H.R. 2810—FY18 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

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DIVISION A—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS

TITLE XII—MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

SUBTITLE D—MATTERS RELATING TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Section 1235—Limitation on Availability of Funds Relating to Implementation of the Open Skies Treaty

This section would prohibit the use of funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act, or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2018, or any subsequent fiscal year, for Department of Defense operations and maintenance, Defense-wide, or operations and maintenance, Air Force, to conduct any flight for the purposes of implementing the Open Skies Treaty until the President submits a plan with respect to such fiscal year to the appropriate congressional committees and 7 days have elapsed. Such a plan would be required to be developed by the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of National Intelligence, and would contain a description of the objectives for each Open Skies Treaty flight in the upcoming fiscal year. These requirements would terminate 5 years after the date enactment of this Act.

This section would also prohibit the use of funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act, or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2018, for the
digital visual imaging system to carry out any activities to modify any U.S. aircraft for purposes of implementing the Open Skies Treaty.

Section 1236—Sense of Congress on Importance of Nuclear Capabilities of NATO

This section would make a series of findings and express the sense of Congress regarding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's nuclear deterrence capability.

**SUBTITLE E—INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) TREATY PRESERVATION ACT OF 2017**

Section 1241—Short Title

This section would cite this subtitle as the "Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Preservation Act of 2017."

Section 1242—Findings

This section would make a series of findings by Congress related to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the Russian Federation's violations of that treaty.

Section 1244—Development of INF Range Ground-Launched Missile System

This section would require the Secretary of Defense to establish a program of record to develop a conventional road-mobile ground-launched cruise missile system with a range of between 500 to 5,500 kilometers. This section would further require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the congressional defense committees, Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate within 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act on the cost, schedule, and feasibility to modify existing and planned systems for ground launch with a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers in order to meet the capabilities specified.

Section 1245—Notification Requirement Related to Russian Federation
Development of Noncompliant Systems and United States Actions Regarding Material Breach of INF Treaty by the Russian Federation

This section would state that Congress declares the Russian Federation to be in material breach of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. This section would also require the Director of National Intelligence to notify the appropriate congressional committees of any development, deployment, or test of a system by Russia that the Director determines is inconsistent with the INF Treaty within 15 days of the Director making such determination. This section would
further direct the President to submit a report within 15 months after the date of the enactment of this Act to the appropriate congressional committees that contains a determination by the President whether Russia engaged in activity that would be considered noncompliant with the INF Treaty during each of the 3 consecutive 120-day periods following the date of the enactment of this Act.

If the determination is made by the President that Russia has engaged in activities considered noncompliant with the INF Treaty, this section would provide that the United States, as a matter of law, would no longer be bound by the prohibitions set forth in Article VI of the INF Treaty.

Section 1246—Limitation on Availability of Funds to Extend the Implementation of the New START Treaty

This section would prohibit any funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2018 for the Department of Defense to be obligated or expended to extend the implementation of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, unless the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Russian Federation has verifiably eliminated all missiles that are in violation of or may be inconsistent with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

Section 1247—Review of RS-26 Ballistic Missile

This section would direct the President, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of National Intelligence to conduct a review of the RS-26 ballistic missile of the Russian Federation and submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Such a report would include a determination of whether the RS-26 ballistic missile is covered under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (NST) or would be a violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty because Russia has conducted flight tests to ranges prohibited by the INF Treaty in more than one warhead configuration. If the President determines that the RS-26 ballistic missile is covered under the NST, the report would further include a determination whether the Russian Federation has agreed that such a system is limited under the NST central limits and has agreed to an exhibition of such a system.

If the determination is made that the RS-26 ballistic missile is covered under the NST and that Russia has not agreed that such a system is limited under the NST or to an exhibition under the treaty of the system, the U.S. Government would consider such a system to be a violation of the INF Treaty for purposes of all policies and decisions.

Section 1248—Definitions
This section would define the terms "appropriate congressional committees", "INF Treaty", "intelligence community", "New START Treaty", and "Open Skies Treaty", among other terms in this subtitle.

TITLE XVI—STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, CYBER, AND INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

SUBTITLE A—MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF SPACE PROGRAMS

Section 1601—Establishment of Space Corps in the Department of the Air Force

This section would authorize the creation of a Space Corps within the Department of the Air Force and require the Secretary of the Air Force to certify its establishment by January 1, 2019. The Space Corps would be led by the Chief of Staff of the Space Corps and would be composed of such offices and officials determined appropriate by the Secretary of the Air Force, in consultation with the Chief of Staff of the Space Corps. This section would further provide that the Chief of Staff of the Space Corps would be appointed for a term of 6 years, be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and would report directly to the Secretary of the Air Force, as a co-equal of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

The Secretary of the Air Force would be given Milestone Decision Authority for space acquisition programs, including with respect to research, development, test, and evaluation and procurement. This section would not affect the authority of the other Services to pursue Service-specific user terminals for space programs. This section would also not affect the authorities of the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office and the Director of the National Geospatial-intelligence Agency. This section would terminate the Principal Department of Defense Space Advisor and Defense Space Council.

Nothing in this section would authorize or require the relocation of any facilities, infrastructure, or military installations of the Air Force.

Lastly, this section would require the Secretary of Defense to provide to the congressional defense committees an interim report by March 1, 2018, and a final report by August 1, 2018, on the plan for the establishment of the Space Corps, recommendations by the Secretary of Defense, and other specified matters related to such.

Section 1602—Establishment of Subordinate Unified Command of the United States Strategic Command

This section would direct the Secretary of Defense to establish United States Space Command as a subordinate unified command under United States Strategic Command not later than January 1, 2019. This section would also require
the commander of such command to hold a four-star rank and be appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate. The commander would exercise command of
joint space activities or missions, and the United States Space Command would be
jointly staffed.

SUBTITLE B—SPACE ACTIVITIES

Section 1611—Codification, Extension, and Modification of Limitation on
Construction on United States Territory of Satellite Positioning Ground Monitoring
Stations of Foreign Governments

This section would amend chapter 135 of title 10, United States Code, by
adding a new section, 2279c. Subsection (b) of section 1602 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (Public Law 113-66), which is a limitation on
construction on United States territory of satellite positioning ground monitoring
stations of certain foreign governments, would be transferred to section 2279c of
title 10, United States Code. This section would exclude foreign governments that
are allies of the United States from the underlying limitation and would extend the
underlying limitation's sunset date to December 31, 2023.

Section 1612—Foreign Commercial Satellite Services: Cybersecurity Threats and
Launches

This section would amend section 2279 of title 10, United States Code, by
adding a new subsection concerning cybersecurity risk for the Department of
Defense. This section would further amend section 2279 of title 10, United States
Code, by adding a subsection that would prohibit the Secretary of Defense from
entering into a contract for satellite services with any entity if such services will be
provided using satellites launched from a covered foreign country or using a launch
vehicle that is designed or manufactured in a covered foreign country, or that is
provided by the government of a covered foreign country or by an entity controlled
in whole or in part by, or acting on behalf of, the government of a covered foreign
country, regardless of the location of the launch. Such prohibition would not apply
to launches that occurred prior to 6 months after the date of the enactment of this
Act or to a contract or other agreement relating to launch services that, prior to the
date that is 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, was either fully
paid for by the contractor or covered by a legally binding commitment of the
contractor to pay for such services.

This section would also add the Russian Federation to the list of covered
foreign countries, and would make a number of conforming and clerical
amendments to section 2279 of title 10, United States Code.

Nothing in this section should impact other laws regarding the
Department's use of Russian rocket engines within a United States launch vehicle.

Section 1613—Extension of Pilot Program on Commercial Weather Data
This section would amend section 1613 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328) by extending the pilot program on commercial weather data by 1 year. This section would also add the congressional intelligence committees to the existing reporting requirements.

Section 1614—Conditional Transfer of Acquisition and Funding Authority of Certain Weather Missions to National Reconnaissance Office

This section would amend section 1614 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328), by requiring the Secretary of the Air Force and the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office to execute the transfer of certain weather missions from the Air Force to the National Reconnaissance Office unless the Secretary and Director both issued the waivers described in section 1614(c) of Public Law 114–328.

Section 1616—Commercial Satellite Communications Pathfinder Program

This section would state the sense of Congress regarding the Air Force's commercial satellite communications pathfinder program.

This section would also require the Secretary of the Air Force to submit a report, by March 1, 2018, to the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate regarding the views and plans of the Secretary related to carrying out a portion of the activities of such pathfinder program under the transaction authority provided by section 2371 of title 10, United States Code.

The committee has been concerned for several years that the Department of Defense is not using sound business practices to procure commercial satellite communications, which has resulted in millions of dollars in inefficient procurement of this key resource. The committee believes that leveraging Other Transaction Authority would further the activities of the Department to more effectively and efficiently procure commercial satellite communications.

Section 1619—Establishment of Space Flag Training Event

This section would require the Secretary of Defense to establish, not later than December 31, 2020, an annual capstone training event titled "Space Flag" for space professionals to develop and test doctrine, concepts of operation, and tactics, techniques, and procedures. The event would also serve to inform and develop the appropriate design of the operational training infrastructure of the space domain. This section would further require the Secretary to model the event on the Red Flag and Cyber Flag exercises and ensure that Space Flag includes live, virtual, and constructive training and on-orbit threat replication, as appropriate.

Lastly, this section would require the Secretary, in coordination with the Commander of Air Force Space Command, Commander, Army Space and Missile Defense Command, and Commander, Navy Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command to submit a plan to the congressional defense committees, not later than
1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, on the establishment of Space Flag, including a description of each of the objectives of the event.

The committee recognizes that the Air Force has started initial activities for Space Flag training, but the committee expects a more comprehensive, Department of Defense-wide approach for exercise participation and infrastructure, consistent with this provision. Additionally, the committee notes the related ongoing testing and development activities in the Air Force, such as the Big Top program, and fully supports these activities.

**SUBTITLE C—DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE-RELATED ACTIVITIES**

Section 1634—Clarification of Annual Briefing on the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Requirements of the Combatant Commands

This section would modify section 1626 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113–291) by including space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in the briefing.

**SUBTITLE E—NUCLEAR FORCES**

Section 1651—Notifications Regarding Dual-Capable F-35A Aircraft

This section would amend section 179(f) of title 10, United States Code, to require the Nuclear Weapons Council to notify the congressional defense committees if either the United States Senate or the United States House of Representatives adopts a bill authorizing or appropriating funds for the Department of Defense that, as determined by the Council, provides funds in an amount that will result in a delay in the nuclear certification or delivery of F-35A dual-capable aircraft.

Section 1652—Oversight of Delayed Acquisition Programs by Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System

This section would amend section 171a of title 10, United States Code, to require each program manager of a covered acquisition program to transmit quarterly reports to the co-chairs of the Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System that identify (1) the covered acquisition program; (2) the requirements of the program; (3) the development timeline of the program; and (4) the status of the program, including whether the program is delayed and whether such delay will result in a program schedule delay.

This section would further require that, in the event an acquisition program is delayed by more than 180 days or in the event a program manager did not properly notify the Council, the co-chairs of the Council shall notify the
congressional defense committees by not later than 7 days after the end of a quarter.

Lastly, this section would require the Secretary of Defense to issue or revise a Department of Defense Instruction to ensure that program managers carry out subsection (k)(1) of section 171a of title 10, United States Code, as amended by this Act.

Section 1654—Security of Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications System from Commercial Dependencies

This section would make a series of findings related to Department of Defense use of systems produced by Huawei Technologies Company or ZTE Corporation. This section would also require the Secretary of Defense to certify whether the Secretary uses telecommunications equipment or services from Huawei Technologies Company or ZTE Corporation to carry out the Department's nuclear deterrence mission, including with respect to the nuclear command, control, and communications, integrated tactical warning and attack assessment, and continuity of government, or the homeland defense mission, including with respect to ballistic missile defense.

Beginning 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, this section would prohibit the Secretary from procuring, obtaining, or renewing a contract to do so, any equipment, system, or service that uses telecommunications equipment from Huawei Technologies Company or ZTE Corporation to carry out the Department's nuclear deterrence or homeland defense missions. Lastly, this section would provide for a waiver for such prohibition, on a case-by-case basis, for a single 1-year period, if the Secretary determines it to be in the national security interests of the United States and certifies to the congressional defense committees that certain criteria are met.

Section 1655—Oversight of Aerial-Layer Programs by Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System

This section would establish that any analysis of alternatives (AOA) for the Senior Leader Airborne Operations Center, the executive airlift program of the Air Force, and the E-6B modernization program may not receive final approval by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation may not complete the AOA sufficiency review unless:

(1) the Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System determines that the alternatives are capable of meeting the requirements for senior leadership communications in support of the nuclear command, control, and communications missions of the Department of Defense and the continuity of government mission of the Department;

(2) the Council submits to the congressional defense committees such a determination; and

(3) a period of 30 days elapses following the date of such submission.
Section 1656—Security Classification Guide for Programs Relating to Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications and Nuclear Deterrence

This section would require that, not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall require the issuance of a security classification guide for nuclear weapons, and nuclear command and control programs and continuity of Government programs of the Department of Defense to ensure the protection of sensitive information of such programs. Such classification guides would be jointly approved by the Nuclear Weapons Council and the Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System and should be in place not later than March 19, 2019.

Section 1657—Evaluation and Enhanced Security of Supply Chain for Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications and Continuity of Government Programs

This section would direct the Secretary of Defense to evaluate by December 31, 2019, the supply chain vulnerabilities of programs related to nuclear weapons; nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3); continuity of Government; and ballistic missile defense. As part of the evaluation, the Secretary would be required to develop a plan to carry out such evaluation and submit the plan to the congressional defense committees not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. This section would also provide a waiver, on a case-by-case basis, for any program, weapon system, or system of systems, that the Secretary certifies to the congressional defense committees within 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act that all known supply chain vulnerabilities have minimal consequences for the capability of such systems.

This section would further require the Secretary to develop strategies for mitigating the risks of supply chain vulnerabilities identified in the course of the evaluation. The Secretary would also be required to issue a Department of Defense Instruction, or update such an Instruction, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, establishing the prioritization of supply chain risk management programs, including supply chain risk management threat assessment reporting, to ensure that programs related to nuclear weapons, NC3, continuity of Government, and ballistic missile defense receive the highest priority of such supply chain risk management programs and reporting.

Lastly, this section would direct the Secretary to establish a requirement to carry out supply chain risk management threat assessment collections and analyses under acquisition and sustainment programs related to nuclear weapons, NC3, continuity of government, and ballistic missile defense programs and submit such requirement not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Section 1658—Limitation on Pursuit of Certain Command and Control Concept

This section would provide that the Secretary of the Air Force may not award a contract for engineering and manufacturing development for the Ground
Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program that would result in a command and control concept for such program that consists of less than 15 fixed launch control centers per missile wing unless the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command determines that:

(1) the plans of the Secretary for a command and control concept consisting of less than 15 fixed launch control centers per missile wing are appropriate, meet requirements, and do not contain excessive risk;

(2) the risks to schedules and costs from such concepts are minimized and manageable;

(3) the strategy and plan of the Secretary for addressing cyber threats for such concept are robust; and

(4) with respect to such concept, the Secretary has established an appropriate process for considering and managing trade-offs among requirements relating to survivability, long-term operations and sustainment costs, procurement costs, and military personnel needs.

This section would require the Commander to submit to the Secretary and the congressional defense committees the Commander's determination. If the Commander is unable to make the determination under subsection (a), the Commander would be required to submit the reasons for not making such determination.

Finally, this section would state that the requirements of this section shall not be construed to affect or prohibit the ability of the Secretary to use fair and open competition procedures in soliciting, evaluating, and awarding contracts for this program.

The committee is concerned about cost, schedule, and technology maturity risks in the GBSD program, particularly as the program considers significant deviations from proven, reliable, and survivable command and control concepts. The committee believes this provision will enable the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command to more closely track and assess how the Air Force is implementing the Commander's requirements and minimizing risk in this important nuclear modernization program.

