

**RECORD VERSION**

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## **INTRODUCTION:**

Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Bordallo, distinguished Members of the Committee, we appreciate the opportunity to testify today on the readiness of the United States Army. On behalf of our Acting Secretary, the Honorable Robert Speer, and our Chief of Staff, General Mark Milley, thank you for your support and demonstrated commitment to our Soldiers, Army Civilians, Families, and Veterans.

Today, the Army remains globally engaged with over 182,000 trained and ready Soldiers committed to meeting Combatant Command deterrence and counter-terrorist requirements. These requirements fall disproportionately on the Army to fulfill: the Army meets 48% of Combatant Command base demand and is set to meet 70% of FY17 emergent force demand. This demand commits all major Regular Army combat formations that are assigned or allocated to Combatant Commands, or that are under orders to be prepared to deploy. In order to sustain this considerable level of demand, the Army has been forced to accept risk in end strength, capacity, readiness, modernization, installations, and sustainment. Simultaneously, rival nations have aggressively updated their armed forces, thus creating capability gaps that impose a significant threat to U.S. forces and contingency missions.

We echo the testimony of General Allyn on 7 February that the Army requires sustained, long-term, and predictable funding to build and sustain readiness. Under funding caps in current law, the Army will be forced to draw down end strength and underinvest in readiness. If the 2011 Budget Control Act is not further revised or repealed, we will be unable to sustain our force, leading to an underprepared and underequipped Army. We ask that you establish new budget authorizations to prevent this outcome and ensure investments in Army readiness are not wasted. Sustainable, consistent, long-term funding will allow us to rebuild the Army's readiness. Ready forces are not just available for contingencies, they prevent contingencies by deterring potential adversaries.

## **A Ready Force:**

Readiness for ground combat is and will remain the U.S. Army's first priority.

Readiness is the capability of our forces to conduct the full range of military operations to defeat all enemies regardless of the threats they pose. It is generated through manning, training, and equipping of forces and the development of leaders to fulfill Combatant Command requirements.

## **Manning a Ready Army:**

We welcome the opportunity to grow the Army to over a million Soldiers, including 476,000 in the Regular Army, 343,000 in the National Guard, and 199,000 in the Reserves, as authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY17. We ask that these vital manpower increases be coupled with commensurate funding to ensure the long-term strength of the force. Under the Army's plan to mitigate risk with additional funded manpower, the first place new soldiers will go will be to undermanned units. Commanders today in many cases struggle to meet readiness objectives because they do not have enough Soldiers present for duty. We will fill these gaps to prevent the development of a hollow force.

The second priority for additional Soldiers will be to build greater quantities of critical unit types and develop crucial capabilities. We plan to convert one of our Infantry brigade combat teams (BCT) to an Armored BCT (ABCT), giving us a total of 15 ABCTs across the Total Force. This restructuring, enabled by additional manning, will alleviate stress on the force caused by the high demand for ABCTs. We would pursue a 16<sup>th</sup> ABCT with additional resources. A second force structure line of effort addresses the security force mission. Right now, we assist our partners requiring security force assistance by deploying the leadership of units apart from the bulk of their Soldiers. This destroys the readiness of the unit. Additional manning will enable the activation of two Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) in the near future, one in the Regular Army and one in the Army National Guard. We intend to resource six SFABs (5 Active Component and 1 National Guard) and align them with each of the

Combatant Commands to enhance security cooperation activities and build BCT readiness. These SFABs will also be available as the basis for new brigades in the event the Army needs to rapidly expand.

### **Training a Ready Army:**

As we refill unit end strength requirements and build new force structure, we are implementing training policies that will enable us to achieve and sustain higher readiness levels. These policies apply to home station training where units develop their individual and small unit tasks, and to Combat Training Centers (CTC), where units put it all together as a combined arms team.

The current global security environment demands a shift in focus to support Joint operations against a broader range of threats, and we use the most demanding challenge – decisive action in support of Unified Land Operations – as our benchmark. Simulating the decisive action challenge – that is, recreating a peer competitor in a training environment for all echelons of command – requires sustained resources. With the last disruption of funding we were forced to leave our Combat Training Centers empty while the units scheduled to train had their readiness degrade. This was an incredible waste of training resources, and more importantly, of the readiness of the affected units. We have prioritized getting units back through the Combat Training Centers, despite budgetary pressures. We completed 18 Decisive Action rotations in FY16, and plan to increase those over the coming years.

