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Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Strategy and the Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Budget Request for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and Chemical Biological Defense Program:

Before the

Emerging Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee
Committee on Armed Services
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Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Langevin, and Members of the Subcommittee, it is an honor to be here today to share with you the work we do every day to make the world safer by countering the threats posed by the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Who We Are

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is a unique place with a rich history. Our roots go back to the Manhattan Project where we provided expertise in weapons effects – work that we still do today. Since that time, we have consolidated several agencies into one, economized our force, expanded our mission areas and demonstrated a track record of success with a direct impact on improving our national security.

As a defense agency, DTRA operates under the authority, direction and control of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, and supports the Commander of the US Strategic Command. In this role, performing and managing a research and development portfolio to develop tools and capabilities in a WMD environment is our prime responsibility. In fact, DTRA provides the Special Operations Command with all of their counterproliferation Science and Technology. As a combat support agency, DTRA communicates directly with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and provides direct support to combatant commanders and the Services.

Our facility at Fort Belvoir also houses the United States Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (SCC-WMD) and the United States Strategic Command Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination (SJFHQ-E). These organizations were embedded with DTRA because of the leveraging opportunities that strong coordination can provide.

We exist because of the existential threat posed by WMD. The consequences of a major WMD attack on our country are almost unimaginable with potentially devastating impact. Those who wish to harm us understand that the use of such weapons could result in immense loss of life and enduring economic, political, and social damage on a global scale. While not an attack, the recent Ebola outbreak provides a good example of the possible impact of WMD. The panic caused by the Ebola outbreak was not just felt in Africa. The outbreak raised legitimate concerns all over the world. In the United States, there was a non-stop news cycle which persisted for months and there was genuine fear in communities. And the United States only had 4 confirmed cases. Now just imagine if the outbreak hadn't been controlled. Or, what if we had a novel biothreat that we were dealing with? The hypothetical scenarios are easy to develop and imagine. For all of these reasons, there is a clear need for an on-call, comprehensive WMD expertise -- for not just the Department of Defense, but for all of the United States Government. That's what we provide.

Our People

We don't build tanks, satellites or aircraft carriers; our biggest and greatest asset is our people. We have a unique blend of subject matter experts who are able to rapidly respond with information, products, services, plans, and analysis. Our expertise spans the full WMD threat spectrum – chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, and high yield explosives (CBRNE). When you walk down our halls you see nuclear physicists, microbiologists, chemists, former Special Forces operators, logisticians, contract specialists, and accountants working side by side to eliminate WMD threats. We are a "one-stop-shop," open 24 hours a day that DoD's functional and geographic commands, the Services and the rest of the interagency can rely on. We are the only USG entity with this type of unique concentration in this critical mission area.

On any given day, tens to hundreds of DTRA and SCC-WMD experts are dispatched overseas, and in certain cases to some of the most dangerous and sensitive of areas, in order to provide analysis, research, testing, training and operational expertise in support of the Warfighter.

Our nuclear experts are supporting global nuclear weapons lockdown efforts, helping to protect and ensure surety of our own nuclear weapons, understanding and predicting nuclear weapons effects, and the survivability of US Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications.

Our biological experts are consolidating and improving the security of dangerous pathogen collections across the planet, collaborating closely with other like-minded nations to prevent nefarious distribution of biological materials. They are also working cooperatively with international partners to build their abilities to counter naturally emerging infectious disease outbreaks and potential intentional attacks caused by genetically altered or weaponized diseases as well as developing new means for protecting our military personnel against biological terrorism.

Our chemical experts are assisting with the safety, security, and cooperative destruction of chemical weapons and developing methods to make it more difficult for terrorists to use Toxic Industrial Chemicals as improvised weapons. Our S&T efforts also address potential future chemical weapons threats.

DTRA structural dynamics experts are working on solutions to protect military and related government facilities at risk while also developing new means for mitigating blast effects resulting from a variety of explosive devices against structures and other infrastructure. Our products are also used internationally, where they have been critical to our partners' efforts in constructing facilities that require the highest levels of protection for personnel and equipment.

Our DTRA and SCC-WMD workforce performs countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) planning and exercise support and provides expertise to the combatant commands and other customers.

