIDDLE-INCOME AND HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES.—The Corporation shall restrict the provision of support under title II in a less developed country with an upper-middle-income economy or a high-income economy unless—

“(A) the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such support furthers the national economic, foreign policy, or development interests of the United States; and

“(B) such support is designed to produce significant developmental outcomes or provide developmental benefits to the poorest, marginalized, or equity-disadvantaged population groups of that country.”.

Subtitle C—Economic Diplomacy and Leadership

SEC. 121. FINDINGS ON REGIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The United States played a leadership role in constructing the architecture, rules, and norms
governing the international economic order following the Second World War, yielding decades of domestic economic and geopolitical prosperity and stability.

(2) In 2017, the United States withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an economic pact that was negotiated by 12 countries that covered 40 percent of the world economy, leading the 11 remaining Asia-Pacific countries to sign the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) the following year, setting high-standard rules for regional economic engagement.

(3) In 2020, the 10 countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations along with South Korea, China, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world’s biggest trade deal in terms of GDP.

(4) Reduced United States economic engagement has led United States allies and partners to question the United States’ commitment to the Indo-Pacific region. Despite its distortive and unfair trade practices, the People’s Republic of China is taking advantage of this vacuum by deepening its partner-
ships in the region and promoting its own state-led economic model.

(5) The United States is increasingly on the outside looking in with regards to economic pacts in the Indo-Pacific. United States absence from these agreements puts it at both a strategic and competitive disadvantage in the region and allows competitors to expand their economic influence at the United States’ expense.

(6) Given that these partnerships and agreements will define the rules and norms that will govern regional commerce over the coming decades, the United States is currently not well positioned to shape the coming economic landscape.

(7) It is in the United States’ vital interest to upgrade its economic engagement and leadership in the Indo-Pacific and develop concrete steps to strengthen its commercial diplomacy to fully participate in the region’s economic dynamism.

SEC. 122. REVIEW OF TRADE AND ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT GLOBALLY OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

(a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the United States Trade Representative
and the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes the global trade and investment diplomacy and engagement of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) over the past decade, including any bilateral or plurilateral trade and investment agreements it has signed, and their impact on the United States economy, American companies and workers, as well as on the countries that have entered into agreements with the PRC and the global economy as a whole.

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report shall include the following:

(1) A survey and comparison of the PRC’s international economic practices, which will—

(A) provide an overview of the PRC’s distortive trade policies;

(B) list the PRC’s trade and investment agreements globally, both agreements it has signed or entered into and any ongoing negotiations it has with individual countries or groups of countries;

(C) detail the other mechanisms the PRC uses to advance its international economic objectives, including economic and commercial dialogues and BRI related activities;
(D) compare the United States and Chinese approaches and priorities on trade and investment with major global economies, United States allies, and for each region of the world; and

(E) outline what further steps the PRC may take in the Indo-Pacific region to bolster its economic position and influence.

(2) An evaluation of the impacts of the PRC’s trade and investment policies, including—

(A) the impact of these trade and investment agreements on the PRC’s economy, with a focus on its trade and investment profile, the impact on the PRC’s economic growth and per-capita income, and the impact on the profitability and market share of Chinese companies and SOEs;

(B) the impact of these agreements on the PRC’s political and diplomatic relations with the countries it entered into agreements with and by region; and

(C) the impact of the PRC’s trade and investment relationships with other countries on the market share of United States companies.
SEC. 123. REPORT ON ENTRENCHING AMERICAN ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that United States national interests and the primacy of United States power in the Indo-Pacific are intimately tied to the following economic objectives:

(1) Deepening United States trade and investment relationships in the region, especially with key allies and partners.

(2) Confirming American leadership and participation in global regional economic organizations and fora, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

(3) Leveraging bilateral and plurilateral sectoral agreements on trade and investment, as well as negotiations at the WTO to reassert United States economic leadership by writing the rules of the road on critical economic questions.

(4) Building secure and resilient supply chains for industries critical for United States national interest, including semiconductors, vaccines, and personal protective equipment.

(5) Showcasing the benefits and appeal of a market-based economic model.
(b) REPORTING.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the United States Trade Representative and the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress that presents the steps the United States is taking and plans to take to achieve the objectives outlined in subsection (a) and includes specific action plans for the following:

(1) Enhancing United States trade and investment relationships in the region bilaterally and plurilaterally, especially with United States allies and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

(2) Reenergizing APEC as a critical component of the region’s economic architecture.

(3) Work to ensure that the United States absence from the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership do not undermine the United States’ ability to shape regional trade and investment rules.

(4) Working with allies and partners to build resilient and trusted supply chains especially for critical and emerging technologies, including semiconductors, and products and components critical
for national health, including vaccines and related materials and personal protective equipment.

(5) Driving the formation and adoption of high-
standards and rules for the region in the following areas:

(A) Advanced technologies and the digital sphere.

(B) Labor practices and environmental standards.

(C) Intellectual property rights.

(6) Developing roadmaps for how to counter the PRC’s unfair trade and economic practices, with a specific focus on—

(A) subsidies and unfair competition by state-owned enterprises; and

(B) corruption and politicized infrastructure.

(c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Energy and Commerce.
SEC. 124. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE NEED TO BOLSTER AMERICAN LEADERSHIP IN THE ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States has benefitted from the regional economic integration agenda of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum since its inception in 1989;

(2) APEC is a hub of trade and commerce for 21 member economies that, as of 2018, accounted for 60 percent of global GDP and 48 percent of global trade;

(3) APEC has contributed to the reduction in trade barriers, harmonization of regulations, and enhanced access to global value chains, while raising the profile of critical topics such as fair trade, sustainability, gender parity, and inclusive growth;

(4) it is in the United States interest to engage and lead at APEC to push for an open and inclusive regional economy that benefits United States workers, consumers, and businesses and better integrates the United States economy with others in the region;

(5) when the United States last hosted APEC in 2011, it was able to promote United States interests, while reassuring allies and partners about its
strong commitment to the region in the economic arena;

(6) today, APEC can again be used as a forum to make progress on several United States priorities, that are shared by United States allies and partners, including—

(A) making regional commerce more inclusive;

(B) fostering innovation and digitization;

and

(C) addressing climate change and environmental protection;

(7) hosting APEC would provide a tremendous opportunity to leverage American leadership to shape the regional economic agenda;

(8) hosting APEC would allow the United States to advance several of its own priorities in the region, including to—

(A) expand the participation of APEC stakeholders to include labor groups, environmental advocates, and other part of civil society;

(B) upgrade APEC’s work to empower and promote small and medium enterprises;
(C) spotlight best practices and plans to upgrade skills for the next-generation of technology jobs;

(D) advance a climate and sustainable trade and development agenda with a focus on green technologies, infrastructure and finance; and

(E) advance work on digital trade, including by expanding rules on data privacy, promoting digital inclusiveness and promoting the free flow of data; and

(9) with no host confirmed for 2023, the United States should immediately announce its interest to host APEC in 2023 and work with the APEC Secretariat and like-minded APEC members to build support.

SEC. 125. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY ISSUES.

(a) LEADERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS SETTING.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States must lead in international bodies that set the governance norms and rules for critical digitally enabled technologies in order to ensure that these technologies operate within a free, secure, interoperable, and stable digital domain.
(b) **Countering Digital Authoritarianism.**—It is the sense of Congress that the United States, along with allies and partners, should lead an international effort that uses all of the economic and diplomatic tools at its disposal to combat the expanding use of information and communications technology products and services to surveil, repress, and manipulate populations (also known as “digital authoritarianism”).

(e) **Freedom of Information in the Digital Age.**—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should lead a global effort to ensure that freedom of information, including the ability to safely consume or publish information without fear of undue reprisals, is maintained as the digital domain becomes an increasingly integral mechanism for communication.

(d) **Efforts to Ensure Technological Development Does Not Threaten Democratic Governance or Human Rights.**—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should lead a global effort to develop and adopt a set of common principles and standards for critical technologies to ensure that the use of such technologies cannot be abused by malign actors, whether they are governments or other entities, and that they do not threaten democratic governance or human rights.
SEC. 126. DIGITAL TRADE AGREEMENTS.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) as the COVID–19 pandemic accelerated United States dependence on digital tools, international rules around digital governance and trade have remained largely piecemeal;

(2) the People’s Republic of China is operating under and advancing a set of digital rules that are contrary to United States values and interests, and those of United States allies and partners;

(3) a patchwork of plurilateral, trilateral, and bilateral digital trade agreements, including the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Singapore-Australia Digital Trade Agreement, and the Singapore-New Zealand-Chile Digital Economy Partnership Agreement have emerged, creating a set of rules that the United States should be driving;

(4) the United States has already underscored the need for such agreements by signing the U.S.-Japan Digital Trade Agreement in October 2019 and including a robust digital trade or e-commerce chapter in the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement;

(5) a regional deal on digital governance and trade would allow the United States to unite a group
of like-minded economies around common standards
and norms, including the principles of openness, in-
clusiveness, fairness, transparency, and the free flow
of data with trust, that are increasingly vital for the
global economy;

(6) such an agreement would facilitate the cre-
ation of common rules and standards that govern
cross-border data flows, the protection of privacy,
and cybersecurity at a time of growing digital
vulnerabilities for individuals, businesses, and insti-
tutions around the world;

(7) such an agreement would facilitate the par-
ticipation of small and medium-sized enterprises in
the global economy through trade facilitation meas-
ures, including e-marketing, e-invoicing and e-pay-
ment; and

(8) the United States Trade Representative, in
consultation with the Secretary of State should ne-
gotiate bilateral and plurilateral agreements or ar-
rangements relating to digital trade with the like-
minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region, the Eu-
ropean Union, the member countries of the Five
Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance, and other part-
ners and allies, as appropriate.
SEC. 127. DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY PARTNERSHIP.

(a) Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership.—The President is authorized to establish a program, to be known as the “Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership” to help foreign countries—

    (1) expand and increase secure Internet access and digital infrastructure;

    (2) adopt policies and regulatory positions that foster and encourage open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet, equitable access, the free flow of data, multi-stakeholder models of internet governance, and pro-competitive and secure information and communications technology (ICT) policies and regulations;

    (3) promote and protect human rights and counter corruption and predatory behavior throughout communications and cybersecurity policy and implementation;

    (4) guard against privacy abuses, cybercrime, disinformation and misinformation, and the use of digital technology and services to carry out criminal activity or human rights violations;

    (5) bolster the role of civil society in informing ICT policy and regulations;
(6) promote exports of United States ICT goods and services and increase United States company market share in target markets;

(7) promote the innovation and diversification of ICT goods and supply chain services to be less reliant on imports from the People’s Republic of China;

(8) build cybersecurity capacity, expand interoperability, and promote best practices for a national approach to cybersecurity; and

(9) enhance the security of their digital infrastructure to facilitate better information sharing with the United States and United States allies and partners, as appropriate.

(b) IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees an implementation plan for the 3-year period beginning on the date of the submission of the plan to advance the goals identified in subsection (a). The implementation plan shall also include a description of interagency responsibilities to carry out implementation, a description of any barriers to successful implementation, and a description of any addi-
tional resources or authorities needed for successful implement-
ment.

(c) CONSULTATION.—In developing the implementation plan required by subsection (b), the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall consult with—

(1) the appropriate congressional committees;
(2) leaders of the United States industry;
(3) civil society leaders with expertise in technology, telecommunications, cybersecurity, economic development and competitiveness, and human rights, including from the Open Technology Fund;
(4) representatives from relevant United States Government agencies; and
(5) representatives from like-minded allies and partners.

(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as necessary for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this section.

Subtitle D—Financial Diplomacy and Leadership

SEC. 131. FINDINGS ON CHINESE FINANCIAL INDUSTRIAL POLICY.

Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The People’s Republic of China operates a system of state-owned financial institutions including retail banks, investment banks, asset managers, and insurers which are given favorable treatment under Chinese law while foreign financial institutions have strict restrictions on their ability to operate in the PRC.

(2) In order to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the PRC Government committed to opening the credit card payment business to foreign firms by 2006.

(3) After years of the PRC refusing to open its payment market, the United States brought a case against the PRC before the WTO. In 2012, the WTO mandated that the PRC open its card payment market to global competitors.

(4) Even after the WTO’s ruling, the PRC Government refused to comply with the ruling and maintained a rule that required all yuan-denominated payment cards to use the PRC’s Union Pay network. Only in 2020, after the Chinese payment market had grown to $27 trillion, did the PRC Government approve the application of foreign firms to enter the market.
(5) The PRC continues to maintain aggressive capital controls, limiting access to the Chinese market to foreign investors while hamstringing its own citizens ability to control their money.

(6) On November 5, 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that the PRC would launch a technology innovation stock exchange. The Shanghai Stock Exchange STAR Market launched on July 22, 2019.

(7) On October 24, 2020, Chinese billionaire Jack Ma referred to “pawnshop mentality” of state-owned banks. Shortly thereafter, the initial public offering of his firm Ant Financial was canceled by Chinese regulators.

(8) The PRC Government is pioneering the use of a fully digitized yuan, which is set to be the world’s first central bank backed digital currency, and the People’s Bank of China and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority have already begun testing the cross-border functionality of the digital currency.

SEC. 132. REPORT ON IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN FINAN-CIAL STRENGTH FOR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-gress that—
(1) the dominance of the dollar as the global re-
serve currency has yielded significant benefits to the
United States and the American people by allowing
the United States to maintain economic independ-
ence, better control its monetary policy, and finance
government outlays;

(2) American global leadership has benefited
from the United States monetary stability, credit-
worthiness, deep capital markets, and financial tech-
nology innovations;

(3) effective diplomacy and safeguarding of
American national security rely on the United States
role as the global financial leader, hub of global
trade, and source of economic opportunity;

(4) by cracking down on dissent in the key fi-
nancial center of Hong Kong, driving the creation of
a technology focused stock exchange, and pushing
forward a Central Bank digital currency, the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China is attempting to become the
leading hub of finance in the world; and

(5) the United States must maintain its posi-
tion as a global financial leader to continue its
broader global leadership role around the world.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that—

(1) lists and examines the benefits to American foreign policy that derive from the United States financial leadership and the dollar’s status as the world’s global reserve currency;

(2) describes the actions taken by the People’s Republic of China that could cement China’s role as the world’s leading financial center;

(3) analyzes the possible impact on American national security and foreign policy were the yuan to supplant the dollar as the world’s leading reserve currency;

(4) outlines how the United States can work diplomatically with allies, partners, and other nations to preserve a financial system that is free, open, and fair; and

(5) identifies steps the United States can take to preserve its status as the world’s leading financial center and maintain the dollar’s position as the global reserve currency.

(e) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(2) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives;

(3) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(4) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.

SEC. 133. REVIEW OF CHINESE COMPANIES ON UNITED STATES CAPITAL MARKETS.

(a) FINDINGS.—

(1) Beginning in the 1990s, a wave of Chinese companies sought to raise capital and list shares on American stock markets.

(2) In 2011 and 2012, more than 100 Chinese firms were delisted from the New York Stock Exchange as a result of fraud, accounting scandals, and other corporate governance failures.

(3) Following extensive diplomatic efforts by the United States Government, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) signed a memorandum of understanding with the China Securities Regulatory Commission and the China Ministry of Finance for the production and exchange of audit documents.
(4) Despite signing the agreement, Chinese regulators continue to hinder the PCAOB’s access to relevant documents that are necessary for the PCAOB to carry out its enforcement duties.

(5) In August 2020, the Department of State sent a letter to American universities warning about national security implications related to Chinese stock holdings.

(6) In December 2020, Congress passed and the President signed the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (Public Law 116–222), which requires foreign companies listed on American stock markets to comply with PCAOB auditing rules within three years. Under the legislation, issuers not in compliance within three years will be delisted.

(b) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the costs and benefits to the United States posed by the presence of companies incorporated in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that are listed on Amer-
ican stock exchanges or traded over the counter, in
the form of American depository receipts.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report
shall—

(A) identify companies incorporated in the
PRC that—

(i) are listed or traded on one or sev-
eral stock exchanges within the United
States, including over-the-counter market
and “A Shares” added to indexes and ex-
change-traded funds out of mainland ex-
changes in the PRC; and

(ii) based on the factors for consider-
ation described in paragraph (3), have
knowingly and materially contributed to—

(I) activities that undermine
United States national security;

(II) serious abuses of internation-
ally recognized human rights; or

(III) a substantially increased fi-
nancial risk exposure for United
States-based investors;

(B) describe the activities of the companies
identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), and
their implications for the United States; and
(C) develop policy recommendations for the United States Government, State governments, United States financial institutions, United States equity and debt exchanges, and other relevant stakeholders to address the risks posed by the presence in United States capital markets of the companies identified pursuant to subparagraph (A).

(3) FACTORS FOR INCLUSION OF A COMPANY.—

In completing the report under paragraph (1), the President shall consider whether a company should be identified pursuant to paragraph (2)(A) because the company has—

(A) materially contributed to the development or manufacture, or sold or facilitated procurement by the PLA, of lethal military equipment or component parts of such equipment;

(B) contributed to the construction and militarization of features in the South China Sea;

(C) been sanctioned by the United States or has been determined to have conducted business with sanctioned entities;

(D) engaged in an act or a series of acts of intellectual property theft;
(E) engaged in corporate or economic espionage;

(F) contributed to the proliferation of nuclear or missile technology in violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions or United States sanctions;

(G) contributed to the repression of religious and ethnic minorities within the PRC, including in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or Tibet Autonomous Region;

(H) contributed to the development of technologies that enable censorship directed or directly supported by the Government of the PRC; or

(I) contributed to other activities or behavior determined to be relevant by the President.

(4) FACTORS FOR MAKING POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS.—In completing the report under paragraph (1), the President shall weigh the national security implications and consider the following factors identified pursuant to paragraph (3):

(A) The possibility that banning or delisting companies from United States markets could lead to an outflow of companies to list in the PRC.
(B) The possibility that banning or delisting companies from United States markets could impact the status of the United States as the world’s leading capital markets center, particularly vis-à-vis the PRC.

(C) The impact on American foreign policy and national security if United States leadership in capital markets was weakened vis-à-vis the PRC.

(c) REPORT FORM.—The report required under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form.

(d) PUBLICATION.—The report required under subsection (b) shall be made accessible to the public online through relevant United States Government websites.

SEC. 134. REPORT ON DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGES TO CROSS-BORDER PAYMENT AND FINANCIAL MESSAGING SYSTEMS.

(a) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the diplomatic and
economic implications of cross-border payment systems.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall—

(A) assess the extent to which American diplomacy and global leadership hinge upon the current infrastructure and existing ecosystem of cross-border payment and financial messaging systems;

(B) examine the durability of the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication cooperative;

(C) review and analyze ways in which the Cross Border Interbank Payment Systems, cryptocurrencies, and central bank digital currencies could erode this system; and

(D) analyze how changes to global cross-border payment systems could undermine United States national security interests including impacts on the efficacy of sanctions, the countering of terrorist finance, and the enforcement of anti-money laundering provisions.

(b) REPORT FORM.—The report required under subsection (a)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form.
(c) Publication.—The report under subsection (a)(1) shall be made accessible to the public online through relevant United States Government websites.

TITLE II—INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS
Subtitle A—Strategic and Diplomatic Matters

SEC. 201. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.

In this subtitle, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 202. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT FOR ALLIES AND PARTNERS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific provide a unique strategic advantage to the United States and are among the Nation’s most
precious assets, enabling the United States to advance its vital national interests, defend its territory, expand its economy through international trade and commerce, establish enduring cooperation with allies while seeking to establish new partnerships, prevent the domination of the Indo-Pacific and its surrounding maritime and air lanes by a hostile power or powers, and deter potential aggressors;

(2) the Governments of the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are critical allies in advancing a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific region and tackling challenges with unity of purpose, and have collaborated to advance specific efforts of shared interest in areas such as defense and security, economic prosperity, infrastructure connectivity, and fundamental freedoms;

(3) the United States greatly values other partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, including with India, Singapore, Indonesia, Taiwan, New Zealand, and Vietnam, as well as its trilateral and quadrilateral dialogues, and regional architecture such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, which are essential to further shared interests;
(4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific demands consistent United States and allied commitment to strengthening and advancing alliances so that they are postured to meet these challenges, and will require sustained political will, concrete partnerships, economic, commercial, technological, and security cooperation, consistent and tangible commitments, high-level and extensive consultations on matters of mutual interest, mutual and shared cooperation in the acquisition of key capabilities important to allied defenses, and unified mutual support in the face of political, economic, or military coercion;

(5) fissures in the United States alliance relationships and partnerships benefit United States adversaries and weaken the collective ability to advance shared interests;

(6) the United States must work with allies to prioritize human rights throughout the Indo-Pacific region;

(7) as the report released in August 2020 by the Expert Group of the International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS), entitled “Climate and Security in the Indo-Asia Pacific” noted, the Indo-Pacific region is one of the regions
most vulnerable to climate impacts, and as former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment Sherri Goodman, Secretary General of IMCCS, noted, climate shocks act as a threat multiplier in the Indo-Pacific region, increasing humanitarian response costs and impacting security throughout the region as sea levels rise, fishing patterns shift, food insecurity rises, and storms grow stronger and more frequent;

(8) the United States should continue to engage on and deepen cooperation with allies and partners of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, as laid out in the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (Public Law 115–409), in the areas of—

(A) forecasting environmental challenges;

(B) assisting with transnational cooperation on sustainable uses of forest and water resources with the goal of preserving biodiversity and access to safe drinking water;

(C) fisheries and marine resource conservation; and

(D) meeting environmental challenges and developing resilience;

(9) the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of
the United States Agency for International Development, should facilitate a robust interagency Indo-Pacific climate resiliency and adaptation strategy focusing on internal and external actions needed—

(A) to facilitate regional early recovery, risk reduction, and resilience to weather-related impacts on strategic interests of the United States and partners and allies of the United States in the region; and

(B) to address humanitarian and food security impacts of weather-related changes in the region; and

(10) ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-led mechanisms remain essential to the evolving institutional architecture of the Indo-Pacific region.

(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United States—

(1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation with and among United States allies in the Indo-Pacific, as appropriate, including through diplomatic engagement, regional development, energy security and development, scientific and health partnerships, educational and cultural exchanges, intelligence-sharing, and other diplomatic and defense-related initiatives;
(2) to uphold the United States multilateral and bilateral treaty obligations, including—

(A) defending Japan consistent with the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan, done at Washington, January 19, 1960, and all related and subsequent bilateral security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the date of enactment of this Act;

(B) defending the Republic of Korea consistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea, done at Washington, October 1, 1953, and all related and subsequent bilateral security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the date of enactment of this Act;

(C) defending the Philippines consistent with article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines, done at Washington, August 30, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the date of enactment of this Act;
(D) defending Thailand consistent with the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty ("Manila Pact"), done at Manila, September 8, 1954, understanding thereto the Thanat-Rusk communique of 1962, and all related and subsequent bilateral security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the date of enactment of this Act; and

(E) defending Australia consistent with the Security Treaty Between Australia and the United States of America, done at San Francisco, September 1, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the date of enactment of this Act;

(3) to strengthen and deepen the United States’ bilateral and regional partnerships, including with India, Taiwan, ASEAN, and New Zealand;

(4) to cooperate with allies and partners to promote human rights across the Indo-Pacific region bilaterally and through regional and multilateral fora and pacts;

(5) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation with regional part-
ners, such as Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and India;

(6) to collaborate and cooperate on the sustainable development of the Mekong River Basin, including by providing support for environmental conservation and protection initiatives in the Mekong sub-region and through assistance to Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, whose governments comprise the Mekong River Commission (MRC). United States efforts should focus on increasing MRC member countries’ capacity in the sustainable conservation and management of natural resources.

SEC. 203. BOOSTING QUAD COOPERATION.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) as a Pacific power, the United States should continue to strengthen its cooperation with Australia, India, and Japan, (commonly referred to as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or “Quad”) to enhance and implement a shared vision to meet regional challenges and to promote a free, open, inclusive, resilient, and healthy Indo-Pacific, characterized by respect for democratic norms, rule of law, and market-driven economic growth, and that is free from undue influence and coercion;
(2) the United States should expand dialogue and cooperation through the Quad with a range of partners to support the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and territorial integrity, and to uphold peace and prosperity and strengthen democratic resilience in the Indo-Pacific;

(3) the recent pledge from the first-ever Quad leaders meeting on March 12, 2021, to respond to the economic and health impacts of COVID–19, including expanding safe, affordable, and effective vaccine production and equitable access, and to address shared challenges, including in cyberspace, critical technologies, counterterrorism, quality infrastructure investment, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as maritime domains, further advances the important cooperation among Quad nations that is so critical to the Indo-Pacific region;

(4) building upon their announced commitment to finance 1,000,000,000 or more COVID–19 vaccines by the end of 2022 for use in the Indo-Pacific region, the United States International Development Finance Corporation, the Japan International Cooperation Agency, and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, including through partnerships
other multilateral development banks, should also
venture to finance development and infrastructure
projects in the Indo-Pacific region that are competi-
tive, transparent, and sustainable;

(5) the United States should participate in the
Resilient Supply Chain Initiative launched by Aus-
tralia, Japan, and India in 2020, along with similar
initiatives that relocate supply chains in the health,
economic, and national security sectors to the
United States, its Quad partners, and other like-
minded countries; and

(6) the formation of a Quad Intra-Parliamen-
tary Working Group could—

(A) sustain and deepen engagement be-
tween senior officials of the Quad countries on
a full spectrum of issues; and

(B) be modeled on the successful and long-
standing bilateral intra-parliamentary groups
between the United States and Mexico, Canada,
and the United Kingdom, as well as other for-
mal and informal parliamentary exchanges.

(b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of State shall submit to the appropriate con-
gressional committees a strategy for bolstering engagement and cooperation with the Quad.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) A description of how the United States intends to demonstrate democratic leadership in the Indo-Pacific through quadrilateral engagement with India, Japan, and Australia on shared interests and common challenges.

(B) A summary of—

(i) current and past Quad initiatives across the whole of the United States Government, including to promote broad based and inclusive economic growth, trade, and investment, and to advance technology cooperation, energy innovation, climate mitigation and adaptation, physical and digital infrastructure development, education, disaster management, and global health security;

(ii) proposals shared among Quad countries to deepen existing security cooperation, intelligence sharing, economic
partnerships, and multilateral coordination;

and

(iii) initiatives and agreements undertaken jointly with Quad countries, in addition to other like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific, on areas of shared interest.

(C) A description of efforts to jointly—

(i) expand ongoing COVID–19 cooperation to prepare for the next pandemic by focusing on medium-term vaccine and medical supply production and building a broader dialogue on global public health;

(ii) combat economic coercion, deepen regional economic engagement and integration, and strengthen regional rules and standards around trade and investment;

(iii) strengthen climate actions on mitigation, adaptation, resilience, technology, capacity-building, and climate finance;

(iv) facilitate the development of quality infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific through joint financing, investment, technical assistance, and standards setting;
(v) enhance joint maritime security and maritime domain awareness initiatives to protect the maritime commons and support international law and freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific; and

(vi) develop international technology standards and share or co-develop new innovative technologies of the future.

SEC. 204. ESTABLISHMENT OF QUAD INTRA-PARLIAMENTARY WORKING GROUP.

(a) Establishment.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall seek to enter into negotiations with the governments of Japan, Australia, and India (collectively, with the United States, known as the “Quad”) with the goal of reaching a written agreement to establish a Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group to facilitate closer cooperation on shared interests and values.

(b) United States Group.—

(1) In general.—At such time as the governments of the Quad countries enter into a written agreement described in subsection (a) to establish a Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group, there shall be established a United States Group, which
shall represent the United States at the Quad Intra-
Parliamentary Working Group.

(2) MEMBERSHIP.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The United States Group shall be comprised of not more than 24 Members of Congress.

(B) APPOINTMENT.—Of the Members of Congress appointed to the United States Group under subparagraph (A)—

(i) half shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives from among Members of the House, not fewer than four of whom shall be members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs; and

(ii) half shall be appointed by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, based on recommendations of the majority leader and minority leader of the Senate, from among Members of the Senate, not fewer than four of whom shall be members of the Committee on Foreign Relations (unless the majority leader and minority leader determine otherwise).

(3) MEETINGS.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—The United States Group shall seek to meet not less frequently than annually with representatives and appropriate staff of the legislatures of Japan, Australia, and India, and any other country invited by mutual agreement of the Quad countries.

(B) LIMITATION.—A meeting described in subparagraph (A) may be held—

(i) in the United States;

(ii) in another Quad country during periods when Congress is not in session; or

(iii) virtually.

(4) CHAIRPERSON AND VICE CHAIRPERSON.—

(A) HOUSE DELEGATION.—The Speaker of the House of Representatives shall designate the chairperson or vice chairperson of the delegation of the United States Group from the House from among members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

(B) SENATE DELEGATION.—The President Pro Tempore of the Senate shall designate the chairperson or vice chairperson of the delegation of the United States Group from the Senate from among members of the Committee on Foreign Relations.
(5) Authorization of Appropriations.—

(A) In General.—There is authorized to be appropriated $1,000,000 for each fiscal years 2022 through 2025 for the United States Group.

(B) Distribution of Appropriations.—

(i) In General.—For each fiscal year for which an appropriation is made for the United States Group, half of the amount appropriated shall be available to the delegation from the House of Representatives and half of the amount appropriated shall be available to the delegation from the Senate.

(ii) Method of Distribution.—The amounts available to the delegations of the House of Representatives and the Senate under clause (i) shall be disbursed on vouchers to be approved by the chairperson of the delegation from the House of Representatives and the chairperson of the delegation from the Senate, respectively.

(6) Private Sources.—The United States Group may accept gifts or donations of services or property, subject to the review and approval, as ap-
propriate, of the Committee on Ethics of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Ethics of the Senate.

(7) Certification of Expenditures.—The certificate of the chairperson of the delegation from the House of Representatives or the delegation of the Senate of the United States Group shall be final and conclusive upon the accounting officers in the auditing of the accounts of the United States Group.

(8) Annual Report.—The United States Group shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report for each fiscal year for which an appropriation is made for the United States Group, including a description of its expenditures under such appropriation.

SEC. 205. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH ASEAN.

It is the policy of the United States to—

(1) stand with the nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as they respond to COVID–19 and support greater cooperation in building capacity to prepare for and respond to pandemics and other public health challenges;
(2) support high-level United States participation in the annual ASEAN Summit held each year;

(3) reaffirm the importance of United States-ASEAN economic engagement, including the elimination of barriers to cross-border commerce, and support the ASEAN Economic Community’s (AEC) goals, including strong, inclusive, and sustainable long-term economic growth and cooperation with the United States that focuses on innovation and capacity-building efforts in technology, education, disaster management, food security, human rights, and trade facilitation, particularly for ASEAN’s poorest countries;

(4) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster greater integration and unity within the ASEAN community, as well as to foster greater integration and unity with non-ASEAN economic, political, and security partners, including Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the European Union, and India;

(5) recognize the value of strategic economic initiatives such as United States-ASEAN Connect, which demonstrates a commitment to ASEAN and the AEC and builds upon economic relationships in the region;
(6) support ASEAN nations in addressing maritime and territorial disputes in a constructive manner and in pursuing claims through peaceful, diplomatic, and, as necessary, legitimate regional and international arbitration mechanisms, consistent with international law, including through the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea that represents the interests of all parties and promotes peace and stability in the region;

(7) urge all parties involved in the maritime and territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific region, including the Government of the People’s Republic of China—

(A) to cease any current activities, and avoid undertaking any actions in the future, that undermine stability, or complicate or escalate disputes through the use of coercion, intimidation, or military force;

(B) to demilitarize islands, reefs, shoals, and other features, and refrain from new efforts to militarize, including the construction of new garrisons and facilities and the relocation of additional military personnel, material, or equipment;
(C) to oppose actions by any country that
prevent other countries from exercising their
sovereign rights to the resources in their exclu-
sive economic zones and continental shelves by
enforcing claims to those areas in the South
China Sea that lack support in international
law; and

(D) to oppose unilateral declarations of ad-
ministrative and military districts in contested
areas in the South China Sea;

(8) urge parties to refrain from unilateral ac-
tions that cause permanent physical damage to the
marine environment and support the efforts of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
and ASEAN to implement guidelines to address the
illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the
region;

(9) urge ASEAN nations to develop a common
approach to encourage China and the Philippines to
comply with the decision of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration’s 2016 ruling in favor of the Republic of
the Philippines in the case against the People’s Re-
public of China’s excessive maritime claims;

(10) reaffirm the commitment of the United
States to continue joint efforts with ASEAN to halt
human smuggling and trafficking in persons and urge ASEAN to create and strengthen regional mechanisms to provide assistance and support to refugees and migrants;

(11) support the Mekong-United States Partnership;

(12) support newly created initiatives with ASEAN nations, including the United States-ASEAN Smart Cities Partnership, the ASEAN Policy Implementation Project, the United States-ASEAN Innovation Circle, and the United States-ASEAN Health Futures;

(13) encourage the President to communicate to ASEAN leaders the importance of promoting the rule of law and open and transparent government, strengthening civil society, and protecting human rights, including releasing political prisoners, ceasing politically motivated prosecutions and arbitrary killings, and safeguarding freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom of speech and expression;

(14) support efforts by organizations in ASEAN that address corruption in the public and private sectors, enhance anti-bribery compliance, enforce bribery criminalization in the private sector,
and build beneficial ownership transparency through
the ASEAN–USAID PROSPECT project partnered
with the South East Asia Parties Against Corrup-
tion (SEA–PAC);

(15) support the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative as an example of a people-to-people
partnership that provides skills, networks, and leadership training to a new generation that will create
and fill jobs, foster cross-border cooperation and partnerships, and rise to address the regional and
global challenges of the future;

(16) support the creation of initiatives similar
to the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative for
other parts of the Indo-Pacific to foster people-to-
people partnerships with an emphasis on civil society
leaders;

(17) acknowledge those ASEAN governments
that have fully upheld and implemented all United
Nations Security Council resolutions and interna-
tional agreements with respect to the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear and ballistic
missile programs and encourage all other ASEAN
governments to do the same; and

(18) allocate appropriate resources across the
United States Government to articulate and imple-
ment an Indo-Pacific strategy that respects and supports the crucial role of ASEAN and supports ASEAN as a source of well-functioning and problem-solving regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific community.

SEC. 206. YOUNG SOUTHEAST ASIAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the “Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative Act” or the “YSEALI Act”.

(b) YOUNG SOUTHEAST ASIAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.—

(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in the Department of State the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative (“YSEALI”) program.

(2) GOALS.—The YSEALI program shall seek to build to capacity of young leaders in Southeast Asia to—

(A) support young leaders from Southeast Asia by offering professional development and a global network to share expertise, including in the areas of civic engagement, economic empowerment and social entrepreneurship, education and environmental issues; and

(B) further strengthen the enduring partnership between the United States and South-
east Asia and connect United States experts with YSEALI participants.

(3) YSEALI PROGRAMS.—

(A) YSEALI ACADEMIC FELLOWS PROGRAM.—There is established the YSEALI Academic Fellows Program to bring students from YSEALI partner countries to the United States for the purposes of building practical expertise, leadership skills, and professional networks relating to one or more of the YSEALI themes. The Secretary of State may award fellowships under the Academic Fellows Program to eligible individuals based on the following:

(i) Citizenship and residency in a YSEALI partner country.

(ii) Status as a full-time undergraduate student, or recent graduate of college, university, or other institutions of higher learning.

(iii) Other criteria determined appropriate by the Secretary.

(B) YSEALI PROFESSIONAL FELLOWS PROGRAM.—There is established the YSEALI Professional Fellows Program to bring professionals from YSEALI partner countries to the
United States for the purposes of building practical expertise, leadership skills, and professional networks relating to one or more of the YSEALI themes. The Secretary of State may award fellowships under the Professional Fellows Program to eligible individuals based on the following:

(i) Citizenship and residency in a YSEALI partner country.

(ii) Status as an emerging leader in government, civil society, or the private sector, and demonstrated expertise relating to one or more of the YSEALI themes.

(iii) Current employment, and two or more years of professional work experience relevant to one or more YSEALI themes.

(iv) Other criteria determined appropriate by the Secretary.

(C) OTHER INITIATIVES.—The Secretary of State may designate other initiatives as YSEALI initiatives under this section if they advance the goals of the YSEALI program as described in paragraph (2).

(4) ACTIVITIES.—
(A) United States-based activities.—

The Secretary of State shall oversee all United States-based activities carried out under the YSEALI program, including the participation of YSEALI Academic Fellows in a program at a United States university or college, and the participation of YSEALI Professional Fellows at United States private and public sector organizations for individually-tailored work placements. Both fellowships may include site visits, professional networking opportunities, leadership training, community service, and organized cultural activities, as appropriate.

(B) Southeast Asia-based activities.—The Secretary of State should continue to support overseas initiatives of the program, including the following:

(i) Quality leadership training, professional development, and networking opportunities for YSEALI alumni.

(ii) Reciprocal exchanges for YSEALI Professional Fellows Program’s United States professional hosts and interlocutors to support post-United States exchange ac-
tion plans and other related public diplomacy goals, as appropriate.

(iii) Opportunities for networking with YSEALI alumni and professionals and experts who are American and Southeast Asian.

(iv) The YSEALI Regional Workshop program, offering networking, mentoring, hands-on training, and the tools necessary to lead communities in addressing economic, environmental, educational, and civic engagement issues.

(v) The YSEALI Seeds for the Future program, providing small, competitive grants to young leaders in Southeast Asia to improve their communities, countries, and the region towards one or more of the themes of civic engagement, economic empowerment and social entrepreneurship, education, or environmental issues.

(vi) The YSEALI Academy at Fulbright University Vietnam, offering executive-level seminars for entry to mid-level professionals around the themes of tech-
...ology and innovation, public policy, and entrepreneurship.

(vii) The YSEALI Women’s Leadership Academy Program, enhancing people-to-people ties and engagement with young and emerging leaders by promoting gender equality and advancing the status of women and girls, such as in the public health sector.

(C) ALUMNI PLATFORM.—The Secretary of State is authorized to convene current YSEALI participants and YSEALI alumni through a platform to promote networking opportunities within the YSEALI community.

(D) IMPLEMENTATION.—To carry out this paragraph, United States diplomatic and consular posts, the Secretary of State, and agency external partners managing and implementing the YSEALI program—

(i) shall promote United States policy goals in Southeast Asia by providing tools and resources to help young Southeast Asian leaders develop important skills and connections, including through online campaigns and public diplomacy initiatives;
(ii) shall establish a system for monitoring, evaluating, and improving the YSEALI program; and

(iii) may accept financial contributions from foundations, corporations, private donors, program partners, and implementing agency external partners intended to foster the goals of the YSEALI program.

(5) REPORTS.—

(A) STRATEGY.—The Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy for implementing the YSEALI program, including the following:

(i) YSEALI program goals, targets, and planned outcomes for each year and, separately, for the YSEALI program generally during the duration of its implementation.

(ii) The continuation of YSEALI program monitoring and evaluation plan, including metrics for measuring YSEALI program progress identification of annual YSEALI program goals, and targets.
(B) **Annual reports.**—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this section, and annually thereafter for 4 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and publish on a publicly available website of the Department a report on—

(i) YSEALI program progress and an assessment of the metrics, goals, targets, and outcomes described in subparagraph (A)(i), including information relating to YSEALI program implementation and outcome activities during the year covered by each report; and

(ii) recommendations for improvements or amendments to the YSEALI program and strategy, if any, that would improve their effectiveness during subsequent years of YSEALI program implementation.

(C) **Final report.**—Not later than the date of the submission of the last report required under subparagraph (B), the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a final assessment report that evaluates YSEALI program implementa-
tion and outcomes during the entire duration of
YSEALI program operation, including rec-
ommendations regarding whether the YSEALI
program should be reauthorized and any
changes that would improve its effectiveness.

(6) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(A) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COM-
MITTEES.—The term “appropriate congress-
sional committees” means—

(i) the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives;

(ii) the Committee on Appropriations
of the House of Representatives;

(iii) the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions of the Senate; and

(iv) the Committee on Appropriations
of the Senate.

(B) IMPLEMENTING AGENCY EXTERNAL
PARTNERS.—The term “implementing agency
eexternal partners” means any external partner
that is not a United States Government agency,
and may include one or more of the following
tentities:

(i) Local or multinational corpora-
tions.
(ii) Nongovernmental organizations.

(iii) Universities.

(iv) Regional institutions.

(C) YSEALI THEME.—The term “YSEALI theme” means—

(i) civic engagement;

(ii) economic empowerment and social entrepreneurship;

(iii) education;

(iv) environmental issues; or

(v) any other theme included by the Secretary of State.

(D) YSEALI PARTNER COUNTRIES.—The term “YSEALI partner countries” includes each member country of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and each other country or political entity the Secretary of State determines appropriate to include in the programs established under this section.

SEC. 207. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH G7 AND G20 COUNTRIES.

It is the sense of Congress that the President, acting through the Secretary of State, should initiate an agenda with G7 and G20 countries on matters relevant to eco-
nomic and democratic freedoms, including relating to the following:

(1) Trade and investment issues and enforcement.

(2) Building support for international infrastructure standards, including standards agreed to at the G20 summit in Osaka in 2018.

(3) The erosion of democracy and human rights.

(4) The security of 5G telecommunications.

(5) Anti-competitive behavior, such as intellectual property theft, massive subsidization of companies, and other policies and practices.

(6) Predatory international sovereign lending that is inconsistent with Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and Paris Club principles.

(7) International influence campaigns.

(8) Environmental standards.

(9) Coordination with like-minded regional partners that are not in the G7 and G20.

SEC. 208. ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES-TAIWAN PARTNERSHIP.

(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States—
(1) to support the close economic, political, and security relationship between Taiwan and the United States and recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the approach to the United States Indo-Pacific;

(2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its democracy a vital national security interest of the United States;

(3) to reinforce all existing United States Government commitments to Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8), the three joint communiques, and the “Six Assurances”;

(4) to support Taiwan’s implementation of its asymmetric defense strategy, including the priorities identified in Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept;

(5) to urge Taiwan to increase its defense spending in order to fully resource its defense strategy;

(6) to conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, particularly its efforts to develop and integrate asymmetric capabilities, such as anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance,
and resilient command and control capabilities, into
its military forces;

(7) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan’s
meaningful participation in international organiza-
tions, including the World Health Assembly, the
International Civil Aviation Organization, the Inter-
ationl Criminal Police Organization, and other
international bodies as appropriate;

(8) to advocate for information sharing with
Taiwan in the International Agency for Research on
Cancer;

(9) to promote meaningful cooperation among
the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded
partners;

(10) to enhance bilateral trade, including poten-
tially through new agreements or resumption of
talks under the Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement;

(11) to actively engage in trade talks in pursu-
ance of a bilateral free trade agreement;

(12) to expand bilateral economic and techno-
logical cooperation, including improving supply chain
security;

(13) to support United States educational and
exchange programs with Taiwan, including by pro-
moting the study of Chinese language, culture, history, and politics in Taiwan; and

(14) to expand people-to-people exchanges between the United States and Taiwan.

(b) SUPPORTING UNITED STATES EDUCATIONAL AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH TAIWAN.—

(1) ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES-TAIWAN CULTURAL EXCHANGE FOUNDATION.—The Secretary of State should consider establishing an independent nonprofit entity that—

(A) is dedicated to deepening ties between the future leaders of Taiwan and the United States; and

(B) works with State and local school districts and educational institutions in the United States to send high school and university students to Taiwan to study the Chinese language, culture, history, politics, and other relevant subjects.

(2) PARTNER.—State and local school districts and educational institutions, including public universities, in the United States are encouraged to partner with the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States to establish
programs to promote an increase in educational and
cultural exchanges.

SEC. 209. TAIWAN DIPLOMATIC REVIEW.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) Pursuant to the Taiwan Relations Act (22
U.S.C. 3301(b)(1)), it is the policy of the United
States to “promote extensive, close, and friendly
commercial, cultural, and other relations between
the people of the United States and the people of
Taiwan”.

(2) In May 2019, the Taiwanese counterpart to
the American Institute in Taiwan, the Coordination
Council for North American Affairs, was renamed
the “Taiwan Council for U.S. Affairs”.

(3) It is the policy of the United States to refer
to Taiwan as “Taiwan”, not “Taipei” or “Chinese
Taipei”.

(4) The Taipei Economic and Cultural Rep-
resentative Office is inaptly named as it works to
cultivate the extensive, close, and friendly commer-
cial, cultural, and other relations between the people
of the United States and the people, organizations,
and enterprises of Taiwan, not merely those in Tai-
pei.
(b) NEGOTIATIONS TO RENAME TECRO.—Reflective of the substantively deepening ties between Taiwan and the United States, the Secretary of State shall seek to enter into negotiations with appropriate officials of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States with the objective of renaming its office in Washington, D.C., the Taiwan Representative Office in the United States, and its subsidiary offices in the United States, accordingly.

SEC. 210. TAIWAN PEACE AND STABILITY ACT.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the “Taiwan Peace and Stability Act”.

(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

(2) INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION.—The term “international organization” includes United Nations funds, programs, specialized agencies, entities, and bodies, as well as other organizations outside of the United Nations system that the Secretary of
State determines appropriate, in consultation with other relevant Federal departments and agencies.

(3) **ONE-CHINA PRINCIPLE.**—The term “One-China Principle” means only the PRC’s policy toward Taiwan.

(4) **CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS.**—The term “civil society organizations” means international civil society organizations that are critical to maintaining Taiwan’s international space and enabling Taiwan to play a positive and constructive role in the global community.

(5) **POTENTIAL PLA CAMPAIGNS.**—The term “potential PLA campaigns” means—

(A) a naval blockade of Taiwan;

(B) an amphibious assault and ground invasion of Taiwan, especially such invasion designed to accomplish a fiat accompli before intervention is possible; or

(C) a seizure of one or more of Taiwan’s outlying islands.

(c) **FINDINGS.**—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The United States has consistently sought to advance peace and stability in East Asia as a cen-
tral element of United States foreign policy toward
the region.

(2) The Government of the People’s Republic of
China (PRC), especially since the election of Tsai
Ing-Wen in 2016, has conducted a coordinated cam-
paign to weaken Taiwan diplomatically, economi-
cally, and militarily in a manner that threatens to
erode United States policy and create a fait accompli
on questions surrounding Taiwan’s future.

(3) In order to ensure the longevity of United
States policy and preserve the ability of the people
of Taiwan to determine their future independently,
it is necessary to reinforce Taiwan’s diplomatic, eco-

momic, and physical space.

(4) Taiwan has provided monetary, humani-
tarian, and medical assistance to combat diseases
such as AIDS, tuberculosis, Ebola, and dengue fever
in countries around the world. During the COVID–
19 pandemic, Taiwan donated millions of pieces of
personal protective equipment and COVID–19 tests
to countries in need.

(5) Since 2016, the Gambia, São Tomé and
Príncipe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina
Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, and
Kiribati have severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in favor of diplomatic relations with China.

(6) Taiwan was invited to participate in the World Health Assembly (WHA), the decision-making body of the World Health Organization, as an observer annually between 2009 and 2016. Since the 2016 election of President Tsai, the PRC has increasingly resisted Taiwan’s participation in the WHA. Taiwan was not invited to attend the WHA in 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, or 2021.

(7) The Taipei Flight Information Region reportedly served 1,750,000 flights and 68,900,000 passengers in 2018 and is home to Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport, the 11th busiest airport in the world. Taiwan has been excluded from participating at the International Civil Aviation Organization since 2013.

(8) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1971) does not address the issue of representation of Taiwan and its people at the United Nations, nor does it give the PRC the right to represent the people on Taiwan.

(d) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to—
(1) maintain the position that peace and stability in the Western Pacific are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern; and
(2) work with allies and partners to promote peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and deter military acts or other forms of coercive behavior that would undermine regional stability.

(e) Sense of Congress on Taiwan’s Meaningful Participation in the International Community.—

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) Taiwan is free, democratic, and prosperous, is home to 23,500,000 people, and is an important contributor to the global community;
(2) multiple United States Government Administrations have taken important steps to advance Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations and to enhance cooperation with Taiwan to provide global public goods, including through development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief in trilateral and multilateral fora;
(3) nonetheless, significant structural, policy, and legal barriers remain to advancing Taiwan’s
meaningful participation in the international community; and

(4) efforts to share Taiwan’s expertise with other parts of the global community could be further enhanced through a systematic approach, along with greater attention from Congress and the American public to such efforts.

(f) Strategy to Support Taiwan’s Meaningful Participation in International Organizations.—

(1) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of State, in consultation with other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy—

(A) to advance Taiwan’s meaningful participation in a prioritized set of international organizations; and

(B) that responds to growing pressure from the PRC on foreign governments, international organizations, commercial actors, and civil society organizations to comply with its “One-China Principle” with respect to Taiwan.

(2) Matters to be included.—The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall include—
(A) an assessment of the methods the PRC uses to coerce actors to adhere to its “One-China Principle”, including those employed against governments, international organizations, and civil society organizations and pressure on commercial actors, to the extent relevant in the context of Taiwan’s meaningful participation international organizations;

(B) an assessment of the policies of foreign governments toward the PRC and Taiwan, to identify likeminded allies and partners who might become public or private partners in the strategy;

(C) a systematic analysis of all international organizations, as practicable, to identify those that best lend themselves to advancing Taiwan’s participation, including—

(i) the organization’s policy on the requirements to obtain membership and observer status, as well as the foundational documents defining membership requirements and observer status within the organization;

(ii) the organization’s participation rules;
(iii) the processes for developing membership requirements and participation rules;

(iv) the policies of current members regarding Taiwan’s political status; and

(v) the organization’s relative reliance on contributions from the PRC and how it may affect internal decision-making;

(D) an evaluation of the feasibility and advisability of expanding economic, security, and diplomatic engagement with countries that have demonstrably strengthened, enhanced, or upgraded relations with Taiwan, where it aligns with United States interests;

(E) a survey of international organizations that have allowed Taiwan’s meaningful participation, including an assessment of whether any erosion in Taiwan’s engagement has occurred within those organizations and how Taiwan’s participation has positively strengthened the capacity and activity of these organizations, providing positive models for Taiwan’s inclusion in other similar forums;

(F) a list of not more than 20 international organizations at which the United
States Government will prioritize using its voice, vote, and influence to advance Taiwan’s meaningful participation over the three-year period following the date of enactment of this Act, to be derived from the organizations identified pursuant to subparagraph (C); and

(G) a description of the diplomatic strategies and the coalitions the United States Government plans to develop to implement subparagraph (F).

(3) Form.—The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in classified form but may include an unclassified summary.

(4) Consultation.—The Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees—

(A) not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, with respect to the international organizations identified pursuant to paragraph (2)(C); and

(B) not later than 180 days after the date of the submission of the strategy required under paragraph (1), and every 180 days thereafter for 2 years, regarding the development and implementation of the strategy required.
(g) **EXPANDING UNITED STATES-TAIWAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—No later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), in consultation with the United States International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on cooperation with Taiwan on trilateral and multilateral development initiatives, through the American Institute in Taiwan as appropriate.

(2) **MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.**—The report required in paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) A comprehensive review of existing cooperation mechanisms and initiatives between USAID or DFC and relevant departments and agencies in Taiwan, including, but not limited to Taiwan’s International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF).

(B) An assessment of how USAID and DFC development cooperation with relevant departments and agencies in Taiwan compares to comparable cooperation with partners of similar economic size and foreign assistance capacity.
(C) An analysis of the opportunities and challenges the cooperation described in subparagraph (A) has offered to date, including—

(i) opportunities collaboration has offered to expand USAID’s and DFC’s ability to deliver assistance into a wider range communities;

(ii) sectors where USAID, DFC, ICDF, other relevant agencies and departments in Taiwan, or the organizations’ implementing partners, have a comparative advantage in providing assistance; and

(iii) opportunities to transition virtual capacity building events relevant departments and agencies in Taiwan, through the Global Cooperation and Training Framework and other forums, into in-person, enduring forms of development cooperation.

(D) An assessment of any legal, policy, logistical, financial, or administrative barriers to expanding cooperation in trilateral or multilateral development, including—

(i) availability of personnel at the American Institute in Taiwan responsible
for coordinating development assistance co-
operation;

(ii) volume of current cooperation ini-
tiatives and barriers to expanding it;

(iii) diplomatic, policy, or legal bar-
riers facing the United States or other
partners to including Taiwan in formal
and informal multilateral development co-
operation mechanisms;

(iv) resource or capacity barriers to
expanding cooperation facing the United
States or Taiwan; and

(v) geopolitical barriers that com-
plicate United States-Taiwan cooperation
in third countries.

(E) Recommendations to address the chal-
lenges identified in subparagraph (D).

(F) A description of any additional re-
sources or authorities that expanding coopera-
tion might require.

(3) FORM.—The strategy required in paragraph
(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may
include a classified annex.
(h) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON EXPANDING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN.—It is the sense of the Congress that—

(1) expanding United States economic relations with Taiwan has benefited the people of both the United States and Taiwan; and

(2) the United States should explore opportunities to deepen, and where possible expand, economic ties between Taiwan and the United States, through dialogue, and by developing the legal templates required to support potential future agreements.

(i) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) PRC attempts to intimidate Taiwan, including through high rates of PRC sorties into air space near Taiwan, and PRC amphibious assault exercises near Taiwan, jeopardizes the long-standing United States position that differences in cross-Strait relations must be resolved peacefully;

(2) given the potential for a cross-Strait conflict to be highly destructive and destabilizing, any increase in the risk of conflict demands attention and obligates leaders to reinforce deterrence, as the most viable means to prevent war;
(3) Taiwan should continue to implement its asymmetric defense strategy, including investing in cost-effective and resilient capabilities, while also strengthening recruitment and training of its reserve and civil defense forces, and those capabilities include, but are not limited to, coastal defense cruise missiles; and

(4) while enhancing deterrence, it is also essential to maintain open and effective crisis communication and risk reduction mechanisms, as a means to reduce the risk of misunderstanding and ultimately, conflict.

(j) Strategy to Enhance Deterrence Over a Cross-Strait Conflict.—

(1) In General.—No later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a whole-of-government strategy to enhance deterrence over a cross-Strait military conflict between the PRC and Taiwan.

(2) Matters to be Included.—The strategy shall include the following:

(A) A comprehensive review of existing diplomatic, economic, and military tools to es-
establish deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict
and an assessment of their efficacy.

(B) An examination of the present and fu-
ture capabilities of the United States and Tai-
wan to respond to the potential PLA campaigns
against Taiwan in 5, 10, and 15 years. The
analysis shall include an assessment of the
progress Taiwan has made in developing the
cost-effective and resilient capabilities needed to
respond to its strategic environment, as well as
any additional personnel, procurement, or train-
ing reforms required.

(C) An evaluation of the feasibility of ex-
panding coordination with United States allies
and partners to enhance deterrence over a
cross-Strait conflict. The review shall include a
review of the following matters:

(i) Expanding coordination of public
or private messaging on deterrence vis-à-
vis Taiwan.

(ii) Coordinating use of economic tools
to raise the costs of PRC military action
that could precipitate a cross-Strait con-
flict.
(iii) Enhancing codevelopment and co-
deployment of military capabilities related
to deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict,
or enhancing coordination on training of
Taiwan’s military forces.

(D) Recommendations on significant addi-
tional diplomatic, economic, and military steps
available to the United States Government, uni-
laterally and in concert with United States al-
lies and partners, to enhance the clarity and
credibility of deterrence over a cross-Strait con-

(E) A description of any additional re-
sources or authorities needed to implement the
recommendations identified in subparagraph
(D).

(3) FORM.—The strategy required in paragraph
(1) shall be submitted classified form but may in-
clude an unclassified annex.

(4) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 90 days
after the date of enactment of this Act, and not less
frequently than every 180 days thereafter for 7
years, the President (or a designee), as well as rep-
resentatives from the agencies and departments in-
volved in developing the strategy required in para-
graph (1), shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees regarding the development and implementation of the strategy required in this subsection. The representatives from the relevant agencies and departments shall be at the Under Secretary level or above.

(k) **STRENGTHENING TAIWAN’S CIVILIAN DEFENSE PROFESSIONALS.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall present to the appropriate congressional committees a plan for strengthening the community of civilian defense professionals in Taiwan, facilitated through the American Institute in Taiwan as appropriate.

(2) **MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.**—The plan required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) A comprehensive review of existing United States Government and non-United States Government programmatic and funding modalities to support Taiwan's civilian defense professionals in pursuing professional development, educational, and cultural exchanges in the United States, including—
(i) opportunities through Department of State-supported programs, such as the International Visitor Leaders Program; and

(ii) opportunities offered through non-governmental institutions, such as think tanks, to the extent the review can practicably make such an assessment.

(B) A description of the frequency that civilian defense professionals from Taiwan pursue or are selected for the programs reviewed pursuant to subparagraph (A).

(C) An analysis of any funding, policy, administrative, or other barriers preventing greater participation from Taiwan’s civilian defense professionals in the opportunities identified pursuant to subparagraph (A).

(D) An evaluation of the value expanding the opportunities reviewed pursuant to subparagraph (A) would offer for strengthening Taiwan’s existing civilian defense community, and for increasing the perceived value of the field for young professionals in Taiwan.

(E) An assessment of options the United States Government could take individually, with
partners in Taiwan, or with foreign governments, or nongovernmental partners, to expand
the opportunities reviewed pursuant to subparagraph (A).

(F) A description of additional resources and authorities required by the options assessed pursuant to subparagraph (E).

(3) FORM.—The plan required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 211. TAIWAN INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY ACT.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the “Taiwan International Solidarity Act”.

(b) CLARIFICATION REGARDING UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2758.—Subsection (a) of section 2 of the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (Public Law 116–135) (relating to diplomatic relations with Taiwan) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:

“(10) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1971) established the representatives of the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations. The resolution did not address the
issue of representation of Taiwan and its people in
the United Nations or any related organizations, nor
did the resolution take a position on the relationship
between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan
or include any statement pertaining to Taiwan’s sov-
ereignty.

“(11) The United States opposes any initiative
that seeks to change Taiwan’s status without the
consent of the people.”.

(c) UNITED STATES ADVOCACY FOR INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS TO RESIST THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA’S EFFORTS TO DISTORT THE “ONE CHINA” POSITION.—Section 4 of the Taiwan Allies International Pro-
tection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019
(relation to the policy of the United States regarding Tai-
wan’s participation in international organizations) is
amended—

(1) in paragraph (2), by striking “and” after
the semicolon at the end;

(2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at
the end and inserting “; and”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new
paragraph:

“(4) to instruct, as appropriate, representatives
of the United States Government in all organizations
described in paragraph (1) to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to advocate such organizations to resist the People’s Republic of China’s efforts to distort the decisions, language, policies, or procedures of such organizations regarding Taiwan.”.

(d) OPPOSING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE TAIWAN’S TIES AND PARTNERSHIPS INTERNATIONALLY.—Subsection (a) of section 5 of the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (relating to strengthening ties with Taiwan) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (2), by striking “and” after the semicolon at the end;

(2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; and”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(4) encourage, as appropriate, United States allies and partners to oppose the People’s Republic of China’s efforts to undermine Taiwan’s official diplomatic relationships and its partnerships with countries with which it does not maintain diplomatic relations.”.
(e) Report on the People’s Republic of China’s Attempts to Promote Its “One China” Position.—

(1) In General.—Subsection (b) of section 5 of the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (relating to strengthening ties with Taiwan) is amended by inserting before the period at the end the following: “, as well as information relating to any prior or ongoing attempts by the People’s Republic of China to undermine Taiwan’s membership or observer status in all organizations described in section (4)(1) and Taiwan’s ties and relationships with other countries in accordance with subsection (a) of this section”.

(2) Effective Date.—The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and apply beginning with the first report required under subsection (b) of section 5 of the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019, as amended by paragraph (1), that is required after such date.
SEC. 212. TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the “Taiwan Fellowship Act”.

(b) FINDINGS; PURPOSES.—

(1) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(A) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) affirmed United States policy “to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area”.

(B) Consistent with the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409), the United States has grown its strategic partnership with Taiwan’s vibrant democracy of 23,000,000 people.

(C) Despite a concerted campaign by the People’s Republic of China to isolate Taiwan from its diplomatic partners and from international organizations, including the World Health Organization, Taiwan has emerged as a global leader in the coronavirus global pandemic response, including by donating more than
2,000,000 surgical masks and other medical equipment to the United States.

(D) The creation of a United States fellowship program with Taiwan would support—

(i) a key priority of expanding people-to-people exchanges, which was outlined in President Donald J. Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy;

(ii) President Joseph R. Biden’s commitment to Taiwan, “a leading democracy and a critical economic and security partner”, as expressed in his March 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance; and

(iii) April 2021 guidance from the Department of State based on a review required under the Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020 (subtitle B of title III of division FF of Public Law 116–260) to “encourage U.S. government engagement with Taiwan that reflects our deepening unofficial relationship”.

(2) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this section are—
(A) to further strengthen the United States-Taiwan strategic relationship and broaden understanding of the Indo-Pacific region by temporarily assigning officials of agencies of the United States Government to Taiwan for intensive study in Mandarin Chinese and placement as Fellows with the governing authorities on Taiwan or a Taiwanese civic institution;

(B) to expand United States Government expertise in Mandarin Chinese language skills and understanding of the politics, history, and culture of Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific region by providing eligible United States personnel the opportunity to acquire such skills and understanding through the Taiwan Fellowship Program established under subsection (c); and

(C) to better position the United States to advance its economic, security, and human rights interests and values in the Indo-Pacific region.

(c) TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.—

(1) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(A) AGENCY HEAD.—The term “agency head” means, in the case of the executive branch of United States Government, or in the
case of a legislative branch agency specified in
subsection (B), the head of the respective
agency.

(B) AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES GOV-
ERNMENT.—The term “agency of the United
States Government” includes the Government
Accountability Office, the Congressional Budget
Office, the Congressional Research Service, and
the United States-China Economic and Security
Review Commission of the legislative branch, as
well as any agency of the executive branch.

(C) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COM-
MITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(i) the Committee on Appropriations,
    the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the
    Committee on Armed Services of the
    House of Representatives; and

(ii) the Committee on Appropriations
    and the Committee on Foreign Relations
    of the Senate.

(D) DETAILEE.—The term “detailee”
means an employee of an agency of the United
States Government on loan to the American In-
stitute in Taiwan, without a change of position
from the agency at which such employee is em-
ployed.

(E) IMPLEMENTING PARTNER.—The term
“implementing partner” means any United
States organization described in section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
and exempt from tax under section 501(a) of
such Code that—

(i) is selected through a competitive
process;

(ii) performs logistical, administrative,
and other functions, as determined by the
Department of State and the American In-
stitute of Taiwan, in support of the Tai-
wan Fellowship Program; and

(iii) enters into a cooperative agree-
ment with the American Institute in Tai-
wan to administer the Taiwan Fellowship
Program.

(2) ESTABLISHMENT OF TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP
PROGRAM.—

(A) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of
State shall establish the “Taiwan Fellowship
Program” (referred to in this section as the
“Program”) to provide a fellowship opportunity
in Taiwan of up to two years for eligible United States citizens through the cooperative agreement established in subparagraph (B). The Secretary of State, in consultation with appropriate counterparts at the American Institute in Taiwan and the implementing partner, may modify the name of the Program.

(B) COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS.——

(i) In general.—The American Institute in Taiwan shall use amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization under paragraph (6)(A) to enter into an annual or multi-year cooperative agreement with an appropriate implementing partner.

(ii) Fellowships.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the American Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, the implementing partner, shall award to eligible United States citizens, subject to available funding——

(I) not fewer than five fellowships during the first two years of the Program; and
(II) not fewer than ten fellowships during each of the remaining years of the Program.

(C) INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT; IMPLEMENTING PARTNER.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the American Institute in Taiwan, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall—

(i) begin negotiations with the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office, or with another appropriate entity, for the purpose of entering into an agreement to facilitate the placement of fellows in an agency of the governing authorities on Taiwan; and

(ii) begin the process of selecting an implementing partner, which—

(I) shall agree to meet all of the legal requirements required to operate in Taiwan; and

(II) shall be composed of staff who demonstrate significant experience managing exchange programs in the Indo-Pacific region.

(D) CURRICULUM.—
(i) **First Year.**—During the first year of each fellowship under this subsection, each fellow should study—

(I) the Mandarin Chinese language;

(II) the people, history, and political climate on Taiwan; and

(III) the issues affecting the relationship between the United States and the Indo-Pacific region.

(ii) **Second Year.**—During the second year of each fellowship under this section, each fellow, subject to the approval of the Secretary of State, the American Institute in Taiwan, and the implementing partner, and in accordance with the purposes of this section, shall work in—

(I) a parliamentary office, ministry, or other agency of the governing authorities on Taiwan; or

(II) an organization outside of the governing authorities on Taiwan, whose interests are associated with the interests of the fellow and the agency of the United States Govern-
ment from which the fellow had been employed.

(E) Flexible fellowship duration.—

Notwithstanding any requirement under this section, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the American Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, the implementing partner, may award fellowships that have a duration of between nine months and two years, and may alter the curriculum requirements under subparagraph (D) for such purposes.

(F) Sunset.—The Program shall terminate ten years after the date of the enactment of this section.

(3) Program requirements.—

(A) Eligibility requirements.—A United States citizen is eligible for a fellowship under this section if he or she—

(i) is an employee of the United States Government;

(ii) has at least two years of experience in any branch of the United States Government;

(iii) has received at least one exemplary performance review in his or her cur-
rent United States Government role within
at least the last three years prior to begin-
ning the fellowship;

(iv) has a demonstrated professional
or educational background in the relation-
ship between the United States and coun-
tries in the Indo-Pacific region; and

(v) has demonstrated his or her com-
mitment to further service in the United
States Government.

(B) Responsibilities of Fellows.—
Each recipient of a fellowship under this section
shall agree, as a condition of such fellowship—

(i) to maintain satisfactory progress
in language training and appropriate be-
havior in Taiwan, as determined by the
Department of State, the American Insti-
tute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, its im-
plementing partner;

(ii) to refrain from engaging in any
intelligence or intelligence-related activity
on behalf of the United States Govern-
ment; and

(iii) to continue Federal Government
employment for a period of not less than
four years after the conclusion of the fellowship, or for not less than two years for a fellowship that is one year or shorter.

(C) **Responsibilities of Implementing Partner.**—

(i) **Selection of Fellows.**—The implementing partner, in close coordination with the Secretary of State and the American Institute in Taiwan, shall—

(I) make efforts to recruit fellowship candidates who reflect the diversity of the United States;

(II) select fellows for the Program based solely on merit, with appropriate supervision from the Department of State and the American Institute in Taiwan; and

(III) prioritize the selection of candidates willing to serve a fellowship lasting one year or longer.

(ii) **First Year.**—The implementing partner should provide each fellow in the first year (or shorter duration, as jointly determined by the Secretary of State and the American Institute in Taiwan, for
those who are not serving a two-year fellowship) with—

(I) intensive Mandarin Chinese language training; and

(II) courses in the politic, culture, and history of Taiwan, China, and the broader Indo-Pacific.

(iii) WAIVER OF REQUIRED TRAINING.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the American Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, the implementing partner, may waive any of the training required under clause (ii) to the extent that a fellow has Mandarin Chinese language skills, knowledge of the topics described in clause (ii)(II), or for other related reasons approved by the Secretary of State and the American Institute in Taiwan. If any of the training requirements are waived for a fellow serving a two-year fellowship, the training portion of his or her fellowship may be shortened to the extent appropriate.

(iv) OFFICE; STAFFING.—The implementing partner, in consultation with the
Secretary of State and the American Institute in Taiwan, shall maintain an office and at least one full-time staff member in Taiwan to—

(I) liaise with the American Institute in Taiwan and the governing authorities on Taiwan; and

(II) serve as the primary in-country point of contact for the recipients of fellowships under this section and their dependents.

(v) OTHER FUNCTIONS.—The implementing partner should perform other functions in association in support of the Program, including logistical and administrative functions, as included in the cooperative agreement entered into pursuant to paragraph (2)(B) by the Secretary of State and the American Institute in Taiwan.

(D) NONCOMPLIANCE.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—Any fellow who fails to comply with the requirements under this section shall reimburse the American Institute in Taiwan for—
(I) the Federal funds expended for the fellow’s participation in the fellowship, as set forth in clauses (ii) and (iii); and

(II) interest accrued on such funds (calculated at the prevailing rate).

(ii) Full Reimbursement.—Any fellow who violates clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (B) shall reimburse the American Institute in Taiwan in an amount equal to the sum of—

(I) all of the Federal funds expended for the fellow’s participation in the fellowship; and

(II) interest on the amount specified in subclause (I), which shall be calculated at the prevailing rate.

(iii) Pro Rata Reimbursement.—Any fellow who violates subparagraph (B)(iii) shall reimburse the American Institute in Taiwan in an amount equal to the difference between—

(I) the amount specified in clause (ii); and
(II) the product of—

(aa) the amount the fellow received in compensation during the final year of the fellowship, including the value of any allowances and benefits received by the fellow; multiplied by

(bb) the percentage of the period specified in subparagraph (B)(iii) during which the fellow did not remain employed by the United States Government.

(E) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the selection of the first class of fellows under this section and annually thereafter for 10 years, the Secretary of State shall offer to brief the appropriate congressional committees regarding the following:

(i) An assessment of the performance of the implementing partner in fulfilling the purposes of this section.

(ii) The number of applicants each year, the number of applicants willing to serve a fellowship lasting one year or
longer, and the number of such applicants selected for a fellowship.

(iii) The names and sponsoring agencies of the fellows selected by the implementing partner and the extent to which such fellows represent the diversity of the United States.

(iv) The names of the parliamentary offices, ministries, other agencies of the governing authorities on Taiwan, and non-governmental institutions to which each fellow was assigned.

(v) Any recommendations, as appropriate, to improve the implementation of the Program, including added flexibilities in the administration of the program.

(vi) An assessment of the Program’s value upon the relationship between the United States and Taiwan or the United States and Asian countries.

(F) ANNUAL FINANCIAL AUDIT.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—The financial records of any implementing partner shall be audited annually in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards by
independent certified public accountants or
independent licensed public accountants
who are certified or licensed by a regu-
latory authority of a State or another po-
itical subdivision of the United States.

(ii) LOCATION.—Each audit under
clause (i) shall be conducted at the place
or places where the financial records of the
implementing partner are normally kept.

(iii) ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS.—The
implementing partner shall make available
to the accountants conducting an audit
under clause (i)—

(I) all books, financial records,
files, other papers, things, and prop-
erty belonging to, or in use by, the
implementing partner that are nec-
essary to facilitate the audit; and

(II) full facilities for verifying
transactions with the balances or se-
curities held by depositories, fiscal
agents, and custodians.

(iv) REPORT.—

(I) IN GENERAL.—Not later than
180 days after the end of each fiscal
year, the implementing partner shall
provide a report of the audit con-
ducted for such fiscal year under
clause (i) to the Secretary of State
and the American Institute in Taiwan.

(II) CONTENTS.—Each audit re-
port under subclause (I) shall—

(aa) set forth the scope of
the audit at issue;

(bb) include such state-
ments, along with the auditor’s
opinion of those statements, as
may be necessary to present fairly
the implementing partner’s as-
sets and liabilities, surplus or
deficit, with reasonable detail;

(cc) include a statement of
the implementing partner’s in-
come and expenses during the
year; and

(dd) include a schedule of—

(AA) all contracts and
cooperative agreements re-
quiring payments greater
than $5,000; and
(BB) any payments of compensation, salaries, or fees at a rate greater than $5,000 per year.

(III) Copies.—Each audit report shall be produced in sufficient copies for distribution to the public.

(4) Taiwan fellows on detail from government service.—

(A) In general.—

(i) Detail authorized.—With the approval of the Secretary of State, an agency head may detail, for a period of not more than two years, an employee of the agency of the United States Government who has been awarded a fellowship under this Act, to the American Institute in Taiwan for the purpose of assignment to the governing authorities on Taiwan or an organization described in paragraph (2)(D)(ii)(II).

(ii) Agreement.—Each detailee shall enter into a written agreement with the Federal Government before receiving a fellowship, in which the fellow shall agree—
(I) to continue in the service of the sponsoring agency at the end of fellowship for a period of at least four years (or at least two years if the fellowship duration is one year or shorter) unless such detailee is involuntarily separated from the service of such agency; and

(II) to pay to the American Institute in Taiwan any additional expenses incurred by the United States Government in connection with the fellowship if the detailee voluntarily separates from service with the sponsoring agency before the end of the period for which the detailee has agreed to continue in the service of such agency.

(iii) EXCEPTION.—The payment agreed to under clause (ii)(II) may not be required of a detailee who leaves the service of the sponsoring agency to enter into the service of another agency of the United States Government unless the head of the sponsoring agency notifies the detailee be-
fore the effective date of entry into the
service of the other agency that payment
will be required under this subsection.

(B) Status as Government Employee.—A detailee under this paragraph—

(i) is deemed, for the purpose of preserving allowances, privileges, rights, seniority, and other benefits, to be an employee of the sponsoring agency;

(ii) is entitled to pay, allowances, and benefits from funds available to such agency, which is deemed to comply with section 5536 of title 5, United States Code; and

(iii) may be assigned to a position with an entity described in paragraph (2)(D)(ii)(I) if acceptance of such position does not involve—

(I) the taking of an oath of allegiance to another government; or

(II) the acceptance of compensation or other benefits from any foreign government by such detailee.

(C) Responsibilities of Sponsoring Agency.—
(i) **IN GENERAL.**—The agency of the United States Government from which a detaillee is detailed should provide the fellow allowances and benefits that are consistent with Department of State Standardized Regulations or other applicable rules and regulations, including—

(I) a living quarters allowance to cover the cost of housing in Taiwan;

(II) a cost of living allowance to cover any possible higher costs of living in Taiwan;

(III) a temporary quarters subsistence allowance for up to seven days if the fellow is unable to find housing immediately upon arriving in Taiwan;

(IV) an education allowance to assist parents in providing the fellow’s minor children with educational services ordinarily provided without charge by public schools in the United States;

(V) moving expenses to transport personal belongings of the fellow and
his or her family in their move to Taiwan, which is comparable to the allowance given for American Institute in Taiwan employees assigned to Taiwan; and

(VI) an economy-class airline ticket to and from Taiwan for each fellow and the fellow’s immediate family.

(ii) Modification of Benefits.—

The American Institute in Taiwan and its implementing partner, with the approval of the Department of State, may modify the benefits set forth in clause (i) if such modification is warranted by fiscal circumstances.

(D) No Financial Liability.—The American Institute in Taiwan, the implementing partner, and any governing authorities on Taiwan or nongovernmental entities in Taiwan at which a fellow is detailed during the second year of the fellowship may not be held responsible for the pay, allowances, or any other benefit normally provided to the detailee.
(E) REIMBURSEMENT.—Fellows may be detailed under clause (A)(ii) without reimbursement to the United States by the American Institute in Taiwan.

(F) ALLOWANCES AND BENEFITS.—Detalees may be paid by the American Institute in Taiwan for the allowances and benefits listed in subparagraph (C).

(5) GAO REPORT.—Not later than one year before the sunset of the Program pursuant to paragraph (2)(F), the Comptroller General of the United States shall transmit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report that includes the following:

(A) An analysis of United States Government participants in the Program, including the number of applicants and the number of fellowships undertaken, and the places of employment.

(B) An assessment of the costs and benefits for participants in the Program and for the United States Government of such fellowships.

(C) An analysis of the financial impact of the fellowship on United States Government of-
fices that have detailed fellows to participate in
the Program.

(D) Recommendations, if any, on how to
improve the Program.

(6) FUNDING.—

(A) Authorization of Appropriations.—There are authorized to be appro-
priated to the American Institute in Taiwan—

(i) for fiscal year 2022, $2,900,000, of which $500,000 should be made avail-
able to an appropriate implementing part-
ner to launch the Program; and

(ii) for fiscal year 2023, and each suc-
ceeding fiscal year, $2,400,000.

(B) Private Sources.—The imple-
menting partner selected to implement the Pro-
gram may accept, use, and dispose of gifts or
donations of services or property in carrying
out such program, subject to the review and ap-
proval of the American Institute in Taiwan.

SEC. 213. INCREASING DEPARTMENT OF STATE PER-
SONNEL AND RESOURCES DEVOTED TO THE
INDO-PACIFIC.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
ings:
1. In fiscal year 2020, the Department of State allocated $1,500,000,000 to the Indo-Pacific region in bilateral and regional foreign assistance resources, including as authorized by section 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409; 132 Stat. 5391), and $798,000,000 in the fiscal year 2020 diplomatic engagement budget. These amounts represent only 5 percent of the diplomatic engagement budget and only 4 percent of the total Department of State-USAID budget.

2. Over the last 5 years the diplomatic engagement budget and personnel levels in the Indo-Pacific averaged only 5 percent of the total, while foreign assistance resources averaged only 4 percent of the total.

3. In 2020, the Department of State began a process to realign certain positions at posts to ensure that its personnel footprint matches the demands of great-power competition, including in the Indo-Pacific.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

1. the size of the United States diplomatic corps must be sufficient to meet the current and
emerging challenges of the 21st century, including those in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere;

(2) robust Chinese-language skills are necessary for the success of the United States diplomatic corps and integral to its ability to meet national security objectives;

(3) the increase must be designed to meet the objectives of an Indo-Pacific strategy focused on strengthening the good governance and sovereignty of countries that adhere to and uphold the rules-based international order; and

(4) the increase must be implemented with a focus on increased numbers of economic, political, and public diplomacy officers, representing a cumulative increase of at least 200 Foreign Service officer generalists, to—

(A) advance free, fair, and reciprocal trade and open investment environments for United States entities, and engaged in increased commercial diplomacy in key markets;

(B) better articulate and explain United States policies, strengthen civil society and democratic principles, enhance reporting on global activities, promote people-to-people ex-


changes, and advance United States influence;
and

(C) increase capacity at small- and medium-sized embassies and consulates in the Indo-Pacific and other regions around the world, as necessary.

(e) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United States to—

(1) ensure Department of State funding levels and personnel footprint in the Indo-Pacific reflect the region’s high degree of importance and significance to United States political, economic, and security interests; and

(2) increase diplomatic engagement and foreign assistance funding and the quantity of personnel dedicated to the Indo-Pacific region respective to the Department of State’s total budget.

(d) ACTION PLAN.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees of Congress an action plan that includes the following elements:

(1) Identification of requirements to advance United States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific and the personnel and budgetary resources for the
Department of State needed to satisfy such objectives, assuming an unconstrained resource environment.

(2) A plan to increase the portion of the Department’s budget dedicated to the Indo-Pacific in terms of DE and FA focused on development, economic, and security assistance.

(3) A plan to increase the number of positions at posts in the Indo-Pacific region and bureaus with responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, including a description of increases at each post or bureau, a breakdown of increases by cone, and a description of how such increases in personnel will advance United States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.

(4) A plan to increase the number of Chinese-language speakers and translation specialists at posts in the Indo-Pacific region and within bureau offices with responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, including in INR.

(5) A description of any staffing or other training or personnel reforms that may be required to quickly increase departmental capacity to address the inter-disciplinary, interconnected opportunities and challenges presented in the Indo-Pacific, including but not limited to issues related to climate
change, public health, supply chains, cybersecurity, and digital technology issues.

(6) Defined concrete and annual benchmarks that the Department will meet in implementing the action plan.

(7) A description of any barriers to implementing the action plan and recommendations to address these barriers, noting whether additional authorities or resources from Congress is needed to address these barriers.

(e) Updates to Report and Briefing.—Every 180 days after the submission of the action plan described in subsection (d) for not more than 3 years, the Secretary of State shall submit an update and brief the appropriate congressional committees on the implementation of such action plan, with supporting data and including a detailed assessment of benchmarks reached.

(f) Authorization of Appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated, for fiscal year 2022, $2,000,000,000 in bilateral and regional foreign assistance resources to carry out the purposes of part I and chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq., 2346 et seq.) to the Indo-Pacific region and $1,250,000,000 in diplomatic engagement resources to the Indo-Pacific region.
(g) **Inclusion of Amounts Appropriated Pursuant to Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018.**—Amounts authorized to be appropriated under subsection (f) include funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to section 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409).

(h) **Benchmarks Update.**—Not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall report to the appropriate congressional committees on the extent to which the strategic objectives described in the action plan in subsection (d) have been satisfied or progress toward such satisfaction has been made.

**SEC. 214. REPORT ON BILATERAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS CHINESE FENTANYL TRAFFICKING.**

(a) **China’s Class Scheduling of Fentanyl and Synthetic Opioid Precursors.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a written report detailing—

(1) a description of United States Government efforts to gain a commitment from the Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to submit unregulated fentanyl precursors such as 4–AP to controls;
(2) a plan for future steps the United States Government will take to urge the PRC to combat illicit fentanyl production and trafficking originating in the PRC;

(3) an assessment of the intersection between illicit fentanyl trafficking originating in China and illicit environmental trade and possible relationships of trade-based money laundering; and

(4) an assessment of the intersection between illicit fentanyl trafficking originating in China and counterfeit medicines and medical supplies in the United States.

(b) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form with a classified annex.

SEC. 215. FACILITATION OF INCREASED EQUITY INVESTMENTS UNDER THE BETTER UTILIZATION OF INVESTMENTS LEADING TO DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 2018.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that support provided under section 1421(c)(1) of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9621(c)(1)) should be considered to be a Federal credit program that is subject to the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661 et
seq.) for purposes of applying the requirements of such Act to such support.

(b) Maximum Contingent Liability.—Section 1433 of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9633) is amended by striking “$60,000,000,000” and inserting “$100,000,000,000”.

(c) Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report on—

(1) a plan to expand the Corporation’s financing to support United States national security and development priorities in critical regions; and

(2) the budgetary, staffing, and programmatic resources that would be required in order to carry out the plan required by this subsection.

SEC. 216. EXPANDING INVESTMENT BY UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION FOR VACCINE MANUFACTURING.

(a) In General.—The Development Finance Corporation is authorized to provide financing to entities in
India and in other less developed countries to increase vaccine manufacturing capacity for the following purposes:


(2) Manufacturing SRA or WHO Emergency Use Listing therapeutics used to treat symptoms related to COVID–19.

(3) Manufacturing critical medical supplies needed for preventing, detecting and treating COVID–19, including ventilators, personal protective equipment, oxygen, diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines.

(b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chief Executive Officer of the Development Finance Corporation, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall provide a report to the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) outlining the countries where DFC financing could be most impactful for vaccine manufacturing and to achieve the goal of manufacturing 1 billion COVID–19 vaccines by 2022;
(2) including a detailed explanation of the United States and partner country interests served by the United States providing support to such projects;

(3) including a detailed description of any support provided by other United States allies and partners to expand the initiatives outlined in subsection (a); and

(4) including a detailed description of any support provided by the People’s Republic of China in support of the initiatives outlined in subsection (a).

(c) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form with a classified annex if necessary.

SEC. 217. ENSURING UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC POSTS ALIGN WITH AMERICAN STRATEGIC NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES.

(a) FINDING.—With 276 embassies and other representative offices globally, China now has more diplomatic posts around the world than any other country, including the United States. Many of Beijing’s new missions can be found in countries that recently broke ties with Taiwan (Burkina Faso, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, the Gambia, and São Tomé and Príncipe) or do not have
any United States diplomatic physical presence despite
these countries asking for increased United States engage-
ment and investment (Antigua and Barbuda and Domi-
rica).

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress, that the Department of State should conduct an
assessment of all United States diplomatic missions and
posts to verify such missions and posts align with United
States national security and economic interests, as well as
ensuring that these locations position the United States
appropriately with its strategic competitors to advance the
national interest in every country worldwide, including
those countries currently lacking any physical United
States diplomatic presence, whether an embassy, consulate
general, or principal officer post.

c) REPORTING.—Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act and biennially thereafter
for 4 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the ap-
propriate congressional committees a report assessing the
number, location, and objectives of each of its diplomatic
missions and posts worldwide, including an assessment of
any gaps that exist compared to other country strategic
competitors. The Secretary of State shall coordinate with
the heads of other Federal departments and agencies hav-
ing an overseas presence at any United States diplomatic
mission or post to ensure such assessment reflects all Federal Government equities and viewpoints.

SEC. 218. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE FULBRIGHT-HAYS PROGRAM.

There are authorized to be appropriated, for the 5-year period beginning on October 1, 2021, $105,500,000, to promote education, training, research, and foreign language skills through the Fulbright-Hays Program, in accordance with section 102(b) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2452(b)).

SEC. 219. SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND COUNTERING DISINFORMATION.

(a) Authorization of USAGM Appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated for the United States Agency for Global Media $100,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026, for ongoing and new programs to support local media, build independent media, combat CCP disinformation inside and outside of the People’s Republic of China, invest in technology to subvert censorship, and monitor and evaluate such programs, of which—

(1) not less than $50,000,000 shall be directed to a grant to Radio Free Asia language services;

(2) not less than $20,000,000 shall be made available to serve populations in China through
Mandarin, Cantonese, Uyghur, and Tibetan language services; and

(3) not less than $5,500,000 shall be made available for digital media services—

(A) to counter propaganda of non-Chinese populations in foreign countries; and

(B) to counter propaganda of Chinese populations in China through “Global Mandarin” programming.

(b) SUPPORT FOR LOCAL MEDIA.—The Secretary of State, acting through the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, acting through the Assistant Administrator for Development, Democracy, and Innovation, shall jointly support and train foreign journalists on investigative techniques necessary to ensure public accountability, promote transparency, fight corruption, and support the ability of the public to develop informed opinions about pressing issues facing their countries.

(e) INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor shall continue to support internet freedom programs.

(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State
and United States Agency for International Development $170,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026, for ongoing and new programs in support of press freedom, training, and protection of journalists. Amounts appropriated pursuant to this authorization are authorized to remain available until expended and shall be in addition to amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated to support press freedom, training, and protection of journalists.

SEC. 219A. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER.

(a) FINDING.—Congress established the Global Engagement Center to “direct, lead, and coordinate efforts” of the Federal Government to “recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and disinformation globally”.

(b) EXTENSION.—Section 1287(j) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended by striking “the date that is 8 years after the date of the enactment of this Act” and inserting “December 31, 2027”.

(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the Global Engagement Center should expand its coordinating capacity of diplomatic messaging through the exchange of liaison officers with Federal departments and agencies that manage aspects of identifying and coun-
tering foreign disinformation, including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and Special Operations Command’s Joint MISO Web Operations Center.

(d) Authorization of Appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated $150,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 for the Global Engagement Center to counter foreign state and non-state sponsored propaganda and disinformation.

SEC. 219B. REPORT ON ORIGINS OF THE COVID–19 PANDEMIC.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) it is critical to understand the origins of the COVID–19 pandemic so the United States can better prepare, prevent, and respond to pandemic health threats in the future;

(2) given the impact of the COVID–19 pandemic on all Americans, the American people deserve to know what information the United States Government possesses about the origins of COVID–19, as appropriate;

(3) it is critical for independent experts to have full access to all pertinent human, animal, and environmental data, biological sample, research, and per-
sonnel involved in the early stages of the outbreak relevant to determining how this pandemic emerged;

(4) Congress shares the concerns expressed by the United States Government and 13 other foreign governments that the international team of experts dispatched to the People’s Republic of China by the World Health Organization (WHO) to study the origins of the SARS–CoV–2 virus was “significantly delayed and lacked access to complete, original data and samples”;

(5) the March 30, 2021, statement by the Director-General of the WHO, Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, further affirms that the investigative team had encountered “difficulties” in accessing necessary raw data, that “we have not yet found the source of the virus”, and that “all hypotheses remain on the table”;

(6) the G7 communique expressing support for full implementation of the International Health Regulations, including “a timely, transparent, expert-led, and science-based WHO-convened Phase 2 COVID–19 Origins study including, as recommended by the experts’ report, in China” is a valuable commitment by the United States and its al-
lies to investigating the origins of COVID–19 in
order to better prepare for future pandemics; and

(7) Congress supports the effort announced by
President Biden, directing the intelligence commu-
nity to conduct a 90 day review to further analyze
information pointing to the origins of COVID–19.

(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days
after enactment of this Act, the President shall submit
to the appropriate committees of Congress a report con-
sisting of—

(1) an assessment of the most likely source or
origin of the SARS–CoV–2 virus, including a de-
tailed review of all information the United States
possesses that it has identified as potentially rel-
evant to the source or origin of the SARS–CoV–2
virus, including zoonotic transmission and spillover,
or other sources of origin, transmission, or spillover,
based on the information the United States Govern-
ment has to date;

(2) its level of confidence in its assessment; and

(3) challenges identified to its ability to make
such an assessment.

(e) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b)
shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include
a classified annex.
(d) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions of the Senate;

(4) the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate;

(5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(6) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and

(8) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 219C. EXTENSION OF ASIA REASSURANCE INITIATIVE ACT OF 2018.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Indo-Pacific region is home to many of the world’s most dynamic democracies, economic opportunities, as well as many challenges to United States interests and values as a result of the growth...
in authoritarian governance in the region and by broad challenges posed by nuclear proliferation, the changing environment, and deteriorating adherence to human rights principles and obligations;

(2) the People’s Republic of China poses a particular threat as it repeatedly violates internationally recognized human rights, engages in unfair economic and trade practices, disregards international laws and norms, coerces its neighbors, engages in malign influence operations, and enables global digital authoritarianism;

(3) the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (‘‘ARIA’’) enhances the United States’ commitment in the Indo-Pacific region by—

(A) expanding its defense cooperation with its allies and partners;

(B) investing in democracy and the protection of human rights;

(C) engaging in cybersecurity initiatives; and

(D) supporting people-to-people engagement and other shared priorities; and

(4) the 2019 Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy Report concludes that ARIA ‘‘en-shrines a generational whole-of-government policy
framework that demonstrates U.S. commitment to a
free and open Indo-Pacific region”.

(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—The
Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–
409) is amended—

(1) in section 201(b), by striking
“$1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019
through 2023” and inserting “$2,000,000,000 for
each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026”;

(2) in section 215(b), by striking “2023” and
inserting “2026”;

(3) in section 306(a)—

(A) in paragraph (1), by striking “5
years” and inserting “8 years”; and

(B) in paragraph (2), by striking “2023”
and inserting “2026”;

(4) in section 409(a)(1), by striking “2023”
and inserting “2026”;

(5) in section 410—

(A) in subsection (c), by striking “2023”
and inserting “2026”; and

(B) in subsection (d), in the matter pre-
ceding paragraph (1), by striking “2023” and
inserting “2026”; and
in section 411, by striking “2023” and inserting “2026”.

SEC. 219D. INVESTMENT, TRADE, AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

(a) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish United States strategies to promote, facilitate, and increase trade and investment and development in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean.

(2) FOCUS OF STRATEGY.—The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall focus on increasing two-way trade and investment with Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean by 200 percent in real dollar value by the date that is years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(3) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—

(A) UNITED STATES STRATEGY TO PROMOTE TWO-WAY TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, AND THE CARIBBEAN.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President, in consultation with the heads of the relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and
make publicly available a government-wide strategy for Africa, to be known as the Prosper Africa Strategy, and for Latin America and the Caribbean, that provides detailed descriptions of how the United States intends to fulfill the policy objectives described in paragraph (2). The strategies shall—

(i) support and be aligned with other existing United States Government strategies; and

(ii) include specific and measurable goals, benchmarks, performance metrics, timetables, and monitoring and evaluation plans to ensure the accountability and effectiveness of all policies and initiatives carried out under the strategy.

(B) Specific plans for departments and agencies.—The strategies submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall also include specific implementation plans, in coordination with the recommendations and activities of the Economic Diplomacy Action Group under section 708 of the Championing American Business Through Diplomacy Act of 2019 (22
U.S.C. 9904), from each of the relevant Federal
departments and agencies that describes—

(i) the anticipated contributions of the
department or agency, including technical,
financial, and in-kind contributions, to im-
plement the strategies;

(ii) the efforts of the department or
agency to ensure that the policies and ini-
tiatives carried out pursuant to the strate-
gies are designed to achieve maximum im-
pact and effectiveness; and

(iii) recommendations on necessary re-
sources, including staffing, to expand ef-
forts to promote trade and investment be-
tween the United States and Africa, and
the United States and Latin America and
the Caribbean.

(C) INTERAGENCY COORDINATION.—The
strategies submitted pursuant to subparagraph
(A) shall include plans for coordinating with
relevant departments and agencies the imple-
mentation of agency-specific plans described in
subparagraph (B), particularly as it relates to
advancing two-way trade and investment trans-
actions and business enabling environment reforms.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the submission of the strategies required by subsection (a)(3), and annually thereafter until 2026, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report, in coordination with the report required by section 707 of the Championing American Business Through Diplomacy Act of 2019 (22 U.S.C. 9903) that—

(1) summarizes and evaluates the implementation of United States diplomatic efforts and foreign assistance programs, projects, and activities to advance the policy objectives set forth in subsection (a)(2);

(2) describes the nature and extent of the coordination among the relevant Federal departments and agencies, including summary of activities and engagements of the Economic Diplomacy Action Group; and

(3) describes the monitoring and evaluation tools, mechanisms, and indicators to assess progress made on the policy objectives of this section.

(c) EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS FOR AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN TRADE AND INVESTMENT.—The President shall designate an individual to
serve as the Executive Director for Trade and Investment Strategy in Africa, also known as the Prosper Africa Executive Director, and an individual to serve as Executive Director for Trade and Investment Strategy in Latin America and the Caribbean to—

(1) oversee the development and implementation of the strategies required by subsection (a); and

(2) coordinate developing and implementing the strategy with the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the Office of Management and Budget, and the relevant departments and agencies.

(d) BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT EXCHANGES WITH AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.—It is the sense of Congress that, not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, high-level officials of relevant departments and agencies of the United States Government with responsibility for promoting trade, investment, financing, and development should conduct joint activities to advance the strategies described in subsection (a), including business development exchanges with public and private sector representatives from Africa and Latin America, and the Caribbean who are focused on promoting two-way trade and investment.
(c) **TRAINING, INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, AND INFORMATION SHARING.**—The President shall develop a plan—

(1) to standardize the training received by United States and Foreign Commercial Service officers, economic officers of the Department of State, and economic officers of the United States Agency for International Development with respect to the programs and procedures of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the United States International Development Finance Corporation, the Small Business Administration, and the United States Trade and Development Agency; and

(2) to ensure that—

(A) not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act—

(i) all personnel referred to in paragraph (1) receive the training described in that paragraph; and

(ii) relevant departments and agencies share information on trade and investment transactions facilitated by the United States Government and funded by the public or private sector;
(B) not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of USAID and the Chief Executive Officer of DFC shall develop a plan to enhance coordination and expedite information sharing that includes—

(i) a process for sharing of information in a timely fashion, and at least monthly, on—

(I) active and early stage leads on transactions initiated, promoted, or facilitated by DFC;

(II) transactions deemed ineligible for DFC support or not being pursued by DFC for other reasons; and

(III) transaction opportunities identified by USAID or other relevant United States departments and agencies submitted for DFC consideration; and

(ii) any training required for DFC, USAID, or other interagency staff to implement the plan;
(C) the Executive Directors and their appointed staff shall be responsible for coordinating implementation of this plan; and

(D) DFC and USAID shall, in consultation with the Executive Directors and Congress, identify targets for DFC’s financial commitments and any private capital mobilized to finalize a transaction.

