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THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

LIEUTENANT GENERAL RONALD L. BAILEY
DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR PLANS, POLICIES, AND OPERATIONS

AND

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JON M. DAVIS
DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR AVIATION

AND

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL G. DANA
DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE

ON

THE CURRENT STATE OF THE MARINE CORPS

APRIL 5, 2017

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Lieutenant General Ronald L. Bailey

Lieutenant General Ronald L. Bailey currently serves as the Deputy Commandant Plans, Polices, and Operations.

Lieutenant General Bailey was born in St. Augustine, Florida and graduated from Austin Peay State University, Clarksville, TN in 1977 with a Bachelor of Science degree in Biology. After graduation from The Basic School, Infantry Officers Course and the Basic Communication Officers Course in August 1978, he was ordered to the 3d Marine Division in Okinawa, Japan to serve with 2d Battalion, 4th Marines as a Rifle Platoon Commander and 81mm Mortar Platoon.

In October 1979, Lieutenant General Bailey was assigned to Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, SC as a Series Commander, Battalion S-3 and Commanding Officer of Company F, 2d Recruit Training Battalion. During this tour, he earned a Master's Degree in Business Management and Administration from Webster University. After graduation from Amphibious Warfare School in 1984, he joined 1st Battalion, 6th Marines at Camp Lejeune where he served as the Commanding Officer of Company C and Weapons Company Commander.

In 1987, Lieutenant General Bailey transferred to Kings Bay, GA where he activated the Security Forces Company, and served as the Guard Company Commander. From August 1989 to June 1992, he served at Marine Barracks, 8th and I, Washington, DC as Department Chief, Professional Military Education and marched as the Parade Commander. Graduating from Army Command and General Staff College in 1993, he joined 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion as the Executive Officer. From 1995 to 1997, he assumed command of the 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion. From August 1997 to 1998, Lieutenant General Bailey attended National War College, Washington, DC.

In June 1998, he was assigned to Headquarters Marine Corps, Manpower Management office as the ground Lieutenant Colonels Monitor. In June 2000, he was assigned as the Deputy, Joint Contact Team Program and Plans Officer, J-5, Headquarters US European Command, Stuttgart, Germany. From 2002 to 2004, Lieutenant General Bailey commanded the 2d Marine Regiment. In May 2006, he assumed duties as Deputy Director for Operations, J-3 Joint Staff. In July 2007, he assumed command of the 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade, and concurrently began duties as the Deputy Commanding General, III MEF.

In August 2009, he transferred to San Diego, California and assumed command of Marine Corps Recruit Depot/Western Recruiting Region. Lieutenant General Bailey assumed command of Marine Corps Recruiting Command in January 2011. In June 2011, Lieutenant General Bailey was assigned to Camp Pendleton, California and assumed command as the Commanding General 1st Marine Division. In June 2013, Lieutenant General Bailey was promoted to his current rank and assigned to Headquarters Marine Corps as the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations.

Lieutenant General Jon M. Davis

Lieutenant General Jon M. Davis assumed his current position as the Deputy Commandant for Aviation, Headquarters Marine Corps in June 2014.

Commissioned in May 1980 through the PLC Program, LtGen Davis completed the Basic School in August 1980, and then reported for flight training. Upon receiving his wings in September of 1982, he was selected to fly the AV-8A Harrier.

He reported to VMAT-203 in October 1982, completed Harrier training and reported to VMA-231 in 1983 where he deployed aboard the USS Inchon. In 1985 he transferred to VMAT-203 serving as an instructor pilot. In 1986 he attended the WTI course at MAWTS-1. In 1987 he transferred to VMA-223 serving as the "Bulldogs" WTI and operations officer. From 1988 to 1991 he served as an exchange officer with the Royal Air Force. After training in the United Kingdom, he deployed to Gutersloh, Germany for duty as a GR-5/7 attack pilot with 3(F) squadron. From 1991 to 1994 he served as an instructor at MAWTS-1 in Yuma, AZ. From 1998 to 2000 he commanded VMA-223. During his tour, VMA-223 won the CNO Safety Award and the Sanderson Trophy two years in a row, and exceeded 40,000 hours of mishap free operations. After completing the Executive Helicopter Familiarization Course at HT-18 in Pensacola in 2003, he was assigned to MAWTS-1 where he served as Executive Officer and from 2004 to 2006 as Commanding Officer. From 2006 to 2008 he served as the Deputy Commander Joint Functional Component Command -- Network Warfare at Fort Meade, Maryland. He commanded the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing from July 2010 to May 2012. From May 2012 to June 2014, he served as the Deputy Commander, United States Cyber Command.