Our CWMD Science and Technology development is conducted in parallel with our operational capabilities in a complementary and collaborative fashion. DTRA does not own or operate any functional laboratory, but we are able to select from the full range of national expertise, wherever that may be. Our performers include the DoD and Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) labs, contractors, Federally-Funded Research and Development Centers, University-Associated Research Centers, and academia. And, we provide and operate unique and essential test and evaluation capabilities at government facilities in New Mexico and Nevada to meet our own mission requirements, and those of our various customers and stakeholders.

The Challenge of CWMD

Countering weapons of mass destruction is a complex and challenging mission. During the Cold War, most of our focus was on nation states. We were worried about huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons. While we remain concerned about the acquisition of nuclear weapons by State actors, an emerging concern is terrorist acquisition of WMD materials that could be stolen, modified, or enhanced for use as a weapon. We are not talking about huge factories or facilities in most of these cases; sometimes it is a small laboratory that could fit inside a bathroom. Given this reality, no region of the world is impervious to potential WMD threats.

The barriers to making WMD, including deadly pathogens, continue to fall every day. Once developed, they are difficult to detect and stop while in transit. The footprint can be small in these cases. And don't forget the power of the internet. The availability of open source expertise and journals now allow for people anywhere to learn about dangerous materials. It is hard to get ahead of this type of threat. Likewise, terrorist activity is on the rise. There are more of them and they are in more places. And, of biggest concern, the terrorists that we are facing today have clearly demonstrated that they will use any weapons or materials at their disposal and for them, no targets are off-limits.

Let me add a couple of additional factors. The increased movement of people means that devastating diseases, whether spread naturally, accidentally or intentionally, can be transferred worldwide through a simple plane trip. There is also a greater threat of animal-to-human pathogen transmission due to the growth of the population which has pushed individuals to reside where only animals once lived.

In addition, the prevention space is hard to quantify and the demand signal continues to increase. It is difficult to assess what crises we have averted as a result of forward-leaning actions to prevent materials from falling in the wrong hands. The job will never be "completed" nor absolute. Prioritization, cooperation, and leveraging ability is key in this environment. You can't simply be "everywhere" to counter these threats.

Partnerships

For all of these reasons, countering WMD threats has to be performed on a larger scale than just one single institution. No one Department, no single geographic region, no single country can marshal the necessary capabilities alone to successfully fight the WMD threats we face in this day and age. Success requires careful collaboration and communication across a variety of functional areas and also with a diverse group of institutions, partner nations and organizations abroad. In addition to established partners like the Departments of Energy, Justice, State and Homeland Security, we also have key relationships with the Department of Health and Human Services, including its Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and international organizations like the World Health Organization and the World Organisation for Animal Health. These health-focused organizations are critical partners as we address biological threats. As the Ebola outbreak showed, biothreats are both a public health issue as well as a biosecurity and biosafety issue.

Success in this New Reality

The countering weapons of mass destruction effort is further complicated because WMD events are occurring more often and in real-time. In 2011, DTRA provided real-time technical and

modeling assistance to our US Armed Forces in Japan and the Japanese government in dealing with the estimated 9.0 magnitude earthquake and subsequent tsunami that battered the east coast of Honshu, Japan. The tsunami damaged the Fukushima nuclear power plant, and resulted in the biggest nuclear accident since Chernobyl. At the same time, DTRA was providing planning support to Operation Odyssey Dawn and played a role in the eventual destruction of the declared chemical weapons in Libya. DTRA had several lines of support in the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons. We worked with our DoD partners to create a first ever field- deployable chemical weapons destruction facility in a mere five months. In 2013, working with our interagency partners, DTRA was able to outfit a ship to host the destruction facility in 66 days. Both achievements were remarkable in terms of their turnaround times and had a direct impact on the success of destroying 600 metric tons of Syria's declared chemical weapons and materials. And of course in 2014 and 2015, DTRA led several lines of effort in response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa. DTRA developed and provided medical countermeasures and diagnostic equipment; created and shared situational awareness tools and modeling data; purchased and delivered mobile labs and laboratory equipment; provided Ebola response training; and developed, tested and fielded the Transportation Isolation System – a novel system which allows for the transport of multiple military members exposed to a deadly, highly infectious disease, such as Ebola while still keeping the medical caregivers and aircrew safe from exposure. Some of these efforts demonstrate our ability to move quickly and adapt to ever-changing threats, while others – especially medical countermeasures – are the result of years of research and having the foresight 5, 10, even 15 years ago, to address WMD threats that were not of concern to most people.

