

Statement by

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Office of the Secretary of Defense

Before the 116th Congress

Committee on Armed Services

U.S. House of Representatives

March 13, 2019

Introduction

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify on policy matters related to the USEUCOM theater, alongside Commander General Scaparrotti. General Scaparrotti has been a great partner and it is an honor to appear beside him today.

The threats we face as a nation are clear. National security threats from Russia and China mark a new chapter in global great power competition. The history of the 20th Century proved that core U.S. interests—in western values, economic freedoms, and democratic legitimacy—will require us to come to the defense of our western allies against threats from authoritarian regimes. If that future war were to come, and hopefully it never will, our troops would be at the front lines -- because we cannot thrive alone in a bleak world of dictators and autocrats.

Over the course of 70 years, NATO has provided an integral means for the United States and Allies to defend our interests by collectively deterring a potential conflict, saving lives, saving dollars, and saving our way of life. And over the last five years, we have successfully built increasing multilateral pressure against Russian aggression—through sanctions, diplomatic expulsions, coherent condemnations, and significant increases in NATO spending and reforms. The alliance and our partners stand together against autocrats who seek neither truth nor human flourishing, but only care for their own personal power.

Our force posture in Europe is not just about military competition. It is about staying true to our national values and preparing for the next fight—together—with a goal that we remain so strong that we never actually have to endure that fight.

European Strategy and Great Power Competition

The Department's approach to European policy, including Israel, is based on the 2017

National Security Strategy (NSS) and the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). The goals of the NSS are to protect the American people, defend the Homeland, and to promote peace and prosperity from a position of strength. Our NDS supports the NSS by setting a course to rebuild our military strength and sustain competitive advantages against our nation's critical challenges. The NDS is clear about the central problem it is focused on solving: the erosion of our military's competitive edge vis-à-vis Russia and China. These powers are developing capabilities and doctrine designed to offset traditional U.S. military advantages and contest our ability to project power in every domain. This competition, not terrorism, is now the principal priority for the Department. Failure to meet this challenge will result in decreasing U.S. global influence and security.

To compete in this environment and defend future generations of Americans against near-peer competitors, the Department is aggressively pursuing three NDS lines of effort: enhancing our lethality, strengthening our alliances and attracting new partners around the globe, and reforming the way we do business. The future Joint Force must be more lethal, resilient, agile, and ready to compete with and deter aggression from China and Russia, while still contending with persistent threats from North Korea, Iran, and terrorist groups. This range of threats requires the Department to prioritize modernization, innovation, technological adaptation, and high-end readiness, while ensuring we remain economical stewards of U.S. taxpayers' dollars.

This complex, volatile, and dangerous security environment is readily apparent in Europe and along its periphery. The need to address near-peer competition in the European theater now and in the future not only requires sound investments in the Joint Force, but also that we posture and employ our forces in ways that ensure a combat-credible forward deterrent. In Europe, we are prioritizing increasing Allied military readiness to enhance North Atlantic Treaty

Organization's (NATO) deterrence and defense. We will continue to forward deploy forces, including through the use of dynamic force employment, to further bolster the Alliance's deterrence and defense posture. And we must continue to deter and confront adversaries, while avoiding miscalculation or escalation that would ultimately undermine our national security interests.

While the United States remains the pre-eminent military power, Russia's and China's military modernization, combined with the challenges in time and distance we face, provide the opportunity for these actors to pursue rapid, short duration actions – what is commonly called the “fait accompli” scenario. Were such a scenario to transpire, it places the United States in an untenable position of responding in ways that may be viewed as escalating the conflict – a deeply problematic path when confronting nuclear-armed powers. Our strategy is focused on making sure we have the right capabilities and posture, reinforced by our Allies and partners, to bolster our deterrence in this environment. Put simply, our strategy is to deter aggression by making clear that our competitors will not gain from it.

Defense policy objectives in Europe are therefore focused on improving our deterrence and confronting Russian activities that threaten to undermine the NATO and the free and open international order that the United States Armed Forces, working in concert with Allies and partners in Europe, strive to uphold every day. The Department is also focused on countering the increased malign activity of China in Europe; maintaining partner support of our efforts to handle Iranian aggression; and working with our Allies and partners to counter the continued threat of terrorism. Europe and Israel are among our strongest and most vital allies and partners in countering the many shared threats we face in Europe and around the world. Some of our closest allies and partners in Europe are deployed alongside us to our coalition operations in

Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq and beyond.

