

STATEMENT OF
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AND
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BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
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Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for allowing me to represent the men and women of United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). I come before you today after my first three months in command to share my thoughts on missile defense and to discuss many of our future challenges.

Upon taking command this past December, I led a detailed analysis of the missions we are tasked to execute as part of the President's Unified Command Plan (UCP) and the NORAD Agreement. From a clean slate, we examined our available ways, means, and desired end-states to prioritize the commands' efforts so that the functions and tasks we perform in support of the United States and Canada are those most important to mission success. In doing so, I have focused our efforts along several important lines of operation.

Defense of our Homelands is our paramount line of operation, common to both USNORTHCOM and NORAD, and the focus of my testimony to you today. The two commands complement each other in this endeavor as evidenced by the integration across nearly all our headquarters functions. USNORTHCOM's homeland defense missions include Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), while NORAD's mission set includes aerospace warning of ballistic and cruise missile attacks against North America. However, today's threats are quite different from those we faced even a few years ago.

Accordingly, we depend on and foster another line of operation, *Homeland Partnerships*, in order to accomplish our missions, and consider them our strategic center of gravity. The partnerships we have built within the homeland serve as the foundation for all our responsibilities. Our nation's BMD capabilities are built on the foundation of strong partnerships with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM),

and the regional Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs), while NORAD's close ties with the interagency community in the National Capital Region (NCR) bring important components together.

Although each Service is responsible for the day-to-day welfare of its people, nearly 90 percent of our nation's military and civilian personnel live and work in our Area of Responsibility (AOR). We owe them and their respective Services a commitment to lines of operation for both *Professionalism and Excellence* and the well-being of our *Warfighters and Families*. As we welcome back and care for those who have been in combat, we have an opportunity to re-commit ourselves to the profession of arms and ensure we are prepared to perform our missions in an ever-changing threat environment, for make no mistake: those who would attack our families and friends have never stopped trying since September 11th, 2001.

DEFENSE OF OUR HOMELANDS—MISSILE DEFENSE

Defense of our homeland is a sacred mission for the men and women of USNORTHCOM and NORAD. The mission requires a defense in depth, made possible because of close partnerships with allies, other combatant commands, and federal agencies.

We remain vigilant against states that may seek to put North America at risk with ballistic missiles. Today we are focused primarily on North Korea and Iran, as both seek to advance their nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. North Korea has successfully test-detonated three nuclear devices and, through its space program, has demonstrated many of the technologies required for an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) that could target the continental United States. Meanwhile, North Korean military parades have showcased the new KN08 road-mobile ICBM. This system will complicate our ability to provide warning and defend against an attack, thereby increasing the credibility of North Korea's strategic deterrent.

Iran has likewise committed considerable resources to enhancing its ballistic missile capabilities and has already placed another satellite into orbit this year using a new booster that could serve as a demonstrator for ICBM technologies. Despite international condemnation and sanctions, Iran has failed to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency to resolve all outstanding concerns regarding its nuclear program, particularly those concerning its possible military dimensions. While we remain hopeful that current negotiations with the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) will lead to a diplomatic solution which addresses the international community's concerns regarding Iran's nuclear program comprehensively and in a durable fashion, we will continue to remain vigilant.

I want to emphasize that USNORTHCOM could not address these threats without the close coordination of our fellow GCCs. A significant event in the homeland from an external threat may not originate in our AOR, as such an event or attack is more likely to emanate from the AORs of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) or United States Pacific Command (USPACOM). Since the enemy lives in the seams, we are seeking a new level of understanding and efficiency among the GCCs in order to deter, detect and, when necessary, defeat threats before they pose a danger to the homeland.

Last September marked the tenth anniversary of Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) missiles standing alert at Fort Greely, Alaska, manned by soldiers of the 49th Missile Defense Battalion of the Alaska Army National Guard and overseen by soldiers of the 100th Missile Defense Brigade of the Colorado Army National Guard. We have high confidence in the ability of this system to defeat an ICBM strike against the United States from an enemy with limited ICBM capabilities. As the Committee noted in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the GBI fleet requires continued vigilance and investment to ensure

reliability and mitigate obsolescence, and we believe we are on a prudent, viable course of action to do just that.

The FY 2014 Defense Appropriations Act included initial funding for an additional 14 GBIs, in addition to the 30 GBIs currently based at Fort Greely and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, while improving the existing fleet by incorporating the second generation Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (CE-II EKV). The improved CE-II EKV accomplished its first successful test last June when a GBI launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base successfully intercepted a ballistic missile target launched from Kwajalein Atoll over the Pacific Ocean. A continued steady testing schedule and investment are critical to increase reliability and resilience across the missile defense enterprise. We believe the MDA is on track to have the additional GBIs on line by 2017.

