
En Bloc Amendments to H.R. 2810 **Subcommittee on Strategic Forces** En Bloc # 2 Log# **Sponsor Description** Fences \$50M of the funds authorized for Ground Based Midcourse Interceptor 99r1 Speier program until Secretary certifies to the defense committee that the risk of mission failure due to foreign object debris has been minimized 130r1 Davis Requires a briefing on commonality between the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program and the D5 life extension program. 156r1 Larsen Requires NNSA to include an assessment of affordability in its Stockpile Stewardship, Management, and Responsiveness Plan, consistent with GAO recommendation. 158r1 Larsen Directs DOD to report on changes to Russia and China defense policy, including nuclear weapons development programs, and how this relates to U.S. missile defense policy. 252r1 Modifies a report on the reclassification of defense nuclear waste Cooper Language to encourage DOD to accelerate the Conventional Prompt Strike 269r1 **Brooks** technology development program to permit early deployment by 2022. Includes coordination efforts with the SecDef. 275r1 Requires NNSA to plan for and carry out a nuclear weapon design competition Franks 286r2 Coffman Limitation on availability of funds relating to the AEHF program until the Air Force provides the required assessments and certifications Stefanik 294r1 Requires a full spectrum of contributing factors to be included in the decision for the next continental US interceptor site. Restricts funding for an alternate solid rocket propellant source until after the 320r1 Hunter review of a separate independent study.



AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2810 OFFERED BY Ms. SPEIER OF CALIFORNIA

1	SEC LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR
2	GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE ELE-
3	MENT OF THE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
4	SYSTEM.
5	Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this
6	Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2018 for
7	the ground-based midcourse defense element of the bal-
8	listic missile defense system, \$50,000,000 may not be obli-
9	gated or expended until the date on which the Secretary
10	of Defense provides to the congressional defense commit-
11	tees—
12	(1) a written certification that the risk of mis-
13	sion failure of ground-based midcourse interceptor
14	enhanced kill vehicles due to foreign object debris
15	has been minimized; or
16	(2) if the certification under paragraph (1) can-
17	not be made, a briefing on the corrective measures
18	that will be carried out to minimize such risk, in-
19	cluding—

1	(A) a timeline for the implementation of
2	the measures; and
3	(B) the estimated cost of implementing the
4	measures.



Amendment to H.R. 2810 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018

Offered by: Mrs Davis of California

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2810, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

Briefing on Commonality Related to the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent Program

The committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives by February 1, 2018, on the degree of commonality with other missile and rocket systems—such as Trident II D5, Ground-based Missile Defense, civilian or commercial rockets, and others—are included within the concepts proposed by the contractors awarded technology maturation and risk reduction contracts for the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent program. Such briefing should include a discussion of:

- (1) the degree and types of commonality within the concepts proposed;
- (2) the incentives that were included in the request for proposals to encourage solutions and concepts that include common technologies or components, where appropriate; and
- (3) how the proposals were evaluated for commonality or related savings in making contract awards.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2810 OFFERED BY MR. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON

1	SEC. 31 MODIFICATION TO STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP,
2	MANAGEMENT, AND RESPONSIVENESS PLAN.
3	Section 4203 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50
4	U.S.C. 2523), as amended by section 3131, is further
5	amended—
6	(1) in subsection (c)—
7	(A) by redesignating paragraph (8) as
8	paragraph (9); and
9	(B) by inserting after paragraph (7) the
0	following new paragraph (8):
1	"(8) A summary of the assessment under sub-
2	section (d)(8) regarding the execution of the pro-
3	grams with current and projected budgets and any
4	associated risks."; and
5	(2) in subsection (d)—
6	(A) by redesignating paragraph (8) as
7	paragraph (9); and
8	(B) by inserting after paragraph (7) the
9	following new paragraph (8):

1	"(8) An assessment of whether the programs
2	described by the report can be executed with current
3	and projected budgets and any associated risks.".



Amendment to H.R. 2810 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018

Offered by Mr. Larsen of Washington

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2810, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

National Missile Defense Policy change and adversary reactions

The Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act changed the National Missile Defense Policy (NMDP) Act of 1999. Since 1999, it had been the policy of the United States "to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate)."

