

QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE JOE WILSON

- Q1. Has the Iranian regime been required to halt all uranium enrichment, including thousands of centrifuges spinning at its main Natanz enrichment facility?
- A1. Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran dismantled two-thirds of its installed centrifuge capacity, including all of its most advanced centrifuges. Iran went from over 19,000 machines before the JCPA to just 5,060 of only its most primitive, first-generation centrifuges. These centrifuges have been put into storage and are continuously monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
- Q2. Has the Iranian regime been required to shut down and dismantle its Arak heavy water reactor and plutonium production plant?
- A2. Under the JCPOA, Iran's plutonium pathway will be shut down. The original core of the Arak reactor, which would have enabled the production of significant quantities of plutonium, has been destroyed. Arak will then be redesigned and rebuilt to support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production, such as those used for medical purposes. There will be no reprocessing, and the spent fuel will be shipped out of Iran for the life of the reactor.
- Q3. Has the Iranian regime been required to shut down and dismantle the underground uranium enrichment facility it built secretly at Fordo?
- A3. Under the JCPOA, the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant will be converted into a nuclear, physics, and technology center. The Joint Commission will be notified in advance of the specific projects that will be undertaken at Fordow. Iran will have no nuclear material at Fordow for 15 years.
- Q4. Has the Iranian regime been required to halt its ongoing missile development?
- A4. As we have continuously said, the JCPOA is regarding nuclear material. We did not strive to address Iran's production of ballistic missiles. We did, however, retain important UN restrictions for an extended period of time.

Q5. Has the Iranian regime been required to halt research and development of the faster centrifuges that will enable it to break out to the bomb far more rapidly than is currently the case?

A5. Iran will only be allowed to do very small-scale R&D on advanced centrifuges for at least 10 years, and under IAEA monitoring. Even after year 15, Iran will continue to be subject to the Additional Protocol and some of the key monitoring measures under the JCPOA, so we will be in a better position than we are today to understand what Iran is doing in its nuclear program. We will retain the right to take action if Iran pursues a program that is inconsistent with its commitments under the JCPOA and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN

- Q1. Secretary Moniz, we are essentially providing Iran with a 1-2-3 agreement, or a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, spelled out in Annex 3. We had gone to great lengths to get allies in the region, like the UAE and Jordan, to forgo enrichment and reprocessing – what we call the Gold Standard. With this deal – Iran is allowed to enrich and reprocess, and we’re actually helping to modernize and advance its nuclear infrastructure. How can we expect any other nation to accept the Gold Standard when this rogue regime in Tehran has been allowed to enrich and reprocess? Will the administration consider removing the Gold Standard from any current nuclear agreements?
- A1. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is neither a 123 Agreement nor a supply arrangement, and should not be considered as such. Nothing in the civil nuclear cooperation annex to the JCPOA commits the United States to participate in any particular cooperative activity with Iran. Annex III makes this clear by stating that the projects envisioned “may be undertaken in a variety of formats, with a variety of potential participants” and that a given project would not necessarily include participation by all JCPOA participants. Any cooperation between the United States and Iran would be of limited scope and consistent with current law, which significantly restricts any such cooperation with Iran. Thus, Annex III is not equivalent to a 123 agreement.
- Q2. Secretary Moniz, in your testimony last week you touted this notion that we will have eyes on the supply chain, from cradle-to-grave. Would it be possible for Iran to import uranium ore or enriched uranium from North Korea, or any other nation, to a covert site without our knowledge – yes or no?
- A2. Under the JCPOA, we will have unparalleled insight into every part of Iran’s nuclear program. With the insight we will have into Iran’s nuclear program, any effort by Iran to import nuclear materials covertly would put them at greater risk of being discovered, giving us the ability to re-impose sanctions or take other appropriate actions. Should Iran wish to establish a covert nuclear program, it would need to build an entire covert supply chain to feed into a covert facility. This endeavor would require a large-scale effort, which would make it harder to hide.