

# United States Space Force

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Presentation

Before the House Appropriations  
Subcommittee on Defense

## ***Continuing Resolution Impacts Hearing***

Witness Statement of

General John W. "Jay" Raymond  
Chief of Space Operations

January 12, 2022

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## BIOGRAPHY

### UNITED STATES SPACE FORCE

#### John W. "Jay" Raymond

Gen. John W. "Jay" Raymond is the Chief of Space Operations, United States Space Force. As Chief, he serves as the senior uniformed Space Force officer responsible for the organization, training and equipping of all organic and assigned space forces serving in the United States and overseas. Gen. Raymond was commissioned through the ROTC program at Clemson University in 1984. He has commanded at squadron, group, wing, numbered air force, Major Command and Combatant Command levels. Notable staff assignments include serving in the Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Director of Plans, Programs and Analyses at Air Force Space Command; the Director of Plans and Policy (J5), U.S. Strategic Command; and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Force. Gen. Raymond deployed to Southwest Asia as Director of Space Forces in support of operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Prior to leading establishment of the U.S. Space Force and serving as the first Chief of Space Operations, Gen. Raymond led the re-establishment of U.S. Space Command as the eleventh U.S. combatant command.



#### EDUCATION

- 1984 Bachelor of Science, Administrative Management, Clemson University, Clemson, S.C.
- 1990 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.
- 1990 Master of Science, Administrative Management, Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant
- 1997 Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
- 2003 Master of Arts, National Security and Strategic Studies, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.
- 2007 Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.
- 2011 Combined Force Air Component Commander Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
- 2012 Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

#### ASSIGNMENTS

1. 1985–1989, Minuteman Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Crew Commander; Alternate Command Post; Flight Commander and Instructor Crew Commander; and Missile Procedures Trainer Operator, 321st Strategic Missile Wing, Grand Forks Air Force Base, N.D.
2. 1989–1993, Operations Center Officer Controller, 1st Strategic Aerospace Division, and Executive Officer, 30th Space Wing, Vandenberg AFB, Calif.
3. 1993–1996, Chief, Commercial Space Lift Operations, Assistant Chief, Current Operations Branch, Headquarters Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.
4. 1996–1996, Deputy Director, Commander in Chief's Action Group, Headquarters AFSPC, Peterson AFB, Colo.
5. 1996–1997, Student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
6. 1997–1998, Space and Missile Force Programmer, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.
7. 1998–2000, Chief, Expeditionary Aerospace Force Space and Program Integration, Expeditionary Aerospace Force Implementation Division, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.
8. 2000–2001, Commander, 5th Space Surveillance Squadron, RAF Feltwell, United Kingdom
9. 2001–2002, Deputy Commander, 21st Operations Group, Peterson AFB, Colo.

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10. 2002–2003, Student, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.
11. 2003–2005, Transformation Strategist, Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.
12. 2005–2007, Commander, 30th Operations Group, Vandenberg AFB, Calif. (September 2006– January 2007, Director of Space Forces, Combined Air Operations Center, Southwest Asia)
13. 2007–2009, Commander, 21st Space Wing, Peterson AFB, Colo.
14. 2009–2010, Director of Plans, Programs and Analyses, Headquarters AFSPC, Peterson AFB, Colo.
15. 2010–2012, Vice Commander, Fifth Air Force, and Deputy Commander, 13th Air Force, Yokota Air Base, Japan
16. 2012–2014, Director of Plans and Policy (J5), U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Neb.
17. 2014–2015, Commander, Fourteenth Air Force (Air Forces Strategic), AFSPC, and Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Space, U.S. Strategic Command, Vandenberg AFB, Calif.
18. 2015–2016, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.
19. 2016–2019, Commander, AFSPC, Peterson AFB, Colo.
20. 2017–2019, Commander, Joint Force Space Component Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.
21. 2019–2020, Commander, U.S. Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.
22. 2019–present, Chief of Space Operations, U.S. Space Force, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.

