

HASC-SF Hearing on the President's Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request for Strategic Forces: Nuclear, Space and Missile Defense

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Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the President's Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request for Strategic Forces.

Security Environment and Strategic Priorities

Today, the United States faces an increasingly complex global security environment, in which the central challenge to our prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term strategic competition by revisionist powers in China and Russia.

While they pose separate challenges with unique attributes, both China and Russia seek to reshape the world order and change territorial borders. Consequently, they pose increasing security threats to us, our allies and partners.

Long-term competition with China and Russia requires increased U.S and allied military investment because of the magnitude of the threats they pose today, and the potential that these threats will increase in the future. We also must simultaneously strengthen our efforts to deter and counter the clear and present dangers posed by rogue regimes such as North Korea and Iran.

The U.S. military remains the strongest in the world. However, our advantages are eroding as potential adversaries modernize and build-up their conventional and nuclear forces. They now field a broad arsenal of advanced missiles, including variants that can reach the American homeland. For example, only last week Russian President Putin claimed publicly that Russia now possesses unprecedented, new types of nuclear forces with which to target the United States and allies.

While this picture is unsettling and clearly not what we desire, as Secretary of Defense Mattis has pointed out, "We must look reality in the eye and see the world as it is, not as we wish it to be."

The administration has heeded this admonition in recent strategic reviews – the *National Security Strategy*, the *National Defense Strategy*, and the *Nuclear Posture Review*. They reflect a

consistent and pragmatic assessment of the threats and uncertainties we face regarding the future security environment.

Our task at the Defense Department is to ensure that U.S. military advantages endure and, in combination with other elements of national power, we are fully able to meet the increasing challenges to our national security. Weakness invites challenges and provocation, but as both George Washington and Thomas Jefferson observed, American strength deters war and promotes peace. It also assures allies and attracts new partners.

Strengthening our alliances and attracting new partners is a critical element of retaining our advantages. As the National Defense Strategy points out, “Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to our strategy, providing a durable, asymmetric advantage that no competitor or rival can match. This approach has served the United States well, in peace and war.”

Nuclear Policy and Posture

The 2018 *Nuclear Posture Review* (NPR) reflects DoD's strategic priority to maintain a safe, secure, survivable and effective nuclear deterrent.

The logic of the NPR was best articulated by Secretary Mattis: “This review rests on a bedrock truth: nuclear weapons have and will continue to play a critical role in deterring nuclear attack and in preventing large-scale conventional warfare between nuclear-armed states for the foreseeable future. U.S. nuclear weapons not only defend our allies against conventional and nuclear threats, they also help them avoid the need to develop their own nuclear arsenals. This, in turn, furthers global security.”

Effective deterrence is critical to our security, and in a complex and dynamic security environment there is no “one size fits all” deterrence strategy. The requirements for effective U.S. deterrence can vary greatly given the unique perceptions, goals, interests, strengths, strategies, and vulnerabilities of different potential adversaries. The deterrence strategy effective against one potential adversary may not deter another. Consequently, the 2018 NPR calls for the United States to tailor deterrence as necessary across a spectrum of adversaries, threats, and contexts. Tailoring our deterrence strategy requires a diverse set of nuclear capabilities to counter a spectrum of threats, and the flexibility needed to adjust our deterrent to new threats as they emerge over time.

The 2018 NPR confirms the findings of all previous NPRs that the diverse capabilities of the nuclear triad provide the flexibility and resilience needed for deterrence. Unfortunately, each leg of the triad is now operating far beyond its originally-planned service life. Consequently, we must not delay the recapitalization of the triad initiated by the previous Administration.

We are off to a good start. The FY2019 budget request funds all critical Department of Defense (DoD) modernization requirements, helping to ensure that modern replacements will be available

before the Nation's legacy systems reach the end of their extended service lives. The FY19 budget request for nuclear forces is \$24 billion, which includes \$11 billion for nuclear force sustainment and operations, \$7 billion for recapitalization programs (including LRSO, B-21, GBSD, and the Columbia Class SSBN), and \$6 billion for Nuclear Command, Control and Communications (including MILSATCOM).

In addition, the President's budget request includes two supplemental capabilities designed to enhance deterrence against emerging challenges in the near- and mid-term. The Department requests funds to modify a small number of existing SLBM warheads to provide a low-yield ballistic missile option in the near term. We also request funds to initiate an analysis of the performance requirements and costs to pursue a modern nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) that could be available in the mid-term.

These proposed supplements would contribute to deterrence by raising the threshold for nuclear use. They would do so by denying potential adversaries confidence that their coercive threats of limited nuclear first use, or their actual first use can provide a useful advantage over us and our allies. These supplements do not, and are not, intended to mimic adversary nuclear capabilities. They can, nevertheless, help address the imbalance in U.S. and Russian non-strategic nuclear forces, and may create incentives for Russia to return to compliance with its nuclear arms control commitments.

