AMENDMENT TO H. RES. 432
OFFERED BY MR. MCCaul OF TEXAS

Strike the preamble and insert the following:

Whereas in 2016, the Government of the United States launched a plan aimed at reducing conflict and expanding humanitarian access in Sudan, improving counterterrorism cooperation, ending Sudan’s negative interference in South Sudan, and addressing the threat of the Lord’s Resistance Army, that, according to the Department of State, led to significant progress in these areas and resulted in the lifting of some United States sanctions on Sudan in October 2017;

Whereas the Department of State announced “Phase II” of the bilateral reengagement framework with Sudan in November 2018, under which the United States would consider reseind Sudan’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism if the country met the relevant statutory criteria for delisting and if the Government of Sudan made progress along six identified areas of concern related to counterterrorism cooperation, humanitarian access, respect for human rights, a cessation of internal hostilities and a conducive environment for peace processes, efforts to address outstanding terrorism-related legal claims, and adherence to United Nations Security Council resolutions on North Korea;

Whereas despite the Government of Sudan’s pledge to cease hostilities, the United Nations Panel of Experts on the Sudan reported in January 2019 that forces of the Gov-
ernment of Sudan had launched “large-scale military operations” against insurgents in the Jebel Marra region of Darfur in 2018 and that elements of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces and associated militia were implicated in indiscriminate shootings, rape, acts of torture, and other inhumane treatment of civilians;

Whereas the Department of State’s country reports on human rights practices describe reports of serious human rights violations by Sudan’s intelligence service and military, including the Rapid Support Forces, citing credible reports that villages in Jebel Marra were targeted for attack in 2018, resulting in the displacement of thousands of civilians and noting that Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces were implicated in the majority of reported human rights violations against civilians in the country;

Whereas contrary to the requirements of Phase II, humanitarian organizations report that humanitarian access restrictions have persisted, including bureaucratic interference, and reports of serious human rights abuses and media censorship increased after Phase II was launched;

Whereas in December 2018, protests that began in Damazin and Atbara spread across the country, with thousands of Sudanese gathering to demand political change;

Whereas the Sudanese authorities responded to the protests by detaining hundreds of people, including protesters, members of the political opposition, civil society, journalists, and more than a dozen American citizens, and by using excessive and lethal force against protesters;

Whereas in late February 2019, President Bashir declared a yearlong nationwide state of emergency, dissolving the Federal and State governments and appointing senior
military officers to key government posts, banning unauthorized gatherings, demonstrations, and strikes, expanding authorization for searches, seizures, and arrests, and barring news deemed to undermine his government;

Whereas tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of protesters gathered in Khartoum on April 6, 2019, calling for the end of the government of President Bashir, and on April 11, 2019, he was ousted from power by the military and replaced by Defense Minister and First Vice President Lt. Gen. Ahmed Awad Ibn Auf, who later ceded power to Military Inspector General and Army Chief Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan;

Whereas Lt. Gen. Burhan stated that his Transitional Military Council is committed to transferring power to a civilian government, but the Council has sought to maintain the military’s dominance in negotiations with opposition representatives on a transitional arrangement;

Whereas protesters maintained their vigil in Khartoum, calling for the military to transfer power to a civilian-led transitional authority that would end Sudan’s civil wars, address the country’s economic crisis, and lay the foundations for democratic elections;

Whereas the Transitional Military Council has not met the demands of the protesters and the African Union Peace and Security Council to “step aside and hand over power to a civilian-led transitional authority, in accordance with the will of the people and constitutional order”;

Whereas on June 3rd, elements of Sudanese security forces, led by the Rapid Support Forces, violently dispersed the sit-in of the protesters and killed over 100 people, with
hundreds more injured and reports of rape and other human rights abuses committed;

Whereas negotiations between the Transitional Military Council and the opposition coalition, known as the Forces for Freedom and Change, on the composition and powers of a transitional government are complicated by the role of individuals in the Military Council who have been accused of war crimes, by the Council’s insistence on Islamic Sharia law as the basis for laws, and by security forces use of live fire against protesters in the cities of Nyala, Zalingei, and Khartoum, resulting in multiple deaths, during the talks; and

Whereas in the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004, Congress expressed its sense that individuals found to be involved in the planning or carrying out of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity should not hold leadership positions in the Government of Sudan: Now, therefore, be it