I highlight these examples for the Committee for three reasons. One, we have a track record of success with several high profile and significant CWMD challenges.

Two, nearly every year since 2011, we have faced another WMD crisis. These are not necessarily situations that can be easily budgeted or planned. In these cases, we are forced to surge our efforts and reprioritize resources from more steady-state types of activities.

And the third reason is because the unique authorities and funding that Congress provides to us each year allows us to respond to these challenges. When we are presented with a WMD challenge, we carefully review our various authorities and funding and approach problems on a regional, mission-focused basis. We have internally organized ourselves to promote communication, agile contracting, rapid innovation, and quick turn decision-making to achieve success. DTRA's ability to rapidly respond to the nation's requirements remains at the fundamental core of the Agency mission and directly enables accomplishment of real-time US global health and national security objectives.

The Levant

Let me give you an example. The devastating turmoil in Syria has had a broad impact to the security of the Middle East and beyond. It was clear by 2012 that the countries neighboring Syria both wanted and needed improvements to their military and civilian response sectors to counter the possible illicit WMD-related trafficking coming from Syria. DTRA immediately started working with USCENTCOM and the whole of the U.S. Government to build the countering weapons of mass destruction capacity of the Governments of Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Lebanon. In these countries, to varying degrees we train, equip, and exercise with the military and civilian sectors so they can address non-proliferation, counter-proliferation and consequence management issues.

For Jordan, now home to over 600,000 Syrian refugees, the potential for WMD coming across its borders became a critical concern and they approached the U.S. Government for assistance.

Working within the Department of Defense, the interagency, and utilizing the capabilities of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, DTRA is making a significant difference to Jordan’s regional security approach through the Jordan Border Security Program (JBSP), just one of many projects on-going in Jordan today. This work is now more important than ever given the rise of ISIS, the clear use of chemical weapons, and the well-known intention of terrorists to utilize any WMD material against the United States and our allies.

The Jordan Border Security Program provides automated border security capabilities – an integrated border surveillance system and a command and control network that provides a common operating picture to the Jordan Armed Forces (JAF). The Phase 1 system was implemented on the Northern border with Syria. Phase 1 was implemented by another partner through Foreign Military Financing, but Jordan had not allocated funding for later phases. Through the unique authorities and funding available through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, DTRA was able to fund and implement Phases 2 and 3 of the program. The Phase 2 section picks up on the boundaries of the Phase 1 system towards the Syrian and Iraqi borders. Phase 3 provides overlapping coverage of the Iraqi border. These phases expand Jordan's capability to remotely monitor its vulnerable borders. Simply put, the length of the border (Phase 1 and 2) is roughly about a trip from Washington, D.C. to Raleigh, North Carolina. Phase 3 is an additional trip from Raleigh down to Charleston, South Carolina. Given the threats that Jordan faces, all three Phases are critical for success.

Through assertive management of timelines and schedules the U.S. Government provided an initial operating capability to Jordan in December 2014, far in advance of what was originally projected. As JAF personnel became familiar and more accustomed to the system and they placed more operators along the border, Jordan began to have operational successes and begin interdicting border incursions. In fact, after only about six weeks of using the system, JAF detected several vehicles trying to cross a berm and penetrate into Jordan from Syria. Today, the systems are fully operational and this project has been officially transferred to the Kingdom of Jordan who will maintain it throughout its lifecycle.

In addition, the Nunn-Lugar border security effort was enhanced by DTRA's CBRN Preparedness Program (CP2) and its ongoing engagements with USCENTCOM in the region. CP2 is a Combat Support Agency effort for Global Combatant Commanders. Utilizing 2014 NDAA Section 1204 authorities, CP2 provides assistance to the military and civilian first responder organizations of designated Partner Nations, to include Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey, which border Syria.