The NDAA changed this policy to state that it is now the policy of the United States "to maintain and improve an effective, robust layered missile defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States, allies, deployed forces, and capabilities against the developing and increasingly complex ballistic missile threat."

The committee wishes to understand what, if any impact this has had on Russian or Chinese defense policy, including nuclear weapons and ballistic missile defense development programs. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to submit a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence not later than December 15, 2017 on any impact to Russian or Chinese defense policy, including nuclear weapons and ballistic missile defense development programs resulting from past and present U.S. missile defense policy. This report should be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2810 OFFERED BY MR. COOPER OF TENNESSEE

Strike section 3133 (Log 64913) and insert the following new section:

1	SEC. 3133. EVALUATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CERTAIN
2	DEFENSE NUCLEAR WASTE.
3	(a) EVALUATION.—The Secretary of Energy shall
4	conduct an evaluation of the feasibility, costs, and cost
5	savings of classifying certain defense nuclear waste as
6	other than high-level radioactive waste, without decreasing
7	environmental, health, or public safety requirements.
8	(b) MATTERS INCLUDED.—In conducting the evalua-
9	tion under subsection (a), the Secretary shall consider—
0	(1) the estimated quantities and locations of
1	certain defense nuclear waste;
2	(2) the potential disposal path for such waste;
3	(3) the estimated disposal timeline for such
4	waste;
5	(4) the estimated costs for disposal of such
6	waste, and potential cost savings;
7	(5) the potential effect on existing consent or-
8	ders, permits, and agreements;

1	(6) the basis by which the Secretary would
2	make a decision on whether to reclassify such waste;
3	and
4	(7) any such other matters relating to defense
5	nuclear waste that the Secretary determines appro-
6	priate.
7	(c) REPORT.—Not later than February 1, 2018, the
8	Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional
9	committees a report on the evaluation under subsection
10	(a), including a description of—
11	(1) the consideration by the Secretary of the
12	matters under subsection (b);
13	(2) any actions the Secretary has taken or
14	plans to take to change the processes, rules, regula-
15	tions, orders, or directives, relating to defense nu-
16	clear waste, as appropriate;
17	(3) any recommendations for legislative action
18	the Secretary determines appropriate; and
19	(4) the assessment of the Secretary regarding
20	the benefits and risks of the actions and rec-
21	ommendations of the Secretary under paragraphs
22	(1) and (2).
23	(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
24	(1) The term "appropriate congressional com-
25	mittees" means the following:

1	(Λ) The congressional defense committees.
2	(B) The Committee on Energy and Com-
3	merce of the House of Representatives.
4	(C) The Committee on Energy and Nat-
5	ural Resources of the Senate.
6	(2) The term "certain defense nuclear waste"
7	means radioactive waste that—
8	(Λ) resulted from the reprocessing of spent
9	nuclear fuel that was generated from atomic en-
10	ergy defense activities; and
11	(B) contains more than 100 nCi/g of
12	alpha-emitting transuranic isotopes with half-
13	lives greater than 20 years.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2810 OFFERED BY MR. BROOKS OF ALABAMA

1	SEC. 16 CONVENTIONAL PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE
2,	WEAPONS SYSTEM.
3	(a) Early Operational Capability.—The Sec-
4	retary of Defense, in coordination with the Chairman of
5	the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall plan to reach early oper-
6	ational capability for the conventional prompt strike weap-
7	on system by not later than September 30, 2022.
8	(b) Limitation on Availability of Funds.—Of
9	the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or
10	otherwise made available for fiscal year 2018 for research,
11	development, test, and evaluation, Defense-wide, for the
12	conventional prompt global strike weapons system, not
13	more than 50 percent may be obligated or expended until
14	the date on which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
15	Staff, in consultation with the Chief of Staff of the Army,
16	the Commander of the United States European Command,
17	the Commander of the United States Pacific Command,
18	and the Commander of the United States Strategic Com-