The United States' alliances, partnerships, and overseas presence in Europe are invaluable force multipliers for the U.S. Armed Forces and provide us an asymmetric ability to project power and defend forward. Maintaining a credible nuclear force and a robust posture in Europe enables DoD to provide a credible deterrent as we leverage our constellation of alliances and partnerships to position our forces to fight the away game, if necessary. With near-peer adversaries such as Russia, investing in our nuclear deterrent is critical to ensuring that tensions with Moscow—regardless of where or how they arise—do not escalate into full-scale war.

Our posture in the European also plays a critical role in supporting global security objectives. The access, basing, and overflight permissions we receive from our European allies enable U.S. forces to support multiple Combatant Commands in many ongoing missions across the globe.

The support from Congress for the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) is instrumental in pursuing U.S. objectives in Europe by strengthening our relationship with European Allies and partners, and deterring Russian aggression. EDI supports DoD's ability to position capabilities forward in Europe to increase our reaction time in the event of a crises and strengthen our deterrence posture. As our critical prepositioned equipment is set in strategic locations and as we look to our allies for additional burden-sharing in our overseas military construction program, the Department has reduced the EDI request to Congress. This does not represent a change to the planned level of forces, capabilities or activities in Europe; or weakening of support for our European allies. This is a recognition of the progress we have made under EDI and the importance of allies contributing to our shared defense. The threats facing Europe are not diminishing.

Russia's destabilizing activities, enabled by its conventional, unconventional, and nuclear forces, threaten global peace and security. Over the past year, we have seen Russia blatantly poison a UK citizen, and a person under the British government's protection, on UK sovereign soil; continue its occupation of Crimea and Georgia, engage in military activity in Ukraine, and 20 percent of Georgia; deny freedom of navigation in the Sea Azov by attacking ships and continuing to hold prisoner 24 Ukrainian sailors; hold one of its largest conventional exercises with Chinese participation; continue to undermine U.S. and coalition operations in Afghanistan and Syria; threaten to field a new missile system in clear violation of the INF Treaty, and work day in and day out to get the West to hate its governing institutions through disinformation campaigns, cyber-attacks, and political interference. The list goes on, but it is abundantly clear: Russian aggression is a threat to Europe, the United States, and the stability of the international order.

Russia continues to modernize and expand its nuclear arsenal, including its non-strategic nuclear weapons. Paired with its strategy and doctrine that include an emphasis on the threat of limited nuclear escalation, Russia makes clear it is prepared to use these capabilities for coercive and military purposes, with the goal of undermining European security. This underscores the importance of modernizing our own nuclear triad, as well as the continued development of U.S. nuclear supplemental capabilities called for in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review—the low-yield Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile and the Nuclear Sea Launched Cruise Missile. These supplemental capabilities are needed to help overcome Russia's mistaken belief that it can gain an advantage through limited use of nuclear weapons and reinforce deterrence against low-yield nuclear use.

Beyond Russia's increasingly aggressive actions, our European partners are starting to

grasp the security threat of an increasingly assertive China. While many investments are beneficial, others present security concerns – requiring careful screening. Some of China’s recent investments in Europe’s critical technology and infrastructure, to include telecommunications, ports, railways, and cutting-edge technologies with military application, are a threat to NATO’s security and unity. In order to ensure Alliance integrity, we are working with our partners to recognize and mitigate the growing threat posed by China’s targeted investments. Though the threats have increased, we are also strengthening our alliances and partnerships to better counter these threats.

The Department is committed to strengthening our alliances and partnerships with European countries and Israel. Close coordination on policy enables U.S. forces to be safer and more effective globally, as we work through NATO to further shared security priorities. I strive every day to deepen cooperation on a wide array of DoD priorities and my job is only possible with consistent Congressional support and stable funding. Congressional support for our Allies and partners in the EUCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) is invaluable. Congressional support for U.S. forces deployed in EUCOM as well as the EDI have been, and will continue to be, critical to achieving NDS priorities and U.S. national security objectives. I want to thank you for your continued support to our men and women overseas in Europe who play an integral part in supporting our commitment to NATO Article 5, training and exercising with our closest military partners, and also the critical supporting role they play to operations in AFRICOM and CENTCOM as well.

Importance of NATO and our European Partners

NATO is vital to U.S. objectives and strategy in Europe and globally. Allies have made considerable progress on the “three c’s” of burden sharing: cash, contributions, and capabilities.

