

**Written Testimony of Marshall Burke**  
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**Hearing on “Examining the Macroeconomic Impacts of a Changing Climate”**  
**United States House Subcommittee on National Security, International Development, and**  
**Monetary Policy**

Thank you Chairman Cleaver, Ranking Member Stivers, and members of the Committee for inviting me to speak today.

My name is Marshall Burke, and I am a professor of Earth System Science at Stanford University. I have a PhD in economics, and my research focuses on using data and statistics to understand how climate change impacts our economy and our livelihoods.

My job as an academic economist is not to make policy recommendations, but to provide information on the likely costs and benefits of a particular policy choice – or in this case, of failing to take policy action. And we have increasing amounts of evidence on what those costs and benefits might look like with regard to climate change.

Data can now tell us what happens to our economy when temperatures warm or when rainfall patterns change. Just as we use thermometers to tell us whether the temperature is going up or down, we can use data and statistics to tell us what happens to different sectors of the economy, or the economy as a whole, when the temperature changes. Again, my goal as a scientist is to simply make measurements, not political statements. And these measurements are starting to tell a very clear story.

Importantly, this climate story touches directly on all three of the jurisdictional areas of this subcommittee: national security, international development, and monetary policy. I would like to make six points about how a changing climate will affect these important areas.

First, **climate change is likely to have a substantial negative impact on the US economy.** Numerous studies using recent historical data on the US economy show that economic output falls in hot years as compared to cooler years<sup>1</sup>. When combined with projections of future temperature change from climate scientists, these data allow researchers to estimate what the likely loss in future economic output could be if warming continues unimpeded.

Research done by myself and colleagues at Berkeley and Stanford finds that, by 2050, unmitigated climate change will have cost the US economy roughly \$5 trillion<sup>2</sup>. By the end of

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<sup>1</sup> Burke, Marshall, Solomon M. Hsiang, and Edward Miguel. "Global non-linear effect of temperature on economic production." *Nature* 527. (2015): 235; Burke, Marshall, and Vincent Tanutama. *Climatic Constraints on Aggregate Economic Output*. No. w25779. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2019; Deryugina, Tatyana, and Solomon Hsiang. *The marginal product of climate*. No. w24072. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017; Kahn, Matthew E., et al. *Long-term macroeconomic effects of climate change: A cross-country analysis*. No. w26167. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2019.

<sup>2</sup> Burke, Marshall, Solomon M. Hsiang, and Edward Miguel. "Global non-linear effect of temperature on economic production." *Nature* 527. (2015): 235; Burke, Marshall, W. Matthew Davis, and Noah S. Diffenbaugh. "Large

the century, these damages could rise to tens of trillions of dollars in present value, just for the US economy alone. In other research, we find that the roughly +1C of temperature increase due to climate change that we've already experienced in the US has already cost the US economy over \$1 trillion.<sup>3</sup>

Second, **climate change will affect nearly all sectors of the economy.** For many people, climate impacts are most closely associated with rising seas and declining crop yields. These impacts are certainly important, but in fact are likely to only be a small part of the overall economic consequences in the US. Many other sectors and many other outcomes will be affected by a warming climate.<sup>4</sup> We have strong evidence that workers in all industries are less productive when it's hot.<sup>5</sup> We also have clear evidence that our cognitive function declines when it's hot: people perform office tasks less effectively<sup>6</sup>, and kids learn less and score worse on standardized tests<sup>7</sup>. These impacts will have economy-wide effects on economic performance.

Given these widespread economic impacts, it's no surprise that the insurance industry is already labeling climate change *the* top global risk – more worrisome than financial instability, cyber warfare, or terrorism.<sup>8</sup>

The third thing we know is that **climate change will worsen security risks, both domestically and abroad.** Police chiefs in US cities have recognized for decades that crime spikes during heat waves. The statistics bear this out very clearly: violent assault, sexual violence, and homicide all increase on days or months where temperatures are above normal<sup>9</sup>. Hot temperatures also increase suicide risk, and in recent research we calculate that future warming could lead to tens

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potential reduction in economic damages under UN mitigation targets." *Nature* 557 (2018): 549; Deryugina, Tatyana, and Solomon Hsiang. *The marginal product of climate*. No. w24072. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017. See <http://web.stanford.edu/~mburke/climate/> for country data.

<sup>3</sup> Burke, Marshall, and Vincent Tanutama. *Climatic Constraints on Aggregate Economic Output*. No. w25779. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2019.

<sup>4</sup> Hsiang, Solomon, et al. "Estimating economic damage from climate change in the United States." *Science* 356.6345 (2017): 1362-1369.

