Statement of Mr. Kenneth A. Myers III
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And
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Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
On
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Strategy
and the Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense Authorization
Budget Request for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and
Chemical Biological Defense Program:

Before the

Emerging Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives

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Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Langevin, and Members of the Subcommittee, it is an honor to be here today to share with you the work we do every day to counter the threats posed by the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

There are three entities co-located at our facilities at Fort Belvoir: the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the United States Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (SCC-WMD) and the United States Strategic Command Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination (SJFHQ-E). Each one of these entities has different mission areas, authorities, requirements, and funding, but they are all located together and intertwined in order to leverage expertise from each other, combine their capabilities, and coordinate efforts. These three entities, as one Team, are engaged in nonproliferation, counterproliferation and consequence management missions throughout the world -- addressing the full spectrum of WMD threats.

Our job is to counter and combat weapons of mass destruction. Our success is determined by what did not happen -- what we prevented, what we helped to interdict, what we eliminated, what we mitigated, and how prepared we are to respond.

Our focus is to keep WMD out of the hands of terrorists and other enemies by locking down, monitoring, and destroying weapons and weapons related materials. We also assist Combatant Commanders with their plans and responses to WMD events and develop and deliver cutting-edge technologies to assist with all of these endeavors.
The legacy of our organization stretches back to the Manhattan Project where we provided expertise in weapons effects. Since that time, we have consolidated several agencies into one, economized our force, expanded our mission areas and demonstrated a track record of success with a direct impact on improving our national security. For example, we have deactivated more than 7,600 Soviet nuclear warheads, 2,500 missiles, 33 ballistic missile submarines, 155 nuclear bombers, and 4,127 metric tons of Russian chemical weapons. We have disassembled legacy Soviet Biopreparat facilities that had the capability to produce tons of anthrax and other deadly biological agents. We have also destroyed chemical weapons arsenals in Albania and Libya, and secured vulnerable nuclear weapons material left at the former Soviet nuclear testing site in Kazakhstan. We helped respond to the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, we built laboratories and disease reporting networks in the Caucasus and Africa to safeguard dangerous pathogens and disease samples and keep them out of the wrong hands, and recently we were part of the team that planned for and eliminated the deadliest chemicals in Syria’s declared chemical weapons program on-board the US flagged MV (motor vessel) Cape Ray.

Our successes are many but much of our work is done quietly behind the scenes. We don't carry out military operations but we provide the tools so that our colleagues can. We developed the Massive Ordnance Penetrator, known as the MOP, designed to hit hard and deeply buried targets. We provide USSOCOM with their counter WMD tools and equipment. We are playing a leadership role in developing vaccines and therapeutics to battle Ebola and other infectious diseases. We are developing advanced situational awareness tools to help us stay ahead of emerging threats, and enhancing the capabilities of our partners and Allies who work alongside the U.S. to counter WMD.

Everyone likes to say they are unique but we truly are. We are a defense agency, a combat support agency, a premier research and development agency, a STRATCOM center and a Standing Joint Force Headquarters Command all rolled into one. We are one team with the same mission, "making the world a safer place."

As the Director, I report to the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Frank Kendall, through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and
Biological Defense Programs and to the Commander of the US Strategic Command, Admiral Cecil Haney. As a combat support agency, I also report directly to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. That description might sound confusing but it makes sense when you consider that we are at the center of the Defense Department’s efforts to counter the WMD threats that we face. We are the go-to organization 24 hours a day to support the functional and geographic commands anywhere in the world.

We manage a $1.8 billion research and development portfolio and an operations budget which is just under $800 million. We have offices in countries around the world and have a presence at every Geographic and Functional Combatant Command and in five locations here in the US.

When you walk down our halls you will see nuclear physicists, microbiologists, chemists, former Special Forces operators, logisticians, contract specialists, and accountants working side by side to eliminate WMD threats. In fact, some days we look and sound like an advertisement for Rosetta Stone. But it is my responsibility to make sure that we are speaking in the same language and ensure we have an organization where each of those experts is able to leverage their expertise and bring solutions to complex problems.