Section 1659—Procurement Authority for Certain Parts of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Fuzes

This section would authorize $6.3 million of the funds made available by this Act for Missile Procurement, Air Force, for the procurement of certain commercially available parts of intercontinental ballistic missile fuzes, notwithstanding section 1502(a) of title 31, United States Code, under contracts entered into under section 1645(a) of the Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113-291).

Section 1660—Sense of Congress on Importance of Independent Nuclear Deterrent of United Kingdom
This section would express the sense of Congress regarding the independent nuclear deterrent of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

**SUBTITLE F—MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS**

Section 1671—Administration of Missile Defense and Defeat Programs

This section would amend chapter 9 of title 10, United States Code, by creating a new section that would establish a unified major force program for missile defense and missile defeat programs. This section would require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on such programs for fiscal years 2019-2023, included with the budget materials submitted as part of the President’s budget request for such years.

This section would further require the Secretary to transfer acquisition authority and total obligation authority for each program covered by this section from the Missile Defense Agency to a military department not later than the date on which the President’s budget is submitted for fiscal year 2020. The Secretary would also be required to submit a report, not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, to the congressional defense committees on the plans for such a transition.

Lastly, this section would change the term of the Director of the Missile Defense Agency to 6 years and require that the Director report to and be under the authority of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering.

Section 1672—Preservation of the Ballistic Missile Defense Capacity of the Army

This section would prohibit the Army from obligating or expending any funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2018 or any fiscal year thereafter to demilitarize any Guidance Enhanced Missile TBM (GEM-T) interceptor or remove any such interceptor from the operational inventory of the Army until the date on which the Secretary of the Army submits an evaluation to the congressional defense committees of the ability of the Army to meet warfighter requirements and operational needs if GEM-T interceptors are removed from the operational inventory of the Army. Such an evaluation shall consider whether the Army can maintain such an inventory by either (1) recertifying GEM-T interceptors either with or without modification; or (2) developing, testing, and fielding a new low-cost interceptor that can be added to the Army’s inventory prior to the retirement of GEM-T interceptors.

Section 1673—Modernization of Army Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor

This section would direct the Secretary of the Army to issue an acquisition strategy not later than April 15, 2018, for a 360-degree lower tier air and missile defense sensor that achieves initial operating capability by January 1, 2022. This
section would also establish the requirements, including the use of competitive procedures, that must be satisfied by such an acquisition strategy.

If the Secretary of the Army does not issue such an acquisition strategy by April 15, 2018, the Secretary would no longer be authorized to obligate or expend funding for the lower tier air and missile defense sensor. Additionally, the Secretary of Defense would be required to transfer the acquisition responsibility for such a sensor to the Missile Defense Agency, and its Director would be required to issue such acquisition strategy by not later than December 15, 2018.

If the Secretary of Defense carries out such transfer, this section would further require that after the 360-degree sensor achieves milestone-B approval (or equivalent), but before such sensor achieves milestone C approval (or equivalent), the Secretary of Defense would transfer the responsibility to procure such sensor and the funding authorized to carry out such procurement from the Director of the Missile Defense Agency to the Secretary of the Army.

Section 1674—Enhancement of Operational Test and Evaluation of Ballistic Missile Defense System

This section would require that, not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the Secretary of the Army, and the Secretary of the Navy shall jointly ensure that the test plans of the Integrated Master Test Plan of the ballistic missile defense system prioritize the integration of missile defense capabilities including Patriot, Aegis ballistic missile defense, and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD).

The committee notes the recent emergency deployment of a THAAD battery to the Republic of Korea to protect U.S. and allied forces against the rapidly escalating ballistic missile threat from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. While the committee supports this deployment, it remains concerned about substantial delays to the integration of and coordination between THAAD and other critical forward-deployed integrated air and missile defense systems, such as Patriot. The committee believes it is imperative that the Department of Defense be able to fully leverage forward-deployed missile defense assets as part of one integrated system capable of discriminating, tracking, and defeating advanced threats. Further, the committee believes that field commanders should have access to the full range of effectors and sensors to address any incoming missile threat.

The committee will continue to monitor efforts by the Department to fully integrate the various missile defense capabilities that have been developed.

Additionally, the committee looks forward to receiving the report on "Integration and Interoperability of Allied Missile Defense Capabilities" required to be submitted not later than December 31, 2017, by section 1676 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92).

Section 1676—Aegis Ashore Anti-Air Warfare Capability
This section would authorize the Secretary of Defense to use funds authorized by sections 101 and 201 of this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2018 for procurement, research, development, test, and evaluation, to continue development, procurement, and deployment of anti-air warfare capabilities at each Aegis Ashore site in Romania and the Republic of Poland.

This section would further require the Secretary to ensure that such capabilities are deployed at the site in Romania by not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and at the site in Poland by not later than 1 year after the declaration of operational status of that site.

Any reprogramming or transfer made to carry out this section would be carried out in accordance with established procedures for reprogramming or transfers.

Section 1678—Review of Proposed Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System Contract

This section would prohibit the Director of the Missile Defense Agency from changing the contracting strategy for the systems integration, operations, and test of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system until 30 days after the report specified at the end of this section is submitted to the congressional defense committees.

This section would require the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) to conduct a review of the contract for the systems integration, operations, and test of the GMD system, and submit such review to the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Missile Defense Executive Board.

Lastly, this section would direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Missile Defense Executive Board to submit a report to the congressional defense committees within 30 days after the review is received that includes the review itself, without change, and any views and recommendations of the Under Secretary and the Board on the review.

The committee has previously imposed limits on the use of lead system integrator (LSI) contracts. For example, section 807 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364) prohibited the use of new LSI contracts under most circumstances. The committee believes that, generally, such contract arrangements have been of limited utility. In the case of the contract for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense System, which was in place at the time section 807 of Public Law 109-364 was enacted, the committee is concerned that while threats to the homeland are increasing, not enough information is known about the potential risks of disaggregating this contract. Moreover, the GMD system is in the midst of robust and diverse modernization and test efforts.

Section 1679—Sense of Congress and Plan for Development of Space-Based Sensor Layer for Ballistic Missile Defense
This section would express the sense of Congress on the importance of a space-based missile defense sensor layer. This section would require the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, in coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force and the heads of the appropriate Defense Agencies and combat support agencies, to develop a space-based sensor layer for ballistic missile defense that provides precision tracking data of missiles beginning in the boost phase and continuing throughout subsequent flight regimes; serves other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance requirements; and achieves an operational prototype payload at the earliest practicable opportunity.

This section would require the Director to submit a plan within 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act to the appropriate congressional committees that explains how the Director will carry out the development of a space-based sensor layer; the estimated costs of such a layer, including development, acquisition, deployment, and operations and sustainment; his assessment of the maturity of critical technologies necessary to make such a sensor layer operational and recommendations for any research and development activities; his assessment of the capabilities that can be provided by a space sensor layer that other ballistic missile sensor layers cannot provide; how the Director will leverage certain capabilities, including national technical means, hosted payloads, small satellites, among others; and any other matters the Director determines appropriate.

DIVISION C—DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORIZATIONS AND OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS

TITLE XXXI—DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

SUBTITLE B—PROGRAM AUTHORIZATIONS, RESTRICTIONS, AND LIMITATIONS

Section 3112—Incorporation of Integrated Surety Architecture in Transportation

This section would create a new section, section 4222, in the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2521) that would require the Administrator for Nuclear Security, in coordination with the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council, to jointly ensure that all nuclear warhead development programs, life extension programs, and major alteration programs incorporate integrated designs compatible with the Integrated Surety Architecture (ISA) Program of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The Administrator would further be required to ensure that over-the-road shipments of the NNSA involving any nuclear weapon planned to be in the active stockpile after 2025 incorporates surety technologies relating to transportation and shipping developed by the ISA Program. If, on a case-
by-case basis, the Administrator determines that a shipment (or class of shipments) or program will not incorporate some or all of the technologies, the Administrator would be required to submit that determination and a documented risk analysis to the congressional defense committees. The requirements of this section would terminate on December 31, 2029, and the Administrator would be required to implement direction relating to this section contained in the classified annex accompanying this Act.

Section 3114—Budget Requests and Certification regarding Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

This section would amend section 3125 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328) to require that the Administrator for Nuclear Security ensure that the President's request submitted to Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2021 includes amounts for the nuclear weapons dismantlement and disposition activities of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) in accordance with the limitation in section 3125(a) of Public Law 114-328, which prescribes a maximum amount of $56.0 million. This section would also require the Administrator to certify to the congressional defense committees by February 1, 2018, that the Administrator is carrying out NNSA's nuclear weapons dismantlement and disposition activities in accordance with the limitations in subsections (a) and (b) of section 3125 of Public Law 114-328.

Section 3115—Improved Information Relating to Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development Program

This section would create a new section 4310 in the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2563) to require the Administrator for Nuclear Security to track and document, for efforts that are not focused on basic research, the technologies and capabilities developed by the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D) program to better understand whether such technologies are transitioned to end users or deployed.

Furthermore, this section would require the Administrator, in assessing projects within the DNN R&D program and the Nonproliferation and Arms Control program, to compare the status of each project, including the final results of such projects, to baseline targets and goals established in the initial project plan.

Lastly, this section would require the Administrator to include, within the annual plan required by section 4309(b) of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2575(b)), information related to these requirements.

Section 3117—Prohibition on Availability of Funds for Programs in Russian Federation
This section would provide that none of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2018 for atomic energy defense activities may be obligated or expended to enter into a contract with, or otherwise provide assistance to, the Russian Federation. The Secretary of Energy, without delegation, would be provided the authority to waive this prohibition if the Secretary determines, in writing, that a nuclear-related threat arising in the Russian Federation must be addressed urgently and that it is necessary to waive the prohibition to address that threat. The waiver could only be used if the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense concur in that determination, and the Secretary of Energy submits a report to the appropriate congressional committees containing notification that such waiver is in the national security interest of the United States, a justification for such waiver, a description of the activities to be carried out pursuant to the waiver, and a period of 7 days elapses. The prohibition and waiver contained in this section would not apply to up to $3.0 million that the Secretary of Energy may make available for the Department of Energy's Russian Health Studies Program.

SUBTITLE C—PLANS AND REPORTS

Section 3131—Modification of Certain Reporting Requirements

This section would eliminate, consolidate, or modify several existing reporting requirements.

Section 3132—Assessment of Management and Operating Contracts of National Security Laboratories

This section would require, within 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator for Nuclear Security to seek to enter into a contract with a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) to conduct an assessment of the benefits, costs, challenges, risks, efficiency, and effectiveness of the Administrator's strategy with respect to management and operating contracts for national security laboratories. This section would prohibit the Administrator from awarding such contract to an FFRDC for which the Department of Energy or the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is the primary sponsor. This section would further require the Administrator and the director of each national security laboratory to provide the FFRDC conducting the assessment full cooperation and access to all information required to conduct the assessment. The FFRDC would be required to submit a report to the Administrator containing their assessment within 90 days of contract award. Such report would be required to include the FFRDC's assessment of matters related to the NNSA's acquisition strategy and contract oversight process, particularly with respect to the use of for-profit contracts as opposed to nonprofit approaches, and whether the NNSA is appropriately using, managing, and overseeing the laboratories with respect to
their nature as FFRDCs. The Administrator would be required to provide the FFRDC report, unchanged, to the congressional defense committees.

Finally, this section would prohibit any funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2018 for the NNSA to be obligated or expended to award, or extend, a management and operating contract for a national security laboratory until the Administrator submits the FFRDC report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Secretary of Energy would be authorized to waive this prohibition and extend such a contract only if the Secretary determines it is required in the interest of national security and notifies the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives.

This section would also express the sense of Congress that states that this section should not be construed to mandate or encourage an extension of an existing management and operating contract for a national security laboratory.

Section 3133—Evaluation of Defense Nuclear Waste Authorities and Processes

This section would require the Secretary of Energy to conduct an evaluation of all statutes, processes, rules, regulations, orders, and directives related to defense nuclear waste to identify any changes that could provide significant cost avoidance or cost savings within the long-term defense environmental cleanup program without decreasing environmental, health, or public safety requirements. Such evaluation would include consideration of the classification of defense nuclear waste, the basis by which the Department of Energy makes waste disposal decisions, and such other matters related to defense nuclear waste that the Secretary determines appropriate. The Secretary would be required to submit a report to the pertinent congressional committees by February 1, 2018, regarding this evaluation, including any actions the Secretary has taken or will take to make changes, any statutory changes the Secretary recommends for Congress to consider, and the assessment of the Secretary regarding the benefits and risks such actions or recommendations.

Section 3134—Report on Critical Decision-1 on Material Staging Facility Project

This section would require that the Administrator for Nuclear Security submit a report to the congressional defense committees, not later than October 31, 2017, containing the Administrator's decision memorandum for Critical Decision-1 (CD-1) on the Material Staging Facility project at the Pantex Plant. The report would be required to contain the preferred alternative approved by the Administrator for CD-1 and several other key pieces of information regarding the project.

TITLE XXXII—DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

Section 3201—Authorization

The budget request contained $30.6 million for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board for fiscal year 2018. The committee recommends $30.6 million, the amount of the budget request.
BILL LANGUAGE
SEC. 1235. [LOG 65407] LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF
FUNDS RELATING TO IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE OPEN SKIES TREATY.

(a) LIMITATION ON CONDUCT OF FLIGHTS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for any fiscal year after fiscal year 2017 for the Department of Defense for operation and maintenance, Defense-wide, or operation and maintenance, Air Force, may be obligated or expended to conduct any flight during such fiscal year for purposes of implementing the Open Skies Treaty until the date that is seven days after the date on which the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a plan described in paragraph (2) with respect to such fiscal year.

(2) PLAN DESCRIBED.—The plan described in this paragraph is a plan developed by the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of National Intelligence, that contains a description of the objectives for all planned flights described in paragraph (1) during such fiscal year.

(3) UPDATE.—To the extent necessary and appropriate, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination
with the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of National
Intelligence, may update the plan described in para-
graph (2) with respect to a fiscal year and submit
the updated plan to the appropriate congressional
committees.

(4) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
TEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appro-
priate congressional committees” means—

(A) the congressional defense committees;

and

(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence
and Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs of the House of Representatives.

(5) SUNSET.—The requirements of this sub-
section shall terminate on the date that is five years
after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(b) PROHIBITION ON ACTIVITIES TO MODIFY
UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT.—None of the funds author-
ized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made
available for fiscal year 2018 for research, development,
test, and evaluation, Air Force, for arms control imple-
mentation (PE 0305145F) or procurement, Air Force, for
digital visual imaging system (BA–05, Line Item #1900) may be obligated or expended to carry out any activities to modify any United States aircraft for purposes of implementing the Open Skies Treaty.

(c) OPEN SKIES TREATY DEFINED.—In this section, the term “Open Skies Treaty” means the Treaty on Open Skies, done at Helsinki March 24, 1992, and entered into force January 1, 2002.
SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IMPORTANCE OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES OF NATO.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) The Warsaw Summit Communique, issued on July 9, 2016, by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (in this section referred to as “NATO”) clearly defines the need for, and the importance of, the nuclear mission of NATO.

