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THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

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BEFORE THE HOUSE
ARMED SERVICES
STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

MAY 9, 2013

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Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, distinguished members of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on our nuclear forces and the policies and programs that support them. I am pleased to join Acting Administrator Miller, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Dr. Harvey, General Kehler, Mr. Winokur, and Mr. Huizenga who are here today for this discussion.

The Office of Global Strategic Affairs (GSA) leads the Department of Defense's efforts to execute the President's vision toward a world without nuclear weapons, while recognizing that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States must maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. The great men and women of GSA lead the Department's work with our international allies and partners to ensure and strengthen stability and deterrence in the international system. GSA is also responsible for policy development on a range of issues, including countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); ballistic missile defense; and dealing with the emerging security threats in the cyber and space domains.

The subcommittee has asked that I address a number of issues today, including: U.S. nuclear force posture; implementation of the Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START); status of the Nuclear Posture Implementation Study; nuclear modernization plans and budget requirements under the 1251/1043 plan; current and future requirements for nuclear weapons delivery systems; the decision-making process and strategic perspective at the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC); and stewardship, sustainment, and modernization of the U.S. nuclear stockpile and supporting infrastructure. Additionally, I stand ready to answer any questions that the subcommittee may have.

Global Strategic Balance

The United States has come a long way from a high point of approximately 31,000 nuclear warheads at the height of the Cold War in 1967 to about 5,000 in our stockpile today. The number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads reported under New START for the United States as of March 1, 2013 stands at 1,654. For the Russian Federation, the figure is 1,480. By any measure, this represents significant, demonstrable disarmament progress.

While reporting and inspections that are done under New START give us a strong understanding of deployed Russian strategic nuclear weapons, we have significantly less confidence in the numbers of Russian non-strategic or “tactical” nuclear weapons.

Russia also maintains a robust nuclear warhead production capability to regularly remanufacture warheads rather than conduct life-extension programs, as the United States does. It is also modernizing its delivery systems. It is fielding a mobile variant of the Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a new Borey-class missile submarine with Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and replacements for its nuclear air launched cruise missile (ALCM). It is also developing a new heavy ICBM to replace aging Cold War-era systems, which we estimate will go into service by the end of this decade.

China continues to invest in nuclear weapons and delivery systems in order to enhance the mobility and survivability of its nuclear deterrent. Its broad range of missile-development programs includes an effort to replace some liquid-fueled systems with more advanced solid-fueled systems. It is also pursuing a sea-based deterrent with the development of the JL-2 submarine launched ballistic missile intended for deployment on the Type-094 Jin-class ballistic missile submarine. Although China continues to upgrade its nuclear missile force, we estimate that it has not substantially increased its nuclear warhead stockpile in the past year, since I last briefed this subcommittee.

Iran continues to defy the calls of the international community for transparency into its nuclear activities. Its refusal to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program continue to heighten U.S. and international concerns that Iran is pursuing the development of a nuclear-weapon capability.

North Korea continues to violate its international obligations and commitments, including denuclearization. Its announcement on February 12, 2013 of a third nuclear test, following on the heels of its December 12 Taepo Dong-2 launch, and its subsequent threatening rhetoric are the latest reminders that North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and proliferation activities, pose threats to U.S. national security, Asia-Pacific regional security, and nonproliferation efforts worldwide.

The array of nuclear-armed or nuclear weapons-pursuing states around the world certainly complicates the global security environment. The United States and Russia together, however, still account for a vast majority of the world's nuclear weapons, even after the central limits of New START are reached in February 2018. For this reason, our focus for the next stage of arms control remains bilateral efforts with Russia.

New START Treaty

The New START Treaty entered into force on February 5, 2011. It allows the United States to continue to field a credible and flexible nuclear deterrent force while also providing a framework for bilateral reductions in strategic nuclear weapons systems. When fully implemented, the New START Treaty will result in the lowest number of deployed nuclear warheads since the 1950s. The Treaty limits both the United States and the Russian Federation to 1,550 accountable warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. Strategic stability will be maintained through a robust triad of strategic delivery systems under the Treaty's limit of 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers; and 800 total deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers. The United States can meet national security requirements under these limits.

A key contribution of New START is its extensive verification regime. I am pleased to report that the United States has been fully implementing the measures that are included in this regime. Since entry into force, the United States has conducted 40 on-site inspections and Russia has conducted 41. Each side has fully used its respective inspection quotas for the Treaty's first two years, and both sides are well into the third year of inspections. Each side is exchanging updates to its respective databases on strategic offensive arms, twice per year as agreed under New START, and each has exchanged telemetric information on selected ICBM and SLBM launches. Delegations from the United States and Russia have also met five times under the Treaty's Bilateral Consultative Commission to address implementation issues.

The United States is on track to meet New START's central limits by the February 5, 2018 deadline. We look forward to continuing robust bilateral cooperation and dialogue with the Russian Federation as we fully implement the Treaty.

