STATEMENT OF
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Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request for Strategic Forces. I am grateful for your consistent attention to and continuing support of the critical mission of nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation.

SUPPORTING POLICY OBJECTIVES

In his April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama highlighted 21st century nuclear dangers, declaring that to overcome these grave and growing threats, the United States will “seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” While we work toward that goal, which he acknowledged would not be reached quickly, he pledged that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal, both to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America’s security commitments.

In his confirmation proceedings, Secretary of Defense Carter affirmed the view that the nuclear deterrent remains our highest priority mission. As such, U.S. nuclear weapons policy and strategy are an important element of the President’s FY 2016 Budget Request. The budget request focuses on maintaining stable and robust deterrence in a time of geopolitical uncertainty, while managing the transition from our current nuclear force to a modernized nuclear force via life extension programs (LEPs) for the warheads, replacing aging delivery systems, and enhancements to sustainment and operations of the current force. It includes the funding necessary to address the findings of last year’s Nuclear Enterprise Reviews.

To sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, we must both maintain and modernize our nuclear forces and their command and control systems. The scope of this work
necessitates continuing focus, through FY 2016 and beyond. In addition to providing for our own defense, U.S. nuclear capabilities strengthen regional deterrence and assure our allies and partners. Maintaining credible extended deterrence and assurance is necessary to honor our alliance commitments, and support our nuclear nonproliferation objectives. As members of this Subcommittee well understand, the Strategic Forces mission extends beyond U.S. nuclear forces. It also involves protecting and defending our access to and use of space and cyberspace.

NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE REVIEWS

Last November and December, we briefed the Committee and your staff on the results of the two reviews ordered by Secretary Hagel of the DoD Nuclear Enterprise. As we said then, the Department has undertaken a serious and vigorous response to the findings of these reviews. Senior leaders are being held accountable for addressing issues identified in the reviews, and the Department is working to create an enduring system of continuous self-evaluation, honest reporting of problems up the chain of command, and detailed monitoring of corrective actions and their effectiveness in fixing the problems identified.

The President’s budget request allocates significant resources to implement recommended changes to ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of the force. But not all of the recommendations involve funding. The recommendations fall in several key areas: additional oversight to clarify the nuclear deterrent leadership structure and reduce administrative burdens imposed on the forces; increased investment in the nuclear deterrent enterprise to improve and sustain current equipment and infrastructure, and increased personnel and training; and improvements in the way we conduct inspections, assure the reliability of our nuclear personnel, and provide for security of our nuclear weapons.
Last year, then-Secretary Hagel created the Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review Group (NDERG) to reinforce senior leader accountability and integrate all the elements of the nuclear force into a coherent enterprise. He asked Deputy Secretary Work to lead this effort and provide regular updates on the Department’s actions and progress in improving the health of our nuclear forces. In his final weeks in the Pentagon, then-Secretary Hagel convened the group one last time during his tenure to remind everyone of the critical importance of this effort.

Secretary Carter shares Secretary Hagel’s commitment to holding accountable the leaders of DoD’s nuclear mission, and to ensuring real near-term improvements in nuclear force sustainment and morale. With sustained Congressional support and continued commitment from the highest levels of the Department – to include the leadership of the services – I believe that our plan for addressing issues identified in the Nuclear Enterprise Reviews will succeed.

**STABLE AND ROBUST DETERRENCE**

The President has opted for a nuclear sustainment and modernization plan that is consistent with his commitment to retain a safe, secure, and effective deterrent for as long as nuclear weapons exist. This plan focuses on modernizing the platforms, delivery systems, and weapons of our current Triad to preserve military capabilities in the face of evolving threats. Our plan is consistent with the Administration’s policy objective of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense strategy. It is not, as some have claimed, a nuclear weapons buildup. On the contrary, the number of nuclear weapons in the United States is the smallest it has been since the Eisenhower Administration. The number of deployed strategic weapons will continue to decrease as we approach February 2018, when we must begin to adhere to the central limits of the New START Treaty. Furthermore, our approach to warhead sustainment and modernization
favors advancements that will continue to enable additional reductions in the non-deployed hedge force.

The effort to modernize our delivery systems and extend the life of our warheads across the Triad and our non-strategic nuclear force will require significant resources over the next decade and beyond. But as I noted at the outset, the nuclear mission is the highest priority mission in the Department of Defense and we must prioritize it accordingly.

**SUSTAINING THE CURRENT FORCE**

The President’s FY 2016 Budget Request funds sustainment efforts that are needed to maintain the health of our nuclear forces. Let me provide a few examples:

The Air Force recently completed several modernization programs that will sustain the Inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) force through the mid-2020s. In order to sustain Minuteman III through 2030, the Air Force will need to address additional age-related concerns.

The ICBM Fuze Replacement Program is a joint Air Force and Navy effort that is leveraging commonality to increase efficiency and reduce costs. It will help sustain re-entry systems flown by the Minuteman III ICBM and the Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), and is representative of a larger effort, encapsulated in the long-term 3+2 strategy, to leverage potential compatibility and commonality of SLBM and ICBM warheads and components.