The reason why is simple. Subject Matter Experts in the WMD field are highly specialized and hard to find. There simply are not enough experts to adequately staff the Services and Commands. And even if you did, you would not have the right type of coordination and synchronization, which is critical for WMD planning. The most effective way to utilize this expertise is to locate it in one place and provide efficient communication channels for collaboration.

Our mission is complicated because of the complex nature of countering weapons of mass destruction. During the Cold War, most of our focus was on nation states. We were worried about huge stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, and biological materials. And while there is no question that these stockpiles are still a threat today, the more difficult area for us to track and address is terrorist or other non-state actor acquisition of WMD materials that can be modified, grown, or enhanced for use as a weapon. The footprint is smaller in these cases, harder to track
and thus harder to find and disrupt. We are not talking about huge factories or facilities in most of these cases; sometimes it is a small laboratory that could fit inside a bathroom. Given this reality, no region of the world is impervious to potential chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear threats.

The only way for us to rapidly surge to meet these challenges is through an organizational structure which provides flexibility and emphasizes access to expertise, communication, agile contracting, rapid innovation, and quick turn decision-making to achieve success.

While I am pleased to walk through individual programs with the Committee members and their staffs, I would like to use my testimony today to highlight four real-world examples of our activities and the roles that different parts of our Team played in these challenges.

Support for the Nuclear Deterrent

I want to share with the Committee our stand-up of a new directorate that is specifically focused on our nuclear mission. The intent of this new directorate is to elevate and increase our focus on our nuclear mission so that we meet the expectations of the recently completed DoD Nuclear Enterprise Review.

Two reviews of the Defense Department nuclear enterprise identified over 100 recommendations to improve the nuclear deterrent forces. Both found a “loose federation of nuclear activities often imbedded and indistinguishable from support for and execution of a wide range of non-nuclear activities.” In turn, one of the most critical proposals made by both an internal and independent, external panel of experts was the need to clarify the enterprise leadership structure.

The U.S. Navy consolidated oversight of the nuclear mission under the Director of Strategic Systems Programs, and the U.S. Air Force has elevated the rank of the Commander of Global Strike Command to a 4-star billet. The Director of USAF Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration (A-10) is now a 3-star to ensure that the rank of these leadership positions is commensurate with the importance of the mission.
The Department is using this opportunity to refocus attention and resources to continue to ensure the safety, security and effectiveness of our nuclear enterprise. We are doing the same. Our new J10 directorate will reach Full Operational Capacity later this Spring.

Ebola

Our Team has been involved with a number of efforts related to the Ebola response, including direct support to USAFRICOM’s Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE.

Through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Cooperative Biological Engagement Program (CBEP), we have provided support to eight Ebola virus diagnostics laboratories in Liberia and Sierra Leone. CBEP funded the deployment and continued operations of two Naval Medical Research Center mobile laboratories in Liberia, and purchased initial supplies for the Army’s 1st Area Medical Laboratory’s four mobile laboratories in Liberia. CBEP also funded U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases and National Institutes of Health staff to augment operations at Liberia’s National Reference Laboratory at the Liberian Institute of Biomedical Research (LIBR). In support of Ebola detection and reporting efforts in Sierra Leone, CBEP sent a contractor-staffed laboratory to Moyamba, which became operational on January 13, 2015. CBEP-supported labs are in the process of transitioning from Ebola outbreak response activities to developing organic laboratory capabilities in partner countries consistent with program implementation guidance and in support of the Global Health Security Agenda. In fact, CBEP performers have already begun training Liberian laboratory personnel at two sites in country.

We have been actively involved in the research and development side of tackling the Ebola epidemic. In fact, since 2003, our Team has invested over $300 million to develop Medical Counter Measures for Hemorrhagic Fever Viruses, which include Ebola. Our contracts funded the development of ZMapp, a therapeutic, which was identified in January 2014 and administered under compassionate use to several infected Ebola patients. In addition, DTRA has
been working to find an effective vaccine and has funded development of rVSV-ZEBOV, a vaccine which has been accelerated through the preclinical stage of development. Phase I clinical human safety trials for the VSV vaccine began on October 13, 2014 and results have been positive, with no serious adverse effects noted in volunteers to date. Phase 2/3 clinical efficacy trials of the Ebola vaccine began in January 2015, with the first Liberian volunteers vaccinated on February 2, 2015. The VSV vaccine has also recently been selected as the sole vaccine candidate for use in upcoming efficacy trials in West Africa.