The Department is very focused on increasing the amount and quality of NATO burden sharing that ultimately benefits the United States as a member of the Alliance. In the Department, our teams are engaging with partners and Allies daily to ensure that NATO is fit for our times and able to deter increased Russian aggression and malign Chinese influence.

If the question is whether the Department of Defense cares about alliances, we state clearly that we do and we must. We are charged with keeping Americans secure and preserving our way of life. We may not always see eye to eye with our partners—and family disputes can often be challenge. But our alliance know that our threats are shared threats and that spending their share on defense serves all of us.

The Department of Defense trusts its allies and partners as we encourage them to do more. And over the past four years, we have seen contributions exponentially increase. Alliance cooperation and cohesion is at its strongest in years.

We are doing this by pushing our NATO Allies to increase their defense budgets, increase their procurement of needed capabilities, and increase their contributions to NATO and other global operations. The emphasis on increased burden-sharing is bearing fruit. According to Secretary General Stoltenberg, non-U.S. NATO Allies are on track to spend an additional \$100 billion by the end of 2020.

Acting Secretary Shanahan recently returned from his first NATO Defense Ministerial in February. Allies were reassured by his message that the United States commitment to Article 5 remains ironclad and that the United States will continue to be a reliable security partner committed to the transatlantic bond. We will continue to work with Allies to ensure NATO's deterrence and defense posture is adequate to meet the global security challenges facing the Alliance. The Department will continue to prioritize working with Allies to improve NATO

readiness levels, to implement NATO's adapted command structure, increase Allied speed of decision making, and to improve military mobility across Europe.

The United States' commitment to transatlantic security is also underpinned by continued investments in missile defense in Europe. Missile defense plays a critical role in NATO's defense of Europe from coercion and aggression. Interoperable NATO missile defense systems will improve the Alliance's collective defense capabilities and strengthen our own security.

The Department is committed to completing the deployment of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), which is the U.S. contribution to NATO ballistic missile defense and will expand defensive coverage against medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile threats from the Middle East. EPAA includes deployment of the first operational Aegis Ashore system in Romania and an Aegis Ashore system in Poland that is under construction.

In addition to these EPAA capabilities, individual NATO Allies are also fielding national air and missile defense systems designed to defend against shorter-range ballistic and cruise missiles. These active defenses will play a crucial role in countering missile strikes that underpin potential adversaries' anti-access/area denial, or A2/AD operations to limit U.S. power projection through missile attacks on U.S. forces, allies, and critical in-theater infrastructure.

Nuclear policy is also a primary focus for the Department, given Russian capabilities. Russia's long-standing violation of the INF Treaty is glaring reminder of Russia's desire to erode European peace, prosperity, and unity. While the Kremlin was certainly hoping for a difference outcome, our Allies have staunchly supported our declaration of Russia's material breach and our decision in February to suspend our obligations and initiate withdrawal from the treaty. The United States and our Allies have made every attempt possible to convince Russia to come back into compliance with the Treaty. We have held over thirty meetings with Russia, over more than

five years, and at every level—from the Presidential level down to technical experts. We have even provided Russia in writing specific steps it could take to return to compliance and save the INF Treaty. Only the complete and verifiable destruction of Russia’s 9M729 missiles, launchers, and associated equipment will resolve Russia’s violation.

An arms control treaty that one side abides by while the other openly and brazenly violates does not make us safer. Violations must have consequences. This is Russia’s final opportunity to return to compliance. The onus is entirely on Russia to save the INF Treaty. Instead of engaging on how to return to compliance, Russia has refused to admit that it is in violation of the Treaty and has attempted to spread falsehoods and disinformation about the capabilities of the 9M729 missile. On March 4, 2019, Russia announced its own suspension of the Treaty. The Department continues to work with Allies and partners to ensure our continued collective security in the face of Russia’s new intermediate-range threat and deny Moscow any advantage from its unlawful conduct.

While the Department engages regularly with our Allies in NATO, we also continue to emphasize the importance of close coordination between NATO and the European Union (EU). Military mobility – which enables forces to move seamlessly across Europe – is a flagship of NATO-EU cooperation. We encourage our Allies and partners to see even more examples of cooperation between NATO, as the cornerstone of transatlantic defense cooperation, and the EU come to fruition. As the EU moves forward on developing a host of its own defense initiatives, we insist they must not duplicate, but rather complement, NATO efforts, and that they must be transparent and open to non-EU NATO Allies to reinforce our ability to effectively deter our common adversaries.