The FY 2016 budget funds continued and expanded work on sustaining our SLBM warheads. The W76-1 SLBM Warhead LEP is well underway, with production now past the halfway mark and on track to be completed in FY 2019. The President’s budget funds an
expanded work scope for the W88 Alteration (ALT) 370, to include needed replacement of the warhead’s conventional high explosive. After considering a range of alternatives, the Nuclear Weapons Council determined to accommodate the increase in program costs primarily by reducing surveillance on some legacy warhead systems.

The Navy is conducting a Trident II D5 missile LEP to sustain it through at least 2042 in order to support the extended life of the OHIO-class submarine. This program will also allow the Trident II D5 to be deployed on OHIO Replacement SSBNs.

The Air Force continues to modernize its nuclear-capable bomber fleet to extend the life of the B-52 and B-2 aircraft.

The FY 2016 budget request funds procurement of the remaining ALCM Service Life Extension Program kits, and takes other actions needed to maintain and assess that important system’s effectiveness.

3+2 STRATEGY

The 3+2 strategy remains the Administration’s long-term approach to maintaining an effective nuclear Triad at reduced force levels and reduced cost. A total of five nuclear warhead types—three interoperable warheads for ballistic missiles, plus one gravity bomb and one cruise missile warhead—will replace the 11 in the current stockpile. This modernization and consolidation of warhead types will allow for more efficient hedging and additional reductions in the stockpile without reducing the military capabilities we require. In addition, fewer warhead types will result in cost savings associated with reduced warhead transportation, surveillance, and certification.
MODERNIZING U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES

The Air Force has conducted a Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to study the full range of concepts to recapitalize the land-based leg of the Triad beyond the extended service life of the Minuteman III missile. The FY 2016 budget continues to fund this preparatory work. DoD is reviewing GBSD acquisition planning and options for reducing programmatic risk.

The OHIO Replacement Program, and supporting systems, requires adequate resources, of particular concern beyond the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), and a stable, predictable funding profile to ensure an on-time construction start in FY 2021 and to meet the deterrence patrol need date of FY 2031. The OHIO Replacement Program submarines will have a service life that will enable patrols into the 2080s. This new class of submarines will remain survivable even as adversary anti-submarine warfare technology advances and proliferates. I want to underscore, however, that we are stretching the current OHIO class submarines to the limit, and there is no margin left in the schedule. Simply put, we cannot let the OHIO Replacement Program system slip any further.

The Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B) is one of the Air Force’s top three acquisition priorities and is currently in the development phase. The Air Force’s FY 2016 budget request includes funding to continue the development of an affordable, long range, penetrating aircraft that incorporates proven technologies. The F-35 is another of the Air Force’s top three acquisition priorities. Like the LRS-B, the F-35 program will deliver capability that is needed for both the conventional and non-strategic nuclear missions. The FY 2016 budget includes
funding for Block 4 of the F-35 program, in addition to research and development funds for a non-strategic nuclear capability for the aircraft.

The B61-12 LEP is an important early step towards implementing the 3+2 strategy. Four existing strategic and tactical variants of the B61 gravity bomb will be replaced with a single weapon design. In addition, the megaton-class B83 strategic gravity bomb will be retired from the stockpile once confidence in the B61-12 is attained. Along with fewer weapon types, the end result will be significantly fewer weapons and lower net explosive yield in the stockpile.

The Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missile will replace the Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) as the United States’ only air-launched, long-range standoff nuclear capability. Sustaining an effective deterrent against nuclear attack depends on preserving such credible response capabilities, including the ability to overcome evolving adversary defenses. LRSO will also provide a rapid and flexible hedge against changes in the strategic environment and limitations of the other two legs of the Triad.

A Life Extension Program for the ALCM’s W80 warhead will allow for its use in the LRSO. LRSO will be compatible with legacy B-2 and B-52 aircraft, as well as the future Long-Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B). As you know, last year, we proposed a three-year delay in funding of the LRSO, due to funding constraints affecting both the Department of Defense and Department of Energy. This year, we are partially reversing the decision and moving the schedule forward by two years.

The FY 2016 budget funds multiple NC3 upgrades. The Department continues to prioritize resources to address known capability gaps while incrementally building toward a fully
modern NC3 architecture that will ensure timely decision-making, and cybersecure, support for the President.

MISSILE DEFENSE

The FY 2016 President’s Budget funds the development and deployment of robust ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities to protect the U.S. homeland, deployed forces, allies, and partners.

For homeland defense, the budget request maintains our commitment to increase the number of deployed Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) to 44 by FY 2017; continue development of the Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV); and proceed with the development of the Long-Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR). When combined with the planned GBI reliability and system engineering improvements, these actions will enable the homeland missile defense system to deal effectively with the maturing ICBM threat from North Korea and a potential ICBM threat from Iran.