Future Arms Control Efforts with Russia

As the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review stated, New START is the first step by this Administration in lowering the numbers of nuclear weapons and delivery systems deployed by the United States and Russia. We intend to pursue further bilateral reductions and transparency with Russia that would cover all nuclear weapons – deployed and non-deployed, strategic and non-strategic – while ensuring that we maintain our commitments to stability with other nuclear powers, deterrence of potential adversaries, and assurance of our allies and partners.

Because of improved relations with Russia, strict numerical parity in nuclear weapons is no longer as compelling as it was during the Cold War. On the other hand, large disparities in nuclear capabilities could raise concerns on both sides and among U.S. allies and partners, and may not be conducive to maintaining a stable, long-term strategic relationship, particularly at lower numbers. Therefore, as the NPR stated, we will place importance on Russia joining us as we pursue additional reductions in nuclear stockpiles.

The timing and framework for the next round of negotiations are not settled, but we are working now to establish the appropriate conditions. The administration has been clear that future discussions with Russia should include non-strategic nuclear weapons, consistent with the Senate's Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification for New START.

Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Study

As you know, the administration has been conducting an NPR implementation study to review our nuclear deterrence requirements and operational plans to ensure they address today's threats. Once the President reviews the results of the study and makes decisions regarding its recommendations, the administration will revise employment guidance and operational plans accordingly. The President's decisions regarding the study recommendations will also provide the foundation on which we can develop specific proposals regarding further nuclear reductions that we can use as the basis for discussions with Russia.

The implementation study focuses on the five key strategic objectives established in the Nuclear Posture Review:

- Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism;
- Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy;
- Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels;
- Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and
- Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.

The analysis is not yet complete, but our preliminary view based on work to date, is that further reductions consistent with the national security environment will be possible and that continuing modernization of our nuclear capabilities is essential. The details of this work are highly sensitive, but as already promised by the Secretary of Defense, the Department is committed to sharing relevant aspects of the analysis with the senior leaders of the defense committees when approved by the President. The Secretary is committed to keeping Congress fully informed of policy developments and our plans for adjustments to both the nuclear force and its supporting nuclear complex.

Budget Uncertainties and Stockpile Management

The current fiscal situation continues to put pressure on the entire Department of Defense. As sequestration cuts are implemented and as budgetary uncertainties continue, the Department will make difficult decisions and assume more risks. These risks, however, will not alter our prioritization of the nuclear mission and our commitment to U.S. extended deterrence and assurance of allies and partners. We will make every effort to minimize adverse effects on our mission and to ensure the capabilities and readiness of our forces.

For as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear stockpile. A modern, responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure is the foundation of our nuclear deterrent and the Department of Defense, in partnership with the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA), will take the steps necessary to ensure its long-term sustainment and modernization. Those steps, and how the administration proposes to fund them, were originally laid out in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 “Section 1251 Report.” Ongoing fiscal challenges and greater-than-anticipated program costs

have forced a reexamination of the 1251 strategy and supporting programs. As a result, the administration has worked to identify cost savings in a sensible and strategic way. We will protect important modernization programs, while continuing to meet our other defense, deterrence, and assurance commitments. We have made difficult choices and are accepting risk through program delays where feasible and other programmatic adjustments.

One such adjustment has been the development of an enduring strategy for plutonium capability that includes re-use of existing plutonium pits to meet near-term requirements. This has allowed for a deferral of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement-Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) that has, in turn, freed funding for construction of the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF). Design work on the UPF continues, and is scheduled for completion in mid-FY 2014.

These decisions reflect careful consideration on the part of the DOE/NNSA, in close consultation with the Department of Defense, and the difficult choices that have been made in order to operate within the budget constraints imposed by the current fiscal environment. Our prioritized stockpile plan supports the President's commitment to modernizing the nation's nuclear infrastructure and the importance of the nuclear mission.

Force Modernization

The 2010 NPR concluded that the United States will maintain a triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers; the President's FY 2014 budget supports its modernization. As Secretary of Defense Hagel has stated, "providing the necessary resources for nuclear modernization of the triad should be a national priority," and that is the policy of this administration.

As we move to lower numbers under New START, sustaining the sea-based leg of our nuclear deterrent remains a vital requirement. The service life for the Trident D-5 SLBM has been extended to 2042 and construction of the first of the *Ohio*-class replacement submarines is scheduled to begin in 2021.

The administration plans to sustain the Minuteman III (MMIII) ICBM system through 2030. Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) flight tests and surveillance efforts are ongoing and by 2017

will provide better estimates for component age-out and system end-of-life timelines. Guidance system and fuse replacement are also expected to be needed prior to 2030. An Air Force analysis of alternatives examining options and required capabilities for a follow-on system, Ground-Based Strategic Deterrence, is projected to be complete in 2014. This will allow a program to further extend the life of the MMIII or to develop a follow-on ICBM. The ICBM Demonstration Validation Program is maturing technologies for insertion into future SRM and guidance programs. Follow-on ICBM activities will be closely coordinated and leveraged with efforts to modernize the MMIII through 2030.

A key modernization issue is sustainment of the large-diameter solid-rocket motor industrial base, pending a decision whether to produce a follow-on system. Strategic rocket motor demand has been on a steady decline for the last two decades, placing a heavy burden on Navy and Air Force resources to keep it viable. Planned investments offer the Department and our industrial partners the opportunity to right-size rocket motor production capacity for the short term while retaining critical skills for the future.