<sup>5</sup> Seppanen, Olli, William J. Fisk, and David Faulkner. "Control of temperature for health and productivity in offices." *ASHRAE transactions* 111.LBNL-55448 (2004); Seppanen, Olli, William J. Fisk, and Q. H. Lei. *Effect of temperature on task performance in office environment*. No. LBNL-60946. Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, CA (US), 2006; Cachon, Gerard P., Santiago Gallino, and Marcelo Olivares. "Severe weather and automobile assembly productivity." *Columbia Business School Research Paper* 12/37 (2012).

<sup>6</sup> Seppanen, Olli, William J. Fisk, and Q. H. Lei. *Effect of temperature on task performance in office environment*. No. LBNL-60946. Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, CA (US), 2006.

<sup>7</sup> Goodman, Joshua, et al. "Heat and learning." (2018), forthcoming *American Economic Journal – Economic Policy*; Graff Zivin, Joshua, Solomon M. Hsiang, and Matthew Neidell. "Temperature and human capital in the short and long run." *Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists* 5.1 (2018): 77-105.

<sup>8</sup> <https://grist.org/article/insurance-experts-rank-climate-change-as-top-risk-for-2019/>, <https://www.soa.org/globalassets/assets/files/resources/research-report/2019/12th-emerging-risk-survey.pdf>, <https://group.axa.com/en/spotlight/story/emerging-risks-survey-2018>

<sup>9</sup> Ranson, Matthew. "Crime, weather, and climate change." *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management* 67.3 (2014): 274-302; Jacob, Brian, Lars Lefgren, and Enrico Moretti. "The dynamics of criminal behavior evidence from weather shocks." *Journal of Human Resources* 42.3 (2007): 489-527; Heilmann, Kilian, and Matthew E. Kahn. *The Urban Crime and Heat Gradient in High and Low Poverty Areas*. No. w25961. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2019.

of thousands of additional suicides in the US by mid-century<sup>10</sup>. Elsewhere in the world, we have documented large increases in civil conflict and organized crime as temperatures rise<sup>11</sup>. Colleagues from Columbia University have in turn shown that this conflict drives substantial international migration into wealthier countries<sup>12</sup>.

Fourth, **climate change is going to exacerbate economic inequality, both domestically and abroad**. Poorer people in this country, and poorer people around the world, tend to live in environments that are already hot. As these regions get even hotter, most economic impacts will be amplified. Country-level estimates that I have published with colleagues at Stanford and Berkeley suggest that poorer countries will suffer two or three times more economic harm than many wealthier countries in coming decades.<sup>13</sup> A recent study in the US also found that economic damages from climate change will be many times higher in poorer counties as compared to wealthier counties.<sup>14</sup>

Fifth, **adaptation is possible, but will be costly**. Adaptation to climate change requires devoting resources to adaptation projects. For instance, we can spend money to build sea walls, to air condition every building, or to treat extra people at the doctor when they get sick. These investments will reduce the damage caused by climate change. But these investments also have a clear “opportunity cost” – they could have been spent on something else, such as on investments that improve future productivity rather than just keeping it from declining.

Similarly, while future innovation will likely reduce the cost of adapting to climate change, it is risky to simply assume these innovations will occur on their own. In many key areas such as agriculture, we don’t have clear evidence that farmers – and the public and private entities that support them – are adapting to the substantial climate change that’s already occurring.<sup>15</sup> If anything, the negative impact of higher temperatures on crop yields appear to be growing larger<sup>16</sup>, likely due to a combination of changing management practices and disincentives

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<sup>10</sup> Burke, Marshall, et al. "Higher temperatures increase suicide rates in the United States and Mexico." *Nature climate change* 8(8) (2018): 723.

<sup>11</sup> Burke, Marshall B., et al. "Warming increases the risk of civil war in Africa." *Proceedings of the national Academy of sciences* 106.49 (2009): 20670-20674; Hsiang, Solomon M., Kyle C. Meng, and Mark A. Cane. "Civil conflicts are associated with the global climate." *Nature* 476,7361 (2011): 438; Hsiang, Solomon M., Marshall Burke, and Edward Miguel. "Quantifying the influence of climate on human conflict." *Science* 341.6151 (2013): 1235367; Burke, Marshall, Solomon M. Hsiang, and Edward Miguel. "Climate and conflict." *Annual Rev. Econ.* 7(1) (2015): 577-617; Baysan, Ceren, et al. *Economic and non-economic factors in violence: Evidence from organized crime, suicides and climate in Mexico*. No. w24897. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2018.

<sup>12</sup> Missirian, Anouch, and Wolfram Schlenker. "Asylum applications respond to temperature fluctuations." *Science* 358 (6370) (2017): 1610-1614.

