

**RECORD VERSION**

**STATEMENT BY**

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**BEFORE THE**

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**FIRST SESSION, 118<sup>TH</sup> CONGRESS**

**REGIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE ASSETS – ASSESSING COMBATANT COMMAND  
AND ALLIED DEMAND FOR CAPABILITIES**

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**NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member Moulton, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to highlight the importance of regional missile defense in the context of Combatant Commanders (CCMD) and allied demand for capabilities. Missile-related threats have rapidly expanded in recent years in quantity, diversity, and sophistication. Current events highlight the criticality of missile defense as a force of credible deterrence and an essential element of our defense capabilities. As articulated in the 2022 Missile Defense Review, missile defense is an integral “deterrence by denial” component of the United States integrated deterrence strategy. As I will discuss in detail, these are tremendously challenging and important times for the Joint Integrated Air & Missile Defense (IAMD) force.

I serve in two roles: first, as the Director of the Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-sUAS) Office, also called the JCO, which supports the Department of Defense (DoD) Executive Agency assigned to the Secretary of the Army for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Groups 1, 2 and 3; and second, I also serve as the Director of Fires within Headquarters, Department of the Army, responsible for air and missile defense and field artillery. Both roles inform my perspective on regional missile defense and our allies and partners.

While specific details of current and planned deployments are more appropriate for a closed session, I can say that Army Air and Missile Defense (AMD) remains the Army’s most heavily deployed force with the highest demand signal among CCMDs every year. This is because of the wide range of advancing threats facing each of these CCMDs, which includes ballistic and cruise missiles, hypersonic threats, UAS, fixed wing, rotary wing and rockets, artillery & mortars (RAM).

Our Army’s contribution to defeat these threats is evolving and continues to improve in both capability and capacity as we build towards the Army of 2030. In 2020, the Army’s Air and Missile Defense contribution consisted of Patriot, several Army National Guard Avenger battalions, and Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD). The Army of 2030 and beyond includes multiple new capabilities, such as Patriot equipped with the Lower

Tier AMD Sensor (LTAMDS) to provide greater range and 360 degree capability, Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) Increment 2 for cruise missile defense, Maneuver - Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) for Divisional Air Defense to support the tactical fight, capabilities for C-sUAS to include Coyote, and High Power Microwave and Directed Energy systems - networked together with the Integrated AMD Battle Command System (IBCS). IBCS will field to Patriot battalions and ADA headquarters, replace legacy Command and Control systems, and enable individual components (radars, launchers) to fight on the network. This will significantly improve surveillance, tracking, and identification, and enable unprecedented and secure integration with coalition partners. These capabilities will be evaluated and, if proven, incorporated into Army of 2030 and beyond.

These new regional AMD capabilities will help to address the growing robust and complex threat, but capabilities alone will not close the gaps or mitigate the threat. There is a necessary capacity component given the robust nature of the air threat. The Army's modernization effort is not solely focused on fielding new capabilities alone but has also resourced 14 new AMD formations to its force structure. This includes 6 IFPC battalions, four M-SHORAD battalions, a 16th Patriot battalion, 9 C-sUAS batteries, as well as a composite AMD battalion consisting of both IFPC and Patriot systems, located on Guam. This additive force structure is designed not only to defeat the threat but to minimize the operational impact to Soldiers and their families.

Secretary of Defense's goal is to keep a Soldier at home station three days for every one they are deployed (e.g., for a nine-month deployment a Soldier would be at home for 27 months). This metric is known as the Deploy-to-Dwell ratio. Due to unprecedented operational demand, the Patriot force has not met the Secretary of Defense's Deploy-to-Dwell goal for several years and is currently trending in a less favorable direction. A significant number of Patriot deployments were extended at least once, creating hardships and a lack of predictability for units, Soldiers, and families. Factors related to this include support operations to U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). Additionally, short falls in

Army wide recruiting and retention have contributed to the challenge in reducing the operational tempo for our Air Defense Soldiers. As a result, the Army has made recruiting and retention top priorities. Army recruiting supplies personnel required to back fill our current team as they develop and advance. Retention maintains our bench of Air Defense Soldiers who are already trained and certified, which better enables us to meet CCMD demands.

Efforts to meet CCMD demands include approving additional force structure (e.g., growth of a 16<sup>th</sup> Patriot battalion), health of the force improvements, modifying policy, and fencing units for modernization. The Army's modernization efforts to increase both capability and capacity will help to mitigate this supply and demand issue, but the Army alone cannot solve this challenge with respect to global demand and must rely on our Joint partners.

A critical point to emphasize is that IAMD is a shared responsibility across the Services. DoD Directive 5100.01 "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components" addresses the roles for each of the Services. The Secretary of Defense certified this directive on 10 September 2021 as "current and accurate for IAMD responsibilities and authorities in support of joint and combined land, sea, air, space, and special forces operations...." The Directive defines Missile Defense as a "common function" to be executed by all Services. The Army will never have enough AMD to protect every critical asset across the globe. To buy down the burden, the Army continues to work with our joint service partners. This includes U.S. Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and the U.S. Air Force offensive counter-air operations. Just as the Army has, each service will have to determine how much AMD it can sustainably provide to the global fight.

The 2022 Missile Defense Review also highlights that integration with Allies and partners on missile defense is an important priority to strengthen international cooperation against shared threats.. If we consider Desert Storm as the baseline example, it was only U.S. Patriot forces available to deploy and defend critical assets

both for the host nation and U.S forces. Nearly the entire Patriot force was required to accomplish that mission. Today, because our allies and partners have both the capability and capacity, the Army is able to focus on U.S. priorities in multiple theaters simultaneously. When Allies protect their own airbases or assets, it contributes to collective security for U.S. forces and can reduce the amount of U.S. AMD assets required by the Combatant Commander.

Working more closely together with our Allies and partners only enhances our ability to face the challenges posed by growing regional missile threats, coercion, and attacks. Recent examples of our efforts to enhance coordination and integration with Allies and partners include: air defense engagements by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates to defeat Houthi missiles and one-way UAS attacks in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR), German and Dutch Patriot contributions to Ukraine in the USEUCOM AOR, and ongoing trilateral agreements between the U.S., Republic of Korea and Japan in the USINDOPACOM AOR.

In conclusion, I take great pride in the efforts made by all Soldiers and their families in support of these critical demands. The Army recognizes the demand placed on the force and is taking significant and aggressive steps to improve regional AMD capabilities and capacity as well quality of life improvements for our Soldiers and families. The Army will continue to work with Joint Service partners and allies to better integrate their defenses into the overall missile defense architecture. The Army appreciates the significant support already provided by Congress and respectfully requests your continued support to achieve the Army of 2030.