In August 2014, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) announced the Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) of the DTRA-funded “EZ1” diagnostic assay, a molecular-based diagnostic assay for the Ebola Zaire Virus. It was the first case of a diagnostic assay being implemented for emergency use, and it quickly became the gold-standard for the presumptive and qualitative diagnosis of the Ebola Zaire virus strain during the West African outbreak. The EZ-1 diagnostic assay was developed as part of a 2011 bio-preparedness initiative to pre-position the Department of Defense (DoD) in the case of an Ebola outbreak, and signifies the first time any biothreat agent assay was pre-positioned (pre-EUA) with the FDA prior to an outbreak. Without question, the availability of the EZ1 assay played an important role in controlling the Ebola outbreak.

We have also been involved with the development of the Transport Isolation System, known as the TIS. This mobile isolation unit was developed in response to a Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) from USTRANSCOM. While a commercial company could transport a single Ebola patient, its capacity to do so was limited. The new TIS is able to transport up to eight Ebola-infected personnel on military aircraft. It is the only capability of its kind. Development and testing of the TIS is complete and three units were delivered to the user in January 2015, with 22 additional systems scheduled for delivery starting in April. The TIS can be used in response to any dangerous pathogen that our troops may face.

In addition, our Team and the Joint Program Executive Office (JPEO) have leveraged the capabilities of Constellation (a CWMD situational awareness tool) to establish the Ebola Portal, which provides a virtual environment for U.S. government agencies and international partners to exchange current Ebola outbreak information. As of March 2015, the Ebola Portal has about
1,000 users from across the U.S. Federal Executive Departments and several international entities. Additionally, DTRA/SCC-WMD is performing modeling and analysis of the Ebola spread in Africa in coordination with industry and academic partners to enable policy and operational decision making.

Through DTRA’s Building Partnership Capacity Division, we have provided Incident Management and Emergency Operations Center training in support of USAFRICOM, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, US Agency for International Development (USAID), and US State Department in West Africa specifically, Ghana, Cameroon, Mali, and Senegal. The effort was critical in the organizational management of Ebola response efforts across military and civilian response sectors.

Syria

Beginning in 2011, DoD began looking at ways to address the CW challenges in Syria. The U.S. Government (USG) and international community were alarmed by the continuing civil war in Syria and particularly concerned about the threats of chemical weapon use and proliferation. DTRA’s planners and intelligence officers worked closely with USCENTCOM to evaluate the WMD threats and options for the destruction of these weapons and materials. This analysis was coordinated with the research and development directorate who began the process of evaluating technologies to destroy these materials.

Throughout this time, DTRA’s Technical Reachback personnel provided modeling and analysis of the potential threats we faced. DTRA was also able to utilize expertise and knowledge of treaty implications to help shape and steer the Department's actions to respond.

The conclusion that we came to was that we simply did not have a good way to get rid of bulk chemical agents in a foreign land. After reviewing a number of options, we were the first organization to invest in a prototype Field Deployable Hydrolysis System (FDHS), a rapidly deployable capability that is suitable for the destruction of industrial quantities of bulk chemical agent. The FDHS was developed in fewer than six months and was designed to be transportable
for rapid deployment in a variety of environments.

The Syrian sarin attacks on August 21, 2013, were a turning point for the international community. DTRA planners provided technical expertise to Department of State and White House-led diplomatic efforts at every step, including the seminal meetings between Secretary Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov in Geneva that led to the Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons. Once the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2118, and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Executive Council passed its associated decisions, Syria acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program was prepared to support the extremely rapid effort to destroy Syria’s declared chemical materials. The Nunn-Lugar program provided the Joint UN-OPCW Mission with the majority of the logistics equipment to move bulk chemicals out of Syria.

When the international community failed to identify a nation willing to host destruction operations for the most dangerous chemicals, a full court press was employed to develop a ship-based destruction option. And with full cooperation across the U.S Government, we were able to deliver a sea-based destruction capability.

