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Statement of Mr. Andrew Weber
Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological
Defense Programs

On

Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Request for
Atomic Energy Defense Activities and Nuclear Forces Programs

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Introduction

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify regarding U.S. nuclear forces. It gives me great pleasure to join Acting Administrator Held, Admiral Richardson, Admiral Benedict, General Harencak, Deputy Assistant Secretary Bunn, Acting Assistant Secretary Huizenga, and Chairman Winokur to discuss these vital topics.

I have the privilege of serving as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (NCB), as well as the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) Staff Director. In this capacity, I am the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) for nuclear matters. AT&L plays a key role in managing the U.S. nuclear deterrent and leading the Department's efforts to acquire the strategic delivery systems for nuclear weapons in order to meet the operational needs of our armed forces. Chief among my responsibilities are the missions of providing the United States and its allies with a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.

My testimony will focus on the Department of Defense's (DoD) work with the Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), to ensure that the United States continues to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. The partnership between the Departments is marked by extensive collaboration and a shared commitment to the Nation's security. Today's fiscal uncertainty presents challenges to the weapon and infrastructure modernization programs that are vital to our nuclear weapons complex. To ensure the continued credibility of our nuclear deterrent, it is essential that Congress supports the President's FY 2015 budget request for nuclear weapons activities executed by DoD and NNSA. This request includes funds to ensure a safe and effective stockpile, to modernize the nuclear infrastructure, and to upgrade ballistic missile and bomber delivery systems. Today, I would like to share with you the progress the NWC has made in ensuring our two Departments achieve their goals, and our collective approach to accomplishing these objectives in the coming year.

Over the past year, the NWC met monthly to focus attention on the most pressing challenges facing the nuclear weapons enterprise. These challenges include managing life extension of warheads in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, modernization of the nuclear infrastructure that supports the stockpile, and modernization or replacement of DoD's nuclear delivery platforms. The vital aspect to these discussions has been the NWC's focus on prioritizing and balancing the necessary work that our budget, aging infrastructure, and highly skilled workforce can support.

Sufficient and timely funding for the enterprise remains a critical challenge for the NWC. The Council has worked hard to align resources, plans, and requirements. The NWC performed extensive cost assessments and leveraged other programmatic expertise to ensure the NNSA and DoD budget requests reflect the most urgent priorities of the nuclear weapons enterprise. This exercise illustrates a much greater level of collaboration between the two Departments and an updated review of the many demands our aging enterprise requires.

A Path Forward for a New U.S. Nuclear Posture

Reversing decades of neglect and addressing the aging nuclear enterprise continues to be a priority for the NWC. We must ensure that the infrastructure, capabilities, and critical skills needed to support the nuclear deterrent are maintained over the long term. The NWC has reviewed its long-term stockpile strategy in response to the overlap of multiple life extension programs, competing requirements, higher-than-anticipated program costs, and a constrained fiscal environment. The work of the Council has identified the enterprise's most pressing priorities and addressed means to ensure that both DoD and DOE are prepared to execute these critical modernization programs.

DoD Stockpile and Platform Requirements

The NWC stockpile strategy—the “3 + 2 Strategy”—when fully implemented, is designed to reduce both the number and types of weapons in our future arsenal. DoD and NNSA are moving forward with several weapon systems Life Extension Programs in FY 2014 to support long-term deterrent capabilities. The B61-12 and W76-1 LEPs are the most critical Life Extension

Programs to our stockpile, and NNSA and the Air Force request funding these LEPs in FY 2015. Given fiscal challenges, the NWC agreed that slipping further the W78/88-1 interoperable warheads and W88 submarine-launched ballistic missile alteration created manageable risk while allowing resources to continue to support the B61-12 and W76-1 LEPs. These decisions allow us to meet Air Force and Navy requirements while more efficiently managing annual costs among our various programs.

The W76-1 LEP is on schedule to meet its production requirements by FY 2019.