## **SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS**

1. 2003–2005, Transformation Strategist, Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Arlington, Va., as a colonel
2. 2012–2014, Director of Plans and Policy (J5), U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Neb., as a major general
3. 2017–2019, Commander, Joint Force Space Component Command, Peterson AFB, Colo., as a general
4. 2019–2020, Commander, U.S. Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo., as a general

## **MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS**

Defense Distinguished Service Medal  
Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster  
Defense Superior Service Medal with oak leaf cluster  
Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster  
Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters  
Air Force Commendation Medal  
French Order of Merit

## **OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS**

2007 General Jerome F. O'Malley Distinguished Space Leadership Award, Air Force Association  
2015 Thomas D. White Space Award, Air Force Association  
2016 Peter B. Teets Government Award, National Defense Industrial Association  
2017 James V. Hartinger Award, National Defense Industrial Association

## **EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION**

Lieutenant July 20, 1984  
First Lieutenant July 20, 1986  
Captain July 20, 1988  
Major July 1, 1996  
Lieutenant Colonel July 1, 1999  
Colonel July 1, 2004  
Brigadier General Aug. 1, 2009  
Major General May 4, 2012  
Lieutenant General Jan. 31, 2014  
General Oct. 25, 2016

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In the two short years since we established the Space Force as an independent service, our Nation's Guardians have been hard at work to deliver new warfighting capabilities that will deter adversaries, defend our interests, and ensure advantage for the joint force and our allies in conflict. Recent events such as the Russian anti-satellite weapon test, which generated thousands of pieces of long-lasting debris, and China's demonstration of a hypersonic glide vehicle on a fractional orbital trajectory highlight the urgency and criticality of our task. Competitors know well that our nation depends on space to enhance all instruments of power in peace or war. They are rapidly building space capabilities for their own advantage, while expanding their ability to attack our space-based capabilities that underpin deterrence and act as a force multiplier for joint and coalition warfighters.

To ensure our advantage in space now and in the future, we are delivering new, resilient force designs that bolster deterrence and provide the joint force a decisive advantage should deterrence fail. The Space Force is uniquely dependent on increasing appropriations because we must rapidly field new warfighting capabilities and functions that did not exist when space was treated as a benign domain. We are in a competition with China and Russia, where the stakes are access to, freedom of action in, and stability and security of a domain that every American depends on daily and every warfighter relies on to successfully accomplish their mission; we cannot afford risks imposed by a yearlong continuing resolution (CR). For the Space Force, those risks fall into three categories: establishment of organize, train, and equip functions; mission readiness; and modernizing for resilience.

### **Unique Impact to Establishment of Vital Organize, Train, and Equip Functions**

Enhancing unity of effort, reducing bureaucracy and redundancy, and fielding new capabilities were central to the rationale for creating the Space Force. A yearlong CR would

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delay our ability to unify and consolidate space missions from other Services by delaying the transfer of the Army's 53<sup>rd</sup> Signals Battalion and the Navy's Narrowband Satellite Operations Center into the Space Force, negatively impacting readiness gains that will be achieved by consolidation.

As a new service, the Space Force would be particularly impacted by limits on new starts imposed by a yearlong CR. Such action would eliminate \$37M in Research, Development, Test, and Engineering (RDT&E) funding needed to design resilient architectures in multiple mission areas, including space data transport; missile warning and tracking; communications; and tactical ISR. It would eliminate \$23M for the Commercial Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Office that allows the Space Force to update and consolidate Department of Defense acquisition of commercial SATCOM services and leverage innovative services available from that sector. Finally, it would delay the transfer of resources needed for space intelligence activity to support both acquisition and operations.

### **Mission Readiness Impacts**

The Space Force relies on the Air Force for many programs to take care of Guardians and their families, in order to minimize duplication and maximize efficient use of resources. A yearlong CR would withhold funding for Department of the Air Force programs, including those that address violence and self-harm prevention, as well as programs that provide diversity training and scholarships. A yearlong CR would reduce our ability to access the talent and impact programs designed to enhance resilience of Guardians, as well as their families.