His staff billets include a two year tour as a member of the 31st Commandant’s Staff Group, and two years as the Junior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. In 2003, he served as an Assistant Operations Officer on the 3rd Marine Air Wing staff in Kuwait during Operation Iraqi Freedom. In 2004, he served in Iraq as the Officer in Charge of the 3d Marine Aircraft Red Team. He served as the Deputy Assistant Commandant for Aviation from 2008 to 2010. In the course of his career he has flown over 4,500 mishap free hours in the AV-8, F-5 and FA-18 and as a co-pilot in every type model series tilt-rotor, rotary winged and air refueler aircraft in the USMC inventory.

LtGen Davis graduated with honors from The Basic School and was a Distinguished Graduate of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. He is a graduate of the Tactical Air Control Party Course, Amphibious Warfare School, Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course (WTI), The School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW), and Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He holds a Bachelor’s of Science from Allegheny College, a Master’s of Science from Marine Corps University and a Masters of International Public Policy from Johns Hopkins.

Lieutenant General Michael G. Dana

Lieutenant General Dana was promoted to his current rank and assumed his duties as Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics in September 2015.

Lieutenant General Dana was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in June of 1982 following graduation from Union College in Schenectady, New York. From 1983-1986, Lieutenant General Dana was assigned to 2nd Tank Battalion, deploying with Battalion Landing Team 1/8 to the Mediterranean. In 1986 he was assigned as the Combat Cargo Officer aboard USS Duluth (LPD-6), deploying to the Western Pacific with Battalion Landing Team 1/9 embarked.

From 1988-1991, Lieutenant General Dana served as the Logistics Officer for Battalion Landing Team 3/1 and as a company commander and S-3 with 1st Landing Support Battalion from 1992-1994 (Desert Storm/Operation Restore Hope). From 1996- 1999 he served with the Standing Joint Task Force at Camp Lejeune, as an ISAF Plans Officer in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and as the II MEF G-4 Operations Officer. After a tour with MAWTS-1, Lieutenant General Dana commanded MWSS-371 from 2000-2002.

From 2003-2005 he was assigned to III MEF, serving as the G-7/3D MEB Chief of Staff, III MEF Deputy G-3, and OIC of the MARCENT Coordination Element at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait.

From 2005-2007, Lieutenant General Dana commanded MWSG-37, including a deployment to Iraq from 2006- 2007. From 2010-2012 Lieutenant General Dana served as the Commanding General, 2d Marine Logistics Group, including a deployment to Afghanistan from 2011- 2012. He was then assigned as the Assistant Deputy Commandant for Logistics (LP) until October 2012.

Joint assignments include service with EUCOM, NORTHCOM and, most recently, PACOM. Lieutenant General Dana is a graduate of Amphibious Warfare School, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, School of Advanced Warfighting and the Naval War College.

Introduction

Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Courtney, and distinguished members of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness, we appreciate the opportunity to testify on the current state of Marine Corps readiness. As chartered by the 82nd Congress and reaffirmed by the 114th Congress, the Marine Corps remains unwavering in its commitment to being the nation's expeditionary force in readiness. We greatly appreciate the continued support of Congress and, in particular, the support of this subcommittee for your understanding of the Marine Corps' pivotal role to our nation's defense and in ensuring we remain ready when the nation is least ready.