The U.S. commitment to nonproliferation and arms control remains strong. The United States remains committed to all of its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, including Article VI. We will continue to use arms control measures like the New Start Treaty, nonproliferation measures, and counter nuclear terrorism measures to advance the security of the United States and our allies and partners.

Missile Defense Policy and Posture

Let me turn now to missile defense. The Department's FY19 budget request supports the President's direction set out in the *National Security Strategy* to deploy a layered missile defense system to protect the American homeland from North Korean and Iranian missile threats. Our missile defense system not only protects the American people, it strengthens the deterrence of war and the assurance of allies.

Today, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system provides this protection for the U.S. homeland. It consists of 44 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) deployed in Alaska and California; land-, sea-, and space-based sensors; and a command and control system. We are strengthening this GMD system and investing in technologies to ensure that we can continue to counter rogue state missile threats to our homeland. Doing so is one of our highest priorities.

For this purpose, in September 2017, DoD requested the reprogramming of FY17 funding of over \$400 million to counter the North Korean missile threat. Congress approved this request. A portion of these funds support important homeland defense activities, including initiating work on the procurement of 20 additional GBIs in Alaska as early as 2023, which will bring the total to 64 fielded interceptors. The reprogramming also funded a service life extension to the COBRA DANE radar in Alaska and software upgrades to the Sea-Based X-band (SBX) radar. In November 2017, the President submitted an amendment to his FY18 budget request for \$4.0 billion for homeland and regional missile defense which includes construction of a new missile field at Fort Greely, Alaska and additional procurement funding for the 20 new GBIs.

The FY19 budget request includes \$9.9 billion for the Missile Defense Agency and \$3 billion for air and missile defense activities in the military Services. The budget includes funding for: a more capable GBI with the Redesigned Kill Vehicle; the deployment of new missile tracking and discrimination sensors in Alaska, Hawaii, and the Pacific region; and a new Space-based Kill Assessment capability.

We are also moving forward to bolster homeland defenses against air and cruise missile threats. In 2018, we will complete the first part of a two-phase effort to provide effective surveillance against these missile threats to the National Capital Region. Doing so will enhance our ability to detect, track, and investigate suspicious aircraft, as well as cruise missiles, and when necessary, cue our missile defense systems. We are on track to begin the second phase of this effort in FY19. We are also looking into technologies and concepts that could be used to provide scalable and deployable options for the rest of North America.

The Department's FY 2019 budget request also continues deployment of regional missile defenses tailored to meet missile threats to U.S. forces abroad, allies and partners in Europe, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific region. The budget seeks to enhance our regional missile defense capacity through additional Patriot, THAAD, and SM-3 Block IB and IIA interceptors. Because systems such as Patriot, THAAD, and our Aegis BMD capable ships can be surged when and where required, they make it possible to deploy layered missile defense capabilities that are responsive to regional missile threats as they arise.

We are also encouraging our allies and partners to acquire missile defense capabilities, and to strengthen missile defense cooperation and interoperability. We are pleased with the progress at NATO to build greater missile defense capabilities and important collaborative efforts with allies in Asia and Middle East.

Potential adversaries are modernizing and expanding their missile capabilities. We must ensure that our missile defense investment strategy and priorities enable us to meet the most dangerous missile threats today, while also enabling us to counter future missile threats as they expand. Areas for work on advanced technology include improved discrimination in our missile defense system sensor architecture, lasers to intercept offensive missiles during their most vulnerable boost phase of flight, and the multi-object kill vehicle.

Space Policy and Posture

U.S. space systems are essential to our prosperity, security and way of life, and DoD's space capabilities are critical for effective deterrence, defense, and U.S. force projection capabilities. Consequently, DoD must be prepared to address threats to our national security assets located in space.

Due to the critical importance of these assets, the *National Security Strategy* states that "any harmful interference with or an attack upon critical components of our space architecture that directly affects this vital U.S. interest will be met with a deliberate response at a time, place, manner, and domain of our choosing." The President's FY19 Budget Request includes \$12.5 billion to take steps to establish a more resilient, defensible space architecture. This is an increase of \$1.1 billion from the FY18 budget.

The United States does not fight alone. Bringing together our allies and partners to share capabilities and information strengthens deterrence and defense, and increases the effectiveness of our combined space force. Cost sharing agreements, hosting U.S. national security payloads on foreign systems, and data sharing arrangements to bolster shared space situational awareness are just a few of the opportunities that our allies and partners provide.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by stating that in an increasingly complex and threatening security environment, DoD must sustain the capabilities needed to deter and defend against attacks on our homeland, U.S. forces deployed abroad, allies and partners. We must make the investments needed to address the on-going erosion of our advantages and remain the preeminent military power in the world. Along with our allies and partners, we must ensure that we have the capabilities needed, now and in the future, to protect our people and the freedoms we cherish, and are able to engage potential adversaries diplomatically from a position of strength.

To do so, I urge you to support the important capabilities funded in the President's FY19 budget request.

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions.