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<td>025</td>
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<td>Requires the Secretary of the Air Force meteorological and oceanographic collection plan to include the requirements of the new weather satellite program to avoid a gap in coverage</td>
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<td>051r1</td>
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<td>Directs the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, to report on Russian global navigation satellite system ground monitoring stations located near OCONUS U.S. and allied military installations. The report requires a plan to mitigate assessed threats to such installations.</td>
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<td>060r1</td>
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<td>Requires the Department of Defense to submit a report regarding Conventional Prompt Strike capability</td>
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<td>070r1</td>
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<td>092r1</td>
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<td>093</td>
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<td>141</td>
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<td>Expresses the Sense of Congress on Missile Defense Cooperation with Asia-Pacific allies. Requires Secretary of Defense to brief Congress regarding an assessment of opportunities for further Missile Defense Cooperation with Japan and South Korea.</td>
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<td>145</td>
<td>Cook</td>
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<td>Directs the Joint Staff to provide a report on any international agreements concerning outer space activities currently in discussion or being considered, and their potential for impact on any DoD</td>
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AMENDMENT TO H.R. 4435
OFFERED BY MRS. WALORSKI OF INDIANA

In section 215(c), add at the end the following new paragraph:

1 (4) The requirements of the weather satellite
2 follow-on system.

Not later than June 30, 2015, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), to provide to the congressional defense committees, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, a report on global navigation satellite system ground monitoring stations operated directly or indirectly by the Russian Federation located near any U.S. military installation overseas or located near allied military installation or any other installation deemed sensitive by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State or Director of National Intelligence. The report shall include the name and location of any such stations located in geographic proximity to any U.S. military or sensitive installation located outside continental United States; an assessment of the threat posed to such installations; the significance of such threat; and the plans to mitigate the impacts of covered stations. The report should also cover any planned future locations of such Russian Federation ground monitoring stations, to the extent that the Secretaries or the DNI is aware. The committee understands from public reports, that this will be a limited number of sites. The Secretary shall submit such report in unclassified form, with a classified annex if necessary.
Amendment Offered by Mr. Brooks.


In the appropriate place in the report, strike all and replace with:

Conventional Prompt Strike Capability Research, Development, and Acquisition

The committee is aware that in testimony before it on April 2, 2014, the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command stated:

"Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) capability offers the opportunity to rapidly engage high-value targets without resorting to nuclear options. CPS could provide precision and responsiveness in Anti-Access Area Denial environments while simultaneously minimizing unintended military, political, environmental, economic, or cultural consequences. I support continuing research and development of these important capabilities."

The committee agrees. The committee recognizes the success of the Army’s Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AHW) test conducted on November 17, 2011, though it notes the failures of the Hypersonic Technology Vehicle tests. The committee is also aware of the planned flight test 2 of the AHW technology development system that will demonstrate operationally suitable ranges and performance as well as additional technologies needed to support continued development of this capability.

The committee is aware that following flight test 2, the Department of Defense plans to examine the feasibility of deploying a hypersonic prompt strike weapon on a submarine platform. The committee believes it is prudent to undertake these efforts but is concerned about the budget sufficiency to do so. The committee is also concerned that there is no clear development path of an Army system. The committee believes that a third flight test of the AHW system could provide useful information to inform decisions about such a development path.

The committee is also concerned that with the budget request for fiscal year 2015, and the Future Years Defense Program, there is not sufficient funding requested and planned for the transition of this technology to a military service for a full-scale development and acquisition program when the technology has reached appropriate maturity.

The committee notes that the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review stated that the Administration planned to deploy these capabilities, "while not negatively affecting the stability of our nuclear relationships with Russia or China." The committee agrees with this policy. The committee also notes that it directed the Secretary of Defense to provide a report on any policy considerations concerning any potential ambiguity problems regarding the launch of a conventionally armed missile from submarine platforms and any potential verification measures that may be pursued in
the Joint Explanatory Statement (Committee Print No. 2) accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014. The committee has not yet received this directed report; it expects to receive a detailed understanding of how the Department plans to evaluate and resolve these potential problems, including potential cooperative measures.

The committee is also concerned that there does not appear to be an Army development program in the Department's plans, notwithstanding the fact that the only success the United States has seen with these technologies is the Army's AHW demonstrator. The committee believes it is prudent to consider whether a third flight test of the AHW could contribute to the Department's understanding of the feasibility of an Army development path.

The committee therefore directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, jointly with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to submit a report to the congressional defense committees not later than February 1, 2015, that includes the following: a detailed plan for the future of CPS, including an estimated timeline for completion of current research and development activities and associated projected cost; a determination about which additional strategic infrastructure technologies and enabling capabilities may be required to support CPS; opportunities for inter-service collaboration in development of common technology; opportunities and efforts to transition technologies developed under this program to current and future weapons systems; a date by which CPS programs will be transitioned to military services for full development and acquisition; an assessment of the utility of a third AHW flight test; an assessment of the key technologies that could be demonstrated through a third development test; and, an updated assessment of threat for which the military requirement for this capability was validated.
Amendment Offered by Ms. Sanchez of California and Mr. Larsen of Washington


In the appropriate place in the report, insert the following:

Briefing on number of B61-12 nuclear gravity bombs to be produced

The committee notes the value of providing a credible extended nuclear deterrent to U.S. allies. The committee recognizes that the ongoing B61 Life Extension Program (LEP) will produce B61-12 nuclear gravity bombs to contribute to both extended deterrence and the U.S. strategic deterrent. The committee believes the number of B61-12 bombs to be produced by the LEP must be appropriately sized to meet the requirements of extended and strategic deterrence, and should be informed by geopolitical developments in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere around the world.

The committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, the Commander of U.S. European Command, the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, and the Administrator for Nuclear Security to provide a briefing to the committee by January 15, 2015, on the analysis and requirements that have informed the determination of the number of B61-12 bombs to be produced by the LEP. This briefing should include analysis regarding the number required to provide a credible extended deterrent to U.S. allies around the world, the number required for forward-deployment and to be available for forward-deployment, the number required for the U.S. strategic deterrent, and a timeframe for when a final decision must be made regarding the total number of B61-12s to be produced by the LEP.
AMENDMENT TO H.R. 4435
OFFERED BY MS. LORETTA SANCHEZ OF CALIFORNIA

In section 1634, add at the end the following:

1 (c) TERMINATION.—The requirement in subsection
2 (b) shall terminate on February 5, 2021.

☐
Amendment Offered by Rep. Turner


In the appropriate place in the report, insert the following:

Poland Center of Excellence on Deterrence

The committee is aware that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has successfully built a construct of centers of excellence in member states to strengthen the alliance’s posture by training and educating leaders from NATO member and partner states, develop important doctrines, improve interoperability, identify lessons learned, and test and validate important concepts for alliance security.

The committee is aware of over 18 of these centers—with three more in development—concentrating on subjects ranging from human intelligence to cooperative cyber defense. The committee is also aware that there is no center devoted to nuclear deterrence, including extended deterrence and assurance, or to reducing the risk of nuclear smuggling and nuclear terrorism.

The committee is aware of the robust nuclear weapons modernization program in a state neighboring the alliance, the on-going security crisis in Europe, including concerns about the use of nuclear weapons in escalation control in certain circumstances, invasion of states considered for Alliance membership, arms control violations that could affect the security of Alliance members, and the instances of nuclear smuggling and risk of fissile material theft or diversion in or near-Europe.

Moreover, the committee is aware that it is a central tenet of the May 2012 NATO Deterrence and Defense Posture Review that, "[n]uclear weapons are a core component of NATO's overall capabilities for deterrence and defense alongside conventional and missile defense forces ... As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance."

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to study the utility for NATO of a center of excellence focusing primarily on nuclear deterrence, (including extended deterrence and ensuring compliance with arms control
obligations), missile defense, and reducing the risk of nuclear smuggling and nuclear terrorism and submit a report to the congressional defense committees not later than November 1, 2014. The study should include: a detailed examination of establishing a NATO Center of Excellence-Deterrence (COE-D), which would include a discussion of the notional concept with key allies and potential stakeholders (Allied Command Transformation, NATO Headquarters, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. European Command); development of a notional vision and mission statement, goals and objectives, and organizational chart; propose a timeline for establishment, initial operating capability, final operating capability (accreditation), and provide proposed budget and staffing; development of a notional curriculum; recommendations for physical location and necessary infrastructure; the manner in which the center would meet NATO (Allied Command Transformation) accreditation requirements; and, additional recommendations as appropriate based on the outcome of the study. The committee believes, in discussion with Allies, the study should identify and encourage member states to offer to be the host nation for the COE-D and equitably share the costs of establishing and operating such a center.
AMENDMENT TO H.R. 4435
OFFERED BY MR. TURNER OF OHIO

At the appropriate place in title XVI, insert the following:

SEC. 16. THEATER AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE OF ALLIES OF THE UNITED STATES.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) A Patriot battery of the United States providing a short-range air and missile defense capability has previously been rotationally deployed to Poland, pursuant to an agreement between the United States and the Government of Poland, during a period occurring between 2010 to 2012.