The JBSP is a Defense Agency effort, while CP2 is a Combat Support Agency effort. Two different funds, two different authorities, two different DoD customers, but one country and one threat. Jordan is a good example of where a Defense Agency and Combat Support Agency come together completely. It is a coordinated and smooth effort.

Ukraine

Another excellent example of our building partnership capacity efforts involves Ukraine. DTRA has successfully worked with the Ukrainians for many years, in particular on border security efforts. Our longstanding work with the Ukrainian State Border Guards Service has focused on how to look for weapons of mass destruction (WMD), toxic chemicals, or associated WMD materials. We trained them on how to detect smuggled devices and related techniques.

Now, obviously, our help is needed more than ever. The Ukrainians are understandably worried about controlling border crossing points where known smugglers traverse. They want to make sure that no WMD or smuggled devices make it into their country and they have the desire to be better prepared to respond.

In 2014, DTRA, in close collaboration with U.S. Embassy Kyiv, delivered a motorized brigade and engineering battalion's worth of vital border security equipment in 18 months. This included communications equipment to improve command and control capabilities, personnel sustainability and engineering equipment to support immediate operations near conflict zones, and other mobility assets to patrol borders, administrative boundaries, and territorial waters. In close collaboration with the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service and other US Government agencies, DTRA applied Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program funding to deliver Ukraine $39 million worth of assistance. By leveraging DTRA's expertise in capacity building, the Ukrainians are better prepared to detect smuggled WMD devices and are better prepared to respond to potential future WMD threats across the Russian and separatists borders.

At the same time, DTRA's CP2 is also working in Ukraine to provide critical skillsets needed for responding and handling CBRN material safely. Much like Jordan, this effort complements the border security work.

This is the type of work that DTRA does in many places around the world, places such as Moldova, Georgia, Albania, and Kosovo.

Support to the Nuclear Deterrent

Last year I shared with the Committee our intent to establish a Nuclear Enterprise Support Directorate (J10) to support the nuclear deterrent. This action fulfilled a commitment to elevate and increase focus on our nuclear mission in order to meet the expectations of the DoD Nuclear Enterprise Review. I am pleased to inform the Committee that our J10 reached full operational capability in May 2015. Our J10 has continued to develop programs in a wide array of areas, including nuclear surety, stockpile logistics, inspections, education, training, exercises, as well as assessments and Countering-WMD.

Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency

I also want to update the Committee about the Department's intent to realign the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency (JIDA) under DTRA. This move is in response to the fiscal year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act which prohibited JIDA from standing up as a separate agency and directed that the capabilities of JIDA be transitioned to a military department or to an existing defense agency.

I can assure the Committee that the Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices and the CWMD missions will be preserved and enhanced under this transition. Both these missions are critical for the safety of our nation's warfighters and to the national security of our country and that of our allies. JIDA will now transition and operate under the authority, direction, and control of DTRA. Realigning JIDA under DTRA will enhance upstream threat prevention and defeat capabilities. Other areas of collaboration will include sharing science and technology information, collaborating on security cooperation and building partner nation capacities,

leveraging acquisition and information technology strengths, sharing expertise particularly in anticipating and identifying emerging threats, and improving each other's situational awareness regarding indications and warning on global threats. Under DTRA, JIDA will now be referred to as the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO).

Budget Request

Fiscal Year 2017 (FY17) DTRA Budget Request Overview

Our base budget request for FY17 is $1.2 billion and comprises Defense-wide Research, Development, Test and Evaluation; Operations and Maintenance; Procurement; and Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) appropriation accounts. In addition, DTRA executes the $361.4 million Science and Technology (S&T) portion of the DoD Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) and serves as the funds manager for the remainder of that program's funding, $832.8 million. Additionally, $408.3 million in overseas contingency operations funds have been requested in the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Fund (JIDF) for execution by JIDO. Therefore, the total DTRA resource portfolio is approximately $2.84 billion. Details and highlights for these requests follow.

