Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, Members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the issue of Russian compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987.

There is, of course, nothing I can tell you about the underlying facts that you don’t already know. I am not privy to classified information about the Russian missile tests that, according to the State Department, have given rise to “concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty”, so my knowledge is limited to what has appeared in the New York Times and other press reports on the subject. But hopefully I can help you interpret what you know, and suggest some conclusions that should be drawn by you and the Obama Administration.

The INF Treaty

I will begin by making some observations about the INF Treaty itself. The treaty was a product of the Cold War, and was in many ways a vindication of President Reagan’s policy of promoting “peace through strength”. He had to overcome fierce opposition not only from the Soviets, but also from peace activists in Europe and here in the United States, in order to lay the groundwork for conclusion of the treaty.

By verifiably forbidding either the United States or the Soviet Union to possess ground-launched missiles with maximum ranges between 500 and 5500 kilometers, the INF treaty contributed to security in the European theater, and was profoundly reassuring to the populations of some of our key NATO allies. Today it continues to be more important to the security of our allies in Europe and Asia than to us, for the simple reason that ground-launched missiles of this range cannot reach America from Russia (except for Alaska).

Whether the INF treaty can survive over the long term, however, is open to question. In a world where increasing numbers of countries are building and deploying INF-range missiles, it becomes increasingly difficult to explain why just the United States and four successor states to the Soviet Union (including Russia) should be forbidden to possess these kinds of missiles, when every other country in the world is allowed to have them. One of my co-panelists today, Mr. Thomas, has written about why it would be in the U.S. national interest to be able to deploy
conventionally-armed missiles of INF range. I am sure he will elaborate on that point in his testimony.

The Russians feel even more strongly about this than Mr. Thomas. As early as 2005, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov raised with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld the possibility of Russian withdrawal from the treaty. President Putin has since complained publicly about the unfairness of the treaty to Russia, and I know from my own conversations with Russian officials during my time in government that they would like to get out from under it. The reason is very simple: Russia is within striking distance of a number of countries that today deploy INF-range missiles, including China, Iran, North Korea and Pakistan, yet Russia is forbidden by the treaty to match the missile deployments of these countries.

One of the ironies of this complaint is that missile technology proliferation from Russia contributed significantly to the missile programs of Iran and North Korea, and North Korea in turn has contributed to Pakistan’s missile program. So in fact Russia is complaining about a problem that is, to a significant extent, of its own making.

Nevertheless, in evaluating Russia’s actions and our possible responses, we have to recognize that Russia’s commitment to the INF Treaty is paper-thin, and they would welcome a U.S. decision to terminate the treaty. I believe this helps explain why they have taken such a cavalier attitude toward compliance with the treaty. This recognition should also inform our response to Russia’s violations, as it would be a mistake to react in ways that will be seen by them as a reward rather than as a punishment.

Russia as an Arms Control Partner

Russia’s attitude toward the INF Treaty is symptomatic of a larger truth: Russia is not the arms control partner that the Obama Administration wants it to be. In his Prague speech in 2009, President Obama spelled out his dream of achieving “a world without nuclear weapons.” If it was not evident to President Obama in 2009, it should be evident today that Russia does not share this dream.

Russia today perceives itself to be surrounded by unfriendly neighbors—China to the East, NATO to the West, and unstable Muslim countries to the South—and does not believe it can rely on its conventional military forces to handle all these threats. Nuclear weapons therefore remain central to Russian defense planning, and they have no intention of giving them up. Indeed, as one Russian official told me some years ago “Nuclear weapons are more important to our security now than ever before.”

There is nothing about the Obama Administration’s principal arms control achievement—the New START Treaty—that contradicts my contention about Russia’s fundamental attitude toward arms control. That treaty mandated no meaningful Russian nuclear reductions, but rather amounted to a unilateral U.S. undertaking to legally bind itself to reduce
U.S. nuclear forces to the Russian level. The Obama Administration intended this to be an attractive offer to the Russians, but rather than immediately accepting it, they chose instead to try to extort from the United States additional limitations on missile defenses and conventional prompt global strike capabilities.

This should have been an eye-opening experience to the Obama Administration, but the Administration was undeterred. Just last year, President Obama called for a further 1/3 reduction in strategic nuclear forces below the New START level, and he dispatched his National Security Advisor to Moscow to try to interest them in negotiating a new round of nuclear reductions. Needless to say, the Russians were not interested.

President Obama could yet seek to implement these proposed reductions unilaterally. The Russians no doubt hope that he will. If nothing else, Russian actions in Crimea, combined with their violations of the INF Treaty, should provide occasion for the Obama Administration to once and for all slam shut the door to unilateral nuclear reductions.