(2) The Warsaw Summit Communique states—

(A) with respect to the nuclear deterrence capability of NATO, “As a means to prevent conflict and war, credible deterrence and defence is essential. Therefore, deterrence and defence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy. . . . The fundamental purpose of NATO’s nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression. Nuclear weapons are unique. Any employment of nuclear weapons against NATO would fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict. The circumstances in which NATO might have to use nuclear weapons are extremely remote”;

(B) with respect to the nature of the nuclear deterrence posture of NATO, “NATO
must continue to adapt its strategy in line with trends in the security environment—including with respect to capabilities and other measures required—to ensure that NATO’s overall deterrence and defence posture is capable of addressing potential adversaries’ doctrine and capabilities, and that it remains credible, flexible, resilient, and adaptable.”; and

(C) with respect to the importance of contributions to the nuclear deterrence mission from across the NATO alliance, “The strategic forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies. The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and contribute to the overall security of the Alliance. These Allies’ separate centres of decision-making contribute to deterrence by complicating the calculations of potential adversaries. NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture also relies, in part, on United States’ nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe and on capabilities and infrastructure provided by Allies concerned. These Allies will ensure that all components of
NATO’s nuclear deterrent remain safe, secure, and effective. That requires sustained leadership focus and institutional excellence for the nuclear deterrence mission and planning guidance aligned with 21st century requirements. The Alliance will ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies concerned in their agreed nuclear burden-sharing arrangements.”

(3) Secretary of Defense James Mattis, in response to the advance policy questions for his Senate confirmation hearing on January 12, 2017, stated that—

(A) “NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture relies in part on U.S. nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe and on capabilities and infrastructure provided by NATO allies. These capabilities include dual-capable aircraft that contribute to current burden-sharing arrangements within NATO. In general, we must take care to maintain this particular capability, and to modernize it appropriately and in a timely fashion.”; and

(B) the role of the nuclear weapons of the United States is “to deter nuclear war and to serve as last resort weapons of self-defense. In
this sense, U.S. nuclear weapons are fundamental to our nation’s security and have historically provided a deterrent against aggression and security assurance to U.S. allies. A robust, flexible, and survivable U.S. nuclear arsenal underpins the U.S. ability to deploy conventional forces worldwide.”.

(4) On March 28, 2017, General Curtis Scaparrotti, Commander of the United States European Command and the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, testified to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives that “NATO and U.S. nuclear forces continue to be a vital component of our deterrence. Our modernization efforts are crucial; we must preserve a ready, credible, and safe nuclear capability.”.

(5) The Russian Federation is currently undergoing significant modernization and recapitalization of all three legs of its nuclear triad, continues to field and modernize a large variety of non-strategic nuclear weapons, and is developing and deploying new and unique nuclear capabilities.

(6) Russia remains in violation of the INF Treaty due to the development, testing, and, most recently, the operational deployment of ground-
launched cruise missiles in violation of the INF Treaty.

(7) On March 28, 2017, General Paul Selva, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described the security consequences of the deployment of such INF Treaty-violating missiles, testifying to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives that “our assessment of the impact is that it more threatens NATO and infrastructure within the European continent than any other...area of the world that we have national interests in or alliance interests in.”.

(8) On March 28, 2017, General Curtis Scaparrotti, in testimony before the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, responded to a question asking if Russia intends to return to compliance with the INF Treaty by stating, “I don’t have any indication that they will at this time.”.

(9) Rhetoric from Russian officials has demonstrated that Moscow has sought to leverage its nuclear arsenal to threaten and intimidate neighboring countries, including members of NATO, as was the case when the Russian Ambassador to Denmark stated, “Danish warships will be targets for Russian
nuclear missiles” in response to Denmark’s potential cooperation in the NATO missile defense system.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the nuclear and conventional deterrence capabilities of NATO are of critical importance to the security of the United States and of the NATO alliance, and must continue to adapt to the changed security environment in Europe;

(2) the ability of the United States to forward-deploy dual-capable aircraft and nuclear weapons, and of select members of NATO to participate in the nuclear deterrence mission of NATO by hosting forward-deployed nuclear weapons of the United States or operating dual-capable aircraft, is central to the credibility of the nuclear deterrence and defense posture of NATO;

(3) the strategic forces of the United States, the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and the French Republic, and the dual-capable aircraft operated by the United States and other members of NATO constitute foundational elements of the nuclear deterrence and defense posture of NATO;
(4) NATO should modernize its nuclear-related infrastructure to ensure the highest-level of safety and security;

(5) effective deterrence requires NATO to conduct nuclear planning and exercises aligned with 21st century requirements and modernize nuclear-related capabilities and infrastructure, including dual-capable aircraft, command and control networks, and facilities; and

(6) to ensure the continued credibility of the deterrence and defense posture of NATO, the planned completion of F–35A aircraft development and testing, as well as the delivery of such aircraft to members of NATO, must not be delayed.


SEC. 1241. [LOG 65603] SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the “Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Preservation Act of 2017”.
Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The 2014, 2015, and 2016 Department of State reports entitled, “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments”, all stated that the United States has determined that “the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles”.

(2) The 2016 report also noted that “the cruise missile developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, and as such, all missiles of that type, and all launchers of the type used or tested to launch such a missile, are prohibited under the provisions of the INF Treaty”.

(3) Potential consistency and compliance concerns regarding the INF Treaty noncompliant GLCM have existed since 2008, were not officially raised with the Russian Federation until 2013, and were not briefed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) until January 2014.
(4) The United States Government is aware of other consistency and compliance concerns regarding Russia actions vis-à-vis its INF Treaty obligations.

(5) Since 2013, senior United States officials, including the President, the Secretary of State, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have raised Russian noncompliance with the INF Treaty to their counterparts, but no progress has been made in bringing the Russian Federation back into compliance with the INF Treaty.

(6) In April 2014, General Breedlove, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, correctly stated, “A weapon capability that violates the INF, that is introduced into the greater European land mass, is absolutely a tool that will have to be dealt with . . . It can’t go unanswered.”

(7) The Department of Defense in its September 2013 report, Report on Conventional Prompt Global Strike Options if Exempt from the Restrictions of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, stated that it has multiple validated military requirement gaps due to the prohibitions imposed on the United States as a result of its compliance with the INF Treaty.
(8) It is not in the national security interests of the United States to be unilaterally legally prohibited from developing dual-capable ground-launched cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, while Russia makes advances in developing and fielding this class of weapon systems, and such unilateral limitation cannot be allowed to continue indefinitely.

(9) Admiral Harry Harris, Jr., Commander of the United States Pacific Command, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 27, 2017, that “[W]e’re in a multi-polar world where we have a lot of countries who are developing these weapons, including China, that I worry about. And I worry about their DF-21 and DF-26 missile programs, their anti-carrier ballistic missile programs, if you will. INF doesn’t address missiles launched from ships or airplanes, but it focuses on those land-based systems. I think there’s goodness in the INF treaty, anything you can do to limit nuclear weapons writ-large is generally good. But the aspects of the INF Treaty that limit our ability to counter Chinese and other countries’ land-based missiles, I think, is problematic.”.
(10) A material breach of the INF Treaty by the Russian Federation affords the United States the right to invoke legal countermeasures which include suspension of the treaty in whole or in part.

(11) Article XV of the INF Treaty provides that “Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.”.
SEC. 1244. [LOG 65608] DEVELOPMENT OF INF RANGE GROUND-LAUNCHED MISSILE SYSTEM.

(a) Establishment of a Program of Record.—The Secretary of Defense shall establish a program of record to develop a conventional road-mobile ground-launched cruise missile system with a range of between 500 to 5,500 kilometers.

(b) Report.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the cost, schedule, and feasibility to modify existing and planned missile systems, including the tomahawk land attack cruise missile, the standard missile-3, the standard missile-6, and Army tactical missile system missiles for ground launch with a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers in order to provide any of the capabilities identified in section 1243(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92; 129 Stat. 1062).
SEC. 1245. [LOG 65609] NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT RELATED TO RUSSIAN FEDERATION DEVELOPMENT OF NONCOMPLIANT SYSTEMS AND UNITED STATES ACTIONS REGARDING MATERIAL BREACH OF INF TREATY BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) DECLARATION OF POLICY.—Congress declares that because of the Russian Federation’s violations of the INF Treaty, including the flight-test, production, and possession of prohibited systems, its actions have defeated the object and purpose of the INF Treaty, and thus constitute a material breach of the INF Treaty.

(b) NOTIFICATION BY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the appropriate congressional committees of any development, deployment, or test of a system by the Russian Federation that the Director determines is inconsistent with the INF Treaty.

(2) DEADLINE.—A notification under this subsection shall be made not later than 15 days after the date on which the Director makes the determination under this subsection with respect to which the notification is required.
(c) Report by President.—Not later than 15 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains a determination of the President of whether the Russian Federation has flight-tested, produced, or is in possession of a ground-launched cruise missile or ground-launched ballistic missile with a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers during each of the three consecutive 120-day periods beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.

(d) United States Actions.—If the determination of the President contained in the report required to be submitted under subsection (c) is that the Russian Federation has flight-tested, produced, or is in possession of any missile described in subsection (c) during each of the periods described in subsection (c), the prohibitions set forth in Article VI of the INF Treaty shall no longer be binding on the United States as a matter of United States law.
SEC. 1246. [LOG 65611] LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS TO EXTEND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW START TREATY.

None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2018 for the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended to extend the implementation of the New START Treaty unless the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Russian Federation has verifiably eliminated all missiles that are in violation of or may be inconsistent with the INF Treaty.
SEC. 1247. [LOG 65614] REVIEW OF RS–26 BALLISTIC MISSILE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall conduct a review of the RS–26 ballistic missile of the Russian Federation.

(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the review conducted under subsection (a). The report shall include—

(1) a determination whether the RS–26 ballistic missile is covered under the New START Treaty or would be a violation of the INF Treaty because Russia has flight-tested such missile to ranges covered by the INF Treaty in more than one warhead configuration; and

(2) if the President determines that the RS–26 ballistic missile is covered under the New START Treaty, a determination whether the Russian Federation—
(A) has agreed through the Bilateral Consultative Commission that such a system is limited under the New START Treaty central limits; and

(B) has agreed to an exhibition of such a system.

effect of determination.—If the President, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of National Intelligence, determines that the RS–26 ballistic missile is covered under the New START Treaty and that the Russian Federation has not taken the steps described under subsection (b)(2), the United States Government shall consider for purposes of all policies and decisions that the RS–26 ballistic missile of the Russian Federation is a violation of the INF Treaty.
SEC. 1248. [LOG 65604] DEFINITIONS.

In this subtitle:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.


(3) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term “intelligence community” has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

Subtitle A—Management and Organization of Space Programs

SEC. 1601. [Log 65708] ESTABLISHMENT OF SPACE CORPS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE.

(a) Certification.—Not later than January 1, 2019, the Secretary of the Air Force shall certify to the congressional defense committees that the Space Corps under chapter 809 of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (b), is established.

(b) Establishment.—

1. In general.—Part I of subtitle D of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new chapter:

“CHAPTER 809—SPACE CORPS

Subchapter Sec.
I. General Matters .......................................................... 8091
II. Organization .............................................................. 8096

“SUBCHAPTER I—GENERAL MATTERS

Sec.
8091. Establishment.
8092. Authorities and Responsibilities.
8093. Research and development and procurement of satellites and terminals.
8094. Space functions of other elements of Department of Defense.

“§ 8091. Establishment

(a) Establishment.—Not later than January 1, 2019, the Secretary of Defense shall establish in the executive part of the Department of the Air Force a Space Corps. The function of the Space Corps shall be to assist
the Secretary of the Air Force in carrying out the duties described in subsection (e).

“(b) COMPOSITION.—The Space Corps shall be composed of the following:

“(1) The Chief of Staff of the Space Corps.

“(2) Such other offices and officials as may be established by law or as the Secretary of the Air Force, in consultation with the Chief of Staff of the Space Corps, may establish or designate.

“(c) DUTIES.—Except as otherwise specifically prescribed by law, the Space Corps shall be organized in such manner, and the members of the Space Corps shall perform, such duties and have such titles, as the Secretary may prescribe. Such duties shall include—

“(1) protecting the interests of the United States in space;

“(2) deterring aggression in, from, and through space;

“(3) providing combat-ready space forces that enable the commanders of the combatant commands to fight and win wars;

“(4) organizing, training, and equipping space forces; and
“(5) conducting space operations of the Space Corps under the command of the Commander of the United States Space Command.

§ 8092. Authorities and responsibilities

“(a) PROFESSIONAL ASSISTANCE.—The Chief of Staff of the Space Corps shall furnish professional assistance to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, and the Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force.

“(b) AUTHORITIES.—Under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff of the Space Corps, shall—

“(1) subject to subsections (c) and (d) of section 8014 of this title, prepare for such employment of the Space Corps, and for such recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping (including research and development), training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering, and maintaining of the Space Corps, as will assist in the execution of any power, duty, or function of the Secretary or the Chief of Staff;

“(2) investigate and report upon the efficiency of the Space Corps and its preparation to support military operations by commanders of the combatant commands;
“(3) prepare detailed instructions for the execution of approved plans and supervise the execution of those plans and instructions;

“(4) as directed by the Secretary, coordinate the action of organizations of the Space Corps; and

“(5) perform such other duties, not otherwise assigned by law, as may be prescribed by the Secretary.

“(e) FUNCTIONS.—To the extent practicable, the Secretary shall provide to the Space Corps the functions of the Department of the Air Force that may be feasibly shared with the Space Corps, including with respect to the United States Air Force Academy, recruitment, and basic training.

“§8093. Research and development and procurement of satellites and terminals

“(a) RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.—The Secretary of the Air Force shall serve as the primary agent of the Department of Defense with respect to the research, development, test, and evaluation of satellites and user satellite terminals used by the Air Force, the Space Corps, and the Defense Agencies (except as otherwise provided by section 8094 of this title).

“(b) PROCUREMENT.—The Secretary shall serve as the primary agent of the Department of Defense with re-
spect to the procurement of satellites and user satellite
terminals used by the military departments and the De-
fense Agencies (except as otherwise provided by section
8094 of this title).

“(c) MILESTONE DECISION AUTHORITY.—(1) Not-
withstanding any other provision of law, and except as
provided in paragraph (2), the Secretary shall serve as the
milestone decision authority (as defined in section 2366a
of this title) for major defense acquisition programs or
major subprograms relating to space.

“(2) The Secretary may not serve as the milestone
decision authority for the user satellite terminal programs
of—

“(A) the military departments other than the
Air Force and the Space Corps; and

“(B) the Defense Agencies specified in section
8094(c)(1) of this title.

“(d) REQUIREMENTS.—The Chief of Staff of the
Space Corps shall develop the requirements for the sat-
ellites and user satellite terminals for which the Secretary
has the authority for research, development, test, and eval-
uation, procurement, and milestone decisions pursuant to
this section.
§ 8094. Space functions of other elements of Department of Defense

(a) Military Departments.—Nothing in this chapter shall affect the authority of each Secretary concerned to—

“(1) carry out the research, development, test, and evaluation of satellites and user satellite terminals of the military department of the Secretary concerned;

“(2) operate such terminals; and

“(3) develop requirements to ensure that the space programs of the Department of Defense support the mission of the Secretary concerned.

(b) Certain Defense Agencies.—Nothing in this chapter shall affect the authority of each Director concerned to—

“(1) carry out the research, development, test, and evaluation and procurement of satellites and user satellite terminals of the Defense Agency of the Director concerned;

“(2) operate such terminals; and

“(3) develop requirements to ensure that the space programs of the Department of Defense support the mission of the Director concerned.

(c) Definitions.—In this section:

“(1) The term ‘Director concerned’ means—
“(A) the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, with respect to matters concerning the National Reconnaissance Office; and

“(B) the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, with respect to matters concerning the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

“(2) The term ‘Secretary concerned’ means—

“(A) the Secretary of the Army, with respect to matters concerning the Army; and

“(B) the Secretary of the Navy, with respect to matters concerning the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard when it is operating as a service in the Department of the Navy.

“SUBCHAPTER II—ORGANIZATION

See.

8096. Chief of Staff of the Space Corps.

§ 8096. Chief of Staff of the Space Corps

“(a) APPOINTMENT.—(1) There shall be a Chief of Staff of the Space Corps, appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Chief of Staff shall serve at the pleasure of the President.

“(2) The Chief of Staff shall be appointed for a term of six years. In time of war or during a national emergency
declared by Congress, the Chief of Staff may be re-appointed for a term of not more than six years.