Operations and Maintenance Funding

O&M funding directly supports the warfighters and national missions as it pays for planning, training, exercises, and other means for collaboration across DoD, the USG, and international partners. O&M funding is the fuel that enables us to reach out to our components and personnel, the warfighters, and international partners across the globe.

The requested $448.1 million in O&M funding would be applied as follows:

** Nonproliferation Activities ($70.3 million) for arms control activities including the conduct of USG inspections of foreign facilities, territories, or events; coordination and conduct of the escort of inspection teams for inspections or continuous monitoring activities in the U.S. and at U.S. facilities overseas; and the acquisition and fielding of technology capabilities required to

implement, comply with, and allow full exercise of U.S. rights and prerogatives under existing and projected arms control treaties and agreements. Last fiscal year, we conducted 37 New START Treaty missions, 24 Open Skies Treaty missions, 22 conventional engagements in Ukraine, and established a Chemical Weapons Convention treaty monitoring detachment at Pueblo Chemical Depot.

** WMD Combat Support and Operations ($188.0 million) for a wide range of combat and warfighter support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commanders, and military forces as they engage the WMD threat and challenges posed to the U.S., its forces and allies. DTRA supports the essential WMD response capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces within their area of responsibility at all levels of war.

** U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating WMD ($10.3 million) for DTRA direct support to the SCC-WMD including providing strategic and contingency planning, policy, and analytical support; developing interagency relationships; and working closely with USSTRATCOM partners to establish the means for assessing and exercising capabilities to combat WMD.

** Core Mission Sustainment ($179.5 million) for a wide range of enabling capabilities which include information management; resource management; security and asset protection; acquisition and logistics management; strategic planning; leadership and professional development; and provide the safety, security, and efficiency necessary for mission success.

Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

The request of $325.6 million for this important program would be used as follows:

** Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination ($11.8 million) for propellant destruction and elimination activities of SS-24 ICBM solid rocket motors in Ukraine.

** Chemical Weapons Destruction ($2.9 million) for working with Iraq to secure and inventory toxic industrial chemicals and materials from those who seek to exploit them and with other

partner countries to reduce threats by assessing and being prepared to destroy chemical weapons stockpiles, chemical agent research capabilities, and production facilities..

** Global Nuclear Security ($16.9 million) for improving nuclear material security, including security for weapons-usable nuclear material. This program also assists in the secure transport of high-threat radiological and nuclear weapons-usable material to secure storage areas, or to processing facilities for disposition. The program also directly supports planning and preparation activities related to potential contingency response requests to secure, transport and dispose of interdicted nuclear weapons, components or material.

** Cooperative Biological Engagement ($214.0 million) for preventing the proliferation of biological weapons, weapons materials, and expertise. This program secures certain biological agents at their source, and conducts activities that facilitate detection and reporting of highly pathogenic diseases of national security concern. This program works closely with other US Government departments and agencies, international partners and the private sector.

** Proliferation Prevention ($50.7 million) to enhance the capability of partner countries to deter, detect, report, and interdict illicit WMD trafficking across international borders.

** Threat Reduction Engagement ($2.0 million) to support relationship-building engagements intended to strategically advance the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program mission with new partners and new geographic locations.

** Other Assessments/Administrative Support ($27.3 million) to provide a network of regional offices and bilateral offices at US Embassies to facilitate DTRA activities and ensure that DoD-provided equipment, services, and related training are fully accounted for and used effectively and efficiently for their intended purposes. This account also funds Nunn-Lugar program travel, logistics, translator/interpreter support, and other Agency support.

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation

DTRA RDT&E programs respond to the most pressing CWMD challenges including stand-off detection, tracking, and interdiction of WMD; modeling and simulation to support weapons effects and hazard predictions; classified support to Special Operations Forces; defeat of WMD agents and underground facilities; and protection of people, systems, and infrastructure against WMD effects.

DTRA RDT&E is unique in being focused solely on CBRNE; tied closely with the agency's Combat Support responsibilities; has a top-notch in-house field test capability; relies upon competitive bids, the national labs, industry, and academia rather than an in-house laboratory infrastructure, allowing for a "best of breed" approach to performer selection; and is nimble and responsive to urgent needs. DTRA's test beds provide unmatched threat-representative target structures and threat-characteristic geologies. We support a number of Service, Joint Staff, and Combatant Command priorities, including development of the Large Caliber Penetrator; expanded tactics, techniques, and procedures for use of the Joint Programmable Fuse; and enhanced U.S. missile defeat capabilities.