The Army is one Total Force, and Army National Guard and Army Reserve units deploy regularly and are integral for our contingency plans. The Army has programmed increased manning, training days, and Combat Training Center rotations to enhance Army National Guard and Army Reserve readiness. These increases are not an across-the-board uptick. They are targeted by unit type to address proscribed readiness levels based on operational demand. Units that must be available immediately, such as Army National Guard ABCTs and Stryker BCTs, will have additional training days to enable their rotations through a Combat Training Center. In

cases where plans allow units more time to deploy, fewer additional training days are programmed. As with the Regular Army, we have reduced the burden of mandatory training on Army National Guard and Army Reserve units by decreasing its frequency and giving more discretion to commanders. These administrative training requirements eat up time at home station that is vital to preparation for a CTC rotation.

The Army made significant progress implementing a new force generation methodology called Sustainable Readiness to sustain established readiness longer, regain combined arms lethality, and develop key capabilities. We will begin implementing Objective Training requirements in FY17 in support of Sustainable Readiness. Sustainable Readiness applies to the Total Force, allowing the integration of Reserve Component units into readiness decisions, which is not only advantageous but vital as we increasingly integrate Reserve Component forces into our global management of forces.

We are also finding ways to couple training with strategic deployment of forces. One prominent example is the return of Army armored forces to Europe. The 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division is deployed from Fort Carson, Colorado to Poland, initiating the heel-to-toe rotation of ABCTs in Europe in order to create a continuous forward presence. Rather than having its readiness consumed by this deployment, the unit will sustain its high-readiness by the conduct of training exercises with allies in seven countries across the region. The deployment will also exercise our ability to deploy strategically. This ABCT deployment will be accompanied by heel-to-toe rotations of Combat Aviation Brigades (CAB) to Europe. The European Reassurance Initiative funds both deployments. It is critical that Congress continue to support ERI both for the value the Army gets out of these deployments, but also for the assurance and deterrence value of these deployments in Europe. As with Europe, we are simultaneously assuring an ally and building readiness in South Korea. We will continue rotating an ABCT to South Korea, and will begin rotating a Heavy Aviation Reconnaissance Squadron to round out a forward deployed Combat Aviation Brigade there.

Despite our best efforts, we still have a lot of work to do. While rotations to Europe and South Korea enable commanders to train and sustain desired readiness thresholds, most missions consume readiness at a rate that the Army is challenged to maintain. As of today, only about one third of our BCTs, one quarter of our Combat Aviation Brigades, and one half of our Division Headquarters are ready. Last month our Vice Chief of Staff testified that only three of those BCTs require no additional people, no additional training and no additional equipment. Since then, we are now down to only two BCTs being ready to fight tonight without receiving additional people, training, or equipment. We can only meet requirements derived from the Defense Planning Guidance at high military risk. Our current plan, coupled with adequate levels of predictable funding and stable demand, will restore sufficient Army readiness in our current force by FY21-23.

### **Equipping and Sustaining a Ready Army:**

The Army's initiatives to regain and sustain readiness have come at a cost to modernization. Of particular note is our current plan to reduce Aviation modernization, which we used to pay for cuts required when the FY15 Bipartisan Budget Act cap adjustments expired. Our Army requires modernized equipment and sufficient, trained manpower to win decisively. Today, we risk being outmanned, outranged, outgunned, and outdated. Capability requirements include long-range precision fires, air and missile defense, Armored BCTs, and aviation. In addition, new and emerging capabilities must be developed and acquired. As a mitigation strategy, the Army is prioritizing critical equipment modernization and infrastructure upgrades while proceeding with acquisition reform initiatives to deliver an acceptable level of near term military risk. This plan will reduce manpower shortages while generating selected formations and modernizing the Army in key areas such as fires, air and missile defense, and armor.