Over 15 years of conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq, we have focused investment and resources on ensuring Marines were prepared for the current fight. During that time, those conflicts consumed much of the life for many of our legacy equipment systems while modernization was necessarily delayed. A focus on those operations, the decrease in funding levels, fiscal instability, and the lack of an operational reprieve have left your Marine Corps in a state that is not optimized for the future. Under the current funding levels and those we stand to face in the near future - the current Continuing Resolution and the Budget Control Act (BCA) - your Marine Corps will experience increasingly significant challenges to the institutional readiness required to deter aggression and fight and win our Nation's battles. While today's force is capable and our forward deployed forces are ready to fight, we are fiscally stretched to maintain readiness across the breadth of the force in the near term, and to modernize for future readiness against threats we will face. The Marine Corps will require sufficient resources to remedy this situation.

Your Marine Corps Today

Today, your Marine Corps continues to operate at a very challenging tempo, as it has over the past 15 years. With a dynamic and complex operating environment, Marines and our unique naval and expeditionary capabilities continue to be in high demand from all our combatant commanders around the globe. During the past year, your Marines executed approximately 185 operations, 140 security cooperation events with our partners and allies and participated in 65 major exercises.

As we sit here today, there are over 34,000 Marines deployed around the globe to assure our allies and partners, to deter our adversaries, and to respond when our Nations citizens and interests are threatened. Nearly 23,000 Marines remain stationed or deployed west of the International Date Line to maintain regional stability and deterrence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. In 2016, our Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) continued to support the joint force by executing counterterrorism (CT) operations throughout the U. S. Central Command Area of Responsibility (USCENTCOM AOR) and North Africa, providing support to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) in Japan and Haiti, and remain forward deployed to respond to crises and emerging threats. With our partners in the State Department, we employed Marine Security Guards across the globe in 146 countries, at 176 embassies and consulates. Altogether, over two thirds of the force have been deployed or stationed overseas during calendar year 2016.

Since 2013, Marines have had to rely on land-based locations to operate from due to the limited inventory of operationally available amphibious ships. Joint Force requirements remain high, and the number of available amphibious ships remains below the requirement. Due to a shortfall in amphibious shipping, your Marine Corps has had to employ land-based Special

Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (SPMAGTFs). This year we sourced SPMAGTFs to Central Command, Africa Command and Southern Command and our Black Sea Rotational Force remains forward deployed in Europe. Where an Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU) may have been the response force of choice in the past, these SPMAGTFs have been called on to conduct operations in support of Geographic Combatant Commands. Although SPMAGTFs have met a limited requirement for the Joint Force, they lack the full capability, capacity and strategic and operational agility that are organic to a fully ready and equipped Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) embarked aboard Navy amphibious ships.

What Tomorrow's Marine Corps Requires

The way the Marine Corps looks at readiness is based upon the foundation of five pillars: Unit Readiness; Capability and Capacity to Meet Joint Force Requirements; High Quality People; Infrastructure Sustainment; and Equipment Modernization. We require proper balance across these pillars and a balanced Marine Corps is a force that has a sustainable operational and personnel tempo and is able to train with the right equipment for all assigned missions. The result of this balance is optimally trained and equipped forces that deploy when required, with the right quantity of forces, on the required timeline with a ready reserve of non-deployed forces that can surge to meet the demands of a large-scale major combat operation or unplanned contingency. First, to maintain unit readiness the operating forces are dependent upon funding for training and maintenance of equipment to safeguard readiness. Although deployed Marine forces are at the highest levels of readiness, this readiness comes at the expense of non-deployed units. Second, simply put, when the Commander-in-chief calls, we must have both the

capabilities and capacity necessary to answer and meet Joint Force requirements. Third, the most important pillar of our readiness has and will always be our Marines. Recruiting and retaining high quality people plays a key role in maintaining the Marine Corps' high state of readiness. Recruiting quality youth ultimately translates into higher performance, reduced attrition, increased retention, and improved readiness for the operating forces. The Marine Corps needs the right quantities and occupational specialties to fulfill its role as an expeditionary force in readiness. Fourth is the readiness of our infrastructure. Adequately resourcing the sustainment of our bases, stations, and installations is essential as these are the platforms for generating ready units through training and deployment, as well as providing support to our Marines, Sailors and their families. Modernizing our training systems, ranges and facilities will be key in attacking our current challenges in readiness across the force. Having adequate funding levels will provide the resources we need to sustain our installation capabilities. And fifth, we must accelerate equipment modernization. Ground and aviation equipment must meet the needs of the current and emerging security environments and is essential in our transformation to a 21st Century Marine Corps.