The Arctic

I would be remiss to discuss the resurgence of great power competition without also addressing the growing importance of the Arctic as strategic terrain. As the Arctic becomes increasingly accessible due to seasonal ice melt, the Department continues to seek a secure and stable region where the homeland is defended and U.S. interests are safeguarded, and nations work cooperatively to address shared challenges. The increased activity and investment of both Russia and China are concerning not only to us, but to many of our Arctic partners as well. Our activity and investments in the region are based on our national interests and informed by our strategy, which we are in the process of updating in response to the NDAA. While it is too early to give much detail, I can share that the new strategy will nest within the framework of the National Defense Strategy and will continue to address military security issues together with appropriate stakeholders through the existing network of relevant binational, bilateral and multilateral relationships, to include NORAD and NATO. DoD will continue our active engagement in this region, including through multilateral military training and exercises in and around the Arctic.

Europe's Eastern Flank

NATO's Eastern Flank—from the Baltics to Bulgaria—has been a recent focus of U.S. force posture in response to an increasingly aggressive Russia. Starting in 2015, under OPERATION ATLANTIC RESOLVE, the United States began rotating forces through and along the Eastern Flank to reassure our Allies and deter Russia. This continues to be a Departmental priority, and we welcome the support of our NATO Allies through their contributions to the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) and Baltic Air Policing missions.

Poland has been a hub for these efforts, and the Department has greatly increased its rotational presence there as a result, including through the deployment of a rotational Armored

Brigade Combat Team. The United States has on average 4,200 rotational personnel in country, though the numbers fluctuate depending on exercises and deployment schedules. This presence includes the rotational Armored Brigade Combat Team, a battalion in support of NATO's eFP, an aviation detachment, and a combat aviation detachment. Additional personnel will staff the planned Aegis Ashore missile defense site that will become operational next year. DoD contributions to eFP support EUCOM's deterrence and defense posture and underscore our commitment to transatlantic security through NATO.

The United States is also considering expanding its presence in Poland as a result of Poland's stated willingness to provide financial support for such an effort. We are currently in the midst of bilateral discussions with the Polish Government on this matter, and the Department views Poland's offer as yet another indication of Poland's commitment to promoting regional security and burden-sharing. Although I realize there is great interest in this issue, I unfortunately cannot discuss these discussions in this unclassified setting, especially given their pre-decisional nature. The Department is committed to keeping this Committee updated if and when a bilateral agreement with Poland is reached.

The Baltic States and Poland are on the frontline of NATO's deterrence and defense on the eastern flank. Russia continues to use disinformation, cyber attacks, and military posturing to undermine the security of the Nordic-Baltic region. DoD, with the Department of State, is bolstering the eastern flank Allies through security cooperation and capacity building initiatives targeted at improving defense and security infrastructure in the Baltics, strengthening national resilience, and building defense capacity through programs such as the EDI, section 333, Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs. The United States has stepped up security cooperation since 2015 following Russia's attempted

annexation of Crimea and aggression in eastern Ukraine. DoD is providing nearly \$100 million for joint procurement of large-caliber ammunition; and over \$70 million in training and equipping programs to the Baltics to build the capacity of the national military or national-level security forces of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to conduct border-security operations. DoD intends to continue exercises and periodic deployment of forces to the Baltic States to strengthen deterrence and to catalyze the efforts of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to develop their national defense.

U.S. force posture and deterrence efforts in the Eastern Flank are not just focused on the Nordic-Baltic region. Southeastern Europe—specifically the Black Sea region, including Romania and Bulgaria—is just as important an emphasis. Indeed, this is the region where Russian aggression has actually manifested itself over the past decade. Like Poland, Romania has been a forward-leaning NATO Ally that has been fully supportive of a U.S. presence in country. Our force posture in Romania, and especially our Army presence there, has grown in the past five years with the rotation of a battalion from the Armored Brigade Combat Team at the Mihail Kogalniceanu—or “MK”—Base. In addition, about 150 U.S. sailors man the Aegis Ashore missile defense site in Deveselu. We continue to review our force posture in this region to ensure that there are no weak spots along NATO’s Eastern Flank when it comes to deterrence or NATO’s ability to respond to an Article 5 situation.