Often foreign policy and national security challenges are difficult to quantify. Diplomatic efforts don’t fit neatly in a spread sheet, and international cooperation is often based on relationships and individual people. Sometimes the end states are years or decades in the future. But some foreign policy efforts demonstrate clear and precise steps to progress, even in regions clouded uncertainty. There is a great deal of chaos in the Middle East right now but our international effort to remove and destroy the deadliest elements of Syria’s declared chemical weapons stockpile was a clear positive for our national security and that of our allies. And in this case, the numbers are quantifiable and paint a vivid picture of efficiency and effectiveness. Nearly 1,300 metric tons of Syria’s chemical weapons material has now been destroyed worldwide and can never be used.
That achievement is remarkable by itself. But there are other notable numbers that I would highlight. It only took 5 months to create a first-ever field deployable hydrolysis system. Incredibly, it only took 66 days for our interagency team to outfit the Cape Ray into the first-ever sea-based chemical weapons destruction facility. And finally, it only took 42 days to neutralize all of the materials in a safe and environmentally friendly way.

Building Partnership Capacity - Jordan and Ukraine

It was clear in 2012 that the countries neighboring Syria both wanted and needed improvements to their military and civilian response sectors to detect, identify, and respond to possible illicit WMD-related trafficking coming from Syria. Beginning in 2012, DTRA, started working with USCENTCOM and the whole of the US Government to build the CWMD capacity of the Governments of Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Lebanon. In these countries, to varying degrees we train, equip, and exercise with the military and civilian sectors so they can address non-proliferation, counter-proliferation and consequence management issues.

Jordan is the most robust effort that we have in the Levant due to the large influx of Syrian refugees and vulnerable borders. Working with USCENTCOM and our inter-agency partners, DTRA O&M and Nunn-Lugar program funding authorizations partnered together to lead the way in forming what has become known as the “Jordan Border Security Project,” (JBSP). This is an excellent example of how leveraging different authorities and funding can build a stronger and more complete support package. The JBSP, using the Nunn-Lugar authorities is building a 274 mile long security system that runs along the northern border with Syria and the eastern border with Iraq. To put this in perspective, two hundred seventy-four (274) miles is the distance from Washington, DC to Raleigh, NC. The system is designed to detect a person from at least 5 miles away and a vehicle from at least 8 miles and provides the Jordanians with capabilities to safely deter, detect, interdict, and inspect illicit WMD smuggling. We are building the system in 30 months and are forecasted to be at full operational capability by August 2015.

As installed sections of the system are integrated, DTRA has provided the Jordanians with an initial operational capability ahead of schedule, which has yielded many successes. For instance,
on Sunday, February 8, 2015, just after sunset there were several incursions into Jordan's border from Syria. At first, two vehicles came across a berm. The Jordanian operator observed the vehicles on the radar and tracked them for several kilometers to the berm, crossing the berm and continuing into Jordan. While this operator focused on the camera scene, multiple other incursions occurred at three nearby sections and were detected at other operator workstations. The border security system allowed the Jordanians to track multiple incursions. The Border Guards Forces’ Quick Reaction Team and an airborne asset were dispatched to effectively interdict.

DTRA’s efforts in Jordan have been executed using Title 10 and 2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Section 1204 (b) Authorities. The newly acquired 1204 (b) authority allowed DTRA to fill a large gap in our Agency’s ability to develop international partners’ necessary whole-of-government capability to respond to WMD incidents. This authority allows DoD to use O&M funding to train, equip, and exercise both military and civilian first responders in the states surrounding Syria. This provided us the agility we needed, and we immediately leveraged this new capacity and authority to complement the efforts of the JBSP, and also to train first responders in Turkey, Lebanon, and Iraq. With the Congress’ continued support, we plan to continue the use of this authority and work within the Department and with the Department of State, to expand the authority to provide such assistance to other countries.

Ukraine

Another excellent example of our building partnership capacity efforts involves Ukraine. DTRA has successfully worked with the Ukrainians for many years, in particular on border security efforts. Our longstanding work with the Ukrainian State Border Guards Service has focused on how to look for weapons of mass destruction (WMD), toxic chemicals, or associated WMD materials. We trained them on how to detect smuggled devices and related techniques.