“(3)(A) The first Chief of Staff appointed after the date of the enactment of this section shall be appointed from the general officers of the Air Force. The President may appoint the incumbent Commander of the Air Force Space Command as the first such Chief of Staff without regard to the requirement in paragraph (1) for the advice and consent of the Senate.

“(B) Each subsequent Chief of Staff shall be appointed from the general officers of the Space Corps.

“(4) The President may appoint an officer as Chief of Staff only if—

“(A) the officer has had significant experience in joint duty assignments; and

“(B) such experience includes at least one full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment (as defined in section 664(d) of this title) as a general officer.

“(5) The President may waive paragraph (4) in the case of an officer if the President determines such action is necessary in the national interest.

“(b) GRADE.—The Chief of Staff of the Space Corps, while so serving, has the grade of general without vacating the permanent grade of the officer.
“(c) REPORTING.—Except as otherwise prescribed by law and subject to section 8013(f) of this title, the Chief of Staff of the Space Corps performs the duties of such position under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Air Force and is directly responsible to the Secretary.

“(d) DUTIES.—Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff of the Space Corps shall—

“(1) preside over the Space Corps;

“(2) transmit the plans and recommendations of the Space Corps to the Secretary and advise the Secretary with regard to such plans and recommendations;

“(3) after approval of the plans or recommendations of the Space Corps by the Secretary, act as the agent of the Secretary in carrying them into effect;

“(4) exercise supervision, consistent with the authority assigned to commanders of unified or specified combatant commands under chapter 6 of this title, over such of the members and organizations of the Space Corps and the Air Force as the Secretary determines;
“(5) perform the duties prescribed for the Chief of Staff by sections 171 and 2547 of this title and other provisions of law; and

“(6) perform such other military duties, not otherwise assigned by law, as are assigned to the Chief of Staff by the President, the Secretary of Defense, or the Secretary of the Air Force.

“(e) JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.—(1) The Chief of Staff of the Space Corps shall also perform the duties prescribed for the Chief of Staff as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under section 151 of this title.

“(2) To the extent that such action does not impair the independence of the Chief of Staff in the performance of the duties of the Chief of Staff as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Staff shall inform the Secretary regarding military advice rendered by members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters affecting the Department of the Air Force.

“(3) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Chief of Staff shall keep the Secretary of the Air Force fully informed of significant military operations affecting the duties and responsibilities of the Secretary.”.

(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENTS.—The table of chapters at the beginning of subtitle D of title 10,
United States Code, and at the beginning of part I of such subtitle, are each amended by inserting after the item relating to chapter 807 the following new item:

“809. Space Corps ................................................................. 8091.”.

(c) JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.—Chapter 5 of title 10, United States Code, is amended as follows:

(1) In section 151(a), by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(8) The Chief of Staff of the Space Corps.”.

(2) In section 152(b)(1)(B), by striking “or the Commandant of the Marine Corps” and inserting “the Commandant of the Marine Corps, or the Chief of Staff of the Space Corps”.

(d) ARMED FORCES POLICY COUNCIL.—Section 171 of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in paragraph (12), by striking “; and”; 

(2) in paragraph (13), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; and”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(14) the Chief of Staff of the Space Corps.”.

(e) CHIEF OF SERVICE.—Section 1406(i)(3)(A) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new clause:
“(vi) Chief of Staff of the Space Corps.”.

(f) Acquisition-related Functions of Chiefs of the Armed Forces.—Section 2547(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking “and the Commandant of the Marine Corps” and inserting “the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Chief of Staff of the Space Corps”.

(g) Successors to Duties.—Section 8017 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking paragraph (4) and inserting the following:

“(4) The Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

“(5) The Chief of Staff of the Space Corps.”.

(h) Termination of Principal Department of Defense Space Advisor and Defense Space Council.—Effective on the date on which the Space Corps is established under section 8091 of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a)(1)—

(1) the position, and the office of, the Principal Department of Defense Space Advisor (previously known as the Department of Defense Executive Agent for Space) shall be terminated;

(2) the personnel of such office shall be transferred to the Air Force and to the Space Corps, as determined appropriate by the Secretary of Defense;
(3) any reference in Federal law, regulations, guidance, instructions, or other documents of the Federal Government to the Principal Department of Defense Space Advisor or the Department of Defense Executive Agent for Space shall be deemed to be a reference to the Secretary of the Air Force or the Chief of Staff of the Space Corps, as appropriate; and

(4) the Defense Space Council shall be terminated.

(i) MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.—Nothing in this section, or the amendments made by this section, shall be construed to authorize or require the relocation of any facility, infrastructure, or military installation of the Air Force.

(j) REPORTS.—

(1) INTERIM REPORT.—Not later than March 1, 2018, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees an interim report on the Space Corps established under chapter 809 of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a)(1), that includes—

(A) a review of the organizational and management structure of the Space Corps; and
(B) recommendations for the modification and improvement of such organizational and management structure.

(2) Final report.—Not later than August 1, 2018, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a final report on the Space Corps that includes—

(A) an update of the review and recommendations described in paragraph (1), including recommendations for any necessary revisions to appointments and qualifications, duties and powers, and precedent in the Department of Defense;

(B) recommendations for the appropriate sharing of functions between the Air Force and the Space Corps, including functions with respect to personnel matters and uniforms;

(C) a plan for implementing the recommendations described in subparagraphs (A) and (B), which shall include proposed legislative and administrative actions, including conforming and other amendments to law, that the Secretary determines to be appropriate for carrying out such plan;
(D) the estimated number of general officers of the Space Corps, including an identification of the current positions of such general officers that will be transferred to the Space Corps and whether the Secretary determines it necessary for the number of general officers authorized in chapter 32 of title 10, United States Code, to be increased; and

(E) any other matters that the Secretary determines to be appropriate.
SEC. 1602. ESTABLISHMENT OF SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMAND OF THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND.

(a) SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMAND.—Not later than January 1, 2019, the Secretary of Defense shall establish a subordinate unified command to be known as the United States Space Command under the United States Strategic Command.

(b) COMMANDER.—The Commander of the United States Space Command shall hold the grade of general or, in the case of an officer of the Navy, admiral while serving in that position, without vacating the permanent grade of the officer. The Commander shall be appointed to that grade by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for service in that position.

(c) COMMAND OF JOINT SPACE ACTIVITY OR MISSIONS.—Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, the Commander of the United States Space Command shall exercise command of joint space activities or missions.

(d) JOINTLY STAFFED.—The United States Space Command shall be jointly staffed.
Subtitle B—Space Activities

SEC. 1611. [Log 65637] CODIFICATION, EXTENSION, AND MODIFICATION OF LIMITATION ON CONSTRUCTION ON UNITED STATES TERRITORY OF SATELLITE POSITIONING GROUND MONITORING STATIONS OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS.

(a) Codification, Extension, and Modification.—Chapter 135 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“§ 2279c. Limitation on construction on United States territory of satellite positioning ground monitoring stations of certain foreign governments.

“(b) Exception.—The limitation in subsection (a) shall not apply to foreign governments that are allies of the United States.

“(c) Sunset.—The limitation in subsection (a) shall terminate on December 31, 2023.”.

(b) Transfer of Provision.—Subsection (b) of section 1602 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (Public Law 113–66; 10 U.S.C. 2281 note) is—

(1) transferred to section 2279c of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a);
(2) inserted as the first subsection of such section;
(3) redesignated as subsection (a); and
(4) amended—
   (A) by amending the subsection heading to read as follows: “LIMITATION”; and
   (B) by striking paragraph (6).
SEC. 1612. [Log 65585] FOREIGN COMMERCIAL SATELLITE SERVICES: CYBERSECURITY THREATS AND LAUNCHES.

(a) CYBERSECURITY RISKS.—Subsection (a) of section 2279 of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1), by striking “; or” and inserting a semicolon;

(2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and inserting: “; or”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(3) entering into such contract would create a cybersecurity risk for the Department of Defense.”.

(b) LAUNCHES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Such section is amended—

(A) by redesignating subsections (b) through (e) as subsections (c) through (f), respectively; and

(B) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection (b):

“(b) LAUNCHES.—In addition to the prohibition in subsection (a), and except as provided in subsection (c), the Secretary may not enter into a contract for satellite services with any entity if the Secretary reasonably believes that such satellite services will be provided using satellites that will be launched—
“(1) from a covered foreign country; or

“(2) using a launch vehicle that is designed or manufactured in a covered foreign country, or that is provided by the government of a covered foreign country or by an entity controlled in whole or in part by, or acting on behalf of, the government of a covered foreign country, regardless of the location of the launch.”.

(2) EXCEPTION.—The prohibition in subsection (b) of section 2279 of title 10, United States Code, as added by paragraph (1), shall not apply with respect to—

(A) a launch that occurred prior to the date that is six months after the date of the enactment of this Act; or

(B) a contract or other agreement relating to launch services that, prior to the date that is six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, was either fully paid for by the contractor or covered by a legally binding commitment of the contractor to pay for such services.

(c) DEFINITIONS.—Subsection (f) of section 2279 of title 10, United States Code, as redesignated by subsection (b)(1)(A), is amended to read as follows:

“(f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
“(1) The term ‘covered foreign country’ means any of the following:


“(B) The Russian Federation.

“(2) The term ‘cybersecurity risk’ means threats to and vulnerabilities of information or information systems and any related consequences caused by or resulting from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, degradation, disruption, modification, or destruction of such information or information systems, including such related consequences caused by an act of terrorism.”.

(d) CONFORMING AND CLERICAL AMENDMENTS.—

(1) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—Such section 2279 is further amended—

(A) in the section heading, by striking “services” and inserting “services and foreign launches”;

(B) by striking “subsection (b)” each place it appears and inserting “subsection (c)”;

(C) in subsection (a)(2), by striking “launch or other”;

“services” and inserting “services and foreign launches”;

(B) by striking “subsection (b)” each place it appears and inserting “subsection (c)”;

(C) in subsection (a)(2), by striking “launch or other”;
(D) in subsection (e), as redesignated by subsection (b)(1), by striking “prohibition in subsection (a)” and inserting “prohibitions in subsection (a) and (b)”; and

(E) in subsection (d), as so redesignated, by striking “prohibition under subsection (a)” and inserting “prohibition under subsection (a) or (b)”.

(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 135 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to section 2279 and inserting the following:

“2279. Foreign commercial satellite services and foreign launches.”.

(e) APPLICATION.—Except as provided by subsection (b)(2), the amendments made by this section shall apply with respect to contracts for satellite services awarded by the Secretary of Defense on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
Section 1613 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328) is amended—

(1) in subsection (b), by striking “one year” and inserting “two years”;

(2) in subsection (c)—

(A) by striking “Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate” each place it appears and inserting “appropriate congressional committees”; and

(B) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(3) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means—

“(A) the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives; and

“(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatess.”.
Conditional Transfer of Acquisition and Funding Authority of Certain Weather Missions to National Reconnaissance Office.

Section 1614 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and

(2) by inserting after subsection (e) the following new subsection (d):

“(d) Implementation of Plans.—The Secretary of the Air Force shall implement the plan developed under paragraph (1) of subsection (b), and the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office shall implement the plan developed under paragraph (2) of such subsection, unless the Secretary and the Director each make a waiver under subsection (e).”
SEC. 1616. COMMERCIAL SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS PATHFINDER PROGRAM.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the Sense of Congress that the Secretary of the Air Force should—

(1) use the acquisition authority under the pathfinder program to acquire, from commercial providers, satellite bandwidth, ground services, and advanced services; and

(2) use the transaction authority provided by section 2371 of title 10, United States Code, to make a portion of such acquisitions.

(b) Report.—Not later than March 1, 2018, the Secretary of the Air Force shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report that includes the views and plans of the Secretary with respect to making a portion of the acquisitions described in subsection (a)(1) using the transaction authority provided by section 2371 of title 10, United States Code.

(c) Definition.—In this section, the term “pathfinder program” means the commercial satellite communications programs of the Air Force designed to demonstrate the feasibility of new, alternative acquisition and procurement models for commercial satellite communications.
SEC. 1619. ESTABLISHMENT OF SPACE FLAG TRAINING EVENT.

(a) Establishment.—Not later than December 31, 2020, the Secretary of Defense shall establish an annual capstone training event titled “Space Flag” for space professionals to—

(1) develop and test doctrine, concepts of operation, and tactics, techniques, and procedures, for—

(A) protecting and defending assets and interests of the United States through the spectrum of space control activities;

(B) operating in the event of degradation or loss of space capabilities;

(C) conducting space operations in a conflict that extends to space;

(D) deterring conflict in space; and

(E) other areas the Secretary determines necessary; and

(2) inform and develop the appropriate design of the operational training infrastructure of the space domain, including with respect to appropriate and dedicated ranges, threat replication, test community support, advanced space training requirements, training simulators, and multi-domain force packaging.
(b) TRAINING.—In establishing the Space Flag training event under subsection (a), the Secretary shall—

(1) model the training event on the Red Flag and Cyber Flag exercises; and

(2) ensure that Space Flag includes live, virtual, and constructive training and on-orbit threat replication, as appropriate.

(c) PLAN.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in coordination with the Commander of the Air Force Space Command, the Commander of the Army Space and Missile Defense Command, and the Commander of the Navy Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, shall submit to the congressional defense committees a plan to establish the Space Flag training under subsection (a), including a description of each objective of the training.
SEC. 1634. CLARIFICATION OF ANNUAL BRIEFING ON THE INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS.


(1) by inserting “(including with respect to space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance)” after “intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance requirements” both places it appears; and

(2) in paragraph (2), by striking “critical intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance requirements” and inserting “critical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance requirements (including with respect to space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance)”. 
Subtitle E—Nuclear Forces

SEC. 1651. NOTIFICATIONS REGARDING DUAL-CAPABLE F–35A AIRCRAFT.

Section 179(f) of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by redesignating paragraph (6) as paragraph (7); and

(2) by inserting after paragraph (5) the following new paragraph (6):

“(6) If a House of Congress adopts a bill authorizing or appropriating funds for the Department of Defense that, as determined by the Council, provides funds in an amount that will result in a delay in the nuclear certification or delivery of F–35A dual-capable aircraft, the Council shall notify the congressional defense committees of the determination.”.
SEC. 1652. [Log 65397] OVERSIGHT OF DELAYED ACQUISITION PROGRAMS BY COUNCIL ON OVERSIGHT OF THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM.

(a) Status Updates.—Section 171a of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsection (k) as subsection (l); and

(2) by inserting after subsection (j) the following new subsection (k):

“(k) Status of Acquisition Programs.—(1) On a quarterly basis, each program manager of a covered acquisition program shall transmit to the co-chairs of the Council, acting through the senior steering group of the Council, a report that identifies—

“(A) the covered acquisition program;

“(B) the requirements of the program;

“(C) the development timeline of the program;

and

“(D) the status of the program, including whether the program is delayed and, if so, whether such delay will result in a program schedule delay.

“(2) Not later than seven days after the end of each quarter, the co-chairs of the Council shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that identifies,
with respect to the reports transmitted to the Council
under paragraph (1) for that quarter—

“(A) each covered acquisition program that is
delayed more than 180 days; and

“(B) any covered acquisition program that
should have been included in such reports but was
excluded, and the reasons for such exclusion.

“(3) In this subsection, the term ‘covered acquisition
program’ means each acquisition program of the Depart-
ment of Defense that materially contributes to—

“(A) the nuclear command, control, and com-
munications systems of the United States; or

“(B) the continuity of government systems of
the United States.”.