The United States will maintain two B-52H strategic bomber wings and one B-2 wing. Both bombers, however, are aging. Sustained funding and support is therefore required to ensure operational effectiveness through the remainder of their respective service lives. The President's Budget Request supports upgrades to these platforms; for example, providing the B-2 with survivable communications, a modern flight system, and upgraded defensive systems. The Department has begun a program for a new, long-range, nuclear-capable, penetrating bomber that is fully integrated with a family of systems supporting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. In addition, as air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) age, the Department is planning to complete an analysis of alternatives this month for an ALCM follow-on system called the long-range standoff (LRSO) missile. We plan to sustain the ALCM and work with DOE/NNSA to sustain the W80-1 ALCM warhead until the LRSO can be fielded.

Nuclear Weapons Council

My colleague, Dr. Harvey, will elaborate on the role of the NWC in more detail. However, I would like to mention that, under Assistant Secretary of Defense Weber's leadership as NWC Executive Director, the Council has met more regularly and has been more aggressive

in addressing areas of need within the nuclear enterprise. As a result, it has served as a vehicle for improving the relationship between the Departments of Defense and Energy and has been a catalyst for progress.

Alliance Commitments

Our commitment to NATO remains strong and continues to be a positive force in the international security environment. Last year, NATO completed a rigorous analysis of its deterrence and defense posture, formally publishing the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR), which clearly states that nuclear weapons and missile defense are core components of NATO's overall capabilities for deterrence alongside conventional forces. To implement the principles and results of the DDPR, the Alliance also updated longstanding nuclear guidance. We also work closely with our NATO allies through the Nuclear Planning Group, which is the senior alliance body on nuclear policy and posture issues. This forum provides a critical venue for discussions among NATO allies on a broad range of nuclear policy matters, including the safety and security of nuclear weapons and the development of common alliance positions on nuclear policy.

The special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom remains strong. Instability in the international system caused by aggressors such as North Korea and the nuclear aspirations of Iran threaten both of our states, and these shared threats strengthen our commitment to bilateral cooperation across the nuclear domain. One way in which this cooperation is evidenced is the Common Missile Compartment program. This joint effort provides significant cost-sharing benefits to both states and helps ensure that the next generation of our respective SSBN fleets remains technically sound and strategically viable. In this era of declining defense budgets and overall fiscal uncertainty, this type of collaboration is increasingly important. We value the UK's continuous at-sea deterrent and the vital contribution it brings to our allied nuclear deterrence mission.

To support U.S. extended deterrence and assurance commitments, the Department plans to provide a nuclear capability to the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) to replace existing dual-capable aircraft (DCA) in Europe, and remains fully committed to the B61 Life Extension Program (LEP). Our plan remains to integrate nuclear delivery capability into the F-35 during Follow-on

Development block upgrades of the aircraft. To allow for more maturity in the Follow-on Development program, the Air Force (in coordination with the Joint Program Office) now intends to deliver nuclear capability to the F-35 for deployment after calendar year 2024. The Air Force has plans in place to ensure there will be no gaps in our ability to meet extended deterrence commitments to our allies and partners as the F-35 DCA capability comes on-line. The B61 LEP will upgrade a successful, but aging, line of weapons with enhanced security features and a precision guidance capability that will serve as a necessary component of our central and extended nuclear deterrent for many years to come.

We continue to engage the Republic of Korea on nuclear matters through the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC), which serves as a bilateral forum to enhance the effectiveness of extended deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. This work has taken on greater urgency in light of North Korea's continued provocative actions that have increased tensions. Our recent B-52 and B-2 missions demonstrate that we are unequivocally committed to our defense of the Republic of Korea, to deterring aggression, and to ensuring peace and stability in the region.

With our Japanese allies, we continue to participate in an ongoing Extended Deterrence Dialogue, co-chaired by the State Department, which covers nuclear and missile defense issues. This dialogue is actively strengthening our alliance by resolving questions and providing frank discussion on a range of strategic issues. Its value lies in the trust and understanding built between partners, and the opportunity it engenders to think creatively about deterrence challenges before they arise.

Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications

The Department of Defense is committed to sustaining and improving our Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) architecture. Over the past year, the Department has begun formulating a long-term strategy to modernize critical NC3 capabilities, while also enhancing NC3 support in regional contingencies.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense is leading this effort to ensure our NC3 system remains enduring and secure against a broad range of threats and challenges. In this context, the Department is prioritizing resources to address known capability gaps while incrementally

building toward a modern NC3 architecture that will ensure timely decision-making support for the President and address the full spectrum of 21st century deterrence challenges.

Conclusion

The current fiscal environment and ongoing budget uncertainties will continue to pose significant challenges as we move forward in the sustainment and modernization of our nuclear deterrent. As a result, we will continue to adjust programs in order to meet the nation's deterrence and defense requirements while taking into account a declining Department of Defense budget. Despite this uncertainty, the administration remains firmly committed to safe, secure, and effective nuclear stockpile and modernized platforms to deter potential adversaries and reassure our allies and partners around the world.