(f) DATA SHARING PLATFORM.—

(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Administrator of USAID shall, in consultation with the Executive Directors and relevant department and agencies, establish an interoperable digital platform maintained by the staff of the Executive Directors to—

(A) facilitate interagency information sharing and collaboration on trade and investment transactions; and

(B) ensure relevant department and agencies use such platform to review, track, and develop consensus on transactions and their relative priorities.

(2) COORDINATION.—The Executive Directors shall coordinate regularly with the leadership of relevant Federal department and agencies to—

(A) advance and finalize transactions; or
(B) provide a written justification for any transaction deemed ineligible for United States Government financing under existing authorities.

(g) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;

(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(2) RELEVANT FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.—The term “relevant Federal departments and agencies” includes—

(A) the Department of State;

(B) the Department of the Treasury;

(C) the Department of Commerce;

(D) the United States Agency for International Development (USAID);

(E) the Millennium Challenge Corporation;
(F) the United States International Development Finance Corporation (DFC);

(G) the United States Trade and Development Agency;

(H) the United States African Development Foundation;

(I) the Export Import Bank;

(J) the Small Business Administration;

(K) the Department of Agriculture; and

(L) any other entity deemed appropriate by the President.

(3) EARLY-STAGE LEAD.—The term “early-stage lead” means a prospective transaction which is being evaluated by DFC staff, prior to DFC holding an internal screening meeting or accepting an application.

(4) TWO-WAY TRADE AND INVESTMENT.—The term “two-way trade and investment” means United States exports to Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, United States public and private investment in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, exports from Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean to the United States, and Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean investment in the United States.
Subtitle B—International Security Matters

SEC. 221. DEFINITIONS.

In this subtitle:

(1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 222. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.

There is authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 2022 through fiscal year 2026 for the Department of State, out of amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.) (relating to international military education and training assistance), $45,000,000 for activi-
ties in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with this sub-title. Funds may be disbursed only after vetting of individuals proposed to be trained, consistent with sections 502B and 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304 and 2378d).

SEC. 223. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON MARITIME FREEDOM OF OPERATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS AND AIRSPACE OF THE INDO-PACIFIC AND ON ARTIFICIAL LAND FEATURES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA.

(a) Sense of Congress.—Congress—

(1) condemns coercive and threatening actions or the use of force to impede freedom of navigation operations in international airspace by military or civilian aircraft, to alter the status quo, or to destabilize the Indo-Pacific region;

(2) urges the Government of the People’s Republic of China to refrain from implementing the declared East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in the South China Sea, where contrary to freedom of overflight in international airspace, and to refrain from taking similar provocative actions elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific region;
(3) reaffirms that the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration decision is final and legally binding on both parties and that the People’s Republic of China’s claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea are unlawful; and

(4) condemns the People’s Republic of China for failing to abide by the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling, despite the PRC’s obligations as a state party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United States to—

(1) reaffirm its commitment and support for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including with respect to the mutual defense treaties with Indo-Pacific allies;

(2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights, freedoms, and lawful use of the sea, or the airspace above it, that are available to all countries, and oppose the militarization of new and reclaimed land features in the South China Sea;

(3) continue certain policies with respect to the PRC claims in the South China Sea, specifically—
(A) that PRC claims in the South China Sea, including to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea, are unlawful;

(B) that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a maritime claim vis-à-vis the Philippines in areas that the Permanent Court of Arbitration found to be in the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or on its continental shelf;

(C) to reject any PRC claim to waters beyond a 12 nautical mile territorial sea derived from islands it claims in the Spratly Islands; and

(D) that the PRC has no lawful territorial or maritime claim to James Shoal;

(4) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in destabilizing activities, including environmentally harmful and provocative land reclamation;

(5) ensure that disputes are managed without intimidation, coercion, or force;

(6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust claims in accordance with international law;

(7) uphold the principle that territorial and maritime claims, including territorial waters or territorial seas, must derive from land features and otherwise comport with international law;
(8) oppose the imposition of new fishing regulations covering disputed areas in the South China Sea, regulations which have raised tensions in the region;

(9) support an effective Code of Conduct, if that Code of Conduct reflects the interests of Southeast Asian claimant countries and does not serve as a vehicle for the People’s Republic of China to advance its unlawful maritime claims;

(10) reaffirm that an existing body of international rules and guidelines, including the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972 (COLREGs), is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation between the United States Armed Forces and the forces of other countries, including the People’s Republic of China;

(11) support the development of regional institutions and bodies, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, to build practical cooperation in the region and reinforce the role of international law;
(12) encourage the deepening of partnerships with other countries in the region for maritime domain awareness and capacity building, as well as efforts by the United States Government to explore the development of appropriate multilateral mechanisms for a “common operating picture” in the South China Sea among Southeast Asian countries that would serve to help countries avoid destabilizing behavior and deter risky and dangerous activities;

(13) oppose actions by any country to prevent any other country from exercising its sovereign rights to the resources of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf by making claims to those areas in the South China Sea that have no support in international law; and

(14) assure the continuity of operations by the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, including, when appropriate, in cooperation with partners and allies, to reaffirm freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea.

SEC. 224. REPORT ON CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT OF INDO-PACIFIC ALLIES AND PARTNERS.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the Secretary of State should expand and strengthen existing measures under the United States Conventional Arms Transfer Policy to provide capabilities to allies and partners consistent with agreed-on division of responsibility for alliance roles, missions and capabilities, prioritizing allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with United States strategic imperatives;

(2) the United States should design for export to Indo-Pacific allies and partners capabilities critical to maintaining a favorable military balance in the region, including long-range precision fires, air and missile defense systems, anti-ship cruise missiles, land attack cruise missiles, conventional hypersonic systems, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, and command and control systems consistent with law, regulation, policy, and international commitments;

(3) the United States should pursue, to the maximum extent possible, anticipatory technology security and foreign disclosure policy on the systems described in paragraph (2);

(4) the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, should—
(A) urge allies and partners to invest in sufficient quantities of munitions to meet contingency requirements and avoid the need for accessing United States stocks in wartime; and

(B) cooperate with allies to deliver such munitions, or when necessary, to increase allies’ capacity to produce such munitions; and

(5) it is in the United States interest to not authorize arms transfers or security cooperation to governments that demonstrate patterns of gross violations of human rights if such arms or security cooperation could be used to commit or support such violations.

(b) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(c) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
of State, in consultation with the Secretary of De-
fense, shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a report that describes United States pri-
orities for building more capable security partners in
the Indo-Pacific region.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report
required under paragraph (1) shall—

(A) provide a priority list of defense and
military capabilities that Indo-Pacific allies and
partners must possess for the United States to
be able to achieve its military objectives in the
Indo-Pacific region;

(B) identify, from the list referred to in
subparagraph (A), the capabilities that are best
provided, or can only be provided, by the
United States;

(C) identify—

(i) actions required to expedite field-
ing the capabilities identified in subpara-
graph (B); and

(ii) steps needed to fully account for
and a plan to integrate all means of
United States foreign military sales, direct
commercial sales, security assistance, and
all applicable authorities of the Depart-
ment of State and the Department of Defense;

(D) assess the requirements for United States security assistance, including International Military Education and Training, in the Indo-Pacific region, as a part of the means to deliver critical partner capability requirements identified in subparagraph (B);

(E) assess the resources necessary to meet the requirements for United States security assistance, and identify resource gaps;

(F) assess the major obstacles to fulfilling requirements for United States security assistance in the Indo-Pacific region, including resources and personnel limits, foreign legislative and policy barriers, and factors related to specific partner countries;

(G) identify limitations on the ability of the United States to provide such capabilities, including capabilities identified under subparagraph (B), because of existing United States treaty obligations, United States policies, including sections 502B and 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304 and 2378d), or other regulations;
(H) recommend improvements to the process for developing requirements for United States partner capabilities; and

(I) identify required jointly agreed recommendations for infrastructure and posture, based on any ongoing mutual dialogues.

(3) FORM.—The report required under this subsection shall be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.

Subtitle C—Multilateral Strategies to Bolster American Power

SEC. 231. FINDINGS ON MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT.

Congress finds the following:

(1) Every UN member state is legally required to finance the UN’s core budget in order to ensure that these missions are properly resourced, and assessment rates are renegotiated every three years by the UN General Assembly.

(2) While the United States is the largest single financial contributor to the UN system, the current model is beneficial because it requires all UN member states, no matter how big or small, to help shoulder the UN’s regular and peacekeeping budgets at specified levels.
(3) Failing to meet our financial commitments to the UN also empowers the PRC, which has raised our annual shortfalls to claim we are not a reliable partner and is seeking to leverage its own contributions to the regular budget and peacekeeping in ways that run counter to United States interests and values.

(4) The People’s Republic of China is now the second largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping, having gone from an assessment rate of just 3 percent in 2008 to more than 15 percent today, and is the ninth largest troop-contributor to UN missions, providing more personnel than the other four permanent members of the Security Council combined.

(5) With greater engagement comes greater influence, and PRC diplomats have sought to use their expanded clout to push back against the human rights, civilian protection, and gender-based violence aspects of UN peacekeeping mandates, using United States funding shortfalls as a pretext.

(6) The PRC has also used its growing clout to fill key posts at UN agencies: Chinese nationals currently occupy the top posts of four of the UN’s 15
specialized agencies, while the United States occupies only one.

(7) From 2021 to 2022, there will be 15 elections for the heads of UN specialized agencies and five for major UN funds and programs. With the exception of the World Food Programme, none are currently led by Americans.

(8) A 2020 Department of State Inspector General Inspection found that the Bureau for International Organizations did not have a standard operating procedure for tracking and promoting the employment of American Citizens in the UN system, and their recommendation to the department to establish one remains open.

SEC. 232. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON AMERICA’S MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT.

It is the policy of the United States that—

(1) the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations serves as a standing member of the cabinet;

(2) assessed dues to multilateral organizations be paid in full in a timely fashion;

(3) Federal agencies utilize all the authorities under section 3343 of title 5, United States Code, and subpart C of title 5, Code of Federal Regula-
tions (relating to detail and transfer of Federal employees to international organizations), to detail or transfer employees to relevant international organizations;

(4) the Secretary of State should assist the Department of State and other Federal agencies in carrying out paragraph (3) to the fullest extent;

(5) the Secretary of State should support qualified American candidates in their bid to win election to United Nations-related leadership positions; and

(6) the Secretary of State should support the placement of Junior Professional Officers sponsored by the United States in United Nations-affiliated agencies.

SEC. 233. SUPPORT FOR AMERICANS AT THE UNITED NATIONS.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State is authorized to establish within the Department of State’s Bureau of International Organization Affairs an Office of Multilateral Strategy and Personnel.

(b) DUTIES.—The office established under subsection (a) of this section shall be responsible for—

(1) promoting United States leadership and participation in the United Nations system, with a focus on issue areas where authoritarian nations are
exercising increased influence in and determining the
agenda of the United Nations system;

(2) establishing and implementing a standard
operating procedure for the promotion and efficient
tracking of United States citizen employment at the
United Nations and other international organiza-
tions that includes Mission Geneva;

(3) monitoring the pipeline of United Nations
jobs and identifying qualified United States citizens
and other qualified nationals to promote for such po-
sitions;

(4) tracking leadership changes in United Na-
tions Secretariat, funds, programs, and agencies,
and developing strategies to ensure that coalitions of
like-minded countries are assembled to ensure lead-
ership races are not won by countries that do not
share United States interests;

(5) eliminating current barriers to the employ-
ment of United States citizens in the United Nations
Secretariat, funds, programs, and agencies; and

(6) increasing the number of qualified United
States candidates for leadership and oversight posi-
tions at the United Nations Secretariat, funds, pro-
grams, agencies, and at other international organiza-
tions.
SEC. 234. JUNIOR PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS.

(a) INCREASE IN JUNIOR PROFESSIONAL OFFICER POSITIONS.—The Secretary of State should increase the number of Junior Professional Officer positions sponsored by the United States within the United Nations system.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than December 31 of each year, the Secretary of State shall provide the appropriate congressional committees information regarding the amount of funding each bureau has designated during the immediately preceding fiscal year for Junior Professional Officer positions in the United Nations system and the number of such positions that exist as of the end of the prior fiscal year.

SEC. 235. REPORT ON AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on how many Federal employees are currently detailed or transferred to an international organization during the immediately preceding 1-year period and a strategy for increasing the number of Federal employees so detailed or transferred.
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report required by subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) The number of Federal employees detailed or transferred to an international organization under section 3343 of title 5, United States Code, and subpart C of title 5, Code of Federal Regulations (relating to the detail and transfer of Federal employees to international organizations), including—

   (A) an identification of the Federal agency from which such employees were detailed or transferred; and

   (B) an identification of the international organizations to and from which such employees have been so detailed or transferred.

(2) A list of international organizations to and from which the United States previously detailed or transferred Federal employees.

Subtitle D—Regional Strategies to Bolster American Power

SEC. 241. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS AROUND THE WORLD.

It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to strengthen alliances and partnerships with like-minded countries around the globe; and
(2) to work in collaboration with such allies and partners—

(A) to address significant diplomatic, economic, and military challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC);

(B) to deter the PRC from pursuing military aggression;

(C) to promote the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in accordance with international law;

(D) to promote private sector-led long-term economic development while countering efforts by the Government of the PRC to leverage predatory economic practices as a means of political and economic coercion in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond;

(E) to promote the values of democracy and human rights, including through efforts to end the repression by the PRC of political dissidents, Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities, Tibetan Buddhists, Christians, and other ethnic minorities;

(F) to respond to the crackdown by the PRC, in contravention of the commitments made under the Sino-British Joint Declaration
of 1984 and the Basic Law of Hong Kong, on
the legitimate aspirations of the people of Hong
Kong; and

(G) to counter the PRC Government’s ef-
forts to spread disinformation in the PRC and
beyond with respect to its response to COVID–
19.

PART I—WESTERN HEMISPHERE

SEC. 242. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED
STATES-CANADA RELATIONS.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States and Canada have a
unique relationship based on shared geography, ex-
tensive personal connections, deep economic ties,
mutual defense commitments, and a shared vision to
uphold democracy, human rights, and the rules
based international order established after World
War II;

(2) the United States and Canada can better
address the People’s Republic of China’s economic,
political, and security influence through closer co-
operation on counternarcotics, environmental stew-
ardship, transparent practices in public procurement
and infrastructure planning, the Arctic, energy and
connectivity issues, trade and commercial relations,
bilateral legal matters, and support for democracy, good governance, and human rights;

(3) amidst the COVID–19 pandemic, the United States and Canada should maintain joint initiatives to address border management, commercial and trade relations and infrastructure, a shared approach with respect to the People’s Republic of China, and transnational challenges, including pandemics, energy security, and environmental stewardship;

(4) the United States and Canada should enhance cooperation to counter Chinese disinformation, influence operations, economic espionage, and propaganda efforts;

(5) the People’s Republic of China’s infrastructure investments, particularly in 5G telecommunications technology, extraction of natural resources, and port infrastructure, pose national security risks for the United States and Canada;

(6) the United States should share, as appropriate, intelligence gathered regarding—

(A) Huawei’s 5G capabilities; and

(B) the PRC government’s intentions with respect to 5G expansion;
(7) the United States and Canada should continue to advance collaborative initiatives to implement the January 9, 2020, United States-Canada Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals Development Collaboration; and

(8) the United States and Canada should prioritize cooperation on continental defense and in the Arctic, including by modernizing the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) sensor architecture to provide effective warning and tracking of threats by peer competitors, including long-range missiles and high-precision weapons, to the Northern Hemisphere.

SEC. 243. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CHINA'S ARBITRARY IMPRISONMENT OF CANADIAN CITIZENS.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Government of the People’s Republic of China’s apparent arbitrary detention and abusive treatment of Canadian nationals Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig in apparent retaliation for the Government of Canada’s arrest of Meng Wanzhou is deeply concerning;

(2) the Government of Canada has shown international leadership by—
(A) upholding the rule of law and complying with its international legal obligations, including obligations pursuant to the Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and Canada, signed at Washington December 3, 1971; and

(B) launching the Declaration Against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations, which has been endorsed by 57 countries and the European Union, and reaffirms well-established prohibitions under international human rights conventions against the arbitrary detention of foreign nationals to be used as leverage in country-to-country relations; and

(3) the United States continues to join the Government of Canada in calling for the immediate release of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig and for due process for Canadian national Robert Schellenberg.

SEC. 244. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH CANADA.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, and the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, a strategy that describes how
the United States will enhance cooperation with the Gov-
ernment of Canada in managing relations with the Gov-
ernment of the People’s Republic of China.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub-
section (a) shall—

(1) identify key policy points of convergence
and divergence between the United States and Can-
da in managing relations with the People’s Repub-
lic of China in the areas of technology, trade, eco-
nomic practices, cyber security, secure supply chains
and critical minerals, and illicit narcotics;

(2) include a description of United States devel-
opment and coordination efforts with Canadian
counterparts to enhance the cooperation between the
United States and Canada with respect to—

(A) managing economic relations with the
People’s Republic of China;

(B) democracy and human rights in the
People’s Republic of China;

(C) technology issues involving the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China;

(D) defense issues involving the People’s
Republic of China; and
(E) international law enforcement and transnational organized crime issues;

(3) detail diplomatic efforts and future plans to work with Canada to counter the People’s Republic of China’s projection of an authoritarian governing model around the world;

(4) detail diplomatic, defense, and intelligence cooperation to date and future plans to support Canadian efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to Huawei’s 5G technology;

(5) detail diplomatic and defense collaboration—

(A) to advance joint United States-Canadian priorities for responsible stewardship in the Arctic Region; and

(B) to counter the People’s Republic of China’s efforts to project political, economic, and military influence into the Arctic Region; and

(6) detail diplomatic efforts to work with Canada to track and counter the People’s Republic of China’s attempts to exert influence across the multilateral system.

(c) FORM.—The strategy required under this section shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be
made available to the public, but may include a classified annex, if necessary.

(d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently than every 180 days thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees, and the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, regarding the development and implementation of the strategy required under this section.

SEC. 245. STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS, GOVERNANCE, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation, as appropriate, with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Attorney General, the United States Trade Representative, and the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representa-
tives, and the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate a multi-year strategy for increasing United States economic competitiveness and promoting good governance, human rights, and the rule of law in Latin American and Caribbean countries, particularly in the areas of—

(1) investment;

(2) equitable, inclusive, and sustainable development;

(3) commercial relations;

(4) anti-corruption activities; and

(5) infrastructure projects.

(b) ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include a plan of action, including benchmarks to achieve measurable progress, to—

(1) enhance the technical capacity of Latin American and Caribbean countries to advance the sustainable and inclusive development of equitable economies;

(2) reduce trade and non-tariff barriers between such countries;

(3) facilitate a more open, transparent, and competitive environment for United States businesses in the region;
(4) establish frameworks or mechanisms to review long term financial sustainability and security implications of foreign investments in strategic sectors or services, including transportation, communications, natural resources, and energy;

(5) establish competitive, transparent, and inclusive infrastructure project selection and procurement processes that promote transparency, supplier diversity, open competition, financial sustainability, adherence to robust global standards, and the employment of a diverse local workforce and management;

(6) strengthen legal structures critical to robust democratic governance, fair competition, combatting corruption, and ending impunity; and

(7) enhance transparent, affordable, and equitable access to the internet and digital infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere.

(c) BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade Representative, and the leadership of the United States International Development Finance Cor-
poration, shall brief the congressional committees specified
in subsection (a) regarding the implementation of this sec-
tion, including examples of successes and challenges.

SEC. 246. ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA-
TIONS AND THE DEFENSE SECTOR IN LATIN
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
tees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate;

(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate;

(3) the Committee on Armed Services of the
Senate;

(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives;

(5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
ligence of the House of Representatives; and

(6) the Committee on Armed Services of the
House of Representatives.

(b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
of State, in coordination with the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that assesses the nature, intent, and impact on United States strategic interests of Chinese diplomatic activity aimed at influencing the decisions, procedures, and programs of multilateral organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean, including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Organization of American States, and the Inter-American Development Bank.

(2) DEFENSE SECTOR.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall include an assessment of the nature, intent, and impact on United States strategic interests of Chinese military activity in Latin America and the Caribbean, including military education and training programs, weapons sales, and space-related activities in the military or civilian spheres, such as—

(A) the satellite and space control station the People’s Republic of China constructed in Argentina; and

(B) defense and security cooperation carried out by the People’s Republic of China in Latin America and the Caribbean, including
sales of surveillance and monitoring technology to governments in the region such as Venezuela, Cuba, Ecuador, and Colombia, and the potential use of such technologies as tools of Chinese intelligence services.

(3) FORM.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form and include classified annexes.

SEC. 247. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State $13,500,000 for the International Military Education and Training Program for Latin America and the Caribbean for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026.

(b) MODERNIZATION.—The Secretary of State shall modernize and strengthen the programs receiving funding in accordance with subsection (a) to ensure that such programs are vigorous, substantive, and the preeminent choice for international military education and training for Latin American and Caribbean partners.

(c) REQUIRED ELEMENTS.—The programs referred to in subsection (a) shall—
(1) provide training and capacity-building opportunities to Latin American and Caribbean security services;

(2) provide practical skills and frameworks for—

(A) improving the functioning and organization of security services in Latin America and the Caribbean;

(B) creating a better understanding of the United States and its values; and

(C) using technology for maximum efficiency and organization;

(3) promote and ensure that security services in Latin America and the Caribbean respect civilian authority and operate in compliance with international norms, standards, and rules of engagement, including a respect for human rights, and full compliance with requirements under section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d; commonly referred to as the “Leahy law”); and

(4) receive funds only after vetting of individuals proposed to be trained, consistent with sections 502B and 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304 and 2378d).
SEC. 248. ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN REGARDING ACCOUNTABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE RISKS OF PERVERSIVE SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Government of the People’s Republic of China is exporting its model for internal security and state control of society through advanced technology and artificial intelligence; and

(2) the inclusion of communication networks and communications supply chains with equipment and services from companies with close ties to or that are susceptible to pressure from governments or security services without reliable legal checks on governmental powers can lead to breaches of citizens’ private information, increased censorship, violations of human rights, and harassment of political opponents.

(b) DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT.—The Secretary of State shall conduct diplomatic engagement with governments and civil society organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean to—
(1) help identify and mitigate the risks to civil liberties posed by technologies and services described in subsection (a); and

(2) offer recommendations on ways to mitigate such risks.

(c) INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—The Chief Executive Officer of the United States Agency for Global Media, who may work through the Open Technology Fund of the Agency, and the Secretary of State, working through the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s Internet Freedom and Business and Human Rights Section, shall expand and prioritize efforts to provide anti-censorship technology and services to journalists in Latin America and the Caribbean, in order to enhance their ability to safely access or share digital news and information.

(d) SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall work through nongovernmental organizations to—

(1) support and promote programs that support internet freedom and the free flow of information online in Latin America and the Caribbean;
(2) protect open, interoperable, secure, and reliable access to internet in Latin America and the Caribbean;

(3) provide integrated support to civil society for technology, digital safety, policy and advocacy, and applied research programs in Latin America and the Caribbean;

(4) train journalists and civil society leaders in Latin America and the Caribbean on investigative techniques necessary to ensure public accountability and prevent government overreach in the digital sphere;

(5) assist independent media outlets and journalists in Latin America and the Caribbean to build their own capacity and develop high-impact, in-depth news reports covering governance and human rights topics;

(6) provide training for journalists and civil society leaders on investigative techniques necessary to improve transparency and accountability in government and the private sector;

(7) provide training on investigative reporting of incidents of corruption and unfair trade, business, and commercial practices;
(8) assist nongovernmental organizations to strengthen their capacity to monitor the incidents and practices described in paragraph (7); and

(9) identify local resources to support the preponderance of activities that would be carried out under this subsection.

SEC. 249. CARIBBEAN ENERGY INITIATIVE AS ALTERNATIVE TO CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The countries of the Caribbean are heavily reliant upon imported oil to provide for approximately 90 percent of their energy production.

(2) The level of dependence is even higher including—

(A) Jamaica, which relies on oil for 95.9 percent of its electricity;

(B) Barbados, which relies on oil for 96 percent of its electricity;

(C) The Virgin Islands, which relies on oil for nearly 100 percent of its electricity; and

(D) St. Lucia, which relies on oil for 100 percent of its electricity.
(3) Overreliance on imported fossil fuels has had a detrimental effect on economic development, growth, and competitiveness in the Caribbean.

(4) Since 1970, more than 80 percent of Caribbean coral reefs have been lost due to coastal development and pollution. Soot particulates and climate change caused by burning fossil fuels have seriously damaged coral reefs, which are a significant source of tourism dollars, fishing, biodiversity, and natural beauty.

(5) Air pollution caused by burning oil for electricity—

(A) has serious health impacts in the form of higher rates of asthma and other lung ailments; and

(B) can also exacerbate climate change.

(6) The Caribbean region is particularly vulnerable to sea level rise and stronger storms.

(7) Between 2005 and 2018, the dependence of the countries of the Caribbean on oil was perpetuated by the Venezuelan-led Petrocaribe oil alliance, which—

(A) offered preferential terms for oil sales; and
(B) supplies some countries with up to 40 percent of their energy production needs.

(8) The ongoing domestic economic crisis and political turmoil in Venezuela has forced the Government of Venezuela to retract its commitments to the Petrocaribe oil alliance and step away as a regional power. Only Cuba still receives preferential Petrocaribe pricing on fuel exports from Venezuela, while other Petrocaribe member countries are experiencing a destabilized flow of oil.

(9) China has spent more than $244,000,000,000 on energy projects worldwide since 2000, 25 percent of which was spent in Latin America and the Caribbean. Although the majority of this spending was for oil, gas, and coal, China has also been the largest investor in clean energy globally for almost a decade.

(10) The World Bank estimates that the Caribbean will need $12,000,000,000 in power investments through 2035.

(11) Renewable energy technology costs have decreased dramatically in recent years, offering a more viable economic alternative for energy production. Solar energy prices have fallen by 80 percent since 2008, causing significant market growth, and
according to data released by the International Renewable Energy Agency, ⅓ of global power capacity is based in renewable energy.

(12) In 2016, the International Monetary Fund estimated that transportation accounted for 36 percent of the total primary energy consumed in the Caribbean subregion.

(13) According to the United Nations Environment Programme, Latin America and the Caribbean could achieve annual savings of $621,000,000,000 and a reduction of 1,100,000,000 tons of CO2 by 2050 if the region’s energy and transport sectors reach net zero emissions.

(14) The Caribbean has an abundance of onshore and offshore resources needed for renewable energy, including sun, wind, geothermal, and some hydropower production capacity.

(15) The United States Government is deeply engaged in providing technical and policy assistance to countries of the Caribbean on energy issues through—

(A) the Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas;

(B) Connecting the Americas 2022; and

(C) bilateral assistance programs.
(16) On February 19, 2014, at the North American Leaders’ Summit, President Barack Obama, Prime Minister Stephen Harper of Canada, and President Enrique Peña Nieto of Mexico re-affirmed their commitment to bring affordable, reliable, and increasingly renewable power to the Caribbean, while opening wider markets for clean energy and green technology.

(17) On June 19, 2015, President Barack Obama announced the Caribbean Energy Security Initiative, which would partner with individual countries—

(A) to transform its energy sector;

(B) to work to increase access to finance, good governance, and diversification; and

(C) to maximize the impact of existing donor effects.

(18) On May 4, 2016, at the United States-Caribbean-Central American Energy Summit, the energy security task force formally launched the Caribbean Sustainable Energy Roadmap and Strategy (C–SERMS) as a mechanism to manage regional coordination and action on energy security and agreed to expand the regional market and transmission system.
(19) The United States has an important opportunity—

(A) to deepen this engagement;

(B) to work as a partner with Caribbean countries on a more regional and coordinated basis;

(C) to help ease the region’s dependence on imported oil; and

(D) to promote affordable alternative sources of energy.

(b) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) Caribbean countries.—The term “Caribbean countries” means countries in the Caribbean region, but does not include Cuba or Venezuela.

(2) Caribbean governments.—The term “Caribbean governments” means the national governments of the Caribbean countries.

(c) Statement of Policy.—It is the policy of the United States to help Caribbean countries—

(1) achieve greater energy security and improve domestic energy resource mobilization;

(2) lower their dependence on imported fuels;

(3) eliminate the use of diesel, heavy fuel oil, other petroleum products, and coal for the generation of electricity;
increase production of renewable energy;
and
meet the greenhouse gas mitigation goals of
their national determined contributions to the Paris
Agreement.

(d) STRATEGY.—

(1) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 120 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of State, in coordination with the Adminis-
trator of the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), shall submit to the appro-
priate congressional committees a multi-year strat-
egy that describes how the Department of State will
promote regional cooperation with Caribbean coun-
tries—

(A) to lower dependence on imported fuels,
grow domestic clean energy production in the
region, strengthen regional energy security, and
lower energy sector greenhouse gas emissions;

(B) to decrease dependence on oil in the
transportation sector;

(C) to increase energy efficiency, energy
conservation, and investment in alternatives to
imported fuels;
(D) to improve grid reliability and modernize electricity transmission networks;

(E) to advance deployment of innovative solutions to expand community and individuals’ access to electricity;

(F) to help reform energy markets to encourage good regulatory governance and to promote a climate of private sector investment; and

(G) to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions from the energy and transportation sector.

(2) Elements.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include—

(A) a thorough review and inventory of United States Government activities that are being carried out bilaterally, regionally, and in coordination with multilateral institutions—

(i) to promote energy and climate security in the Caribbean region; and

(ii) to reduce the region’s reliance on oil for electricity generation;

(B) opportunities for marshaling regional cooperation—

(i) to overcome market barriers resulting from the small size of Caribbean energy markets;
(ii) to address the high transportation and infrastructure costs faced by Caribbean countries;

(iii) to ensure greater donor coordination between governments, multilateral institutions, multilateral banks, and private investors; and

(iv) to expand regional financing opportunities to allow for lower cost energy entrepreneurship;

(C) measures to ensure that each Caribbean government has—

(i) an independent utility regulator or equivalent;

(ii) affordable access by third party investors to its electrical grid with minimal regulatory interference;

(iii) effective energy efficiency and energy conservation;

(iv) programs to address technical and nontechnical issues;

(v) a plan to eliminate major market distortions;

(vi) cost-reflective tariffs; and
(vii) no tariffs or other taxes on clean energy solutions; and

(D) recommendations for how United States policy, technical, and economic assistance can be used in the Caribbean region—

(i) to advance renewable energy development and the incorporation of renewable technologies into existing energy grids and the development and deployment of microgrids where appropriate and feasible to boost energy security and reliability, particularly to underserved communities;

(ii) to increase the generation of clean energy sufficiently to replace and allow for the retirement of obsolete fossil fuel energy generation units in Caribbean countries;

(iii) to create regional financing opportunities to allow for lower cost energy entrepreneurship;

(iv) to deploy transaction advisors in the region to help attract private investment and break down any market or regulatory barriers; and
(v) to establish a mechanism for each host government to have access to independent legal advice—

(I) to speed the development of energy-related contracts; and

(II) to better protect the interests of Caribbean governments and citizens.

(3) CONSULTATION.—In devising the strategy under this subsection, the Secretary of State shall work with the Secretary of Energy and shall consult with—

(A) the Secretary of the Interior;

(B) the Secretary of Commerce;

(C) the Secretary of the Treasury;

(D) the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of the United States;

(E) the Board of Directors of the Development Finance Corporation;

(F) the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development;

(G) the Caribbean governments;

(H) the Inter-American Development Bank;

(I) the World Bank Group; and
(J) the Caribbean Electric Utility Services Corporation.

SEC. 250. UNITED STATES-CARIBBEAN RESILIENCE PARTNERSHIP.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The United States shares with the Caribbean a collective vulnerability to natural disasters, which affects the lives and the economies of our citizens.

(2) The April 9, 2021, eruption of the La Soufriere volcano is another reminder of the devastation caused by the many natural disasters the Caribbean confronts each year and the region’s vulnerability to external shocks. Hurricane Dorian, the largest storm to hit the region, wiped out large parts of the northern Bahamas in 2019, and Hurricanes Maria and Irma devastated multiple islands across the region in 2017, including Puerto Rico. According to IMF research, of the 511 plus disasters worldwide to hit small states since 1950, around two-thirds (324) have been in the Caribbean.

(3) This region is seven times more likely to experience a natural disaster than elsewhere. And,
when one occurs, it will incur as much as six times more damage.

(4) Extreme weather events and other environmental impacts will only worsen over the coming years, and if not addressed, we will see only increasing economic shocks on these countries, driving irregular migration.

(5) While the United States has considerable expertise and capacity in assisting countries with disaster response, there remains a need for stronger partnerships that build regional resilience through efficient and interoperable platforms, protecting people and speeding recovery.

(6) The People’s Republic of China has dramatically increased its engagement in the Caribbean in the past five years, including offering loans and grants related to disaster response and resilience and sought to acquire property rights in the Caribbean that would be detrimental to United States national security interests.

(7) In 2019, the United States launched a new U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership to deepen cooperation and investment to strengthen our disaster resilience throughout the Caribbean region, including—
(A) to streamline early warning response networks and formalize communication channels;

(B) to enhance, encourage, and work collaboratively on further developing aviation disaster resilience plans and partnerships;

(C) to prioritize regional technical exchange in energy planning, risk reduction, and resilience;

(D) to increase communications network interoperability between Caribbean partners and the United States;

(E) to utilize storm surge mapping data and share real-time information in preparation for potential damage resulting from tropical cyclones and tsunamis;

(F) to use meteorological services to strengthen and deepen physical and communications infrastructure, data collection networks, and human and technical capacity throughout the region, as well as interactions with the public;

(G) to understand that while the use of international and military and civil defense assets in disaster response may only be considered
as a last resort, when local, national, and international civilian capabilities are overwhelmed, civil-military coordination should occur, in support of the affected nation;

(H) to develop a framework that would govern the deployment of international military and civil defense assets in disaster response when local, national, and international civilian capabilities are overwhelmed, in support of the affected nation;

(I) to seek common mechanisms for ensuring rapid disaster response and recovery, including waiving or expediting diplomatic clearances, waiving of or reducing customs fees, streamlining overflight and airspace clearance, and ensuring that the first responders have the ability to rapidly respond to disasters in other countries;

(J) to promote the integration and coordination of regional response mechanisms in the Caribbean, including through the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency, the Regional Security System, United States Government Agencies, and allies in ways that facilitate more effective and efficient planning, miti-
gation, response, and resilience to natural disasters;

(K) to share best practices in improved building codes with national disaster organizations, including building better programs, at regional, national and community levels; and

(L) to promote community-based disaster preparedness and mitigation activities, particularly in underserved communities, with the aim of increasing broad public participation and resilience.

(b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to help Caribbean countries—

(1) increase their resilience and adapt to natural disasters and the impacts of severe weather events and a changing environment;

(2) partner with United States Federal, State, and local agencies and engage in technical cooperation, dialogue, and assistance activities;

(3) harmonize standards and practices related to paragraphs (1) and (2) to promote increased investment and integration;

(4) increase investment from United States companies in the Caribbean on resilience-building, adaptation, and climate-related mitigation efforts;
(5) promote regional cooperation and ensure efforts by the United States, Caribbean countries, and international partners complement each other; and

(6) further assist with the efforts described in subsection (a)(7).

(c) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a multi-year strategy that describes how the Department of State will achieve the policies described in subsection (b).

(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated for activities, programs, technical assistance, and engagement under this section the following:

(1) $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2022.

(2) $25,000,000 for fiscal year 2023.

(3) $30,000,000 for fiscal year 2024 and each fiscal year thereafter.

(e) REPORTING AND MONITORING.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated each fiscal year pursuant to subsection (d), at least five percent of all programming funding allocation shall support and be directed to—
ward reporting, monitoring, and assessment of effec-
tiveness.

(2) ENGAGEMENT AND COLLABORATION.—The
Department of State shall ensure that at least 20
percent of amounts authorized to be appropriated
pursuant to subsection (d) directly support the
training of, engagement with, collaboration with, and
exchange of expertise on resilience between United
States Federal, State, and local officials and their
Caribbean government counterparts. Such amounts
should also support, as appropriate, increased aca-
demic, civil society, media, and private sector en-
gagement in the fields of resilience-building, adapta-
tion, and mitigation.

SEC. 251. COUNTERING CHINA’S EDUCATIONAL AND CUL-
TURAL DIPLOMACY IN LATIN AMERICA.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) According to a report by the National En-
dowment for Democracy, China has spent the equi-
valent of billions of dollars to shape public opinion
and perceptions around the world through thousands
of people-to-people exchanges, cultural activities,
educational programs, and the development of media
enterprises and information initiatives with global
reach.
(2) Educational and exchange programs are a core element of United States public diplomacy, elevating our culture, policies, and interests worldwide.

(3) These programs provide students with access to international knowledge, an opportunity to learn foreign languages, and a unique environment for developing cultural understanding, all of which are valuable skills in today’s global economy.

(4) 90 percent of ECA’s appropriation is spent in the United States or invested directly in American citizens or American organizations.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) China’s efforts to mold public opinion and influence educational institutions undermine United States’ influence in Latin America and the Caribbean and threaten democratic institutions and practices in the region;

(2) the United States Government should expand current educational and cultural exchange programs in Latin America and the Caribbean, which are cost-effective and strengthen people-to-people diplomacy, to promote national security and foreign policy interests of the United States; and
(3) educational exchanges foster linguistic, cultural, and educational skills that advance United States economic competitiveness, strengthen alliances, and support democracies worldwide.

(c) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, acting through the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, and in coordination with the Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Economic Growth, Education, and Environment at the United States Agency for International Development, shall devise a strategy—

(1) to evaluate and expand existing programs and, as necessary, design and implement new educational, professional, and cultural exchanges and other programs to—

(A) create and sustain mutual understanding with other countries necessary to advance United States foreign policy goals by cultivating people-to-people ties among current and future global leaders that build enduring networks and personal relationships; and

(B) promote United States national security interests and values, including through the expansion of exchange visitor programs such as
international visitor leadership programs and
the Young Leaders of the Americas Initiative,
as well as professional capacity building pro-
grams that prioritize building skills in entrepre-
neurship, promoting transparency, and tech-
nology;

(2) to ensure that exchange programs for
Americans abroad and international visitors attract
a diverse pool of participants, including from under-
represented, marginalized, and low-income commu-
nities; and

(3) to evaluate, expand, and strengthen existing
programs, and, as necessary, design and implement
new basic and higher education programs in Latin
America and the Caribbean, in accordance with the
United States Strategy on International Basic Edu-
cation and the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development Education Policy, to enable all
young adults, youth, and children to acquire the
quality education and skills needed to be productive
members in society, which will lead to better indi-
vidual and societal outcomes.

(d) REPORT WITH INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT.—
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in coordination
with the Director of National Intelligence, submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report that as-
asses the nature and impact of the People’s Republic of
China’s educational and cultural sector activity in Latin
America and the Caribbean, its impact on United States’
strategic interests, and recommendations for the United
States Government to expand people-to-people ties.

PART II—TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS

SEC. 255. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TRANSATLANTIC RELA-
TIONSHPES.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States, European Union, the
United Kingdom, and other European countries are
close partners, sharing values grounded in democ-
raacy, human rights, transparency, and the rules-
based international order established after World
War II;

(2) without a common approach by the United
States, European Union, the United Kingdom, and
other European countries on connectivity, trade,
transnational challenges, and support for democracy
and human rights, the People’s Republic of China
will continue to increase its economic, political, and
security leverage in Europe;
(3) the People’s Republic of China’s deployment of assistance to European countries following the COVID–19 outbreak showcased a coercive approach to aid, but it also highlighted Europe’s deep economic ties to the People’s Republic of China;

(4) as European countries seek to recover from the economic toll of the COVID–19 outbreak, the United States must stand in partnership with Europe to support our collective economic recovery, reinforce our collective national security, and defend shared values;

(5) the United States, European Union, the United Kingdom, and other European countries should coordinate on joint strategies to diversify reliance on supply chains away from the People’s Republic of China, especially in the medical and pharmaceutical sectors;

(6) the United States, European Union, the United Kingdom, and other European countries should leverage their respective economic innovation capabilities to support the global economic recovery from the COVID–19 recession and draw a contrast with the centralized economy of the People’s Republic of China;
(7) the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union should accelerate efforts to de-escalate their trade disputes, including negotiating a United States-European Union trade agreement that benefits workers and the broader economy in both the United States and European Union;

(8) the United States, European Union, and Japan should continue trilateral efforts to address the security, economic, democracy, and human rights challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China;

(9) the United States, European Union, the United Kingdom, and other European countries should enhance cooperation to counter People’s Republic of China disinformation, influence operations, and propaganda efforts;

(10) the United States and Europe share serious concerns with the repressions being supported and executed by the Government of the People’s Republic of China, and should continue implementing measures to address the Government of the People’s Republic of China’s specific abuses in Tibet, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang, and should build joint mechanisms and programs to prevent the export of China’s authoritarian governance model to countries around the world;
(11) the United States and Europe should remain united in their shared values against attempts by the Government of the People’s Republic of China at the United Nations and other multilateral organizations to promote efforts that erode the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, like the “community of a shared future for mankind” and “democratization of international relations”;

(12) the People’s Republic of China’s infrastructure investments around the world, particularly in 5G telecommunications technology and port infrastructure, could threaten democracy across Europe and the national security of key countries;

(13) as appropriate, the United States should share intelligence with European allies and partners on Huawei’s 5G capabilities and the intentions of the Government of the People’s Republic of China with respect to 5G expansion in Europe;

(14) the European Union’s Investment Screening Regulation, which came into force in October 2020, is a welcome development, and member states should closely scrutinize PRC investments in their countries through their own national investment screening measures;
(15) the President should actively engage the European Union on the implementation of the Export Control Reform Act regulations and to better harmonize United States and European Union policies with respect to export controls;

(16) the President should strongly advocate for the listing of more items and technologies to restrict dual use exports controlled at the National Security and above level to the People’s Republic of China under the Wassenaar Arrangement;

(17) the United States should explore the value of establishing a body akin to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) that would specifically coordinate United States and European Union export control policies with respect to limiting exports of sensitive technologies to the People’s Republic of China; and

(18) the United States should work with counterparts in Europe to—

(A) evaluate United States and European overreliance on goods originating in the People’s Republic of China, including in the medical and pharmaceutical sectors, and develop joint strategies to diversify supply chains;
(B) develop a common strategy for promoting energy security and economic growth in eastern Europe and the Balkans that addresses shared concerns related to China’s Belt and Road Initiative in these regions, including complementary investments in the Three Seas Initiative Fund for clean energy and digital connectivity projects;

(C) counter PRC efforts to use COVID–19-related assistance as a coercive tool to pressure developing countries by offering relevant United States and European expertise and assistance; and

(D) leverage the United States and European private sectors to advance the post-COVID–19 economic recovery.

SEC. 256. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE TRANSATLANTIC CO-OPERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall brief the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives on a strategy for how the United States will enhance coopera-
tation with the European Union, NATO, and European partner countries with respect to the People’s Republic of China.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The briefing required under subsection (a) shall include the following elements with respect to the strategy referred to in such subsection:

(1) An identification of the senior Senate-confirmed Department of State official who leads United States efforts to cooperate with the European Union, NATO, and European partner countries to advance a shared approach with respect to the People’s Republic of China.

(2) An identification of key policy points of convergence and divergence between the United States and European allies and partners with respect to the People’s Republic of China in the areas of technology, trade, and economic practices.

(3) A description of efforts to advance shared interests with European counterparts on—

(A) security and economic challenges with respect to the People’s Republic of China;

(B) democracy and human rights challenges with respect to the People’s Republic of China;
(C) technology issues with respect to the People’s Republic of China;
(D) defense issues with respect to the People’s Republic of China; and
(E) developing a comprehensive strategy to respond to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) established by the Government of the People’s Republic of China.

(4) A description of the coordination mechanisms among key regional and functional bureaus within the Department of State and Department of Defense tasked with engaging with European allies and partners on the People’s Republic of China.

(5) A detailing of diplomatic efforts up to the date of the briefing and future plans to work with European allies and partners to counter the Government of the People’s Republic of China’s advancement of an authoritarian governance model around the world.

(6) A detailing of the diplomatic efforts made up to the date of the briefing and future plans to support European efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to Huawei’s 5G technology.

(7) A detailing of how United States public diplomacy tools, including the Global Engagement
Center of the Department of State, will coordinate efforts with counterpart entities within the European Union to counter Chinese propaganda.

(8) A description of the staffing and budget resources the Department of State dedicates to engagement between the United States and the European Union on the People’s Republic of China and provide an assessment of out-year resource needs to execute such strategy.

(9) A detailing of diplomatic efforts to work with European allies and partners to track and counter Chinese attempts to exert influence across multilateral fora, including at the World Health Organization.

(c) FORM.—The briefing required under section (a) shall be classified.

(d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for three years, the Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives regarding the development and implementation of the elements described in subsection (b).
SEC. 257. ENHANCING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION ON

PROMOTING PRIVATE SECTOR FINANCE.

(a) In general.—The President should work with transatlantic partners to build on the agreement among the Development Finance Corporation, FinDev Canada, and the European Development Finance Institutions (referred to as the “DFI Alliance”) to enhance coordination on shared objectives to foster private sector-led development and provide market-based alternatives to state-directed financing in emerging markets, particularly as related to the People’s Republic of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), including by integrating efforts such as—

(1) the European Union Strategy on Connecting Europe and Asia;

(2) the Three Seas Initiative and Three Seas Initiative Fund;

(3) the Blue Dot Network among the United States, Japan, and Australia; and

(4) a European Union-Japan initiative that has leveraged $65,000,000,000 for infrastructure projects and emphasizes transparency standards.

(b) Standards.—The United States and the European Union should coordinate and develop a strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation with the OECD and the Paris Club on ensuring the highest possible standards for
Belt and Road Initiative contracts and terms with developing countries.

SEC. 258. REPORT AND BRIEFING ON COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND IRAN AND BETWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA.

(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(b) REPORT AND BRIEFING REQUIRED.—
(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and such other heads of Federal agencies as the Director considers appropriate, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report and brief such committees on cooperation between—

(A) the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Iran; and

(B) the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation.

(2) **CONTENTS.**—The report and briefing under paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:

(A) An identification of major areas of diplomatic energy, infrastructure, banking, financial, economic, military, and space cooperation—

(i) between the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Iran;

and

(ii) between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation.
(B) An assessment of the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on such cooperation.

(C) An assessment of the effect that United States compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) starting in January 14, 2016, and United States withdrawal from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, had on the cooperation described in subparagraph (A)(i).

(D) An assessment of the effect on the cooperation described in subparagraph (A)(i) that would be had by the United States reentering compliance with the JCPOA or a successor agreement and the effect of the United States not reentering compliance with the JCPOA or reaching a successor agreement.

(3) FORM.—The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SHARING WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS.—It is the sense of Congress that the Director of National Intelligence and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies should share with important allies and partners of the United States,
as appropriate, the findings of the report required under subsection (b).

PART III—SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA

SEC. 261. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States should continue to stand with friends and partners, while also working to establish new partners in South and Central Asia as they contend with efforts by the Government of the People's Republic of China to interfere in their respective political systems and encroach upon their sovereign territory; and

(2) the United States should reaffirm its commitment to the Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership with India and further deepen bilateral defense consultations and collaboration with India commensurate with its status as a major defense partner.

SEC. 262. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and, the Com-
mittee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives

(a) Strategy for how the United States will engage with the
countries of South and Central Asia, including through
the C5+1 mechanism, with respect to the People’s Republic of China.