For the bomber leg of the Triad, DoD requires life extension of the B61 gravity bomb. The B61 models 3 and 4 non-strategic bombs are deployed with NATO dual capable aircraft to provide U.S. extended deterrence to our Allies. The B61 models 7 and 11 strategic bombs are carried by the B-2 bomber and are an essential component of air-delivered strategic deterrence. In April 2010, the Nuclear Posture Review reaffirmed both the extended and strategic deterrent roles of the B61 and directed proceeding with its full-scope life extension. The result will be a single bomb, termed the B61 model 12, which will replace four types of the B61—one strategic and three non-strategic—further promoting efficiencies and minimizing costs. In addition, the B61-12 will enable the retirement of the B83-1, the last megaton weapon in the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

The B61-12 is currently in Phase 6.3, *Development Engineering* and is on schedule for the 2014 milestones. We have worked successfully to ensure that the development of DoD-provided hardware, in this case, a tail kit, is on track. The Air Force has funded both the tail kit development and production to synchronize with NNSA needs. Due to sequestration impacts, the overall LEP schedule has been revised for DOE/NNSA to complete the first production unit by second quarter FY 2020. This first production unit date will just meet U.S. Strategic Command's requirements and also critical U.S. commitments to our NATO allies to sustain their non-strategic nuclear capabilities and to provide extended deterrence to our partners.

The NWC continues to plan efforts for an Air-Launched Cruise Missile replacement—the Long Range Stand-off cruise missile. The NWC currently supports the Air Force's need for a

replacement cruise missile, and the DoD and NNSA are working closely to align the warhead and a missile programs.

In response to the Nuclear Posture Review's guidance to maintain a triad, DoD has a robust plan for recapitalizing the ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers that support our nuclear deterrent. In FY 2015, DoD will continue to fund the Ohio class replacement submarine and Trident II D-5 missile, the follow-on capability to the Minuteman III ICBM, upgrades to the B-2 and B-52H heavy bombers, and development of a Long Range Stand-off missile to replace the current air-launched cruise missile. We are working closely with the Services to ensure our Ohio class submarines, D-5 missile, ICBMs, and bombers remain on line until follow-on or life extension programs are in place. Additionally, DoD is developing options to meet its extended deterrence commitments to allies with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and making sure that the life-extended B61 bomb is compatible with the aircraft.

Maintaining Fiscal Prudence and Revitalizing the Nuclear Infrastructure

An effective strategic deterrent consists of more than nuclear weapons and their delivery platforms. It also requires an infrastructure to provide agile research and development and manufacturing capabilities. A responsive infrastructure will provide the United States with capabilities to address technical problems in the stockpile, or future adverse geopolitical challenges, with a substantially smaller stockpile than today's. Continuing to recapitalize the Nation's nuclear infrastructure will require sustained investments. The Departments of Defense and Energy share a common path forward to accomplish this task in a responsible, fiscally prudent manner.

To support a future responsive infrastructure, the Department of Defense Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) and NNSA collaborated on a joint review of NNSA's plutonium pit production strategy to achieve cost-savings. We believe this strategy, which couples repurposed existing facilities with new scalable facilities, is a prudent means to respond to geopolitical or technical surprise, and to allow reductions in hedge weapons. To support NNSA's plutonium strategy, the NWC has fully supported NNSA's efforts to reprogram

\$120 million in FY12 funds to begin repurposing existing infrastructure. This reprogramming would support the transition of high hazard work out of the current Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility to other existing facilities, ultimately initiating the three-part plutonium strategy. In September 2013, partial approval and conditions received from a congressional subcommittee enabled \$43.3 million to transfer capabilities. The approval of the remaining \$76.7 million in reprogramming funds is essential to preparing existing facilities for repurposing. The DoD encourages Congress to approving the remaining reprogramming to support this critical national capability.

In light of findings for plutonium pit production, CAPE applied its methodology to the Nation's need for a uranium processing capability replacement. As with any major systems acquisition program, building large, one-of-a-kind nuclear facilities presents significant challenges in terms of planning, design, and development—one of our principal requirements in today's fiscally constrained environment is to control costs.

Revitalizing our Structures

In January, I joined Secretary Hagel in visiting F.E. Warren and Kirtland Air Force Bases and Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico. It was a privilege to observe the daily professionalism of airmen, sailors, and laboratory personnel who ensure a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. Over the last year, several personnel concerns have received the highest levels of DoD attention, and the Secretary of Defense has directed an internal and external review of these issues. This comprehensive review will examine the nuclear mission in the Departments of Navy and Air Force regarding personnel, training, testing, oversight, mission performance, and investment and will provide short- and long-term recommendations by April 30, 2014.