Achieving this balance must be accomplished as we are confronted by increasingly capable threats. As we engage in the current fight and maintain our forward presence in order to respond to crises, our enemies and potential adversaries have not stood idle. They have developed new capabilities which now equal, or in some cases exceed, our own. These potential adversaries are, for example, capable of creating combined arms dilemmas using information, cyber, deception, unmanned ISR, and long-range precision fires in highly advanced and lethal ways. In a 21st century characterized by rapid change, it is imperative that we keep pace with

change for, as our Commandant has noted, history has not been kind to militaries that fail to evolve and adapt to the changing security environment.

Unit Readiness

Given the current fiscal environment, we will continue to prioritize deployed and preparing to deploy units and provide them the mission critical resources to the greatest extent possible. We will have to continue to make tough choices and balance our available resources to meet current operational commitments and, at the same time, try to build the readiness of non-deployed units – our "ready bench" – to respond to a potential contingency. In addition, we must modernize to achieve tomorrow's readiness.

The most dire readiness situation lies within our Aviation element. An unhealthy percentage of our aviation units lack the minimum number of ready basic aircraft (RBA) for training, and we are significantly short ready aircraft for wartime requirements. We simply do not have the available aircraft to meet our squadrons' requirements. This means that flight hour averages per crew per month are below the minimum standards required to achieve and maintain adequate training and readiness levels. Although deployed squadrons remain trained for their assigned mission, next-to-deploy squadrons are often achieving the minimum readiness goals just prior to deployment. Depot level maintenance capacity remains constrained. Reduced acquisition rates for the F-35 and the CH-53K require the Marine Corps to continue to operate legacy aircraft well beyond their planned lifespan; recapitalization of attack helicopters and reset of heavy lift helicopters are two examples of ways we are addressing RBA shortfalls. The real key to reducing risk in capacity and recovering readiness, however, is in transition – recapitalizing the strike/fighter fleet with the F-35B/C, completing the H-1 transition, and soon initiating the transition to the CH-53K. Every delay in the procurement of future systems

increases both the cost and complexity of maintaining our aged legacy systems beyond their projected life. Every dollar spent on aviation modernization now has a direct positive effect on current and future aviation readiness. With sufficient resources for these initiatives and procurement timelines, Marine aviation expects to achieve T 2.0 in FY20.

Ground equipment readiness is in a better situation than aviation but there are still significant challenges. With Congress' continual support of our efforts, the Marine Corps has reset over 90 percent of its legacy ground equipment. However, our most important ground legacy capabilities continue to age as modernization efforts are not moving quickly enough. For example, our Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAVs) are now more than four decades old. Our AAV Survivability Upgrade (SU) Program will sustain and marginally enhance the capability of the legacy AAV, but this does not remove the need to modernize this nearly obsolete platform. A similar example is our Light Armored Vehicle (LAV). The average age of LAV's within our inventory is 26 years; the oldest vehicle is 34 years old. As of today, there is no program identified to replace this capable but outdated platform. All the while, we continue to incur increasing costs to extend the life of this vehicle. Our AAVs and LAVs are two of the four systems that consume 50 percent of the Marine Corps' annual depot maintenance budget. As we continue on this path with limited fiscal resources to sustain legacy and outdated systems while deferring modernization, the comparative advantage in capability against potential adversaries is steadily shrinking.

Sufficient resources are needed to facilitate the conduct of exercises and training, reduce shortfalls in repair parts, and address aviation specific operations and maintenance funding. The Marine Corps has a plan to regain and sustain unit readiness. And with your continued support, we can execute our plan to restore and maintain the balance of our institutional readiness.

