STATEMENT

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BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES OF THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON

CAPACITY OF THE U.S. NAVY TO PROJECT POWER WITH LARGE SURFACE COMBATANTS

JUNE 17, 2015
Mr. Chairman, Representative Courtney, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to address the Navy’s capacity to project power with large surface combatants (LSCs).

To protect U.S. national interests and achieve the objectives of the 2015 National Security Strategy, and in order to credibly deter potential adversaries and prevent them from achieving their objectives, the United States must maintain its ability to project power in areas in which our access and freedom to operate are challenged. Accordingly, the U.S. military will invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) environments. Navy’s LSC fleet, comprised of guided missile cruisers (CGs) and guided missile destroyers (DDGs), are vital to achieving our power projection objectives. These are multi-role warships – capable of launching Tomahawk cruise missiles to strike strategic or tactical targets, firing long-range Standard Missiles for defense against aircraft or anti-ship missiles, launching anti-surface weapons at threats over the horizon, employing their sonar systems and their embarked helicopters to perform anti-submarine missions, and providing naval surface fire support to Marines conducting littoral maneuver and subsequent operations ashore – fulfill broad power projection mission requirements both independently and in conjunction with strike groups.

The Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 President’s Budget submission is informed by the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which implements the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) and continues our efforts to ensure our ability to protect the homeland, build security globally, and project power and win decisively. It represents the bare minimum to execute the DSG in the world we face. The cumulative effect of significant budget shortfalls over the last three years has forced the Navy to accept high risk in two of the most challenging DSG missions that depend on adequate numbers of modern, responsive forces: Deter and Defeat Aggression and Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges. For the latter, there is greater risk if the Navy is confronted with a technologically advanced adversary compared to our FY 2014 President’s Budget, the last budget to fully meet all of the missions of the DSG. This is principally due to the slower delivery of new critical capabilities, particularly in air and missile defense, and overall ordnance capacity.

**Force Structure Assessment**

Navy’s Force Structure Assessment (FSA) determines the long-term requirements for the numbers and types of ships to provide the capabilities needed to meet the Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF)-assigned Combatant Commander (COCOM) objectives, from peacetime theater security cooperation efforts through warfighting. The FSA produces an objective number of each type of ship, based on capabilities provided by those ships, to meet the future steady state and warfighting requirements determined by the Navy’s analytic process, with an acceptable degree of risk (e.g., does not jeopardize joint force campaign success).

Navy conducts an FSA when there is significant change in SECDEF’s guidance concerning either the national defense strategy or the specific military objectives assigned to the COCOMs. The FSA directly informs Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan, which provides a plan to achieve the FSA mix of ships, by quantity and type, and describes the resources necessary for implementation of the plan.

In 2014, Navy conducted an update to the 2012 FSA in compliance with the FY 2015 HASC Committee Report 113-446 that accompanied H.R. 4435. The Navy reviewed changes, below the strategic guidance level, that had the potential to impact the long-term Naval Battle Force requirement. Those changes included: the instruction governing general guidance for the classification of naval vessels and ship counting procedures was updated and subsequently modified by FY15 NDAA language; a new presence requirement was identified; the 2014 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) was released; strategic laydown was revised and employment cycles were modified.

The 2014 update to the 2012 FSA resulted in a total requirement of 308 ships: 11 CVN, 88 LSCs, 48 attack submarines, 12 SSBN, 34 amphibious ships, 52 small surface combatants, 10 JHSV, 29 combat logistics force ships, and 24 command and support ships. Of particular note, the combination of employment cycle changes, home porting of additional LSCs forward, shifting of the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) of land mission to ashore assets, and independent deployment of DDG 1000s results in no change to the LSC objective of 88 ships. However, the 2014 FSA update did provide the additional detail that 40 LSCs require advanced BMD capabilities to meet Navy-unique requirements to provide defense of the sea base and expeditionary land base sites, and 11 LSCs require the ability to support an embarked Air Defense Commander.

