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STATEMENT OF

VICE ADMIRAL COLLIN P. GREEN, U.S. NAVY

DEPUTY COMMANDER

UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

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Chairman Gallego, Ranking Member Kelly, and Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to represent U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) today. On behalf of General Clarke, it is my privilege to join Mr. John Plumb, Ms. Deborah Rosenblum, and Dr. Rhys M. Williams at this hearing on how we work together to address some of our most critical national security challenges. These Department leaders are critical partners for USSOCOM in our Coordinating Authority (CA) role across the Department of Defense (DoD) for countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD). We applaud their leadership, depth and breadth of innovation, and competence. We are proud to work together with them across the DoD and interagency, and with our allies and partner nations to counter threats from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Today I will review USSOCOM's role, WMD challenges, summarize our work to counter them over the past year, and our priorities for the coming year.

DoD CWMD CA Role

The Unified Command Plan underscores USSOCOM's CA responsibility for planning DoD CWMD strategic efforts, integrating operational plans, and advancing intelligence priorities in support of the Combatant Commands and other U.S. Government agencies as directed by the Secretary. Working within national and DoD policy guidance, USSOCOM's J10 directorate, based both here in the National Capital Region and at USSOCOM Headquarters in Tampa, exercises our CA responsibilities and makes relevant recommendations to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. To accomplish this, we collaborate across DoD, with U.S. government agencies, and other relevant organizations.

USSOCOM has served in this role for over five years, and we implement a DoD-wide functional campaign plan (FCP) that supports National Security priorities. The FCP directs action to achieve CWMD objectives and enable the Joint Force to integrate DoD efforts with

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those of other U.S. government departments and agencies to counter regional and transregional WMD threats. We work with Combatant Commands to incorporate CWMD objectives into campaign and contingency planning and operations, activities, and investments (OAIs). By integrating key FCP concepts into military plans and doctrine, and campaign objectives into OAIs, we align the DoD OAIs across time horizons from strategy to current operations and evaluate the Department's collective results through the annual CWMD Assessment. We improve and refine collaborative processes, such as the CWMD Coordinating Authority Synchronization forum to advance understanding of the WMD threat, develop new OAIs and initiatives to mitigate strategic risk, and conduct in-situ assessments of the efficacy of our efforts. We will continue to assess capability gaps across the Joint Force and develop recommendations to improve readiness, resourcing, and force posture necessary to counter WMD effectively.

Clearly, no single agency or government can address any of these threats alone. WMD pose complex transregional challenges that demand the application of specialized expertise and authorities across our government as well as our allies and partner nations. The DoD plays a unique and critical supporting role to our interagency colleagues, especially at the Departments of State, Energy, Treasury, Homeland Security, and Commerce, as well as our law enforcement entities, to prevent and contain threats, even as we prepare to respond to WMD crises in coordination with some of the same interagency colleagues. Therefore, we coordinate across the DoD, with interagency colleagues, allies, and partner nations without whom achieving U.S. objectives would be nearly impossible.

We are advancing our engagements with relevant academia, national laboratories, think tanks, and others to understand alternative points of view, promote innovation, and enhance the disruption of WMD proliferation networks. We benefit from the Defense Counterproliferation

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Office's analytic and tradecraft proficiency, partner with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) for its technical expertise and maintain liaison officers at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's (ODNI) National Counterproliferation Center and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security to ensure close collaboration. We collaborate with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense to explore cutting-edge technologies, material, and non-material solutions with unparalleled creativity.

WMD Challenges

The landscape of nuclear, chemical, and biological threats has continued to evolve over the past year. We closely monitor and analyze the progression of existing and potential WMD programs for state actors, Violent Extremist Organizations, and emerging technologies and threats, with essential support from the Defense Intelligence Agency.

