<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Log #</th>
<th>Sponsor</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>99r1</td>
<td>Speier</td>
<td>Fences $50M of the funds authorized for Ground Based Midcourse Interceptor program until Secretary certifies to the defense committee that the risk of mission failure due to foreign object debris has been minimized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130r1</td>
<td>Davis</td>
<td>Requires a briefing on commonality between the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program and the D5 life extension program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>156r1</td>
<td>Larsen</td>
<td>Requires NNSA to include an assessment of affordability in its Stockpile Stewardship, Management, and Responsiveness Plan, consistent with GAO recommendation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>158r1</td>
<td>Larsen</td>
<td>Directs DOD to report on changes to Russia and China defense policy, including nuclear weapons development programs, and how this relates to U.S. missile defense policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>252r1</td>
<td>Cooper</td>
<td>Modifies a report on the reclassification of defense nuclear waste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>269r1</td>
<td>Brooks</td>
<td>Language to encourage DOD to accelerate the Conventional Prompt Strike technology development program to permit early deployment by 2022. Includes coordination efforts with the SecDef.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>275r1</td>
<td>Franks</td>
<td>Requires NNSA to plan for and carry out a nuclear weapon design competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>286r2</td>
<td>Coffman</td>
<td>Limitation on availability of funds relating to the AEHF program until the Air Force provides the required assessments and certifications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>294r1</td>
<td>Stefanik</td>
<td>Requires a full spectrum of contributing factors to be included in the decision for the next continental US interceptor site.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>320r1</td>
<td>Hunter</td>
<td>Restricts funding for an alternate solid rocket propellant source until after the review of a separate independent study.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2810
OFFERED BY MS. SPEIER OF CALIFORNIA

At the appropriate place in title XVI, insert the following new section:

SEC. ___. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR
GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE ELEMENT OF THE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM.

Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2018 for the ground-based midcourse defense element of the ballistic missile defense system, $50,000,000 may not be obligated or expended until the date on which the Secretary of Defense provides to the congressional defense committees—

(1) a written certification that the risk of mission failure of ground-based midcourse interceptor enhanced kill vehicles due to foreign object debris has been minimized; or

(2) if the certification under paragraph (1) cannot be made, a briefing on the corrective measures that will be carried out to minimize such risk, including—
2

1 (A) a timeline for the implementation of
2 the measures; and
3 (B) the estimated cost of implementing the
4 measures.

☒
Amendment to H.R. 2810
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018

Offered by: Mrs Davis of California

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2810, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

Briefing on Commonality Related to the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent Program

The committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives by February 1, 2018, on the degree of commonality with other missile and rocket systems—such as Trident II D5, Ground-based Missile Defense, civilian or commercial rockets, and others—are included within the concepts proposed by the contractors awarded technology maturation and risk reduction contracts for the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent program. Such briefing should include a discussion of:

(1) the degree and types of commonality within the concepts proposed;
(2) the incentives that were included in the request for proposals to encourage solutions and concepts that include common technologies or components, where appropriate; and
(3) how the proposals were evaluated for commonality or related savings in making contract awards.
AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2810
OFFERED BY MR. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON

At the appropriate place in title XXXI, insert the following new section:

SEC. 31. MODIFICATION TO STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND RESPONSIVENESS PLAN.

Section 4203 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2523), as amended by section 3131, is further amended—

(1) in subsection (c)—

(A) by redesignating paragraph (8) as paragraph (9); and

(B) by inserting after paragraph (7) the following new paragraph (8):

"(8) A summary of the assessment under subsection (d)(8) regarding the execution of the programs with current and projected budgets and any associated risks."

(2) in subsection (d)—

(A) by redesignating paragraph (8) as paragraph (9); and

(B) by inserting after paragraph (7) the following new paragraph (8):
2  
1   "(8) An assessment of whether the programs 
2   described by the report can be executed with current 
3   and projected budgets and any associated risks.".
4

Amendment to H.R. 2810
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018

Offered by Mr. Larsen of Washington

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 2810, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

National Missile Defense Policy change and adversary reactions

The Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act changed the National Missile Defense Policy (NMDP) Act of 1999. Since 1999, it had been the policy of the United States “to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate).”

The NDAA changed this policy to state that it is now the policy of the United States “to maintain and improve an effective, robust layered missile defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States, allies, deployed forces, and capabilities against the developing and increasingly complex ballistic missile threat.”