**LSC Procurement**

The *Arleigh Burke* class (DDG 51) program remains one of the Navy’s most successful shipbuilding programs – 62 ships are currently operating in the Fleet. The first four DDG 51
Flight IIA restart ships are currently under construction and DDG 113, the first restart ship, will deliver in FY 2016 as the first ship built from the keel up with advanced BMD capability. The FY 2016 President’s Budget includes funding for two destroyers to execute the fourth year of the current ten ship multi-year procurement contract. The first of these ships will be a Flight IIA and will incorporate the latest Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) capability. The second ship will introduce the next flight upgrade, known as Flight III, which incorporates the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), designated as AN/SPY-6. AN/SPY-6 is the future multi-mission radar of the Navy's surface combatant fleet, which will meet the growing cruise and ballistic missile threat by improving radar sensitivity and enabling longer range detection for engagement of increasingly complex threats. The AN/SPY-6 radar suite will be capable of providing simultaneous surveillance and engagement support for long range BMD and area air defense.

Navy BMD continues to be in high demand, as COCOM demand has increased from 44 in FY 2012-2014 to 77 in FY 2016. As mentioned previously, the 2014 update to the 2012 Force Structure Assessment sets the requirement at 40 advanced capable BMD ships, as part of the 88 LSC requirement, to meet Navy unique requirements to support defense of the sea base and limited expeditionary land base sites. To better meet COCOM demand and the Navy unique requirement, Navy is building advanced BMD capability in new construction destroyers and modernizing existing destroyers with advanced BMD capability. The basic and intermediate capable BMD ships remaining in inventory will continue to contribute to the sourcing of COCOM requests independent of the Navy unique requirement. Navy continues to meet 100% of Secretary of Defense adjudicated requirements.

The DDG 1000 Zumwalt class guided missile destroyer will be an optimally crewed, multi-mission, surface combatant designed to provide long-range, precision, naval surface fire support to Marines conducting littoral maneuver and subsequent operations ashore. In addition to the ship’s two 155mm Advanced Gun Systems capable of engaging targets with the Long Range Land Attack Projectiles (LRLAP), the ship will be capable of conducting Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), land attack, and will provide valuable advancements in technology such as signature reduction (both acoustic and radar cross-section), enhanced survivability features, shipboard automation, and an Integrated Power System (IPS) capable of generating 78 megawatts of power - providing tremendous growth opportunity for future systems.
Cruiser Modernization

The FY 2016 President’s Budget implements the CG modernization plan as modified by the FY 2015 NDAA and Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act. This plan will provide the means to retain the best ADC capabilities through the 2030s. This plan paces the threat through the installation of the latest technological advances in combat systems and engineering in CGs 63-73. As a result, these ships remain relevant and viable, extending the CGs service life out to 40 years and enabling the Navy to sustain dominant force structure. To date, the Navy has modernized CGs 52-58 with the Advanced Capability Build (ACB) 08 Combat System as well as substantial Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical (HM&E) upgrades, and has completed modernization on CGs 59, 60, and 62 with the improved ACB 12. These investments have allowed these 11 ships of the Ticonderoga class to remain the world’s premier ADC platforms.

In the FY 2015 President’s Budget, the Navy proposed an affordable framework to retain the remaining eleven cruisers (CG 63-73) in the active Fleet, through induction into a phased modernization period. Under this plan, the final CG retirement would have occurred in 2045, at a significantly reduced cost to the Navy, and would have relieved pressure on the shipbuilding account largely consumed in the 2030s with building OHIO-replacement SSBNs and aircraft carriers.

Following Congressional direction in the FY15 National Defense Authorization Act and Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, the Navy revised its CG modernization program to the “2-4-6” plan. Under this approach, the Navy will begin inducting no more than two CGs per year in FY 2015, will retain them in a phased modernization status for no more than four years, and will limit the number of CGs in modernization to no more than six.

The Navy will begin the modernization of these ships with material assessments, detailed availability planning, and material procurements. Subsequently, the Navy will perform HM&E upgrades, critical structural repairs, and extensive corrective and condition-based maintenance. These HM&E modernization and repair efforts will commence as soon as possible after entering this modernization period, and will include modernization industrial periods. The HM&E-centric maintenance and modernization industrial periods will include modifications that are part of the Cruiser Modernization program of record, such as structural modifications and maintenance, including tanks and voids, and mission life extension alterations. Other preparatory work for the combat system modernization, such as equipment removal and space
preparations may also be accomplished during these periods. These modernization industrial periods can be scheduled at times when there is a shortage of work in the various homeports, thereby leveling the work load and effectively utilizing industrial facilities. Without the pressure of meeting near term Fleet deployment schedules, the work can be planned in the most economical and efficient manner, including reducing the need for costly overtime rates and hiring subcontractors to supplement shipyard workforce. The final phase of the modernization period will include combat system installation, integration, and testing. This will occur concurrently with re-crewing the ship, immediately preceding re-introduction to the Fleet. With combat systems modernization occurring immediately prior to restoration, these ships will have the latest combat systems upgrades, thus mitigating the risk and cost of technical obsolescence.