(b) Elements.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include the following elements:

(1) A detailed description of the security and
economic challenges that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) poses to the countries of South and
Central Asia, including border disputes with South and Central Asian countries that border the People’s
Republic of China, and PRC investments in land and sea ports, transportation infrastructure, and energy projects across the region.

(2) A detailed description of United States efforts to provide alternatives to PRC investment in infrastructure and other sectors in South and Central Asia.

(3) A detailed description of bilateral and regional efforts to work with countries in South Asia on strategies to build resilience against PRC efforts to interfere in their political systems and economies.

(4) A detailed description of United States diplomatic efforts to work with the Government of Af-
ghanistan on addressing the challenges posed by PRC investment in the Afghan mineral sector.

(5) A detailed description of United States diplomatic efforts with the Government of Pakistan with respect to matters relevant to the People’s Republic of China, including investments by the People’s Republic of China in Pakistan through the Belt and Road Initiative.

(6) In close consultation with the Government of India, identification of areas with respect to which the United States Government can provide diplomatic and other support as appropriate for India’s efforts to address economic and security challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China in the region.

(7) A description of the coordination mechanisms among key regional and functional bureaus within the Department of State and Department of Defense tasked with engaging with the countries of South and Central Asia on issues relating to the People’s Republic of China.

(8) A description of the efforts being made by Federal departments and agencies, including the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, the Department of Com-
merce, the Department of Energy, and the Office of
the United States Trade Representative, to help the
countries of South and Central Asia develop trade
and commerce links that will help those countries di-
versify their trade away from the People’s Republic
of China.

(9) A detailed description of United States dip-

dломatic efforts with Central Asian countries, Turkey,
and any other countries with significant populations
of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities fleeing perse-
cution in the People’s Republic of China to press
those countries to refrain from deporting ethnic mi-
norities to the People’s Republic of China, protect
ethnic minorities from intimidation by Chinese Gov-
ernment authorities, and protect the right to the
freedoms of assembly and expression.

(c) FORM.—The strategy required under section (a)
shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be
made available to the public, but may include a classified
annex as necessary.

(d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 120 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act and not less often
than annually thereafter for five years, the Secretary of
State shall consult with the appropriate congressional
committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Sen-
ate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House
of Representatives regarding the development and imple-
mentation of the strategy required under subsection (a).

SEC. 263. INDIAN OCEAN REGION STRATEGIC REVIEW.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
ings:

(1) The Indian Ocean region is a vitally impor-
tant part of the Indo-Pacific where the United
States has political, economic, and security interests.

(2) The United States has an interest in work-
ing with partners in the Indo-Pacific, including
India, Japan, and Australia, to address regional gov-
ernance, economic connectivity, and security chal-

(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—As a part of the
United States engagement in the Indo-Pacific, it shall be
the policy of the United States to strengthen engagement
with the countries in the Indian Ocean region, including
with governments, civil society, and private sectors in such
countries to—

(1) promote United States political engagement
with such region, including through active participa-
tion in regional organizations, and strengthened dip-

 diplomatic relations with United States partners in
such region;
(2) enhance United States economic
cconnectivity and commercial exchange with such re-
gion;

(3) defend freedom of navigation in such region
from security challenges, including related to piracy;

(4) support the ability of governments and or-
ganizations in such region to respond to natural dis-
asters;

(5) support and facilitate the role of regional all-
ies and partners as net providers of security to such
region and as partners to the United States in ad-
ressing security challenges in such region, including
through assistance to such allies and partners to
build capacity in maritime security and maritime do-
main awareness;

(6) continue to build the United States-India
relationship in order to regularize security coopera-
tion through the negotiation of agreements con-
cerning access, communication, and navigation, in-
cluding through foundational agreements; and

(7) promote cooperation with United States al-
lies in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan and Aus-
tralia, and major defense partners, including India,
and NATO allies, including the United Kingdom and
France, to support a rules-based order in such region.

(c) Strategy.—

(1) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a multi-year strategy for United States engagement to support United States interests in the Indian Ocean region. Such strategy shall—

(A) define United States political, economic, and security interests in the Indian Ocean region;

(B) outline challenges to the interests of the United States in such region;

(C) outline efforts to improve cooperation between the United States and members of the Quad, including India, Japan, and Australia, through coordination in diplomacy and development priorities, joint military exercises and operations, and other activities that promote United States political, economic, and security interests;
(D) outline efforts to support economic connectivity in such region, including through the United States-India-Japan Trilateral Infrastructure Working Group, the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, and other efforts to expand and enhance connectivity across the Indo-Pacific, including with the countries of Southeast Asia, that maintain high standards of investment and support for civil society and people-to-people connectivity;

(E) describe how the United States can engage with regional intergovernmental organizations and entities, including the Indian Ocean Rim Association, to promote United States political, economic, and security interests in such region;

(F) review the United States diplomatic posture in such region, including an assessment of United States diplomatic engagement in countries without a permanent United States embassy or diplomatic mission, and an assessment of ways to improve the cooperation with the Maldives, the Seychelles, and Comoros;

(G) review United States diplomatic agreements with countries in such region that facili-
tate United States military operations in such region, including bilateral and multilateral agreements, and describe efforts to expand United States cooperation with such countries through the negotiation of additional agreements; and

(H) include a security assistance strategy for such region that outlines priorities, objectives, and actions for United States security assistance efforts to governments of countries in such region to promote United States political, economic, and security interests in such region.

(2) INCLUSION.—The strategy required under paragraph (1) may be submitted as a part of any other strategy relating to the Indo-Pacific.

(3) REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than one year after the submission of the strategy required under paragraph (1) and one year thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on progress made toward implementing such strategy.

(d) UNITED STATES-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subparagraph (E) of section 1238(c)(2) of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (22 U.S.C. 7002(e)(2)) is amended—

(A) by inserting “, including in the Indian Ocean region” after “deployments of the People’s Republic of China military”; and

(B) by adding at the end the following new sentence: “In this subparagraph, the term ‘Indian Ocean region’ means the Indian Ocean, including the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, and the littoral areas surrounding the Indian Ocean.”.

(2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by paragraph (1) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and apply beginning with the first report required under section 1238 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (as amended by such paragraph) that is submitted after such date.

(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Re-
lations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

(2) INDIAN OCEAN REGION.—The term “Indian Ocean region” means the Indian Ocean, including the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, and the littoral areas surrounding the Indian Ocean.

PART IV—AFRICA

SEC. 271. ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY ACTIVITY OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN AFRICA.

(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(b) INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that assesses the nature and
impact of the People’s Republic of China’s political, economic, socio-cultural, and security sector activity in Africa, and its impact on United States strategic interests, including information relating to—

(1) the amount and impact of direct investment, loans, development financing, oil-for-loans deals, and other preferential trading arrangements;

(2) the involvement of People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-owned enterprises in Africa;

(3) the amount of African debt held by the PRC;

(4) the involvement of PRC private security, technology and media companies in Africa;

(5) the scale and impact of PRC arms sales to African countries;

(6) the scope of PRC investment in and control of African energy resources and minerals critical for emerging and foundational technologies;

(7) an analysis on the linkages between PRC’s aid and assistance to African countries and African countries supporting PRC geopolitical goals in international fora;

(8) the methods, tools, and tactics used to facilitate illegal and corrupt activity, including trade in counterfeit and illicit goods, to include smuggled ex-
tractive resources and wildlife products, between Africa and the PRC;

(9) the methods and techniques that the PRC uses to exert undue influence on African governments and facilitate corrupt activity in Africa, including through the CCP’s party-to-party training program, and to influence African multilateral organizations; and

(10) an analysis of the soft power, cultural and educational activities undertaken by the PRC and CCP to seek to expand its influence in Africa.

SEC. 272. Increasing the Competitiveness of the United States in Africa.

(a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

(b) Strategy Requirement.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in consultation with the Secretary
of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade Representative, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the leadership of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report setting forth a multi-year strategy for increasing United States economic competitiveness and promoting improvements in the investment climate in Africa, including through support for—

(1) democratic institutions and the rule of law, including property rights; and

(2) improved transparency, anti-corruption efforts, and good governance.

(c) ELEMENTS.—The strategy submitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall include—

(1) a description and assessment of barriers to United States investment in Africa for United States businesses, including a clear identification of the different barriers facing small-sized and medium-sized businesses, and an assessment of whether existing programs effectively address such barriers;

(2) a description and assessment of barriers to African diaspora investment in Africa, and recommendations to overcome such barriers;
(3) an identification of the economic sectors in the United States that have a comparative advantage in African markets;

(4) a determination of priority African countries for promoting two-way trade and investment and an assessment of additional foreign assistance needs, including democracy and governance and rule of law support, to promote a conducive operating environment in priority countries;

(5) an identification of opportunities for strategic cooperation with European allies on trade and investment in Africa, and for establishing a dialogue on trade, security, development, and environmental issues of mutual interest; and

(6) a plan to regularly host a United States-Africa Leaders Summit to promote two-way trade and investment, strategic engagement, and security in Africa.

(d) ASSESSMENT OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HUMAN RESOURCES CAPACITY.—The Comptroller General of the United States shall—

(1) conduct a review of the number of Foreign Commercial Service Officers and Department of State Economic Officers at United States embassies in sub-Saharan Africa; and
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(2) develop and submit to the appropriate con-
gressional committees an assessment of whether
human resource capacity in such embassies is ade-
quate to meet the goals of the various trade and eco-

dic programs and initiatives in Africa, including
the African Growth and Opportunity Act and Pros-
per Africa.

SEC. 273. DIGITAL SECURITY COOPERATION WITH RESPECT
TO AFRICA.

(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS De-
FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
tees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.

(b) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP TO COUNTER
PRC CYBER AGGRESSION IN AFRICA.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish
an interagency Working Group, which shall include
representatives of the Department of State, the De-
partment of Defense, the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, and such other agencies of the United States Government as the President considers appropriate, on means to counter PRC cyber aggression with respect to Africa.

(2) DUTIES.—The Working Group established pursuant to this subsection shall develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a set of recommendations, such as for—

(A) bolstering the capacity of governments in Africa to ensure the integrity of their data networks and critical infrastructure, where applicable;

(B) providing alternatives to Huawei;

(C) an action plan for United States embassies in Africa to provide assistance to host-country governments with respect to protecting their vital digital networks and infrastructure from PRC espionage, including an assessment of staffing resources needed to implement the action plan in embassies in Africa;

(D) utilizing interagency resources to counter PRC disinformation and propaganda in traditional and digital media targeted to African audiences; and
(E) helping civil society in Africa counter digital authoritarianism and identifying tools and assistance to enhance and promote digital democracy.

SEC. 274. SUPPORT FOR YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.

(a) FINDING.—Congress finds that youth in Africa can have a positive impact on efforts to foster economic growth, improve public sector transparency and governance, and counter extremism, and should be an area of focus for United States outreach on the continent.

(b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States, in cooperation and collaboration with private sector companies, civic organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and national and regional public sector entities, to commit resources to enhancing the entrepreneurship and leadership skills of African youth with the objective of enhancing their ability to serve as leaders in the public and private sectors in order to help them spur growth and prosperity, strengthen democratic governance, and enhance peace and security in their respective countries of origin and across Africa.

(e) YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—There is hereby established the Young African Leaders Initiative (referred to in
this section as the “Initiative”), to be carried out by
the Secretary of State.

(2) FELLOWSHIPS.—The Secretary of State is
authorized to continue to support the participation
in the Initiative, in the United States, of fellows
from Africa each year for such education and train-
ing in leadership and professional development
through the Department of State as the Secretary
considers appropriate. The Secretary shall establish
and publish criteria for eligibility for participation as
such a fellow, and for selection of fellows among eli-
gible applicants for a fellowship.

(3) RECIPROCAL EXCHANGES.—Under the Ini-
tiative, United States citizens may engage in such
reciprocal exchanges in connection with and collabor-
ation on projects with fellows under paragraph (1)
as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(4) NETWORKS.—The Secretary of State is au-
thorized to continue to maintain an online network
that provides information and online courses for
young leaders in Africa on topics related to entrepre-
neurship and leadership.

(5) REGIONAL CENTERS.—The Administrator
of the United States Agency for International Devel-
opment is authorized to establish regional centers in
Africa to provide in-person and online training throughout the year in business and entrepreneurship, civic leadership, and public management.

(d) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State should increase the number of fellows from Africa participating in the Mandela Washington Fellowship above the current 700 projected for fiscal year 2021.

SEC. 275. AFRICA BROADCASTING NETWORKS.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chief Executive Officer of the United States Agency for Global Media shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the resources and timeline needed to establish within the Agency an organization the mission of which shall be to promote democratic values and institutions in Africa by providing objective, accurate, and relevant news and information to the people of Africa and counter disinformation from malign actors, especially in countries in which a free press is banned by the government or not fully established, about the region, the world, and the United States through uncensored news, responsible discussion, and open debate.
SEC. 276. AFRICA ENERGY SECURITY AND DIVERSIFICATION.

(a) Statement of Policy.—It is the policy of the United States to support increased access to energy in Africa and reduce Africa’s energy dependence on countries that use energy reliance for undue political influence such as the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China.

(b) Findings.—Congress finds the following:

(1) Lack of access to energy remains a significant barrier to economic advancement and opportunity in Africa. As of 2018, an estimated 789,000,000 people, the vast majority of them in sub-Saharan Africa, lacked access to any modern electricity. Even in the region’s most advanced economies, average annual per capita electricity consumption is often under 200 kilowatt-hours, less than what is needed to power a typical refrigerator. Only a small fraction of the 12,000,000 young Africans who enter the job market each year find employment; and the cost and reliability of electricity remain top constraints to job creation and economic competitiveness.

(2) The United States’ global strategic competitors have stepped in to address this disparity and finance energy sector development across Africa.
China is the single largest trading partner for African countries in aggregate, and the largest bilateral lender for public sector loans across Africa. Approximately 65 percent of Chinese lending to Africa goes to infrastructure, and between 2013–2020, the energy sector consistently accounted for the largest share of all investment under China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

(3) Reliable, affordable, and sustainable power is the foundation for all modern economies and necessary for increasing growth and employment.

(4) Increasing energy supply in low- and lower middle-income countries is necessary in the next decades in order to meet human, social, security, and economic needs.

(5) Addressing energy poverty, powering inclusive economies, and making energy systems resilient in low- and lower middle-income countries will require diversified power systems and a mix of technologies that align with local conditions, resources, and needs.

(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that countries in Africa continue to be important partners to the United States and the DFC should continue to make investments in sub-Saharan Africa to facili-
state technologies that contribute to energy security and reliable, affordable, and sustainable power in low and lower middle-income countries.

(d) AMENDMENT.—Section 3 of the Electrify Africa Act of 2015 (Public Law 114–121; 22 U.S.C. 2293 note) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (8), by striking “and” at the end;

(2) in paragraph (9), by striking the period and inserting a semicolon; and

(3) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following:

“(10) advance United States foreign policy and development goals by assisting African countries to reduce their dependence on energy resources from countries that use energy dependence for undue political influence, such as the Russian Federation or the People’s Republic of China, which have used energy and financial resources to influence other countries;

“(11) promote the energy security of allies and partners of the United States by encouraging the development of accessible, transparent, and competitive energy markets that provide diversified sources and reliable, affordable, and sustainable power;
“(12) encourage United States public and private sector investment in African energy infrastructure projects to bridge the gap between energy security requirements and commercial demand in a way that is consistent with the region’s capacity; and

“(13) help facilitate the export of United States energy resources, technology, and expertise to global markets in a way that benefits the energy security of allies and partners of the United States, including in Africa.”.

PART V—MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

SEC. 281. STRATEGY TO COUNTER CHINESE INFLUENCE IN, AND ACCESS TO, THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the People’s Republic of China is upgrading its influence in the Middle East and North Africa through its energy and infrastructure investments, technology transfer, and arms sales;

(2) the People’s Republic of China seeks to establish military or dual use facilities in geographically strategic locations in the Middle East and North Africa to further its Belt and Road Initiative
at the expense of United States national security interests; and

(3) the export of certain communications infrastructure from the People’s Republic of China degrades the security of partner networks, exposes intellectual property to theft, threatens the ability of the United States to conduct security cooperation with compromised regional partners, and furthers China’s authoritarian surveillance model.

(b) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall jointly develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a strategy for countering and limiting the People’s Republic of China’s influence in, and access to, the Middle East and North Africa.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall include—
(A) an assessment of the People’s Republic of China’s intent with regards to increased cooperation with Middle East and North African countries and how such cooperation fits into its broader global strategic objectives;

(B) an assessment of how governments across the region are responding to the People’s Republic of China’s efforts to increase its military presence in their countries;

(C) efforts to improve regional cooperation through foreign military sales, financing, and efforts to build partner capacity and increase interoperability with the United States;

(D) an assessment of the People’s Republic of China’s joint research and development with the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on the United States’ national security interests, and recommended steps to mitigate the People’s Republic of China’s influence in such area;

(E) an assessment of arms sales and weapons technology transfers from the People’s Republic of China to the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on United States’ national security interests, and recommended steps to miti-
igate the People’s Republic of China’s influence in such area;

(F) an assessment of the People’s Republic of China’s military sales to the region, including lethal and non-lethal unmanned aerial systems;

(G) an assessment of People’s Republic of China military basing and dual-use facility initiatives across the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on United States’ national security interests, and recommended steps to mitigate the People's Republic of China’s influence in such area;

(H) efforts to improve regional security cooperation with United States allies and partners with a focus on—

(i) maritime security in the Arabian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean;

(ii) integrated air and missile defense;

(iii) cyber security;

(iv) border security; and

(v) critical infrastructure security, to include energy security;

(I) increased support for government-to-government engagement on critical infrastruc-
ture development projects, including ports and water infrastructure;

(J) efforts to encourage United States private sector and public-private partnerships in healthcare technology and foreign direct investment in non-energy sectors;

(K) efforts to expand youth engagement and professional education exchanges with key partner countries;

(L) specific steps to counter increased investment from the People’s Republic of China in telecommunications infrastructure and diplomatic efforts to stress the political, economic, and social benefits of a free and open internet;

(M) efforts to promote United States private sector engagement in and public-private partnerships on renewable energy development;

(N) the expansion of public-private partnership efforts on water, desalination, and irrigation projects; and

(O) efforts to warn United States partners in the Middle East and North Africa of the risks associated with the People’s Republic of China’s telecommunications infrastructure and
provide alternative “clean paths” to the People’s Republic of China’s technology.

(c) **FORM.**—The strategy required under section (b) shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be made available to the public, but may include a classified annex as necessary.

**SEC. 282. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA ENGAGEMENT.**

(a) **FINDINGS.**—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The United States and the international community have long-term interests in the stability, security, and prosperity of the people of the Middle East and North Africa.

(2) In addition to and apart from military and security efforts, the United States should harness a whole of government approach, including bilateral and multilateral statecraft, economic lines of effort, and public diplomacy to compete with and counter PRC influence.

(3) A clearly articulated positive narrative of United States engagement, transparent governance structures, and active civil society engagement help counter predatory foreign investment and influence efforts.
(b) **Statement of Policy.**—It is the policy of the United States that the United States and the international community should continue diplomatic and economic efforts throughout the Middle East and North Africa that support reform efforts to—

(1) promote greater economic opportunity;
(2) foster private sector development;
(3) strengthen civil society;
(4) promote transparent and democratic governance and the rule of law; and
(5) promote greater regional integration and intraregional cooperation, including with Israel.

**PART VI—ARCTIC REGION**

**SEC. 285. ARCTIC DIPLOMACY.**

(a) **Sense of Congress on Arctic Security.**—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the rapidly changing Arctic environment—

(A) creates new national and regional security challenges due to increased military activity in the Arctic;

(B) heightens the risk of the Arctic emerging as a major theater of conflict in ongoing strategic competition;

(C) threatens maritime safety as Arctic littoral countries have inadequate capacity to pa-
trol the increased vessel traffic in this remote region, which is a result of diminished annual levels of sea ice;

(D) impacts public safety due to increased human activity in the Arctic region where search and rescue capacity remains very limited; and

(E) threatens the health of the Arctic’s fragile and pristine environment and the unique and highly sensitive species found in the Arctic’s marine and terrestrial ecosystems; and

(2) the United States should reduce the consequences described in paragraph (1) by—

(A) evaluating the wide variety and dynamic set of security and safety risks developing in the Arctic;

(B) developing policies and making preparations to mitigate and respond to threats and risks in the Arctic, including by continuing to work with allies and partners in the Arctic region to deter potential aggressive activities and build Arctic competencies;

(C) adequately funding the National Earth System Prediction Capability to substantively improve weather, ocean, and ice predictions on
the time scales necessary to ensure regional se-
curity and trans-Arctic shipping;

(D) investing in resources, including a sig-
nificantly expanded icebreaker fleet, to ensure
that the United States has adequate capacity to
prevent and respond to security threats in the
Arctic region; and

(E) pursuing diplomatic engagements with
all states in the Arctic region to reach an agree-
ment for—

(i) maintaining peace and stability in
the Arctic region;

(ii) fostering cooperation on steward-
ship and safety initiatives in the Arctic re-
gion;

(iii) ensuring safe and efficient man-
agement of commercial maritime traffic in
the Arctic;

(iv) promoting responsible natural re-
source management and economic develop-
ment; and

(v) countering China’s Polar Silk
Road initiative;
(vi) examining the possibility of reconvening the Arctic Chiefs of Defense Forum; and

(vii) reducing black carbon and methane emissions in the Arctic Region, including by working with observers of the Arctic Council, including India and the People’s Republic of China, to adopt mitigation plans consistent with the findings and recommendations of the Arctic Council’s Framework for Action on Black Carbon and Methane.

(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to recognize only the states specified in subsection (c)(1) as Arctic states, and to reject all other claims to such status; and

(2) that the militarization of the Arctic poses a serious threat to Arctic peace and stability, and the interests of United States allies and partners.

(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) ARCTIC STATES.—The term “Arctic states” means Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway, Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Sweden, and Iceland.
(2) Arctic Region.—The term “Arctic Region” means the geographic region north of the 66.56083 parallel latitude north of the equator.

(d) Designation of Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs.—There is established within the Department of State an Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs (referred to in this section as the “Ambassador”), appointed in accordance with paragraph (1).

(1) Appointment.—The Ambassador shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

(2) Duties.—

(A) Diplomatic representation.—Subject to the direction of the President and the Secretary of State, the Ambassador is authorized to represent the United States in matters and cases relevant to the Arctic Region in—

(i) contacts with foreign governments, intergovernmental organizations, and specialized agencies of the United Nations, the Arctic Council, and other international organizations of which the United States is a member; and

(ii) multilateral conferences and meetings relating to Arctic affairs.
(B) CHAIR OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL.—The Ambassador shall serve as the Chair of the Arctic Council when the United States holds the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council.

(3) POLICIES AND PROCEDURES.—The Ambassador shall coordinate United States policies related to the Arctic Region, including—

(A) meeting national security, economic, and commercial needs pertaining to Arctic affairs;

(B) protecting the Arctic environment and conserving its biological resources;

(C) promoting environmentally sustainable natural resource management and economic development;

(D) strengthening institutions for cooperation among the Arctic states;

(E) involving Arctic indigenous people in decisions that affect them;

(F) enhancing scientific monitoring and research on local, regional, and global environmental issues;

(G) integrating scientific data on the current and projected effects of climate change in the Arctic Region and ensure that such data is
applied to the development of security strategies
for the Arctic Region;

(H) making available the methods and ap-
proaches on the integration of climate science
to other regional security planning programs in
the Department of State to better ensure that
broader decision-making processes may more
adequately account for the effects of climate
change; and

(I) reducing black carbon and methane
emissions in the Arctic Region.

(c) Arctic Region Security Policy.—The Amb-
bassador shall develop a policy, to be known as the “Arctic
Region Security Policy”, to assess, develop, budget for,
and implement plans, policies, and actions—

(1) to bolster the diplomatic presence of the
United States in Arctic states, including through en-
hancements to diplomatic missions and facilities,
participation in regional and bilateral dialogues re-
lated to Arctic security, and coordination of United
States initiatives and assistance programs across
agencies to protect the national security of the
United States and its allies and partners;

(2) to enhance the resilience capacities of Arctic
states to the effects of environmental change and in-
creased civilian and military activity by Arctic states and other states that may result from increased accessibility of the Arctic Region;

(3) to assess specific added risks to the Arctic Region and Arctic states that—

(A) are vulnerable to the changing Arctic environment; and

(B) are strategically significant to the United States;

(4) to coordinate the integration of environmental change and national security risk and vulnerability assessments into the decision making process on foreign assistance awards with Greenland;

(5) to advance principles of good governance by encouraging and cooperating with Arctic states on collaborative approaches—

(A) to responsibly manage natural resources in the Arctic Region;

(B) to share the burden of ensuring maritime safety in the Arctic Region;

(C) to prevent the escalation of security tensions by mitigating against the militarization of the Arctic Region;

(D) to develop mutually agreed upon multilateral policies among Arctic states on the
management of maritime transit routes through
the Arctic Region and work cooperatively on the
transit policies for access to and transit in the
Arctic Region by non-Arctic states; and

(E) to facilitate the development of Arctic
Region Security Action Plans to ensure stability
and public safety in disaster situations in a hu-
mane and responsible fashion;

(6) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, sur-
vivability, and resiliency of United States interests
and non-defense assets in the Arctic Region; and

(7) to reduce black carbon and methane emis-
sions in the Arctic.

PART VII—OCEANIA

SEC. 291. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES EN-
GAGEMENT IN OCEANIA.

It shall be the policy of the United States—

(1) to elevate the countries of Oceania as a
strategic national security and economic priority of
the United States Government;

(2) to promote civil society, the rule of law, and
democratic governance across Oceania as part of a
free and open Indo-Pacific region;

(3) to broaden and deepen relationships with
the Freely Associated States of the Republic of
Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the
Federated States of Micronesia through robust de-
fense, diplomatic, economic, and development ex-
changes that promote the goals of individual coun-
tries and the entire region;

(4) to work with the Governments of Australia,
New Zealand, and Japan to advance shared alliance
goals of the Oceania region concerning health, envi-
ronmental protection, disaster resilience and pre-
paredness, illegal, unreported and unregulated fish-
ing, maritime security, and economic development;

(5) to participate, wherever possible and appro-
priate, in existing regional organizations and inter-
national structures to promote the national security
and economic goals of the United States and coun-
tries of Oceania;

(6) to invest in a whole-of-government United
States strategy that will enhance youth engagement
and advance long-term growth and development
throughout the region, especially as such relates to
protecting marine resources that are critical to liveli-
hoods and strengthening the resilience of the coun-
tries of Oceania against current and future threats
resulting from extreme weather and severe changes
in the environment;
(7) to deter and combat acts of malign foreign influence and corruption aimed at undermining the political, environmental, social, and economic stability of the people and governments of the countries of Oceania;

(8) to improve the local capacity of the countries of Oceania to address public health challenges and improve global health security;

(9) to help the countries of Oceania access market-based private sector investments that adhere to best practices regarding transparency, debt sustainability, and environmental and social safeguards as an alternative to state-directed investments by authoritarian governments;

(10) to ensure the people and communities of Oceania remain safe from the risks of old and degrading munitions hazards and other debris that threaten health and livelihoods;

(11) to cooperate with Taiwan by offering United States support for maintaining Taiwan’s diplomatic partners in Oceania; and

(12) to work cooperatively with all governments in Oceania to promote the dignified return of the remains of members of the United States Armed
Forces who are missing in action from previous conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region.

SEC. 292. OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.

(a) OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategic roadmap for strengthening United States engagement with the countries of Oceania, including an analysis of opportunities to cooperate with Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, to address shared concerns and promote shared goals in pursuit of security and resiliency in the countries of Oceania.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategic roadmap required by subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) A description of United States regional goals and concerns with respect to Oceania and increasing engagement with the countries of Oceania.

(2) An assessment, based on paragraph (1), of United States regional goals and concerns that are shared by Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, including a review of issues related to anti-corruption efforts, maritime and other security issues, environmental protection, fisheries management, economic growth and development, and disaster resilience and preparedness.
(3) A review of ongoing programs and initiatives by the Governments of the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan in pursuit of shared regional goals and concerns.

(4) A review of ongoing programs and initiatives by regional organizations and other related intergovernmental structures aimed at addressing shared regional goals and concerns.

(5) A plan for aligning United States programs and resources in pursuit of shared regional goals and concerns, as appropriate.

(6) Recommendations for additional United States authorities, personnel, programs, or resources necessary to execute the strategic roadmap.

(7) Any other elements the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

SEC. 293. OCEANIA SECURITY DIALOGUE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the feasibility and advisability of establishing a United States-based public-private sponsored security dialogue (to be known as the “Oceania Security Dialogue”) among the countries of Oceania for the purposes of jointly exploring and discussing issues affecting the economic, diplomatic,
and national security of the Indo-Pacific countries of Oceania.

(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—The briefing required by subsection (a) shall, at a minimum, include the following:

(1) A review of the ability of the Department of State to participate in a public-private sponsored security dialogue.

(2) An assessment of the potential locations for conducting an Oceania Security Dialogue in the jurisdiction of the United States.

(3) Consideration of dates for conducting an Oceania Security Dialogue that would maximize participation of representatives from the Indo-Pacific countries of Oceania.

(4) A review of the funding modalities available to the Department of State to help finance an Oceania Security Dialogue, including grant-making authorities available to the Department of State.

(5) An assessment of any administrative, statutory, or other legal limitations that would prevent the establishment of an Oceania Security Dialogue with participation and support of the Department of State.

(6) An analysis of how an Oceania Security Dialogue could help to advance the Boe Declaration
on Regional Security, including its emphasis on the changing environment as the greatest existential threat to countries of Oceania.

(7) An evaluation of how an Oceania Security Dialogue could help amplify the issues and work of existing regional structures and organizations dedicated to the security of the Oceania region, such as the Pacific Island Forum and Pacific Environmental Security Forum.

(8) An analysis of how an Oceania Security Dialogue would help with implementation of the strategic roadmap required by section 292 and advance the National Security Strategy of the United States.

(c) INTERAGENCY CONSULTATION.—To the extent practicable, the Secretary of State may consult with the Secretary of Defense and, where appropriate, evaluate the lessons learned of the Regional Centers for Security Studies of the Department of Defense to determine the feasibility and advisability of establishing the Oceania Security Dialogue.

SEC. 294. OCEANIA PEACE CORPS PARTNERSHIPS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Peace Corps shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on strategies to reasonably and safely expand the number of Peace Corps volunteers in Oceania, with the goals of—

(1) expanding the presence of the Peace Corps to all currently feasible locations in Oceania; and

(2) working with regional and international partners of the United States to expand the presence of Peace Corps volunteers in low-income Oceania communities in support of climate resilience initiatives.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection (a) shall—

(1) assess the factors contributing to the current absence of the Peace Corps and its volunteers in Oceania;

(2) examine potential remedies that include working with United States Government agencies and regional governments, including governments of United States allies—

(A) to increase the health infrastructure and medical evacuation capabilities of the countries of Oceania to better support the safety of Peace Corps volunteers while in such countries;
(B) to address physical safety concerns that have decreased the ability of the Peace Corps to operate in Oceania; and

(C) to increase transportation infrastructure in the countries of Oceania to better support the travel of Peace Corps volunteers and their access to necessary facilities;

(3) evaluate the potential to expand the deployment of Peace Corps Response volunteers to help the countries of Oceania address social, economic, and development needs of their communities that require specific professional expertise; and

(4) explore potential new operational models to address safety and security needs of Peace Corps volunteers in the countries of Oceania, including—

(A) changes to volunteer deployment durations; and

(B) scheduled redeployment of volunteers to regional or United States-based healthcare facilities for routine physical and behavioral health evaluation.

(c) VOLUNTEERS IN LOW-INCOME OCEANIA COMMUNITIES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—In examining the potential to expand the presence of Peace Corps volunteers in
low-income Oceania communities under subsection (a)(2), the Director of the Peace Corps shall consider the development of initiatives described in paragraph (2).

(2) INITIATIVES DESCRIBED.—Initiatives described in this paragraph are volunteer initiatives that help the countries of Oceania address social, economic, and development needs of their communities, including by—

(A) addressing, through appropriate resilience-based interventions, the vulnerability that communities in Oceania face as result of extreme weather, severe environmental change, and other climate related trends; and

(B) improving, through smart infrastructure principles, access to transportation and connectivity infrastructure that will help address the economic and social challenges that communities in Oceania confront as a result of poor or nonexistent infrastructure.

(d) OCEANIA DEFINED.—In this section, the term “Oceania” includes the following:

1. Easter Island of Chile.
2. Fiji.
3. French Polynesia of France.
(4) Kiribati.
(5) New Caledonia of France.
(6) Nieu of New Zealand.
(7) Papua New Guinea.
(8) Samoa.
(9) Vanuatu.
(10) The Ashmore and Cartier Islands of Australia.
(11) The Cook Islands of New Zealand.
(12) The Coral Islands of Australia.
(13) The Federated States of Micronesia.
(14) The Norfolk Island of Australia.
(15) The Pitcairn Islands of the United Kingdom.
(17) The Republic of Palau.
(18) The Solomon Islands.
(19) Tokelau of New Zealand.
(20) Tonga.
(21) Tuvalu.
(22) Wallis and Futuna of France.
PART VIII—PACIFIC ISLANDS

SEC. 295. SHORT TITLE.

This part may be cited as the “Boosting Long-term U.S. Engagement in the Pacific Act” or the “BLUE Pacific Act”.

SEC. 296. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) The Pacific Islands—

(A) are home to roughly 10 million residents, including over 8.6 million in Papua New Guinea, constituting diverse and dynamic cultures and peoples;

(B) are spread across an expanse of the Pacific Ocean equivalent to 15 percent of the Earth’s surface, including the three sub-regions of Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia; and

(C) face shared challenges in development that have distinct local contexts, including climate change and rising sea levels, geographic distances from major markets, and vulnerability to external shocks such as natural disasters.

(2) The United States is a Pacific country with longstanding ties and shared values and interests with the Pacific Islands, including through the Compacts of Free Association with the Freely Associated States, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the

(3) The United States has vital national security interests in the Pacific Islands, including—

(A) protecting regional peace and security that fully respects the sovereignty of all nations;

(B) advancing economic prosperity free from coercion through trade and sustainable development; and

(C) supporting democracy, good governance, the rule of law, and human rights and fundamental freedoms.

(4) Successive United States administrations have recognized the importance of the Pacific region, including the Pacific Islands, in high-level strategic documents, including the following:

(A) The 2015 National Security Strategy, which first declared the rebalance to Asia and the Pacific, affirmed the United States as a Pacific nation, and paved the way for subsequent United States engagement with the Pacific Islands, including several new policies focused on conservation and resilience to climate change announced in September 2016.
(B) The 2017 National Security Strategy, which includes a commitment to “shore up fragile partner states in the Pacific Islands region to reduce their vulnerability to economic fluctuations and natural disasters”.

(C) The 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, which identified the Pacific Islands as “critical to U.S. strategy because of our shared values, interests, and commitments” and committed the United States to “building capacity and resilience to address maritime security; Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing; drug trafficking; and resilience to address climate change and disaster response”.

(5) The United States has deepened its diplomatic engagement with the Pacific Islands through several recent initiatives, including—

(A) the Pacific Pledge, which provided an additional $100,000,000 in 2019 and $200,000,000 in 2020, on top of the approximately $350,000,000 that the United States provides annually to the region to support shared priorities in economic and human development, climate change, and more; and
(B) the Small and Less Populous Island Economies (SALPIE) Initiative launched in March 2021 to strengthen United States collaboration with island countries and territories, including in the Pacific Islands, on COVID–19 economic challenges, long-term economic development, climate change, and other shared interests.

(6) The Boe Declaration on Regional Security, signed by leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum in 2018, affirmed that climate change “remains the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security, and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific” and asserted “the sovereign right of every Member to conduct its national affairs free of external interference and coercion”.

(7) The Asian Development Bank has estimated that the Pacific Islands region needs upwards of $2.8 billion a year in investment needs through 2030, in addition to $300 million a year for climate mitigation and adaptation over the same period.

(8) The Pacific Islands swiftly enacted effective policies to prevent and contain the spread of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (commonly referred to as “COVID–19”) pandemic to their populations. The
United States has provided over $130,000,000 in assistance to the Pacific Islands for their COVID–19 response. However, priorities must be met to ensure continued success in preventing the spread of the COVID–19 pandemic, achieving swift and widespread vaccinations, and pursuing long-term economic recovery in the Pacific Islands, including through—

(A) expanding testing capacity and acquisition of needed medical supplies, including available COVID–19 vaccines and supporting vaccination efforts, through a reliable supply chain;

(B) planning for lifting of lockdowns and reopening of economic and social activities; and

(C) mitigating and recovering from the impacts of the COVID–19 pandemic on the health system and the reliance on food and energy imports as well as lost tourism revenue and other economic and food security damages caused by the pandemic.

(9) Since 1966, thousands of Peace Corps volunteers have proudly served in the Pacific Islands, building strong people-to-people relationships and demonstrating the United States commitment to peace and development in the region. Prior to the
COVID–19 pandemic, the Peace Corps maintained presence in four countries of the Pacific Islands. Peace Corps volunteers continue to be in high demand in the Pacific Islands and have been requested across the region.

SEC. 297. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to develop and commit to a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy in the Pacific Islands that—

(A) promotes peace, security, and prosperity for all countries through a rules-based regional order that respects the sovereignty and political independence of all nations;

(B) preserves the Pacific Ocean as an open and vibrant corridor for international maritime trade and promotes trade and sustainable development that supports inclusive economic growth and autonomy for all nations and addresses socioeconomic challenges related to public health, education, renewable energy, digital connectivity, and more;

(C) supports regional efforts to address the challenges posed by climate change, including by strengthening resilience to natural disasters
and through responsible stewardship of natural resources;

(D) improves civil society, strengthens democratic governance and the rule of law, and promotes human rights and the preservation of the region’s unique cultural heritages;

(E) assists the Pacific Islands in preventing and containing the spread of the COVID–19 pandemic and in pursuing long-term economic recovery; and

(F) supports existing regional architecture and international norms;

(2) to support the vision, values, and objectives of existing regional multilateral institutions and frameworks, such as the Pacific Islands Forum and the Pacific Community, including—

(A) the 2014 Framework for Pacific Regionalism;

(B) the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security; and

(C) the Boe Declaration Action Plan;

(3) to extend and renew the provisions of the Compacts of Free Association and related United States law that will expire in 2023 for the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of
Micronesia and in 2024 for the Republic of Palau unless they are extended and renewed; and

(4) to work closely with United States allies and partners with existing relationships and interests in the Pacific Islands, such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Taiwan, in advancing common goals.

SEC. 298. DEFINITION.

In this part, the terms “Pacific Islands” means the Cook Islands, the Republic of Fiji, the Republic of Kiribati, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Nauru, Niue, the Republic of Palau, the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, the Independent State of Samoa, the Solomon Islands, the Kingdom of Tonga, Tuvalu, and the Republic of Vanuatu.

SEC. 299. AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS; FORM OF REPORTS.

(a) Authority to Consolidate Reports.—Any reports required to be submitted to the appropriate congressional committees under this part that are subject to deadlines for submission consisting of the same units of time may be consolidated into a single report that is submitted to the appropriate congressional committees pursu-
ant to such deadlines and that contains all information required under such reports.

(b) **Form of Reports.**—Each report required by this part shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

**Sec. 299A. Diplomatic Presence in the Pacific Islands.**

(a) **Sense of Congress.**—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the strategic importance of the Pacific Islands necessitates an examination of whether United States diplomatic, economic, and development engagement and presence in the Pacific Islands region is sufficient to effectively support United States objectives and meaningful participation in regional fora;

(2) improving shared understanding of and jointly combatting the transnational challenges pertinent to the Pacific Islands region with countries of the Pacific Islands and regional partners such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Taiwan is vitally important to our shared long-term interests of stability, security, and prosperity;

(3) the United States should seek to participate in and support efforts to coordinate a regional re-
sponse toward maritime security, including through continued United States and Pacific Islands participation in the Pacific Fusion Centre in Vanuatu and Information Fusion Centre in Singapore, and robust cooperation with regional allies and partners; and

(4) the United States Government should commit to sending appropriate levels of representation to regional events.

(b) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the diplomatic and development presence of the United States in the Pacific Islands.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) A description of the Department of State, United States Agency for International Development, United States International Development Finance Corporation, Millennium Challenge Corporation, and United States Com-
mercial Service presence, staffing, programming, and resourcing of operations in the Pacific Islands, including programming and resourcing not specifically allocated to the Pacific Islands.

(B) A description of gaps in such presence, including unfilled full-time equivalent positions.

(C) A description of limitations and challenges such gaps pose to United States strategic objectives, including—

(i) gaps in support of the Pacific Islands due to operations being conducted from the United States Agency for International Development offices in Manila and Suva; and

(ii) gaps in programming and resourcing.

(D) A strategy to expand and elevate such presence to fill such gaps, including by establishing new missions, expanding participation in regional forums, and elevating United States representation in regional forums.

(e) Authority to Enhance Diplomatic and Economic Engagement.—The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce are authorized to hire locally em-
ployed staff in the Pacific Islands for the purpose of promoting increased diplomatic engagement and economic and commercial engagement between the United States and the Pacific Islands.

(d) Regional Development Cooperation Strategy.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every five years thereafter, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a regional development cooperation strategy for the Pacific Islands.

SEC. 299B. COORDINATION WITH REGIONAL ALLIES AND PARTNERS.

(a) In General.—The Secretary of State shall consult and coordinate with regional allies and partners, such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan, and regional institutions such as the Pacific Islands Forum and the Pacific Community, with respect to programs to provide assistance to the Pacific Islands, including programs established by this Act, including for purposes of—

(1) deconflicting programming;

(2) ensuring that any programming does not adversely affect the absorptive capacity of the Pacific Islands; and
(3) ensuring complementary programs benefit the Pacific Islands to the maximum extent practicable.

(b) FORMAL CONSULTATIVE PROCESS.—The Secretary of State shall establish a formal consultative process with such regional allies and partners to coordinate with respect to such programs and future-years programming.

(e) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report that includes—

(1) a review of ongoing efforts, initiatives, and programs undertaken by regional allies and partners, including multilateral organizations, to advance priorities identified in this Act;

(2) a review of ongoing efforts, initiatives, and programs undertaken by non-allied foreign actors that are viewed as being potentially harmful or in any way detrimental to one or more countries of the Pacific Islands;

(3) an assessment of United States programs in the Pacific Islands and their alignment and
complementarity with the efforts of regional allies
and partners identified in paragraph (1); and

(4) a review of the formal consultative process
required in subsection (b) to summarize engage-
ments held and identify opportunities to improve co-
ordination with regional allies and partners.

SEC. 299C. CLIMATE RESILIENT DEVELOPMENT IN THE PA-
CIFIC ISLANDS.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that—

(1) the United States Government should lever-
age the full range of authorities and programs avail-
able to assist the Pacific Islands in achieving their
development goals;

(2) United States development assistance
should seek to build on existing public and private
sector investments while creating new opportunities
toward a favorable environment for additional such
investments; and

(3) United States development efforts should be
coordinated with and seek to build on existing ef-
forts by like-minded partners and allies and regional
and international multilateral organizations.

(b) STRATEGY.—The Secretary of State, in coordina-
tion with the Administrator of the United States Agency
for International Development, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, shall develop and implement a strategy to—

(1) invest in and improve critical infrastructure, including transport connectivity, information and communications technology, food security, coastal zone management, marine and water resource management, and energy security and access to electricity in the Pacific Islands, with an emphasis on climate resiliency and sustainable development;

(2) provide technical assistance to assist local government and civil society leaders assess risks to local infrastructure, especially those posed by climate change, consider and implement risk mitigation efforts and policies to strengthen resilience, and evaluate proposed projects and solutions for their efficacy and sustainability; and

(3) support investment and improvement in ecosystem conservation and protection for the long-term sustainable use of ecosystem services, especially those that mitigate effects of climate change and those that support food security and livelihoods.

(c) CONDUCT OF STRATEGY.—The strategy developed under this section shall be coordinated with like-
minded partners and allies, regional and international multilateral organizations, and regional frameworks for development in the Pacific Islands.

(d) **INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.**—

The Secretary of the Treasury shall direct the representatives of the United States to the World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank to use the voice and vote of the United States to support climate resilient infrastructure projects in the Pacific Islands.

(e) **REPORT.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on Natural Resources of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate a report on foreign infrastructure developments in the Pacific Islands.

(2) **MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.**—The report required by paragraph (1) shall include—

(A) a review of foreign infrastructure developments in the Pacific Islands by non-United States allies and partners;
(B) assessments of the environmental impact and sustainability of such developments; and

(C) an analysis of the financial sustainability of such developments and their impacts on the debt of host countries in the Pacific Islands.

(f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated $50,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this section.

SEC. 299D. INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY FOR THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall develop and implement a plan to expand coverage of the International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEA) program for the Pacific Islands, including by—

(1) expanding coverage of the regional program located in Bangkok, Thailand, to the Pacific Islands; or

(2) establishing a new regional program for the Pacific Islands.

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The plan required by subsection (a) shall include consultation and coordination with existing regional law enforcement entities, in-
including the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police and civil society, including those focused on human rights and specializing in victim-centered approaches, and take into consideration costs of implementation, effectiveness, and capacity of the Pacific Islands to participate in the ILEA program.

(c) BRIEFING REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the plan developed under this section.

SEC. 299E. SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.

(a) STRATEGY.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense and in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall develop and implement a comprehensive strategy to provide assistance to and build the capacity of local civilian and national security institutions of the Pacific Islands for purposes of—

(A) enhancing maritime security and maritime domain awareness to address challenges such as illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing;
(B) assisting local law enforcement in detecting, preventing, and combatting human and drug trafficking and other forms of transnational crime;

(C) participating in efforts by regional institutions and frameworks to coordinate and facilitate cooperation on shared security challenges; and

(D) expanding information sharing and to work toward operational coordination and interoperability among Pacific Island maritime security forces, including through regional fusion centers.

(2) PROGRAMS AND AUTHORITIES DESCRIBED.—The strategy required by this subsection shall build on but not be limited to the following programs and authorities:

(A) The International Military Education and Training program.

(B) The Foreign Military Financing program.

(C) The authority to build the capacity of foreign security forces under section 333 of title 10, United States Code.
(D) The authority to provide excess defense articles under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j).

(E) The Department of Defense State Partnership Program.

(3) NATIONAL POLICE FORCES AND COAST GUARDS.—The national police forces and coast guards of the Pacific Islands are eligible to receive assistance under the programs and authorities described in paragraph (2) (other than the programs and authorities described in subparagraphs (A), (D), and (F) of paragraph (2)) for purposes of the strategy required by this subsection.

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy required by subsection (a) shall seek to preserve peace and regional stability in the Pacific Islands and take into consideration and seek to build upon but not duplicate existing assistance provided by United States allies and partners.

(c) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains the strategy developed under this section.
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall include—

(A) an assessment of security challenges to the Pacific Islands;

(B) an analysis of demonstrated needs of the Pacific Islands for assistance;

(C) a review of existing security assistance programs in the Pacific Islands, including programs and efforts provided by United States allies and partners;

(D) a plan for programs for training, equipping, and sustainment, including excess defense equipment and related materials;

(E) a list of militaries, national police forces, coast guards, and other national security forces of the Pacific Islands receiving assistance under the strategy;

(F) a review of existing cross-border maritime law enforcement operations (commonly known as “shiprider agreements”) with the Pacific Islands, an assessment of additional resourcing needs to enhance operational capacity, and a plan to improve on these programs and operations;
(G) a review of existing Department of Defense State Partnership Programs with the Pacific Islands and an assessment of additional opportunities to leverage Department of Defense State Partnership Programs to address national security, law enforcement, disaster relief and emergency management, and related priorities;

(H) a review of current efforts and progress in removing unexploded ordnance in the Pacific Islands and an assessment of additional resourcing needed to ensure continued progress, including to support coordination with regional efforts and those of United States allies and partners;

(I) a review of existing regional fusion centers and other cooperative intelligence sharing efforts in the Pacific Islands to address maritime security, transnational crime, natural disasters, and other security challenges and an assessment of opportunities for the United States to participate in such efforts, including by allocating staff and supplying resourcing;

(J) measures to evaluate success for the strategy; and
(K) a detailed assessment of appropriations required to achieve the objectives for the strategy in future years.

