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UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the events of January 6, 2021, and the Department’s actions since then to ensure the security of the Capitol Complex.

For the officers of the United States Capitol Police, January 6th, is a date that will live in infamy. Our strength, our determination, and our commitment to the mission of protecting the Democratic process that is the foundation of this country was tested.

Tens of thousands of insurrectionists descended on Capitol Hill causing destruction to property, committing acts of unspeakable violence towards USCP officers and its law enforcement partners, and defiling the U.S. Capitol Building — the symbol of American democracy. It was an ugly battle.

But at the end of the day, the USCP succeeded in its mission. It protected Congressional Leadership. It protected Members. And it protected the Democratic Process. At the end of a battle that lasted for hours, democracy prevailed. It prevailed in part because of the determination and commitment of USCP officers at every level of this Department and the assistance of the Department’s law enforcement partners, such as the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD).

On January 6, 2021, I was the Assistant Chief of Police of the Department’s Protective & Intelligence Operations. The Protective & Intelligence Operations covers specialty law enforcement activities and includes:

- The Dignitary Protection Division, which provides security details for Congressional Leadership;
- The Department’s Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division (IICD), which partners with security and law enforcement agencies to gather information about potential threats to Congress or Members;
- The Department’s Investigations Division, which investigates alleged criminal activity on Capitol Grounds and threats to Members; and
- The Department’s Security Services Bureau, which manages and services the physical security systems the Department uses to protect Capitol Grounds.

As Assistant Chief of Protective & Intelligence Operations, I oversaw all of these operations.

In particular, under my leadership, the Protective & Intelligence Operations recruited John Donohue, a former law enforcement officer with over thirty years’ experience with the New York Police Department, to head the IICD.

Leading up to January 6th, the IICD gathered information about the anticipated events of that day, which came from law enforcement partners such as the FBI and open sources. The
IICD then released reports called “Special Assessments,” which, in part, analyzed the raw information the Department received from these multiple sources and provided the findings of this analysis.

The IICD issued four Special Assessments about the January 6th event. As the event drew nearer, the intelligence landscape, grew clearer. The final Special Assessment issued on January 3rd indicated among other things that:

- Militia members, white supremacists, and other extremist groups would be participating in the January 6th event;
- These groups planned to be armed;
- Unlike previous post-election protests, the targets of demonstrator would not be other branches of government or counter-protesters, but rather Congress and the Joint Session Certification process; and
- Due to the tense political environment following the 2020 election, the threat of disruptive actions or violence cannot be ruled out. Supporters of the current president see January 6, 2021, as the last opportunity to overturn the results of the presidential election. This sense of desperation and disappointment may lead to more of an incentive to become violent.

Based on the assessment, the Department understood that this demonstration would be unlike the previous demonstrations held by protesters with similar ideologies in November and December 2020. The first and second “MAGA marches” were intended to put public pressure on states where vote counting was ongoing and on the Supreme Court to intervene in the election. This event was different because all judicial remedies for opposing election results had been exhausted and the only way for their candidate to win was for Congress to reject the Electoral College results. Thus the scheduled demonstrations were intended to pressure Congress.

The Department’s January 3rd Special Assessment was shared widely throughout the Department. The Special Assessment was emailed to all officers above the rank of Sergeant. The Sergeants’ and Lieutenants’ responsibility was to ensure the information got to rank and file officers. The IICD held intelligence briefings for officers above the rank of Captain to explain the findings and conclusions of the January 3rd Special Assessment and to provide an opportunity for questions.

The Department provided the January 3rd Special Assessment to the House and Senate Sergeants at Arms via email. The Special Assessment was also discussed on a January 4th multi-agency teleconference hosted by MPD and including the United States Park Police, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, FBI, Supreme Court Police, United States Secret Service, and DC Fire & Emergency Medical Services.

The Department also discussed its intelligence as to the January 6th event during a virtual teleconference on January 5th hosted by USCP and attended by security agencies and law enforcement partners to discuss preparations for the inauguration including the MPD, DC

Upon the issuance of the January 3rd Special Assessment and briefings on the Special Assessment, the Department made significant changes to its security posture. Bureaus within the Protective & Intelligence, for example, adjusted operations for the week of January 6th in the following ways:

- Increasing the size of Dignitary Protection details for Members with four agents to six agents and extending coverage for Dignitary Protection details to 24/7 coverage;
- Posting Dignitary Protection Agents at the residence of certain Congressional Leaders and mandating that each Dignitary Protection detail include assault weapons;
- Extending coverage for the Investigations Division and IICD to 24/7 operations; and
- Embedding an analyst from the National Capitol Region Threat Intelligence Consortium (NTIC) with USCP intelligence analysts to ensure the real time sharing of information.