Within the weapons program, DoD has provided input to the Congressional Advisory Panel on the nuclear security enterprise as directed by section 3166 of the FY 2013 National Defense Authorization Act. We look forward to the recommendations this panel will provide on how to

achieve the most efficient governance structure to meet DoD weapons requirements and to protect the taxpayer.

Efforts to Counter Nuclear Threats

Finally, I want to highlight DoD's efforts to counter nuclear threats, including those efforts that help ensure that terrorists and proliferators cannot access nuclear materials and expertise abroad. During the preceding decade, there has been valuable collaboration on this goal at the federal level. President Obama has called nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists "the single biggest threat to U.S. security." As President Obama pointed out, just one nuclear weapon detonated in an American city would devastate "our very way of life" and represent a "catastrophe for the world." For this reason, this Administration has outlined a series of policies that reflect the gravity of this threat, and the interagency has made significant improvements in working to prevent, and prepare mitigation actions for, catastrophic nuclear events.

One of DoD's priorities is to "internationalize" the response to the nuclear terrorism threat. The United States has been aggressive in its threat reduction efforts, but it cannot meet this challenge alone. In President Obama's view, there is a pressing need to "deepen our cooperation and to strengthen the institutions and partnerships that help prevent nuclear materials from ever falling into the hands of terrorists." To this end, with our NNSA and other interagency partners, we are expanding nuclear counterterrorism and threat reduction cooperation with two of our closest allies, the UK and France, building on all three countries' technical expertise and history of cooperation. At the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, the three governments released a joint statement pledging cooperation and assistance to others facing nuclear terrorism threats. However, this work cannot be limited to a handful of countries. For this reason, we have made building international partnership capacity a high priority.

Last month, the third Nuclear Security Summit was held in The Hague, Netherlands. This gathering brought together leaders from 53 countries and four international organizations to address measures to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism, protect nuclear materials, and prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. First introduced by President Obama in Prague in

2009, the Summit process formally began in Washington, DC, in 2010 and endorsed the President's call for an international effort to secure all vulnerable fissionable materials worldwide. The U.S. has contributed to this global effort through an interagency strategy to eliminate as much material as practicable and ensure that all remaining sites are secured at least to the guidelines set forth by the International Atomic Energy Agency. DoD has supported this effort by working to secure weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and Kazakhstan to and by working with our colleagues at NNSA to assist China, India, and Kazakhstan establish their nuclear security training centers. Ensuring that all nuclear material remains secure is the first priority, but there are also critical efforts underway to address the risks of lost or stolen nuclear material and build capacity for responding to incidents involving nuclear material. DoD contributes to these activities by building partner capacity in detection, interdiction, border security, and emergency response. Although more than four years have passed since the President's call for increased focus in this area our work isn't done; nuclear security is an enduring responsibility as long as nuclear materials exist.

On the domestic front, the Nuclear Weapons Accident/Incident Exercise program focuses on exercising a whole of government response to a U.S. nuclear weapon accident or incident. This full-scale national-level exercise program is led on a rotating basis by the Air Force, Navy, and DOE/NNSA and addresses terrorist driven events, in addition to those not caused by malevolent actions. Last May we successfully conducted the largest exercise in the program's history at Malmstrom Air Force Base, with over 1,200 participants from departments and agencies at the federal, state, and local level. DOE/NNSA led the latest iteration last week. The work that DoD, DOE/NNSA, and the FBI, as well as other partners, have put into this program over the last several years has led to stronger ties and enhanced collaboration. We look forward to continuing these efforts so that we can be prepared if an unlikely, but potentially catastrophic, incident were to occur.

Conclusion

The nuclear threat to the United States has evolved considerably since the end of the Cold War. No longer does the threat of a large-scale nuclear exchange hover constantly over the world.

Yet, we cannot afford to be complacent. We must continue to field a strong nuclear deterrent that is supported by an agile and responsive infrastructure and valued workforce, and we must continue to carry out the threat reduction and nonproliferation activities that help to prevent nuclear terrorist threats. The Department of Defense remains committed to its vital partnership with DOE and Congress in meeting the Nation's most fundamental security needs. In closing, I respectfully ask for your support for the President's FY 2015 budget request. This will ensure that we are fully capable of providing safety and security to the American people.