(2) The deployment of the Patriot battery did not include operational missiles and was not replaced with another short-range air and missile defense system upon completion of the deployment rotation in 2012.

(b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States that available short-range air and missile defense systems and terminal missile defense systems of the United States with operational missiles be rotationally deployed to central and eastern European allies, pursuant to agreements...
between the United States and such allies, to strengthen
the air and missile defense capabilities of such allies, as
appropriate.

(c) Aegis Ashore System.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than December 31,
2016, and pursuant to an agreement between the
United States and the Government of Poland, the
Secretary of Defense shall ensure the operational
availability of the Aegis Ashore system site in Po-
land.

(2) RELOCATION OF ASSETS.—The Secretary
may relocate the necessary assets of the Aegis weap-
on system between and within the DDG–51 Class
Destroyer program and the Aegis Ashore program to
meet mission requirements.

(3) BRIEFINGS.—The Secretary shall provide to
the appropriate congressional committees quarterly
briefings to update the status of the progress in car-
ying out paragraph (1).

(4) TRANSFER AUTHORITY.—The Secretary
may use the authority provided under section 1001
to carry out this subsection.

(d) MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITY OF POLAND.—

(1) DEPLOYMENT.—Not later than December
31, 2014, and pursuant to an agreement between
the United States and the Government of Poland, the Secretary of Defense shall deploy to Poland a system providing a short-range air and missile defense capability or terminal missile defense capability, or both, and the personnel required to operate and maintain such system.

(2) REMOVAL.—No action may be taken to effect or implement the removal of the system or the personnel described in paragraph (1) unless—

(A) at least 30 days before the removal, the Secretary of Defense notifies the appropriate congressional committees that such removal is in the national security interests of the United States; or

(B) the removal is requested by the Government of Poland in the manner provided in the agreement between the United States and the Government of Poland regarding the system and personnel.

(e) NOTIFICATION.—The Secretary of Defense shall notify the appropriate congressional committees by not later than 60 days after the date on which a NATO member state makes a request that communicates to the Secretary the interest of the member state in hosting missile
defense capabilities described in subsection (b) and the
plan of the Secretary for addressing such request.

(f) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES Defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means the following:

(1) The congressional defense committees.

(2) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
Amendment Offered by Mr. Larsen of Washington

In the appropriate place in the report, insert the following:

Briefing on Requirements and Gaps for Preserving the Capability to Study the Use of Low-Enriched Uranium for Naval Reactors

The committee notes that the report submitted in January 2014 by the Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, on the potential of using low-enriched uranium (LEU) in place of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) in naval nuclear propulsion systems found that “while it may be feasible to replace HEU fuel with LEU fuel in current U.S. Naval reactor plants, it is not economical or practical to do so.” The report notes that “substituting LEU for HEU would fundamentally decrease reactor energy density, increase lifecycle and operating costs, increase operational radiation exposure, and increase the volume of radioactive wastes.”

The report also states that “recent work has shown that the potential exists to develop an advanced fuel system that could increase uranium loading beyond what is practical today while meeting the rigorous performance requirements for naval reactors” and that “the capability to develop advanced naval fuel resides within a small cadre of highly specialized, experienced, and qualified engineers and scientists.” The report also notes that “the investment to develop a fuel technology and determine its viability is estimated to be up to $2 billion over at least 10 to 15 years.”

The committee directs the Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives by March 1, 2015, on the requirements and costs to maintain the capability to develop an advanced fuel system, including the near-term gaps and investments in research and development that would be required to preserve the technical capability to do so once ongoing new design work is complete.
Log 093

Amendment to HR 4435

Offered by MR. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON

Directive report language

In the appropriate section of the report, insert:

Briefing on funding modernization of the nuclear deterrent

Given the long timeframes and costs associated with programs to modernize the nation’s nuclear deterrent, the committee believes it is imperative that such efforts be based upon sound long-term planning. The nation is embarking upon a decades-long effort to modernize a nuclear deterrent that last saw major recapitalization in the 1980s. These current and future efforts include life extension of nuclear warheads, development and procurement of new delivery systems (ballistic missile submarines, nuclear-capable bombers, dual-capable tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, and ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles), modernization of nuclear command and control systems, and construction of new nuclear infrastructure.