(3) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate.

SEC. 299F. COUNTERING TRANSNATIONAL CRIME.

(a) RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall prioritize efforts to assist the Pacific Islands in ratifying and implementing international legal conventions related to transnational crime, such as—

(A) the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wildlife Fauna and Flora;
(B) the Agreement on Port State Measures; and

(C) relevant protocols supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, such as—

(i) the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Person, Especially Women and Children; and

(ii) the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air.

(2) Biennial report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and every two years thereafter as appropriate, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on—

(A) the status of the progress of each country of the Pacific Islands toward ratifying and implementing international legal conventions related to transnational crime; and

(B) United States plans for assisting those countries that have yet to fully ratify such conventions with their respective ratification efforts.

(b) Updates of certain reports.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with other Federal agencies as
appropriate, shall identify and update existing reports to include forms of transnational crime affecting the Pacific Islands, such as—

(1) the International Narcotics Control Strategy report;

(2) the Improving International Fisheries Management report; and

(3) the Trafficking in Persons report.

c) Illegal Logging and Associated Trade.—

(1) In General.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of relevant Federal agencies, shall submit to appropriate congressional committees a report that identifies countries of the Pacific Islands that are countries of concern with respect to illegal logging and associated trade.

(2) Elements.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) A description of the impact illegal logging and associated trade have had on local communities, good governance, and biodiversity, including an identification of those foreign countries that may be financing or in any other manner supporting illegal logging activities.
(B) A description of efforts taken by countries identified under paragraph (1) to comply and take appropriate corrective action to mitigate illegal logging, and an evaluation of the progress of those efforts.

(C) A description of steps taken by the heads of relevant Federal agencies to assist the Pacific Islands in adopting and implementing international measures comparable to those of the United States, such as the Lacey Act, to reduce impacts of illicit logging.

(3) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Finance of the Senate.

(d) ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED, AND UNREGULATED FISHING.—Section 3553 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (16 U.S.C. 8033) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (7), by striking “and” at the end;
(2) by redesignating paragraph (8) as paragraph (9); and

(3) by inserting after paragraph (7) (as amended) the following:

“(8) an assessment of gaps or limitations in the ability of the United States to effectively assist priority regions and priority flag states relating to IUU fishing due to resource constraints and the additional resources necessary to overcome those constraints; and”.

SEC. 299G. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS INITIATIVE FOR THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall develop and implement an initiative to assist the Pacific Islands in enhancing their preparedness for and resilience to natural disasters and other emergencies.

(b) CONDUCT OF PROGRAM.—The program developed under this section shall include—

(1) education and training programs on natural disaster prevention and preparedness for emergency management professionals in the Pacific Islands, including by leveraging the expertise of nonprofit organizations and institutions of higher education in the United States;
(2) technical assistance, including through grants and cooperative agreements for qualified United States and local nongovernmental organizations, to enhance early warning systems, emergency management and preparedness procedures, and post-disaster relief and recovery; and

(3) coordination of existing disaster mitigation and response plans in the region, including by United States allies and partners in the region.

(c) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the program developed under this section.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall include—

(A) an assessment of disaster risks in the Pacific Islands and existing local and regional capacity to respond to such risks;

(B) a review of existing efforts by United States allies and partners to provide assistance and training for natural disaster preparedness and emergency management; and
(C) objectives, means of implementation, and measures of success for the initiative.

(3) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Natural Resources of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate.

(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated $40,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this section.

SEC. 299H. PEACE CORPS IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the presence of the Peace Corps in the Pacific Islands should be expanded and the Peace Corps should reopen its programs in as many of the Pacific Islands as possible, including where it has previously operated but has suspended operations;

(2) consulting like-minded regional allies and partners, such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan,
and Taiwan is crucial for identifying and overcoming challenges for increased Peace Corps presence in the Pacific Islands;

(3) the Peace Corps, whose mission is to promote world peace and friendship in part by helping the people of interested countries in meeting their need for trained men and women, provides an invaluable opportunity to connect the American people with the people of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau; and

(4) the Peace Corps should promptly reopen its programs in the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Peace Corps shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes—

(1) a comparative analysis of the Peace Corps presence in the Pacific Islands region to other regions of the world, including a cost-benefit analysis of placement in the region versus elsewhere globally;

(2) analysis of current impediments to Peace Corps expansion in the Pacific Islands region;
(3) outcomes of consultations among United States agencies, and with regional allies and partners, on areas in which cooperation can reduce factors limiting Peace Corps expansion, particularly those related to medical transportation and personal safety; and

(4) a plan and timeline for implementing outcomes identified in paragraph (3) to facilitate expansion of Peace Corps presence in the region, where appropriate.

TITLE III—INVESTING IN OUR VALUES

SEC. 301. STATEMENT OF CONGRESS ON THE CONTINUED VIOLATION OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) Despite international condemnation, the Government of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) continues to disregard its international legal obligations under the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong (“Joint Declaration”), in which the PRC committed that—
(A) Hong Kong would enjoy a high degree of autonomy;

(B) for at least 50 years the “social and economic systems in Hong Kong” would remain unchanged; and

(C) the personal rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong would be protected by law.

(2) As part of its continued efforts to undermine the established rights of the Hong Kong people, the PRC National People’s Congress Standing Committee (“Standing Committee”) passed and imposed upon Hong Kong oppressive and intentionally vague national security legislation on June 30, 2020, that grants Beijing sweeping powers to punish acts of “separating the country, subverting state power, and organizing terroristic activities”.

(3) The legislative process by which the Standing Committee imposed the national security law on Hong Kong bypassed Hong Kong’s local government in a potential violation of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (“Basic Law”), and involved unusual secrecy, as demonstrated by the fact that the legislation was only the second law since
2008 that the Standing Committee has passed without releasing a draft for public comment.

(4) On July 30, 2020, election officials of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) disqualified twelve pro-democracy candidates from participating in the September 6 Legislative Council elections, which were subsequently postponed for a year until September 5, 2021, by citing the public health risk of holding elections during the COVID-19 pandemic.

(5) On July 31, 2020, in an attempt to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction, the HKSAR Government announced indictments of and arrest warrants for six Hong Kong activists living overseas, including United States citizen Samuel Chu, for alleged violations of the national security law.

(6) On November 11, 2020, the HKSAR Government removed four lawmakers from office for allegedly violating the law after the Standing Committee passed additional legislation barring those who promoted or supported Hong Kong independence and refused to acknowledge PRC sovereignty over Hong Kong, or otherwise violates the national security law, from running for or serving in the Legislative Council.
(7) On December 2, 2020, pro-democracy activists Joshua Wong, Agnes Chow, and Ivan Lam were sentenced to prison for participating in 2019 protests.

(8) Ten of the twelve Hong Kong residents (also known as “the Hong Kong 12”) who sought to flee by boat from Hong Kong to Taiwan on August 23, 2020, were taken to mainland China and sentenced on December 30, 2020, to prison terms ranging from seven months to three years for illegal border crossing.

(9) On December 31, 2020, Hong Kong’s highest court revoked bail for Jimmy Lai Chee-Ying, a pro-democracy figure and publisher, who was charged on December 12 with colluding with foreign forces and endangering national security under the national security legislation.

(10) On January 4, 2021, the Departments of Justice in Henan and Sichuan province threatened to revoke the licenses of two lawyers hired to help the Hong Kong 12.

(11) On January 5, 2021, the Hong Kong Police Force arrested more than fifty opposition figures, including pro-democracy officials, activists, and an American lawyer, for their involvement in an in-
formal July 2020 primary to select candidates for
the general election originally scheduled for Sep-
tember 2020, despite other political parties having
held similar primaries without retribution.

(12) On April 22, 2021, a Hong Kong court
convicted Choy Yuk-ling, a video producer with
Radio Television Hong Kong, in relation to her in-
vestigative reporting on the Hong Kong police.

(13) On June 24, 2021, Apple Daily, Hong
Kong’s only surviving pro-democracy newspaper,
published its final edition following months of intimi-
dation and repression by the HKSAR Government,
including through the arrest of its senior editors, po-
lice raids on its offices, and the freezing of its finan-
cial assets.

(b) STATEMENT OF CONGRESS.—Congress—

(1) condemns the actions taken by the Govern-
ment of the People’s Republic of China (‘‘PRC’’)
and the Government of the Hong Kong Special Ad-
ministrative Region (‘‘HKSAR’’), including the
adoption and implementation of national security
legislation for Hong Kong through irregular proce-
dures, that violate the rights and freedoms of the
people of Hong Kong that are guaranteed by the
Joint Declaration and its implementing document, the Basic Law;

(2) reaffirms its support for the people of Hong Kong, who face grave threats to their rights and freedoms;

(3) calls on the Governments of the PRC and HKSAR to—

(A) respect and uphold—

(i) commitments made to the international community and the people of Hong Kong under the Joint Declaration; and

(ii) the judicial independence of the Hong Kong legal system; and

(B) release pro-democracy activists and politicians arrested under the national security law; and

(4) encourages the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of the Treasury to coordinate with allies and partners and continue United States efforts to respond to developments in Hong Kong, including by—

(A) providing protection for Hong Kong residents who fear persecution;
(B) supporting those who may seek to file a case before the International Court of Justice to hold the Government of the PRC accountable for violating its binding legal commitments under the Joint Declaration;

(C) encouraging allies and partner countries to instruct, as appropriate, their respective representatives to the United Nations to use their voice, vote, and influence to press for the appointment of a United Nations special mandate holder to monitor and report on human rights developments in Hong Kong;

(D) ensuring the private sector, particularly United States companies with economic interests in Hong Kong, is aware of risks the national security legislation poses to the security of United States citizens and to the medium and long-term interest of United States businesses in Hong Kong;

(E) continuing to implement sanctions authorities, especially authorities recently enacted to address actions undermining the rights and freedoms of the Hong Kong people, such as the Hong Kong Autonomy Act (Public Law 116–149) and the Hong Kong Human Rights and
Democracy Act of 2019 (Public Law 116–76), with respect to officials of the Chinese Communist Party, the Government of the PRC, or the Government of the HKSAR who are responsible for undermining such rights and freedoms; and

(F) coordinating with allies and partners to ensure that such implementation of sanctions is multilateral.

SEC. 302. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN HONG KONG.

(a) Authorization of Appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the Department of State to promote democracy in Hong Kong.

(b) Administration.—The Secretary of State shall designate an office with the Department of State to administer and coordinate the provision of such funds described in subsection (a) within the Department of State and across the United States Government.

SEC. 303. HONG KONG PEOPLE’S FREEDOM AND CHOICE.

(a) Definitions.—For purposes of this section:

(1) Joint Declaration.—The term “Joint Declaration” means the Joint Declaration of the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the
People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong
Kong, signed on December 19, 1984, and entered
into force on May 27, 1985.

(2) **Priority Hong Kong resident.**—The
term “Priority Hong Kong resident” means—

(A) a permanent resident of Hong Kong
who—

(i) holds no right to citizenship in any
country or jurisdiction other than the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China (referred to in this
section as the “PRC”), Hong Kong, or
Macau as of the date of enactment of this
Act;

(ii) has resided in Hong Kong for not
less than the last ten years as of the date
of enactment of this Act; and

(iii) has been designated by the Sec-
retary of State or Secretary of Homeland
Security as having met the requirements of
this subparagraph, in accordance with the
procedures described in subsection (f) of
this section; or
(B) the spouse of a person described in subparagraph (A), or the child of such person as such term is defined in section 101(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1)), except that a child shall be an unmarried person under twenty-seven years of age.

(3) **HONG KONG NATIONAL SECURITY LAW.**—
The term “Hong Kong National Security Law” means the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region that was passed unanimously by the National People’s Congress and signed by President Xi Jinping on June 30, 2020, and promulgated in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (referred to in this section as “Hong Kong SAR”) on July 1, 2020.

(4) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations
and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Sen-
ate.

(b) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) The Hong Kong National Security Law pro-
mulgated on July 1, 2020—

(A) contravenes the Basic Law of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (re-
ferred to in this Act as “the Basic Law”) that
provides in Article 23 that the Legislative
Council of Hong Kong shall enact legislation re-
lated to national security;

(B) violates the PRC’s commitments under
international law, as defined by the Joint Dee-
laration; and

(C) causes severe and irreparable damage
to the “one country, two systems” principle and
further erodes global confidence in the PRC’s
commitment to international law.

(2) On July 14, 2020, in response to the pro-
mulgation of the Hong Kong National Security Law,
President Trump signed an Executive order on
Hong Kong normalization that, among other policy
actions, suspended the special treatment of Hong
Kong persons under U.S. law with respect to the issuance of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas.

(3) The United States has a long and proud history as a destination for refugees and asylees fleeing persecution based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.

(4) The United States also shares deep social, cultural, and economic ties with the people of Hong Kong, including a shared commitment to democracy, to the rule of law, and to the protection of human rights.

(5) The United States has sheltered, protected, and welcomed individuals who have fled authoritarian regimes, including citizens from the PRC following the violent June 4, 1989, crackdown in Tiananmen Square, deepening ties between the people of the United States and those individuals seeking to contribute to a free, open society founded on democracy, human rights, and the respect for the rule of law.

(6) The United States has reaped enormous economic, cultural, and strategic benefits from welcoming successive generations of scientists, doctors, entrepreneurs, artists, intellectuals, and other free-
dom-loving people fleeing fascism, communism, vio-
1 lent Islamist extremism, and other repressive
2 ideologies, including in the cases of Nazi Germany,
3 the Soviet Union, and Soviet-controlled Central Eu-
4 rope, Cuba, Vietnam, and Iran.
5
6 (7) A major asymmetric advantage of the
7 United States in its long-term strategic competition
8 with the Communist Party of China is the ability of
9 people from every country in the world, irrespective
10 of their race, ethnicity, or religion, to immigrate to
11 the United States and become American citizens.
12
13 (c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
14 United States—
15
16 (1) to reaffirm the principles and objectives set
17 forth in the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of
18 1992 (Public Law 102–383), specifically that—
19
20 (A) the United States has “a strong inter-
21 est in the continued vitality, prosperity, and
22 stability of Hong Kong”; 
23
24 (B) “support for democratization is a fun-
25 damental principle of United States foreign pol-
26 icy”, and therefore “naturally applies to United
27 States policy toward Hong Kong”; 
28
29 (C) “the human rights of the people of
30 Hong Kong are of great importance to the
United States and are directly relevant to United States interests in Hong Kong and serve as a basis for Hong Kong’s continued economic prosperity”; and

(D) Hong Kong must remain sufficiently autonomous from the PRC to “justify treatment under a particular law of the United States, or any provision thereof, different from that accorded the People’s Republic of China”; (2) to continue to support the high degree of autonomy and fundamental rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong, as enumerated by—

(A) the Joint Declaration;

(B) the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, done at New York, December 19, 1966; and

(C) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, done at Paris, December 10, 1948;

(3) to continue to support the democratic aspirations of the people of Hong Kong, including the “ultimate aim” of the selection of the Chief Executive and all members of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage, as articulated in the Basic Law;

(4) to urge the Government of the PRC, despite its recent actions, to uphold its commitments to
Hong Kong, including allowing the people of Hong Kong to govern Hong Kong with a high degree of autonomy and without undue interference, and ensuring that Hong Kong voters freely enjoy the right to elect the Chief Executive and all members of the Hong Kong Legislative Council by universal suffrage;

(5) to support the establishment of a genuine democratic option to freely and fairly nominate and elect the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, and the establishment of open and direct democratic elections for all members of the Hong Kong Legislative Council;

(6) to support the robust exercise by residents of Hong Kong of the rights to free speech, the press, and other fundamental freedoms, as provided by the Basic Law, the Joint Declaration, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

(7) to support freedom from arbitrary or unlawful arrest, detention, or imprisonment for all Hong Kong residents, as provided by the Basic Law, the Joint Declaration, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

(8) to draw international attention to any violations by the Government of the PRC of the funda-
mental rights of the people of Hong Kong, as provided by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and any encroachment upon the autonomy guaranteed to Hong Kong by the Basic Law and the Joint Declaration;

(9) to protect United States citizens and long-term permanent residents living in Hong Kong, as well as people visiting and transiting through Hong Kong;

(10) to maintain the economic and cultural ties that provide significant benefits to both the United States and Hong Kong, including the reinstatement of the Fulbright exchange program with regard to Hong Kong at the earliest opportunity;

(11) to coordinate with allies, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, to promote democracy and human rights in Hong Kong; and

(12) to welcome and protect in the United States residents of Hong Kong fleeing persecution or otherwise seeking a safe haven from violations by the Government of the PRC of the fundamental rights of the people of Hong Kong.

(d) TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS FOR HONG KONG RESIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES.—
(1) DESIGNATION.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a), Hong Kong shall be treated as if it had been designated under subsection (b)(1)(C) of such section, subject to the provisions of this section.

(B) PERIOD OF DESIGNATION.—The initial period of the designation referred to in subparagraph (A) shall be for the 18-month period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act.

(2) ALIENS ELIGIBLE.—As a result of the designation made under subsection (a), an alien is deemed to satisfy the requirements under paragraph (1) of section 244(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a(c)), subject to paragraph (3) of such section, if the alien—

(A) was a permanent resident of Hong Kong at the time such individual arrived into the United States and is a national of the PRC (or in the case of an individual having no nationality, is a person who last habitually resided in Hong Kong);
(B) has been continuously physically present in the United States since the date of the enactment of this Act;

(C) is admissible as an immigrant, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2)(A) of such section, and is not ineligible for temporary protected status under paragraph (2)(B) of such section; and

(D) registers for temporary protected status in a manner established by the Secretary of Homeland Security.

(3) CONSENT TO TRAVEL ABROAD.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Homeland Security shall give prior consent to travel abroad, in accordance with section 244(f)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a(f)(3)), to an alien who is granted temporary protected status pursuant to the designation made under paragraph (1) if the alien establishes to the satisfaction of the Secretary of Homeland Security that emergency and extenuating circumstances beyond the control of the alien require the alien to depart for a brief, temporary trip abroad.
(B) TREATMENT UPON RETURN.—An alien returning to the United States in accordance with an authorization described in subparagraph (A) shall be treated as any other returning alien provided temporary protected status under section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a).

(4) FEE.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—In addition to any other fee authorized by law, the Secretary of Homeland Security is authorized to charge and collect a fee of $360 for each application for temporary protected status under section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act by a person who is only eligible for such status by reason of paragraph (1).

(B) WAIVER.—The Secretary of Homeland Security shall permit aliens to apply for a waiver of any fees associated with filing an application referred to in subparagraph (A).

c) TREATMENT OF HONG KONG RESIDENTS FOR IMMIGRATION PURPOSES.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, during the five fiscal year period beginning on the first day of the first full fiscal year after the date of enactment of this Act, Hong Kong shall continue
to be considered a foreign state separate and apart from the PRC as mandated under section 103 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990 (Public Law 101–649) for purposes of the numerical limitations on immigrant visas under sections 201, 202, and 203 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1151, 1152, and 1153).

(f) Verification of Priority Hong Kong Residents.—

(1) In General.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall publish in the Federal Register, an interim final rule establishing procedures for designation of Priority Hong Kong Residents. Notwithstanding section 553 of title 5, United States Code, the rule shall be effective, on an interim basis, immediately upon publication, but may be subject to change and revision after public notice and opportunity for comment. The Secretary of State shall finalize such rule not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act. Such rule shall establish procedures—

(A) for individuals to register with any United States embassy or consulate outside of the United States, or with the Department of
Homeland Security in the United States, and request designation as a Priority Hong Kong Resident; and

(B) for the appropriate Secretary to verify the residency of registered individuals and designate those who qualify as Priority Hong Kong Residents.

(2) DOCUMENTATION.—The procedures described in paragraph (1) shall include the collection of—

(A) biometric data;

(B) copies of birth certificates, residency cards, and other documentation establishing residency; and

(C) other personal information, data, and records deemed appropriate by the Secretary.

(3) GUIDANCE.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall issue guidance outlining actions to enhance the ability of the Secretary to efficiently send and receive information to and from the United Kingdom and other like-minded allies and partners for purposes of rapid verification of permanent residency in Hong Kong and designation of individuals as Priority Hong Kong Residents.
(4) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report detailing plans to implement the requirements described in this subsection.

(5) PROTECTION FOR REFUGEES.—Nothing in this section may be construed to prevent a Priority Hong Kong Resident from seeking refugee status under section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157) or requesting asylum under section 208 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1158).

(g) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—On an annual basis, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with other Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report detailing for the previous fiscal year—

(A) the number of Hong Kong SAR residents who have applied for United States visas
or immigration benefits, disaggregated by visa type or immigration benefit, including asylum, refugee status, temporary protected status, and lawful permanent residence;

(B) the number of approvals, denials, or rejections of applicants for visas or immigration benefits described in subparagraph (A), disaggregated by visa type or immigration benefit and basis for denial;

(C) the number of pending refugee and asylum applications for Hong Kong SAR residents, and the length of time and reason for which such applications have been pending; and

(D) other matters determined relevant by the Secretaries relating to efforts to protect and facilitate the resettlement of refugees and victims of persecution in Hong Kong.

(2) FORM.—Each report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form and published on a text-searchable, publicly available website of the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security.

(h) STRATEGY FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON HONG KONG.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—It is the policy of the United States—

(A) to support the people of Hong Kong by providing safe haven to Hong Kong SAR residents who are nationals of the PRC following the enactment of the Hong Kong National Security Law that places certain Hong Kong persons at risk of persecution; and

(B) to encourage like-minded nations to make similar accommodations for Hong Kong people fleeing persecution by the Government of the PRC.

(2) PLAN.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall develop a plan to engage with other countries, including the United Kingdom, on cooperative efforts to—

(A) provide refugee and asylum protections for victims of, and individuals with a fear of, persecution in Hong Kong, either by Hong Kong authorities or other authorities acting on behalf of the PRC;

(B) enhance protocols to facilitate the resettlement of refugees and displaced persons from Hong Kong;
(C) identify and prevent the exploitation of immigration and visa policies and procedures by corrupt officials; and

(D) expedite the sharing of information, as appropriate, related to the refusal of individual applications for visas or other travel documents submitted by residents of the Hong Kong SAR based on—

(i) national security or related grounds under section 212(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)); or

(ii) fraud or misrepresentation under section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)).

(3) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on the plan described in paragraph (2).
REFUGEE STATUS FOR CERTAIN RESIDENTS OF HONG KONG.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Aliens described in paragraph (2) may establish, for purposes of admission as a refugee under sections 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157) or asylum under section 208 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1158), that such alien has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion by asserting such a fear and a credible basis for concern about the possibility of such persecution.

(2) ALIENS DESCRIBED.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—An alien is described in this subsection if such alien—

(i) is a Priority Hong Kong Resident and—

(I) had a significant role in a civil society organization supportive of the protests in 2019 and 2020 related to the Hong Kong National Security Law and the encroachment on the autonomy of Hong Kong by the PRC;

(II) was arrested, charged, detained, or convicted of an offense aris-
1. ing from their participation in an ac-
2. tion as described in section 206(b)(2)
3. of the United States-Hong Kong Pol-
5. 5726(b)(2)) that was not violent in
6. nature; or
7. (III) has had their citizenship,
8. nationality, or residency revoked for
9. having submitted to any United
10. States Government agency a nonfrivo-
11. lous application for refugee status,
12. asylum, or any other immigration ben-
13. efit under the immigration laws (as
14. defined in section 101(a) of the Immi-
15. gration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
16. 1101(a)));
17. (ii) is a Priority Hong Kong Resident
18. spouse or child of an alien described in
19. clause (i); or
20. (iii) is the parent of an alien described
21. in clause (i), if such parent is a citizen of
22. the PRC and no other foreign state.
23. (B) OTHER CATEGORIES.—The Secretary
24. of Homeland Security, in consultation with the
25. Secretary of State, may designate other cat-
egories of aliens for purposes of establishing a well-founded fear of persecution under paragraph (1) if such aliens share common characteristics that identify them as targets of persecution in the PRC on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

(C) **Significant Role**.—For purposes of subclause (I) of paragraph (2)(A)(i), a significant role shall include, with respect to the protests described in such clause—

(i) an organizing role;

(ii) a first aid responder;

(iii) a journalist or member of the media covering or offering public commentary;

(iv) a provider of legal services to one or more individuals arrested for participating in such protests; or

(v) a participant who during the period beginning on June 9, 2019, and ending on June 30, 2020, was arrested, charged, detained, or convicted as a result of such participation.
(3) Age Out Protections.—For purposes of this subsection, a determination of whether an alien is a child shall be made using the age of the alien on the date an application for refugee or asylum status in which the alien is a named beneficiary is filed with the Secretary of Homeland Security.

(4) Exclusion from Numerical Limitations.—Aliens provided refugee status under this subsection shall not be counted against the numerical limitation on refugees established in accordance with the procedures described in section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157).

(5) Reporting Requirements.—

(A) In General.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on the matters described in subparagraph (B).

(B) Matters to be Included.—Each report required by subparagraph (A) shall in-
include, with respect to applications submitted under this section—

(i) the total number of refugee and asylum applications that are pending at the end of the reporting period;

(ii) the average wait-times for all applicants for refugee status or asylum pending—

(I) a prescreening interview with a resettlement support center;

(II) an interview with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services; and

(III) the completion of security checks;

(iii) the number of approvals, referrals including the source of the referral, denials of applications for refugee status or asylum, disaggregated by the reason for each such denial; and

(iv) the number of refugee circuit rides to interview populations that would include Hong Kong SAR completed in the last 90 days, and the number planned for the subsequent 90-day period.
(C) FORM.—Each report required by sub-
paragraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassi-
fied form, but may include a classified annex.

(D) PUBLIC REPORTS.—The Secretary of
State shall make each report submitted under
this paragraph available to the public on the
internet website of the Department of State.

(j) ADMISSION FOR CERTAIN HIGHLY SKILLED
HONG KONG RESIDENTS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subsection (c),
the Secretary of Homeland Security, or, notwith-
standing any other provision of law, the Secretary of
State in consultation with the Secretary of Home-
land Security, may provide an alien described in sub-
section (b) with the status of a special immigrant
under section 101(a)(27) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)), if the
alien—

(A) or an agent acting on behalf of the
alien, submits a petition for classification under
section 203(b)(4) of such Act (8 U.S.C.
1153(b)(4));

(B) is otherwise eligible to receive an im-
migrant visa;
(C) is otherwise admissible to the United States for permanent residence (excluding the grounds for inadmissibility specified in section 212(a)(4) of such Act (8 U.S.C. (a)(4)); and

(D) clears a background check and appropriate screening, as determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security.

(2) Aliens described.—

(A) Principal Aliens.—An alien is described in this subsection if—

(i) the alien—

(I) is a Priority Hong Kong Resident; and

(II) has earned a bachelor’s or higher degree from an institution of higher education; and

(ii) the Secretary of Homeland Security determines that such alien’s relocation to the United States would provide a significant benefit to the United States.

(B) Spouses and Children.—An alien is described in this subsection if the alien is the spouse or child of a principal alien described in paragraph (1).

(3) Numerical Limitations.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—The total number of principal aliens who may be provided special immigrant status under this section may not exceed 5,000 per year for each of the five fiscal years beginning after the date of the enactment of this Act. The Secretary of Homeland Security may, in consultation with the Secretary of State, prioritize the issuance of visas to individuals with a bachelor’s or higher degree in science, technology, engineering, mathematics, medicine, or health care.

(B) EXCLUSION FROM NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS.—Aliens provided immigrant status under this section shall not be counted against any numerical limitation under section 201, 202, 203, or 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1151, 1152, 1153, and 1157).

(4) ELIGIBILITY FOR ADMISSION UNDER OTHER CLASSIFICATION.—No alien shall be denied the opportunity to apply for admission under this section solely because such alien qualifies as an immediate relative or is eligible for any other immigrant classification.
(5) TIMELINE FOR PROCESSING APPLICATIONS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall ensure that all steps under the control of the United States Government incidental to the approval of such applications, including required screenings and background checks, are completed not later than one year after the date on which an eligible applicant submits an application under subsection (a).

(B) EXCEPTION.—Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the relevant Federal agencies may take additional time to process applications described in paragraph (1) if satisfaction of national security concerns requires such additional time, provided that the Secretary of Homeland Security, or the designee of the Secretary, has determined that the applicant meets the requirements for status as a special immigrant under this section and has so notified the applicant.

(k) TERMINATION.—Except as provided in section 6 of this Act, this section shall cease to have effect on the
date that is five years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 304. EXPORT PROHIBITION OF MUNITIONS ITEMS TO THE HONG KONG POLICE FORCE.

Section 3 of the Act entitled “An Act to prohibit the commercial export of covered munitions items to the Hong Kong Police Force”, approved November 27, 2019 (Public Law 116–77; 133 Stat. 1173), is amended by striking “on December 31, 2021.” and inserting the following: “on the date on which the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that—

“(1) the Secretary of State has, on or after the date of the enactment of this paragraph, certified under section 205 of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 that Hong Kong warrants treatment under United States law in the same manner as United States laws were applied to Hong Kong before July 1, 1997;

“(2) the Hong Kong Police have not engaged in gross violations of human rights during the 1-year period ending on the date of such certification; and

“(3) there has been an independent examination of human rights concerns related to the crowd control tactics of the Hong Kong Police and the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administra-
tive Region has adequately addressed those con-
cerns.”.

SEC. 305. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TREATMENT OF
UYGHURS AND OTHER ETHNIC MINORITIES
IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS RE-
GION.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
ings:

(1) The Uyghurs are one of several predomi-
nantly Muslim Turkic groups living in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in the north-
west of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

(2) Following Uyghur demonstrations and un-
rest in 2009 and clashes with government security
personnel and other violent incidents in subsequent
years, PRC leaders sought to “stabilize” the XUAR
through large-scale arrests and extreme security
measures, under the pretext of combatting alleged
terrorism, religious extremism, and ethnic sepa-
ratism.

(3) In May 2014, the PRC launched its “Strike
Hard Against Violent Extremism” campaign, which
placed further restrictions on and facilitated addi-
tional human rights violations against minorities in
the XUAR under the pretext of fighting terrorism.
(4) In August 2016, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo member Chen Quanguo, former Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Party Secretary, known for overseeing intensifying security operations and human rights abuses in the TAR, was appointed as Party Secretary of the XUAR.

(5) Beginning in 2017, XUAR authorities have sought to forcibly “assimilate” Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities into Chinese society through a policy of cultural erasure known as “Sinicization”.

(6) Since 2018, credible reporting including from the BBC, France24, and the New York Times has shown that the Government of the PRC has built mass internment camps in the XUAR, which it calls “vocational training” centers, and detained Uyghurs and other groups in them and other facilities.

(7) Since 2015, XUAR authorities have arbitrarily detained an estimated 1,500,000 Uyghurs—12.5 percent of the XUAR’s official Uyghur population of 12,000,000—and a smaller number of other ethnic minorities in the “vocational training” centers and other detention and pre-detention facilities.
(8) In 2017, the XUAR accounted for less than two percent of the PRC’s total population but 21 percent of all arrests in China.

(9) The Atlantic, Radio Free Asia, and other sources have revealed that detainees are forced to renounce many of their Islamic beliefs and customs and repudiate Uyghur culture, language, and identity.

(10) Investigations by Human Rights Watch and other human rights organizations have documented how detainees are subject to political indoctrination, forced labor, crowded and unsanitary conditions, involuntary biometric data collection, both medical neglect and intrusive medical interventions, food and water deprivation, beatings, sexual violence, and torture.

(11) Research by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute suggests that, since late 2019, many detainees have been placed in higher security facilities and convicted of formal crimes.

(12) Human Rights Watch has reported that the PRC uses data collection programs, including facial recognition technology, to surveil Uyghurs in the XUAR and to identify individuals whom authorities may detain.
(13) PRC authorities have placed countless children whose parents are detained or in exile in state-run institutions and boarding schools without the consent of their parents.

(14) New York Times reporting revealed that numerous local PRC officials who did not agree with the policies carried out in XUAR have been fired and imprisoned.

(15) Associated Press reporting documented widespread and systemic efforts by PRC authorities to force Uyghur women to take contraceptives or to subject them to sterilization or abortion, threatening to detain those who do not comply.

(16) PRC authorities prohibit family members and advocates inside and outside China from having regular communications with relatives and friends imprisoned in the XUAR, such as journalist and entrepreneur Ekpar Asat.

(17) PRC authorities have imposed pervasive restrictions on the peaceful practice of Islam in the XUAR, to the extent that Human Rights Watch asserts the PRC “has effectively outlawed the practice of Islam”.

(18) Individuals who are not detained in camps have been forced to attend political indoctrination
sessions, subjected to movement restrictions, mass surveillance systems, involuntary biometric data collection, and other human rights abuses.

(19) International media, nongovernmental organizations, scholars, families, and survivors have reported on the systemic nature of many of these abuses.

(20) On June 26, 2020, a group of 50 independent United Nations experts jointly expressed alarm over China's deteriorating human rights record, including its repression in Xinjiang, and called on the international community “to act collectively and decisively to ensure China respects human rights and abides by its international obligations”.

(21) On October 6, 2020, 39 United Nations member countries issued a public statement condemning human rights violations by PRC authorities and calling on the PRC to allow the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights unfettered access to Xinjiang.


(23) The United States Congress passed the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act
(subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note), which has been used to sanction PRC officials and entities for their activities in the XUAR.

(24) The United States Government has implemented additional targeted restrictions on trade with Xinjiang and imposed visa and economic sanctions on PRC officials and entities for their activities in the XUAR.

(25) The United States Government has documented human rights abuses and violations of individual freedoms in the XUAR, including in the 2019 Department of State Report on International Religious Freedom.

(26) On January 19, 2021, during his confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Antony Blinken testified that “forcing men, women, and children into concentration camps, trying to in effect reeducate them to be adherents to the Chinese Communist Party—all of that speaks to an effort to commit genocide”.

(27) On January 19, 2021, Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen, during her confirmation hearing, publicly stated that China is guilty of “horrendous human rights abuses”.
(28) On January 27, 2021, in response to a question from the press regarding the Uyghurs, Secretary Blinken stated that his “judgement remains that genocide was committed against the Uyghurs”.

(29) On March 10, 2021, in response to a question on Xinjiang during his testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, Secretary Blinken reiterated, “We’ve been clear, and I’ve been clear, that I see it as genocide, other egregious abuses of human rights, and we’ll continue to make that clear.”.

(30) The 2020 Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China states that “[g]enocide and crimes against humanity occurred during the year against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang”.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the atrocities committed by the PRC against Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim Turkic groups in Xinjiang, including forced labor, sexual violence, the internment of over 1,000,000 individuals, and other horrific abuses must be condemned;
(2) the President, the Secretary of State, and
the United States Ambassador to the United Na-
tions should speak publicly about the ongoing
human rights abuses in the XUAR, including in for-
tial speeches at the United Nations and other inter-
national fora;

(3) the President, the Secretary of State, and
the United States Ambassador to the United Na-
tions should appeal to the United Nations Secretary-
General to take a more proactive and public stance
on the situation in the XUAR, including by sup-
porting calls for an investigation and accountability
for individuals and entities involved in abuses
against the people of the XUAR;

(4) the United States should continue to use
targeted sanctions and all diplomatic tools available
to hold those responsible for the atrocities in
Xinjiang to account;

(5) United States agencies engaged with China
on trade, climate, defense, or other bilateral issues
should include human rights abuses in the XUAR as
a consideration in developing United States policy;

(6) the United States supports Radio Free Asia
Uyghur, the only Uyghur-language news service in
the world independent of Chinese government influence; and

(7) the United States recognizes the repeated requests from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights for unfettered access to the XUAR and the PRC’s refusal to comply, and therefore—

(A) PRC authorities must allow unfettered access by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to the XUAR;

(B) the United States should urge collaborative action between the United States Government and international partners to pressure PRC authorities to allow unfettered access to the XUAR;

(C) the President, the Secretary of State, and the United States Ambassador to the United Nations should simultaneously outline a strategy to investigate the human rights abuses and crimes that have taken place in the XUAR, collect evidence, and transfer the evidence to a competent court; and

(D) United States partners and allies should undertake similar strategies in an effort to build an international investigation outside of
the PRC if PRC authorities do not comply with
a United Nations investigation in the XUAR.

SEC. 306. PREVENTION OF UYGHUR FORCED LABOR.

(a) Statement of Policy.—It is the policy of the
United States—

(1) to prohibit the import of all goods, wares,
articles, or merchandise mined, produced, or manu-
factured, wholly or in part, by forced labor from the
People’s Republic of China and particularly any such
goods, wares, articles, or merchandise produced in
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (commonly
referred to as “Xinjiang” or “XUAR”) of China;

(2) to encourage the international community
to reduce the import of any goods made with forced
labor from the People’s Republic of China, particu-
larly goods mined, manufactured, or produced in the
XUAR;

(3) to coordinate with Mexico and Canada to ef-
effectively implement Article 23.6 of the United
States-Mexico-Canada Agreement to prohibit the im-
portation of goods produced in whole or in part by
forced or compulsory labor, which includes goods
produced in whole or in part by forced or compul-
sory labor in the People’s Republic of China;
(4) to actively work to prevent, publicly de-
nounce, and end human trafficking as a horrific as-
sertion on human dignity and to restore the lives of
those affected by human trafficking, a modern form
of slavery;

(5) to regard the prevention of atrocities as in
its national interest, including efforts to prevent tor-
ture, enforced disappearances, severe deprivation of
liberty, including mass internment, arbitrary deten-
tion, and widespread and systematic use of forced
labor, and persecution targeting any identifiable eth-
nic or religious group; and

(6) to address gross violations of human rights
in the XUAR through bilateral diplomatic channels
and multilateral institutions where both the United
States and the People’s Republic of China are mem-
bers and with all the authorities available to the
United States Government, including visa and finan-
cial sanctions, export restrictions, and import con-
trols.

(b) PROHIBITION ON IMPORTATION OF GOODS MADE
IN THE XUAR.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in para-
graph (2), all goods, wares, articles, and merchan-
dise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in
part in the XUAR of China, or by persons working
with the XUAR government for purposes of the
“poverty alleviation” program or the “pairing-assist-
ance” program which subsidizes the establishment of
manufacturing facilities in the XUAR, shall be
debemed to be goods, wares, articles, and merchan-
dise described in section 307 of the Tariff Act of
1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307) and shall not be entitled to
entry at any of the ports of the United States.

(2) EXCEPTION.—The prohibition described in
paragraph (1) shall not apply if the Commissioner of
U.S. Customs and Border Protection—

(A) determines, by clear and convincing
evidence, that any specific goods, wares, arti-
cles, or merchandise described in paragraph (1)
were not produced wholly or in part by convict
labor, forced labor, or indentured labor under
penal sanctions; and

(B) submits to the appropriate congress-
ional committees and makes available to the
public a report that contains such determina-
tion.

(3) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section shall take
effect on the date that is 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act.
(c) Enforcement Strategy to Address Forced Labor in the XUAR.—

(1) In general.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force, established under section 741 of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement Implementation Act (19 U.S.C. 4681), shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains an enforcement strategy to effectively address forced labor in the XUAR of China or products made by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans, or members of other persecuted groups through forced labor in any other part of the People’s Republic of China. The enforcement strategy shall describe the specific enforcement plans of the United States Government regarding—

(A) goods, wares, articles, and merchandise described in subsection (b)(1) that are imported into the United States directly from the XUAR or made by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans, or members of other persecuted groups in any other part of the People’s Republic of China;

(B) goods, wares, articles, and merchandise described in subsection (b)(1) that are im-
ported into the United States from the People’s
Republic of China and are mined, produced, or
manufactured in part in the XUAR or by per-
sons working with the XUAR government or
the Xinjiang Production and Construction
Corps for purposes of the “poverty alleviation”
program or the “pairing-assistance” program;
and

(C) goods, wares, articles, and merchandise
described in subsection (b)(1) that are imported
into the United States from third countries and
are mined, produced, or manufactured in part
in the XUAR or by persons working with the
XUAR government or the Xinjiang Production
and Construction Corps for purposes of the
“poverty alleviation” program or the “pairing-
assistance” program.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy
required by paragraph (1) shall include the fol-
lowing:

(A) A description of the actions taken by
the United States Government to address
forced labor in the XUAR under section 307 of
the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307), in-
cluding a description of all Withhold Release
Orders issued, goods detained, and fines issued.

(B) A list of products made wholly or in
part by forced or involuntary labor in the
XUAR or made by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz,
Tibetans, or members of other persecuted
groups in any other part of the People’s Repub-
lic of China, and a list of businesses that sold
products in the United States made wholly or
in part by forced or involuntary labor in the
XUAR or made by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz,
Tibetans, or members of other persecuted
groups in any other part of the People’s Repub-
lic of China.

(C) A list of facilities and entities, includ-
ing the Xinjiang Production and Construction
Corps, that source material from the XUAR or
by persons working with the XUAR government
or the Xinjiang Production and Construction
Corps for purposes of the “poverty alleviation”
program or the “pairing-assistance” program, a
plan for identifying additional such facilities
and entities, and facility- and entity-specific en-
forcement plans, including issuing specific
Withhold Release Orders to support enforce-
ment of subsection (b), with regard to each listed facility or entity.

(D) A list of high-priority sectors for enforcement, including cotton, tomatoes, polysilicon, and a sector-specific enforcement plan for each high-priority sector.

(E) A description of the additional resources necessary for U.S. Customs and Border Protection to effectively implement the enforcement strategy.

(F) A plan to coordinate and collaborate with appropriate nongovernmental organizations and private sector entities to discuss the enforcement strategy for products made in the XUAR.

(3) FORM.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex, if necessary.

(4) UPDATES.—The Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force shall provide briefings to the appropriate congressional committees on a quarterly basis and, as applicable, on any updates to the strategy required by paragraph (1) or any additional actions taken to address forced labor in the XUAR, including actions described in this section.
(5) **SUNSET.**—This section shall cease to have effect on the earlier of—

(A) the date that is eight years after the date of the enactment of this Act; or

(B) the date on which the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a determination that the Government of the People’s Republic of China has ended mass internment, forced labor, and any other gross violations of human rights experienced by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups in the XUAR.

(d) **DETERMINATION RELATING TO CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY OR GENOCIDE IN THE XUAR.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall—

(A) determine if the practice of forced labor or other crimes against Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups in the XUAR of China can be considered systematic and widespread and therefore constitutes crimes against humanity or constitutes genocide as defined in subsection
391  (a) of section 1091 of title 18, United States
   Code; and
   
   (B) submit to the appropriate congressional committees and make available to the
   public a report that contains such determination.
   
   (2) FORM.—The report required by paragraph
   
   (1)—
   
   (A) shall be submitted in unclassified form
   but may include a classified annex, if necessary;
   and
   
   (B) may be included in the report required
   by subsection (e).

   (e) DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY TO ADDRESS FORCED
   LABOR IN THE XUAR.—

   (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
   the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
   of State, in coordination with the heads of other ap-
   propriate Federal departments and agencies, shall
   submit to the appropriate congressional committees
   a report that contains a United States strategy to
   promote initiatives to enhance international aware-
   ness of and to address forced labor in the XUAR of
   China.
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall include—

(A) a plan to enhance bilateral and multilateral coordination, including sustained engagement with the governments of United States partners and allies, to end forced labor of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups in the XUAR;

(B) public affairs, public diplomacy, and counter-messaging efforts to promote awareness of the human rights situation, including forced labor in the XUAR; and

(C) opportunities to coordinate and collaborate with appropriate nongovernmental organizations and private sector entities to raise awareness about forced labor made products from the XUAR and to provide assistance to Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups in the XUAR, including those formerly detained in mass internment camps in the region.

(3) ADDITIONAL MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—

The report required by paragraph (1) shall also include—

(A) to the extent practicable, a list of—
(i) entities in the People’s Republic of China or affiliates of such entities that directly or indirectly use forced or involuntary labor in the XUAR; and

(ii) foreign persons that acted as agents of the entities or affiliates of entities described in clause (i) to import goods into the United States; and

(B) a description of actions taken by the United States Government to address forced labor in the XUAR under existing authorities, including—

(i) the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (Public Law 106–386; 22 U.S.C. 7101 et seq.);

(ii) the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–441; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note); and

(iii) the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 note).

(4) FORM.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex, if necessary.
(5) **UPDATES.**—The Secretary of State shall include any updates to the strategy required by paragraph (1) in the annual Trafficking in Persons report required by section 110(b) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107(b)).

(6) **SUNSET.**—This section shall cease to have effect the earlier of—

(A) the date that is eight years after the date of the enactment of this Act; or

(B) the date on which the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a determination that the Government of the People’s Republic of China has ended mass internment, forced labor, and any other gross violations of human rights experienced by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups in the XUAR.

(f) **IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO FORCED LABOR IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.**—

(1) **REPORT REQUIRED.**—

(A) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently than annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the appro-
priate congressional committees a report that identifies each foreign person, including any official of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, that the President determines—

(i) knowingly engages in, is responsible for, or facilitates the forced labor of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups in the XUAR; and

(ii) knowingly engages in, contributes to, assists, or provides financial, material or technological support for efforts to contravene United States law regarding the importation of forced labor goods from the XUAR.

(B) FORM.—The report required under subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(2) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—The President shall impose the sanctions described in paragraph (3) with respect to each foreign person identified in the report required under paragraph (1)(A).

(3) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions described in this subsection are the following:
(A) Asset blocking.—The President shall exercise all of the powers granted to the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in property and interests in property of a foreign person identified in the report required under paragraph (1)(A) if such property and interests in property—

(i) are in the United States;

(ii) come within the United States; or

(iii) come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(B) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.—

(i) Visas, admission, or parole.— An alien described in paragraph (1)(A) is—

(I) inadmissible to the United States;

(II) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and

(III) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States.
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States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

(ii) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

(I) IN GENERAL.—An alien described in paragraph (1)(A) is subject to revocation of any visa or other entry documentation regardless of when the visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.

(II) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A revocation under subclause (I) shall—

(aa) take effect immediately;

and

(bb) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the alien’s possession.

(4) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

(A) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section.
(B) PENALTIES.—The penalties provided for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a foreign person that engages in an activity described in paragraph (1)(A) to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of such section 206.

(5) WAIVER.—The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section with respect to a foreign person identified in the report required under paragraph (1)(A) if the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such a waiver is in the national interest of the United States.

(6) EXCEPTIONS.—

(A) EXCEPTION FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States.
(B) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under paragraph (3)(B) shall not apply with respect to an alien if admitting or paroling the alien into the United States is necessary—

(i) to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations; or

(ii) to carry out or assist law enforcement activity in the United States.

(7) TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.—The President may terminate the application of sanctions under this section with respect to a foreign person if the President determines and reports to the appropriate congressional committees not less than 15 days before the termination takes effect that—

(A) information exists that the person did not engage in the activity for which sanctions were imposed;
(B) the person has been prosecuted appropriately for the activity for which sanctions were imposed;

(C) the person has credibly demonstrated a significant change in behavior, has paid an appropriate consequence for the activity for which sanctions were imposed, and has credibly committed in the future to not engage in such activity; or

(D) the termination of the sanctions is in the national security interests of the United States.

(8) **Sunset.**—This section, and any sanctions imposed under this section, shall terminate on the date that is five years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(9) **Definitions of admission; admitted; alien.**—In this section, the terms “admission”, “admitted”, and “alien” have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).