After Detection—What?

The title of today’s hearing echoes Fred Ikle’s seminal 1961 article on enforcement of arms control treaties. He famously observed that:

detecting violations is not enough. What counts are the political and military consequences of a violation once it has been detected, since these alone will determine whether or not the violator stands to gain in the end.

President Obama apparently agrees in principle with Ikle, insisting in his Prague speech that “Rules must be binding. Violations must be punished. Words must mean something.”

However, there is little about Russia’s violations of the INF Treaty that suggests President Obama’s words are being taken seriously. By all accounts, the violations at issue were intentional rather than accidental. And if Russia is intentionally testing missiles prohibited by the treaty, that has to be seen as a serious violation.

Further, according to the New York Times, Administration officials were persuaded that there was a compliance concern by the end of 2011. I have seen letters signed by a number of members of Congress suggesting that they believe the Administration knew Russia was violating the treaty substantially earlier than that.

Even if the New York Times date is the correct one, the Administration waited more than two years before briefing our NATO Allies—who have far more at stake when it comes to this treaty than do we—about Russia’s actions. And the Administration has yet to address the matter in any of its arms control compliance reports to Congress, which are required to be submitted annually, notwithstanding that such reports have been submitted each year since 2010.
The Administration says of its concerns that “[w]e have raised them with Russia and are pressing for clear answers in an effort to resolve our concerns.” But from the outside it appears that this issue is being driven more by congressional indignation over the violations than anything else.

I have already indicated that I do not believe the appropriate remedy in this case is for the United States to withdraw from the treaty. Rather, since Russia so clearly wants out, we should make sure that they alone pay the political and diplomatic price of terminating the treaty. But it is also clear that we cannot and should not ignore the violations. Contrary to what some might believe, doing so will not advance the interests of arms control, but rather will serve only to tempt the Russians to believe that they can successfully cut corners on other arms control agreements.

So how should the United States respond? I suggest the following:

• The Obama Administration needs to start worrying less about its arms control agenda and more about the security implications of Russia’s reported INF violations. It should speak out plainly on the subject, both in public and through diplomatic channels. It should urgently convene a meeting of the Special Verification Commission, the implementation body established under the INF Treaty, to press its compliance concerns. Inexplicably, that body has not met since 2007. Most importantly, the Administration needs to stop leaving the impression that it is acting reluctantly and only because Congress is forcing its hand.

• The Administration must also absorb the lesson that Russia is not on board with their dream of a nuclear-free world. Russian nuclear weapons are going to be with us for the foreseeable future, and therefore America will continue to need a robust and reliable nuclear force of its own. There is a long list of nuclear modernization requirements that the Administration has delayed, ranging from replacement of our ballistic missile submarines to warhead life extension programs and critical infrastructure at our national labs. These delays must end so that Russia understands that they will not gain through obsolescence what they are refusing to negotiate at the bargaining table.

• The United States needs to begin planning for a post-INF world. This treaty is unlikely to be with us for the long-term, because Russia wants out, and evidently is taking concrete steps in anticipation of getting out. We need to make sure that when that day comes, we and our allies do not find ourselves at a disadvantage because Russia is deploying previously prohibited missiles.

  o In a post-INF world, Russia will be able to target INF-range missiles (which it evidently is now testing) on our allies in Europe and Asia. We need to work with
our allies to begin planning the deployment of missile defense capabilities sufficient to meet this threat. The existing European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), for example, should be revisited. The EPAA was designed with the much more limited threat from Iran in mind. More robust capabilities will be needed to defend our European allies against Russian INF-range missiles should they be deployed. Similar missile defense planning needs to begin with our allies in Asia as well.

- The United States needs to consider what INF-range capabilities it can usefully deploy in a post-INF world. In this regard, the recent report prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. Strategic Command on “Conventional Prompt Global Strike Options if Exempt from the Restrictions of the INF Treaty” identifies four options that should be explored:
  - Modifications to existing short range or tactical weapons systems to extend range;
  - Forward-based, ground-launched cruise missiles;
  - Forward-based, ground-launched intermediate range ballistic missiles; and
  - Forward-based, ground-launched intermediate range missiles with trajectory shaping vehicles.

Consistent with this report, these four conventional prompt global strike options should be evaluated, as well as other possible INF-range missile capabilities.

I believe these recommendations are consistent with Fred Ikle’s analysis in his 1961 article. He observed that in responding to arms control violations, “Political sanctions are likely to be less effective than an increased defense effort.”

For these reasons, I commend you for beginning a discussion about these issues, and I look forward to responding to your questions.