In a 2013 report, the Congressional Budget Office estimated the cost of operating, sustaining, and modernizing the nuclear triad over the next decade at approximately $355.0 billion. While the Department of Defense’s estimate contained in the reports submitted pursuant to section 1043 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81) is lower, the committee notes that this report did not include expected costs for the new bomber or replacement intercontinental ballistic missiles because of uncertainty in these programs’ direction. The committee is pleased that the Department plans to include rough estimates for these costs in its next report, and encourages the Department to make its assumptions clear to enable consistent comparisons between various cost estimates.

The committee is aware that many of the planned nuclear programs are expected to enter service in the 2030s, and is aware of significant production and funding challenges to successfully execute this important recapitalization effort. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees no later than October 31, 2014, on the Department’s process for planning, prioritizing, and estimating costs for sustaining and modernizing the nuclear triad beyond the current 10-year reporting requirement. This briefing should include relevant measures to ensure that these plans are executable and cost-effective, and discussion of the challenges associated with such very-long-term planning.
AMENDMENT TO H.R. 4435
OFFERED BY MR. FORBES OF VIRGINIA

At the appropriate place in subtitle D of title XII, insert the following:

1. SEC. ___. MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION.

   (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

   (1) Admiral Samuel Locklear, Commander of the United States Pacific Command, testified before the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives on March 5, 2014, that in the spring of 2013, North Korea “conducted another underground nuclear test, threatened the use of a nuclear weapon against the United States, and concurrently conducted a mobile missile deployment of an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, reportedly capable of ranging our western most U.S. territory in the Pacific.”;

   (2) General Curtis Scaparrotti, Commander of the United States Forces Korea, testified before such committee on April 2, 2014, that “CFC [Combined Forces Command] is placing special emphasis on missile defense, not only in terms of systems and
capabilities, but also with regard to implementing an
Alliance counter-missile strategy required for our
combined defense.”; and

(3) increased emphasis and cooperation on mis-
sile defense among the United States, Japan, and
the Republic of Korea, enhances the security of al-
lies of the United States in Northeast Asia, in-
creases the defense of forward-based forces of the
United States, and enhances the protection of the
United States.

(b) ASSESSMENT REQUIRED.—The Secretary of De-

fense shall conduct an assessment to identify opportunities
for increasing missile defense cooperation among the
United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, and to
evaluate options for short-range missile, rocket, and artil-
ler y defense capabilities.

(c) ELEMENTS.—The assessment under subsection
(b) shall include the following:

(1) Candidate areas for increasing missile de-
fense cooperation, including greater information
sharing, systems integration, and joint operations.

(2) Potential challenges and limitations to ena-
bling such cooperation and plans for mitigating such
challenges and limitations.
(3) An assessment of the utility of short-range missile defense and counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar system capabilities, including with respect to—

(A) the requirements for such capabilities to meet operational and contingency plan requirements in Northeast Asia;

(B) cost, schedule, and availability;

(C) technology maturity and risk; and

(D) consideration of alternatives.

(d) BRIEFING REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing on the assessment under subsection (b).
AMENDMENT TO H.R. 4435
OFFERED BY MR. COOK OF CALIFORNIA

In section 215(c)(2), insert "satellite weather data" after "commercial".
Amendment Offered by Rep. Doug Lamborn

In the appropriate place in the report, insert the following:

Report on International Agreements Concerning Outer Space Activities

The committee is aware that there are ongoing discussions related to international agreements concerning outer space activities. As noted in section 913 of the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, the committee wants to ensure that any agreements, nonbinding or otherwise, will not have any impact on the ability of the United States to conduct military or intelligence activities in outer space. Therefore, the committee directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide a report to the congressional defense committees, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence by December 1, 2014 on any agreements currently in discussion or being considered, the potential for impact on any DoD or intelligence activities in outer space, and the significance of such impacts. Such report shall be in unclassified form, with a classified portion-marked annex if necessary.

The Secretary of State may submit additional views, and such additional views shall be submitted to the congressional defense committees and the congressional intelligence committees, as well as the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House and Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. Such report shall be in unclassified form, with a classified portion-marked annex if necessary.