Our BMD capability relies on a series of infrared space sensors as well as land and sea-based radars for targeting. This year, a second AN/TPY-2 radar will be brought on-line in Japan that improves our ability to persistently track potential threats to the homeland originating from East Asia.

Like everything we do in defense of the homeland, many of the systems and sensors we rely on reside in other AORs, which makes developing partnerships between MDA, USSTRATCOM, and the regional GCCs critical. This includes developing and deploying Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) system for more efficient and time-sensitive BMD. The Sea-Based X-Band Radar, currently in Limited Test Support Status, provides unique discrimination and tracking capabilities that are unavailable in current operational systems. I believe we must continue to invest in these types of emerging technology BMD capabilities to counter tomorrow's missile threats. Engaging a target that is flying over 15,000 miles per hour

in space with a kill vehicle that is roughly the size and weight of a basic military trainee's foot locker continues to expand the limits of what is technically possible.

Since September 11th, we have focused on terrorist groups that have demonstrated the capability and intent to strike within our borders. However, resurgent state actors have invested in new capabilities that make North America vulnerable in ways not seen in a generation. Russia is progressing toward its goal of deploying long-range, conventionally-armed cruise missiles with ever increasing stand-off launch distances on its heavy bombers, submarines and surface combatants, augmenting the Kremlin's toolkit of flexible deterrent options short of the nuclear threshold. Should these trends continue, over time NORAD will face increased risk in our ability to defend North America against Russian cruise missile threats.

We remain concerned with the development of conventional cruise missiles that could provide near peer adversaries with options to strike the United States without the perceived risk of retaliation of a nuclear exchange. For over forty years we have enjoyed an unchallenged ability to employ precision conventional cruise missiles at low altitudes evading radar detection. However, the emerging capability of near peers to generate similar long-range strike effects could complicate our decision-making.

Moreover, the need for improved situational awareness in the high latitudes and maritime domain continues to increase. Whether it is a strategic bomber, a submarine, or a surface combatant, defeating the archer is technically more feasible and affordable than defeating the arrow. The ability to locate, intercept, and if necessary destroy these platforms before they can launch a strike is crucial. We are working with our Canadian partners to develop plans to modernize or replace current assets such as the North Warning System that will further leverage emerging technologies.

Before we can engage an airborne threat, we must be able to see it. We are continuing to work with our partners to employ advanced surveillance capabilities that will enhance our ability to detect, track, and investigate suspicious aircraft to include cruise missiles and unmanned aerial systems, and when necessary, cue our defense systems against the full spectrum of air threats of all sizes, at all altitudes, and at all speeds.

Our first Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) aerostat is now airborne, with a second that is scheduled to be deployed later this year, beginning a three-year operational exercise. Using these aerostats moored at Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland, we will take the radar data these platforms provide and integrate it into our NCR air defenses, as well as the larger NORAD air defense architecture. Assessing JLENS' capability to enhance our surveillance capabilities is important to determine the best way forward to protect against a potential cruise missile threat from near-peer adversaries. We appreciate the support of Congress for full funding of the JLENS FY16 President's Budget request to keep the operational exercise on track and on schedule.

CONCLUSION

Today, we face increasing challenges from near peer competitors, rogue regimes, myriad terrorist organizations, individual violent extremists, and transnational organized crime looking for weaknesses to exploit. Near peers continue to erode what has always been our military technological advantage and the ability to hold targets at risk anywhere in the world.

I am confident that today we are able to execute our assigned missions with forces by the Services that remain capable and ready. As a combatant commander, it is my responsibility to identify the capabilities required to meet my requirements; it is the Services' responsibility to

fulfill it. But investment in readiness today leads to a ready force in the future. This includes training, recapitalization, and modernization across the Services.

And so I continue to be strongly concerned about the long-term fiscal situation of the DOD. Sequestration targets both current and future readiness and risks a hollow force undertrained and underprepared for today's emerging threats. The across-the-board cuts required to meet sequestration spending levels beginning again in FY 2016 mean critical capabilities USNORTHCOM and NORAD depend on to accomplish our missions could be in jeopardy, even as our potential adversaries remain persistent and innovative. Of particular concern, the BMD investment in LRDR and EKV upgrades of the past two years and the new effort to redesign the kill vehicle will likely be at great risk should sequestration return.

Our true competitive advantage is the remarkable people dedicated to professionalism and excellence accomplishing our missions every day, including one of the most experienced civilian workforces in the entire DOD. While their dedication has never wavered, let me add my voice to those who have sounded the alarm over the morale of our civilians after several cycles of threatened and realized furloughs, pay freezes, and reductions in forces. We have broken faith with our civilians and can, and should, do better.

We appreciate the Subcommittee's work to highlight for the entire Congress the adverse effects our current budget process not only has on missile defense and our national security, but also on our dedicated warfighting men and women, our exceptional civilian workforce, and their families. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are fully prepared to defend the homelands from those who would do us harm. I welcome your questions.