Beyond NATO, Ukraine and Georgia are vital partners in Europe’s Eastern Flank and Black sea region. In Ukraine, Russia occupies Crimea and fuels conflict in the Donbas in its attempt to change borders by force and to thwart our goal of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. In November, Russia attacked Ukrainian vessels and personnel near the Kerch Strait in a brazen violation of international law. We once again call on Russia to immediately return the

seized vessels and 24 detained personnel, and keep the Kerch Strait and Sea of Azov open to ships transiting to Ukrainian ports. In the Crimea Declaration of July 25, 2018, the United States reaffirmed its refusal to recognize the Kremlin's claims of sovereignty over Crimea. The United States also condemns Russia's illegal actions in Crimea and its continued aggression against Ukraine. The United States will maintain respective sanctions against Russia until the Russian government returns control of Crimea to Ukraine and fully implements the Minsk agreements.

The United States remains steadfast in its support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. The \$1.2 billion in security assistance the United States has provided to Ukraine since 2014 includes Javelin anti-tank missile systems and other train and equip programs to help Ukraine build its long-term defense capacity, defend its territorial integrity, and deter further Russian aggression. Going forward, we intend to focus more U.S. security assistance resources for Ukraine in the maritime domain by providing equipment to support its most critical operational needs, in line with Ukraine's recently released Naval Strategy.

Ukraine has made significant strides on defense reform, including the 2018 adoption of a Law on National Security, which provides a legislative framework for aligning Ukraine's national security architecture with Euro-Atlantic principles. This constitutes a major step toward Ukraine's goal of achieving NATO interoperability.

As the U.S. Senior Defense Advisor to Ukraine, LTG (Ret) Keith Dayton is helping Ukraine implement key provisions of the law to ensure that Ukraine's defense and security sectors embody Euro-Atlantic principles. The implementation of these reforms will bolster Ukraine's ability to defend its territorial integrity in support of a secure and a thriving, democratic Ukraine.

The Republic of Georgia is a key strategic partner in the South Caucasus and Black Sea region. Georgia provides the U.S. with unconditional ground and air transit to Afghanistan. Despite the Russian military occupying 20% of its territory, Georgia is the largest non-NATO and fourth overall force contributor to NATO's Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan. With 870 Georgians currently serving alongside U.S. forces without caveat, Georgia is the largest per capita contributor to RSM. U.S. forces provide pre-deployment training and mobilization to Georgian forces through the Georgia Deployment Program-Resolute Support Mission. Georgia's Ministry of Defense has a U.S.-only procurement policy, spending 2% of GDP on defense and 20% on major equipment acquisition.

The U.S. is steadfastly committed to Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Through the three year, bilateral Georgia Defense Readiness Program (GDRP), the U.S. is developing Georgia's institutional capacity to man, train, equip, and sustain the Georgian Defense Forces. Georgia's capacity to self-train its defense forces for all national missions, to counter external threats, and to provide support for Black Sea security will preserve Georgia's independence.

Europe's Southern Flank

Meanwhile, Europe's southern flank also demands attention and a well-coordinated approach. Chinese and Russian influence in Africa continues to grow, and both competitors seek access to African natural resources and African support in international fora. Terrorist attacks in Europe and the recent migrant crisis are fueling European engagement in Africa, both to project stability and to stem the migrant flow. Building on the U.S. Africa Strategy published last year, and NATO's Projecting Stability concept, the Department of Defense is working with European partners to address these complex southern flank challenges. Since the attack on our compounds in Benghazi, Libya in 2012, the Department has worked with our Southern European Allies Italy,

Spain, Greece, and Portugal to enhance our force posture to protect U.S. diplomatic presence in Africa, protect Europe, and project security into the greater Mediterranean and Africa. Bases in Greece, Italy, and Spain host force posture elements from both EUCOM and AFRICOM.

Italy hosts 13,500 U.S. military, civilian and contractor personnel for operations and training on five major bases and other smaller installations. Naval Air Station Sigonella, in particular, has become an important hub for logistics; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; maritime situational awareness; crisis response, and theater cooperation, with temporary deployments by AFRICOM's SPMAGTF-Crisis Response-AF and the basing of U.S. Air Force Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, among other force posture assets.