(g) **Disclosures to the Securities and Exchange Commission of certain activities related to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.**—
(1) **Policy Statement.**—It is the policy of the United States to protect American investors, through stronger disclosure requirements, alerting them to the presence of Chinese and other companies complicit in gross violations of human rights in United States capital markets, including American and foreign companies listed on United States exchanges that enable the mass internment and population surveillance of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslim minorities and source products made with forced labor in the XUAR. Such involvements represent clear, material risks to the share values and corporate reputations of certain of these companies and hence to prospective American investors, particularly given that the United States Government has employed sanctions and export restrictions to target individuals and entities contributing to human rights abuses in the People’s Republic of China.

(2) **Disclosure of Certain Activities Relating to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.**—Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
“(s) Disclosure of Certain Activities Relating to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.—

“(1) In general.—Each issuer required to file
an annual or quarterly report under subsection (a)
shall disclose in that report the information required
by paragraph (2) if, during the period covered by
the report, the issuer or any affiliate of the issuer—

“(A) knowingly engaged in an activity with
an entity or the affiliate of an entity engaged
in creating or providing technology or other as-
sistance to create mass population surveillance
systems in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region (commonly referred to as ‘Xinjiang’ or
‘XUAR’) of China, including any entity in-
cluded on the Department of Commerce’s ‘Enti-
ty List’ in the XUAR;

“(B) knowingly engaged in an activity with
an entity or an affiliate of an entity building
and running detention facilities for Uyghurs,
Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other members of Mus-
lim minority groups in the XUAR;

“(C) knowingly engaged in an activity with
an entity or an affiliate of an entity described
in section 306(e)(3)(A)(i) of the Ensuring
American Global Leadership and Engagement Act, including—

“(i) any entity engaged in the ‘pairing-assistance’ program which subsidizes the establishment of manufacturing facilities in the XUAR; or

“(ii) any entity for which the Department of Homeland Security has issued a ‘Withhold Release Order’ under section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307); or

“(D) knowingly conducted any transaction or had dealings with—

“(i) any person the property and interests in property of which were sanctioned by the Secretary of State for the detention or abuse of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, or other members of Muslim minority groups in the XUAR;

“(ii) any person the property and interests in property of which are sanctioned pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 note); or
“(iii) any person or entity responsible for, or complicit in, committing atrocities in the XUAR.

“(2) INFORMATION REQUIRED.—

“(A) IN GENERAL.—If an issuer described under paragraph (1) or an affiliate of the issuer has engaged in any activity described in paragraph (1), the information required by this paragraph is a detailed description of each such activity, including—

“(i) the nature and extent of the activity;

“(ii) the gross revenues and net profits, if any, attributable to the activity; and

“(iii) whether the issuer or the affiliate of the issuer (as the case may be) intends to continue the activity.

“(B) EXCEPTION.—The requirement to disclose information under this paragraph shall not include information on activities of the issuer or any affiliate of the issuer activities relating to—

“(i) the import of manufactured goods, including electronics, food products,
textiles, shoes, and teas, that originated in the XUAR; or

“(ii) manufactured goods containing materials that originated or are sourced in the XUAR.

“(3) NOTICE OF DISCLOSURES.—If an issuer reports under paragraph (1) that the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer has knowingly engaged in any activity described in that paragraph, the issuer shall separately file with the Commission, concurrently with the annual or quarterly report under subsection (a), a notice that the disclosure of that activity has been included in that annual or quarterly report that identifies the issuer and contains the information required by paragraph (2).

“(4) PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION.—Upon receiving a notice under paragraph (3) that an annual or quarterly report includes a disclosure of an activity described in paragraph (1), the Commission shall promptly—

“(A) transmit the report to—

“(i) the President;

“(ii) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial
Services of the House of Representatives;
and
“(iii) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate;
and
“(B) make the information provided in the disclosure and the notice available to the public by posting the information on the Internet website of the Commission.

“(5) INVESTIGATIONS.—Upon receiving a report under paragraph (4) that includes a disclosure of an activity described in paragraph (1), the President shall—

“(A) make a determination with respect to whether any investigation is needed into the possible imposition of sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) or section 306(f) of the Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement Act or whether criminal investigations are warranted under statutes intended to hold accountable individuals or entities involved in the importation of goods produced by forced
labor, including under section 545, 1589, or 1761 of title 18, United States Code; and

“(B) not later than 180 days after initiating any such investigation, make a determination with respect to whether a sanction should be imposed or criminal investigations initiated with respect to the issuer or the affiliate of the issuer (as the case may be).

“(6) ATROCITIES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term ‘atrocities’ has the meaning given the term in section 6(2) of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–441; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note).”.

(3) SUNSET.—Section 13(s) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as added by paragraph (2), is repealed on the earlier of—

(A) the date that is eight years after the date of the enactment of this Act; or

(B) the date on which the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a determination that the Government of the People’s Republic of China has ended mass internment, forced labor, and any other gross violations of human rights experienced by

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Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups in the XUAR.

(4) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by paragraph (2) shall take effect with respect to reports required to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(h) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate.

(2) ATROCITIES.—The term “atrocities” has the meaning given the term in section 6(2) of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–441; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note).
(3) **CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY.**—The term “crimes against humanity” includes, when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack—

(A) murder;

(B) deportation or forcible transfer of population;

(C) torture;

(D) extermination;

(E) enslavement;

(F) rape, sexual slavery, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable severity;

(G) persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law; and

(H) enforced disappearance of persons.

(4) **FORCED LABOR.**—The term “forced labor” has the meaning given the term in section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307).

(5) **FOREIGN PERSON.**—The term “foreign person” means a person that is not a United States person.
(6) PERSON.—The term “person” means an individual or entity.

(7) MASS POPULATION SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM.—The term “mass population surveillance system” means installation and integration of facial recognition cameras, biometric data collection, cell phone surveillance, and artificial intelligence technology with the “Sharp Eyes” and “Integrated Joint Operations Platform” or other technologies that are used by Chinese security forces for surveillance and big-data predictive policing.

(8) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term “United States person” means—

(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

SEC. 307. UYGHUR HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the “Uyghur Human Rights Protection Act”.

(b) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has a long history of repressing Turkic Muslims and other Muslim minority groups, particularly Uyghurs, in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (commonly referred to as “Xinjiang” or “XUAR”), also known as East Turkestan. Central and regional PRC government policies have systematically discriminated against these minority groups by denying them a range of civil and political rights, particularly freedom of religion. Senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials bear direct responsibility for these gross human rights violations.

(2) PRC government abuses include the arbitrary detention of more than 1,000,000 Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups, separation of working age adults from their children and elderly parents, and the integration of forced labor into supply chains. Those held in detention facilities and internment camps in the XUAR have described forced political indoctrination, torture, beatings, food deprivation, sexual assault, coordinated campaigns to reduce birth rates among Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims through forced sterilization, and denial of religious, cultural, and linguistic freedoms. Recent
media reports indicate that since 2019, the PRC government has newly constructed, expanded, or fortified at least 60 detention facilities with higher security or prison-like features in Xinjiang.

(3) The PRC government’s actions against Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups in the XUAR violate international human rights laws and norms, including—

(A) the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, to which the PRC has acceded;

(B) the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which the PRC has signed and ratified;

(C) The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which the PRC has signed and ratified;

(D) the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the PRC has signed; and

(E) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Labor Organization’s Force Labor Convention (no. 29) and the
Abolition of Forced Labor Convention (no. 105).

(c) **Refugee Protections for Certain Residents of the XUAR.**—

(1) **Populations of Special Humanitarian Concern.**—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall designate, as Priority 2 refugees of special humanitarian concern—

(A) aliens who were nationals of the PRC and residents of the XUAR on January 1, 2021;

(B) aliens who fled the XUAR after June 30, 2009, and reside in other provinces of the PRC or in a third country where such alien is not firmly resettled; and

(C) the spouses, children, and parents (as such terms are defined in subsections (a) and (b) of section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101)) of individuals described in subparagraphs (A) and (B), except that a child shall be an unmarried person under 27 years of age.

(2) **Processing of XUAR Refugees.**—The processing of individuals described in paragraph (1)
for classification as refugees may occur in the PRC or a third country.

(3) Eligibility for admission as a refugee.—

(A) In general.—Aliens described in subparagraph (B) may establish, for purposes of admission as a refugee under section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157) or asylum under section 208 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1158), that such alien has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion by asserting such a fear and asserting a credible basis for concern about the possibility of such persecution.

(B) Aliens described.—An alien is described in this subsection if such alien has been identified as a person of special humanitarian concern pursuant to paragraph (1) and—

(i) has experienced persecution in the XUAR by the PRC government, including—
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(I) forced and arbitrary detention
including in an internment or re-education camp;

(II) forced political indoctrination, torture, beatings, food deprivation, and denial of religious, cultural, and linguistic freedoms;

(III) forced labor;

(IV) forced separation from family members;

(V) other forms of systemic threats, harassment, and gross human rights violations; or

(VI) has been formally charged, detained, or convicted on account of their peaceful actions as described in the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–145).

(ii) is currently a national of the PRC whose residency in the XUAR, or any other area within the jurisdiction of the PRC, was revoked for having submitted to any United States Government agency a nonfrivolous application for refugee status,
asylum, or any other immigration benefit under United States law.

(C) Eligibility for Admission Under Other Classification.—An alien may not be denied the opportunity to apply for admission as a refugee or asylum under this section solely because such alien qualifies as an immediate relative of a national of the United States or is eligible for admission to the United States under any other immigrant classification.

(4) Priority.—The Secretary of State shall prioritize bilateral diplomacy with third countries hosting former residents of the XUAR and who face significant diplomatic pressures from the PRC government.

(5) Reporting Requirements.—

(A) In General.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on the matters described in subparagraph (B).
(B) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report required by subparagraph (A) shall include, with respect to applications submitted under this section—

(i) the total number of applications that are pending at the end of the reporting period;

(ii) the average wait-times and number of applicants who are currently pending—

(I) a pre-screening interview with a resettlement support center;

(II) an interview with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services;

(III) the completion of security checks;

(IV) receipt of a final decision after completion of an interview with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services; and

(iii) the number of denials of applications for refugee status, disaggregated by the reason for each such denial.
(C) Form.—Each report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(D) Public reports.—The Secretary of State shall make each report submitted under this subsection available to the public on the internet website of the Department of State.

(d) Statement of policy on encouraging allies and partners to make similar accommodations.—It is the policy of the United States to encourage United States allies and partners to make accommodations similar to the accommodations made in this section for residents of the XUAR who are fleeing oppression by the PRC Government.

(e) Termination.—This section shall terminate on the date that is ten years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 308. REMOVAL OF MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL THAT COMMIT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.

The President shall direct the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to—

(1) reform the process for removing Member States of the United Nations Human Rights Council
that commit gross and systemic violations of human rights, including—

(A) lowering the threshold vote at the United Nations General Assembly for removal to a simple majority;

(B) ensuring information detailing the Member State’s human rights record is publicly available before the vote on removal; and

(C) making the vote of each country on the removal from the United Nations Human Rights Council publicly available;

(2) reform the rules on electing members to the United Nations Human Rights Council to ensure United Nations Member States that have committed gross and systemic violations of human rights are not elected to the Human Rights Council; and

(3) oppose the election to the United Nations Human Rights Council of any United Nations Member State—

(A) currently designated as a country engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights pursuant to section 116 or section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n or 2304);
(B) the government of which the Secretary of State currently determines has repeatedly provided support for international terrorism pursuant to—

(i) section 1754(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019;

(ii) section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371);

(iii) section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2779A); or

(iv) any other provision of law;

(C) currently designated as a Tier 3 country under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7101 et seq.);

(D) the government of which is identified on the list published by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 404(b) of the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 (22 U.S.C. 2370c–1(b)) as a government that recruits and uses child soldiers; or

(E) the government of which the United States determines to have committed genocide or crimes against humanity.
SEC. 309. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO TIBET.

(a) Rank of United States Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues.—Section 621 of the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e), as subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f), respectively; and

(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection:

“(b) Rank.—The Special Coordinator shall either be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, or shall be an individual holding the rank of Under Secretary of State or higher.”.

(b) Tibet Unit at United States Embassy in Beijing.—

(1) In General.—The Secretary of State shall establish a Tibet Unit in the Political Section of the United States Embassy in Beijing, People’s Republic of China (PRC).

(2) Operation.—The Tibet Unit established under paragraph (1) shall operate until such time as the Government of the PRC permits—

(A) the United States Consulate General in Chengdu, PRC, to reopen; or
(B) a United States Consulate General in
Lhasa, Tibet, to open.

(3) STAFF.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall—

(i) assign not fewer than two United
States direct-hire personnel to the Tibet
Unit established under paragraph (1); and

(ii) hire not fewer than one locally en-
gaged staff member for such unit.

(B) LANGUAGE TRAINING.—The Secretary
shall make Tibetan language training available
to the personnel assigned under subparagraph
(A), consistent with the Tibetan Policy Act of

SEC. 310. UNITED STATES POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL EN-
GAGEMENT ON THE SUCCESSION OR REIN-
CARNATION OF THE DALAI LAMA AND RELI-
GIOUS FREEDOM OF TIBETAN BUDDHISTS.

(a) REAFFIRMATION OF POLICY.—It is the policy of
the United States, as provided under section 342(b) of di-
vision FF of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021
(Public Law 116–260), that any “interference by the Gov-
ernment of the People’s Republic of China or any other
government in the process of recognizing a successor or
reincarnation of the 14th Dalai Lama and any future
Dalai Lamas would represent a clear abuse of the right to religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists and the Tibetan people.”

(b) International Efforts to Protect Religious Freedom of Tibetan Buddhists.—The Secretary of State should engage with United States allies and partners to—

(1) support Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders’ sole religious authority to identify and install the 15th Dalai Lama;

(2) oppose claims by the Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that the PRC has the authority to decide for Tibetan Buddhists the 15th Dalai Lama; and

(3) reject interference by the Government of the PRC in the religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists.

SEC. 311. DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNET FREEDOM AND GREAT FIREWALL CIRCUMVENTION TOOLS FOR THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG.

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has repeatedly violated its obligations under the Joint
Declaration by suppressing the basic rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong.

(2) On June 30, 2020, the National People's Congress passed a “National Security Law” that further erodes Hong Kong’s autonomy and enables authorities to suppress dissent.

(3) The Government of the PRC continues to utilize the National Security Law to undermine the fundamental rights of the Hong Kong people through suppression of the freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and the press.

(4) Article 9 of the National Security Law authorizes unprecedented regulation and supervision of internet activity in Hong Kong, including expanded police powers to force internet service providers to censor content, hand over user information, and block access to platforms.

(5) On January 13, 2021, the Hong Kong Broadband Network blocked public access to HK Chronicles, a website promoting pro-democracy viewpoints, under the authorities of the National Security Law.

(6) On February 12, 2021, internet service providers blocked access to the Taiwan Transitional Justice Commission website in Hong Kong.
(7) Major tech companies, including Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp and Google, have stopped reviewing requests for user data from Hong Kong authorities.

(8) On February 28, 2021, 47 pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong were arrested and charged under the National Security Law on the charge of “conspiracy to commit subversion”.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should—

(1) support the ability of the people of Hong Kong to maintain their freedom to access information online; and

(2) focus on investments in technologies that facilitate the unhindered exchange of information in Hong Kong in advance of any future efforts by the Chinese Communist Party—

(A) to suppress internet access;

(B) to increase online censorship; or

(C) to inhibit online communication and content-sharing by the people of Hong Kong.

(c) HONG KONG INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAM.—

(1) WORKING GROUP.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State is authorized to establish a working group to
develop a strategy to bolster internet resiliency and online access in Hong Kong.

(B) MEMBERSHIP.—The working group under subparagraph (A) shall consist of—

(i) the Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights;

(ii) the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs;

(iii) the Chief Executive Officer of the United States Agency for Global Media and the President of the Open Technology Fund of the Agency; and

(iv) the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development.

(2) HONG KONG INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—

(A) DEPARTMENT OF STATE.—The Secretary of State shall establish a Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor in the Department of State.

(B) OPEN TECHNOLOGY FUND.—The President of the Open Technology Fund of the
United States Agency for Global Media is authorized to establish a Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program.

(C) OPERATION.—The Programs referred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B) shall operate independently, but in strategic coordination with other entities in the working group under paragraph (1). The Open Technology Fund shall remain independent from Department of State direction in its implementation of the Program of such Fund, and any other internet freedom programs.

(3) INDEPENDENCE.—During the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on September 30, 2023, the Hong Kong Internet Freedom Programs described in paragraph (2) shall be carried out independently from any other internet freedom programs relating to the People’s Republic of China carried out by the Department of State or the Open Technology Fund of the United States Agency for Global Media, as the case may be, in order that such Hong Kong Internet Freedom Programs may focus on supporting liberties presently enjoyed by the people of Hong Kong.
(4) CONSOLIDATION OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE PROGRAM.—Beginning on October 1, 2023, the Secretary of State may—

(A) consolidate the Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program of the Department of State with any other internet freedom programs relating to the People’s Republic of China carried out by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; or

(B) continue to carry out the Program in accordance with paragraph (3).

(5) CONSOLIDATION OF OPEN TECHNOLOGY FUND PROGRAM.—Beginning on October 1, 2023, the President of the Open Technology Fund of the United States Agency for Global Media may—

(A) consolidate the Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program of the Fund with any other internet freedom programs relating to the People’s Republic of China carried out by the Fund; or

(B) continue to carry out the Program in accordance with paragraph (3).

(d) SUPPORT FOR INTERNET FREEDOM TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS.—

(1) GRANTS AUTHORIZED.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, working through the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and President of the Open Technology Fund of the United States Agency for Global Media, are each separately and independently authorized to award grants and contracts to private organizations to support and develop programs in Hong Kong that promote or expand—

(i) an open, interoperable, reliable and secure internet; and

(ii) the online exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms of individual citizens, activists, human rights defenders, independent journalists, civil society organizations, and marginalized populations in Hong Kong.

(B) GOALS.—The goals of the programs developed pursuant to grants awarded pursuant to subparagraph (A) should be—

(i) to make the internet available in Hong Kong;

(ii) to increase the number of the tools in the technology portfolio;
(iii) to promote the availability of such technologies and tools in Hong Kong;

(iv) to encourage the adoption of such technologies and tools by the people of Hong Kong;

(v) to scale up the distribution of such technologies and tools throughout Hong Kong;

(vi) to prioritize the development of tools, components, code, and technologies that are fully open-source, to the extent practicable;

(vii) to conduct research on repressive tactics that undermine internet freedom in Hong Kong;

(viii) to ensure digital safety guidance and support is available to repressed individual citizens, human rights defenders, independent journalists, civil society organizations and marginalized populations in Hong Kong; and

(ix) to engage United States private industry, including e-commerce firms and social networking companies, on the impor-
(C) GRANT RECIPIENTS.—Grants awarded pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be distributed to multiple vendors and suppliers through an open, fair, competitive, and evidence-based decision process—

(i) to diversify the technical base; and

(ii) to reduce the risk of misuse by bad actors.

(D) SECURITY AUDITS.—New technologies developed using grants awarded pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall undergo comprehensive security audits to ensure such technologies are secure and have not been compromised in a manner detrimental to the interests of the United States or to individuals or organizations benefitting from programs supported by the Open Technology Fund.

(2) FUNDING SOURCE.—The Secretary of State is authorized to expend funds made available to the Human Rights and Democracy Fund of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the Department of State for each of fiscal years 2022 and 2023 for grants authorized under paragraph (1) by
any entity in the working group established under subsection (c)(1).

(3) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

(A) OPEN TECHNOLOGY FUND.—In addition to the funds authorized to be expended pursuant to paragraph (2), there are authorized to be appropriated to the Open Technology Fund of the United States Agency for Global Media $5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 and 2023 for grants to carry out this subsection. Such amounts are in addition to any amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Open Technology Fund under section 1299P of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283).

(B) BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR.—In addition to the funds authorized to be expended pursuant to paragraph (2), there are authorized to be appropriated to the Office of Internet Freedom Programs of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the Department of State $10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 and 2023 to carry out this subsection.
(C) AVAILABILITY.—Amounts authorized to be appropriated pursuant to subparagraphs (A) and (B) shall remain available until expended.

(e) STRATEGIC PLANNING REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the working group under subsection (c)(1) shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a classified report that—

(1) describes the Federal Government’s plan to bolster and increase the availability of Great Firewall circumvention and internet freedom technology in Hong Kong during fiscal year 2022;

(2) outlines a plan for—

(A) supporting the preservation of an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet in Hong Kong;

(B) increasing the supply of the technology referred to in paragraph (1);

(C) accelerating the dissemination of such technology;

(D) promoting the availability of internet freedom in Hong Kong;
(E) utilizing presently-available tools in the existing relevant portfolios for further use in the unique context of Hong Kong;

(F) expanding the portfolio of tools in order to diversify and strengthen the effectiveness and resiliency of the circumvention efforts;

(G) providing training for high-risk groups and individuals in Hong Kong; and

(H) detecting analyzing, and responding to new and evolving censorship threats;

(3) includes a detailed description of the technical and fiscal steps necessary to safely implement the plans referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2), including an analysis of the market conditions in Hong Kong;

(4) describes the Federal Government’s plans for awarding grants to private organizations for the purposes described in subsection (d)(1)(A);

(5) outlines the working group’s consultations regarding the implementation of this section to ensure that all Federal efforts are aligned and well coordinated; and

(6) outlines the Department of State’s strategy to influence global internet legal standards at international organizations and multilateral fora.
(f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.


SEC. 312. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available to carry out section 409 of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2019 (Public Law 115–409) should include programs that prioritize the
protection and advancement of the freedoms of association, assembly, religion, and expression for women, human rights activists, and ethnic and religious minorities in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

(b) Use of Funds.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to section 409 of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2019 (Public Law 115–409) may be used to fund non-governmental agencies within the Indo-Pacific region that are focused on the issues described in subsection (a).

(c) Consultation Requirement.—In carrying out this section, the Assistant Secretary of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees and representatives of civil society regarding—

(1) strengthening the capacity of the organizations referred to in subsection (b);

(2) protecting members of the groups referred to in subsection (a) who have been targeted for arrest, harassment, forced sterilizations, coercive abortions, forced labor, or intimidation, including members residing outside of the PRC; and

(3) messaging efforts to reach the broadest possible audiences within the PRC about United States Government efforts to protect freedom of associa-
tion, expression, assembly, and the rights of ethnic
minorities.

SEC. 313. MODIFICATIONS TO AND REAUTHORIZATION OF
SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—Section 1262 of the Global
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Subtitle F
of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note)
is amended by striking paragraph (2).

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—The Global Magnitsky
Human Rights Accountability Act (Subtitle F of title XII
of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended
by inserting after section 1262 the following new section:

“SEC. 1262A. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

“It is the sense of Congress that the President should
establish and regularize information sharing and sanc-
tions-related decision making with like-minded govern-
ments possessing human rights and anti-corruption sanc-
tions programs similar in nature to those authorized under
this subtitle.”.

(c) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (a) of section
1263 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Ac-
countability Act (Subtitle F of title XII of Public
Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended to read as follows:

“(a) IN GENERAL.—The President may impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to—

“(1) any foreign person that the President determines, based on credible information—

“(A) is responsible for or complicit in, or has directly or indirectly engaged in, serious human rights abuse or any violation of internationally recognized human rights;

“(B) is a current or former government official, or a person acting for or on behalf of such an official, who is responsible for or complicit in, or has directly or indirectly engaged in—

“(i) corruption; or

“(ii) the transfer or facilitation of the transfer of the proceeds of corruption;

“(C) is or has been a leader or official of—

“(i) an entity, including a government entity, that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, any of the activities described in subparagraph (A) or (B) related to the tenure of the leader or official; or
“(ii) an entity whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this section as a result of activities related to the tenure of the leader or official;

“(D) has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of—

“(i) an activity described in subparagraph (A) or (B) that is conducted by a foreign person;

“(ii) a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this section; or

“(iii) an entity, including a government entity, that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, an activity described in subparagraph (A) or (B) conducted by a foreign person; or

“(E) is owned or controlled by, or acts or is purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this section.”.
(2) Consideration of certain information.—Subsection (c)(2) of such section is amended by inserting “corruption and” after “monitor”.

(3) Requests by Congress.—Subsection (d) of such section is amended—

(A) in paragraph (1), in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking “subsection (a)” and inserting “subsection (a)(1)”;

(B) in paragraph (2)—

(i) in subparagraph (A)—

(I) in the subparagraph heading, by striking “HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS” and inserting “SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE OR VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS”; and

(II) by striking “described in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a)” and inserting “described in subsection (a)(1) relating to serious human rights abuse or any violation of internationally recognized human rights”; and

(ii) in subparagraph (B)—
(I) in the matter preceding clause

(i), by striking “described in paragraph (3) or (4) of subsection (a)” and inserting “described in subsection (a)(1) relating to corruption or the transfer or facilitation of the transfer of the proceeds of corruption”; and

(II) by striking “ranking member of” and all that follows through the period at the end and inserting “ranking member of one of the appropriate congressional committees”.

(d) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.—Section 1264(a) of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (5), by striking “; and” and inserting a semicolon;

(2) in paragraph (6), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; and”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(7) a description of additional steps taken by the President through diplomacy, international engagement, and assistance to foreign or security sectors to address persistent underlying causes of seri-
ous human rights abuse, violations of internationally recognized human rights, and corruption in each country in which foreign persons with respect to which sanctions have been imposed under section 1263 are located; and

“(8) a description of additional steps taken by the President to ensure the pursuit of judicial accountability in appropriate jurisdictions with respect to those foreign persons subject to sanctions under section 1263 for serious human rights abuse, violations of internationally recognized human rights, and corruption.”.

(e) REPEAL OF SUNSET.—Section 1265 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is repealed.

SEC. 314. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING ANTI-ASIAN RACISM AND DISCRIMINATION.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Since the onset of the COVID–19 pandemic, crimes and discrimination against Asians and those of Asian descent have risen dramatically worldwide. In May 2020, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said “the pandemic con-
continues to unleash a tsunami of hate and xenophobia, scapegoating and seare-mongering” and urged governments to “act now to strengthen the immunity of our societies against the virus of hate”.

(2) Asian American and Pacific Island (AAPI) workers make up a large portion of the essential workers on the frontlines of the COVID–19 pandemic, making up 8.5 percent of all essential healthcare workers in the United States. AAPI workers also make up a large share—between 6 percent and 12 percent based on sector—of the biomedical field.

(3) The United States Census notes that Americans of Asian descent alone made up nearly 5.9 percent of the United States population in 2019, and that Asian Americans are the fastest-growing racial group in the United States, projected to represent 14 percent of the United States population by 2065.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the reprehensible attacks on people of Asian descent and concerning increase in anti-Asian sentiment and racism in the United States and around the world have no place in a peaceful, civilized, and tolerant world;
(2) the United States is a diverse country with a proud tradition of immigration, and the strength and vibrancy of the United States is enhanced by the diverse ethnic backgrounds and tolerance of its citizens, including Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders;

(3) the United States Government should encourage foreign governments to use the official and scientific names for the COVID–19 pandemic, as recommended by the World Health Organization and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; and

(4) the United States Government and other governments around the world must actively oppose racism and intolerance, and use all available and appropriate tools to combat the spread of anti-Asian racism and discrimination.

SEC. 315. ANNUAL REPORTING ON CENSORSHIP OF FREE SPEECH WITH RESPECT TO INTERNATIONAL ABUSES OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

Section 116(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act (227 U.S.C. 2151n(d)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (11)(C), by striking “and” at the end;

(2) in paragraph (12)(C)(ii), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(13) wherever applicable, instances in which
the government of each country has attempted to
extraterritorially intimidate or pressure a company
or entity to censor or self-censor the speech of its
employees, contractors, customers, or associated
staff with regards to the abuse of human rights in
such country, or sought retaliation against such em-
ployees or contractors for the same, including any
instance in which the Government of the People’s
Republic of China has sought to extraterritorially
censor or punish speech that is otherwise legal in the
United States on the topics of—

“(A) repression and violation of funda-
mental freedoms in Hong Kong;

“(B) repression and persecution of reli-
gious and ethnic minorities in China, including
in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
and the Tibet Autonomous Region;

“(C) efforts to proliferate and use surveil-
 lance technologies to surveil activists, journal-
ists, opposition politicians, or to profile persons
of different ethnicities; and

“(D) other gross violations of human
rights; and
“(14) wherever applicable, instances in which a company or entity located in or based in a third country has censored or self-censored the speech of its employees, contractors, customers, or associated staff on the topic of abuse of human rights in each country or sought to retaliate against such employees for the same, due to intimidation or pressure from or the fear of intimidation by the foreign government.”.

SEC. 316. POLICY TOWARD THE XXIV OLYMPIC WINTER GAMES AND THE XIII PARALYMPIC WINTER GAMES.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) In October 2020, 39 countries at the United Nations Third Committee of the General Assembly appealed for action on the mass arbitrary detentions and other crimes against the Uyghur Muslim population of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

(2) The 2018 concluding observations of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination decried reports of mass arbitrary detention of Uyghurs.

(3) Over 400 international nongovernmental organizations have joined together to decry the mass
arbitrary detentions of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region.

(4) The Olympic Charter states that the prac-
tice of sport “is a human right” that “shall be se-
cured without discrimination of any kind, such as
race, colour, sex, sexual orientation, language, reli-
gion, political or other opinion, national or social ori-
gin, property, birth or other status”, a right that by
definition cannot be secured in a country in which
over 1,000,000 people are imprisoned in camps be-
cause of their race, language, and religion.

(5) The 2008 Olympics in Beijing were accom-
panied by widespread tracking, arrest, and intimida-
tion of foreign journalists and bloggers, as well as
restrictions on movement of journalists, contrary to
explicit commitments made by the Government of
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to the Inter-
national Olympic Committee.

(6) The Government of the PRC denied visas
for some journalists granted press accreditation for
the 2008 Olympic Games, and the Beijing
Organising Committee of the Olympic Games repeat-
edly refused to address incidents involving freedom
of expression.
(7) The International Olympic Committee faced broad criticism for failing to adequately anticipate infringements by the Government of the PRC's on freedom of expression and press for international media and 2008 Olympics participants, and failing to hold the Government of the PRC to their own commitments to safeguard human rights during the 2008 games.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the International Olympic Committee should—

(1) consider that the Olympic Charter’s principles of solidarity and nondiscrimination are hard to reconcile with holding the 2022 Winter Games in a country the government of which stands credibly accused of perpetrating crimes against humanity and genocide against ethnic and religious minorities;

(2) take into account the recent precedent of the 2008 games, at which Olympic athletes, spectators, and international media had their fundamental freedoms severely challenged, and the likely limitations the Government of the PRC will seek to enforce on participants speaking out about ongoing persecution of the Uyghurs and other human rights abuses in the PRC, despite repeated commitments by the Government of the PRC;
(3) emphasize that the International Olympic Committee is not opposed to moving an Olympic competition in all circumstances, and will keep this option available as demanded by the human rights situation, and initiate an emergency search process for suitable replacement facilities for the 2022 Winter Olympics if the Government of the PRC fails to release all arbitrarily held Uyghurs from mass detention centers and prisons;

(4) affirm the International Olympic Committee’s—

(A) desire to stay above politics does not permit turning a blind eye to mass atrocity crimes, which cannot and should not be dismissed as mere political concerns; and

(B) commitment to the fundamental rights instruments of the international system, which are beyond partisan or domestic policy, and upon which the success of the entire Olympic project depends;

(5) propose a set of clear, executable actions to be taken by the International Olympic Committee upon infringement of freedom of expression by a host country’s government during any Olympics
event, including the 2022 Winter Olympics, against athletes, participants, and international media; and

(6) rescind Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter, which restricts the freedom of expression by athletes when competing during Olympics events, and affirm the rights of athletes to political and other speech during athletic competitions, including speech that is critical of their host countries.

(e) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United States—

(1) to implement a presidential and cabinet level diplomatic boycott of the XXIV Olympic Winter Games and the XIII Paralympic Winter Games in the PRC;

(2) to encourage other nations, especially democratic partners and allies, to do the same; and

(3) to call for an end to the Chinese Communist Party’s ongoing human rights abuses, including the Uyghur genocide.

TITLE IV—INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT

SEC. 401. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S INDUSTRIAL POLICY.

It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the challenges presented by a nonmarket economy like the economy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which has captured such a large share of global economic exchange, are in many ways unprecedented and require sufficiently elevated and sustained long-term focus and engagement;

(2) in order to truly address the most detrimental aspects of Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-directed mercantilist economic strategy, the United States must adopt policies that—

(A) expose the full scope and scale of intellectual property theft and mass subsidization of Chinese firms, and the resulting harm to the United States, foreign markets, and the global economy;

(B) ensure that PRC companies face costs and consequences for anticompetitive behavior;

(C) provide options for affected United States persons to address and respond to unreasonable and discriminatory CCP-directed industrial policies; and

(D) strengthen the protection of critical technology and sensitive data, while still fostering an environment that provides incentives
for secure but open investment, innovation, and
competition;

(3) the United States must work with its allies
and partners and multilateral venues and fora—

(A) to reinforce long-standing generally ac-
cepted principles of fair competition and market
behavior and address the PRC’s anticompetitive
economic and industrial policies that undermine
decades of global growth and innovation;

(B) to ensure that the PRC is not granted
the same treatment as that of a free-market
economy until it ceases the implementation of
laws, regulations, policies, and practices that
provide unfair advantage to PRC firms in fur-
therance of national objectives and impose un-
reasonable, discriminatory, and illegal burdens
on market-based international commerce; and

(C) to align policies with respect to curbing
state-directed subsidization of the private sec-
tor, such as advocating for global rules related
to transparency and adherence to notification
requirements, including through the efforts cur-
rently being advanced by the United States,
Japan, and the European Union;
(4) the United States and its allies and partners must collaborate to provide incentives to their respective companies to cooperate in areas such as—

(5) the United States should develop policies that—

(A) insulate United States entities from PRC pressure against complying with United States laws;

(B) together with the work of allies and partners and multilateral institutions, counter the potential impact of the blocking regime of the PRC established by the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC on January 9, 2021, when it issued Order No. 1 of 2021, entitled “Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extraterritorial Application of Foreign Legislation and other Measures”; and

(C) plan for future actions that the Government of the PRC may take to undermine the lawful application of United States legal authorities, including with respect to the use of sanctions.

SEC. 402. ECONOMIC DEFENSE RESPONSE TEAMS.

(a) PILOT PROGRAM.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall
develop and implement a pilot program for the creation of deployable economic defense response teams to help provide emergency technical assistance and support to a country subjected to the threat or use of coercive economic measures (in this section referred to as a “partner country”) and to play a liaison role between the legitimate government of that country and the United States Government. Such assistance and support may include the following activities:

(1) Reducing the partner country’s vulnerability to coercive economic measures.

(2) Minimizing the damage that such measures by an adversary could cause to the partner country.

(3) Implementing any bilateral or multilateral contingency plans that may exist for responding to the threat or use of such measures.

(4) In coordination with the partner country, developing or improving plans and strategies by the country for reducing vulnerabilities and improving responses to such measures in the future.

(5) Assisting the partner country in dealing with foreign sovereign investment in infrastructure or related projects that may undermine the partner country’s sovereignty.
(6) Assisting the partner country in responding to specific efforts from an adversary attempting to employ economic coercion that undermines the partner country’s sovereignty, including efforts in the cyber domain, such as efforts that undermine cybersecurity or digital security of the partner country or initiatives that introduce digital technologies in a manner that undermines freedom, security, and sovereignty of the partner country.

(7) Otherwise providing direct and relevant short-to-medium term economic or other assistance from the United States and marshalling other resources in support of effective responses to such measures.

(b) REPORTS REQUIRED.—

(1) REPORT ON ESTABLISHMENT.—Upon establishment of the pilot program required by subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall provide the appropriate congressional committees with a detailed report and briefing describing the pilot program, the major elements of the program, the personnel and institutions involved, and the degree to which the program incorporates the elements described in subsection (a).
(2) Follow-up report.—Not later than one year after the date on which the report required by paragraph (1) is submitted, the Secretary of State shall provide the appropriate congressional committees with a detailed report and briefing describing the operations over the previous year of the pilot program established pursuant to subsection (a), as well as the Secretary’s assessment of its performance and suitability for becoming a permanent program.

(3) Form.—Each report required under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(c) Declaration of an Economic Crisis Required.—

(1) Notification.—The President may activate an economic defense response team for a period of 180 days under the authorities of this section to assist a partner country in responding to an unusual and extraordinary economic coercive threat by an adversary of the United States upon the declaration of a coercive economic emergency, together with notification to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(2) EXTENSION AUTHORITY.—The President may activate the response team for an additional 180 days upon the submission of a detailed analysis to the committees described in paragraph (1) justifying why the continued deployment of the economic defense response team in response to the economic emergency is in the national security interest of the United States.

(d) SUNSET.—The authorities provided under this section shall expire on December 31, 2026.

(e) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Neither the authority to declare an economic crisis provided for in subsection (d), nor the declaration of an economic crisis pursuant to subsection (d), shall confer or be construed to confer any authority, power, duty, or responsibility to the President other than the authority to activate an economic defense response team as described in this section.

(f) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the Committee on Agriculture, Nu-
trition, and Forestry, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Agriculture, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

**SEC. 403. COUNTERING OVERSEAS KLEPTOCRACY.**

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) Authoritarian leaders in foreign countries abuse their power to steal assets from state institutions, enrich themselves at the expense of their countries’ economic development, and use corruption as a strategic tool both to solidify their grip on power and to undermine democratic institutions abroad.

(2) Global corruption harms the competitiveness of United States businesses, weakens democratic governance, feeds terrorist recruitment and transnational organized crime, enables drug smuggling and human trafficking, and stymies economic growth.

(3) Illicit financial flows often penetrate countries through what appear to be legitimate financial transactions, as kleptocrats launder money, use shell
companies, amass offshore wealth, and participate in a global shadow economy.

(4) The Government of the Russian Federation is a leading model of this type of kleptocratic system, using state-sanctioned corruption to both erode democratic governance from within and discredit democracy abroad, thereby strengthening the authoritarian rule of Vladimir Putin.

(5) Corrupt individuals and entities in the Russian Federation, often with the backing and encouragement of political leadership, use stolen money—

(A) to purchase key assets in other countries, often with a goal of attaining monopolistic control of a sector;

(B) to gain access to and influence the policies of other countries; and

(C) to advance Russian interests in other countries, particularly those that undermine confidence and trust in democratic systems.

(6) Systemic corruption in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), often tied to, directed by, or backed by the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Government of the PRC is used—
(A) to provide unfair advantage to certain PRC economic entities;

(B) to increase other countries’ economic dependence on the PRC to secure greater deference to the PRC’s diplomatic and strategic goals; and

(C) to exploit corruption in foreign governments and among other political elites to enable PRC state-backed firms to pursue predatory and exploitative economic practices.

(7) Thwarting these tactics by Russian, Chinese, and other kleptocratic actors requires the international community to strengthen democratic governance and the rule of law. International cooperation in combating corruption and illicit finance is vital to such efforts, especially by empowering reformers in foreign countries during historic political openings for the establishment of the rule of law in those countries.

(8) Technical assistance programs that combat corruption and strengthen the rule of law, including through assistance provided by the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the United States Agency for International Development, and through pro-
grams like the Department of Justice’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training and the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, can have lasting and significant impacts for both foreign and United States interests.

(9) There currently exist numerous international instruments to combat corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit finance, including—

(A) the Inter-American Convention against Corruption of the Organization of American States, done at Caracas March 29, 1996;

(B) the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development, done at Paris December 21, 1997 (commonly referred to as the “Anti-Bribery Convention”);

(C) the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, done at New York November 15, 2000;

(D) the United Nations Convention against Corruption, done at New York October 31, 2003;
(E) Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, adopted November 26, 2009; and

(F) recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force comprising the International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation.

(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.

(2) FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.—The term “foreign assistance” means foreign assistance authorized
under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2251 et seq.).

(3) FOREIGN STATE.—The term “foreign state” has the meaning given such term in section 1603(a) of title 28, United States Code.

(4) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term “intelligence community” has the meaning given such term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

(5) PUBLIC CORRUPTION.—The term “public corruption” includes the unlawful exercise of entrusted public power for private gain, such as through bribery, nepotism, fraud, extortion, or embezzlement.

(6) RULE OF LAW.—The term “rule of law” means the principle of governance in which all persons, institutions, and entities, whether public or private, including the state, are accountable to laws that are—

(A) publicly promulgated;

(B) equally enforced;

(C) independently adjudicated; and

(D) consistent with international human rights norms and standards.
STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to leverage United States diplomatic engagement and foreign assistance to promote the rule of law;

(2)(A) to promote international instruments to combat corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit finance, including instruments referred to in subsection (a)(9), and other relevant international standards and best practices, as such standards and practices develop; and

(B) to promote the adoption and implementation of such laws, standards, and practices by foreign states;

(3) to support foreign states in promoting good governance and combating public corruption;

(4) to encourage and assist foreign partner countries to identify and close loopholes in their legal and financial architecture, including the misuse of anonymous shell companies, free trade zones, and other legal structures, that are enabling illicit finance to penetrate their financial systems;

(5) to help foreign partner countries to investigate, prosecute, adjudicate, and more generally combat the use of corruption by malign actors, in—
including authoritarian governments, particularly the
Government of the Russian Federation and the Gov-
ernment of the People’s Republic of China, as a tool
of malign influence worldwide;

(6) to assist in the recovery of kleptocracy-re-
lated stolen assets for victims, including through the
use of appropriate bilateral arrangements and inter-
national agreements, such as the United Nations
Convention against Corruption, done at New York
October 31, 2003, and the United Nations Conven-
tion against Transnational Organized Crime, done at
New York November 15, 2000;

(7) to use sanctions authorities, such as the
Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act
(subtitle F of title XII of the National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law
114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note)) and section
7031(e) of the Department of State, Foreign Oper-
ations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
2020 (division G of Public Law 116–94), to identify
and take action against corrupt foreign actors;

(8) to ensure coordination between relevant
Federal departments and agencies with jurisdiction
over the advancement of good governance in foreign
states; and
(9) to lead the creation of a formal grouping of like-minded states—

(A) to coordinate efforts to counter corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit finance; and

(B) to strengthen collective financial defense.

(d) ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTION FUND.—

(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in the United States Treasury a fund, to be known as the “Anti-Corruption Action Fund”, only for the purposes of—

(A) strengthening the capacity of foreign states to prevent and fight public corruption;

(B) assisting foreign states to develop rule of law-based governance structures, including accountable civilian police, prosecutorial, and judicial institutions;

(C) supporting foreign states to strengthen domestic legal and regulatory frameworks to combat public corruption, including the adoption of best practices under international law; and

(D) supplementing existing foreign assistance and diplomacy with respect to efforts described in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C).
(2) **Funding.**—

(A) **Transfers.**—Beginning on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, if total criminal fines and penalties in excess of $50,000,000 are imposed against a person under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (Public Law 95–213) or section 13, 30A, or 32 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m, 78dd–1, and 78ff), whether pursuant to a criminal prosecution, enforcement proceeding, deferred prosecution agreement, nonprosecution agreement, a declination to prosecute or enforce, or any other resolution, the court (in the case of a conviction) or the Attorney General shall impose an additional prevention payment equal to $5,000,000 against such person, which shall be deposited in the Anti-Corruption Action Fund established under paragraph (1).

(B) **Availability of Funds.**—Amounts deposited into the Anti-Corruption Action Fund pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be available to the Secretary of State only for the purposes described in paragraph (1), without fiscal year limitation or need for subsequent appropriation.
(C) LIMITATION.—None of the amounts made available to the Secretary of State from the Anti-Corruption Action Fund may be used inside the United States, except for administrative costs related to overseas program implementation pursuant to paragraph (1).

(3) SUPPORT.—The Anti-Corruption Action Fund—

(A) may support governmental and non-governmental parties in advancing the purposes described in paragraph (1); and

(B) shall be allocated in a manner complementary to existing United States foreign assistance, diplomacy, and anti-corruption activities.

(4) ALLOCATION AND PRIORITIZATION.—In programming foreign assistance made available through the Anti-Corruption Action Fund, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Attorney General, shall prioritize projects that—

(A) assist countries that are undergoing historic opportunities for democratic transition, combating corruption, and the establishment of the rule of law; and
(B) are important to United States national interests.

(5) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDERS.—For any technical assistance to a foreign governmental party under this section, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Attorney General, shall prioritize United States Government technical assistance providers as implementers, in particular the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training and the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program at the Department of Justice.

(6) PUBLIC DIPLOMACY.—The Secretary of State shall announce that funds deposited in the Anti-Corruption Action Fund are derived from actions brought under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to demonstrate that the use of such funds are—

(A) contributing to international anti-corruption work; and

(B) reducing the pressure that United States businesses face to pay bribes overseas, thereby contributing to greater competitiveness of United States companies.

(7) REPORTING.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act and not less
frequently than annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that contains—

(A) the balance of the funding remaining in the Anti-Corruption Action Fund;

(B) the amount of funds that have been deposited into the Anti-Corruption Action Fund; and

(C) a summary of the obligation and expenditure of such funds.

(8) Notification Requirements.—None of the amounts made available to the Secretary of State from the Anti-Corruption Action Fund pursuant to this section shall be available for obligation, or for transfer to other departments, agencies, or entities, unless the Secretary of State notifies the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, not later than 15 days in advance of such obligation or transfer.

(e) Interagency Anti-Corruption Task Force.—
(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Interagency Anti-Corruption Task Force established pursuant to paragraph (2), shall manage a whole-of-government effort to improve coordination among Federal departments and agencies and donor organizations with a role in—

(A) promoting good governance in foreign states; and

(B) enhancing the ability of foreign states to combat public corruption.

(2) **INTERAGENCY ANTI-CORRUPTION TASK FORCE.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall establish and convene the Interagency Anti-Corruption Task Force (referred to in this section as the “Task Force”), which shall be composed of representatives appointed by the President from appropriate departments and agencies, including the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, the Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the intelligence community.
(3) ADDITIONAL MEETINGS.—The Task Force shall meet not less frequently than twice per year.

(4) DUTIES.—The Task Force shall—

(A) evaluate, on a general basis, the effectiveness of existing foreign assistance programs, including programs funded by the Anti-Corruption Action Fund, that have an impact on—

(i) promoting good governance in foreign states; and

(ii) enhancing the ability of foreign states to combat public corruption;

(B) assist the Secretary of State in managing the whole-of-government effort described in paragraph (1);

(C) identify general areas in which such whole-of-government effort could be enhanced; and

(D) recommend specific programs for foreign states that may be used to enhance such whole-of-government effort.

(5) BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently than annually thereafter through the end of fiscal year 2026, the Secretary of State shall provide a briefing to the appropriate
congressional committees regarding the ongoing work of the Task Force. Each briefing shall include the participation of a representative of each of the departments and agencies described in paragraph (2), to the extent feasible.

(f) Designation of Embassy Anti-Corruption Points of Contact.——

(1) Embassy Anti-Corruption Point of Contact.—The chief of mission of each United States embassy shall designate an anti-corruption point of contact for each such embassy.

(2) Duties.—The designated anti-corruption points of contact designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall—

(A) coordinate, in accordance with guidance from the Interagency Anti-Corruption Task Force established pursuant to subsection (e)(2), an interagency approach within United States embassies to combat public corruption in the foreign states in which such embassies are located that is tailored to the needs of such foreign states, including all relevant Federal departments and agencies with a presence in such foreign states, such as the Department of State, the United States Agency for International De-
velopment, the Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the intelligence community;

(B) make recommendations regarding the use of the Anti-Corruption Action Fund and other foreign assistance funding related to anti-corruption efforts in their respective countries of responsibility that aligns with United States diplomatic engagement; and

(C) ensure that anti-corruption activities carried out within their respective countries of responsibility are included in regular reporting to the Secretary of State and the Interagency Anti-Corruption Task Force, including United States embassy strategic planning documents and foreign assistance-related reporting, as appropriate.