The committee wishes to understand what, if any impact this has had on Russian or Chinese defense policy, including nuclear weapons and ballistic missile defense development programs. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to submit a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence not later than December 15, 2017 on any impact to Russian or Chinese defense policy, including nuclear weapons and ballistic missile defense development programs resulting from past and present U.S. missile defense policy. This report should be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.
AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2810
OFFERED BY MR. COOPER OF TENNESSEE

Strike section 3133 (Log 64913) and insert the following new section:

SEC. 3133. EVALUATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CERTAIN DEFENSE NUCLEAR WASTE.

(a) EVALUATION.—The Secretary of Energy shall conduct an evaluation of the feasibility, costs, and cost savings of classifying certain defense nuclear waste as other than high-level radioactive waste, without decreasing environmental, health, or public safety requirements.

(b) MATTERS INCLUDED.—In conducting the evaluation under subsection (a), the Secretary shall consider—

(1) the estimated quantities and locations of certain defense nuclear waste;
(2) the potential disposal path for such waste;
(3) the estimated disposal timeline for such waste;
(4) the estimated costs for disposal of such waste, and potential cost savings;
(5) the potential effect on existing consent orders, permits, and agreements;
(6) the basis by which the Secretary would
make a decision on whether to reclassify such waste; and
(7) any such other matters relating to defense
classification that the Secretary determines appropriate.
(e) REPORT.—Not later than February 1, 2018, the
Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on the evaluation under subsection
(a), including a description of—
(1) the consideration by the Secretary of the
matters under subsection (b);
(2) any actions the Secretary has taken or
plans to take to change the processes, rules, regula-
tions, orders, or directives, relating to defense nu-
clear waste, as appropriate;
(3) any recommendations for legislative action
the Secretary determines appropriate; and
(4) the assessment of the Secretary regarding
the benefits and risks of the actions and rec-
ommendations of the Secretary under paragraphs
(1) and (2).
(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
(1) The term “appropriate congressional com-
mittees” means the following:
(A) The congressional defense committees.

(B) The Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.

(C) The Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate.

(2) The term "certain defense nuclear waste" means radioactive waste that—

(A) resulted from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel that was generated from atomic energy defense activities; and

(B) contains more than 100 nCi/g of alpha-emitting transuranic isotopes with half-lives greater than 20 years.
AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2810
OFFERED BY MR. BROOKS OF ALABAMA

At the appropriate place in title XVI, insert the following new section:

SEC. 16. CONVENTIONAL PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE WEAPONS SYSTEM.

(a) EARLY OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY.—The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall plan to reach early operational capability for the conventional prompt strike weapons system by not later than September 30, 2022.

(b) LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2018 for research, development, test, and evaluation, Defense-wide, for the conventional prompt global strike weapons system, not more than 50 percent may be obligated or expended until the date on which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Commander of the United States European Command, the Commander of the United States Pacific Command, and the Commander of the United States Strategic Com-
mand, submits to the congressional defense committees, a report on—

(1) the required level of resources that is consistent with the level of priority assigned to the associated capability gap;

(2) the estimated period for the delivery of a medium-range early operational capability, the required level of resources necessary to field a medium-range conventional prompt global strike weapon within the United States (including the territories and possessions of the United States), and a detailed plan consistent with the urgency of the associated capability gap across multiple platforms;

(3) the joint performance requirements that—

(A) ensure interoperability, where appropriate, between and among joint military capabilities; and

(B) are necessary, as designated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to fulfill capability gaps of more than one military department, Defense Agency, or other element of the Department; and

(4) in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, any plan (including policy options) considered appropriate to address any potential risks of ambi-
guity from the launch or employment of such a ca-

pability.
AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2810
OFFERED BY MR. FRANKS OF ARIZONA

At the appropriate place in title XXXI, insert the following new section:

1 SEC. 31_. DESIGN COMPETITION.

2 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

3 (1) In January 2016, the co-chairs of a congressionally-mandated study panel from the National Academies of Science testified before the House Committee on Armed Services that:

4 (A) "The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) complex must engage in robust design competitions in order to exercise the design and production skills that underpin stockpile stewardship and are necessary to meet evolving threats."

5 (B) "To exercise the full set of design skills necessary for an effective nuclear deterrent, the NNSA should develop and conduct the first in what the committee envisions to be a series of design competitions that integrate the full end-to-end process from novel design con-
ception through engineering, building, and non-
nuclear testing of a prototype.”