On January 6th, Commanders within the Protective & Intelligence Operations also implemented the following measures:

- Deploying counter surveillance agents early in the morning to observe the crowd at the Ellipse, at metro stations, and other gathering locations in DC;
- Deploying Dignitary Protection agents to the Ellipse in case Members of Congress attending the event encountered a security threat;
- Coordinating with the Department’s Office of Information Systems to intercept the radio frequency used by some demonstration groups and monitoring the communications of those groups; and
- Posting Dignitary Protection agents to evacuation vehicles for Congressional Leadership.

The Department’s Uniformed Operations, led by Assistant Chief Chad Thomas, also adjusted its planning for January 6th in response to the January 3rd Special Assessment. For example, the Department changed its Civil Disturbance Unit (CDU) plan for January 6th in the following ways:

- Increasing the number of CDU platoons for the event from four to seven, including deploying four hard platoons with less lethal munitions such as the pepper ball launcher system and FN-303. The total number of sworn employees assigned to CDU operations increased to 276;
- Changing the scheduled report times for officers within CDU to ensure continuous coverage from 0800 hours on January 6, 2021, through 0400 hours on January 7, 2021;
• Deploying USCP SWAT teams to act as counter-assault ground teams, provide counter-sniper support, and monitor for protesters open carrying or concealing firearms; and

• Enlarging the physical security perimeter to encircle the entire Capitol Square with bike rack manned by officers to keep out unauthorized persons.

The Uniformed Services Bureau, the largest Bureau within Uniformed Operations, which posts uniformed officers in the Capitol Building and the House and Senate office buildings, also revised its operations plans for January 6th. The revised plan included the following enhancements beyond regular operations:

• Placing pre-screener officers at each Member and staff building entrance for House and Senate office buildings;

• Increasing exterior patrols;

• Restricting East Front Plaza access to Members and staff;

• Posting additional officers at the North and South Barricades to facilitate access;

• Posting additional officers at the subways to monitor access to the Capitol;

• Restricting House Wing of the U.S. Capitol building to Members and staff with offices in the Capitol.

Additionally, based on the information in the January 3rd Special Assessment, former USCP Chief of Police Steven Sund requested that the Capitol Police Board declare a state of emergency on January 4th, which would authorize him to request National Guard support for the January 6th event. Chief Sund directed his request to the House and Senate Sergeants at Arms who denied the request, but encouraged Chief Sund to contact the DC National Guard to determine how many Guardsman could be sent to the Capitol on short notice, which he did. Chief Sund was advised by General William Walker that the DC National Guard could quickly repurpose approximately 125 Guardsman from their current mission in DC to deploy to the U.S. Capitol if needed. Chief Sund also coordinated with MPD Acting Chief of Police Robert Contee to guarantee additional support on January 6th.

Despite the adjustment in its operations in response to the January 3rd Special Assessment, the Department was not prepared for the massive groups of violent insurrectionists that descended on the U.S. Capitol’s West Front just before 1:00 p.m. on January 6th. While the Department was prepared to neutralize and remove individuals or groups engaging in civil disobedience or violence among the demonstrators, it was quickly overwhelmed by the thousands of insurrectionists (many armed) who immediately and without provocation began attacking officers, bypassing physical barriers, and refusing to comply with lawful orders. The Department’s preparations were based on the information it gathered from its law enforcement partners like the FBI and others within the intelligence community, none of which indicated that a mass insurrection of this scale would occur at the U.S. Capitol on January 6th.
The Department, which had just over 1200 officers working on Capitol grounds at the time of the attack, fought to hold the insurrectionists back. It did so while also deploying resources to respond to other significant security threats. Just minutes before the insurrectionists arrived on the West Front, the Department was alerted to a pipe bomb at the RNC Headquarters. While investigating the pipe bomb at that location, USCP officers discovered a vehicle with explosive chemicals and a firearm in plain sight. Shortly thereafter, a second pipe bomb was also discovered at the DNC Headquarters. USCP officers facilitated the evacuation of House office buildings located near the pipe bombs and, with the assistance of law enforcement partners, also evacuated residents and businesses in the area. Once the evacuations were complete, the USCP and its law enforcement partners securely detonated the two bombs.

More than one hour after the attack began, the Department’s officers, with the assistance of MPD, continued to hold off insurrectionists on the West Front. However, groups that were on the East Front of the U.S. Capitol began breaking through the barriers on the Plaza. When the East Front Plaza was breached, I directed an immediate lockdown of the U.S. Capitol Building, which means all entrances and exits are sealed, preventing anyone from entering or exiting the building, including police officers. Some of the physical infrastructure of the building, however, gave way to protesters using shields, flag poles, and other objects to break through glass windows and doors.

Once the U.S. Capitol building itself was breached, the Department’s priority was evacuating Members. Our Dignitary Protection Division agents immediately evacuated congressional leadership and took them to a secure location to ensure the continuity of government.

Almost simultaneously, I connected with both the House and Senate Sergeants at Arms to arrange the evacuation of Members from the House and Senate Chambers, as well as the extraction of Members from their offices by USCP personnel.

