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<td>Strike &quot;dual capable&quot; and insert &quot;conventional&quot; from log 65608</td>
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Amendment to H.R. 2810
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018

Offered by: Mr. Lamborn of Colorado

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2810, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

Hypersonic Defense

The budget request contained $75.3 million in PE 64181C for the development of a defensive system to protect the nation from rapidly evolving hypersonic glide vehicle threats. The committee supports Missile Defense Agency (MDA) plans to develop requirements, conduct necessary engineering, and proceed with experiments that ultimately result in a fielded defensive architecture or system of systems. However, the committee is concerned that the current acquisition approach may increase risk by relying on a single technical approach.

Therefore, the committee directs the Director, MDA, to provide a briefing to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives by October 1, 2017 that details the potential benefits, challenges, and associated costs of an acquisition strategy allowing for at least two competitive designs until the operational demonstration. Further, the briefing should address whether this acquisition strategy requires additional funds than the current program of record.
AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2810

OFFERED BY MR. ROGERS OF ALABAMA

In subsection (a) of section 12—(Log 65407; relating to limitation on availability of funds relating to implementation of the Open Skies Treaty)—

(1) redesignate paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and

(2) insert after paragraph (3) the following:

1  (4) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

2  (A) the congressional defense committees;

3  and

4  (B) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

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Amendment to H.R. 2810
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018

Offered by: Mr. Lamborn of Colorado

In the portion of the report to accompany H.R. 2810 titled “Space Situational Awareness and Battle Management Command and Control”, insert after

“Therefore, the committee directs the Commander of Air Force Space Command, in coordination with the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, to provide a briefing to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives by October 1, 2017, on an assessment of relevant commercial capabilities and the near-term plan to leverage existing and mature commercial space situational awareness capabilities to rapidly address validated warfighter capability gaps concerning foundational SSA and BMC2.”,

the following new text:

“The briefing should include funding amounts, including any unfunded requirements, for development, operations, and sustainment of the following components:

(1) space surveillance sensor systems
(2) SSA software for operations centers
(3) BMC2 software for operations centers”.
AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2810

OFFERED BY MR. COOPER OF TENNESSEE

In section 31____ (Log 65478, relating to assessment of management and operating contracts of national security laboratories), insert after subsection (e) the following new subsection (and redesignate the subsequent subsection accordingly):

1  (d) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that nothing in this section should be construed to mandate or encourage an extension of an existing management and operating contract for a national security laboratory.
AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2810

OFFERED BY MR. COOPER OF TENNESSEE

In section ____ (Log 65608, regarding the development of INF range ground-launched missile system)—

(1) in subsection (a), strike “dual-capable” and insert “conventional”; and

(2) in subsection (b), after “congressional defense committees” insert “, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate”.

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Amendment to H.R. 2810
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018

Offered by: Mr. Garamendi of California

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2810, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

Briefing on the 3+2 Strategy and Interoperable Warhead 1 (IW-1)

The Obama Administration's nuclear modernization plan centered upon a "3+2" strategy that was intended to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and types of nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile. In the budget request for fiscal year 2018, the Trump Administration has proposed continuing this strategy for the coming year while evaluating its long-term plan within the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review.

The first ballistic missile warhead in the 3+2 strategy is the Interoperable Warhead 1 (IW-1), which would replace the current W78 and W88 warheads and provide some degree of interoperability or commonality between these sea-based and land-based weapons. According to the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, published in March 2016, the IW-1 is estimated to cost between $9.0 billion and $13.8 billion (in FY2016 dollars) and to enter production in 2029.

The committee is aware that the Nuclear Posture Review is assessing the long-term nuclear modernization plan and evaluating how this plan aligns with adversary threats to the effectiveness and credibility of U.S. nuclear forces. As the threat environment changes throughout the coming decades, the committee believes a thorough evaluation of its impacts to long-term programs, such as IW-1, is warranted.

To enable its oversight and inform its eventual consideration of the Nuclear Posture Review, the committee directs the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services by February 15, 2018 on both the 3+2 strategy and IW-1. The briefing should include an assessment of:

1. the costs, benefits, risks, and opportunities of the 3+2 strategy;
2. the degree of interoperability or commonality within the IW-1 concept, and the costs, benefits, risks, and opportunities associated with that concept;
3. the implications to certification requirements of the IW-1 concept, including whether such concept increases the potential need to resume nuclear explosive testing;
4. the expected threats to U.S. nuclear forces in 2030 and beyond, and whether such threats should affect or change the 3+2 strategy or the requirements for IW-1 and its associated missile delivery vehicles; and
(5) whether and how the 3+2 strategy or IW-1 is driving infrastructure or capability requirements within the NNSA or DOD nuclear enterprises, and whether such infrastructure or capabilities would not be required absent such strategy or IW-1.
Amendment to H.R. 2810  
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018  

Offered by: Mr. Garamendi of California

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2810, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

Report on Ground Based Strategic Deterrent and Minuteman III

The United States currently deploys more than 400 LGM-30G Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles. In the nuclear modernization program laid out by the Obama Administration and now continued by the Trump Administration’s budget request for fiscal year 2018, the Air Force plans to replace the Minuteman III system with the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) system.

In testimony and reports provided to the committee by Department of Defense and Air Force officials, the total development and procurement costs for the GBSD program, including replacement of the missile flight system and recapitalization of all support ground infrastructure and command and control systems, will cost approximately $62.3 billion over the course of the 25+ year program. A separate analysis of the GBSD program by the Department of Defense’s Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) estimated the cost of development and procurement of the GBSD system in a range from $85.0 billion to significantly more than $100.0 billion (in then-year dollars). Ultimately, at the Milestone A decision for GBSD, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics set a baseline cost for the program at CAPE’s lower estimate.

The committee acknowledges the challenge of estimating replacement costs for a system first deployed 47 years ago, particularly when historical data is largely absent and present-day comparison systems are dissimilar. To ensure the Department is seeking greater fidelity in its varying cost estimates as the GBSD program moves forward, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force and the Director of CAPE, to provide a report to the House Committee on Armed Services by March 1, 2018, on cost estimates and requirements related to the GBSD program. Such report should include:

(1) Updates, based on information gathered from the selected contractors for the technology maturation and risk reduction phase of the GBSD program, from the Air Force and CAPE regarding their cost estimates for the development and procurement of the GBSD system;
(2) A detailed breakdown of the costs associated with life extending Minuteman III as compared to the costs of GBSD, including a breakdown of
the costs to replace or extend the life of relevant components until 2045, as well as until 2075; and
(3) The trade-offs between requirements and costs, including how GBSD and Minuteman III will meet military effectiveness requirements over the course of their expected lifecycles.