STATEMENT OF

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BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

APRIL 3, 2019

Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member Stefanik, and Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to address you today. I am here representing the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in its role as the Department of Defense (DoD) Coordinating Authority for countering weapons of mass destruction (countering WMD). This is a very different and distinct role from the operational countering WMD role USSOCOM's Special Operations Forces have traditionally held and with which you may also be familiar. USSOCOM assumed the DoD Coordinating Authority role just over two years ago under the revised Unified Command Plan, and I am pleased to report to you today on progress against key objectives since USSOCOM briefed this committee one year ago. In close collaboration with our DoD, interagency and international partners, our work has included: completion of the Functional Campaign Plan for Countering WMD; development of an operational framework that will facilitate and integrate future countering WMD operations, activities and investments via collaborative planning with Combatant Commands, interagency partners, and allies; and improvement on 2017's baseline assessment of the DoD countering WMD campaign plan by mapping this year's assessment to the five adversary-focused Global Campaign Plans. We still have much work to do to leverage the momentum from these accomplishments and to optimize prioritization and sequencing for how we apply our resources against known and constantly evolving WMD threats. We are grateful for the continuing support of this committee — and of the strong partners sitting next to me today — as we work to ensure the United States has the agility, flexibility, resilience, and strength to disrupt emerging WMD capabilities, protect the homeland and its interests from actors with existing WMD programs, and respond to WMD threats.

More than two years into the DoD countering WMD Coordinating Authority role directed in the Unified Campaign Plan, and building from the base of our traditional role in the tactical aspects of countering WMD, USSOCOM is enhancing the already strong community of action across DoD, the U.S. interagency, and foreign partner governments. USSOCOM recognizes DoD's primarily supportive role vis a vis the responsibilities of other U.S. departments and agencies during all but the most acute WMD crisis scenarios. We seek to optimize that DoD support role through enhanced collective awareness of threats, vulnerabilities, and opportunities for action. Located at both USSOCOM Headquarters and collocated with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency at Ft. Belvoir, USSOCOM's Countering WMD Fusion Cell executes the Coordinating Authority mission by working within national and Department policy guidance to conduct planning, assess countering WMD campaign progress, and make recommendations to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.

With its leadership based here in the National Capital Region, the Countering WMD Fusion Cell has worked with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and the Joint Staff to support DoD countering WMD unity of effort and enhance DoD's operational relationships across the interagency and intelligence community. We hosted more than 850 attendees at our annual Countering WMD Coordination Conference (previously called the Global Synchronization Conference) this past September, to include representatives not only from DoD, but also from a broad cross-section of the U.S. interagency as well as six partner nations (UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, France, and Germany). These attendees participated in some 20 working groups and 24 information sessions, as we continued the tradition, started by General Thomas, of relentless focus on distilling outcomes and actions required from the productive discussions. I would also like to take this opportunity to

note the strides the DoD has made in the past year in standing up the Countering WMD Unity of Effort Council, as directed by then Deputy Secretary of Defense Shanahan, under the leadership of ASD Rapuano and General Clarke in his former role as the Joint Staff J5 Director. The Council's multi-layered structure allows the Department to address complex issues deliberately and holistically, elevating only the most complex issues and recommended solutions for executive resolution.

Nature of Threats

This unity of effort is critical as the nature of the WMD threat continues to change and evolve, becoming ever more complex and difficult to address. In part, the change is driven by broader geopolitical shifts such as the re-emergence of great power competition, as highlighted by the National Defense Strategy. The threat of non-state extremist organizations acquiring and using WMD remains real and sobering, even as rogue regimes with WMD aspirations dominate headlines and demand vigorous and creative deterrent and disruptive approaches. Within this dynamic and dangerous global context, transregional proliferation of WMD material, technology, and expertise becomes harder to detect and disrupt even as the imperative to do so grows. Every day brings news of scientific and technological breakthroughs with the potential for enormous benefit-as well as the possibility of misuse, abuse, and in some cases catastrophic harm.

The Functional Campaign Plan for Countering WMD

The centerpiece of USSOCOM's approach to these threats as the DoD Countering WMD Coordinating Authority is the Functional Campaign Plan for Countering WMD, which General Thomas approved, signed, and disseminated this past November. The plan nests tightly with the National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, DoD Strategy for Countering WMD, and

other policy and strategic guidance documents developed by the offices of ASD Rapuano and ASD Roberts. It is also crosscutting with the Department's threat-specific Global Campaign Plans, as directed by the National Security Strategy, implementing an active, transregional, and adaptive countering WMD campaign to conduct and assess integrated military activities focused on networks and pathways that support an adversary's pursuit of WMD capabilities. In this way, the plan also provides critical support to the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the Global Integrator, driving a partnered, joint, multi-domain, and integrated approach to the complex WMD problem. Active, rigorous, and persistent transregional collaboration between and among DoD commands and defense agencies and with interagency partners and partner nations is a critical element of this campaign.