(b) INSTRUCTIONS.—The Secretary of Defense shall
issue a Department of Defense Instruction, or revise such
an Instruction, to ensure that program managers carry
out subsection (k)(1) of section 171a of title 10, United
States Code, as added by subsection (a).
SEC. 1654. [Log 65411] SECURITY OF NUCLEAR COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM FROM COMMERCIAL DEPENDENCIES.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) At a hearing before the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives on September 30, 2015, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work, responding to a question about the use of Huawei telecommunications equipment, stated, “In the Office of the Secretary of Defense, absolutely not. And I know of no other—I don’t believe we operate in the Pentagon, any [Huawei] systems in the Pentagon.”.

(2) At such hearing, the Commander of the United States Cyber Command, Admiral Mike Rogers, responding to a question about why such Huawei telecommunications equipment is not used, stated, “as we look at supply chain and we look at potential vulnerabilities within the system, that it is a risk we felt was unacceptable.”.

(3) At a hearing before the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives on June 22, 2016, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security Thomas Atkin, stated, “There are currently no
Huawei or ZTE products on the DoD Unified Capabilities Approved Products List (APL).’’.

(b) CERTIFICATION.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall certify to the congressional defense committees whether the Secretary uses covered telecommunications equipment or services as a substantial or essential component of any system, or as critical technology as part of any system, to carry out—

(1) the nuclear deterrence mission of the Department of Defense, including with respect to nuclear command, control, and communications, integrated tactical warning and attack assessment, and continuity of government; or

(2) the homeland defense mission of the Department, including with respect to ballistic missile defense.

(c) PROHIBITION AND MITIGATION.—

(1) PROHIBITION.—Except as provided by paragraph (2), beginning on the date that is one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense may not procure or obtain, or extend or renew a contract to procure or obtain, any equipment, system, or service to carry out the missions described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of sub-
section (b) that uses covered telecommunications
equipment or services as a substantial or essential
component of any system, or as critical technology
as part of any system.

(2) WAIVER.—The Secretary may waive the
prohibition in paragraph (1) on a case-by-case basis
for a single one-year period if the Secretary—

(A) determines such waiver to be in the
national security interests of the United States;

and

(B) certifies to the congressional commit-
tees that—

(i) there are sufficient mitigations in
place to guarantee the ability of the Sec-
retary to carry out the missions described
in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection
(b); and

(ii) the Secretary is removing the use
of covered telecommunications equipment
or services in carrying out such missions.

(3) DELEGATION.—The Secretary may not del-
legate the authority to make a waiver under para-
graph (2) to any official other than the Deputy Sec-
retary of Defense or the co-chairs of the Council on
Oversight of the National Leadership Command,
Control, and Communications System established by section 171a of title 10, United States Code.

(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) The term “congressional defense committees” has the meaning given that term in section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code.

(2) The term “covered foreign country” means any of the following:

(A) The People’s Republic of China.

(B) The Russian Federation.

(3) The term “covered telecommunications equipment or services” means any of the following:

(A) Telecommunications equipment produced by Huawei Technologies Company or ZTE Corporation (or any subsidiary or affiliate of such entities).

(B) Telecommunications services provided by such entities or using such equipment.

(C) Telecommunications equipment or services produced or provided by an entity that the Secretary of Defense reasonably believes to be an entity owned or controlled by, or otherwise connected to, the government of a covered foreign country.
SECTION 1655. [Log 65396] OVERSIGHT OF AERIAL-LAYER PROGRAMS BY COUNCIL ON OVERSIGHT OF THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM.

Any analysis of alternatives for the Senior Leader Airborne Operations Center, the executive airlift program of the Air Force, and the E–6B modernization program may not receive final approval by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation may not conduct any sufficiency review of such an analysis of alternatives, unless—

(1) the Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System established by section 171a of title 10, United States Code, determines that the alternatives for such programs are capable of meeting the requirements for senior leadership communications in support of the nuclear command, control, and communications mission of the Department of Defense and the continuity of government mission of the Department;

(2) the Council submits to the congressional defense committees such determination; and

(3) a period of 30 days elapses following the date of such submission.
SEC. 1656. [Log 65410] SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE
FOR PROGRAMS RELATING TO NUCLEAR
COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICA-
TIONS AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE.

(a) Requirement for Security Classification
Guide.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the en-
actment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall require
the issuance of a security classification guide for each cov-
ered program to ensure the protection of sensitive infor-
mation from public disclosure.

(b) Requirements.—Each security classification
guide issued pursuant to subsection (a) shall be—

(1) approved by—

(A) the Council on Oversight of the Na-
tional Leadership Command, Control, and Com-
 munications System with respect to covered
programs under paragraph (1) or (2) of sub-
section (c); or

(B) the Nuclear Weapons Council with re-
spect to covered programs under paragraph (3)
of such subsection; and

(2) issued not later than March 19, 2019, with
respect to a covered program in existence as of such
date.

(c) Covered Program Defined.—In this section,
the term “covered program” means programs of the De-
part of Defense in existence on or after the date of
the enactment of this Act relating to any of the following:

(1) Continuity of government.

(2) Nuclear command, control, and communications.

(3) Nuclear deterrence.
SEC. 1657. [Log 65413] EVALUATION AND ENHANCED SECURITY OF SUPPLY CHAIN FOR NUCLEAR COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS AND CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS.

(a) Evaluations of Supply Chain Vulnerabilities.—

(1) In general.—Not later than December 31, 2019, and in accordance with the plan under paragraph (2)(A), the Secretary of Defense shall conduct evaluations of the supply chain vulnerabilities of each covered program.

(2) Plan.—

(A) Development.—The Secretary shall develop a plan to carry out the evaluations under paragraph (1).

(B) Submission.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees the plan under subparagraph (A).

(3) Waiver.—The Secretary may waive, on a case-by-case basis with respect to a weapons system, a program, or a system of systems, of a covered program, either the requirement to conduct an evaluation under paragraph (1) or the deadline specified in...
such paragraph if the Secretary certifies to the congressional defense committees before such date that all known supply chain vulnerabilities of such weapons system, program, or system of systems have minimal consequences for the capability of such weapons system, program, or system of systems to meet operational requirements or otherwise satisfy mission requirements.

(4) Risk Mitigation Strategies.—In carrying out an evaluation under paragraph (1) with respect to a covered program specified in subparagraph (B) or (C) of subsection (c)(2), the Secretary shall develop strategies for mitigating the risks of supply chain vulnerabilities identified in the course of such evaluation.

(b) Prioritization of Certain Supply Chain Risk Management Efforts.—

(1) Instructions.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall issue a Department of Defense Instruction, or update such an Instruction, establishing the prioritization of supply chain risk management programs, including supply chain risk management threat assessment reporting, to ensure that acquisition and sustainment programs relating to covered
programs receive the highest priority of such supply
chain risk management programs and reporting.

(2) REQUIREMENTS.—

(A) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary
shall establish requirements to carry out supply
chain risk management threat assessment col-
lections and analyses under acquisition and
sustainment programs relating to covered pro-
grams.

(B) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 120
days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary shall submit to the appro-
priate congressional committees the require-
ments established under subparagraph (A).

(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) The term “appropriate congressional com-
mittees” means—

(A) the congressional defense committees;

and

(B) the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives
and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate.

(2) The term “covered programs” means pro-
grams relating to any of the following:
(A) Nuclear weapons.

(B) Nuclear command, control, and communications.

(C) Continuity of government.

(D) Ballistic missile defense.
SEC. 1658. LIMITATION ON PURSUIT OF CERTAIN COMMAND AND CONTROL CONCEPT.

(a) LIMITATION ON COMMAND AND CONTROL CONCEPT.—The Secretary of the Air Force may not award a contract for engineering and manufacturing development for the ground-based strategic deterrent program that would result in a command and control concept for such program that consists of less than 15 fixed launch control centers per missile wing unless the Commander of the United States Strategic Command—

(1) determines that—

(A) the plans of the Secretary for a command and control concept consisting of less than 15 fixed launch control centers per missile wing are appropriate, meet requirements, and do not contain excessive risk;

(B) the risks to schedules and costs from such concept are minimized and manageable;

(C) the strategy and plan of the Secretary for addressing cyber threats for such concept are robust; and

(D) with respect to such concept, the Secretary has established an appropriate process for considering and managing trade-offs among requirements relating to survivability, long-term
operations and sustainment costs, procurement costs, and military personnel needs; and

(2) submits, in writing, to the Secretary and the congressional defense committees such determination.

(b) INABILITY TO MAKE DETERMINATION.—If the Secretary proposes to award a contract specified in subsection (a) and the Commander is unable to make the determination under such subsection, the Commander shall submit, in writing, to the Secretary and the congressional defense committees the reasons for not making such determination.

(c) NO EFFECT ON COMPETITION.—Nothing in subsection (a) or (b) shall be construed to affect or prohibit the ability of the Secretary to use fair and open competition procedures in soliciting, evaluating, and awarding contracts for the ground-based strategic deterrent program.
SEC. 1659. PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY FOR CERTAIN PARTS OF INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE FUZES.

(a) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Notwithstanding section 1502(a) of title 31, United States Code, of the amount authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2018 by section 101 and available for Missile Procurement, Air Force, as specified in the funding table in division D, $6,334,000 shall be available for the procurement of covered parts pursuant to contracts entered into under section 1645(a) of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113–291; 128 Stat. 3651).

(b) COVERED PARTS DEFINED.—In this section, the term “covered parts” means commercially available off-the-shelf items as defined in section 104 of title 41, United States Code.
SEC. 1660. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IMPORTANCE OF INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR DETERRENCE OF UNITED KINGDOM.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) nuclear deterrence is foundational to the defense and security of the United States and the security of the United States is enhanced by a nuclear-armed ally with common values and security priorities;

(2) the United States sees the nuclear deterrent of the United Kingdom as central to transatlantic security and welcomes the commitment of the United Kingdom to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to continue to spend two percent of gross domestic product on defense;

(3) in the face of increasing threats, the presence of credible nuclear deterrent forces of the United Kingdom is essential to international stability and for NATO;

(4) the commitment of the United Kingdom to sustaining an independent nuclear deterrent, deployed continuously at sea, provides a vital second decision-making point within the deterrent capability of NATO, creating essential uncertainty in the mind of any potential adversary;
(5) the United States Navy must continue to execute the Columbia-class submarine program on time and within budget to ensure that the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad of the United States is sustained and the program delivers a Common Missile Compartment, the Trident II (D5) Strategic Weapon System, and associated equipment and production capabilities, to support the successful development and deployment of the Dreadnought submarines of the United Kingdom;

(6) the support that the United Kingdom provides to deployments of strategic ships and aircraft of the United States at specialized facilities enables a vital part of the deterrence posture of the United States as well as mutual deterrence of adversaries and assurance to the allies and partners of the United States; and

(7) the collaboration of the United Kingdom with the United States on the military use of atomic energy ensures a peer in the technology and science of nuclear weapons and provides independent expert peer review of the nuclear programs of the United States, ensuring resilience, and cost effectiveness to the nuclear defense programs of both nations.
Subtitle F—Missile Defense Programs

SEC. 1671. ADMINISTRATION OF MISSILE DEFENSE AND DEFEAT PROGRAMS.

(a) MAJOR FORCE PROGRAM.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 9 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“§ 239a. Missile defense and defeat programs: major force program and budget assessment

“(a) ESTABLISHMENT OF MAJOR FORCE PROGRAM.—The Secretary of Defense shall establish a unified major force program for missile defense and defeat programs pursuant to section 222(b) of this title to prioritize missile defense and defeat programs in accordance with the requirements of the Department of Defense and national security.

“(b) BUDGET ASSESSMENT.—(1) The Secretary shall include with the defense budget materials for each of fiscal years 2019 through 2023 a report on the budget for missile defense and defeat programs of the Department of Defense.

“(2) Each report on the budget for missile defense and defeat programs of the Department under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
“(A) An overview of the budget, including—

“(i) a comparison between that budget, the

previous budget, the most recent and prior fu-

ture-years defense program submitted to Con-

gress under section 221 of this title (such com-

parison shall exclude the responsibility for re-

search and development of the continuing im-

provement of such missile defense and defeat

program), and the amounts appropriated for

such missile defense and defeat programs dur-

ing the previous fiscal year; and

“(ii) the specific identification, as a budg-

etary line item, for the funding under such pro-

grams.

“(B) An assessment of the budget, including

significant changes, priorities, challenges, and risks.

“(C) Any additional matters the Secretary de-

termines appropriate.

“(3) Each report under paragraph (1) shall be sub-

mitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified

annex.

“(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

“(1) The term ‘budget’, with respect to a fiscal

year, means the budget for that fiscal year that is
submitted to Congress by the President under section 1105(a) of title 31.

“(2) The term ‘defense budget materials’, with respect to a fiscal year, means the materials submitted to Congress by the Secretary of Defense in support of the budget for that fiscal year.

“(3) The term ‘missile defense and defeat programs’ means active and passive ballistic missile defense programs, cruise missile defense programs for the homeland, and missile defeat programs.”.

(2) Clerical Amendment.—The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 239 the following new item:

“239a. Missile defense and defeat programs: major force program and budget assessment.”.

(b) Transition of Ballistic Missile Defense Programs to Military Departments.—

(1) Requirement.—Not later than the date on which the budget of the President for fiscal year 2020 is submitted under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, the Secretary of Defense shall transfer the acquisition authority and the total obligational authority for each missile defense program described in paragraph (2) from the Missile Defense Agency to a military department.
(2) Missile defense program described.—
A missile defense program described in this para-
graph is a missile defense program of the Missile
Defense Agency that, as of the date specified in
paragraph (1), has received Milestone C approval (as
defined in section 2366 of title 10, United States
Code).

(3) Report.—

(A) In general.—Not later than one year
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the con-
gressional defense committees a report on the
plans of the Department of Defense for the
transition of missile defense programs from the
Missile Defense Agency to the military depart-
ments pursuant to paragraph (1).

(B) Scope.—The report under subpara-
graph (A) shall cover the period covered by the
future-years defense program that is submitted
under section 221 of title 10, United States
Code, in the year in which such report is sub-
mitted.

(C) Matters included.—The report
under subparagraph (A) shall include the fol-
lowing:
(i) An identification of—

(I) the missile defense programs planned to be transitioned from the Missile Defense Agency to the military departments; and

(II) the missile defense programs, if any, not planned for transition to the military departments.

(ii) The schedule for transition of each missile defense program planned to be transitioned to a military department, and an explanation of such schedule.

(iii) A description of—

(I) the status of the plans of the Missile Defense Agency and the military departments for the transition of missile defense programs from that agency to the military departments; and

(II) the status of any agreement between the Missile Defense Agency and one or more of the military departments on the transition of any such program from that agency to the military departments, including any
agreement on the operational test criteria that must be achieved before such transition.

(iv) An identification of the element of the Department of Defense (whether the Missile Defense Agency, a military department, or both) that will be responsible for funding each missile defense program to be transitioned to a military department, and at what date.

(v) A description of the type of funds that will be used (whether funds for research, development, test, and evaluation, procurement, military construction, or operation and maintenance) for each missile defense program to be transitioned to a military department.

(vi) An explanation of the number of systems planned for procurement for each missile defense program to be transitioned to a military department, and the schedule for procurement of each such system.

(vii) A description of how the Missile Defense Agency will continue the responsi-
(c) ROLE OF MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 8 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“§ 205. Missile Defense Agency

“(a) TERM OF DIRECTOR.—The Director of the Missile Defense Agency shall be appointed for a six-year term.

“(b) REPORTING.—The Missile Defense Agency shall be under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering.”.

(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the beginning of subchapter II of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

“205. Missile Defense Agency.”.

(3) APPLICATION.—

(A) TERMS.—Subsection (a) of section 205 of title 10, United States Code, as added by paragraph (1), shall apply the day following the date on which the present incumbent in the office of the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, ceases to serve as such.
(B) REPORTING.—Subsection (b) of such section 205 shall apply beginning on February 1, 2018. In carrying out such subsection, the Missile Defense Agency shall be under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering in the same manner as the Missile Defense Agency was under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics pursuant to Department of Defense Directive 5134.09. Any reference in such Instruction to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics shall be deemed to be a reference to the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, including with respect to the Under Secretary serving as the chairman of the Missile Defense Executive Board.
SEC. 1672. PRESERVATION OF THE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE CAPACITY OF THE ARMY.