The Navy intends to draw down the manpower for these CGs during their modernization, to reduce the cruiser costs during the period.

The Navy is finalizing plans to induct USS COWPENS (CG 63) and USS GETTYSBURG (CG 64) in FY 2015. The Navy has procured the equipment required to modernize these two ships through the use of the Ships Modernization, Operations and Sustainment Fund (SMOSF) and has also programmed nearly $1 billion in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) towards CG modernization.

**Destroyer Modernization**

The FY 2016 President’s Budget also includes funding for the modernization of four destroyers. To counter emerging threats from peer competitor nations, the Navy must look to upgrade existing capability in order to reduce risk to our forces to acceptable levels until we are able to procure sufficient SPY-6 equipped DDGs. This investment is critical to sustain combat effectiveness, reach the required number of advanced BMD capable ships to meet the Navy requirement, and to achieve the full expected service lives of the Aegis Fleet. The destroyer modernization program includes HM&E upgrades, advances in warfighting capability including advanced BMD capability and Navy Integrated Fire Control Counter Air (NIFC-CA), and open architecture combat systems. This renovation reduces total ownership costs and expands mission capability for current and future combat capabilities. However, due to fiscal constraints, we were compelled to reduce the combat system modernization of one DDG Flight IIA per year starting in FY 2018.
Increasing Surface Force Lethality

In addition to building the future Fleet and modernizing the current Fleet, the FY 2016 President’s Budget increases the lethality of the Surface Force in the areas of Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), and Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW). Examples include the Tomahawk recertification effort beginning in FY 2019 to improve weapon capability in the second half of its service life, procurements of advanced active weapons such as SM-6, and investment in a Next Generation Land Attack Weapon (NGLAW) that will achieve Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in the mid-2020s. Additionally, the Navy is conducting an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) for a surface launched offensive anti-surface warfare (OASuW) weapon.

Future Surface Combatants

With the planned retirement of cruisers and destroyers beginning in 2020 and 2026 respectively, the Navy is in the early phase of planning for the future surface combatant force. Capabilities Based Assessments will begin this year and are expected to complete in 2016. These assessments will identify capability gaps, capacity shortfalls, and risks in the surface combatant force in the context of the Navy’s projected roles and missions in the mid-21st century. Future ships will continue to ensure our Navy’s ability to project power and operate effectively in A2/AD environments.

Sequestration

If sequestration returns in FY 2016, a revisit and revision of the defense strategy would be necessary. The Navy would be unable to execute two missions of the DSG: Deter and Defeat Aggression and Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges. For the latter, the major challenges include inadequate power projection capacity; too few strike fighter, command/control, and electronic warfare assets; limited advanced radar and missile capacity; and insufficient munitions. With limited ability to mitigate the impacts as we did in FY 2013, sequestration in FY 2016 would force the Navy to further delay critical warfighting capabilities, reduce readiness of forces needed for contingency response, further downsize weapons capacity, and forego or stretch force structure procurements as a last resort. The Navy’s capability and
capacity to meet operational requirements over the long-term will be reduced, including our ability to deploy forces on the timeline required by COCOMs in the event of a contingency.

**Summary**

Navy continues to instill affordability and stability into its large surface combatant force, and remains focused on providing global presence, sea-control, mission flexibility, and when necessary, power projection. The FY 2016 President’s Budget provides the best compromise between fiscal constraints and a path to attain force structure requirements, accepting risk while modernizing our current fleet and building a future Fleet with the capabilities required to support the defense strategy. Fiscal uncertainty – and sequestration in particular – remain the most significant threats to our ability to reach this goal. We thank you for your continued efforts for national security and request your support of the Navy’s FY 2016 President’s Budget.