The FY 2016 President’s Budget also reflects the Department’s commitment to building regional missile defenses that are interoperable with systems deployed by international partners.

The Department continues to support the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), which is designed to protect U.S. deployed forces and allies in Europe from ballistic missile attacks from the Middle East. We are on schedule to complete the construction of the Aegis Ashore site in Romania by the end of this year. The budget request also supports the implementation of Phase 3 of the EPAA, to include the deployment of Aegis Ashore to Poland in the FY 2018 timeframe.
NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE

As the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review notes, “military operations depend on freedom of access in space, making security in this domain vital to our ability to project power and win decisively in conflict.” As the Director of National Intelligence has noted, adversaries are moving aggressively to deny these advantages to the United States. To address these concerns, the Department conducted a portfolio-wide review of our space systems focusing on how we assure U.S. space capabilities in light of these future threats. The result was a significant adjustment in our FY 2016 space portfolio.

In accordance with the Review’s findings and recommendations, FY 2016 investments aim first and foremost to improve the resilience and mission assurance of U.S. space assets. These changes are reflected in several key program initiatives that increase funding for current and new space initiatives and the continuation of future follow-on systems to support the warfighter and achieve assured space objectives. Some specific strategic initiatives to this end include assuring access to space through the development of domestically-sourced space launch services; upgrading space situational awareness (SSA) and space control capabilities to better identify, characterize, and address threats in the space environment; and enhancing the Global Positioning System (GPS) architecture. These adjustments amount to a new investments of over $5 billion across the portfolio over the FYDP.

NONPROLIFERATION

As the new National Security Strategy says, “No threat poses as grave a danger to our security and well-being as the potential use of nuclear weapons and materials by irresponsible states or terrorists…Vigilance is required to stop countries and non-state actors from developing
or acquiring nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, or the materials to build them.” Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation risks are more difficult to mitigate than ever before. Our increasingly interconnected world makes WMD-related knowledge and technology more readily available to those seeking to do harm to the United States and our interests abroad.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) are key elements of the international nonproliferation architecture. DoD will continue to work with the Department of State to support and strengthen these regimes.

DoD’s Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program is the most comprehensive tool to prevent WMD risks from becoming concrete threats against the Homeland. The CTR Program has a decades-long track record of working with foreign partners to destroy existing WMD, most recently leading the successful efforts to eliminate Syrian and Libyan chemical weapons. Our mission for the CTR Program in FY 2016 will continue efforts to make dangerous nuclear, chemical, and biological materials more difficult for bad actors to acquire; and to enable foreign partners to detect, interdict, analyze, and safely eliminate nuclear, chemical, and biological threats on their own soil.

MEETING TODAY’S CHALLENGES AND EMERGING THREATS

Together with our Allies and partners, we face a number of challenges, both persistent and evolving. These include preventing the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran, containing the threat of a belligerent North Korea, maintaining strategic stability with China as well as Russia, and maintaining the strength and credibility of U.S. extended deterrence and assurance in NATO and Asia.
Russia’s recent behavior currently poses one of our most pressing and evolving strategic challenges – challenges felt across the strategic forces mission space. We are confronted with Russia’s occupation of Crimea, continuing Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine, Russia’s increasingly aggressive nuclear posturing and threats, including the prospect of nuclear weapons in Crimea, and its violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

The Administration’s response to Russia’s actions must be integrated across all instruments of national power, including diplomatic, economic, and military. Our strategy must serve and be guided by the vital interests of the United States and our allies.

We need not respond symmetrically to every Russian provocation. In particular, there is currently no need to expand the role for U.S. nuclear weapons, or to change our nuclear posture. Our modernization plan was specifically designed to hedge against geopolitical risk, including increasing strategic competition with Russia. It does so by sustaining a full Triad that offers a range of capabilities that underwrite strategic stability and serve to convince Russia and other potential adversaries that they cannot escalate their way out of a failed conventional aggression.

We do not want to find ourselves engaged in an escalatory action/reaction cycle as a result of Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty. We will continue to press Russia to return to compliance with the Treaty, while at the same time preparing responses to prevent Russia from gaining a significant military advantage from its violation and to protect the security interests of the United States and our allies. We will continue to work together with Russia on implementing the New START Treaty, while remaining vigilant with respect to ongoing treaty verification activities.
CONCLUSION

The President’s FY 2016 Budget Request supports our nuclear, nonproliferation, and space strategies for defending U.S. vital interests. It increases funding for sustaining and modernizing our nuclear forces to ensure a safe, secure, and effective deterrent for as long as nuclear weapons exist. Those same capabilities that provide for our defense also extend deterrence to, and assure, U.S. allies and partners, contributing in turn to our nonproliferation policy objectives. Sustaining stable and robust nuclear deterrence allows a steady approach to the persistent and evolving strategic challenges we face today and will face in the years to come. We request the Committee’s support for this budget.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to your questions.