The agency has a comprehensive, balanced CBRNE S&T portfolio that supports DoD goals and is well connected with DoD customers, as well as interagency and international partners. Our RDT&E approach balances the need for near-term pay-off with the need for long-term technology and capability development, knowledge and expertise, and is centered upon the following programs: Basic Research (6.1), Applied Research (6.2), Advanced Research (6.3), and System Development and Demonstration (6.5). The requested RDT&E funding totals $461.3 million. We are requesting $35.4 million in Basic Research to provide for the discovery and development of fundamental knowledge and understanding by researchers primarily in academia and world-class research institutes in government and industry. The DTRA Fiscal Year 2017 request also includes $154.9 million for WMD Defeat Technologies Applied Research, which is used to translate fundamental knowledge into useful materials, technologies, and concepts that address recognized CWMD needs. Our $266.4 million budget request for Proliferation Prevention and Defeat Advanced Research funds development of systems, subsystems, and component integration to build, field and test prototypes to assess utility and feasibility of technology solutions to well-defined CWMD requirements. Finally, $4.6 for WMD

Defeat Capabilities System Development and Demonstration funds development, operational testing, and initial deployment of mature technologies and systems.

These programs have resulted in significant capability transfer to the warfighter. DTRA has transitioned nuclear detection and forensic capabilities to the Air Force Technical Applications Center and the Army's 20th CBRNE Command. All 57 National Guard Civil Support Teams now benefit from use of the Mobile Field Kit, a hand-held device and application that integrates and coordinates the readings from multiple radiation sensors. We've achieved initial operating capacity for the National CWMD Technical Reachback Support Enterprise, providing 24/7 CBRNE decision support capability for planning, operations, and post event analysis to Combatant Commands, OSD, the Joint Staff, the Intelligence Community, and other USG agencies. We're hard at work developing capabilities for missile defeat, advanced analytics and discovery processes to predict the emergence of future threats, standards and technologies to protect critical systems from electromagnetic pulse, and models to predict the multidimensional effects of nuclear weapons use for USSTRATCOM.

Procurement, Defense-Wide

The DTRA Fiscal Year 2017 budget request includes $6.6 million in procurement for mission-essential major equipment and vehicles.

Chemical and Biological Defense Program S&T

The Department's CBDP S&T programs support DoD-wide efforts to research, develop, and acquire capabilities for a layered, integrated defense against CBRNE agents; better understand potential threats; secure and reduce dangerous materials whenever possible; and prevent potential attacks. Although funding for the CBDP is not part of the DTRA budget request, the agency executes the S&T portion of this program, for which the Department has requested approximately $361.4 million in FY17. The agency also manages funding execution in support of CBDP advanced development and procurement.

Overseas Contingency Operations Funds

Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Fund

The $408.3 million requested in the JIDF will enable JIDO to support DoD efforts to counter improvised threats with tactical responsiveness and through anticipatory, rapid acquisition in support of Combatant Command's efforts to prepare for, and adapt to, battlefield surprise. JIDO accomplishes this mission by sustaining an advanced information technology and fusion infrastructure that enables a threat awareness and understanding capability; providing expeditionary, forward deployed operations, intelligence, training, and advisory capabilities with reach-back support linked to broad intelligence community, interagency, industry, and academia communities of action; enabling rapid and innovative counter-improvised-threat solution development and delivery; and supporting Military Departments/Services' pre-deployment training and Combatant Commands' priority training-exercise support requirements as requested and validated.

I would like to thank the Committee for this opportunity to share some of our recent efforts and accomplishments. There are a number of challenges on the horizon, but I am confident that the resources provided in our budget request will allow us to appropriately address these problems. I hope that we will continue to earn the Committee's trust and support in meeting WMD threats and ensuring our security. Thank you, again, for the opportunity to be here today. I would be pleased to respond to your questions.