(3) TRAINING.—The Secretary of State shall develop and implement appropriate training for the designated anti-corruption points of contact.

(g) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—

(1) REPORT OR BRIEFING ON PROGRESS TOWARD IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 3 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit a report or provide a briefing to the appropriate congressional committees that summarizes progress made in combating public corruption and in implementing this Act, including—

(A) identifying opportunities and priorities for outreach with respect to promoting the adoption and implementation of relevant international law and standards in combating public corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit finance;

(B) describing—

(i) the bureaucratic structure of the offices within the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development that are engaged in activities to combat public corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit finance; and

(ii) how such offices coordinate their efforts with each other and with other relevant Federal departments and agencies;
(C) providing a description of how the provisions under paragraphs (4) and (5) of subsection (d) have been applied to each project funded by the Anti-Corruption Action Fund;

(D) providing an explanation as to why a United States Government technical assistance provider was not used if technical assistance to a foreign governmental entity is not implemented by a United States Government technical assistance provider;

(E) describing the activities of the Inter-agency Anti-Corruption Task Force established pursuant to subsection (e)(2);

(F) identifying—

(i) the designated anti-corruption points of contact for foreign states; and

(ii) any training provided to such points of contact; and

(G) recommending additional measures that would enhance the ability of the United States Government to combat public corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit finance overseas.

(2) ONLINE PLATFORM.—The Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Develop-
ment, should consolidate existing reports with anti-
corruption components into a single online, public
platform that includes—

(A) the Annual Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices required under section
116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2151n);

(B) the Fiscal Transparency Report re-
quired under section 7031(b) of the Depart-
ment of State, Foreign Operations and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 2019 (division F
of Public Law 116–6);

(C) the Investment Climate Statement re-
ports;

(D) the International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report;

(E) any other relevant public reports; and

(F) links to third-party indicators and
compliance mechanisms used by the United
States Government to inform policy and pro-
gramming, as appropriate, such as—

(i) the International Finance Corpora-
tion’s Doing Business surveys;

(ii) the International Budget Partner-
ship’s Open Budget Index; and
(iii) multilateral peer review anti-corruption compliance mechanisms, such as—

(I) the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions;

(II) the Follow-Up Mechanism for the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption; and


SEC. 404. ANNUAL REPORT ON CHINESE SURVEILLANCE COMPANIES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter until 2040, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, a report with respect to persons in China that the Secretary determines—
(1) have operated, sold, leased, or otherwise
provided, directly or indirectly, items or services re-
lated to targeted digital surveillance to—

(A) a foreign government or entity located
primarily inside a foreign country where a rea-
sonable person would assess that such transfer
could result in a use of the items or services in
a manner contrary to human rights; or

(B) a country or any governmental unit
thereof, entity, or other person determined by
the Secretary of State, in a notice published in
the Federal Register, to have used items or
services for targeted digital surveillance in a
manner contrary to human rights; or

(2) have materially assisted, sponsored, or pro-
vided financial, material, or technological support
for, or items or services to or in support of, the ac-
tivities described in paragraph (1).

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re-
quired by subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) The name of each foreign person that the
Secretary determines—

(A) meets the requirements of subsection
(a)(1); and
(B) meets the requirements of subsection (a)(2).

(2) The name of each intended and actual recipient of items or services described in subsection (a).

(3) A detailed description of such items or services.

(4) An analysis of the appropriateness of including the persons listed in (b)(1) on the entity list maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security.

(c) CONSULTATION.—In compiling data and making assessments for the purposes of preparing the report required by subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall consult with a wide range of organizations, including with respect to—

(1) classified and unclassified information provided by the Director of National Intelligence;

(2) information provided by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s Internet Freedom, Business and Human Rights section;

(3) information provided by the Department of Commerce, including the Bureau of Industry and Security;

(4) information provided by the advisory committees established by the Secretary to advise the
Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security on controls under the Export Administration Regulations, including the Emerging Technology and Research Advisory Committee; and

(5) information on human rights and technology matters, as solicited from civil society and human rights organizations through regular consultative processes; and

(6) information contained in the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices published annually by the Department of State.

(d) Form and Public Availability of Report.—

The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form. The report shall be posted by the President not later than 14 days after being submitted to Congress on a text-based, searchable, and publicly available internet website.

(e) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) Targeted Digital Surveillance.—The term “targeted digital surveillance” means the use of items or services that enable an individual or entity to detect, monitor, intercept, collect, exploit, preserve, protect, transmit, retain, or otherwise gain access to the communications, protected information, work product, browsing data, research, identifying
information, location history, or online and offline
activities of other individuals, organizations, or enti-
ties, with or without the explicit authorization of
such individuals, organizations, or entities.

(2) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term “foreign per-
son” means an individual or entity that is not a
United States person.

(3) IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO HUMAN
RIGHTS.—The term “in a manner contrary to
human rights”, with respect to targeted digital sur-
veillance, means engaging in targeted digital surveil-
ance—

(A) in violation of basic human rights, in-
cluding to silence dissent, sanction criticism,
punish independent reporting (and sources for
that reporting), manipulate or interfere with
democratic or electoral processes, persecute mi-
norities or vulnerable groups, or target adva-
cates or practitioners of human rights and
democratic rights (including activists, journal-
ists, artists, minority communities, or opposi-
tion politicians); or

(B) in a country in which there is lacking
a minimum legal framework governing its use,
including established—
(i) authorization under laws that are accessible, precise, and available to the public;

(ii) constraints limiting its use under principles of necessity, proportionality, and legitimacy;

(iii) oversight by bodies independent of the government’s executive agencies;

(iv) involvement of an independent and impartial judiciary branch in authorizing its use; or

(v) legal remedies in case of abuse.

TITLE V—ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY

SEC. 501. COOPERATION ON A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DIALOGUE.

(a) Statement of Policy.—It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to pursue, in coordination with United States allies and partners, arms control negotiations and sustained and regular engagement with the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—

(A) to enhance understanding of each other’s respective nuclear policies, doctrine, and capabilities;
(B) to improve transparency; and

(C) to help manage the risks of miscalculation and misperception;

(2) to formulate a strategy to engage the Government of the PRC on relevant issues that lays the groundwork for a constructive arms control framework, including—

(A) fostering dialogue on arms control leading to the convening of strategic security talks;

(B) negotiating norms for outer space;

(C) developing pre-launch notification regimes aimed at reducing nuclear miscalculation; and

(D) expanding lines of communication between both governments for the purposes of reducing the risks of conventional war and increasing transparency;

(3) to pursue relevant negotiations in coordination with United States allies and partners to ensure the security of United States and allied interests to slow the PRC’s military modernization and expansion, including on—

(A) ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles;
(B) integrated air and missile defense;

(C) hypersonic missiles;

(D) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;

(E) space-based capabilities;

(F) cyber capabilities; and

(G) command, control, and communications; and

(4) to ensure that the United States policy continues to reassure United States allies and partners.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) it is in the interest of the United States and China to cooperate in reducing risks of conventional and nuclear escalation;

(2) a physical, cyber, electronic, or any other People’s Liberation Army (PLA) attack on United States early warning satellites, other portions of the nuclear command and control enterprise, or critical infrastructure poses a high risk to inadvertent but rapid escalation;

(3) the United States and its allies and partners should promote international norms on military operations in space, the employment of cyber capabilities, and the military use of artificial intelligence,
as an element of risk reduction regarding nuclear command and control; and

(4) United States allies and partners should share the burden of promoting and protecting norms regarding the weaponization of space, highlighting unsafe behavior that violates international norms, such as in rendezvous and proximity operations, and promoting responsible behavior in space and all other domains.

SEC. 502. REPORT ON UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO ENGAGE THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON NUCLEAR ISSUES AND BALLISTIC MISSILE ISSUES.

(a) Report on the Future of United States-PRC Arms Control.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report, and if necessary a separate classified annex, that outlines the approaches and strategies such Secretaries will pursue to engage the Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on arms control and risk reduction, including—

(1) areas of potential dialogue between the Governments of the United States and the PRC, includ-
ing on ballistic, hypersonic glide, and cruise missiles, conventional forces, nuclear, space, and cyberspace issues, as well as other new strategic domains, which could reduce the likelihood of war, limit escalation if a conflict were to occur, and constrain a destabilizing arms race in the Indo-Pacific region;

(2) how the United States Government can engage the Government of the PRC in a constructive arms control dialogue;

(3) identifying strategic military capabilities of the PRC that the United States Government is most concerned about and how limiting these capabilities may benefit United States and allied security interests;

(4) mechanisms to avoid, manage, or control nuclear, conventional, and unconventional military escalation between the United States and the PRC;

(5) the personnel and expertise required to effectively engage the PRC in strategic stability and arms control dialogues; and

(6) opportunities and methods to encourage transparency from the PRC.

(b) REPORT ON ARMS CONTROL TALKS WITH PRC.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation
with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes—

(1) a concrete plan for arms control talks with the PRC;

(2) if a bilateral arms control dialogue does not arise, what alternative plans the Department of State envisages for ensuring the security of the United States and its allies through international arms control negotiations;

(3) effects on the credibility of United States extended deterrence assurances to allies and partners if arms control negotiations do not materialize and the implications for regional security architectures;

(4) efforts at engaging the PRC to join arms control talks, whether on a bilateral or international basis; and

(5) the interest level of the Government of PRC in joining arms control talks, whether on a bilateral or international basis, including through—

(A) a formal invitation to appropriate officials from the PRC, and to each of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, to observe a United States-Russian
Federation New START Treaty on-site inspection to demonstrate the security benefits of transparency into strategic nuclear forces;

(B) discussions on how to advance international negotiations on the fissile material cut-off;

(C) an agreement with the PRC that allows for advance notifications of ballistic missile launches, through the Hague Code of Conduct or other data exchanges or doctrine discussions related to strategic nuclear forces;

(D) an agreement not to target or interfere in nuclear command, control, and communications (commonly referred to as “NC3”) infrastructure; or

(E) any other cooperative measure that benefits United States-PRC strategic stability.

(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 503. COUNTERING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S PROLIFERATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES AND NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TO THE MIDDLE EAST.

(a) MTCR Transfers.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a written determination, and any documentation to support that determination detailing—

(1) whether any foreign person in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) knowingly exported, transferred, or engaged in trade of any item designated under Category I of the MTCR Annex to any foreign person in the previous three fiscal years; and

(2) the sanctions the President has imposed or intends to impose pursuant to section 11B(b) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4612(b)) against any foreign person who knowingly engaged in the export, transfer, or trade of that item or items.
(b) PRC’s Nuclear Fuel Cycle Cooperation.—
Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report detailing—

(1) whether any foreign person in the PRC engaged in cooperation with any other foreign person in the previous three fiscal years in the construction of any nuclear-related fuel cycle facility or activity that has not been notified to the International Atomic Energy Agency and would be subject to complementary access if an Additional Protocol was in force; and

(2) the policy options required to prevent and respond to any future effort by the PRC to export to any foreign person an item classified as “plants for the separation of isotopes of uranium” or “plants for the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear reactor fuel elements” under Part 110 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission export licensing authority.

c) Form of Report.—The determination required under subsection (b) and the report required under subsection (c) shall be unclassified with a classified annex.

d) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(2) FOREIGN PERSON; PERSON.—The terms “foreign person” and “person” mean—

(A) a natural person that is an alien;

(B) a corporation, business association, partnership, society, trust, or any other non-governmental entity, organization, or group, that is organized under the laws of a foreign country or has its principal place of business in a foreign country;

(C) any foreign governmental entity operating as a business enterprise; and

(D) any successor, subunit, or subsidiary of any entity described in subparagraph (B) or (C).
TITLE VI—INVESTING IN A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE

SEC. 601. ENSURING NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC PRIORITIES WITH THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND OTHER COUNTRIES ACCOUNT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND CLIMATE CHANGE.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) The Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5°C, published by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change on October 8, 2018, and the Fourth National Climate Assessment, first published by the United States Global Change Research Program in 2018, concluded that—

(A) the release of greenhouse gas emissions, most notably the combustion of fossil fuels and the degradation of natural resources that absorb atmospheric carbon from human activity, are the dominant causes of climate change during the past century;

(B) changes in the Earth’s climate are—

(i) causing sea levels to rise;

(ii) increasing the global average temperature of the Earth;
(iii) increasing the incidence and severity of wildfires; and

(iv) intensifying the severity of extreme weather, including hurricanes, cyclones, typhoons, flooding, droughts, and other disasters that threaten human life, healthy communities, and critical infrastructure.

(2) An increase in the global average temperature of 2 degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrialized levels would cause—

(A) the displacement, and the forced internal migration, of an estimated 143,000,000 people in Latin America, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa by 2050 if insufficient action is taken (according to the World Bank);

(B) the displacement of an average of 17,800,000 people worldwide by floods every year (according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre) because of the exacerbating effects of climate change;

(C) more than $500,000,000,000 in lost annual economic output in the United States (a 10 percent contraction from 2018 levels) by
2100 (according to the Fourth National Climate Assessment);

(D) an additional 100,000,000 people worldwide to be driven into poverty by 2030 (according to the World Bank);

(E) greater food insecurity and decreased agricultural production due to climate change’s effects on the increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events;

(F) the proliferation of agricultural pests and crop diseases, loss of biodiversity, degrading ecosystems, and water scarcity; and

(G) more than 350,000,000 additional people worldwide to be exposed to deadly heat stress by 2050.

(3) According to the International Energy Agency, the United States, China, India, and the European Union (including the United Kingdom) account for more than 58 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions. China, which is the world’s top greenhouse gases emitter and has an outsized impact on the United States’ core interest in climate stability—

(A) is likely to achieve its carbon emissions mitigation pledge to the Paris Agreement, con-
tained in its 2015 nationally determined contribution, to “peak” emissions around 2030 ahead of schedule;

(B) announced, on September 22, 2020, and restated on April 22, 2021, a pledge to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060;

(C) announced on April 22, 2021, its intent to strictly control coal fired power generation projects, as well as strictly limit the increase in coal consumption over the 14th five year plan period and phase it down in the 15th five year plan period; and

(D) however, remains uncommitted to internationally recognized metrics for achieving these goals.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) to address the climate crisis, the United States must leverage the full weight of its diplomatic engagement and foreign assistance to promote our national security and economic interests related to climate change;

(2) in the absence of United States leadership on global issues driving international climate-related policymaking, it would lead to a substantial and
harmful decline in the Nation’s global competitiveness;

(3) promoting international instruments on climate action and other relevant international standards and best practices, as such standards and practices develop, serve the interests of the American people and protect United States environmental resources and the planet;

(4) promoting the adoption and implementation of international climate-related agreements, standards, and practices by foreign states ensures a level playing field for United States businesses and other stakeholders;

(5) working with international allies and partners to promote environmental justice and climate justice serves the American people’s interests;

(6) finding common ground with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on climate action where possible is important, but the United States must also continue to hold the PRC accountable where its actions undermine the interests of the United States and its allies and partners;

(7) and in furtherance of the previous clauses, the United States should—
(A) explore opportunities for constructive cooperation on climate action initiatives with the PRC and other countries while ensuring the United States maintains its competitive advantage in climate-related fields of expertise and industry, including—

(i) support for international cooperative policies, measures, and technologies to decarbonize industry and power, including through circular economy, energy storage and grid reliability, carbon capture, and green hydrogen; and

(ii) increased deployment of clean energy, including renewable and advanced nuclear power; green and climate resilient agriculture; energy efficient buildings; green, and low-carbon transportation;

(B) cooperate on addressing emissions of methane and other non-CO\textsubscript{2} greenhouse gases;

(C) cooperate on addressing emissions from international civil aviation and maritime activities;

(D) reduce emissions from coal, oil, and gas;
(E) implement the Paris Agreement that significantly advances global climate ambition on mitigation, adaptation, and support;

(F) coordinate among relevant federal, state, and local departments and agencies on climate action related initiatives;

(G) provide resources, authorities and support for enhancing United States ambition and commitment to solving the climate crisis including climate action specific assistance and multilateral fund contributions; and

(H) integrate considerations for climate change into broader United States foreign policy decision-making and the United States national security apparatus.

(e) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this section is to provide authorities, resources, policies, and recommended administrative actions—

(1) to restore United States global leadership on addressing the climate crisis and make United States climate action and climate diplomacy a more central tenet of United States foreign policy;

(2) to improve the United States commitment to taking more ambitious action to help mitigate global greenhouse gas emission and improve devel-
oping countries’ resilience and adaptation capacities
to the effects of climate change;

(3) to ensure the United States maintains com-
petitive advantage over global strategic competitors
in diplomacy and new technological development;

(4) to encourage the pursuit of new bilateral co-
operation agreements with other world powers on
initiatives to advance global clean energy innovation
and other measures to mitigate global greenhouse
gas emissions and improve climate change adapta-
tion capacities;

(5) to ensure that the United States national
security apparatus integrates critically important
data on the compounding effects that climate change
is having on global security risks by enhancing our
understanding of how, where, and when such effects
are destabilizing countries and regions in ways that
may motivate conflict, displacement, and other driv-
ers of insecurity; and

(6) to authorize funding and programs to sup-
port a reaffirmation of the United States’ commit-
ments to international cooperation and support for
developing and vulnerable countries to take climate
action.

(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this title:
(1) CLEAN ENERGY.—The term “clean energy” means—

(A) renewable energy and related systems;

(B) energy production processes that emit zero greenhouse gas emissions, including nuclear power;

(C) systems and processes that capture and permanently store greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel production and electricity generation units; and

(D) products, processes, facilities, or systems designed to retrofit and improve the energy efficiency and electricity generated from electrical generation units, while using less fuel, less or fewer power production resources, or less feedstocks.

(2) CLIMATE ACTION.—The term “climate action” means enhanced efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-induced impacts, including—

(A) climate-related hazards in all countries;

(B) integrating climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning; and
(C) improving education, awareness-raising, and human and institutional capacity with respect to climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction, and early warning.

(3) CLIMATE CRISIS.—The term “climate crisis” means the social, economic, health, safety, and security impacts on people, and the threats to biodiversity and natural ecosystem health, which are attributable to the wide-variety of effects on global environmental and atmospheric conditions as a result of disruptions to the Earth’s climate from anthropogenic activities that generate greenhouse gas emissions or reduce natural resource capacities to absorb and regulate atmospheric carbon.

(4) CLIMATE DIPLOMACY.—The term “climate diplomacy” means methods of influencing the decisions and behavior of foreign governments and peoples through dialogue, negotiation, cooperation, and other peaceful measures on or about issues related to addressing global climate change, including—

(A) the mitigation of global greenhouse gas emissions;

(B) discussion, analysis, and sharing of scientific data and information on the cause and effects of climate change;
(C) the security, social, economic, and political instability risks associated with the effects of climate change;

(D) economic cooperation efforts and trade matters that are related to or associated with climate change and greenhouse gas mitigation from the global economy;

(E) building resilience capacities and adapting to the effects of change;

(F) sustainable land use and natural resource conservation;

(G) accounting for loss and damage attributed to the effects of climate change;

(H) just transition of carbon intense economies to low or zero carbon economies and accounting for laborers within affected economies;

(I) technological innovations that reduce or eliminate carbon emissions; and

(J) clean energy and energy systems.

(5) CLIMATE FINANCING.—The term “climate financing” means the transfer of new and additional public funds from developed countries to developing countries for projects and programs that—
(A) reduce or eliminate greenhouse gas emissions;

(B) enhance and restore natural carbon sequestration; and

(C) promote adaptation to climate change.

(6) CLIMATE SECURITY.—The term “climate security” means the effects of climate change on—

(A) United States national security concerns and subnational, national, and regional political stability; and

(B) overseas security and conflict situations that are potentially exacerbated by dynamic environmental factors and events, including—

(i) the intensification and frequency of droughts, floods, wildfires, tropical storms, and other extreme weather events;

(ii) changes in historical severe weather, drought, and wildfire patterns;

(iii) the expansion of geographical ranges of droughts, floods, and wildfires into regions that had not regularly experienced such phenomena;
(iv) global sea level rise patterns and the expansion of geographical ranges affected by drought; and

(v) changes in marine environments that effect critical geostrategic waterways, such as the Arctic Ocean, the South China Sea, the South Pacific Ocean, the Barents Sea, and the Beaufort Sea.

(7) **GREEN CLIMATE FUND.**—The term “Green Climate Fund” means the independent, multilateral fund—

(A) established by parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; and

(B) adopted by decision as part of the financial mechanism of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

(8) **PARIS AGREEMENT.**—The term “Paris Agreement” means the annex to Decision 1/CP.21 adopted by the 21st Conference of Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Paris, France, on December 12, 2015.

(7) **RESILIENCE.**—The term “resilience” means the ability of human made and natural systems (including their component parts) to anticipate, absorb,
cope, accommodate, or recover from the effects of a
hazardous event in a timely and efficient manner, in-
cluding through ensuring the preservation, restora-
tion, or improvement of its essential basic structures
and functions. It is not preparedness or response.

SEC. 602. ENHANCING SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR
GLOBAL CLIMATE DISRUPTIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in con-
sultation with the heads of other relevant Federal agen-
cies, shall conduct biennial comprehensive evaluations of
present and ongoing disruptions to the global climate sys-
tem, including—

(1) the intensity, frequency, and range of nat-
ural disasters;

(2) the scarcity of global natural resources, in-
cluding fresh water;

(3) global food, health, and energy insecurities;

(4) conditions that contribute to—

(A) intrastate and interstate conflicts;

(B) foreign political and economic insta-
bility;

(C) international migration of vulnerable
and underserved populations;

(D) the failure of national governments;

and
(E) gender-based violence; and

(5) United States and allied military readiness, operations, and strategy.

(b) PURPOSES.—The purposes of the evaluations conducted under subsection (a) are—

(1) to support the practical application of scientific data and research on climate change’s dynamic effects around the world to improve resilience, adaptability, security, and stability despite growing global environmental risks and changes;

(2) to ensure that the strategic planning and mission execution of United States international development and diplomatic missions adequately account for heightened and dynamic risks and challenges associated with the effects of climate change;

(3) to improve coordination between United States science agencies conducting research and forecasts on the causes and effects of climate change and United States national security agencies;

(4) to better understand the disproportionate effects of global climate disruptions on women, girls, indigenous communities, and other historically marginalized populations; and

(5) to inform the development of the climate security strategy described in subsection (d).
(c) **SCOPE.**—The evaluations conducted under subsection (a) shall—

(1) examine developing countries’ vulnerabilities and risks associated with global, regional, and localized effects of climate change; and

(2) assess and make recommendations on necessary measures to mitigate risks and reduce vulnerabilities associated with effects, including—

(A) sea level rise;

(B) freshwater resource scarcity;

(C) wildfires; and

(D) increased intensity and frequency of extreme weather conditions and events, such as flooding, drought, and extreme storm events, including tropical cyclones.

(d) **CLIMATE SECURITY STRATEGY.**—The Secretary shall use the evaluations required under subsection (a)—

(1) to inform the development and implementation of a climate security strategy for the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, embassies, consulates, regional bureaus, and other offices and programs operating chief of mission authority, including those with roles in conflict avoidance, prevention and security
assistance, or humanitarian disaster response, prevention, and assistance; and

(2) in furtherance of such strategy, to assess, develop, budget for, and (upon approval) implement plans, policies, and actions—

(A) to account for the impacts of climate change to global human health, safety, governance, oceans, food production, fresh water and other critical natural resources, settlements, infrastructure, marginalized groups, and economic activity;

(B) to evaluate the climate change vulnerability, security, susceptibility, and resiliency of United States interests and non-defense assets abroad;

(C) to coordinate the integration of climate change risk and vulnerability assessments into all foreign policy and security decision-making processes, including awarding foreign assistance;

(D) to evaluate specific risks to certain regions and countries that are—

(i) vulnerable to the effects of climate change; and
(ii) strategically significant to the United States;

(E) to enhance the resilience capacities of foreign countries to the effects of climate change as a means of reducing the risks of conflict and instability;

(F) to advance principles of good governance by encouraging foreign governments, particularly nations that are least capable of coping with the effects of climate change—

(i) to conduct climate security evaluations; and

(ii) to facilitate the development of climate security action plans to ensure stability and public safety in disaster situations in a humane and responsible fashion;

(G) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, susceptibility, and resiliency of United States interests and nondefense assets abroad;

(H) to build international institutional capacity to address climate security implications and to advance United States interests, regional stability, and global security; and

(I) other activities that advance—
(i) the utilization and integration of climate science in national security planning; and

(ii) the clear understanding of how the effects of climate change can exacerbate security risks and threats.

(e) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and every two years thereafter for the following 20 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives an unclassified report, with a classified annex if necessary, that includes—

(1) a review of the efforts, initiatives, and programs in support of the strategy in subsection (c), as well as—

(A) an assessment of the funding expended by relevant Federal departments and agencies on emerging events exacerbated by climate change and the legal, procedural, and resource constraints faced by the Department of State and the United States Agency for International
Development throughout respective budgeting, strategic planning, and management cycles to support the prevention of and response to emerging events exacerbated by climate change;

(B) current annual global assessments of emerging events exacerbated by climate change;

(C) recommendations to further strengthen United States capabilities described in this section; and

(D) consideration of analysis, reporting, and policy recommendations by civil society, academic, and nongovernmental organizations and institutions, and partner countries to prevent and respond to emerging events exacerbated by climate change;

(2) recommendations to ensure shared responsibility by—

(A) enhancing multilateral mechanisms for preventing, mitigating, and responding to emerging events exacerbated by climate change; and

(B) strengthening regional organizations; and
(3) the implementation status of the recommendations included in the review under paragraph (1).

(f) REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.—The Director of National Intelligence is encouraged to include, in the Director’s annual (or more often as appropriate) unclassified testimony, accompanied by a classified annex, if necessary, to Congress on threats to United States national security—

(1) a review of countries and regions at risk of emerging events exacerbated by climate change; and

(2) whenever possible, specific identification of countries and regions at immediate risk of emerging events exacerbated by climate change.

SEC. 603. BALANCING ACCOUNTABILITY AND COOPERATION WITH CHINA.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) successful mitigation of global greenhouse gas emissions and changes to the environment require global cooperation and coordination of efforts, as well as holding other countries such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) accountable for their actions and commitments to ensure a level playing field with the United States and its allies and partners;
(2) other countries look toward the United States and the PRC, as the world’s largest emitters and largest economies, for leadership by example to effectively mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, develop and deploy energy generation technologies, and integrate sustainable adaptation solutions to the inevitable effects of climate change;

(3) given the volume of the PRC’s greenhouse gas emissions and the scientific imperative to swiftly reduce global greenhouse gas emissions to net-zero emissions around 2050, China should—

(A) revise its long-term pledge;

(B) seek to immediately peak its emissions;

(C) begin reducing its greenhouse gas emissions significantly to meet a more ambitious long-term 2050 reductions target; and

(D) update its nationally determined contribution along a trajectory that aligns with achieving a more ambitious net-zero by 2050 emissions target;

(4) it is in the United States national interest to emphasize the environment and climate change in its bilateral engagement with the PRC, as global climate risks cannot be mitigated without a significant reduction in PRC domestic and overseas emissions;
(5) the United States and the PRC, to the extent practicable, should coordinate on making and delivering ambitious pledges to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with aspirations towards achieving net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050;

(6) the United States and its allies and partners should work together, using diplomatic and economic tools, to hold the PRC accountable for any failure by the PRC—

(A) to increase ambition in its 2030 nationally determined contribution, in line with net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 before the 26th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC scheduled for November 2021 and meeting a more ambitious nationally determined contribution;

(B) to work faithfully to uphold the principles, goals, and rules of the Paris Agreement;

(C) to avoid and prohibit efforts to undermine or devolve the Paris Agreement’s rule or underlying framework, particularly within areas of accountability transparency, and shared responsibility among all parties;

(D) to eliminate greenhouse gas intensive projects from the PRC’s Belt and Road Initia-
tive and other overseas investments, including—

(i) working with United States allies and partners to eliminate support for coal power production projects in the Belt and Road Initiative;

(ii) providing financing and project support for cleaner and less risky alternatives; and

(iii) undertaking “parallel initiatives” to enhance capacity building programs and overseas sustainable investment criteria, including in areas such as integrated energy planning, power sector reform, just transition, distributed generation, procurement, transparency, and standards to support low-emissions growth in developing countries; and

(E) to phase out existing coal power plants and reduce net coal power production;

(7) the United States should pursue confidence-building opportunities for the United States and the PRC to undertake “parallel initiatives” on clean energy research, development, finance, and deployment, including through economic and stimulus
measures with clear, mutually agreed upon rules and policies to protect intellectual property, ensure equitable, nonpunitive provision of support, and verify implementation, which would provide catalytic progress towards delivering a global clean energy transformation that benefits all people;

(8) the United States should pursue cooperative initiatives to reduce global deforestation, including efforts to shift toward the import and consummation of forest and agricultural commodities that are produced in a manner that does not contribute to deforestation; and

(9) the United States should pursue appropriate scientific cooperative exchanges and research that align with United States interests and those of its international partners and allies, provide reciprocity of access, protect intellectual property rights, and preserve the values and human rights interests of the American people.

SEC. 604. PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE.

(a) In General.—The President should seek opportunities to partner with multilateral development finance institutions to develop financing tools based on shared de-
velopment finance criteria and mechanisms to support investments in developing countries that—

(1) support low carbon economic development; and

(2) promote resiliency and adaptation to environmental changes and natural disasters.

(b) PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT.—The Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation should seek to partner with other multilateral development finance institutions and development finance institutions to leverage the respective available funds to support low carbon economic development, which may include clean energy including renewable and nuclear energy projects, environmental adaptation, and resilience activities in countries.

(e) CO-FINANCING OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS.—

(1) AUTHORIZATION.—Subject to paragraph (2), the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies are authorized to co-finance infrastructure, resilience, and environmental adaptation projects that advance the development objectives of the United States overseas and provide viable alternatives to
519 projects that would otherwise be included within the
People’s Republic of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

(2) CONDITIONS.—Co-financing arrangements
authorized pursuant to paragraph (1) may not be
approved unless—

(A) the projects to be financed—

(i) promote the public good;

(ii) promote United States national
security or economic interests;

(iii) promote low carbon emissions, in-
cluding clean energy renewable and nuclear
energy projects; and

(iv) will have substantially lower envi-
ronmental impact than the proposed Belt
and Road Initiative alternative; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs of the House of Representatives are noti-
fied not later than 15 days in advance of enter-
ing into such co-financing arrangements.
SEC. 605. USING CLIMATE DIPLOMACY TO BETTER SERVE NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS.

(a) In General.—The President and the Secretary of State shall prioritize climate action and climate diplomacy in United States foreign policy by—

1. ensuring diplomacy, support, and interagency coordination for bilateral and multilateral actions to address the climate crisis; and

2. improving coordination and integration of climate action across all bureaus and United States missions abroad.

(b) Climate Action Integration.—The Secretary of State shall—

1. prioritize climate action and clean energy within the bureaus and offices under the leadership of the Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment;

2. ensure that such bureaus and offices are coordinating with other bureaus of the Department of State regarding the integration of climate action and climate diplomacy as a cross-cutting imperative across the Department of State;

3. encourage all Under Secretaries of State—
(A) to assess how issues related to climate change and United States climate action are integrated into their operations and programs;

(B) to coordinate crosscutting actions and diplomatic efforts that relate to climate action; and

(C) to make available the technical assistance and resources of the bureaus and offices with relevant expertise to provide technical assistance and expert support to other bureaus within the Department of State regarding climate action, clean energy development, and climate diplomacy;

(4) manage the integration of scientific data on the current and anticipated effects of climate change into applied strategies and diplomatic engagements across programmatic and regional bureaus of the Department of State and into the Department of State’s decision making processes;

(5) ensure that the relevant bureaus and offices provide appropriate technical support and resources—

(A) to the President, the Secretary of State, and their respective designees charged
with addressing climate change and associated
issues;

(B) to United States diplomats advancing
United States foreign policy related to climate
action; and

(C) for the appropriate engagement and
integration of relevant domestic agencies in
international climate change affairs, including
United States participation in multilateral fora;
and

(6) carry out other activities, as directed by the
Secretary of State, that advance United States cli-
mate-related foreign policy objectives, including glob-
al greenhouse gas mitigation, climate change adapta-
tion activities, and global climate security.

(e) Responsibilities of the Under Secretary
of State for Political Affairs.—The Under Sec-
retary of State for Political Affairs shall ensure that all
foreign missions are—

(1) advancing United States bilateral climate
diplomacy;

(2) engaging strategically on opportunities for
bilateral climate action cooperation with foreign gov-
ernments; and
(3) utilizing the technical resources and coordinating adequately with the bureaus reporting to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy and the Environment.

(d) REPORT.—Not later than 200 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, in cooperation with the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that—

(1) assesses how climate action and United States climate diplomacy is integrated across the Bureaus of the Department of State; and

(2) includes recommendations on strategies to improve cross bureau coordination and understanding of United States climate action and climate diplomacy.

(e) EFFECT OF ELIMINATION OF POSITIONS.—If the positions of Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment and the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs are eliminated or undergo name changes, the responsibilities of such Under Secretaries under this section shall be reassigned to other Under Secretaries of State, as appropriate.

(f) CLIMATE CHANGE OFFICERS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall establish and staff Climate Change Officer positions. Such Officers shall serve under the supervision of the appropriate chief of mission or the Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment of the Department of State, as the case may be. The Secretary shall ensure each embassy, consulate, and diplomatic mission to which such Officers are assigned pursuant to paragraph (2) has sufficient additional and appropriate staff to support such Officers.

(2) ASSIGNMENT.—Climate Change Officers shall be assigned to the following posts:

(A) United States embassies, or, if appropriate, consulates.

(B) United States diplomatic missions to, or liaisons with, regional and multilateral organizations, including the United States diplomatic missions to the European Union, African Union, Organization of American States, Arctic Council, and any other appropriate regional organization, and the United Nations and its relevant specialized agencies.

(C) Other posts as designated by the Secretary.
(3) RESPONSIBILITIES.—Each Climate Change Officer shall—

(A) provide expertise on effective approaches to—

(i) mitigate the emission of gases which contribute to global climate change and formulate national and global plans for reducing such gross and net emissions; and

(ii) reduce the detrimental impacts attributable to global climate change, and adapt to such impacts;

(B) engage and convene, in a manner that is equitable, inclusive, and just, with individuals and organizations which represent a government office, a nongovernmental organization, a social or political movement, a private sector entity, an educational or scientific institution, or any other entity concerned with—

(i) global climate change; the emission of gases which contribute to global climate change; or

(ii) reducing the detrimental impacts attributable to global climate change;
(C) facilitate engagement by United States entities in bilateral and multilateral cooperation on climate change; and

(D) carry out such other responsibilities as the Secretary may assign.

(4) Responsibilities of Under Secretary.—The Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment of the Department of State shall, including by acting through the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs of the Department of State—

(A) provide policy guidance to Climate Change Officers established under this subsection;

(B) develop relations with, consult with, and provide assistance to relevant individuals and organizations concerned with studying, mitigating, and adapting to global climate change, or reducing the emission of gases which contribute to global climate change; and

(C) assist officers and employees of regional bureaus of the Department of State to develop strategies and programs to promote studying, mitigating, and adapting to global cli-
mate change, or reducing the emission of gases which contribute to global climate change.

(g) ACTIONS BY CHIEFS OF MISSION.—Each chief of mission in a foreign country shall—

(1) develop, as part of annual joint strategic plans or equivalent program and policy planning, a strategy to promote actions to improve and increase studying, mitigating, and adapting to global climate change, or reducing the emission of gases which contribute to global climate change by—

(A) consulting and coordinating with and providing support to relevant individuals and organizations, including experts and other professionals and stakeholders on issues related to climate change; and

(B) holding periodic meetings with such relevant individuals and organizations relating to such strategy; and

(2) hold ongoing discussions with the officials and leaders of such country regarding progress to improve and increase studying, mitigating, and adapting to global climate change, or reducing the emission of gases which contribute to global climate change in a manner that is equitable, inclusive, and just in such country; and
(3) certify annually to the Secretary of State that to the maximum extent practicable, considerations related to climate change adaptation and mitigation, sustainability, and the environment were incorporated in activities, management, and operations of the United States embassy or other diplomatic post under the director of the chief of mission.

(h) Training.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall establish curriculum at the Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute that supplements political and economic reporting tradecraft courses in order to provide employees of the Department with specialized training with respect to studying, mitigating, and adapting to global climate change, or reducing the emission of gases which contribute to global climate change. Such training shall include the following:

(1) Awareness of the full range of national and subnational agencies, offices, personnel, statutory authorities, funds, and programs involved in the international commitments of the United States regarding global climate change and the emission of gases which contribute to global climate change, the science of global climate change, and methods for mitigating and adapting to global climate change.
(2) Awareness of methods for mitigating and adapting to global climate change and reducing the emission of gases which contribute to global climate change that are equitable, inclusive, and just.

(3) Familiarity with United States agencies, multilateral agencies, international financial institutions, and the network of donors providing assistance to mitigate and adapt to global climate change.

(4) Awareness of the most frequently announced goals and methods of the entities specified in subsection (f)(3)(B).

(i) CONTRACTING.—Contracting and agreements officers of the Department of State, and other United States embassy personnel responsible for contracts, grants, or acquisitions, shall receive training on evaluating proposals, solicitations, and bids, for considerations related to sustainability and adapting to or mitigating impacts from climate change.

(j) REPORTING.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and biennially thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes a detailed breakdown of posts at which staff are assigned the role of Climate Change Officer, the responsibilities to which
they have been assigned, and the strategies developed by
the chief of mission, as applicable.

(k) **CLIMATE CHANGE SUPPORT AND FINANCING.**—
The Secretary of State shall facilitate the coordination
among the Department of State and other relevant Fed-
eral departments and agencies toward contributing tech-
nical cooperation, engagement, development finance, or
foreign assistance relevant to United States international
climate action and in support of United States climate di-
plomacy.

(l) **SENSE OF CONGRESS.**—It is the sense of Congress
that climate diplomacy tools as described in this section
are critical for demonstrating the commitment to include
climate changes issues as core tenets of foreign policy pri-
orities, as well as preserving the United States' role as
a global leader on climate change action.

**SEC. 606. DRIVING A GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESIL-
IENCE STRATEGY.**

(a) **AMENDMENT.**—Section 117 of the Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151p) is amended—
(1) in subsection (b)—
(A) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(b)''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(2)(A) The President is authorized to furnish
assistance to programs and initiatives that—"
“(i) promote resilience among communities facing harmful impacts from climate change; and

“(ii) reduce the vulnerability of persons affected by climate change.

“(B) There shall be, in the Department of State, a Coordinator of Climate Change Resilience.”;

and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(d)(1) The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall establish a comprehensive, integrated, 10-year strategy, which shall be referred to as the ‘Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy’, to mitigate the impacts of climate change on displacement and humanitarian emergencies.

“(2) The Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy shall—

“(A) focus on addressing slow-onset and rapid-onset effects of events caused by climate change, consider the effects of events caused by climate change, and describe the key features of successful strategies to prevent such conditions;
“(B) include specific objectives and multisectoral approaches to the effects of events caused by climate change;

“(C) promote United States national security and economic interests while leading international climate-related policymaking efforts, on which the absence of United States leadership would lead to a substantial and harmful decline in the nation’s global competitiveness;

“(D) promote international instruments on climate action and other relevant international standards and best practices, as such standards and practices develop, that serve the interests of the American people and protect United States environmental resources and the planet;

“(E) promote the adoption and implementation of such international climate-related agreements, standards, and practices by foreign states;

“(F) work with United States allies and partners to ensure a level playing field exists when it comes to climate action and to encourage and assist foreign countries to make similar or even greater commitments than the United States;

“(G) describe approaches that ensure national leadership, as appropriate, and substantively engage
with civil society, local partners, and the affected communities, including marginalized populations and underserved populations, in the design, implementation, and monitoring of climate change programs to best safeguard the future of those subject to displacement;

“(H) assign roles for relevant Federal agencies to avoid duplication of efforts, while ensuring that—

“(i) the Department of State is responsible for—

“(I) leading the Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy;

“(II) establishing United States foreign policy;

“(III) advancing diplomatic and political efforts; and

“(IV) guiding security assistance and related civilian security efforts to mitigate climate change threats;

“(ii) the United States Agency for International Development is—

“(I) responsible for overseeing programs to prevent the effects of events caused by climate change;
“(II) the lead implementing agency
for development and related nonsecurity
program policy related to building resil-
ience and achieving recovery; and

“(III) responsible for providing over-
seas humanitarian assistance to respond to
international and internal displacement
caus.ed by climate change and to coordi-
nate the pursuit of durable solutions for
climate-displaced persons; and

“(iii) other Federal agencies support the
activities of the Department of State and the
United States Agency for International Devel-
opment, as appropriate, with the concurrence of
the Secretary of State and the Administrator of
the United States Agency for International De-
velopment;

“(I) describe programs that agencies will under-
take to achieve the stated objectives, including de-
scriptions of existing programs and funding by fiscal
year and account;

“(J) identify mechanisms to improve coordina-
tion between the United States, foreign govern-
ments, and international organizations, including the
World Bank, the United Nations, regional organizations, and private sector organizations;

“(K) address efforts to expand public-private partnerships and leverage private sector resources;

“(L) describe the criteria, metrics, and mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation of programs and objectives in the Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy;

“(M) describe how the Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy will ensure that programs are country-led and context-specific;

“(N) establish a program to monitor climate and social conditions to anticipate and prevent climate and environmental stressors from evolving into national security risks;

“(O) include an assessment of climate risks in the Department of State’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review; and

“(P) prioritize foreign aid, to the extent practicable, for international climate resilience in support of this Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy.

“(3) Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on For-
eign Affairs of the House of Representatives, based in part
on the information collected pursuant to this section, that
details the Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy.
The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
may include a classified annex, if necessary.

“(4) Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this subsection, the Secretary of State and
the Coordinator of Global Climate Change Resilience shall
brief the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives regarding the progress made by the Fed-
eral Government in implementing the Global Climate
Change Resilience Strategy.

“(5)(A) Not later than 270 days after the date of
the enactment of this subsection, and annually thereafter,
the Comptroller General of the United States, in coopera-
tion and consultation with the Secretary of State, shall
produce a report evaluating the progress that the Federal
Government has made toward incorporating climate
change into department and agency policies, including the
resources that have been allocated for such purpose.

“(B) The report required under subparagraph (A)
shall assess—
“(i) the degree to which the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) are—

“(I) developing climate change risk assessments; and

“(II) providing guidance to missions on how to include climate change risks in their integrated country strategies;

“(ii) whether the Department of State and USAID have sufficient resources to fulfill the requirements described in paragraph (2); and

“(iii) any areas in which the Department of State and USAID may lack sufficient resources to fulfill such requirements.”.

(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy.

SEC. 607. ADDRESSING INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION, ADAPTATION, AND SECURITY.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(2) Most vulnerable communities and populations.—The term “most vulnerable communities and populations” means communities and populations that are at risk of substantial adverse effects of climate change and have limited capacity to respond to such effects, including women, impoverished communities, children, indigenous peoples, and informal workers.

(3) Most vulnerable developing countries.—The term “most vulnerable developing countries” means, as determined by the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, developing countries that are at risk of substantial adverse effects of climate change and have limited capacity to respond to such effects, considering the approaches included in any international treaties and agreements.

(4) Program.—The term “Program” means the International Climate Change Adaptation, Mitigation, and Security Program established pursuant to subsection (c).

(b) Purpose.—The purpose of this section is to provide authorities for additional, new, current, and ongoing bilateral and regional international development assistance, and, as appropriate, to leverage private resources,
in support of host country driven projects, planning, policies, and initiatives designed to improve the ability of host countries—

(1) to primarily produce reliable renewable energy and reduce or mitigate carbon emissions from the power sector while facilitating the transition in key global markets from electricity generated from fossil fuel power to low-cost clean energy sources, in a manner that is equitable for workers and communities;

(2) to adapt and become more resilient to current and forecasted effects of climate change; and

(3) to employ—

(A) sustainable land use practices that mitigate desertification and reduce greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation; and

(B) agricultural production practices that reduce poverty while improving soil health, protecting water quality, and increasing food security and nutrition.

(c) Establishment of Program.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), shall establish a
program, to be known as the “International Climate Change Adaptation, Mitigation, and Security Program”, to provide bilateral and regional assistance to developing countries for programs, projects, and activities described in subsection (e).

(d) Supplement Not Supplant.—Assistance provided under this section shall be used to supplement, and not to supplant, any other Federal, State, or local resources available to carry out activities that fit the characteristics of the Program.

(e) Policy.—It shall be the policy of the United States to ensure that the Program provides resources to developing countries, particularly the most vulnerable communities and populations in such countries, to support the development and implementation of programs, projects, and activities that—

(1) reduce greenhouse gas emissions through the integration and deployment of clean energy, including transmission, distribution, and interconnections to renewable energy, while facilitating the transition from electricity generated from fossil fuel power to low-cost renewable energy sources, in a manner that is equitable for workers and communities;
(2) address financial or other barriers to the widespread deployment of clean energy technologies that reduce, sequester, or avoid greenhouse gas emissions;

(3) improve the availability, viability, and accessibility of zero emission vehicles, including support for design and development of transportation networks and land use practices that mitigate carbon emissions in the transportation sector;

(4) support building capacities that may include—

(A) developing and implementing methodologies and programs for measuring greenhouse gas emissions and verifying emissions mitigation, including building capacities to conduct emissions inventories and meet reporting requirements under the Paris Agreement;

(B) assessing, developing, and implementing technology and policy options for greenhouse gas emissions mitigation and avoidance of future emissions, including sector-based and cross-sector mitigation strategies;

(C) enhancing the technical capacity of regulatory authorities, planning agencies, and related institutions in developing countries to
improve the deployment of clean energy technologies and practices, including through increased transparency;

(D) training and instruction regarding the installation and maintenance of renewable energy technologies; and

(E) activities that support the development and implementation of frameworks for intellectual property rights in developing countries;

(5) improve resilience, sustainable economic growth, and adaptation capacities in response to the effects of climate change;

(6) promote appropriate job training and access to new job opportunities in new economic sectors and industries that emerge due to the transition from fossil fuel energy to clean energy;

(7) reduce the vulnerability and increase the resilience capacities of communities to the effects of climate change, including effects on—

(A) water availability;

(B) agricultural productivity and food security;

(C) flood risk;

(D) coastal resources;

(E) biodiversity;
(F) economic livelihoods;
(G) health and diseases;
(H) housing and shelter; and
(I) human migration;

(8) help countries and communities adapt to changes in the environment through enhanced community planning, preparedness, and growth strategies that take into account current and forecasted regional and localized effects of climate change;

(9) conserve and restore natural resources, ecosystems, and biodiversity threatened by the effects of climate change to ensure such resources, ecosystems, and biodiversity are healthy and continue to provide natural protections from the effects of climate change such as extreme weather;

(10) provide resources, information, scientific data and modeling, innovative best practices, and technical assistance to support vulnerable developing countries to adapt to the effects of climate change;

(11) promote sustainable and climate-resilient societies, including through improvements to make critical infrastructure less vulnerable to the effects of climate change;

(12) encourage the adoption of policies and measures, including sector-based and cross-sector
policies and measures, that substantially reduce, se-
quester, or avoid greenhouse gas emissions from the
domestic energy and transportation sectors of devel-
oping countries;

(13) reduce deforestation and land degradation
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and implement
sustainable forestry practices;

(14) promote sustainable land use activities, in-
cluding supporting development planning, design,
and construction with respect to transportation sys-
tems and land use;

(15) promote sustainable agricultural practices
that mitigate carbon emissions, conserve soil, and
improve food and water security of communities;

(16) foster partnerships with private sector en-
tities and nongovernmental international develop-
ment organizations to assist with developing solu-
tions and economic opportunities that support
projects, planning, policies, and initiatives described
in subsection (b);

(17) provide technical assistance and strengthen
capacities of developing countries to meet the goals
of the conditional nationally determined contribu-
tions of those countries;
(18) establish investment channels designed to leverage private sector financing in—

(A) clean energy;

(B) sustainable agriculture and natural resource management; and

(C) the transportation sector as described in paragraph (3); and

(19) provide technical assistance and support for non-extractive activities that provide alternative economic growth opportunities while preserving critical habitats and natural carbon sinks.