(a) LIMITATION.—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2018 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Army may be obligated or expended to demilitarize any GEM–T interceptor or remove any such interceptor from the operational inventory of the Army until the date on which the Secretary of the Army submits to the congressional defense committees the evaluation conducted under subsection (b).

(b) EVALUATION.—The Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Army shall jointly conduct an evaluation of the ability of the Army to meet warfighter requirements and operational needs if GEM–T interceptors are removed from the operational inventory of the Army. In conducting such evaluation, the Secretary and the Chief of Staff shall evaluate whether the Army can maintain an inventory of interceptors necessary to retain the capability provided by GEM–T interceptors and to meet such operational needs by either—

(1) recertifying GEM–T interceptors (either with or without modification); or

(2) developing, testing, and fielding a new low-cost interceptor that can be placed on the oper-
ational inventory of the Army prior to the retirement
of GEM-T interceptors.

(c) EXCEPTION.—The limitation in subsection (a)
shall not apply to activities that the Secretary determines
are critical to the safety of GEM–T interceptors.

(d) GEM–T INTERCEPTOR DEFINED.—In this sec-
tion, the term “GEM–T interceptor” means the Patriot
guidance enhanced missile TBM.
SEC. 1673.[Log 65405] MODERNIZATION OF ARMY LOWER TIER AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE SENSOR.

(a) APPROVAL OF ACQUISITION STRATEGY.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than April 15, 2018, the Secretary of the Army shall issue an acquisition strategy for a 360-degree lower tier air and missile defense sensor that achieves initial operating capability by not later than January 1, 2022.

(2) REQUIREMENTS.—The acquisition strategy under paragraph (1) shall—

(A) ensure the use of competitive procedures;

(B) clearly describe the open-architecture design to be used;

(C) provide a comprehensive fielding plan that provides 360-degree lower tier air and missile defense sensor capability to all units of the Army by not later than January 1, 2026;

(D) define the operation and sustainment cost savings of the acquisition strategy and other acquisition options of the Army;

(E) identify any programmatic cost avoidance that could be achieved through co-production, co-development, or foreign military sales;

(F) ensure the fielding of an interim gap-filler capability to the highest priority forces.
(consisting of not less than three battalions) for imminent threats; and

(G) identify the estimated cost to field both the 360-degree lower tier air and missile defense sensor capability and the interim capability pursuant to subparagraph (E).

(3) LIMITATION.—If the Secretary of the Army does not issue the acquisition strategy under subsection (a) by April 15, 2018, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2018 for the lower tier air and missile defense sensor of the Army that are unobligated as of such date may be obligated or expended.

(b) CONDITIONAL TRANSFER.—

(1) MDA.—If the Secretary of the Army does not issue the acquisition strategy under subsection (a) by April 15, 2018, the Secretary of Defense shall transfer from the Secretary of the Army to the Director of the Missile Defense Agency—

(A) the responsibility to issue the acquisition strategy described in subsection (a) by not later than December 15, 2018; and

(B) beginning on the date of such approval, the responsibility to implement such ac-
quisition strategy to procure a 360-degree lower tier air and missile defense sensor.

(2) ARMY.—If the Secretary of Defense carries out the transfer under paragraph (1), after the 360-degree lower tier air and missile defense sensor achieves Milestone B approval (or equivalent), but before such sensor achieves Milestone C approval (or equivalent), the Secretary of Defense shall transfer from the Director of the Missile Defense Agency to the Secretary of the Army the responsibility to procure such sensor.

(c) DEFINITIONS.—The terms “Milestone B approval” and “Milestone C approval” have the meanings given those terms in section 2366 of title 10, United States Code.
SEC. 1674. ENHANCEMENT OF OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the Secretary of the Army, and the Secretary of the Navy shall jointly ensure that—

(1) the test plans of the Integrated Master Test Plan of the ballistic missile defense system include planned tests activity of the lower tier ballistic missile defenses of the Army;

(2) such plans prioritize the integration of such defenses with elements of the ballistic missile defense system; and

(3) such plans are clearly described in such Integrated Master Test Plan.
SEC. 1676. AEGIS ASHORE ANTI-AIR WARFARE CAPABILITY.

(a) AUTHORIZATION.—Using funds authorized to be appropriated by sections 101 and 201 of this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2018 for procurement and research, development, test, and evaluation, as specified in the funding tables in division D, the Secretary of Defense shall continue the development, procurement, and deployment of anti-air warfare capabilities at each Aegis Ashore site in Romania and Poland. The Secretary shall ensure the deployment of such capabilities—

(1) at such sites in Romania by not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act; and

(2) at such sites in Poland by not later than one year after the declaration of operational status for such sites.

(b) REPROGRAMMING AND TRANSFERS.—Any reprogramming or transfer made to carry out subsection (a) shall be carried out in accordance with established procedures for reprogramming or transfers.
SEC. 1678. [Log 65401] REVIEW OF PROPOSED GROUND-
BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE SYSTEM CONTRACT.

(a) LIMITATION ON CHANGES TO CONTRACTING STRATEGY.—The Director of the Missile Defense Agency may not change the contracting strategy for the systems integration, operations, and test of the ground-based midcourse defense system until the date on which—

(1) the report under subsection (b)(3) is submitted to the congressional defense committees; and

(2) a period of 30 days has elapsed following the date of such submission.

(b) REVIEW.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation shall conduct a review of the contract for the systems integration, operations, and test of the ground-based midcourse defense system. Such review shall include the following:

(A) Contract performance of current industry-led prime contract approach, including with respect to—

(i) system readiness performance and reliability growth;
(ii) development, integration, and fielding of new homeland defense capabilities; and

(iii) cost performance against baseline contract.

(B) With respect to alternate contracting approaches—

(i) an enumeration and detailing of any specific benefits for each such alternate approach;

(ii) an identification of specific costs to switching to each such alternate approach; and

(iii) detailing of the specific risks of each such alternate approach to homeland defense, including regarding schedule, costs, and the sustainment, maintenance, development, and fielding, of integrated capabilities.

(C) With respect to contracting approaches that transition to Federal Government-led systems engineering integration and test—

(i) an enumeration of the processes, procedures, and command media that have been established by the Missile Defense
Agency and proven to be effective for the execution of programs that are of the scale of the ground-based midcourse defense system; and

(ii) the manner in which a new contract will control for growth in the personnel and support contracts of the Federal Government to support cost growth and minimize the risk of schedule delay.

(D) A baseline for historical and current staffing of the ground-based midcourse defense system program, specifically with respect to personnel of the Federal Government, personnel of federally funded research and development centers, personnel of departments and agencies of the Federal Government, and support contractors.

(E) Projections of the staffing categories specified in subparagraph (D) under a new contracting strategy and how such staffing categories will be limited to prevent significant cost growth and to minimize the risk of schedule delays.

(F) The views and recommendations of the Director for any changes the current ground-
based midcourse defense system contract or a new contract, including the proposed contracting strategy of the Missile Defense Agency.

(G) Any other such matters the Director determines appropriate.

(2) TRANSMISSION.—The Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation shall transmit to the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Missile Defense Executive Board the review under paragraph (1).

(3) REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Under Secretary and the Missile Defense Executive Board receive the review under paragraph (1), the Under Secretary and Board shall jointly submit to the congressional defense committees a report containing—

(A) the review, without change; and

(B) any views and recommendations of the Under Secretary and the Board on such review.
SEC. 1679. [Log 65627] SENSE OF CONGRESS AND PLAN FOR DEVELOPMENT OF SPACE-BASED SENSOR LAYER FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the defense of the homeland, the deployed members of the Armed Forces, and the allies of the United States against the threat of attack by ballistic and hypersonic missiles is the highest priority of the Missile Defense Agency;

(2) the Missile Defense Agency, and the Defense Agencies and combat support agencies, must prioritize the design, development, and deployment of the space-based missile defense sensor layer;

(3) a space-based missile defense sensor layer is essential for the future of the missile defense of the homeland, the deployed members of the Armed Forces, and the allies of the United States; and

(4) such a space-based layer can, and should, benefit a multitude of other important defense and intelligence requirements, including targeting and space situational awareness.

(b) DEVELOPMENT.—After the date on which the Director of the Missile Defense Agency submits the plan under subsection (c), the Director, in coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force and the heads of the De-
fense Agencies and combat support agencies that the Di-
rector determines appropriate, shall develop a space-based
ballistic missile defense sensor layer that—

(1) provides missile defense engagement quality
precision tracking data of the United States begin-
ning in the boost phase and continuing throughout
subsequent flight regimes; and

(2) serves other defense and intelligence re-
quirements for intelligence, surveillance, and recon-
naissance, including targeting and space situational
awareness; and

(3) achieves an operational prototype payload at
the earliest practicable date.

(e) SPACE-BASED MISSILE DEFENSE SENSOR LAYER
PLAN.—Not later than one year after the date of the en-
actment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the ap-
propriate congressional committees a plan that includes—

(1) how the Director will carry out subsection
(b), including with respect to the estimated costs—

(A) for the operational prototype payload
specified in paragraph (3) of such subsection;
and

(B) to develop, acquire, and deploy, and
the lifecycle costs to operate and sustain, a
space-based sensor layer and support systems
to provide global missile defense coverage;

(2) an assessment of the maturity of critical
technologies necessary to make operational such a
space-based sensor layer, and recommendations for
any research and development activities to rapidly
mature such technologies;

(3) an assessment of what capabilities such a
space-based sensor layer can contribute that other
sensor layers do not contribute;

(4) how the Director will leverage the use of na-
tional technical means, commercially available space
and terrestrial capabilities, hosted payloads, small
satellites, and other capabilities to carry out sub-
section (b); and

(5) any other matters the Director determines
appropriate.

(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) The term “appropriate congressional com-
mittees” means—

(A) the congressional defense committees;

and

(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence
of the Senate and the Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(2) The term “combat support agency” has the meaning given that term in section 193(f) of title 10, United States Code.

(3) The term “Defense Agency” has the meaning given that term in section 101(a)(11) of title 10, United States Code.
SEC. 3112. Incorporation of Integrated Surety Architecture in Transportation.

(a) Incorporation.—Subtitle A of title XLII of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2521 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“SEC. 4222. Incorporation of Integrated Surety Architecture.

“(a) Shipments.—(1) The Administrator shall ensure that shipments described in paragraph (2) incorporate surety technologies relating to transportation and shipping developed by the Integrated Surety Architecture program of the Administration.

“(2) A shipment described in this paragraph is an over-the-road shipment of the Administration that involves any nuclear weapon planned to be in the active stockpile after 2025.

“(b) Certain Programs.—(1) The Administrator, in coordination with the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council, shall ensure that each program described in paragraph (2) incorporate integrated designs compatible with the Integrated Surety Architecture program.

“(2) A program described in this subsection is a program of the Administration that is a warhead development program, a life extension program, or a warhead major alteration program.
“(c) Determination.—(1) If, on a case-by-case basis, the Administrator determines that a shipment under subsection (a) will not incorporate some or all of the surety technologies described in such subsection, or that a program under subsection (b) will not incorporate some or all of the integrated designs described in such subsection, the Administrator shall submit such determination to the congressional defense committees, including the results of an analysis conducted pursuant to paragraph (2).

“(2) Each determination made under paragraph (1) shall be based on a documented, system risk analysis that considers security risk reduction, operational impacts, and technical risk.

“(e) Termination.—The requirements of subsections (a) and (b) shall terminate on December 31, 2029.”.

(b) Clerical Amendment.—The table of contents for such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 4221 the following new item:

“Sec. 4222. Incorporation of integrated surety architecture.”.

(e) Implementation of Certain Direction.—The Administrator shall implement the direction relating to this section contained in the classified annex accompanying this Act.
SEC. 3114. BUDGET REQUESTS AND CERTIFICATION REGARDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS Dismantlement.

Section 3125 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (f); and

(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new subsections:

“(d) BUDGET REQUESTS.—The Administrator for Nuclear Security shall ensure that the budget of the President submitted to Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, for each of fiscal years 2019 through 2021 includes amounts for the nuclear weapons dismantlement and disposition activities of the National Nuclear Security Administration in accordance with the limitation in subsection (a).

“(e) CERTIFICATION.—Not later than February 1, 2018, the Administrator shall certify to the congressional defense committees that the Administrator is carrying out the nuclear weapons dismantlement and disposition activities of the Administration in accordance with the limitations in subsections (a) and (b).”.
SEC. 3115. Log 65639 IMPROVED INFORMATION RELATING TO DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.

(a) IMPROVED INFORMATION.—Title XLIII of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2563 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“SEC. 4310. INFORMATION RELATING TO DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AND ARMS CONTROL PROGRAM.

“(a) TECHNOLOGIES AND CAPABILITIES.—The Administrator shall document, for efforts that are not focused on basic research, the technologies and capabilities of the defense nuclear nonproliferation research and development program—

“(1) that are transitioned to end users for further development or deployment; and

“(2) that are deployed.

“(b) ASSESSMENTS OF STATUS.—(1) In assessing projects under the defense nuclear nonproliferation research and development program or the defense nuclear nonproliferation and arms control program, the Administrator shall compare the status of each such project, including with respect to the final results of such project, to the baseline targets and goals established in the initial project plan of such project.
“(2) The Administrator may carry out paragraph (1) using a common template or such other means as the Administrator determines appropriate.”.

(b) INCLUSION IN PLAN.—Section 4309(b) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 2575(b)) is amended—

(1) by redesignating paragraph (16) as paragraph (18); and

(2) by inserting after paragraph (15) the following new paragraphs:

“(16) A summary of the technologies and capabilities documented under section 4310(a).

“(17) A summary of the assessments conducted under section 4310(b)(1).”.
SEC. 3117. PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR PROGRAMS IN RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) Prohibition.—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2018 for atomic energy defense activities may be obligated or expended to enter into a contract with, or otherwise provide assistance to, the Russian Federation.

(b) Waiver.—The Secretary of Energy, without delegation, may waive the prohibition in subsection (a) only if—

(1) the Secretary determines, in writing, that a nuclear-related threat arising in the Russian Federation must be addressed urgently and it is necessary to waive the prohibition to address that threat;

(2) the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense concur in the determination under paragraph (1); and

(3) the Secretary of Energy submits to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing—

(A) a notification that the waiver is in the national security interest of the United States; and

(B) justification for the waiver, including the determination under paragraph (1); and
(C) a description of the activities to be carried out pursuant to the waiver, including the expected cost and timeframe for such activities; and

(4) a period of seven days elapses following the date on which the Secretary submits the report under paragraph (3).

(c) EXCEPTION.—The prohibition under subsection (a) and the requirements under subsection (b) to waive that prohibition shall not apply to an amount, not to exceed $3,000,000, that the Secretary may make available for the Department of Energy Russian Health Studies Program.

(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means the following:

(1) The congressional defense committees.

(2) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
Subtitle C—Plans and Reports

SEC. 3131. MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

(a) Status of Nuclear Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting Program.—

(1) Repeal.—Section 4303 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2563) is repealed.

(2) Clerical Amendment.—The table of contents for the Atomic Energy Defense Act is amended by striking the item relating to section 4303.

(b) Status of Security of Atomic Energy Defense Facilities.—Section 4506 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2657) is amended by striking “of each year” each place it appears and inserting “of each even-numbered year”.