Joint Force Requirements and Capacity to Respond

As directed under the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), combined with fiscal constraints, the Marine Corps decreased its Active Component end strength from 202,000 to 182,000. Those decisions based on the 2014 QDR assessments and assumptions identified challenges and a security environment unlike the situation that exists today with the re-emergence of near-peer state adversaries. As you know, we as a nation are still working to counter violent extremist organizations along with deterring provocative and aggressive actions from other competitors. Equipment readiness and force structure levels remain critical requirements to improve our readiness. Additionally, equally as important as sufficient, consistent and predictable funding is time in order rebuild readiness. It has taken more than a decade to reach this point; it will take several years and more than a singular budget cycle to recover.

Our current end strength challenges our ability to support Joint Force requirements while sustaining a minimum acceptable deployment to dwell (D2D) ratio. This minimum time at home stations and bases is necessary to reconstitute our units and train for the next deployment, ensuring they are capable of executing across the full range of military operations. At our current end strength, coupled with the current operational tempo, the impacts to our force are not sustainable.

Our sustainable deployment to dwell (D2D) ratio is 1:3, which equates to every six month deployment being followed by 18 months at home station. It is during this time at home station that readiness is rebuilt during pre-deployment training when units complete a comprehensive individual, collective, and cohesive unit training program. The operational demands of today with our current requirements impose a 1:2 D2D ratio on many of our units.

For some units, it is even less. The Marine Corps prides itself on its ability to provide the right force at the right time. Under the existing operational environment, we can provide the necessary capabilities but may not have the required capacity or the necessary "ready bench" - ready units at home - to respond to larger crises at the readiness levels and in the time required by Combatant Commanders.

High Quality People

In the Marine Corps we have an expression that is known by leaders at all levels - "Mission first, Marines always." The meaning behind that phrase is to never lose sight of what our greatest asset is and will always be, Marines. The best plan or strategy will never succeed without Marines of high caliber, character, and capabilities to execute it. This is what makes them the cornerstone of our readiness. Nearly 70 percent of our Marines are serving in their first enlistment, and approximately 35,000 Marines leave the Marine Corps each year. We must continue to fill those ranks with the same high quality of men and women. Our recruiting efforts continue to succeed in finding talented and patriotic men and women willing to serve their country. Despite our continued successes, we must always seek self-improvement and find ways to better recruit and retain our most highly qualified and skilled Marines. In order to improve our ability to retain Marines, we require the resources to offer incentives to Marines with experience, critical skills and valuable specialties.

Marine Corps Force 2025, a year-long, comprehensive, bottom-up review of the force identified various end-strengths and the associated capabilities and modernization required to operate in the future security environment. Our FY 2018 Budget request will be informed by this review. We thank you for passing the 2017 NDAA that authorizes 185,000 active

component Marines. Your authorization, combined with the appropriations we still require, puts your Marine Corps on the right path to realize necessary growth that will enhance readiness.

Installation Capability

Marine Corps installations are the platforms at which we generate ready forces and from which we project power. It is from our installations that we man, train, and equip our combat-ready forces. As we have had to prioritize deployed readiness, we have had to assume risks from deferred infrastructure and facility investments and modernization. The continued deferment of Facility Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (FSRM) requires increased infrastructure investment now or we incur further risks as future FSRM costs are likely to increase. We ask for your continued support to restore and modernize our facilities.

In addition to facilities sustainment and recapitalization, we require investment in military construction (MILCON). Those investments will provide us the facilities necessary to support the fielding of new equipment and state of the art simulation systems. These facilities will provide a direct correlation to enhancing our training standards as well as readiness. Improving training areas, including aerial and ground ranges, will require your support for special use airspace and additional land to replace degraded and inadequate facilities.

Modernization

Modernization is the keystone in providing operationally relevant forces to deter and counter emerging threats. As was the case with our other pillars of readiness, deferred modernization has allowed our adversaries to shrink the gap between their capabilities and our own. We have had to expend resources maintaining aging and obsolete legacy systems and

platforms. As General Dunford testified last year, "we should [never] send Americans into a fair fight." Continued delays in modernization will lead to just that, or worse. Investing in and accelerating our modernization programs directly contribute to improved readiness by achieving efficiencies and providing needed capabilities sooner.