The Functional Campaign Plan for Countering WMD provides the Joint Force with the "What" and "Why". It emphasizes efforts to defeat emerging WMD capabilities and protect the U.S. and its interests from actors with existing WMD programs, and sets the conditions to respond to WMD threats. We summarize these three central lines of effort as "Prevent, Protect, and Respond." The Functional Campaign Plan focuses most intensely on the Prevent line of effort, where relatively small amounts of United States treasure can have disproportionately effective outcomes with reduced risk to the Joint Force. In so doing, the Functional Campaign Plan conceptualizes WMD actors of concern navigating a "pathway" that progresses along the WMD continuum from WMD aspiration to development or use of WMD. The central idea driving the Functional Campaign Plan's approach is defeating adversary activities along these WMD pathways. Progress along this pathway can be halted or slowed, for example, by affecting the decision making of WMD aspirants, blocking the means to acquire infrastructure and expertise, or interdicting illicit materials or information in transit. The Prevent line of effort is

both the primary military effort of this campaign, yet also where DoD is most likely to play a supporting role to other Departments or agencies. A comprehensive understanding of those operations, activities and investments of the U.S. Government and other partners is critical to ensuring DoD alignment and effectiveness, as well as to the ultimate achievement of targeted end states. At the same time, preparations for activities under the Protect and Respond lines of effort, to include building preparedness for countering WMD and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats with capable partner nations, must be consistent elements of Combatant Command and the wider Joint Force campaign activities.

The Operational Framework

To more quickly translate the functional plan into action, we have also developed an operational framework that applies to the priority challenges laid out in the National Defense Strategy. If the Functional Campaign Plan for Countering WMD is the "What" and "Why" of Joint Force countering WMD operations, the operational framework provides the "How". In close collaboration with other Combatant Command planners, we have completed the tailored application of the framework to one threat actor in particular, with versions in development that have application to other threat actors outlined in the National Defense Strategy. While I am limited in my ability to provide more detail in this open forum, I am pleased to report that this first tailored version of the framework has become a key element of the Geographic Combatant Command's official actor-specific countering WMD campaign planning. We have also begun work with ASD Rapuano, ASD Roberts, Director Oxford, and our interagency and international partners to refine the framework and ensure it has utility as a tool, not just for the Department, but for the whole U.S. Government countering WMD community of action. Using this tool to articulate common goals and build awareness of each other's countering WMD operations,

activities, and investments will facilitate understanding of how these activities should be sequenced and supported across the U.S. Government for maximum strategic effect.

The Countering WMD Assessment

While the Functional Campaign Plan for Countering WMD was only signed in November, the Combatant Commands, services, and key combat support agencies have been familiar with its core lines of effort and strategic objectives for more than a year during the formal coordination and staffing process. In coordination with the Joint Staff, we updated our 2017 countering WMD assessment by mapping the 2018 assessment to the five adversary-specific Global Campaign Plans as well as the Functional Campaign Plan for Countering WMD. In support of the Joint Staff's Global Integration framework, we are evolving our assessment process to facilitate continuous understanding of the WMD environment with more frequent and dynamic assessments of Joint Force countering WMD capabilities, as well as to prepare specific recommendations for the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense. For this assessment cycle, we also expanded our request for input to include the Services and numerous interagency partners. As these relationships mature and mutual understanding deepens in the years to come, we look forward to broadening the insights and recommendations from the annual assessment process.

Priorities for the Year Ahead

Even as we look back on the progress the countering WMD community of action has made in more clearly framing goals and effectively coordinating and sequencing authorities and resources against certain threats in the past year, we are mindful of the work still to be done. Over the coming year, our top priority will be to collaborate with DoD and interagency partners to complete the operational frameworks and begin applying the approach to other countering WMD operations, activities, and investments of the Joint Force. Related to those tasks, we will

sustain our focus on broadening the community of action's situational awareness of the network of operations, activities, and investments targeted against transregional and global threats, identifying gaps and vulnerabilities, and enabling action against threat actors. And, as always, we will strive to evolve as an organization to more effectively execute our mission and support national strategic and security goals. Thank you for your attention this morning and for your support of USSOCOM and our people.