(2) In March 2016 testimony before the House
Committee on Armed Services regarding a December
2016 Defense Science Board (DSB) report titled,
“Seven Defense Priorities for the New Administra-
tion”, members of the DSB said:

(A) “A key contributor to nuclear deter-
rence is the continuous, adaptable exercise of
the development, design, and production func-
tions for nuclear weapons in both the DOD and
DOE... Yet the DOE laboratories and DOD
contractor community have done little inte-
grated design and development work outside of
life extension for 25 years, let alone concept de-
velopment that could serve as a hedge to sur-
prise.”

(B) “The Defense Science Board believes
that the triad’s complementary features remain
robust tenets for the design of a future force.
Replacing our current, aging force is essential,
but not sufficient in the more complex nuclear
environment we now face to provide the adapt-
ability or flexibility to confidently hold at risk
what adversaries value. In particular, if the
threat evolves in ways that favorably change the cost/benefit calculus in the view of an adversary’s leadership, then we should be in a position to quickly restore a credible deterrence posture.”

(3) In a memorandum dated May 9, 2014, then-Secretary of Energy Ernie Moniz said:

(A) “If nuclear military capabilities are to provide deterrence for the nation they need to be relevant to the emerging global strategic environment. The current stockpile was designed to meet the needs of a bipolar world with roots in the Cold War era. A more complex, chaotic, and dynamic security environment is emerging. In order to uphold the Department’s mission to ensure an effective nuclear deterrent... we must ensure our nuclear capabilities meet the challenges of known and potential geopolitical and technological trends. Therefore we must look ahead, using the expertise of our laboratories, to how the capabilities that may be employed by other nations could impact deterrence over the next several decades.”

(B) “We must challenge our thinking about our programs of record in order to permit
foresighted actions that may reduce, in the
coming decades, the chances for surprise and
that buttress deterrence.”

(b) DESIGN COMPETITION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—In accordance with para-
graph (2), the Administrator for Nuclear Security,
in coordination with the Chairman of the Nuclear
Weapons Council, shall carry out a new and com-
prehensive design competition for a nuclear warhead
that could be employed on ballistic missiles of the
United States by 2030. Such competition shall—

(A) examine options for warhead design
and related delivery system requirements in the
2030s, including—

(i) life extension of existing weapons;

(ii) new capabilities; and

(iii) such other concepts that the Ad-
ministrator and Chairman determine nec-
essary to fully exercise and create respon-
sive design capabilities in the enterprise
and ensure a robust nuclear deterrent into
the 2030s;

(B) assess how the capabilities and de-
fenses that may be employed by other nations
could impact deterrence in 2030 and beyond
and how such threats could be addressed or mitigated in the warhead and related delivery systems;

(C) exercise the full set of design skills necessary for an effective nuclear deterrent and responsive enterprise through production of conceptual designs and, as the Administrator determines appropriate, production of non-nuclear prototypes of components or subsystems; and

(D) examine and recommend actions for significantly shortening timelines and significantly reducing costs associated with design, development, certification, and production of the warhead, without reducing worker or public health and safety.

(2) TIMING.—The Administrator shall—

(A) during fiscal year 2018 develop a plan to carry out paragraph (1); and

(B) during fiscal year 2019 implement such plan.

(c) BRIEFING.—Not later than March 1, 2018, the Administrator, in coordination with the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council, shall provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House
of Representatives on the plan of the Administrator to carry out the warhead design competition under subsection (b). Such briefing shall include an assessment of the costs, benefits, risks, and opportunities of such plan, particularly impacts to ongoing life extension programs and infrastructure projects.
AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2810
OFFERED BY MR. COFFMAN OF COLORADO

At the appropriate place in title XVI, insert the following new section:

SEC. 16. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS RELATING TO ADVANCED EXTREMELY HIGH FREQUENCY PROGRAM.

(a) LIMITATION.—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2018 for research, development, test, and evaluation, Air Force, for protected tactical enterprise (PE 1206760F), protected tactical service (PE 1206761F), or protected satellite communication services (PE 1206855F) for the Evolved Strategic SATCOM (EES) system, may be obligated or expended on a final request for proposals, other than evolution of the AEHF program of record until the date on which the reports required under subsection (b) are submitted to the congressional defense committees.