The proliferation of dual-use, WMD-applicable goods, knowledge, and technology continues to present a direct threat to U.S. and allied interests by complicating U.S. force projection capabilities, countering Western missile defense systems, improving adversarial targeting capabilities, and expanding or sustaining WMD-related production capabilities. Procurement networks continue to acquire dual-use goods, materials, technologies, and expertise for WMD programs and delivery systems of certain countries of concern, such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Most networks remain resilient and adaptable despite international sanctions, export controls, and other prohibitions limiting the purchase or transfer of certain WMD-applicable goods to specific countries or entities. Most countries publicly desire to become self-sufficient in the domestic production of equipment and materials necessary to

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sustain or advance their WMD-related capabilities. If achieved, such domestic capabilities will challenge future counterproliferation opportunities.

Beijing is accelerating the modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal. The PRC is investing in, and expanding, the number of its land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear delivery platforms and constructing the infrastructure necessary to support this major expansion of its nuclear forces. China's continued implementation of conventional nuclear integration (CNI), i.e., placing nuclear capable weapons within conventional forces, remains a concern. China is flight testing and deploying several hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV), which can support nuclear or conventional munitions and are designed for high-speed maneuvers at altitudes where they pose challenges to U.S. missile defenses. China also sustained possible dual-use biological research, some of which raises concerns regarding its compliance with Article I of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Also problematic are the People's Liberation Army (PLA) efforts to leverage bioscience, technology, and gene-editing innovations. China's civil-military fusion allows the PLA to gain access to our emerging technology, expertise, and mass genetic datasets through legitimate academic, research, and business ventures which increases the risk of U.S. genomic data and biotechnology being used to further China's military priorities. Lastly, the Chinese market remains the world's leading source of dual-use, WMD-applicable goods going to countries of concern.

Russia continues to increase its nuclear stockpile, with an emphasis on nonstrategic nuclear weapons and, like China, is implementing CNI and testing HGV. Russia's first hypersonic weapon, the Avangard, uses a glide vehicle to deliver a nuclear warhead. As detailed in the 2021 State Department Compliance Report, the United States found that Russia is in violation of its obligations under both the BWC and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

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Russia also employed chemical weapons in two assassination attempts of Russian dissidents over the past four years, demonstrating an alarming willingness to use chemical weapons in small-scale operations.

The Intelligence Community continues to assess that Iran is not currently undertaking key development activities necessary to produce a nuclear explosive device. However, Iran has continued to expand its uranium enrichment and metallurgy activities beyond the limits of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran also continues to have limited success with its development and flight tests of space launched vehicles (SLV), including boosters that could support achieving intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) ranges if configured for that purpose.

North Korea retains nuclear and biological weapon capabilities as well as a likely chemical warfare program. North Korea has worked on the development of hypersonic gliding weapons and leader Kim Jong Un informed the Eighth Congress of the Korean Workers Party in January 2021 that development of hypersonic missiles for their next strategic weapon is underway. Pyongyang established a research center dedicated to hypersonic missile-related development that same month. North Korea almost certainly continued to acquire foreign-sourced goods for its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, as well as other dual-use items that could support chemical and biological weapons production and research.

Although military hostilities in South Asia abated in 2020, the regional rivalry between India and Pakistan persists and both countries continue to develop and flight test nuclear capable delivery systems. In 2021, India officials indicated their latest ballistic missile in development will provide operational flexibility while Pakistan reported the test of a domestically produced extended range cruise missile.

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Regarding Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs), the U.S. and our Coalition partners have succeeded against both ISIS and al-Qaida, attriting key leaders, preventing external attacks against the U.S. homeland, and disrupting chemical warfare aspirations; the Islamic State was the first non-state actor to have developed a chemical warfare agent and combine it with a projectile delivery system. While we necessarily realign our forces and resources as required to compete against multiple threats simultaneously, VEOs will remain an enduring threat and will continue to exploit widely available industrial chemicals for rudimentary chemical attacks in Iraq and Syria, while remaining intent on developing WMD capabilities and inspiring WMD-related attacks against Western interests, including possible crude CBW attacks against the U.S. Homeland. Moreover, VEOs offer potential instructions, documents, and videos on the internet to both inspire and to enable the use of crude toxins and improvised chemical weapons by their supporters as well as lone actors.