(c) Security Risks Posed to Nuclear Weapons Complex.—

(1) Included in SSMP.—Section 4203 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2523) is amended—

(A) in subsection (e)—

(i) by redesignating paragraph (7) as paragraph (8); and

(ii) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following new paragraph (7):
“(7) A summary of the status of the plan regarding the research and development, deployment, and lifecycle sustainment of technologies described in subsection (d)(7).”; and

(B) in subsection (d)—

(i) by redesigning paragraph (7) as paragraph (8); and

(ii) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following new paragraph (7):

“(7) A plan for the research and development, deployment, and lifecycle sustainment of the technologies employed within the nuclear security enterprise to address physical and cybersecurity threats during the five-fiscal-year period following the date of the plan, together with—

“(A) for each site in the nuclear security enterprise, a description of the technologies deployed to address the physical and cybersecurity threats posed to that site;

“(B) for each site and for the nuclear security enterprise, the methods used by the Administration to establish priorities among investments in physical and cybersecurity technologies; and
“(C) a detailed description of how the funds identified for each program element specified pursuant to paragraph (1) in the budget for the Administration for each fiscal year during that five-fiscal-year period will help carry out that plan.”.

(2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 3253(b) of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 2453) is amended by striking paragraph (5).

(d) SELECTED ACQUISITION REPORTS.—Section 4217(a) of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2537(a)) is amended by striking “fiscal-year quarter” each place it appears and inserting “fiscal year”.

(e) LONG-TERM PLAN FOR MEETING NATIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR UNENCUMBERED URANIUM.—Section 4221(a) of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2538c(a)) is amended by striking “Concurrent with the submission to Congress of the budget of the President under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, in” and inserting “Not later than December 31 of”.

(f) DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION MANAGEMENT PLAN.—Section 4309 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2575) is amended—
(1) in subsection (a), by striking “IN GENERAL.—Concurrent with the submission to Congress of the budget of the President under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, in each fiscal year” and inserting “PLAN.—Not later than March 31 of each odd-numbered year”;

(2) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d);

(3) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection (c):

“(c) UPDATED SUMMARY.—Not later than March 31 of each even-numbered year, the Administrator shall submit to the congressional defense committees an updated summary of the plan submitted under subsection (a) during the previous year.”; and

(4) in subsection (d), as so redesignated, by inserting “and the updated summary required by subsection (c)” before “shall be submitted”.

SEC. 3132. ASSESSMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND OPERATING CONTRACTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY LABORATORIES.

(a) ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator for Nuclear Security shall seek to enter into a contract with a federally funded research and development center to conduct an assessment of the benefits, costs, challenges, risks, efficiency, and effectiveness of the strategy of the Administrator with respect to management and operating contracts for national security laboratories. The Administrator may not award such contract to a federally funded research and development center for which the Department of Energy or the National Nuclear Security Administration is the primary sponsor.

(b) COOPERATION.—The Administrator, and the director of each national security laboratory, shall provide to the federally funded research and development center conducting the assessment under subsection (a) the information the center requires to conduct such assessment.

(c) SUBMISSION.—

(1) NNSA.—Not later than 90 days after the date on which the Administrator and a federally funded research and development center enter into the contract under subsection (a), the center shall submit to the Administrator a report on the assess-
ment conducted under such subsection. Such report shall include the following:

(A) An assessment of the acquisition strategy and the contract oversight process of the Administrator, and of the use of for-profit management and operating contractors at national security laboratories, and whether such strategy, process, and contractors provide the best outcomes to the Federal Government with respect to performance, cost, efficiency, and effectiveness.

(B) An assessment of the total costs, for each national security laboratory, that are incurred because of using a for-profit model for the management and operating contract that would not be incurred under a nonprofit model, and whether performance, costs, efficiency, and effectiveness would be expected to increase or decrease under a nonprofit model.

(C) An assessment of whether the Administrator is appropriately using, managing, and overseeing the national security laboratories with respect to the nature of the laboratories as federally funded research and development centers.
(2) CONGRESS.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Administrator receives the report under paragraph (1), the Administrator shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate such report, without change, together with any comments the Administrator determines appropriate.

(3) LIMITATION.—

(A) AWARD OR EXTENSION OF CONTRACT.—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2018 for the National Nuclear Security Administration may be obligated or expended to award, or to extend, a management and operating contract for a national security laboratory until the date on which the Administrator submits to the congressional defense committees the report under paragraph (2).

(B) WAIVER FOR EXTENSION.—The Secretary of Energy may waive the limitation in subparagraph (A) with respect to the extension of a management and operating contract for a national security laboratory if the Secretary—
(i) determines such waiver is required in the interest of national security; and
(ii) notifies the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate of such determination.

(d) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that nothing in this section should be construed to mandate or encourage an extension of an existing management and operating contract for a national security laboratory.

(e) National Security Laboratory Defined.—In this section, the term “national security laboratory” has the meaning given that term in section 4002(7) of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2501(7)).
SEC. 3133. EVALUATION OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR WASTE AUTHORITIES AND PROCESSES.

(a) Evaluation.—The Secretary of Energy shall conduct an evaluation of all provisions of Federal law, processes, rules, regulations, orders, and directives, relating to defense nuclear waste to identify any changes that the Secretary determines would provide significant cost avoidance or cost savings within the long-term defense environmental cleanup program without decreasing environmental, health, or public safety, requirements.

(b) Matters Included.—In conducting the evaluation under subsection (a), the Secretary shall consider—

(1) the classification of defense nuclear waste;
(2) the basis by which the Secretary makes waste disposal decisions; and
(3) and such other matters relating to defense nuclear waste that the Secretary determines appropriate.

(c) Report.—Not later than February 1, 2018, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the evaluation under subsection (a), including a description of—

(1) any actions the Secretary has taken or will take to change the processes, rules, regulations, orders, or directives, relating to defense nuclear waste;
(2) any recommendations for legislative action
the Secretary determines appropriate; and
(3) the assessment of the Secretary regarding
the benefits and risks of the actions and rec-
ommendations of the Secretary under paragraphs
(1) and (2).

(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate con-
gressional committees” means the following:

(1) The Committees on Armed Services of the
House of Representatives and the Senate.

(2) The Committee on Energy and Commerce
of the House of Representatives.

(3) The Committee on Energy and Natural Re-
sources of the Senate.
SEC. 3134. Log 64927 REPORT ON CRITICAL DECISION–1 ON
MATERIAL STAGING FACILITY PROJECT.

Not later than October 31, 2017, the Administrator for Nuclear Security shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report containing the following:

(1) The decision memorandum of the Administrator with respect to Critical Decision–1 on the Material Staging Facility project at the Pantex Plant.

(2) The preferred alternative approved by the Administrator for such Critical Decision–1.

(3) The cost-range estimates, including a description of the costs saved or avoided from not carrying out recapitalization and sustainment of Area 4 at the Pantex Plant.

(4) The schedule-range estimates that include completion of the Material Staging Facility by 2024.

(5) The risk factors and risk mitigation and management options relating to the Material Staging Facility.

(6) The expected improvements to operations and security provided by the Material Staging Facility, once operational, including the potential annual cost savings.

(7) Such other matters as the Administrator considers appropriate.
TITLE XXXII—DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD


SEC. 3201. [Log 62685] AUTHORIZATION.

There are authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2017, $31,000,000 for the operation of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board under chapter 21 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2286 et seq.).
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Certification of Reusable Launch Vehicles for National Security Space Missions

The committee is aware of the recent successful re-launch of an Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle-class launch vehicle that had previously been used to deliver a payload to orbit. The potential to reuse launch vehicles for orbital space launch has the potential to significantly reduce the cost of space launch in the commercial sector and for national security space launches.

The committee believes that the Air Force should move rapidly evaluate how to leverage this commercial technology in order to meet national security space requirements. Reusability offers the potential to enable the Department of Defense to further lower the price of national security space launch.

The committee believes that the government should move rapidly to evaluate the use of reusable space launch vehicles. Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to brief the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives not later than March 1, 2018 on the Department’s plan to evaluate the risks, benefits, costs and potential cost-savings of the use of reusable launch vehicles for use in national security space missions.

Comptroller General Review of Hosted Payloads

The committee is aware that the Air Force is working to strengthen processes to ensure greater consideration of hosted payloads in space-related analysis of alternatives and architecture studies. Of note, the Air Force has undertaken some efforts to study, contract for, and use hosted payloads for technology development, but it appears the Air Force has done little to operationally use hosted payloads. The committee is concerned that the acquisition process may not fully consider the use of hosted payloads. Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services by February 1, 2018, on the following:

(1) the Department of Defense’s use of hosted payload arrangements to date;

(2) the extent to which the Department has the knowledge it needs, from the perspectives of cost, capability, and resilience, to determine whether to expand its use of hosted payloads;
the extent that hosted payloads are appropriately considered throughout the acquisition process, including how acquisition requirements are written and how they impact the option to use hosted payloads; and
(4) barriers or challenges the Department faces for increasing its use of hosted payloads.

Multi-Band Satellite Communications Terminals

The committee is aware that satellite communications provide significant capabilities to deployed forces to communicate around the globe. The Department of Defense uses various satellite communication frequency ranges, each with advantages and drawbacks, to meet its mission. The committee also recognizes that potential adversaries are developing counter-space capabilities, to include but not limited to, systems which are designed to interfere with satellite communications. The committee therefore believes that warfighters may benefit from flexible user terminals which can communicate with a variety of government and commercial satellite systems. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees by December 1, 2017, on an assessment, including benefits, costs, technology insertion opportunities, and timelines to expand the use of dual or multi-band satellite communication terminals. The briefing shall address:
(1) a review of fielded and projected Department of Defense platforms and mission sets using satellite communications terminals;
(2) a review of commercial and government satellite communications capabilities;
(3) an assessment of the viability, benefits, and drawbacks if applicable, of using dual or multi-band satellite communications terminals for all or some of the identified platforms and mission sets; and
(4) any other matter the Secretary deems appropriate.

Outer Space Cooperation with Japan

The committee encourages further outer space cooperation between the United States and Japan. The committee notes that the guidelines for defense cooperation between the United States and Japan issued in April 2015 include openness to cooperation in several areas, including areas relating to outer space. The committee further notes the Japanese QZSS regional navigation satellite system could potentially complement and augment the coverage provided by the Global Positioning System of the United States and improve availability of space-based position, navigation, and timing signals in the Asia-Pacific region.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, jointly with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in coordination with the Secretary of State, to submit a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate by
December 1, 2017, on the status of cooperation between the United States and the Government of Japan regarding outer space activities, including with respect to space-based position, navigation, and timing.

Reliance on Global Positioning System for Defense of the Homeland

The committee is aware that the Department of Defense is coordinating with the Department of Transportation and the Department of Homeland Security on efforts to strengthen positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) capabilities, including considering redundant systems. The committee notes that section 1618 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328) required a report on requirements and technology options to address PNT resilience. In addition to this assessment, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Commander of U.S. Northern Command, to provide a briefing to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives by December 15, 2017, on the risks associated with disruptions to the Global Positioning System (GPS) that could affect defense of the homeland and other defense activities in the United States. The briefing shall include the requirements for PNT reliability and redundancy for Department of Defense operations in the United States, an analysis of the extent to which defense of the homeland operations rely on accurate PNT signals from GPS, and an assessment of alternative sources of PNT that could be used as a backup to ensure continuity of operations in the event of a major disruption to GPS.

Responsive Launch

According to the Department of Defense budget request documentation, U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) has identified needs to:

1. rapidly augment existing space capabilities when needed to expand operational capability;
2. rapidly reconstitute/replenish critical space capabilities to preserve “continuity of operations” capability; and
3. rapidly exploit and infuse space technological or operational innovations to increase U.S. advantage.

There have been a variety of previous and ongoing activities within the Air Force, Army, and the Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency to develop responsive launch capabilities. To date, none of these programs have matured to the point of a military operational capability that meets USSTRATCOM needs.

Therefore, the committee encourages the Secretary of Defense to increase the priority and resources of this mission area. This could include low-cost responsive launch for small satellites and modifications of existing launch infrastructure, including use of commercial capabilities. Additionally, the committee believes that state-owned spaceports may provide an opportunity to support this mission. The committee encourages the Department to evaluate the contribution and necessary investments in spaceports to support responsive launch.
The committee also directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives by December 1, 2017, on the warfighter requirements and documented needs for reconstitution and responsive launch; the current and projected activities to meet those requirements, to include investments in launch systems, infrastructure, and payloads; and the opportunities, risks, and challenges in this mission area.

Small Satellite Technology Development

The committee supports the efforts of the Department of Defense to include the Air Force, Army, and Navy in the research and development of militarily relevant small satellites. Industry has made significant advances in recent years regarding the miniaturization of electronics and satellite-related components. The military services have begun to leverage this innovative technology. For instance, the Air Force is planning to invest in key mission areas, such as position, navigation, and timing, to develop a combination of small satellites and rapidly procured payloads. In addition, the Air Force’s Space and Missile Systems Center has begun planning for utilization of small satellites in fulfilling its mission requirements. The Army Space and Missile Defense Command is building and testing multiple small satellites for warfighters’ tactical use in contested, remote, and anti-access/area denial regions. The U.S. Naval Research Laboratory has worked on unique satellite capabilities, such as thruster technologies, to support efforts for smaller, less expensive satellites.

The committee supports these activities and encourages continued emphasis on the research and development of small satellites, including the maturation of small satellite technologies which support warfighter systems, as these systems can provide lower-cost solutions and increase agility and resiliency to address developing threats. The committee also encourages the Department to initiate and use commercial partnerships and demonstration efforts to procure small satellites for demonstrations relevant to military missions.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy, and the directors of defense agencies and offices as appropriate, to provide a briefing to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives by December 1, 2017, on the military applications of small satellites and a coordinated Department-wide strategy for technology development activities and investments in small satellites.

Space Security

The committee is aware of the significant and increasing foreign threats to our national security space systems. Officials in the Department of Defense recognize this counter-space threat, and are taking steps to address it. However, as stated by General John Hyten, former Commander of Air Force Space Command and current Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, “the space enterprise which
evolved in an uncontested environment is not resilient enough to fight through and deliver warfighting effects in, from, and through today’s contested space domain.”

This lack of military preparedness for this new battle space domain is of serious concern to the committee. The committee recognizes that the response to such threats will require a range of activity to include, but not limited to, investments, plans, training, allied partnerships, clear messaging, and diplomatic engagement. The committee requires close oversight of the progress being made in this area.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide two briefings to the congressional defense committees in fiscal year 2018, the first by December 1, 2017, and the second by July 1, 2018, on the plans and progress in addressing counter-space threats. The briefings should address the following areas:

1. intelligence analysis regarding current and projected foreign counter-space threats;
2. status of the Department of Defense activities, plans, policies, and programs to address the threat, including effectively managing deterrence in space;
3. areas of significant risk; and
4. other areas the Secretary deems appropriate.

Space Situational Awareness and Battle Management Command and Control

The committee recognizes the importance of rapidly developing robust space situational awareness (SSA) and space battle management command and control (BMC2) capabilities in order to successfully operate in the space warfighting domain. The committee is aware that there are multiple acquisition and development efforts underway in response to warfighter requirements, including the Joint Space Operations Center Mission System (JMS) and Enterprise BMC2 program, managed by the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC); a Joint Emergent Operational Need (JEON) spiral development program, managed by the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL); and a common standards and open mission system development program, managed by the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office (AFRCO). SMC is serving as the enterprise manager for these BMC2 activities, which, when developed and acquired, will be delivered to the warfighter to operate at the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) and the National Space Defense Center (formerly called the Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations Center).

The committee believes that, in addition to the aforementioned activities, the use of commercial capabilities can and should be increased to rapidly meet the warfighter requirement. The committee understands that SMC, AFRL, and AFRCO plan to, in the near term, competitively seek commercial solutions and to form a consortia to include additional commercial and defense industry partners in BMC2 efforts.