Our Aviation Modernization Plan requires acceleration after suffering recent delays, many attributed to funding deficiencies. Increasing the procurement of the F-35 and CH-53K will result in similar and greater Marine aviation capability improvements. Our first operational F-35B squadron, VMFA-121, relocated to Iwakuni, Japan in January. By the end of this year, that squadron will fill both the 31st MEU requirement and the land-based requirements within PACOM. We also look forward to the stand-up of our first F-35C squadron in FY19, further enhancing the 5th generation capabilities of our Navy-Marine Corps Team. Additionally, the CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement remains critical to maintaining the battlefield mobility our force requires. The acceleration of these key modernization programs will directly improve our readiness and allow us to retire aircraft that have reached or exceeded their intended life.

For our ground combat element, in order to maintain our technological advantage we must accelerate the modernization of ground systems. Our Ground Combat Tactical Vehicle (GCTV) modernization strategy is to sequentially modernize priority capabilities, reduce equipment inventories wherever possible, and judiciously sustain remaining equipment. The fiscal environment has prevented us from accelerating procurement of critical ground systems. Our fleet of AAVs is over four decades old and is a top priority for replacement. Procurement of Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV) to replace our High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) also needs to be accelerated. Thirty years ago, the HMMWV was not developed to address the threat of asymmetric warfare and improvised explosive devices (IED).

The JLTV will give our Marines a more survivable and capable platform with which to operate. There is currently no replacement program for our legacy Light Armored Vehicle fleet. We need to develop and invest in a next generation replacement for this system. Additionally, we need to establish programs that develop, procure, and deliver active protection systems, counter-UAS and increased long-range precision fires capabilities.

A critical component in building, training, and maintaining an expeditionary forward presence and contingency response capability is the availability and readiness of amphibious ships. Amphibious platforms provide the sovereignty, strategic mobility, unmatched logistical support, operational reach, and forcible entry capability required to deter and, when necessary, defeat our Nation's adversaries. Our amphibious concepts have been validated throughout our history, and we will remain a conduit for innovation. As the operating environment changes, the Marine Corps will continue to innovate as we implement our new Marine Corps Operating Concept. The availability of amphibious shipping remains paramount to our relevancy, responsiveness, resiliency and readiness. The Nation's amphibious warship requirement remains at 38. The current inventory of 31 vessels falls well short of this requirement. Maintenance challenges in the aging amphibious fleet significantly exacerbate that shortfall. The decreased quantity and availability of amphibious warships, the preferred method of deploying and employing Marine Corps capabilities inhibits our Navy-Marine Corps Team from training to our full capabilities, impedes our shared ability to respond to an emergent crisis, and increases the strain on our current readiness. Sufficient resources for amphibious shipbuilding plans, as well as surface ship-to-shore connectors programmed to replace the Landing Craft Air Cushioned and Landing Craft Utility platforms, will improve our overall amphibious capability and capacity.

As we move towards a 21st Century Marine Corps we must be able to dominate all five domains – air, land, maritime, cyber and space. In the information environment, enabling and protecting our ability to command and control (C2) Marine forces widely distributed across an area of operations is critical to future success. This requires transforming MAGTF C2 capabilities through a unified network environment that is ready, relevant, responsive and resilient.

Conclusion

On behalf of all of our Marines, Sailors, civilians and their families, we thank the Congress and this committee for this opportunity to discuss the key challenges your Marine Corps faces. We thank you for your support as articulated in the recent 2017 NDAA. We have a plan to reset, recapitalize and modernize your Marine Corps into a 21st century force. The most important actions that Congress can take now is to immediately repeal the caps on defense spending in the Budget Control Act and provide a defense appropriation that ensures sufficient, consistent, and predictable funding to train, man, and equip the FY17 NDAA authorized force. The Marine Corps must begin to rebalance and modernize for the future. Resourcing the Marine Corps will enable future readiness and create a multi-domain force with overmatch that can deter and, when necessary, defeat a highly capable near-peer adversary. With your help, we can begin the deliberate journey to overcome these challenges and rebuild your Marine Corps for the 21st century.