(b) ASSESSMENTS AND CERTIFICATIONS.—

(1) The Commanders of STRATCOM and NORTHCOM jointly certifies a protected satcom system other than the AEHF program of record or
an evolution of the same will meet all applicable re-
requirements for Nuclear Command and Control and
continuity of government, and all other functions re-
lated to protected communications of the National
Command Authority and the Combatant Commands,
to include operational forces in a peer-near-peer
jamming environment;

(2) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
submits the validated military requirement for resil-
ience and mission assurance, and the criteria to
measure and evaluate the same, of each and any al-
ternative to an evolved advanced extremely high fre-
quency program; how each alternative affects deter-
rence and full spectrum warfighting, warfighter re-
quirements and relative costs, including with respect
to ground station and user terminals; the assessed
order of battle of adversaries; and the required ca-
bbilities of the broader space security and defense en-
terprise;

(3) The Secretary of the Air Force submits a
detailed plan for the ground control system and all
user terminals developed and acquired by the Air
Force will be synchronized through development and
deployment to meet all applicable requirements for
Nuclear Command and Control and continuity of
government, and other functions related to protected communications of the National Command Authority and the Combatant Commands; and

(4) The Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff completes an assessment concerning the impact of developing and fielding all the waveforms and terminals required to utilize the proposed alternative systems to the AEHF program of record or an evolution of the same.

(c) EXCEPTION.—The limitation in paragraph (a) shall not apply to efforts to examine and develop technology insertion opportunities for the satellite communications programs of record.

(d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section may be construed as delaying the request for proposals for the Enhanced Advanced Extremely High Frequency (E-AEHF).
AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2810
OFFERED BY MS. STEFANIK OF NEW YORK

At the appropriate place in title XVI, insert the following new section:

SEC. 16. DETERMINATION OF LOCATION OF CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES INTERCEPTOR SITE.

(a) DETERMINATION.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Ballistic Missile Defense Review is issued, the Secretary of Defense shall determine the location of a potential additional continental United States interceptor site. In making such determination, the Secretary shall consider the full spectrum of contributing factors, including with respect to each of the following:

(1) Strategic and operational effectiveness, including with respect to the location that is the most advantageous site to the continental United States, including by having the capability to provide shoot-assess-shoot coverage to the entire continental United States.

(2) Existing infrastructure at the location.

(3) Economic impacts.

(4) Public support.

(5) Cost to construct and operate.
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after making the determination described in subsection (a), the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report detailing all of the contributing factors considered by the Secretary in making such determination, including any other factors that the Secretary considered, including any relevant recommendations of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review.
AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2810
OFFERED BY MR. HUNTER OF CALIFORNIA

At the appropriate place in title XVI, insert the following new section:

SEC. 16. LIMITATION AND BUSINESS CASE ANALYSIS REGARDING AMMONIUM PERCHLORATE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense, acting through the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, shall conduct a business case analysis regarding the options of the Federal Government to ensure a robust domestic industrial base to supply ammonium perchlorate for use in solid rocket motors. Such analysis should include assessments of the near and long-term costs, program impacts, opportunities for competition, opportunities for redundant or complementary capabilities, and national security implications of—

(1) continuing to rely on one domestic provider;

(2) supporting development of a second domestic source;

(3) procuring ammonium perchlorate as Government-furnished material and providing it to all necessary programs; and
2

(4) such other options as the Secretary determines appropriate.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The analysis under subsection (a) shall, at minimum, include—

(1) an estimate of all associated costs, including development, procurement, and qualification costs, as applicable;

(2) an assessment of options, under various scenarios, for the quantity of ammonium perchlorate that would be required by the Department of Defense; and

(3) the assessment of the Secretary of how the requirements for ammonium perchlorate of other Federal agencies impact the requirements of the Department of Defense.

(c) REPORT.—The Secretary shall submit the business case analysis required by subsection (a) to the Comptroller General of the United States and the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives by March 1, 2018, along with any views of the Secretary.

(d) REVIEW.—The Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct a review of the report submitted by the Secretary under subsection (c) and, not later than 30 days after receiving such report, provide a briefing on such
review to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives.

(e) LIMITATION.—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2018 for the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended for the development or construction of a new source for ammonium perchlorate until 45 days after the date on which the report under subsection (e) is submitted to the Comptroller General and the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives.

(f) WAIVER.—The Secretary of Defense may waive the limitation under subsection (e) if the Secretary—

(1) determines such waiver to be in the national security interest of the United States; and

(2) submits written notification of such determination to the congressional defense committees and waits 15 days.