The committee supports these activities and plans, and expects the Air Force to appropriately leverage commercial capabilities, which may be able to address certain warfighter requirements in the near term.
Therefore, the committee directs the Commander of Air Force Space Command, in coordination with the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, to provide a briefing to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives by October 1, 2017, on an assessment of relevant commercial capabilities and the near-term plan to leverage existing and mature commercial space situational awareness capabilities to rapidly address validated warfighter capability gaps concerning foundational SSA and BMC2. The briefing should include funding amounts, including any unfunded requirements, for development, operations, and sustainment of the following components:

1. space surveillance sensor systems
2. SSA software for operations centers
3. BMC2 software for operations centers.

Additionally, considering the complexity and scope of this activity, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to review the Air Force Enterprise Space BMC2 activities, to include JMS, and provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees by November 1, 2017, with an update briefing not more than 6 months later, on the status of the program, the extent to which the Air Force is following acquisition best practices for information technology, and whether it is appropriately leveraging commercial capabilities.

MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Improving Ground Testing of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System

The committee notes the congressional requirement included in section 1664 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113-291) for an independent report to improve the effectiveness of the Ground-Based Midcourse Missile Defense system testing. The committee received this classified report from the Institute for Defense Analyses in 2016 which made recommendations related to improving testing, and recommended that the Director of the Missile Defense Agency develop a strategy for making these improvements. The committee commends the Director of the Missile Defense Agency for considering and accepting these recommendations. The committee remains interested in the implementation of these recommendations, and whether and how they might improve cost-effectiveness, reduce unnecessary risks, and increase the value of missile defense flight intercept tests. Therefore, the committee directs the Director of the Missile Defense Agency to provide a briefing to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives not later than November 1, 2017, on the implementation of the recommendations, any related funding requirements, and, any associated risk-reduction that is expected to occur as a result of implementing the recommendations.

Hypersonic Defense
The budget request contained $75.3 million in PE 64181C for the development of a defensive system to protect the nation from rapidly evolving hypersonic glide vehicle threats. The committee supports Missile Defense Agency (MDA) plans to develop requirements, conduct necessary engineering, and proceed with experiments that ultimately result in a fielded defensive architecture or system of systems. However, the committee is concerned that the current acquisition approach may increase risk by relying on a single technical approach.

Therefore, the committee directs the Director, MDA, to provide a briefing to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives by October 1, 2017 that details the potential benefits, challenges, and associated costs of an acquisition strategy allowing for at least two competitive designs until the operational demonstration. Further, the briefing should address whether this acquisition strategy requires additional funds than the current program of record.

Nuclear Forces

Briefing on the 3+2 Strategy and Interoperable Warhead 1 (IW-1)

The Obama Administration’s nuclear modernization plan centered upon a "3+2" strategy that was intended to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and types of nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile. In the budget request for fiscal year 2018, the Trump Administration has proposed continuing this strategy for the coming year while evaluating its long-term plan within the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review.

The first ballistic missile warhead in the 3+2 strategy is the Interoperable Warhead 1 (IW-1), which would replace the current W78 and W88 warheads and provide some degree of interoperability or commonality between these sea-based and land-based weapons. According to the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, published in March 2016, the IW-1 is estimated to cost between $9.0 billion and $13.8 billion (in FY2016 dollars) and to enter production in 2029.

The committee is aware that the Nuclear Posture Review is assessing the long-term nuclear modernization plan and evaluating how this plan aligns with adversary threats to the effectiveness and credibility of U.S. nuclear forces. As the threat environment changes throughout the coming decades, the committee believes a thorough evaluation of its impacts to long-term programs, such as IW-1, is warranted.

To enable its oversight and inform its eventual consideration of the Nuclear Posture Review, the committee directs the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services by February 15, 2018 on both the 3+2 strategy and IW-1. The briefing should include an assessment of:

(1) the costs, benefits, risks, and opportunities of the 3+2 strategy;
(2) the degree of interoperability or commonality within the IW-1 concept, and the costs, benefits, risks, and opportunities associated with that concept;
(3) the implications to certification requirements of the IW-1 concept, including whether such concept increases the potential need to resume nuclear explosive testing;

(4) the expected threats to U.S. nuclear forces in 2030 and beyond, and whether such threats should affect or change the 3+2 strategy or the requirements for IW-1 and its associated missile delivery vehicles; and

(5) whether and how the 3+2 strategy or IW-1 is driving infrastructure or capability requirements within the NNSA or DOD nuclear enterprises, and whether such infrastructure or capabilities would not be required absent such strategy or IW-1.

Comptroller General Review of Nuclear Forces Readiness During Recapitalization and Transition

The Department of Defense is embarked on a large, complex, and interdependent effort to sustain and modernize U.S. nuclear forces. Current delivery systems, infrastructure, and nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) systems are all aging, with many systems now deployed well beyond their intended service lives. For example, the Minuteman III missile system was first deployed in 1970 and, following multiple life extension efforts, is intended to stay in service through 2030. Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines will, by 2020, have been in service longer than any other submarines and will still have more than a decade until retirement. Meanwhile, the youngest airplane in the B-52 bomber fleet was delivered to the Air Force in 1962 and the B-2 bomber entered service 25 years ago.

The Department's plans to recapitalize these major systems concurrently are tightly scheduled and closely coupled to plans to sustain and maintain the readiness of the current systems until the new systems are fully operational. The committee believes the success of maintaining the readiness of nuclear forces at all times, but particularly during this transition period, is vital to national security. Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to assess the readiness of U.S. nuclear forces and provide a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives by March 1, 2018. Such report should include an assessment of:

(1) the historical and current status of nuclear forces readiness, including how well such forces and NC3 systems are meeting combatant commander requirements;

(2) the Department's strategy and plans, for maintaining the readiness of legacy delivery systems and NC3 systems until modern replacement systems are operational;

(3) the Department's risk mitigation plans for maintaining nuclear forces readiness and meeting combatant commander requirements during the transition from legacy systems, including risk reduction plans if legacy systems expire sooner than planned or new systems are delayed.
Continuation of Nuclear Command, Control and Communications Acquisition Assessments by the Government Accountability Office

The committee values the ongoing work of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in reviewing the progress and challenges facing the Department of Defense’s nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) acquisition programs. Similar to space acquisition programs, NC3 acquisition is a system of systems process, which takes years to oversee on a continuous basis to determine if the programs are achieving their cost, schedule, and performance goals. The committee supports the Department’s continuing efforts to establish new and rigorous NC3 acquisition oversight structures to address NC3 capability gaps and weaknesses. However, much work remains to be done to establish these oversight structures at both the departmental and military services levels.

Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to assess the Department's NC3 acquisition oversight and NC3 acquisition programs, as well as its progress in developing and implementing an overall NC3 architecture. The committee further directs the Comptroller General to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees by March 1, 2018, on the results of GAO's assessment for fiscal year 2018. In conducting the assessment, the Comptroller General should include, as the Comptroller General deems appropriate, the insights of both Department of Defense and non-Department entities that have relevant NC3 knowledge. The Department organizations include, but are not limited to, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Nuclear Matters, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, Chief Information Office), the military services, the Joint Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, Defense Information Systems Agency, and Department of Defense independent test offices. The non-Department entities include federally funded research and development centers, university affiliated research centers such as the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, contractors, the White House Military Office, and industry groups. Finally, the committee encourages the Comptroller General to conduct periodic updates of such an assessment in consultation with the congressional defense committees.

Nuclear Security Collaboration and Harmonization

The committee continues to encourage the Department of Defense and the National Nuclear Security Administration to collaborate and share expertise, resources, standards, processes, and lessons learned to more effectively and efficiently safeguard the nation's nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials. This collaboration began pursuant to a December 2011 memorandum of agreement between the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Energy, but it took several years for implementation to truly begin. Recent efforts to collaborate on development and validation of security technologies, develop and implement tools like the Joint Integrated Lifecycle Surety (JILS) system, and understand threats, are positive.
The committee encourages the Department of Defense and Department of Energy to recommit to the principles contained in the 2011 memorandum and establish milestones and a roadmap to carry out the activities called for within it. The committee believes more can be done to take common approaches to technology development and validation, share inspection and force-on-force capabilities and approaches, and take more consistent approaches to threat policies and security risk analyses. The committee believes these steps will reduce costs, improve consistency, and lead to improved nuclear security.

The committee directs the Administrator for Nuclear Security, in coordination with the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council and appropriate representatives from the Navy and Air Force, to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives by November 30, 2017, on progress in nuclear security collaboration and their plan or roadmap for future activities.

Office of the Secretary of Defense Oversight and Organization for the Nuclear Deterrence Mission

The committee recognizes and appreciates the importance and priority placed by the Department of Defense on its nuclear deterrence mission. The Department's Nuclear Enterprise Review (NER) in 2014 brought renewed senior leadership attention to the mission and made a variety of recommendations to make improvements through increased focus, investment, and policy adjustments.

To track and ensure meaningful implementation of the recommendations of the NER, the Department created the Nuclear Deterrence Enterprise Review Group (NDERG), headed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and supported by the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE). The committee believes the NDERG was instrumental in correcting many of the longstanding problems and deficiencies identified by the NER. But the committee also believes that key cultural problems identified by the NER will take many years of continuous, high-level engagement and follow-through to successfully address. The committee is concerned that senior leader attention and engagement on the nuclear mission could wane with the transition of senior personnel between administrations.

The committee therefore directs the Deputy Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives by October 31, 2017, on the Department's approach to oversight and organization for the nuclear deterrence mission. Such briefing should include:

(1) a description of how the Department is following through on the recommendations of the NER and the NDERG process, and how the Department will ensure meaningful and successful remedies are being applied now and in the future;

(2) the Department's approach to ensuring senior leader engagement and focus continues for the nuclear deterrence mission;
remaining gaps and challenges that will require ongoing attention, and
metrics for measuring progress on those issues; and
(4) how the Office of the Secretary of Defense will be organized, taking into
account recent legislation and executive actions, to oversee and steward the nuclear
deterrence mission.

**Report on Ground Based Strategic Deterrent and Minuteman III**

The United States currently deploys more than 400 LGM-30G Minuteman
III intercontinental ballistic missiles. In the nuclear modernization program laid
out by the Obama Administration and now continued by the Trump
Administration’s budget request for fiscal year 2018, the Air Force plans to replace
the Minuteman III system with the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD)
system.

In testimony and reports provided to the committee by Department of
Defense and Air Force officials, the total development and procurement costs for the
GBSD program, including replacement of the missile flight system and
recapitalization of all support ground infrastructure and command and control
systems, will cost approximately $62.3 billion over the course of the 25+ year
program. A separate analysis of the GBSD program by the Department of Defense’s
Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) estimated the cost of
development and procurement of the GBSD system in a range from $85.0 billion to
significantly more than $100.0 billion (in then-year dollars). Ultimately, at the
Milestone A decision for GBSD, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics set a baseline cost for the program at CAPE’s lower
estimate.

The committee acknowledges the challenge of estimating replacement costs
for a system first deployed 47 years ago, particularly when historical data is largely
absent and present-day comparison systems are dissimilar. To ensure the
Department is seeking greater fidelity in its varying cost estimates as the GBSD
program moves forward, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in
coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force and the Director of CAPE, to
provide a report to the House Committee on Armed Services by March 1, 2018, on
cost estimates and requirements related to the GBSD program. Such report should
include:

(1) Updates, based on information gathered from the selected contractors
for the technology maturation and risk reduction phase of the GBSD program, from
the Air Force and CAPE regarding their cost estimates for the development and
procurement of the GBSD system;

(2) A detailed breakdown of the costs associated with life extending
Minuteman III as compared to the costs of GBSD, including a breakdown of the
costs to replace or extend the life of relevant components until 2045, as well as until
2075; and
(3) The trade-offs between requirements and costs, including how GBSD and Minuteman III will meet military effectiveness requirements over the course of their expected lifecycles.

Status of Infrastructure Supporting NATO Nuclear Deterrence Mission

The committee appreciates the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) deterrence and defense mission, and the role that U.S. forward-deployed nuclear weapons play in the Alliance. The committee understands that NATO, the U.S., and individual host nations all bear responsibilities for ensuring that the infrastructure supporting NATO's nuclear deterrence mission and the U.S. military personnel stationed in Europe enabling that mission, are safe, secure, and modern. As NATO continues to strengthen and update its deterrence posture following the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, and based on the findings of the Department of Defense's Nuclear Enterprise Review in 2014, the committee believes it is imperative upon all stakeholders to ensure NATO's nuclear-related infrastructure receives sufficient funding and senior leadership attention.

The committee appreciates the ongoing dialogue with the Department of Defense on this issue. To provide continuing and close oversight of this issue, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Secretary of Defense Advisor, Europe, and in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Air Force, to provide two briefings to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, with the first such briefing to be provided by October 1, 2017, on the status of U.S. and NATO nuclear-related infrastructure in Europe, including efforts to upgrade, modernize, and improve such infrastructure. The briefings should also address plans to encourage NATO to adopt and implement a common standard for perimeter security at relevant sites. The final briefing should be provided by April 1, 2018. Specifically, the briefings should include:

(1) the status of nuclear-related infrastructure across NATO, including descriptions of facilities' state of repair and progress on efforts to recapitalize or replace outdated facilities or equipment, and including a description of any variances in perimeter security and infrastructure at relevant sites;
(2) current or potential plans, programs, or activities that would improve NATO's nuclear-related infrastructure, including for safety, security, communications, or operations for U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe or quality of life for U.S. military personnel supporting this mission;
(3) actions taken by the U.S. Government to standardize or improve NATO's nuclear-related infrastructure and adopt common standards, such as for perimeter security, including engagements bilaterally with host nations and multilaterally through NATO; and
(4) such other matters as the Secretary of Defense determines appropriate.
Nuclear detection and verification efforts

The committee is aware that nuclear detection and verification efforts, and improving related cooperation and engagement, were a focus of discussion at the May 2017 Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. To support the coming Review Conference and increase international support for a successful conference, the committee believes a comprehensive understanding of U.S. Government efforts related to research, development, policies, and plans is warranted.

In this context, the committee notes that section 3132 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328) required an updated national roadmap for nuclear detection and verification. The committee remains concerned that, for a second year in a row, the report delivered pursuant to this statutory requirement failed to provide an adequate or comprehensive response. Instead, the report only described initial steps and lacked a clear explanation of the plan, current and planned capabilities, near-term or long-term objectives, funding needs, actions, or recommendations.

Therefore, as a step toward increasing understanding of current and planned efforts, the committee directs the Administrator for Nuclear Security, in coordination with the relevant national security laboratories, to provide a briefing to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives not later than December 1, 2017, on nuclear verification and detection programs. In particular, such briefing should include a description of relevant current or potential research and development programs that could enhance international cooperation with foreign partners, and the opportunities, benefits, risks, and challenges associated with such programs.
In 2015, the Department of Energy's Inspector General conducted a review of the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) use and management of support service contracts (SSC) and concluded that certain NNSA SSCs exhibited characteristics that could create the appearance, depending on how they are managed, of violating Federal acquisition regulations. NNSA agreed to implement corrective actions in response to the Inspector General's findings.

The committee remains concerned about NNSA's use and management of SSCs, both from the perspective of compliance with pertinent acquisition regulations and laws, as well as a potential means to circumvent the intent of the statutory cap on the number of Federal NNSA employees contained in section 3241A of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 2441a). The committee therefore directs the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a review of NNSA's use and management of SSCs and to provide a briefing on such review to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives by March 1, 2018. This review should include:

1. the number and cost of NNSA's SSCs over the past 8 years, including the value of the contracts, the number of personnel working under SSCs, and the cost of such personnel as compared to costs of comparable Federal employees;
2. the functions performed by SSC personnel and the type of funding used to support SSCs, and the extent to which such functions and funding sources were consistent with applicable rules, guidance, directives, and laws;
3. an assessment of NNSA's potential use of SSC personnel to compensate for a perceived shortage in Federal employee billets;
4. actions taken by NNSA to address the findings and recommendations made by the Inspector General in its 2015 review; and
5. such other matters or additional opportunities for improvement in the use and management of SSCs by NNSA as the Comptroller General determines appropriate.