<sup>13</sup> Diffenbaugh, Noah S., and Marshall Burke. "Global warming has increased global economic inequality." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 116.20 (2019): 9808-9813; Burke, Marshall, W. Matthew Davis, and Noah S. Diffenbaugh. "Large potential reduction in economic damages under UN mitigation targets." *Nature* 557 (2018): 549; Burke, Marshall, Solomon M. Hsiang, and Edward Miguel. "Global non-linear effect of temperature on economic production." *Nature* 527 (2015): 235.

<sup>14</sup> Hsiang, Solomon, et al. "Estimating economic damage from climate change in the United States." *Science* 356 (2017): 1362-1369.

<sup>15</sup> Burke, Marshall, and Kyle Emerick. "Adaptation to climate change: Evidence from US agriculture." *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 8 3 (2016): 106-40.

<sup>16</sup> Lobell, David B., et al. "Greater sensitivity to drought accompanies maize yield increase in the US Midwest." *Science* 344 6183 (2014): 516-519.; Ortiz-Bobea, Ariel, Erwin Knippenberg, and Robert G. Chambers.

provided by subsidized crop insurance programs<sup>17</sup>. Similarly, while the widespread adoption of air conditioning in the US reduced many types of mortality<sup>18</sup>, it has not reduced suicide- or homicide-related mortality<sup>19</sup>, nor has it reduced the impact of hot temperatures on overall economic output in the US<sup>20</sup>.

Sixth, **most policies that mitigate climate change will generate immediate benefits**, in the form of improved air quality as we transition away from dirty sources of power in the energy and transportation sectors. Estimates suggest that the health and economic benefits of this improved air quality could be massive. For instance, were the US to adopt clean energy and clean transportation policies consistent with our prior emissions reductions commitments under the Paris Accords, these policies would lead to air quality improvements that would save roughly 300,000 premature deaths by 2030 in the US alone.<sup>21</sup> This reduced mortality would be valued in the trillions of dollars in the US<sup>22</sup>, which is roughly on par with the economic benefit of reduced warming by mid-century. Improved air quality would also have positive effects on worker productivity<sup>23</sup> and cognition<sup>24</sup>, further amplifying these economic benefits. Crucially, however, unlike the long-run benefits of climate mitigation, these air quality benefits accrue immediately after a polluting power plant is turned off or a polluting car is taken off the road.

Taken together, this evidence helps provide a more robust understanding of how much we should be willing to pay to reduce climate change. Focusing exclusively on the costs of action without considering these very large costs of inaction is terrible economics and bad policy. If we are able to substantially slow the future temperature increases expected under climate change, this will generate tens of trillions of dollars in economic benefits for the US economy and its citizens over the coming decades – and even larger benefits globally. These benefits should be weighed against the costs of proposed climate policies. Policies that can put a big dent in climate change that cost less than tens of trillions of dollars to implement are policies that make economic sense.

Thank you.

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"Growing climatic sensitivity of US agriculture linked to technological change and regional specialization." *Science Advances* 4.12 (2018): eaat4343.

<sup>17</sup> Annan, Francis, and Wolfram Schlenker. "Federal crop insurance and the disincentive to adapt to extreme heat." *American Economic Review* 105.5 (2015): 262-66.

<sup>18</sup> Barreca, Alan, et al. "Adapting to climate change: The remarkable decline in the US temperature-mortality relationship over the twentieth century." *Journal of Political Economy* 124.1 (2016): 105-159.

<sup>19</sup> Burke, Marshall, et al. "Higher temperatures increase suicide rates in the United States and Mexico." *Nature Climate Change* 8(8) (2018): 723; Ranson, Matthew. "Crime, weather, and climate change." *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management* 67(3) (2014): 274-302

<sup>20</sup> Deryugina, Tatyana, and Solomon Hsiang. *The marginal product of climate*. No. w24072. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017.

<sup>21</sup> Shindell, Drew T., Yunha Lee, and Greg Faluvegi. "Climate and health impacts of US emissions reductions consistent with 2 C." *Nature Climate Change* 6.5 (2016): 503.

<sup>22</sup> Shindell, Drew T., Yunha Lee, and Greg Faluvegi. "Climate and health impacts of US emissions reductions consistent with 2 C." *Nature Climate Change* 6.5 (2016): 503.

<sup>23</sup> Graff Zivin, Joshua, and Matthew Neidell. "The impact of pollution on worker productivity." *American Economic Review* 102.7 (2012): 3652-73; Chang, Tom, et al. "Particulate pollution and the productivity of pear packers." *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 8.3 (2016): 141-69.

<sup>24</sup> Ebenstein, Avraham, Victor Lavy, and Sefi Roth. "The long-run economic consequences of high-stakes examinations: Evidence from transitory variation in pollution." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 8.4 (2016): 36-65.