Prior to the Russian occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea, most of our efforts have involved the southwest border and their waterways. Now, obviously, our help is needed more than ever. The Ukrainians are understandably worried about controlling border crossing points
where known smugglers traverse. They want to make sure that no WMD or smuggled devices make it into their country and they have the desire to be better prepared to respond.

Some of the equipment that we are providing includes: up-armored trucks; bulldozers, entrenchers, and graders; binoculars and thermal imagers; patrol boats; and concertina wire. Overall, we are scheduled to provide Ukraine with $39 million worth of assistance in this effort that began in April of 2014.

DTRA’s CBRN Preparedness Program is also working in Ukraine to provide critical skillsets needed for responding and handling CBRN material safely. This effort complements the border security work.

This is the type of work that DTRA does in many places around the world, such as Moldova, Georgia, Albania, Kosovo, and Armenia. And we have a long track record of success. But the problems in Ukraine make this work challenging, as the Ukrainians are clearly operating in a hostile environment.

FY16 DTRA Budget Request Overview

Our budget request for Fiscal Year 2016 (FY16) is $1.27 billion and comprises Defense-wide Research, Development, Test and Evaluation; Operations and Maintenance; Procurement; and Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) appropriation accounts. In addition, DTRA executes the $394.5 million Science and Technology (S&T) portion of the DoD Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) and serves as the funds manager for the remainder of that program’s funding, $890.9 million. Therefore, the total DTRA resource portfolio is approximately $2.6 billion. Details and highlights for these requests follow.

Operations and Maintenance Funding

O&M funding directly supports the warfighters and national missions as it pays for planning, training, exercises, and other means for collaboration across DoD and the USG, and with international partners. O&M funding is the fuel that enables us to reach out to our components and personnel, the warfighters, and international partners across the globe.
The requested $415.7 million in O&M funding would be applied as follows:

** Nonproliferation Activities ($66.7 million) for arms control activities including the conduct of USG inspections of foreign facilities, territories, or events; coordination and conduct of the escort of inspection teams for inspections or continuous monitoring activities in the U.S. and at U.S. facilities overseas; and the acquisition and fielding of technology capabilities required to implement, comply with, and allow full exercise of U.S. rights and prerogatives under existing and projected arms control treaties and agreements.

** WMD Combat Support and Operations ($169.7 million) for a wide range of combat and warfighter support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commanders, and military forces as they engage the WMD threat and challenges posed to the U.S., its forces and allies. DTRA supports the essential WMD response capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces within their area of responsibility at all levels of war.

** U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating WMD ($11.2 million) for DTRA direct support to the SCC-WMD including providing strategic and contingency planning, policy, and analytical support; developing interagency relationships; and working closely with USSTRATCOM partners to establish the means for assessing and exercising capabilities to combat WMD.

** Core Mission Sustainment ($168.1 million) for a wide range of enabling capabilities which include information management; resource management; security and asset protection; acquisition and logistics management; strategic planning; leadership and professional development; and provide the safety, security, and efficiency necessary for mission success.

Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
The request of $358.5 million for this important program would be used as follows:

** Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination ($1.3 million) for elimination activities of SS-24 ICBM solid rocket motors in Ukraine in 2016. Ukrainian President Poroshenko has requested that
President Obama provide additional assistance with this project, and we are working with OSD to address this new requirement. None of these funds will be spent in the Russian Federation. Elimination of Russian ballistic missile submarine Delta III Hull 393 under the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in the Russian Federation (MNEPR) is on track to be completed in early 2016 using remaining prior-year funds. Due to diminishing elimination activities needed for the Russian Federation to meet the New START Treaty requirements, the DoD will complete its transition for all remaining elimination activities to the Russian Federation in 2016.

**Chemical Weapons Destruction ($0.9 million)** for working with partner countries to reduce the threat from chemical weapons by securing and destroying CW stockpiles and eliminating chemical agent research capabilities and production facilities.

**Global Nuclear Security ($20.6 million)** for improving nuclear material security, including security for nuclear warheads and weapons-usable nuclear material. This program also assists in the secure transport of nuclear warheads and other qualifying nuclear material to dismantlement facilities, secure storage areas, or processing facilities for disposition.