1	mand, submits to the congressional defense committees,
2	a report on—
3	(1) the required level of resources that is con-
4	sistent with the level of priority assigned to the asso-
5	ciated capability gap;
6	(2) the estimated period for the delivery of a
7	medium-range early operational capability, the re-
8	quired level of resources necessary to field a me-
9	dium-range conventional prompt global strike weap-
10	on within the United States (including the territories
11	and possessions of the United States), and a detailed
12	plan consistent with the urgency of the associated
13	capability gap across multiple platforms;
14	(3) the joint performance requirements that—
15	(Λ) ensure interoperability, where appro-
16	priate, between and among joint military capa-
17	bilities; and
18	(B) are necessary, as designated by the
19	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to fulfill
20	capability gaps of more than one military de-
21	partment, Defense Agency, or other element of
22	the Department; and
23	(4) in coordination with the Secretary of De-
24	fense, any plan (including policy options) considered
25	appropriate to address any potential risks of ambi-

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- 1 guity from the launch or employment of such a ca-
- 2 pability.



AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2810 OFFERED BY MR. FRANKS OF ARIZONA

1	SEC. 31 DESIGN COMPETITION.
2	(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
3	(1) In January 2016, the co-chairs of a con-
4	gressionally-mandated study panel from the National
5	Academies of Science testified before the House
6	Committee on Armed Services that:
7	(A) "The National Nuclear Security Ad-
8	ministration (NNSA) complex must engage in
9	robust design competitions in order to exercise
10	the design and production skills that underpin
11	stockpile stewardship and are necessary to meet
12	evolving threats."
13	(B) "To exercise the full set of design
14	skills necessary for an effective nuclear deter-
15	rent, the NNSA should develop and conduct the
16	first in what the committee envisions to be a se-
17	ries of design competitions that integrate the
18	full end-to-end process from novel design con-

1	ception through engineering, building, and non-
2	nuclear testing of a prototype."
3	(2) In March 2016 testimony before the House
4	Committee on Armed Services regarding a December
5	2016 Defense Science Board (DSB) report titled,
6	"Seven Defense Priorities for the New Administra-
7	tion", members of the DSB said:
8	(A) "A key contributor to nuclear deter-
9	rence is the continuous, adaptable exercise of
10	the development, design, and production func-
11	tions for nuclear weapons in both the DOD and
12	DOE Yet the DOE laboratories and DOD
13	contractor community have done little inte-
14	grated design and development work outside of
15	life extension for 25 years, let alone concept de-
16	velopment that could serve as a hedge to sur-
17	prise."
18	(B) "The Defense Science Board believes
19	that the triad's complementary features remain
20	robust tenets for the design of a future force.
21	Replacing our current, aging force is essential,
22	but not sufficient in the more complex nuclear
23	environment we now face to provide the adapt-
24	ability or flexibility to confidently hold at risk
25	what adversaries value. In particular, if the

1	threat evolves in ways that favorably change the
2	cost/benefit calculus in the view of an adver-
3	sary's leadership, then we should be in a posi-
4	tion to quickly restore a credible deterrence pos-
5	ture."
6	(3) In a memorandum dated May 9, 2014,
7	then-Secretary of Energy Ernie Moniz said:
8	(A) "If nuclear military capabilities are to
9	provide deterrence for the nation they need to
10	be relevant to the emerging global strategic en-
11	vironment. The current stockpile was designed
12	to meet the needs of a bipolar world with roots
13	in the Cold War era. A more complex, chaotic,
14	and dynamic security environment is emerging.
15	In order to uphold the Department's mission to
16	ensure an effective nuclear deterrent we must
17	ensure our nuclear capabilities meet the chal-
18	lenges of known and potential geopolitical and
19	technological trends. Therefore we must look
20	ahead, using the expertise of our laboratories,
21	to how the capabilities that may be employed by
22	other nations could impact deterrence over the
23	next several decades."
24	(B) "We must challenge our thinking
25	about our programs of record in order to permit

1	foresighted actions that may reduce, in the
2	coming decades, the chances for surprise and
3	that buttress deterrence."
4	(b) Design Competition.—
5	(1) In General.—In accordance with para-
6	graph (2), the Administrator for Nuclear Security,
7	in coordination with the Chairman of the Nuclear
8	Weapons Council, shall carry out a new and com-
9	prehensive design competition for a nuclear warhead
10	that could be employed on ballistic missiles of the
11	United States by 2030. Such competition shall—
12	(A) examine options for warhead design
13	and related delivery system requirements in the
14	2030s, including—
15	(i) life extension of existing weapons;
16	(ii) new capabilities; and
17	(iii) such other concepts that the Ad-
18	ministrator and Chairman determine nec-
19	essary to fully exercise and create respon-
20	sive design capabilities in the enterprise
21	and ensure a robust nuclear deterrent into
22	the 2030s;
23	(B) assess how the capabilities and de-
24	fenses that may be employed by other nations
25	could impact deterrence in 2030 and beyond