A yearlong CR would have a significant negative impact on our ability to generate ready Guardians. We would be forced to curtail or delay planned large-scale training exercises, with significant negative effects on mission readiness against our greatest threats. A yearlong CR

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would slow the establishment of new capabilities such as the National Space Test and Training Complex, which will support operational test, tactics development, and tactics validation against threat-representative aggressors. We would also delay or cancel planned throughput enhancements at advanced training and contractor-provided training, and delay development of new Space Fundamentals and Guardian Orientation course curricula, negatively affecting the integration of inter-service transfers and accessions.

While FY21 appropriations levels met 85% of weapons systems sustainment requirements, introduction of new systems means that a yearlong CR would reduce our FY22 weapons systems sustainment to just 75% of requirements. This would force inefficient incremental funding for mission-critical requirements and defer obsolescence solutions, software maintenance, and cybersecurity updates.

Finally, a yearlong CR would prohibit the transfer of facility sustainment, restoration, and maintenance funds for 14 Space Force installations from the Air Force, delaying normalization of oversight and accountability for key space operations facilities to the Space Force.

### **Modernizing for Resilience**

Under a yearlong CR, the Space Force would see impacts across our efforts to modernize our capabilities. The largest impact in the procurement account would be in the National Security Space Launch program, which ensures access to space, promotes competition, and eliminates reliance on Russian-made rocket engines. Under the CR, we would be limited to the same number of launch services from FY21—three—when we are planning to procure five. A yearlong CR would delay these launches by one year, slowing our ability to place previously acquired systems on orbit as well as deferring our ability to realize the benefit and cost-savings of NSSL Phase 2 launch services agreements.

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As our adversaries are accelerating, a shortfall of \$700M to planned investment in RDT&E would slow numerous programs designed to field more resilient and defensible architectures; protect the joint force from adversary use of space capabilities in conflict; and build a lean, agile, and combat-effective digital service. Specifically, a yearlong CR would affect resilient missile warning and missile tracking; space domain awareness to enable effective protect-and-defend architecture; protected satellite communications; and precision, navigation, and timing systems that meet Joint warfighter needs in contested environments.

In the missile warning and missile tracking mission areas, a yearlong CR would result in a shortfall of \$130M in RDT&E for the Next Generation OPIR program. This would delay replacement of the legacy systems for missile warning that are increasingly challenged to detect modern missile and hypersonic threats.

Additionally, in our space domain awareness portfolio, a yearlong CR would significantly slow development of the Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability that is vital to tracking potential space-based threats and protecting our high-value assets on orbit.

Our satellite communications modernization efforts would also slow. A yearlong CR would result in a 20% shortfall for Protected Tactical SATCOM and new-start restrictions on the Protected Tactical Enterprise System, delaying our ability to provide the warfighter secure wideband communications solutions in contested environments by at least a year. In the narrowband mission area, a yearlong CR would prohibit the transfer of the Multi User Objective System from the Navy to the Space Force and delay our efforts to begin a service life extension program of two additional satellites. In addition to deferring enhancements for tactical SATCOM systems, a yearlong CR would impact RDT&E enhancements that will delay Evolved Strategic

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SATCOM and follow-on narrowband strategic communications solutions that ensure advantage into the next decade.

In the position, navigation, and timing mission area, impacts occur across the entire GPS enterprise. A yearlong CR would drive delays to fielding GPS III and GPS III F satellites; delivering the Next Generation Operational Control System for enhanced command and control; and integrating new Military GPS User Equipment. The result would be a reduction in our overall resilience, leaving warfighters more vulnerable to GPS-degraded environments.

In addition to impacts outlined above, a yearlong CR would reduce over \$800M in RDT&E funds for classified operational systems, details of which could be discussed in a separate forum.

### **Conclusion**

An extended continuing resolution would undoubtedly have negative impacts across the entirety of the joint force, but the effects on the Space Force are particularly acute. We have been charged to not only establish a new service, but to ensure our Nation has enduring advantage and security in a new warfighting domain. A yearlong continuing resolution would seriously compromise the Space Force's ability to enhance unity of effort and efficiency; generate mission ready forces; and deliver the resilient architectures we need in the space domain.