

Log 396n1

Amendment to H.R. 2500
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020

Offered by: Ms. Cheney of Wyoming

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2500, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

Report on the Adequacy of the New START Treaty to Restrain Current Threats

The committee finds that arms control is beneficial for both United States national security and international stability, but the United States should not enter arms control agreements that impose unilateral restrictions on the United States Armed Forces and fail to properly account for the nuclear arsenals of all near-peer competitors in the international system.

The committee also finds that the United States and Russia signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (the “New START Treaty”) on April 8, 2010, which is due to expire in 2021, and that the United States does not have any arms control agreements with China.

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states, “While the United States has continued to reduce the number and salience of nuclear weapons, others, including Russia and China, have moved in the opposite direction. Russia has expanded and improved its strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces. China’s military modernization has resulted in an expanded nuclear force, with little to no transparency into its intentions.”

Regarding Russia, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states, “Russia is developing and deploying new nuclear warheads and launchers. These efforts include multiple upgrades for every leg of the Russian nuclear triad of strategic bombers, sea-based missiles, and land-based missiles. Russia is also developing at least two new inter-continental range systems, a hypersonic glide vehicle, and a new intercontinental, nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered, undersea autonomous torpedo.” “[Russia] is also building a large, diverse, and modern set of non-strategic systems that are dual-capable . . . These theater- and tactical-range systems are not accountable under the New START Treaty.”

Regarding China, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states, “China continues to increase the number, capabilities, and protection of its nuclear forces.” It additionally states that, “China has developed a new road-mobile strategic intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a new multi-warhead version of its DF5 silo-based ICBM, and its most advanced ballistic missile submarine armed with new submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). It has also announced

development of a new nuclear-capable strategic bomber, giving China a nuclear triad.”

In testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate on April 10, 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated, in response to a question about extending the New START treaty, that “we need to make sure that we’ve got all the parties that are relevant as a component of this as well.”

On March 16, 2019, National Security Advisor John Bolton stated, “China is building up its nuclear capacity now. It’s . . . one reason why if we’re going to have another arms control negotiation, for example, with the Russians, it may make sense to include China in that discussion as well”.

The committee seeks additional information from the Department of Defense related to Russia and China’s expanding inventory of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapon systems, and the suitability of the current New START Treaty to restrain Russia and China from developing and deploying additional nuclear weapons.

The committee therefore directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense to provide a report to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 11, 2019, on the following:

- (1) Russia and China’s expanding inventory of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapon systems;
- (2) The impacts on United States national security should an extension or successor agreement of the New START Treaty not be:
 - (A) a trilateral arrangement among the United States, Russia, and China; and
 - (B) an expanded arrangement to include all strategic, non-strategic nuclear-capable weapon systems.

The report should be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.