1	and how such threats could be addressed or
2	mitigated in the warhead and related delivery
3	systems;
4	(C) exercise the full set of design skills
5	necessary for an effective nuclear deterrent and
6	responsive enterprise through production of
7	conceptual designs and, as the Administrator
8	determines appropriate, production of non-nu-
9	clear prototypes of components or subsystems;
10	and
11	(D) examine and recommend actions for
12	significantly shortening timelines and signifi-
13	cantly reducing costs associated with design, de-
14	velopment, certification, and production of the
15	warhead, without reducing worker or public
16	health and safety.
17	(2) TIMING.—The Administrator shall—
18	(A) during fiscal year 2018 develop a plan
19	to carry out paragraph (1); and
20	(B) during fiscal year 2019 implement
21	such plan.
22	(c) Briefing.—Not later than March 1, 2018, the
23	Administrator, in coordination with the Chairman of the
24	Nuclear Weapons Council, shall provide a briefing to the
25	Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House

- 1 of Representatives on the plan of the Administrator to
- 2 carry out the warhead design competition under sub-
- 3 section (b). Such briefing shall include an assessment of
- 4 the costs, benefits, risks, and opportunities of such plan,
- 5 particularly impacts to ongoing life extension programs
- 6 and infrastructure projects.



AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2810 OFFERED BY MR. COFFMAN OF COLORADO

1	SEC. 16 LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS RE-
2	LATING TO ADVANCED EXTREMELY HIGH
3	FREQUENCY PROGRAM.
4	(a) LIMITATION.—None of the funds authorized to
5	be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available
6	for fiscal year 2018 for research, development, test, and
7	evaluation, Air Force, for protected tactical enterprise
8	(PE $1206760F$), protected tactical service (PE
9	1206761F), or protected satellite communication services
10	(PE $1206855F$) for the Evolved Strategic SATCOM
11	(EES) system, may be obligated or expended on a final
12	request for proposals, other than evolution of the AEHF
13	program of record until the date on which the reports re-
14	quired under subsection (b) are submitted to the congres-
15	sional defense committees.
16	(b) Assessments and Certifications.—
17	(1) The Commanders of STRATCOM and
18	NORTHCOM jointly certifies a protected satcom
19	system other than the AEHF program of record or

1	an evolution of the same will meet all applicable re-
2	quirements for Nuclear Command and Control and
3	continuity of government, and all other functions re-
4	lated to protected communications of the National
5	Command Authority and the Combatant Commands,
6	to include operational forces in a peer-near-peer
7	jamming environment;
8	(2) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
9	submits the validated military requirement for resil-
10	ience and mission assurance, and the criteria to
11	measure and evaluate the same, of each and any al-
12	ternative to an evolved advanced extremely high fre-
13	quency program; how each alternative affects deter-
14	rence and full spectrum warfighting, warfighter re-
15	quirements and relative costs, including with respect
16	to ground station and user terminals; the assessed
17	order of battle of adversaries; and the required capa-
18	bilities of the broader space security and defense en-
19	terprise;
20	(3) The Secretary of the Air Force submits a
21	detailed plan for the ground control system and all
22	user terminals developed and acquired by the Air
23	Force will be synchronized through development and
24	deployment to meet all applicable requirements for

Nuclear Command and Control and continuity of

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1	government, and other functions related to protected
2	communications of the National Command Authority
3	and the Combatant Commands; and
4	(4)) The Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
5	completes an assessment concerning the impact of
6	developing and fielding all the waveforms and termi-
7	nals required to utilize the proposed alternative sys-
8	tems to the AEHF program of record or an evo-
9	lution of the same.
0	(c) Exception.—The limitation in paragraph (a)
1	shall not apply to efforts to examine and develop tech-
12	nology insertion opportunities for the satellite communica-
13	tions programs of record.
14	(d) Rule of Construction.—Nothing in this sec-
15	tion may be construed as delaying the request for pro-
16	posals for the Enhanced Advanced Extremely High Fre-
17	quency (E-AEHF).



AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2810 OFFERED BY MS. STEFANIK OF NEW YORK

1	SEC. 16 DETERMINATION OF LOCATION OF CONTI-
2	NENTAL UNITED STATES INTERCEPTOR SITE.
3	(a) Determination.—Not later than 30 days after
4	the date on which the Ballistic Missile Defense Review is
5	issued, the Secretary of Defense shall determine the loca-
6	tion of a potential additional continental United States in-
7	terceptor site. In making such determination, the Sec-
8	retary shall consider the full spectrum of contributing fac-
9	tors, including with respect to each of the following:
0	(1) Strategic and operational effectiveness, in-
1	cluding with respect to the location that is the most
2	advantageous site to the continental United States,
3	including by having the capability to provide shoot-
4	assess-shoot coverage to the entire continental
5	United States.
6	(2) Existing infrastructure at the location.
7	(3) Economic impacts.
8	(4) Public support.
9	(5) Cost to construct and operate.

- 1 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after making
- 2 the determination described in subsection (a), the Sec-
- 3 retary shall submit to the congressional defense commit-
- 4 tees a report detailing all of the contributing factors con-
- 5 sidered by the Secretary in making such determination,
- 6 including any other factors that the Secretary considered,
- 7 including any relevant recommendations of the Ballistic
- 8 Missile Defense Review.



AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2810 OFFERED BY MR. HUNTER OF CALIFORNIA

1	SEC. 16 LIMITATION AND BUSINESS CASE ANALYSIS
2	REGARDING AMMONIUM PERCHLORATE.
3	(a) In General.—The Secretary of Defense, acting
4	through the Director of Cost Assessment and Program
5	Evaluation, shall conduct a business case analysis regard-
6	ing the options of the Federal Government to ensure a
7	robust domestic industrial base to supply ammonium per-
8	chlorate for use in solid rocket motors. Such analysis
9	should include assessments of the near and long-term
10	costs, program impacts, opportunities for competition, op-
11	portunities for redundant or complementary capabilities,
12	and national security implications of—
13	(1) continuing to rely on one domestic provider;
14	(2) supporting development of a second domes-
15	tic source;
16	(3) procuring ammonium perchlorate as Gov-
17	ernment-furnished material and providing it to all
18	necessary programs; and

1	(4) such other options as the Secretary deter-
2	mines appropriate.
3	(b) Elements.—The analysis under subsection (a)
4	shall, at minimum, include—
5	(1) an estimate of all associated costs, including
6	development, procurement, and qualification costs,
7	as applicable;
8	(2) an assessment of options, under various sce-
9	narios, for the quantity of ammonium perchlorate
10	that would be required by the Department of De-
11	fense; and
12	(3) the assessment of the Secretary of how the
13	requirements for ammonium perchlorate of other
14	Federal agencies impact the requirements of the De-
15	partment of Defense.
6	(e) Report.—The Secretary shall submit the busi-
17	ness case analysis required by subsection (a) to the Comp-
8	troller General of the United States and the Committees
9	on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Represent-
20	atives by March 1, 2018, along with any views of the Sec-
21	retary.
22	(d) Review.—The Comptroller General of the United
23	States shall conduct a review of the report submitted by
24	the Secretary under subsection (c) and, not later than 30
25	days after receiving such report, provide a briefing on such

1	review to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate
2	and House of Representatives.
3	(e) Limitation.—None of the funds authorized to be
4	appropriated by this Λ ct or otherwise made available for
5	fiscal year 2018 for the Department of Defense may be
6	obligated or expended for the development or construction
7	of a new source for ammonium perchlorate until 45 days
8	after the date on which the report under subsection (c)
9	is submitted to the Comptroller General and the Commit-
0	tees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Rep-
1	resentatives.
2	(f) WAIVER.—The Secretary of Defense may waive
3	the limitation under subsection (e) if the Secretary—
4	(1) determines such waiver to be in the national
5	security interest of the United States; and
6	(2) submits written notification of such deter-
7	mination to the congressional defense committees
8	and waits 15 days.