**Cooperative Biological Engagement ($264.6 million)** for combating the threat of state and non-state actors acquiring biological materials and expertise that could be used to develop or deploy biological materials and weapons. This program destroys or secures certain biological agents at their source, and activities that facilitate detection and reporting of highly pathogenic diseases. This program works closely with other US Government departments and agencies, international partners and the private sector.

**Proliferation Prevention ($39.0 million)** to enhance the capability of partner countries to deter, detect, report, and interdict illicit WMD trafficking across international borders. Beginning in fiscal year 2013, the Proliferation Prevention Program began expansion outside of the FSU to Southeast Asia and the Middle East.
** Threat Reduction Engagement ($2.8 million) to develop active and positive relationships between the defense, military, and security establishments of the United States and the states of Eurasia and Central Asia. This program engages military and defense officials in activities that promote regional stability, counter-proliferation, and defense reform; builds security cooperation with the partner states; and promotes exchanges that enhance interoperability with U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces for multinational operations.

** Other Assessments/Administrative Support ($29.3 million) to ensure that DoD-provided equipment, services, and related training are fully accounted for and used effectively and efficiently for their intended purposes. This account also funds Nunn-Lugar program travel, logistics, translator/interpreter support, and other agency support.

*Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation*

DTRA RDT&E programs respond to the most pressing CWMD challenges including stand-off detection, tracking, and interdiction of WMD; modeling and simulation to support weapons effects and hazard predictions; classified support to Special Operations Forces; defeat of WMD agents and underground facilities; and protection of people, systems, and infrastructure against WMD effects.

DTRA RDT&E is unique in being focused solely on CBRNE; tied closely with the agency’s Combat Support responsibilities; has a top-notch in-house field test capability; relies upon competitive bids, the national labs, industry, and academia rather than an in-house laboratory infrastructure, allowing for a “best of breed” approach to performer selection; and is nimble and responsive to urgent needs.

The agency has a comprehensive, balanced CBRNE S&T portfolio that supports DoD goals and is well connected with DoD customers, as well as interagency and international partners. Our RDT&E approach balances the need for near-term pay-off with the need for long-term technology and capability development, knowledge and expertise, and is centered upon the following programs: Basic Research (6.1), Applied Research (6.2), Advanced Research (6.3), and System Development and Demonstration (6.5). The requested RDT&E funding totals
$491.7 million. We are requesting $38.4 million in Basic Research to provide for the discovery and development of fundamental knowledge and understanding by researchers primarily in academia and world-class research institutes in government and industry. The DTRA Fiscal Year 2016 request also includes $155.4 million for WMD Defeat Technologies Applied Research, which is used to translate fundamental knowledge into useful materials, technologies, and concepts that address recognized CWMD needs. Our $290.7 million budget request for Proliferation Prevention and Defeat Advanced Research funds development of systems, subsystems, and component integration to build, field and test prototypes to assess utility and feasibility of technology solutions to well-defined CWMD requirements. Finally, $7.2 for WMD Defeat Capabilities System Development and Demonstration funds development, operational testing, and initial deployment of mature technologies and systems.

Chemical and Biological Defense Program S&T
The Department’s CBDP S&T programs support DoD-wide efforts to research, develop, and acquire capabilities for a layered, integrated defense against CBRNE agents; better understand potential threats; secure and reduce dangerous materials whenever possible; and prevent potential attacks. Although funding for the CBDP is not part of the DTRA budget request, the agency executes the S&T portion of this program, for which the Department has requested approximately $394.5 million in FY16. The agency also manages funding execution in support of CBDP advanced development and procurement.

Conclusion

I would like to thank the Committee for this opportunity to share some of our recent efforts and accomplishments. Through all of the Agency/Center’s successes is the ability to work with DoD and interagency partners as well as the international community. This demonstrates not just our subject matter expertise, but also our agility, our relationships and our ability to collaborate and work with the larger community in resolving the world's problems related to WMD. I hope that we will continue to earn the Committee’s trust and support in meeting WMD threats and ensuring our security. Thank you, again, for the opportunity to be here today. I would be pleased to respond to your questions.