This year marks 66 years of U.S. military presence in Spain, and in 2018 we celebrated the 30th anniversary of the U.S.-Spain bilateral Agreement on Defense Cooperation. Spain hosts over 7,000 U.S. military, civilian and contract personnel in Rota and Moron, and these strategic bases support operational deployments throughout Africa and the Middle East. Spain actively promotes security in North and West Africa, and is a significant contributor to NATO, EU, and UN peacekeeping missions. As evidence of their robust military capabilities, a Spanish destroyer will join a U.S. Carrier Strike Group on patrol in the Pacific.

The cornerstone of our bilateral defense relationship with Greece is U.S. Naval Support Activity (NSA) Souda Bay, Crete with 650 U.S. personnel. Souda is critical for strategic access and support to regional operations. It is the largest deep-water port in the Mediterranean, hosting approximately 240 NATO ship visits per year, and serves as an air and sea logistics hub and Ballistic Missile Defense trans-loading point for U.S. forces assigned to EUCOM. The Government of Greece has also been flexible with permissions to deploy AFRICOM assets from Souda for crisis response and has permitted the temporary basing of U.S. unarmed MQ-9s at

Larissa and the rotation of USAREUR's 4th Combat Aviation Brigade to Stefanoviko Army Base for winter training. Portugal remains a staunch trans-Atlantic ally with linguistic ties throughout West and South Africa and remains a strong U.S. partner and reliable NATO ally whose forces deploy in small but meaningful capacities in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Mediterranean, the Baltics, and Africa.

Turkey is a critical Ally on NATO's southern flank. Turkey contributes to coalition missions, including Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo. We continue to reiterate the importance of Turkey remaining grounded in the NATO security structures. The United States has been clear in expressing its concern about Turkey's stated intent to procure S-400 surface-to-air missile systems from Russia. We believe this would undermine the NATO Alliance, introduce risks to U.S. and NATO defense technology, and run counter to Allies' pledges to reduce dependency on Russian equipment.

The Department also recognizes that there are significant challenges with Turkey as an ally. Specifically, we have been clear that Turkey will very likely face sanctions under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) if it proceeds with its S-400 purchase. We thank Congress for its support for offering the PATRIOT Air and Missile Defense Foreign Military Sales case to Turkey as an alternative to the S-400. We have been clear that we will continue to discuss the potential PATRIOT sale with Turkey only if it commits to cancelling its S-400 purchase.

The Department is also prioritizing engagement with the Balkans. Russia stokes and exploits ethnic tensions in the Balkans and employs disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, political subversion, and economic manipulation as tools to undermine regional stability, democratic processes, and Euro-Atlantic integration and NATO unity. Despite Moscow's efforts,

Montenegro became the 29th NATO Ally in June 2017 and NATO is poised to welcome its 30th Ally, North Macedonia, once Allied ratifications are complete.

DoD is bolstering regional Allies and partners through security cooperation and capacity building initiatives, including cybersecurity with Montenegro and North Macedonia. The key to our capacity building initiatives is to eliminate regional militaries' dependence on Soviet legacy systems. We are leveraging security cooperation tools to modernize regional militaries with U.S.-origin and NATO interoperable equipment.

Israel

EUCOM also covers Israel, a critical partner for whom the Administration requested \$3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and \$500 million in missile defense assistance this fiscal year. The Administration appreciates the Congress' support for this request in FY 2019. The Department ensures Israel's defense through joint exercises, co-development of a multi-tiered missile defense architecture, and supply of advanced weapons and technology – proving our commitment to Israel's Qualitative Military Edge. Our strong missile defense partnership with Israel is underpinned by a new U.S.-Israel Memorandum of Understanding that includes a commitment of \$500 million for Israeli missile defense each year beginning in FY 2019 through FY 2028. American longstanding support of Israeli ballistic missile defense programs now includes co-development and co-production of the David's Sling and Arrow-3 missile defense systems. DoD also continues to support co-production efforts for the Iron Dome program to provide critical defense against short-range rocket, artillery, and mortar attack. Our defense policy dialogues are also extensive and cover the range of global and regional challenges we face together.

Conclusion

The Department of Defense is working within the framework of the NDS to ensure the national security and defense objectives of the United States are met. With continued Congressional support, the Department will be able to continue to meet the threats of this increasingly volatile world, while increasing the lethality of our Armed Forces and fostering sustained alliances and partnerships that enable our global operations. Alliances and partnerships are vital in the EUCOM AOR and the enduring importance of NATO cannot be overstated as we pursue a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace. Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this hearing and thank you for your ongoing support of the Department of Defense.