New technologies, rapidly diffusing around the world, put increasingly sophisticated capabilities in the hands of small groups and individuals as well as enhancing the capabilities of nation states. While democratization of technology can be beneficial, it can also be economically, militarily, and socially destabilizing. For this reason, advances in technologies such as computing, biotechnology, artificial intelligence, and manufacturing warrant extra attention to anticipate the trajectories of emerging technologies and understand their implications for security.

Accomplishments

National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy. Over the past year we contributed to the development of the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) to ensure our strategic approach keeps pace with our adversaries' WMD

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capabilities. USSOCOM participated in the Chairman's operational planning teams to integrate relevant CWMD objectives in the NMS and worked with the CWMD Unity of Effort Council – co-chaired by OSD and the Joint Staff – to ensure CWMD equities are included in the NDS.

Joint Force Resiliency. We implemented pertinent insights from the U.S. Forces Korea and U.S. European Command Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) defense and CWMD-focused assessments to ensure the Joint Force can continue to operate in a contaminated environment. This process led U.S. European Command to develop an Implementation Plan designed to enhance CBRN readiness across its area of operations over the next few years.

Operational Planning Enhancement. USSOCOM collaborates closely with the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, and military services to assess the global DoD CWMD campaign and ensure operational military plans appropriately address changes in the WMD threat environment. We initiated revision of our FCP to ensure optimal alignment of CWMD objectives across applicable Combatant Commands' operational plans and improve unity of effort across the DoD.

Advanced Exercises and Training. We integrated CWMD scenarios within the Chairman's Globally Integrated Exercise (GIE) and Global Integrated Campaign of Learning (GICoL). Exercising CWMD objectives with joint, interagency, and international partners ensures senior leaders are informed about the range of possible strategic outcomes and perceptions of other state and non-state actors given certain provocations, and improves the effectiveness, feasibility, and range of U.S. responses.

Enhanced International Integration. After publishing an unclassified CWMD guidebook for distribution to allies and partners on June 14, 2021, USSOCOM joined the U.S. delegation to

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the NATO Joint CBRN Defence Capability Development Group. We collaborated with 80 international experts from 20 NATO nations through this organization that supports development of CBRN defense capabilities including, but not limited to doctrine, materiel, and training. The U.S. delegation led an effort to rename the title of Allied Joint Publication 3.23 to “Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction in Military Operations,” replacing “Weapons of Mass Destruction Disablement.” This change ensures alignment between NATO and U.S. doctrine and terminology to drive NATO capability development beyond CBRN defense.

Improved Information Sharing. USSOCOM employs transregionally focused threat actor branches that enhanced shared understanding of WMD proliferation and procurement channels employed by adversaries ensuring deconfliction between the DoD, other U.S. government departments and agencies, and international partners while enabling operations, activities, and investments. In partnership with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, on October 28, 2021, USSOCOM established an ongoing CWMD information sharing forum with the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to coordinate and deconflict CWMD planning priorities and activities. As we enhance perceptions of strategic risk and associated mitigations, we can evaluate multiple contributions to counter the threat that may enhance our whole of government responses in heretofore unrealized ways.

WMD Pathway Defeat. USSOCOM has partnered with the Joint Staff to conduct a capabilities-based assessment (CBA) for the specialized activity of WMD pathway defeat. This CBA will identify proposed advancements for future Joint Force capabilities to defeat adversary WMD acquisition and development as part of a U.S. government approach in concert with our interagency partners.

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CWMD Senior Leader Seminar. On February 9-10, 2022, we facilitated the annual CWMD Senior Leader Seminar (SLS) to address Chinese WMD threats within the Indo-Pacific area of responsibility, support relevant DoD strategies, plans, and policies, and improve interoperability between the U.S. government and our international partners. Key outputs and recommendations from the SLS included commitments for sustained advancement of information sharing and collaboration with our allies.

2022 Priorities and Conclusion

We will continue to collaborate with the Combatant Commands, the Joint Staff and other government agencies to review our functional campaign plan and ensure it aligns with the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and the National Military Strategy. In closing, General Clarke and I would like to thank the members of this subcommittee for their support of this important national security mission. It is a privilege to work together with our DoD colleagues to keep our country safe from the threat of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. We look forward to our continued partnership with them, with members of Congress, and with our interagency and international partners to ensure our safety now and into the future.