It was while Members were being evacuated that an insurrectionist was shot by a USCP officer outside of the House Floor. This matter is still undergoing investigation by outside law enforcement.

Once Members were safe, the Department began aiding staff barricaded in offices in the Capitol.

Once Members and staff were safely evacuated, that the Department began clearing the U.S. Capitol floor by floor with the assistance of its law enforcement partners. The Department’s mission was to ensure that the Joint Session would safely resume that evening.

Following the events of January 6th, it has been suggested that the Department either was ignorant of or ignored critical intelligence that indicated that an attack of the magnitude experienced on January 6th was known and probable. This implication simply is not true.

Although the Department’s January 3rd Special Assessment foretold of a significant likelihood for violence on Capitol grounds by extremists groups, it did not identify a specific credible threat indicating that thousands of American citizens would descend upon the U.S. Capitol attacking police officers with the goal of breaking into the U.S. Capitol Building to harm
Members and prevent the certification of Electoral College votes. Nor did the intelligence received from the FBI or any other law enforcement partners include any specific credible threat that thousands of American citizens would attack the U.S. Capitol. Indeed, the United States Secret Service brought the Vice-President to the Capitol for the election certification that day because they were also unaware of any specific credible threat of that magnitude.

Still, once the attack was underway, the Department faced some internal challenges as it concerned our operational response that we have since learned from and are working to correct. For example, we learned that despite the lockdown order simulcast over the radio, a lockdown was not properly executed. Going forward, we will be training on lockdown procedures. We also learned that officers were unsure of when to use lethal force on January 6th. We have provided guidance to officers since January 6th as to when lethal force may be used consistent with the Department’s existing Use of Force policy. The Department will also implement significant training to refresh our officers as to the use of lethal force. We also learned that the Department’s less lethal munitions were not as successful in dispersing insurrectionists in the attack, and we have already begun to diversify our less lethal capabilities. Additionally, the Department recognized that its training largely focuses on keeping unauthorized persons out of buildings on the Capitol Complex and not scenarios in which a building has been breached. The Department will also be developing and pushing out additional training scenarios for our officers.

Our focus since January 6th has been on ensuring the security of the Capitol Complex, improving the flow of intelligence internally and externally, and making sure our officers are supported. In the short term, the Department has hardened the campus by erecting a global non-scalable fence with razor wire. It also increased its manpower by extending the shifts of USCP officers and also adding support from the National Guard.

In the long term, the Department is completing an assessment of the Capitol’s physical securities to ensure any vulnerabilities are identified and addressed. The Department is also working to increase its manpower and ensure that its officers are knowledgeable and fluent in specific security measures.

As it concerns the intelligence it gathers, the Department has already taken steps to facilitate the free flow of information to its law enforcement partners, stakeholders, and its workforce. The Department now holds routine intelligence calls with the FBI and with NTIC. It also has continued to have an NTIC analyst embedded with USCP intelligence analysts. The Department holds daily intelligence briefings with command staff and the House and Senate Sergeants at Arms. The Department also provides routine updates to Congressional leadership and major caucuses, such as the Democratic Caucus, the Republican Caucus, and the Tri-Caucus.

As to the USCP officers that proudly serve the Congressional Community, they fought bravely on January 6th. They held off the attackers long enough for the Department to evacuate the House and Senate Chambers and lead the Members to safety. These officers are heroes.

The attack and the loss of two of our officers in the wake of the attack, Officer Brian Sicknick and Officer Howard Liebengood, may lead to PTSD, low morale, and other stresses. To ensure our officers are supported during this difficult time the Department is providing 24/7
on-site EAP support, including counselors specializing in providing support to law enforcement personnel and their families. We have also made significant progress towards vaccinating all USCP employees.

The attack on the U.S. Capitol on January 6th forever changed how we look at the “People’s House.” By design, the Capitol campus is open and welcoming to visitors. The Capitol Building, until recently, had not been surrounded by global fencing.

And, because it is an open campus, it is very difficult to fortify. Even before September 11, 2001, security experts, including former USCP chiefs of police, argued that more needed to be done to protect the Capitol campus – although I doubt many would have thought it would be necessary to protect it against our own citizens.

The Department is working with the various offices and agencies tasked with documenting the events as they unfolded that day, as well as conducting our own in depth review of the incident, to ensure that accurate, factual and detailed information is provided.

I believe the multiple reviews, after actions, and investigations currently underway will conclude that the Capitol’s security infrastructure must change and that the Department needs access to additional resources – both manpower and physical assets.

We know the eyes of the country and the world are upon us. The U.S. Capitol Police remains steadfast in addressing the new challenges that we face head on. We are committed to protecting and defending this institution that is responsible for safeguarding the freedoms we all hold dear – including the public’s right to exercise their First Amendment rights at the U.S. Capitol.

Once again, I’d like to thank this Committee and the entire Congress for their support of our law enforcement officers.

Thank you.