The Army needs to refocus investment in our Organic Industrial Base (OIB) to ensure the long-term strength of the force. We need a viable industrial base to sustain readiness and to enable the reconstitution of combat losses at an acceptable rate. The longer the Army operates in an unpredictable fiscal environment or under continuing

resolutions, the more difficult it is to sustain production and workforce skill sets. In order to maintain a viable industrial base, we are pursuing an OIB strategy that includes an assessment of critical capabilities, workload, and the skills required to sustain readiness. We are aligning capabilities and capacities to effectively meet readiness and modernization needs, and are publishing policies to increase OIB efficiency and effectiveness. We've also taken advantage of opportunities for Public Private Partnerships – for example those conducted at Letterkenny with Raytheon – that have helped facilities enhance their technical capability and become more cost efficient.

### **Installations – Platforms for a Ready Army:**

Every aspect of generating, projecting and sustaining combat power needed to train, fight and win occurs on Army installations. We as an Army made a deliberate choice to ensure our Soldiers had what they needed to train, fight and win against our adversaries ... and rightly so. Reduced resources, emerging requirements, missions and increased operational tempo for more than a decade resulted in nearly 22% or 33,000 facilities that are now in poor or failed condition. The deferred maintenance against these facilities is equivalent to \$10.8 billion which will take years to buy back. The condition of these mission facilities, airfields, training areas, maintenance facilities, roads, ports, dams, bridges, housing and barracks directly impacts the readiness of our units and the morale of our Soldiers, Civilians and Families.

To enable mission readiness, installations need a sustained amount of funding over the next ten years to prevent further facility degradation; restore poor and failing facilities; and modernize infrastructure to meet current and emerging mission requirements.

The Army deeply appreciates your support for the authority in NDAA 17 to convert existing buildings to new functions using Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding. We are carefully using all of our existing authorities to address excess capacity to include conversion; offering facilities for lease; moving off-post activities back into excess on-post facilities; and, if necessary, demolition. As we seek to utilize our best facilities, they are not evenly distributed across our installations. Should the Department

receive BRAC authority we will use it effectively to eliminate excess infrastructure and reinvest funds on higher priorities.

As we carefully apply resources for infrastructure, we also do the same with Base Operation Support services to provide a safe, secure living and working environment for all those who work and live on Army installations worldwide.

We remain committed to providing the best support for our Soldiers, Families, and Civilians but need continued support from you for sufficient, timely, and predictable funding to ensure installations remain able to effectively support the Total Army.

### **Developing Ready Army Leaders:**

Leaders are who make the Army ready to fight and win the Nation's wars. Leader development cannot be postponed – it is the single most important factor in delivering Army readiness, both now and in the future. All Soldiers are leaders, and as we develop their skills for ever higher levels of responsibility, we are creating strength. As General Allyn put it, our deep bench is our asymmetric advantage. We will continue to develop our leaders across the Total Army. Last fiscal year, we trained half a million Soldiers from across all three components plus 30,000 members of other Services in our Professional Military Education programs. These and other leader development programs will remain a priority.

Readiness depends on a culture where Soldiers focus on the mission. To that end, we remain committed to our Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) efforts, including the new Emergent Leader Immersive Training Environment (ELITE) Command Team Trainer and the Prevention and Outreach Simulation Trainer. These and other programs strengthen our Army culture, helping to create a ready force.



## **Closing:**

Despite increasing demand for forces and budgetary pressure, we have maintained Army readiness and refocused on the threat posed by peer competitors. However, we have paid for this readiness by assuming risk in meeting contingency requirements and deferring investments in equipment modernization, infrastructure and installations, sustainment force readiness, and the OIB. These were difficult decisions driven by budgetary constraints. We ask for your help in alleviating these constraints so we can get back on a path toward sustained readiness as we move forward into an increasingly complex future. We need sustained, predictable funding.

Ultimately, the strength of the U.S. Army is its people. We must equip our Soldiers with modern weapons that allow them to fight and win. We must provide them with sufficient training facilities. We must develop them as leaders. We must supply and support them in the field. We must provide adequate homes and a high quality of life for them and their Families as they shoulder the Nation's burdens. We rely on our Civilians to do much of the background work and free up our Soldiers for warfighting, and we must support them adequately. If we support our people, the Army will be ready.