(f) PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Administrator of USAID, in consultation with other Federal departments and agencies, shall provide assistance under the Program—

(A) in the form of bilateral assistance pursuant to the requirements under subsection (g);

(B) to multilateral funds or international institutions with programs for climate mitigation or adaptation in developing countries consistent with the policy described in subsection (e); or

(C) through a combination of the mechanisms specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B).
(2) LIMITATION.—

(A) CONDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION TO MULTILATERAL FUNDS OR INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS.—In any fiscal year, the Administrator of USAID may provide up to 40 percent of the assistance available to carry out the Program to 1 or more multilateral funds or international institutions that meet the requirements of subparagraph (B).

(B) MULTILATERAL FUND OR INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTION ELIGIBILITY.—A multilateral fund or international institution is eligible to receive assistance under subparagraph (A)—

(i) if—

(I) such fund or institution is established pursuant to—

(aa) the Convention; or

(bb) an agreement negotiated under the Convention; or

(II) the assistance is directed to 1 or more multilateral funds or international development institutions, pursuant to an agreement negotiated under the Convention; and
(ii) if such fund or institution—

(I) specifies the terms and conditions under which the United States is to provide assistance to the fund or institution, and under which the fund or institution is to provide assistance to recipient countries;

(II) ensures that assistance from the United States to the fund or institution and the principal and income of the fund or institution are disbursed only—

(aa) to support projects, planning, policies, and initiatives described in subsection (b);

(bb) consistent with the policy described in subsection (e); and

(cc) in regular consultation with relevant governing bodies of the fund or institution that—

(AA) include representation from countries among the most vulnerable developing countries; and
(BB) provide public access.

(C) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—The Secretary of State, the Administrator of USAID, or the Secretary of the Treasury shall notify the appropriate congressional committees not later than 15 days before providing assistance to a multilateral fund or international institution under this subsection.

(3) LOCAL CONSULTATIONS.—Programs, projects, and activities supported by assistance provided under this subsection shall require consultations with local communities, particularly the most vulnerable communities and populations in such communities, and indigenous peoples in areas in which any programs, projects, or activities are planned to engage such communities and peoples through adequate disclosure of information, public participation, and consultation, including full consideration of the interdependence of vulnerable communities and ecosystems to promote the resilience of local communities.

(g) BILATERAL ASSISTANCE.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Except to the extent inconsistent with this subsection, the administrative au-
authorities under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) shall apply to the implementation of this subsection to the same extent and in the same manner as such authorities apply to the implementation of such Act in order to provide the Administrator of USAID with the authority to provide assistance to countries, including the most vulnerable developing countries, for programs, projects, and activities consistent with the purposes described in subsection (b) and the policy described in subsection (e).

(2) CONSIDERATIONS.—In carrying out this subsection, the Administrator shall ensure that—

(A) the environmental impact of proposed programs, projects, and activities is considered through adequate consultation, public participation, and public disclosure of relevant information; and

(B) programs, projects, and activities under this subsection—

(i) avoid environmental degradation, to the maximum extent practicable; and

(ii) are aligned, to the maximum extent practicable, with broader development, poverty alleviation, or natural resource
management objectives and initiatives in
the recipient country.

(3) COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT.—The Adminis-
trator shall seek to ensure that—

(A) local communities, particularly the
most vulnerable communities and populations in
areas in which any programs, projects, or ac-
tivities are carried out under this subsection,
are engaged in the design, implementation,
monitoring, and evaluation of such programs,
projects, and activities through disclosure of in-
formation, public participation, and consulta-
tion; and

(B) the needs and interests of the most
vulnerable communities and populations are ad-
dressed in national or regional climate change
adaptation plans developed with USAID sup-
port.

(4) CONSULTATION AND DISCLOSURE.—For
each country receiving assistance under this sub-
section, the Administrator shall establish a process
for consultation with, and disclosure of information
to, local, national, and international stakeholders re-
arding any programs, projects, or activities carried
out under this subsection.
(h) Authorization of Appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section $2,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 and each fiscal year thereafter.

SEC. 608. REDUCING THE NEGATIVE IMPACTS FROM BLACK CARBON, METHANE, AND HIGH-GWP HYDROFLUOROCARBONS.

(a) Definition.—In this section, the term “high-GWP HFC” means newly manufactured hydrofluorocarbons with a global warming potential calculated over a 100-year period of greater than 150, as described in the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

(b) In General.—The President shall direct the United States representatives to appropriate international bodies and conferences to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States, consistent with the broad foreign policy goals of the United States, to advocate that each such body or conference—

(1) commit to significantly increasing efforts to reduce black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC;

(2) invest in and develop alternative energy sources, industrial and agricultural processes, appliances, and products to replace sources of black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC;
(3) enhance coordination with the private sector—

(A) to increase production and distribution of clean energy alternatives, industrial processes, and products that will replace sources of black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC;

(B) to develop action plans to mitigate black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC from various private sector operations;

(C) to encourage best technology, methods, and management practices for reducing black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC;

(D) to craft specific financing mechanisms for the incremental costs associated with mitigating black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC pollutants; and

(E) to grow economic opportunities and develop markets, as appropriate, for reducing black carbon, methane, tropospheric ozone, and hydrofluorocarbons;

(4) provide technical assistance to foreign regulatory authorities and governments to remove unnecessary barriers to investment in short-lived climate mitigation solutions, including—
(A) the use of safe and affordable clean energy;

(B) the implementation of policies requiring industrial and agricultural best practices for capturing or mitigating the release of methane from extractive, agricultural, and industrial processes; and

(C) climate assessment, scientific research, monitoring, and technological development activities;

(5) develop and implement clear, accountable, and metric-based targets to measure the effectiveness of projects described in paragraph (4); and

(6) engage international partners in an existing multilateral forum (or, if necessary, establish through an international agreement a new multilateral forum) to improve global cooperation for—

(A) creating tangible metrics for evaluating efforts to reduce black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC;

(B) developing and implementing best practices for phasing out sources of black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC, including expanding capacity for innovative instruments to mitigate black carbon, methane, and high-
GWP HFC at the national and subnational levels of foreign countries, particularly countries with little capacity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and deploy clean energy facilities, and countries that lack sufficient policies to advance such development;

(C) encouraging the development of standards and practices, and increasing transparency and accountability efforts for the reduction of black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC;

(D) integrating tracking and monitoring systems into industrial processes;

(E) fostering research to improve scientific understanding of—

(i) how high concentrations of black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC affect human health, safety, and our environment;

(ii) changes in the amount and regional concentrations of black carbon and methane emissions, based on scientific modeling and forecasting;

(iii) effective means to sequester black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC; and
(iv) other related areas of research the United States representatives deem necessary;

(F) encouraging the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other international finance organizations—

(i) to prioritize efforts to combat black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC; and

(ii) to enhance transparency by providing sufficient and adequate information to facilitate independent verification of their climate finance reporting;

(G) encouraging observers of the Arctic Council (including India and China) to adopt mitigation plans consistent with the findings and recommendations of the Arctic Council’s Framework for Action on Black Carbon and Methane;

(H) collaborating on technological advances in black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC pollutant mitigation, sequestration and reduction technologies; and

(I) advising foreign countries, at both the national and subnational levels, regarding the
development and execution of regulatory poli-
cies, services, and laws pertaining to reducing
the creation and the collection and safe man-
agement of black carbon, methane, and high-
GWP HFC.

c) Enhancing International Outreach and
Partnership of United States Agencies Involved
in Greenhouse Gas Reductions.—

(1) Finding.—Congress recognizes the success
of the United States Climate Alliance and the green-
house gas reduction programs and strategies estab-
lished by the Environmental Protection Agency’s
Center for Corporate Climate Leadership.

(2) Authorization of Efforts to Build
Foreign Partnerships.—The Secretary of State
shall work with the Administrator of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency to build partnerships, as
appropriate, with the governments of foreign coun-
tries and to support international efforts to reduce
black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC.

d) Negotiation of New International Agree-
ments and Reassertion of Targets in Existing
Agreements.—Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall sub-
mit a report to Congress that—
(1) assesses the potential for negotiating new international agreements, new targets within existing international agreements or cooperative bodies, and the creation of a new international forum to mitigate globally black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC to support the efforts described in subsection (b);

(2) describes the provisions that could be included in such agreements;

(3) assesses potential parties to such agreements;

(4) describes a process for reengaging with Canada and Mexico regarding the methane targets agreed to at the 2016 North American Leaders’ Summit; and

(5) describes a process for reengaging with the countries of the Arctic Council regarding the methane and black carbon targets that were negotiated in 2015 through the Framework for Action.

e) CONSIDERATION OF BLACK CARBON, METHANE, AND HIGH-GWP HFC IN NEGOTIATING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS.—In negotiating any relevant international agreement with any country or countries after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall—

(1) consider the impact black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC are having on the increase in
global average temperatures and the resulting global climate change;

(2) consider the effects that climate change is having on the environment; and

(3) ensure that the agreement strengthens efforts to eliminate black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC from such country or countries.

(f) PLAN TO REDUCE BLACK CARBON EMISSIONS FROM SHIPS.—Consistent with strategies adopted by the International Maritime Organization to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from ships, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard, shall develop a comprehensive plan to reduce black carbon emissions from ships based on appropriate emissions data from oceangoing vessels. The plan shall provide for such reduction through—

(1) a clean freight partnership;

(2) limits on black carbon emissions; and

(3) efforts that include protection of access to critical fuel shipments and emergency needs of coastal communities.

(g) ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON BLACK CARBON, METHANE, AND HIGH-GWP HFC POLLUTANT MITIGATION.—
(1) **ESTABLISHMENT.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall establish a task force, to be known as the Interagency Working Group on Black Carbon, Methane, and High-GWP HFC Pollutant Mitigation.

(2) **MEMBERSHIP.**—The members of the Working Group shall include the head (or a designee thereof) of each relevant Federal agency.

(3) **DUTIES.**—The Working Group shall—

(A) not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes specific plans of each relevant Federal agency—

(B) look for opportunities with other countries to promote alternatives to high-GWP HFC, and transition over time to equipment that uses safer and more sustainable alternatives to high-GWP HFC;

(C) review the policy recommendations made by—

(i) the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change;

(ii) the United States Climate Alliance;
(iii) the Interagency Strategy to Reduce Methane Emissions;

(iv) the Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience;

(v) the Clean Cooking Alliance;

(vi) the International Maritime Organization; and

(vii) other relevant organizations and institutions; and

(D) develop an action plan to reduce black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC pollutants that incorporates any appropriate proposals or recommendations made by the entities referred to in subparagraph (C).

SEC. 609. BUILDING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION THROUGH THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND.

(a) Green Climate Fund.—

(1) Findings.—Congress finds that—

(A) climate change most severely impacts vulnerable and disadvantaged communities in the United States and around the world;

(B) it is the responsibility of the United States Government to work with and press
other countries to address environmental justice and climate justice;

(C) the report of the United Nations Environment Programme entitled “Climate Change and the Cost of Capital in Developing Countries”, dated May 2018, found that, in the 10 years prior to the publication of the report, climate vulnerability has cost the 20 nations most affected by catastrophes rooted in climate change an additional $62,000,000,000 in interest payments alone;

(D) individuals and families, particularly communities of color, indigenous communities, and low-income communities, that are on the frontlines of climate change across the globe are often in close proximity to environmental stressors or sources of pollution;

(E) the communities described in subparagraph (D)—

(i) are often the first exposed to the causes and impacts of climate change; and

(ii) have the fewest resources with which to mitigate those impacts or to relocate;
(F) all efforts to adapt to and mitigate climate change must include specific protections for and acknowledgment of the harm of climate change to communities of color, indigenous peoples, women, and other frontline communities and marginalized peoples around the world;

(G) in Paris, on December 12, 2015, the parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change adopted the Paris Agreement, a benchmark agreement—

(i) to combat climate change;

(ii) to accelerate and intensify the actions and investments needed for a sustainable low carbon future; and

(iii) that acknowledges, “Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity”;}
(H) the Paris Agreement—

(i) notes the importance of “climate justice” when mitigating and adapting to climate change; and

(ii) recognizes “the need for an effective and progressive response to the urgent threat of climate change”;

(I) it is imperative for all countries to undertake mitigation activities to rapidly meet the goal of limiting global warming to not more than 1.5 degrees Celsius;

(J) developed countries have the greatest capacity to mitigate their greenhouse gas emissions, while—

(i) developing countries have the least capacity to engage in mitigation activities; and

(ii) the capacity of developing countries to engage in mitigation activities is less than the national mitigation potential of those developing countries;

(K) the determination for the fair share of mitigation and adaptation activities for each country must take into account—
(i) the historic greenhouse gas emissions of each country; and

(ii) the current capacity of each country to both mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to climate impacts;

(L) developed countries that have historically emitted a disproportionately high share of greenhouse gas emissions, and reaped the economic benefits of those polluting activities, have a corresponding disproportionately greater responsibility to engage in global mitigation and adaptation activities, as compared to less industrialized countries that have historically polluted far less;

(M) the only realistic way for less industrialized countries to meet their full mitigation potential is through international climate financing by more developed countries;

(N) in the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, developed countries committed to jointly mobilize, starting in 2020, $100,000,000,000 per year in public climate financing (as well as private investment and other alternative forms of finance), for developing countries, a commitment reaffirmed in 2015 in Decision 1/CP.21 of the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement;

(O) the $100,000,000,000 commitment described in subparagraph (N) was a political compromise that falls short of the actual financing needs for climate action in developing countries;

(P) Bloomberg New Energy Finance has estimated that the transition to renewable energy sources in developing countries will require hundreds of billions of dollars annually;

(Q) the United Nations Environment Programme has estimated that adaptation needs relating to climate change in developing countries may be as much as $300,000,000,000 annually by 2030;

(R) the Green Climate Fund was created in 2010 by 194 countries to serve as a crucial financing mechanism to help developing countries limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to climate change;

(S) in 2015, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change agreed that the Green Climate Fund should serve the goals of the Paris Agreement, which states that
“developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention”;

(T) the Green Climate Fund is an essential institution for climate financing, as the Green Climate Fund ensures—

(i) balanced governance between developed and developing countries;

(ii) stakeholder engagement and discourse;

(iii) a balanced approach between mitigation and adaptation;

(iv) fair and equal labor and working conditions;

(v) conservation of biodiversity and critical habitats; and

(vi) strong environmental, social, and gender protections;

(U) the Green Climate Fund—

(i) promotes and protects human rights and the rights of marginalized groups, including indigenous peoples,
women, children, and people with disabilities; and

(ii) continues to take steps to strengthen protection for marginalized groups;

(iii) the United States committed $3,000,000,000 of the first $10,000,000,000 raised for the initial resource mobilization period of the Green Climate Fund, though only 1/3 of this pledge was fulfilled, leaving the United States the only country to fall substantially short of a commitment of a country to the Green Climate Fund; and

(V) the Green Climate Fund is a fully operational and proven institution supporting well over 100 projects and programs in developing countries around the world.

(2) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to provide climate financing—

(A) as an essential part of the global effort to combat climate change; and

(B) that—

(i) upholds the principles of environmental justice and climate justice;
(ii) supports programs and projects developed by recipient countries and communities;

(iii) is designed and implemented with the free, prior, and informed consent of indigenous peoples and other impacted communities;

(iv) promotes gender equality as essential in all of the projects and programs supported by climate financing;

(v) includes best practices for environmental and social safeguards to ensure that projects and programs supported by climate financing respect fundamental human rights; and

(vi) addresses both mitigation and adaptation as essential aspects of responding to climate change.

(b) Authorization of Appropriations.—There are authorized to be appropriated for contributions to the Green Climate Fund $4,000,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2022 and 2023.

(e) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the climate financing needs to achieve the greenhouse gas emissions reductions required to keep the
planet at or below 1.5 degrees Celsius of global warming
are significantly greater than the amount of funds author-
ized to be appropriated under subsection (a).

SEC. 610. ENSURING A WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
TO CLIMATE ACTION.

(a) Establishment.—The Secretary of State shall
establish a Climate Impacts Task Force (referred to in
this section as the “Task Force”) with the mandate to—

(1) monitor climate and related impacted social
conditions to anticipate and prevent climate and en-
vironmental stressors from evolving into national se-
curity risks;

(2) monitor and assess climate action under-
taken by other countries in response to national
strategies and international commitments, and co-
ordinate closely with allies and partners to ensure a
coordinated response against any state or non-state
actors, including the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) and PRC companies, undermining global cli-
mate objectives, norms, and practices.

(2) strengthen the efforts of the Department of
State and the United States Government to act
proactively to mitigate the human harms and poten-
tial for national security risks resulting from emerg-
ing events exacerbated by climate change; and
(3) assist other Federal departments and agencies, foreign partners, and multilateral organizations in their efforts to do the same.

(b) **LEADERSHIP.**—The Secretary of State shall designate a senior career official, as appropriate, of the Department of State to serve as the Chair of the Task Force. Such official shall report to the Secretary of State.

(c) **RESPONSIBILITIES.**—Under the direction of the Chair, the Task Force shall—

(1) meet regularly to ensure that events exacerbated by climate change and the risk of emerging events exacerbated by climate change throughout the world are adequately considered and addressed;

(2) facilitate the development and execution of policies and tools to enhance the capacity of the United States to prevent and respond to emerging events exacerbated by climate change worldwide;

(3) monitor developments throughout the world that heighten the risk of emerging events exacerbated by climate change;

(5) identify gaps in United States foreign policy related to the prevention of and response to emerging events exacerbated by climate change with respect to certain regions or particular countries;
(6) incorporate lessons learned from past United States efforts to prevent and respond to emerging events exacerbated by climate change and other impacts that are comparable in scope or severity;

(7) provide the Secretary of State with recommendations and potential improvements to policies, programs, resources, and tools related to the prevention of and response to emerging events exacerbated by climate change;

(8) coordinate the Department of State’s engagement in interagency processes led by the National Security Council that share the Task Force’s objectives;

(9) conduct outreach not less frequently than biannually, with representatives of nongovernmental organizations dedicated to the prevention of and response to emerging events exacerbated by climate change and other appropriate parties, to—

(A) receive assistance relating to the Task Force’s efforts to address emerging events exacerbated by climate change and develop new or improved policies, programs, resources, and tools; and
(B) provide a public understanding of the work of the Task Force;

(10) in carrying out paragraphs (1) through (9), focus on particular ways for the United States to develop, strengthen, and enhance its capabilities to—

(A) monitor, receive early warning of, and coordinate responses to potential emerging events exacerbated by climate change;

(B) engage allies and partners, including multilateral and regional institutions, to build capacities and mobilize action for preventing and responding to emerging events exacerbated by climate change;

(C) encourage the deployment of civilian advisors to prevent and respond to emerging events exacerbated by climate change;

(D) increase the capacity of and develop doctrine for the United States Foreign Service, civil service, Armed Forces, development professionals, and other actors to engage in the full spectrum of activities to prevent and respond to emerging events exacerbated by climate change;

(E) develop and implement tailored foreign assistance programs that address and mitigate
the risks of emerging events exacerbated by climate change;

(F) ensure intelligence collection, analysis, and sharing of appropriate information; and

(G) address any other issues that the Task Force determines appropriate;

(11) in carrying out paragraphs (1) through (9), receive support from bureaus and offices of the Department of State, as the Secretary of State determines appropriate; and

(12) facilitate annual coordination between the Department of State and other appropriate departments and agencies to ensure international and domestic climate change objectives are aligned.

(d) COMPOSITION.—The Task Force shall—

(1) seek to ensure that its efforts complement and support interagency processes led by the National Security Council that share the Task Force’s objectives; and

(2) operate with regular consultation and participation of designated representatives, at the Assistant Secretary level or higher, from all such executive departments, agencies, or offices as the Chair may designate.
(e) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and every 2 years thereafter for the following 10 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Task Force, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives an unclassified report, with a classified annex if necessary, that includes—

(1) a review, in consultation with the designated representatives specified in subsection (d), consisting of—

(A) an evaluation of the efficacy of current efforts based on United States and locally identified indicators, including capacities and constraints for United States Government-wide detection, early warning and response, information-sharing, contingency planning, and coordination of efforts to prevent and respond to emerging events exacerbated by climate change;

(B) an assessment of the funding expended by relevant Federal departments and agencies on emerging events exacerbated by climate change and the legal, procedural, and resource constraints faced by the Department of State.
and the United States Agency for International Development throughout respective budgeting, strategic planning, and management cycles to support the prevention of and response to emerging events exacerbated by climate change;

(C) current annual global assessments of emerging events exacerbated by climate change;

(D) recommendations to further strengthen United States capabilities described in sub-paragraph (A); and

(E) consideration of analysis, reporting, and policy recommendations by civil society, academic, and other nongovernmental organizations and institutions to prevent and respond to emerging events exacerbated by climate change;

(2) recommendations to ensure shared responsibility by—

(A) enhancing multilateral mechanisms for preventing, mitigating, and responding to emerging events exacerbated by climate change; and

(B) strengthening regional organizations; and
(3) the implementation status of the recommenda-
12 tions included in the review under para-
13 graph (1).

(f) BRIEFINGS AND MATERIALS.—The Chair and
15 members of the Task Force shall, not less frequently than
16 annually, provide briefings and materials to the Com-
17 mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Com-
18 mittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(g) REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTEL-
19 LIGENCE.—The Director of National Intelligence is en-
20 couraged to include, in his or her annual (or more often
21 as appropriate) unclassified testimony, accompanied by a
22 classified annex, if necessary, to Congress on threats to
23 United States national security—

(1) a review of countries and regions at risk of
24 emerging events exacerbated by climate change; and

(2) whenever possible, specific identification of
25 countries and regions at immediate risk of emerging
26 events exacerbated by climate change.

(h) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
28 gress that rapid and robust climate change response mech-
29 anisms, including the establishment of the Task Force, are
30 critical for ensuring other countries remain accountable to
31 their climate action commitments as well as preserving the
SEC. 611. WORKING WITH INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS TO REDUCE DEFORESTATION.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is having a substantial impact on the most important forest ecosystems in the world, and illegal logging and agricultural expansion have caused the massive forest loss. According to the World Resources Institute, the PRC has become the world’s leading importer and consumer of timber products, soybeans, and palm oil, as well as the largest manufacturing and export country of forest products.

(2) In 2016, the PRC imported logs from more than 100 countries in the world. According to a Global Witness report, between January 2013 and April 2020, Chinese financial institutions provided more than $22.5 billion to major companies that produce and trade commodities at high risk of driving deforestation. These commodities include beef, soy, palm oil, paper, pulp, rubber, and timber.

(3) Further, the growing international demand for such agricultural commodities causes the majority of deforestation emissions globally, and most of
the associated land-clearing violates applicable na-
tional or local laws. According to a 2021 Forest
Trends report, at least 69 percent of forest land con-
verted to pasture or cropland was cleared illegally.

(4) The growing demand for timber and agri-
cultural commodities has accelerated
unsustainable—and often illegal—logging and the
trade of timber products, which harms the countries
in which it takes place by siphoning away govern-
ment tax revenue, transforming the livelihoods of
communities dependent on forests, and hurting legal
businesses’ competitiveness. Further, illegal logging
and illegal conversion of forest to agricultural land
threatens biodiversity and accelerates deforestation
and forest degradation in key timber supply coun-
tries, undermining United States and global climate
goals.

(5) The United States should work with inter-
national partners to ensure that Chinese and other
banks factor into lending practices the environ-
mental and social impact of the companies they fi-
nance. This should include pressuring the PRC and
other countries to revise regulations to require the
banking sector not to finance companies linked to
deforestation and include rigorous checks on the
companies operating in sectors or regions where there is a high risk of deforestation to ensure they are not associated with deforestation.

(b) **Definitions.**—In this section:

1. **Administrator.**—Except as otherwise expressly provided, the term “Administrator” means the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development.

2. **Deforestation.**—The term “deforestation” means a change in land use from a forest (including peatlands) to any other land use.

3. **Developing country.**—The term “developing country” means a country eligible to receive official development assistance according to the income guidelines of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

4. **Emissions reductions.**—The term “emissions reductions” means greenhouse gas emissions reductions achieved from reduced or avoided deforestation under this section.

5. **Forest.**—

   (A) **In general.**—The term “forest” means a terrestrial ecosystem, including wetland forests, comprised of native tree species
generated and maintained primarily through
natural ecological and evolutionary processes.

(B) EXCLUSION.—The term “forest” does
not include plantations, such as crops of trees
planted by humans primarily for the purposes
of harvesting.

(6) FOREST DEGRADATION.—The term “forest
degradation” is any reduction in the carbon stock of
a forest due to the effects of human land-use activi-
ties, including such land-use activities on peatlands.

(7) INTACT FOREST.—The term “intact forest”
means an unbroken expanse of natural ecosystems
within the global extent of forest cover that—

(A) covers an area of at least 500 square
kilometers and is at least 10 kilometers in each
direction; and

(B) contains forest and non-forest eco-
systems minimally influenced by human eco-
omic activity and large enough that all native
biodiversity, including viable populations of
wide-ranging species, could be maintained.

(9) LEAKAGE.—The term “leakage” means the
unexpected loss of anticipated carbon benefits due to
the displacement of activities in a project area to
areas outside the project, resulting in carbon emissions.

(10) **Leakage Prevention Activities.**—The term “leakage prevention activities” means activities in developing countries that are directed at preserving existing forest carbon stocks, including forested wetlands and peatlands that might, absent such activities, be lost through leakage.

(11) **National Deforestation Reduction Activities.**—The term “national deforestation reduction activities” means activities in developing countries that reduce a quantity of greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation that is calculated by measuring actual emissions against a national deforestation baseline established pursuant to subparagraphs (B) and (C) of subsection (d)(4).

(12) **Subnational Deforestation and Forest Degradation Reduction Activities.**—The term “subnational deforestation and forest degradation reduction activities” means activities in developing countries that reduce a quantity of greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation that is calculated by measuring actual emissions using an appropriate baseline, or an alternative de-
terminated under subsection (d)(4)(B)(ii), established by the Administrator at the State or provincial level.

(c) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this section are to provide United States assistance to developing countries to develop, implement, and improve actions that reduce deforestation and forest degradation or conserve or restore forest ecosystems—

(1) to protect the value of forest ecosystems with respect to permanent carbon capture and sequestration in a manner in which such value is measurable, reportable, and verifiable; and

(2) in a manner that—

(A) is consistent with and enhances the implementation of complementary United States policies that support the good governance of forests, biodiversity conservation, and environmentally sustainable development;

(B) takes into consideration the views and participation of local communities and most vulnerable communities and populations, particularly forest-dependent communities; and

(C) incorporates the right to free prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples.

(d) EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS THROUGH REDUCED D EFORESTATION.—
(1) Establishment of Program.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator, in consultation with other appropriate agencies, shall establish a program to provide assistance to reduce deforestation in developing countries and its impacts, in accordance with this section.

(2) Objectives.—The objectives of the program established under paragraph (1) shall be—

(A) to achieve—

(i) emissions reductions of at least 7,000,000,000 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent in 2025;

(ii) cumulative emissions reductions of at least 11,000,000,000 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent by December 31, 2030; and

(iii) additional emissions reductions in subsequent years;

(B) to build capacity to reduce deforestation at a national level in developing countries experiencing deforestation, which may include—

(i) preparing developing countries to participate in international markets for
international offset credits for reduced emissions from deforestation;

(ii) supporting the development of overseas domestic policy frameworks to ensure effective, efficient, and equitable benefit-sharing of the proceeds of such credits issued by national and subnational governments; and

(iii) promoting and expanding land titling initiatives and programs in other countries;

(C) to preserve forest carbon stocks in countries where such forest carbon may be vulnerable to leakage, particularly in developing countries with largely intact native forests;

(D) to build the scientific knowledge and institutional capacity to help developing countries—

(i) monitor the effects of climate change on their forests;

(ii) develop and implement strategies to conserve their forests; and

(iii) support forest-dependent communities adapt to climate change;
(E) to the extent practicable, to reduce deforestation in ways that reduce the vulnerability and increase the resilience to climate effects for forests and forest-dependent communities;

(F) to prevent degradation and fragmentation of forests and other intact ecosystems, particularly in tropical countries, including by providing assistance or supporting policies to—

(i) conserve, protect, and restore the integrity of such ecosystems; and

(ii) support the rights of Indigenous People and local communities and their ability to continue their effective stewardship of their intact traditional lands and territories;

(G) to build capacity to address illegal deforestation for agricultural commodities; and

(H) to remove subsidies that favor deforestation;

(e) REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERNATIONAL DEFORESTATION REDUCTION PROGRAM.—

(1) ELIGIBLE COUNTRIES.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Administrator may pro-
provide assistance under this section only with re-
spect to a developing country that—

(i) the Administrator, in consultation
with other appropriate agencies, deter-
mines—

(I) is experiencing deforestation
or forest degradation; or

(II) has standing forest carbon
stocks that may be at risk of deforest-
ation or degradation;

(ii) has the legal regimes, standards,
and safeguards to ensure that the rights
and interests of indigenous peoples and
forest-dependent communities are pro-
tected in accordance with the standards es-
tablished under paragraph (4); and

(iii) has entered into a bilateral or
multilateral agreement or arrangement
with the United States, or is part of an
international program supported by the
United States to prevent deforestation,
that establishes the conditions of participa-
tion by the country in the program estab-
lished under this section, which shall in-
clude an agreement to meet the standards
established under paragraph (4) for the activities to which such standards apply.

(B) EXCEPTION.—A developing country that does not meet the requirement described in paragraph (1)(A)(ii) may receive assistance under this section for the purpose of building capacity to meet such requirement.

(2) AUTHORIZED ACTIVITIES.—Subject to the requirements of this section, in providing assistance under this section, the Administrator may support activities to achieve the objectives described in subsection (c)(2), such as—

(A) national deforestation reduction activities;

(B) subnational deforestation and forest degradation reduction activities, including pilot activities, policies, and measures that reduce greenhouse gas emissions and are subject to significant uncertainty;

(C) activities to measure, monitor, and verify deforestation, avoided deforestation, and rates of deforestation, including, if applicable, spatially explicit land use plans that identify intact and primary forest areas and managed forest areas;
(D) leakage prevention activities;

(E) the development and implementation
of measurement, monitoring, reporting, and
verification capacities and governance struc-
tures, including legal regimes, standards, proc-
esses, and safeguards, as established under
paragraph (4), to enable a country to quantify
emissions reductions for purposes of purchasing
or trading subnational emissions reduction cred-
its in carbon markets;

(F) the identification of, and actions to ad-
dress, the drivers of land use emissions;

(G) programs that would exclude from the
United States illegally harvested timber or
products made from illegally harvested timber,
in accordance with and consistent with the ob-
jectives of the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981
(16 U.S.C. 3371 et seq.);

(H) the development and strengthening of
governance capacities to reduce deforestation
and other land use emissions and to combat il-
legal logging and associated trade, including the
development of systems for independent moni-
toring of the efficacy of forest law enforcement
and increased enforcement cooperation, includ-
ing joint efforts with Federal agencies, to enforce the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981 (16 U.S.C. 3371 et seq.);

(I) programs to help countries strengthen the necessary governance and technological capacity to trace and make publicly available the origin of agricultural commodities associated with tropical deforestation, such as beef, soy, palm oil, paper, pulp, cocoa, and rubber;

(J) the development and strengthening of governance capacities and associated implementation activities to combat illegal deforestation related to the production of agricultural commodities, such as those described in subparagraph (I);

(K) the provision of incentives for policy reforms to achieve the objectives described in subsection (c)(2);

(L) the development of pilot projects—

(i) to examine where mitigation and adaptation activities in forest ecosystems coincide; and

(ii) to explore means for enhancing the resilience of forest ecosystems and forest-dependent communities;
(M) the promotion of mechanisms to deliver resources for local action and to address the needs, rights, interests, and participation of local and indigenous communities;

(N) the promotion of land tenure and titling programs, including legal recognition and effective protection of the land tenure, access and use rights of Indigenous People and local communities; and

(O) the monitoring and evaluation of the results of the activities conducted under this section.

(3) MECHANISMS.—The Administrator shall apply the administrative authorities under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), except to the extent inconsistent with the provisions of this section, to the same extent and in the same manner as such authorities apply to the implementation of such Act in order to support activities to achieve the objectives described in subsection (c)(2) by—

(A) developing and implementing programs and project-level activities that achieve such objectives;
(B) to the extent practicable, giving priority in any review process to activities under paragraph (2)(A); and

(C) as appropriate, considering multi-year funding arrangements in carrying out the purposes of this section.

(4) STANDARDS.—The Administrator, in consultation with other appropriate agencies, shall establish program standards that—

(A) ensure that emissions reductions achieved through supported activities—

(i) are additional, measurable, verifiable, and monitored;

(ii) account for leakage, uncertainty, and permanence; and

(iii) at a minimum, meet the standards established under the emissions unit criteria of the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) developed by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO);

(B) require—

(i) the establishment of a national deforestation baseline for each country with national deforestation reduction activities
that is used to account for reductions achieved from such activities; or

(ii) if a developing country has established policies and taken measures to reduce emissions from disturbed peatlands, deforestation, or forest degradation, but has not established a national baseline, the provision of a credible, transparent, accurate, and conservative alternative for quantifying emissions;

(C) provide that each national deforestation baseline established under subparagraph (B)(i)—

(i) is national, or subnational on an interim basis, in scope; and

(ii) is consistent with nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions with respect to deforestation, taking into consideration—

(I) the average annual historical deforestation rates of the country during a period of at least 5 years; and

(II) the applicable drivers of deforestation and other factors to ensure additionality;
(iii) establishes a trajectory that would result in zero net deforestation by not later than 20 years after the date on which the baseline is established;

(iv) is adjusted over time to account for changing national circumstances; and

(v) is designed to account for all significant sources of greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation in the country;

(D) with respect to assistance provided for activities described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (2), require emissions reductions to be achieved and verified before the provision of any assistance under this section;

(E) with respect to accounting for sub-national deforestation and forest degradation reduction activities that lack the standardized or precise measurement and monitoring techniques needed for a full accounting of changes in emissions or baselines, or are subject to other sources of uncertainty, apply a conservative discount factor to reflect the uncertainty regarding the levels of reductions achieved;

(F) ensure that activities under this section are designed, carried out, and managed—
(i) using forest management practices that, in an open and transparent process—

(I) improve the livelihoods of forest communities in a manner that promotes the maintenance of intact forests, protects associated biodiversity, and restores native forest species and ecosystems while avoiding the introduction of invasive nonnative species;

(II) maintain natural biodiversity, resilience, and carbon storage capacity of forests;

(III) to the extent practicable, do not adversely affect the permanence of forest carbon stocks or emissions reductions;

(IV) include broad stakeholder participation and the free prior and informed consent of affected indigenous peoples; and

(V) take into account the needs and interests of local communities, forest-dependent communities, indige-
nous peoples, and vulnerable social groups;

(ii) in consultation with, and with the full and effective participation of, local communities, indigenous peoples, and forest-dependent communities in affected areas, as partners and primary stakeholders, before and during the design, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of activities; and

(iii) with equitable sharing of profits and benefits derived from the activities with local communities, indigenous peoples, and forest-dependent communities; and

(G) with respect to assistance for all activities under this section, seek to ensure the establishment and enforcement of legal regimes, standards, processes, and safeguards by the country in which the activities are conducted, as a condition of such assistance or as a proposed activity for which such assistance may be provided, which—

(i) protect the rights and interests of local communities, indigenous peoples, forest-dependent communities, human rights
defenders, and vulnerable social groups;
and

(ii) promote consultations with local communities, indigenous peoples, and forest-dependent communities in affected areas, as partners and primary stakeholders, before and during the design, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of activities under this section;
and

(iii) ensure equitable sharing of profits and benefits from incentives for emissions reductions or leakage prevention with local communities, indigenous peoples, and forest-dependent communities.

(5) **Scope.**—

(A) **Reduced Emissions.**—The Administrator shall include reduced emissions from forest degradation and disturbance of peatlands within the scope of activities under this section.

(B) **Expansion of Authorized Activities.**—If the Administrator determines, in consultation with other appropriate agencies, that sufficient methodologies and technical capacities exist to measure, monitor, and account for the
emissions referred to in subparagraph (A), the Administrator may expand the authorized activities under this section, as appropriate, to include reduced soil carbon-derived emissions associated with deforestation and degradation of forested wetlands and peatlands, consistent with a comprehensive approach to maintaining and enhancing forests, increasing climate resiliency, reducing emissions, and increasing removals of greenhouse gases.

(6) ACCOUNTING.—The Administrator shall use a publicly accessible registry to account for and register the emissions reductions achieved through assistance provided under this section each year, after appropriately discounting for uncertainty and other relevant factors as required by the standards established under paragraph (4).

(7) INTERNATIONAL DEFORESTATION REDUCTION PROGRAM INSURANCE ACCOUNT FOR NON-COMPLETION OR REVERSAL.—In furtherance of the objectives described in subsection (c)(2), the Administrator shall develop and implement a program that—

(A) addresses noncompletion or reversal with respect to any greenhouse gas emissions
that were not, or are no longer, sequestered; and

(B) may include a mechanism to hold in reserve a portion of the amount allocated for projects to support the program.

(8) EXTENSION OF ASSISTANCE.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Administrator may extend, for an additional 5 years, the period during which assistance is authorized for activities supported by assistance under this section, if the Administrator determines that—

(i) the country in which the activities are conducted is making substantial progress toward adopting and implementing a program to achieve reductions in deforestation measured against a national baseline;

(ii) the greenhouse gas emissions reductions achieved as a result of the activities are not resulting in significant leakage;

(iii) such greenhouse gas emissions reductions are being appropriately discounted to account for any leakage that is occurring; and
(iv) such extension would further advance or ensure achievement of the objectives of the activities.

(B) ASSISTANCE FOR SUBNATIONAL DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION REDUCTION ACTIVITIES.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—If the Administrator extends the period during which assistance is authorized for activities under subparagraph (A), the Administrator shall determine, based on the criteria specified that subparagraph, whether such assistance should include assistance for subnational deforestation and forest degradation reduction activities.

(ii) CONTINUED ASSISTANCE.—The Administrator may extend the period during which assistance is authorized for subnational deforestation and forest degradation reduction activities beyond the 5-year period described in subparagraph (A) in order to further the objectives described in subparagraph (B) or (C) of subsection (c)(2).
(9) COORDINATION WITH FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.—Subject to the direction of the President, the Administrator shall, to the extent practicable and consistent with the objectives described in subsection (c)(2), seek to align activities under this section with broader development, poverty alleviation, or natural resource management objectives and initiatives in countries receiving assistance under this section.

(10) ASSISTANCE AS SUPPLEMENT.—The provision of assistance for activities under this section shall be used to supplement, and not to supplant, any other Federal, State, or local support available to carry out activities under this section.

(11) FUNDING LIMITATION.—Of the funds made available to carry out this section in any fiscal year, not more than 7 percent may be used for the administrative expenses of the United States Agency for International Development in support of activities described in paragraph (2). Such amount shall be in addition to other amounts otherwise available for such purposes.

(f) LEGAL EFFECT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Nothing in this section may be construed to supersede, limit, or otherwise affect any restriction imposed by Federal law (including
regulations) on any interaction between an entity located in the United States and an entity located in a foreign country.

(2) Role of the Secretary of State.—Nothing in this section may be construed to affect the role of the Secretary of State or the responsibilities of the Secretary under section 622(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2382(c)).

(g) International Financial Institutions.—The President shall direct the United States representatives to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other international financial institutions (as defined in section 1701(c) of the International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)) to prioritize efforts to combat deforestation.

SEC. 612. CONTROLLING THE EXPORT OF ELECTRONIC WASTE TO PROTECT UNITED STATES SUPPLY CHAINS.

(a) Findings.—Congress finds the following:

(1) It is in the national security interests of the United States to ensure that the export of electronic waste does not become the source of counterfeit goods that may reenter electronics supply chains in the United States, and for other purposes.
(2) A 2012 Senate Armed Services Committee Report “discovered counterfeit electronic parts from China in the Air Force’s largest cargo plane, in assemblies intended for Special Operations helicopters, and in a Navy surveillance plane among 1,800 cases of bogus parts”.

(3) Further, exporting such material has often resulted in environmental damage because of illegal dumping or inadequate environmental regulations in other countries for ensuring their safe and secure disposal.

(4) China, the single largest producer of electronic waste, is on track for its e-waste industry to total $23,800,000,000 by 2030, given its high supply of used products, demand for recycled materials, and capacity to transport these materials.

(5) As the second largest producer of electronic waste, the United States has a strong economic and national security incentive to enhance domestic e-waste recycling capacity rather than exporting to China and other countries.

(6) Given China’s lack of regulations and worker protections, workers in the e-waste industry have been exposed to over 1,000 harmful substances, in-
including lead and mercury, endangering the health and wellbeing of workers.

(b) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) Electronic waste.—

(A) In general.—The term “electronic waste” means any of the following used items containing electronic components, or fragments thereof, including parts or subcomponents of such items:

(i) Computers and related equipment.

(ii) Data center equipment (including servers, network equipment, firewalls, battery backup systems, and power distribution units).

(iii) Mobile computers (including notebooks, netbooks, tablets, and e-book readers).

(iv) Televisions (including portable televisions and portable DVD players).

(v) Video display devices (including monitors, digital picture frames, and portable video devices).

(vi) Digital imaging devices (including printers, copiers, facsimile machines, image scanners, and multifunction machines).
(vii) Consumer electronics—

(I) including digital cameras, projectors, digital audio players, cellular phones and wireless internet communication devices, audio equipment, video cassette recorders, DVD players, video game systems (including portable systems), video game controllers, signal converter boxes, and cable and satellite receivers; and

(II) not including appliances that have electronic features.

(viii) Portable global positioning system navigation devices.

(ix) Other used electronic items that the Secretary determines to be necessary to carry out this section.

(B) EXEMPT ITEMS.—The term “electronic waste” does not include—

(i) exempted electronic waste items;

(ii) electronic parts of a motor vehicle;

or

(iii) electronic components, or items containing electronic components, that are exported or reexported to an entity under
the ownership or control of the person exporting or reexporting the components or items, with the intent that the components or items be used for the purpose for which the components or items were used in the United States.

(2) Exempted electronic waste items.—

(A) In general.—The term “exempted electronic waste items” means the following:

(i) Tested, working used electronics.

(ii) Low-risk counterfeit electronics.

(iii) Recalled electronics.

(B) Definitions.—In this paragraph:

(i) Tested, working used electronics.—The term “tested, working used electronics” means any used electronic items that—

(I) are determined, through testing methodologies established by the Secretary, to be—

(aa) fully functional for the purpose for which the items were designed; or

(bb) in the case of multi-function devices, fully functional
for at least one of the primary purposes for which the items were designed;

(II) are exported with the intent to reuse the products as functional products; and

(III) are appropriately packaged for shipment to prevent the items from losing functionality as a result of damage during shipment.

(ii) Low-risk counterfeit electronics.—The term “low-risk counterfeit electronics” means any electronic components or items that—

(I) have been subjected to destruction processes that render the items unusable for their original purpose; and

(II) are exported as a feedstock, with no additional mechanical or hand separation required, in a reclamation process to render the electronic components or items recycled consistent with the laws of the foreign country performing the reclamation process.
(iii) Recalled Electronics.—The term “recalled electronics” means any electronic items that—

(I) because of a defect in the design or manufacture of the items—

(aa) are subject to a recall notice issued by the Consumer Product Safety Commission or other pertinent Federal authority and have been received by the manufacturer or its agent and repaired by the manufacturer or its agent to cure the defect; or

(bb) have been recalled by the manufacturer as a condition of the validity of the warranty on the items and have been repaired by the manufacturer or its agent to cure the defect; and

(II) are exported by the manufacturer of the items.

(iv) Feedstock.—The term “feedstock” means any raw material constituting the principal input for an industrial process.
(3) COUNTERFEIT GOOD.—The term “counterfeit good” means any good on which, or in connection with which, a counterfeit mark is used.

(4) COUNTERFEIT MILITARY GOOD.—The term “counterfeit military good” means a counterfeit good that—

(A) is falsely identified or labeled as meeting military specifications; or

(B) is intended for use in a military or national security application.

(5) COUNTERFEIT MARK.—The term “counterfeit mark” has the meaning given that term in section 2320 of title 18, United States Code.


(7) EXPORT; REEXPORT.—The terms “export” and “reexport” have the meanings given such terms in section 1742 of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801).

(8) SECRETARY.—The term “Secretary” means the Secretary of Commerce.
(9) USED.—The term “used”, with respect to an item, means the item has been operated or employed.

(c) PROHIBITION.—Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d), no person or entity may export or reexport electronic waste or exempted electronic waste items.

(d) EXPORT PROHIBITION EXEMPTIONS.—A person or entity may export or reexport exempted electronic waste items, but only if the following requirements are met:

(1) REGISTRATION.—The person or entity is listed on a publicly available registry maintained by the Secretary.

(2) FILING OF EXPORT INFORMATION.—For each export transaction, the person or entity files in the Automated Export System, in accordance with part 758 of the Export Administration Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or ruling), electronic export information that contains at least the following information:

(A) A description of the type and total quantity of exempted electronic waste items exported.

(B) The name of each country that received the exempted electronic waste items for reuse or recycling.
(C)(i) The name of the ultimate consignee
to which the exempted electronic waste items
were received for reclamation, recall, or reuse;
and
(ii) documentation and a declaration that
such consignee has the necessary permits, re-
sources, and competence to manage the exempt-
ed electronic waste items as reusable products
or recyclable feedstock and prevent its release
as a counterfeit good or counterfeit military
good.

(3) COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING LAWS.—The
export or reexport of exempted electronic waste
items otherwise comply with applicable international
agreements to which the United States is a party
and with other trade and export control laws of the
United States.

(4) EXPORT DECLARATIONS AND REQUIRE-
MENTS.—The exempted electronic waste items are
accompanied by—

(A) documentation of the registration of
the exporter required under paragraph (1);

(B) a declaration signed by an officer or
designated representative of the exporter assert-
ing that the exempted electronic waste items
meet the applicable requirements for exempted
electronic waste items under this section;

(C) a description of the contents and condi-
tion of the exempted electronic waste items in
the shipment;

(D) for tested, working electronics, a de-
scription of the testing methodologies and test
results for each item;

(E) the name of the ultimate consignee
and declaration of the consignee’s applicable
permits, resources, and competence to process
or use the items as intended; and

(F) with respect to low-risk counterfeit
electronics only and when required by the im-
porting country, the written consent of the com-
petent authority of the receiving country to
allow the products in such country.

(e) EXCEPTION FOR PERSONAL USE.—The Secretary
may provide for an exception to the requirements of this
section, subject to such recordkeeping requirements as the
Secretary may impose, for the export or reexport of 5 or
fewer items that are or contain electronic components in-
tended for personal use.

(f) EFFECTIVE DATE.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), this section shall take effect upon the expiration of the 1-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.

(2) MODIFICATION OF EAR.—The Secretary shall, not later than the effective date under paragraph (1), ensure that the Export Administration Regulations are modified to carry out this section.

(g) PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS.—Any person who violates this section or the regulations issued under subsection (e)(2) shall be subject to the same penalties as those that apply to any person violating any other provision of the Export Administration Regulations.